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feat(sdk): DSPX-4495 remove 64GiB TDF limit, use counter-based payload IVs (DSP… - #393

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@sujankota

@sujankota sujankota commented Aug 27, 2026 •

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Removes MAX_TDF_INPUT_SIZE (68719476736) and the size check in createTDF. That constant was GCM's per-invocation plaintext limit (2^39-256 bits) misapplied to the whole TDF input; each segment is its own invocation and is capped at 4MiB by Config.MAX_SEGMENT_SIZE, so the bound was never relevant. SDK.DataSizeNotSupported is retained as public API but is no longer thrown.

Replaces the random per-segment AES-GCM nonce with a deterministic unsigned 96-bit big-endian counter (TDF.IvCounter). NIST SP 800-38D prefers the deterministic construction; the RBG-based one it replaces carries a birthday bound that a counter does not have.

Metadata is encrypted with the per-split symKey while the payload uses the XOR of all split keys, so with a single key split the two are the same key. IV 0 is therefore reserved for the metadata and payload segments start at IV 1.

The counter enforces the SP 800-38D 8.3 cap of 2^32 invocations per key and refuses to wrap, so an IV can never be issued twice. Neither limit is reachable in practice - at the 16KiB minimum segment size the cap is 64TiB of input - but the invariant now holds by construction rather than by assumption.

Every segment is still prefixed with its 12-byte IV, so the wire format is unchanged and existing TDFs continue to decrypt.

Summary by CodeRabbit

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • New Features

    • TDF creation supports inputs spanning many segments.
    • Added reliable ZIP64 support for reading and writing large archives.
    • Encryption uses sequential IV allocation with safeguards against reuse.
  • Bug Fixes

    • Improved handling of large ZIP offsets, sizes, and entry metadata.
    • Added stricter AES-GCM validation for IV and authentication tag sizes.
  • Documentation

    • Clarified that the data-size exception is deprecated, never thrown, and retained for legacy compatibility.

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sujankota requested review from a team as code owners August 27, 2026 21:35
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  • sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java
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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The SDK now uses bounded deterministic AES-GCM IV allocation, validates AES-GCM inputs, deprecates DataSizeNotSupported, and improves ZIP64 writing and reading. Tests cover IV uniqueness, large TDF input, ZIP64 boundaries, unsigned fields, and round trips.

Changes

TDF encryption contract

Layer / File(s) Summary
Bounded IV counter and encryption wiring
sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDF.java
IvCounter issues bounded 96-bit IVs. Metadata uses IV 0. Payload segments use sequential IVs and GCM tag-based size calculations.
AES-GCM parameter and exception contract
sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/AesGcm.java
AES-GCM validates 12-byte IVs and 16-byte tags. Encryption and decryption failures use SDKException.
TDF compatibility documentation and validation
sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/SDK.java, sdk/src/test/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDFTest.java
DataSizeNotSupported is deprecated. Tests cover IV bounds, concurrency, segment handling, IV separation, and fresh payload keys.

ZIP64 archive support

Layer / File(s) Summary
ZIP64 writing and TDF writer seam
sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipWriter.java, sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDFWriter.java
ZipWriter selects ZIP64 entries at a configurable threshold and guards non-ZIP64 field limits.
Unsigned ZIP and ZIP64 parsing
sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java
ZipReader parses unsigned ZIP fields and ZIP64 extra fields. It validates local-header offsets and single-byte reads.
ZIP64 round-trip validation
sdk/src/test/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipWriterTest.java, sdk/src/test/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReaderTest.java, sdk/src/test/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDFWriterTest.java
Tests cover ZIP64 output, bounds, entry-count sentinels, CRC calculation, parsing, and TDF round trips.

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 6ed40

The PR replaces the whole-input size limit with larger ZIP64-capable processing and deterministic payload IVs. ZIP64 inputs may still silently omit entries in a specific sentinel combination, while untrusted callers can now drive much larger resource usage and receive partial output on failure. These bounded correctness and availability risks should be fixed or explicitly accepted before merge.

Suggested reviewers: biscoe916

Poem

A rabbit counts IVs in line,
And packs ZIP64 fields just fine.
Zero guards the metadata door,
Payloads count from one and more,
Bounds keep every byte in time.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Docstring Coverage ⚠️ Warning Docstring coverage is 33.78% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 74 functions across 10 files. Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly identifies the SDK changes: removing the 64 GiB TDF limit and introducing counter-based payload IVs.
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
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dmihalcik-virtru self-requested a review September 1, 2026 17:58

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.

⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java (1)

133-135: 🎯 Functional Correctness | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win

Detect ZIP64 when an EOCD entry-count field has its sentinel.

Line 133 checks only offsetToStartOfCentralDirectory. A valid ZIP64 archive can use the 0xFFFF entry-count sentinel while its central-directory offset remains below 4 GiB. This path returns the sentinel count instead of reading the ZIP64 EOCD record, so ZipReader omits entries after that count.

Check the entry-count and central-directory-size sentinels before returning the non-ZIP64 record.

Proposed fix
-        if (offsetToStartOfCentralDirectory != ZIP64_MAGICVAL) {
+        if (totalNumEntries != ZIP64_MAGIC_SHORT
+                && sizeOfCentralDirectory != ZIP64_MAGICVAL
+                && offsetToStartOfCentralDirectory != ZIP64_MAGICVAL) {
             return new CentralDirectoryRecord(totalNumEntries, offsetToStartOfCentralDirectory);
         }
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In `@sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java` around lines 133 -
135, Update the ZIP64 detection condition in ZipReader so it checks the EOCD
entry-count and central-directory-size sentinel fields, in addition to
offsetToStartOfCentralDirectory, before returning CentralDirectoryRecord. When
any sentinel is present, continue to the ZIP64 EOCD parsing path; otherwise
preserve the existing non-ZIP64 return behavior.
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Inline comments:
In `@sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDF.java`:
- Around line 155-158: Update the package-private IvCounter constructor to
reject firstInvocation values below FIRST_PAYLOAD_INVOCATION, preserving the
existing validation for other invalid values. Add a test that verifies a
zero-start counter is rejected.

---

Outside diff comments:
In `@sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java`:
- Around line 133-135: Update the ZIP64 detection condition in ZipReader so it
checks the EOCD entry-count and central-directory-size sentinel fields, in
addition to offsetToStartOfCentralDirectory, before returning
CentralDirectoryRecord. When any sentinel is present, continue to the ZIP64 EOCD
parsing path; otherwise preserve the existing non-ZIP64 return behavior.
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📒 Files selected for processing (9)
  • sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/AesGcm.java
  • sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/SDK.java
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  • sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDFWriter.java
  • sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java
  • sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipWriter.java
  • sdk/src/test/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDFTest.java
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  • sdk/src/test/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipWriterTest.java

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Comment thread sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/TDF.java
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Comment thread sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java
@dmihalcik-virtru
dmihalcik-virtru force-pushed the feat/tdf3-size-64gb-limit branch from 045c119 to da60a74 Compare September 2, 2026 12:39
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Comment thread sdk/src/main/java/io/opentdf/platform/sdk/ZipReader.java
pflynn-virtru
pflynn-virtru previously approved these changes Sep 2, 2026
@pflynn-virtru

pflynn-virtru commented Sep 2, 2026 •

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(AI generated below, unvetted)
Removing MAX_TDF_INPUT_SIZE leaves nothing bounding the manifest, which is assembled in memory. A 64 GiB input at Config.MIN_SEGMENT_SIZE (16 KiB) produces ~4.19M Manifest.Segment objects plus a gson.toJson string of roughly 90 chars each — well over 2 GB across the segment list, the JSON String, and its UTF-8 byte copy. On a default heap that dies with OutOfMemoryError at gson.toJson(...) after the entire payload has already been streamed to outputStream. Previously the same input threw DataSizeNotSupported before writing anything.

Two suggestions, one cheap and one optional.

1. Bound the segment count. The input is an InputStream, so there's no size to pre-check — but you can fail deterministically instead of via OutOfMemoryError. A constant next to MAX_GCM_INVOCATIONS_PER_KEY:

/**
 * The manifest holds one record per segment and is assembled in memory, so the segment count
 * is bounded well below {@link #MAX_GCM_INVOCATIONS_PER_KEY}. At the default segment size this
 * is 4 TiB of payload; a caller who hits it should raise the segment size rather than lower it.
 */
static final int MAX_SEGMENTS = 1 << 21;

and a check at the segments.add(segmentInfo) in createTDF:

var segments = tdfObject.manifest.encryptionInformation.integrityInformation.segments;
if (segments.size() >= MAX_SEGMENTS) {
    throw new SDKException("exceeded the maximum of " + MAX_SEGMENTS
            + " segments; increase the segment size for payloads this large");
}
segments.add(segmentInfo);

SDKException rather than reviving DataSizeNotSupported — it matches how IvCounter reports its bound, and keeps the story clean: no fixed input-size limit, but there is a segment-count limit. SDK.java would need a word change, since that bound stops being "practical rather than fixed."

Sizing: 2^21 covers 4 TiB at the 2 MiB default and 8 TiB at MAX_SEGMENT_SIZE. It does reject 64 GiB at MIN_SEGMENT_SIZE (4.19M segments) — deliberately, since that's the config that OOMs today, and a clear exception pointing at the segment size beats dying at gson.toJson after the whole payload is on the wire.

2. Stream the manifest (optional, later). The manifest is written after the payload, and ZipWriter already has a stream() path, so a gson JsonWriter writing straight into the entry would drop the intermediate String and its UTF-8 byte[] — roughly a 3x cut in peak memory, leaving only the segment list. Bigger change, and I haven't checked whether anything downstream needs the serialized manifest bytes, so the ceiling is the one worth landing first.

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yeah, I filed https://virtru.atlassian.net/browse/DSPX-4584 for the streaming issue - I suspect Java isn't the only SDK which will suffer from this or a similar issue.

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sujankota and others added 6 commits September 3, 2026 11:18
…X-4495)

Removes MAX_TDF_INPUT_SIZE (68719476736) and the size check in createTDF.
That constant was GCM's per-invocation plaintext limit (2^39-256 bits)
misapplied to the whole TDF input; each segment is its own invocation and is
capped at 4MiB by Config.MAX_SEGMENT_SIZE, so the bound was never relevant.
SDK.DataSizeNotSupported is retained as public API but is no longer thrown.

Replaces the random per-segment AES-GCM nonce with a deterministic unsigned
96-bit big-endian counter (TDF.IvCounter). NIST SP 800-38D prefers the
deterministic construction; the RBG-based one it replaces carries a birthday
bound that a counter does not have.

Metadata is encrypted with the per-split symKey while the payload uses the XOR
of all split keys, so with a single key split the two are the same key. IV 0 is
therefore reserved for the metadata and payload segments start at IV 1.

The counter enforces the SP 800-38D 8.3 cap of 2^32 invocations per key and
refuses to wrap, so an IV can never be issued twice. Neither limit is reachable
in practice - at the 16KiB minimum segment size the cap is 64TiB of input - but
the invariant now holds by construction rather than by assumption.

Every segment is still prefixed with its 12-byte IV, so the wire format is
unchanged and existing TDFs continue to decrypt.

Signed-off-by: sujan kota <sujankota@gmail.com>
The manifest is appended after the payload, so in a TDF over 2 GiB its
central directory offset didn't fit in a 32-bit field. ZipWriter narrowed
it with an unchecked (int) cast, so createTDF reported success and wrote a
file loadTDF could not read. Pre-existing, but this branch removes the
64 GiB cap that had been hiding it above 2 GiB.

- ZipWriter marks byte-array entries zip64 when the offset or size exceeds
  MAX_NON_ZIP64_VALUE, and fails loud rather than truncating an entry that
  wasn't marked. The threshold is Integer.MAX_VALUE rather than the
  0xFFFFFFFE the format allows: the fields are unsigned on the wire, but
  readers that widen them with a signed read see 2 GiB as negative.
- ZipReader reads the 32- and 16-bit header fields unsigned, with the
  zip64 sentinels moved in lockstep, and rejects an out-of-range local
  header offset instead of throwing a raw IllegalArgumentException.
- Both sides write and read the zip64 extra field in APPNOTE 4.5.3 order.
  A no-op for STORED entries, where original and compressed size are
  equal; correct now for a compressed entry from another writer.

Archives below 2 GiB are byte-identical to before, verified by writing the
same archive with the pre-change and post-change writer.

Also on the crypto path this branch touches:

- IvCounter is a single long bounded at construction by
  MAX_GCM_INVOCATIONS_PER_KEY, so no caller can configure a counter that
  reaches 2^96 and wraps onto the metadata IV, and next() is synchronized.
- The MAX_GCM_INVOCATIONS_PER_KEY javadoc no longer mis-cites SP 800-38D
  section 8.3, whose 2^32 limit is scoped to RBG-based or non-96-bit IVs
  and does not bind here. 2^32 is kept as a conservative ceiling.
- AesGcm.encrypt validates the IV and tag lengths, and reports encryption
  failures as SDKException("error gcm encrypt") rather than
  RuntimeException("error gcm decrypt").
- SDK.DataSizeNotSupported is deprecated for removal. It extends
  RuntimeException, so a downstream catch still compiles and never runs.

Tests: zip64 round-trips through a lowered-threshold seam so the real path
runs in CI in milliseconds; the disabled 7-8 GB test now appends an entry
after the big stream, which is what would have caught this. The two
reflection-based IV tests are replaced with behavioral ones, including the
single-split case the metadata IV reservation exists to protect.
…ount sentinel

The package-private IvCounter constructor accepted firstInvocation 0, the
invocation reserved for the metadata. With a single key split the metadata
and payload keys are the same key, so a counter started there would reuse
an AES-GCM IV. Require FIRST_PAYLOAD_INVOCATION instead.

ZipReader decided an archive was zip64 by looking only at the central
directory offset sentinel. An archive with more than 65,535 entries needs
zip64 for its entry count alone while its central directory still starts
below 4 GiB; on such an archive the reader took the non-zip64 path, believed
there were 65,535 entries, and walked off the end of the central directory.
Check every sentinel-bearing field.

Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
The segment size addition ran in int arithmetic before widening to long
(java:S2184), which is the one reliability finding failing the quality
gate. Also adds the missing @deprecated tag on DataSizeNotSupported
(java:S1123), drops an import left unused by the test changes
(java:S1128), and uses the AssertJ size assertions (java:S5838).

Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
Pure refactor, no behavior change. getData was doing three things: checking
the entry's local header offset, parsing the header, and building the
InputStream over the entry's bytes. The first two move into private helpers
on Entry, which also drops getData back under the cognitive complexity limit
that the offset check pushed it over.

Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
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dmihalcik-virtru force-pushed the feat/tdf3-size-64gb-limit branch from 905227a to 6ed40df Compare September 3, 2026 15:18
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@dmihalcik-virtru
dmihalcik-virtru merged commit 98c839e into main Sep 3, 2026
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dmihalcik-virtru deleted the feat/tdf3-size-64gb-limit branch September 3, 2026 16:18
dmihalcik-virtru pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 17, 2026
🤖 I have created a release *beep* *boop*
---


<details><summary>0.19.0</summary>

##
[0.19.0](v0.18.0...v0.19.0)
(2026-09-14)


### Features

* **sdk:** DSPX-4495 remove 64GiB TDF limit, use counter-based payload
IVs (DSP… ([#393](#393))
([98c839e](98c839e))
* **sdk:** resolve attribute key splits via GetKeyMappingsByFqns during
encrypt ([#392](#392))
([152a115](152a115))


### Bug Fixes

* **sdk:** reject GMAC root signatures on read (DSPX-4703)
([#401](#401))
([7191d05](7191d05))
</details>

---
This PR was generated with [Release
Please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please). See
[documentation](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please#release-please).

Co-authored-by: opentdf-automation[bot] <149537512+opentdf-automation[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
dmihalcik-virtru added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2026
…, and UTF-8 entry names (#398)

Jira: https://virtru.atlassian.net/browse/DSPX-4589

This PR carries everything left of DSPX-4589 now that #397 has merged.
#396 is closed as a duplicate.

It started as three zip container conformance findings from an audit
against PKWARE APPNOTE.TXT. Review turned up more reader hardening,
which is also here. None of it has known field impact; the one finding
that did is #397.

## Release note

> **Behavior change:** `ZipReader` now looks for the end of central
directory record only in the last 22 + 65,535 bytes of the archive,
which is the most a zip comment can push it back. An archive with more
than 64 KiB of data appended *after* the record (not a comment) used to
read and is now rejected with `InvalidZipException`. Zip64 archives with
trailing data never read correctly before and now do. Truncated archives
and entries now fail with `InvalidZipException` rather than being
accepted or returning short data. An archive whose central directory
does not end exactly where the record after it starts (the zip64 end of
central directory record if there is one, otherwise the end of central
directory record) is rejected; every writer we know of, this SDK's
included, writes them back to back.

## Public API note

`InvalidZipException` is unchecked (it extends `RuntimeException`). Two
places that used to report truncation through `IOException` now throw it
instead:
- `new ZipReader(channel)` and `readCentralDirectoryFileHeader()` throw
`InvalidZipException` for a filename cut short, where they used to throw
`EOFException`.
- An entry's `InputStream` throws `InvalidZipException` when the archive
ends before the entry does, where it used to return `-1` early.

Callers that catch only `IOException` around these will now see an
unchecked exception. Inside the SDK, `SDK.isTDF` already catches both.
#418 wraps the manifest and payload cases in `TDFReader` as
`SDK.MalformedTDFException`.

## Writer

### End of central directory sentinel thresholds (fixed)

`ZipWriter.finish()` decided whether the archive needed a zip64 end of
central directory record with masks that matched none of the field
widths:

```java
(numEntries & ~0xFF) != 0 || (startOfCentralDirectory & ~0xFFFF) != 0 || (sizeOfCentralDirectory & ~0xFFFF) != 0
```

Any archive with 256 or more entries was needlessly promoted to zip64,
and the offset and size checks fired three orders of magnitude too
early. Now:

```java
var isZip64 = hasZip64Entry
        || numEntries > MAX_NON_ZIP64_ENTRY_COUNT          // Short.MAX_VALUE
        || needsZip64(startOfCentralDirectory, sizeOfCentralDirectory);
```

All three thresholds stop short of what the format allows (`0xFFFE`
entries, `0xFFFFFFFE` bytes), so that a reader widening these unsigned
fields with a signed read never sees a negative value. Released versions
of this SDK do exactly that: an entry count above 32,767 would come back
negative and read as an empty archive. So an archive goes zip64 at
32,768 entries, and at the same 2 GiB (`Integer.MAX_VALUE`) offset/size
ceiling the per-entry fields already use. Routing offset and size
through `needsZip64` also keeps the `ZipWriter(out, maxNonZip64Value)`
test seam from #393 usable for them. Whenever the writer goes zip64 it
sets the offset sentinel too, which is the only one older readers check.

### UTF-8 entry names

The ticket says the central directory filename length was computed from
`String.length()`. The assignment existed (`cdFileHeader.filenameLength
= (short) fileInfo.filename.length();`), but `CDFileHeader.write()`
never read it: it wrote the length of the encoded byte array. The local
header's copy was set from the encoded bytes too. **The bytes on the
wire were already correct**; no archive was ever mis-written.

What changed:
- The dead `filenameLength` field in `CDFileHeader` is gone, and
`LocalFileHeader` now takes its length from the encoded bytes it writes,
like `CDFileHeader` does.
- A new `encodeFilename` helper rejects a name over `Short.MAX_VALUE`
UTF-8 bytes with an `SDKException` rather than silently truncating it
into the 2-byte field. The cap is `Short.MAX_VALUE` rather than `0xFFFF`
for the same signed-read reason as above: older SDK readers read the
name length as signed. Validation runs before anything is written, so a
rejected name leaves the writer usable.
- `data()` entries now set the UTF-8 flag (general purpose bit 11) in
the local header as well as the central directory. It was previously set
only in the central directory, so readers that go by the local header
could garble non-ASCII names. `stream()` entries already set it in both.

## Reader

- **End of central directory scan.** A short read used to be treated as
a signature match. The scan now:
- only matches a real signature, and throws `InvalidZipException` if it
finds none;
- is bounded to the last 22 + 0xFFFF bytes (see the release note).
Previously it was unbounded, doing a positioned 4-byte read per byte
back to the start of the file;
- skips any candidate whose declared comment would run past the end of
the archive. That rejects a record whose comment was truncated. Trailing
data after an honest comment is still allowed;
- skips any candidate whose central directory does not end exactly where
the next record starts: the zip64 end of central directory record if
there is one (including one written without sentinels, as
commons-compress does), otherwise the candidate itself. This is what
passes over a stray `PK\5\6` inside a comment or in trailing data whose
declared comment happens to fit, such as a zero-filled one, which used
to read as an empty archive. If no candidate passes, the failure of the
one nearest the end is reported.
- **Zip64 locator.** The locator is found relative to the end of central
directory record it precedes (APPNOTE 4.3.15), not relative to the end
of the file. This is what makes zip64 archives with trailing data
readable. An archive too small to hold the locator it claims is
rejected.
- **Bounds checks.** Offsets taken from the archive (the zip64 end of
central directory pointer and the central directory offset) are checked
against the archive size, and so is the entry count: a negative or
impossibly large zip64 count is rejected instead of reading as an empty
archive. So is a zip64 entry size or central directory size that reads
as a negative `long`; a negative entry size used to read as an empty
entry.
- **Short and empty reads.** Every fixed-width read loops until it is
full. `ReadableByteChannel.read` may return fewer bytes than asked, or
none at all, without being at end of stream; only `-1` is end of file.
Empty reads are retried at most 16 times in a row, without waiting, and
then fail with an `IOException` that names the channel class. So a
channel with nothing to give can't make the reader spin, but `ZipReader`
needs a blocking channel; non-blocking channels are not supported.
`loadTDF` takes caller-supplied channels, so this is reachable from the
public API.
- **Truncation is always an error.** Entry data that runs past the end
of the archive now throws `InvalidZipException` instead of ending the
stream early with a short entry. A filename cut short throws
`InvalidZipException` instead of `EOFException`.
`InputStream.read(byte[], int, int)` no longer returns 0 for a non-empty
request.
- Error messages name the record, offset and bytes found. The locator
signature error used to name the wrong record. A bad local file header
signature now names the entry and offset.

## Tests

30 new tests:

**`ZipWriterTest`** (6)
- One test per end of central directory sentinel:
- entry count: `Short.MAX_VALUE` stays non-zip64 and `Short.MAX_VALUE +
1` goes zip64, both round-tripped through `ZipReader`;
  - central directory offset;
  - central directory size.

Each is isolated so that only the end of central directory record is
zip64 and no entry is.
- `filenameLengthIsMeasuredInUtf8Bytes` writes `"🔒両.txt"` (7 UTF-16 code
units, 11 UTF-8 bytes). It checks the length at both header offsets and
the UTF-8 flag in both headers.
- `rejectsAnEntryNameTooLongToDescribe` covers the boundary: a
32,767-byte name is accepted and reads back, and 32,768 bytes is
rejected on both the `data()` and `stream()` paths. It also checks that
the writer still works after a rejection and that the result has exactly
one entry.
- `streamedEntryNameIsMeasuredInUtf8Bytes` round-trips a non-ASCII name
through `stream()`, the path a TDF payload takes, with both `ZipReader`
and commons-compress. The 32,768-entry archive is also opened with
commons-compress.

**`ZipReaderTest`** (24)

Truncated or malformed trailing records:
- truncated archives (four shapes) and an archive too short for its
zip64 locator;
- an end of central directory record pushed past the comment limit is
rejected;
- a zip64 archive with the longest possible comment (0xFFFF bytes) still
reads;
- a decoy signature inside the comment is skipped, both one whose
declared comment runs past the end and one whose comment fits:
zero-filled, a copy of the real record, and a copy claiming one entry,
each in a roomy comment, a comment it fills exactly, and trailing data,
on plain and zip64 archives;
- a truncated comment is rejected.

Bounds checks:
- a zip64 locator pointer outside the archive;
- a zip64 central directory offset outside the archive;
- a plain (non-zip64) central directory offset outside the archive;
- a negative or impossibly large zip64 entry count;
- a zip64 entry size, and a zip64 central directory size, that read as
negative;
- an end of central directory record that claims zip64 with no locator
in front of it;
- a zip64 locator that points inside the archive, but at the wrong
record.

Channel behavior:
- a channel returning short reads (1 to 8 bytes at a time);
- a channel returning empty reads;
- a channel that stops returning data, both before the archive is opened
and partway through an entry (through both `read()` and `read(byte[])`);
- a channel whose `size()` claims more bytes than it holds.

Everything else:
- a zip64 archive with trailing data reads;
- an empty archive reads;
- a central directory filename running past the end is rejected;
- entry data running past the end is rejected, through both `read()` and
`read(byte[])`;
- a zero-length read returns 0, including at the end of an entry.

Negative tests match error messages on stable values (entry name,
offset, size) rather than wording.

The writer sentinel tests were confirmed to be real regression tests by
reverting the mask fix and watching them fail. Run against the previous
`ZipReader`, the new tests for empty reads, a stalled channel, the decoy
and truncated comments, the entry count bounds, filename truncation and
entry truncation all fail. Without the fixes from earlier in this PR,
the tests for short reads, trailing data and locator bounds fail too.
The decoy tests with a comment that fits and the negative entry size
test fail against the reader as it was before the latest commit. The
plain-truncation, longest-comment, empty-archive and plain-offset tests
pass on the old code; they are there to lock that behavior in.

```
mvn -o -pl sdk test -Denforcer.skip=true -Dmaven.antrun.skip=true   [JDK 21, generated sources from an earlier build]
  -> 338 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors, 8 skipped
```

## End-to-end validation

None of this has an xtest cell of its own; it is unit-tested only. What
e2e gives this PR is a no-regression signal: xtest on this PR is green
across java/go/js against `main` and v0.26.0 (see the X-Test Results
comments). [opentdf/tests run
34357326964](https://github.com/opentdf/tests/actions/runs/34357326964)
also passed earlier with `force-supports=chunky`, including all five
java `test_chunky_roundtrip` pairs. That run predates the latest round
of reader changes.


<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **Bug Fixes**
* ZIP archives are read reliably when data arrives in partial chunks or
channels temporarily return no data; persistently stalled reads now fail
instead of hanging.
* Missing, truncated, or out-of-bounds archive metadata and entry data
are reported as errors.
* ZIP64 archives are handled correctly, including those with large entry
counts or central directories.

* **Improvements**
* Non-ASCII filenames use accurate UTF-8 byte lengths and flags in
archive headers.
* Entry names that exceed ZIP format limits are rejected with a clear
error.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->

---------

Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
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