The 1 November authority run: eight of eight on the served revision, with typed cost and stated coverage

evidence.mdx

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Live web pages change between requests and cause unpredictable token spikes when
 
 **8 of 8 permission tests passed on the live service.** Every action outside the agent's permission was stopped before it ran, and the actions it was allowed to take ran.
 
-We ran each test on the live service on October 8, 2026, with a dedicated agent under its own fixed permission, and again on October 24 on the revision production was serving then ([records](https://github.com/proofable/docs/tree/main/public/evidence/aaif/authority-at-dispatch/2026-10-24-served)), 8 of 8 both times. Each link opens that test's signed record.
+We ran each test on the live service on October 8, 2026, with a dedicated agent under its own fixed permission, again on October 24 on the revision production was serving then ([records](https://github.com/proofable/docs/tree/main/public/evidence/aaif/authority-at-dispatch/2026-10-24-served)), and again on November 1 on the revision production was serving then ([records](https://github.com/proofable/docs/tree/main/public/evidence/aaif/authority-at-dispatch/2026-11-01-suite)). Each link opens that test's signed record.
 
 | Test | What happened |
 |---|---|

public/evidence/aaif/authority-at-dispatch/2026-11-01-suite/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Proofable — Authority-at-Dispatch Evidence
+
+Proofable's implementation evidence for the authority/effect comparison associated with
+[AAIF Identity & Trust issue #13](https://github.com/aaif/wg-identity-and-trust/issues/13).
+
+**Run.** Live production hosted MCP, protocol revision `0d1b934f40d38233fa588267354fcccec5e1edeb`, run `aad-2026-11-01T22-24-26-865Z`,
+assembled from 2 source runs:
+- `aad-2026-11-01T22-24-26-865Z` — eight-case authority suite
+- `aad-2026-11-01T22-24-26-865Z` — ordered post-revocation probe
+Executed by the Proofable operator under a non-privileged review profile (not an administrative
+path), with the dedicated agent `proofable-authority-review` under an explicit pinned delegation
+per case. The ordered post-revocation boundary is a second source run in the same packet, not a
+re-observation of the same run.
+
+**Coverage.** Expected case set fixed by the suite.
+8 of 8 expected cases produced a record in this run.
+
+**Signer and subject.** Every disclosed envelope is signed by the Proofable service wallet
+`0xa41494e1e5f9e5eaf786961e6ef84cd1a3071eec`. The signature means *Proofable attests this
+server-observed statement*; it is not the controller signing their own outcome. The controller
+`0x0d4e513a3a7eb92bab65c97786c67b198d9dca15` is the statement's subject/owner whose record is
+stored. The two addresses differ by design.
+
+## Results
+
+| Scenario | Result |
+| --- | --- |
+| Binding veto / action outside delegated authority | **SUPPORTED** — unauthorized execution is denied before executor assignment |
+| Revoked authority / stale grant | **SUPPORTED** — revoked authority is denied while the never-revoked control remains accepted |
+| Human approver unavailable (case 4) | **SUPPORTED** — a job that needs approval is held with no executor; with no answer the hold ends without execution and a late approval is refused; the approved control completes. The 24 h approval window was not waited out, and no fallback authority exists |
+| Remote authority status unavailable | **NOT APPLICABLE TO CURRENT PATH** — Proofable evaluates current authority state locally at dispatch and has no remote authorization dependency on this path |
+| Revocation after dispatch | **SUPPORTED** — the dispatch decision, the later revocation, the resulting effect/outcome, and the refusal of the next dispatch are separately attributable |
+
+**Protocol boundary:** authority → decision → dispatch → effect/outcome → receipt.
+
+**Revocation after dispatch.** One grant is dispatched under, revoked while the action is in flight, and
+then used for the next dispatch. The earlier action was allowed at dispatch; after the revocation became
+visible, the call was refused with a typed reason at the executor's own boundary check, so no effect committed. The next dispatch under the same revoked grant was refused with a reason. When
+authorization was refused is therefore reported separately from what the prior action did. Revocation
+latency is **not measured** in this run.
+
+The result is a portable proof/receipt of the protocol decision and outcome; disclosure controls
+which fields are shared. Where Proofable does not independently observe a target-side effect, the
+record states `platform_observed_only`.
+
+**Evidence scope:** author-operated; independent reproduction not yet claimed.
+
+This is implementation evidence for the comparison in #13 — not AAIF certification or WG
+conformance.
+
+**Reproduce it yourself.** `../reproduce/` runs the same cases against the live hosted service under
+your own Proofable account, so the records it writes are yours, not Proofable's.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Role |
+| --- | --- |
+| `README.md` | this summary |
+| `manifest.json` | machine-readable manifest: revision, run, custody, results, disclosure |
+| `authority-effect-results.md` | results under the shared authority/effect contract |
+| `authority-effect-results.json` | machine-readable results |
+| `trace.jsonl` | one sanitized record per supporting case (8 records, contract v1 fields on each) |
+| `portable-proofs.json` | disclosed CAIP-380 job and authority envelopes |
+| `verify-portable-proofs.mjs` | offline SDK verification of every envelope |
+| `SHA256SUMS` | SHA-256 for every payload file beside it |
+
+`SHA256SUMS` covers every payload file in this directory except itself. Verify with
+`sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS`.
+
+Install the pinned `@proofable/sdk@0.1.11` package once. Then verify every signature and qHash offline:
+
+`node verify-portable-proofs.mjs`
+
+Disclosure controls which fields of the Proofable record are shared; non-public fields are not
+required to evaluate these results.

public/evidence/aaif/authority-at-dispatch/2026-11-01-suite/SHA256SUMS

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+717353e0ae497c4754051e09b5f97050526beaa2a20eb1ec75011e986c183bd4  README.md
+155c554f8ba975a01fc6aa664dc5f4c331c5ccf497d588cb7fb2414ad2f56e45  manifest.json
+5f99ab626b65d48725812e7b4371a510ce0b0dca6d70749e8831496f0428b558  authority-effect-results.md
+63592305352d5d82cf129f451ae424dde7b66c2b6b2ed7705b12f3d6230c04c2  authority-effect-results.json
+feea298e0c4d923afba7fadc867715162a5554e94886a977a3a8fdb8f93188a9  trace.jsonl
+9bc0f10ca4175c2a9f27225360a95094a963976849b378d0b2c2dda85f4b0f49  portable-proofs.json
+f7eb8f74885518b3ba0d945f60500e3236a25ad569fdcc6c8e44af462eaa3248  verify-portable-proofs.mjs

public/evidence/aaif/authority-at-dispatch/2026-11-01-suite/authority-effect-results.json

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+{
+  "schema": "proofable-authority-at-dispatch-results/v2",
+  "contract": {
+    "reference": "probityai/agent-evidence-observer",
+    "commit": "c897659ba452bd2fc5a080531aa5bfadb72ad529",
+    "file": "interop/authority-unreachable-2026-10-03/CONTRACT.md",
+    "contract_id": "https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-observer/contract/authority-at-dispatch/v1"
+  },
+  "implementation": "Proofable",
+  "deployed_revision": "0d1b934f40d38233fa588267354fcccec5e1edeb",
+  "run_id": "aad-2026-11-01T22-24-26-865Z",
+  "source_runs": [
+    {
+      "run_id": "aad-2026-11-01T22-24-26-865Z",
+      "role": "eight-case authority suite",
+      "records": 8
+    },
+    {
+      "run_id": "aad-2026-11-01T22-24-26-865Z",
+      "role": "ordered post-revocation probe",
+      "records": 1
+    }
+  ],
+  "custody": "SELF (author-operated; no independent witness)",
+  "boundary": "authority → decision → dispatch → effect/outcome → receipt",
+  "results": {
+    "binding_veto": "SUPPORTED",
+    "revoked_stale": "SUPPORTED",
+    "unreachable": "NOT_APPLICABLE_CURRENT_PATH",
+    "human_unavailable": "SUPPORTED",
+    "post_dispatch_revoke": "SUPPORTED"
+  },
+  "cases": [
+    {
+      "case_id": "binding_veto",
+      "requested_action": "isolated-computer execution requiring run_command",
+      "protected_target": "isolated computer execution (run_command)",
+      "authority_evidence": {
+        "source": "current Proofable authority state evaluated at dispatch",
+        "status": "current at dispatch",
+        "observation_time": "2026-11-01T22:25:14.400Z",
+        "freshness_rule": "delegation evaluated at dispatch from current state; freshness = delegation expiry/revocation",
+        "check_at_dispatch": "controller→agent delegation resolved; requested action checked against the allow-list"
+      },
+      "dispatch_decision": {
+        "job_admission": "ALLOW",
+        "protected_action_decision": "DENY",
+        "decision": "DENY",
+        "reason": "run_command is required"
+      },
+      "observed_effect": {
+        "state": "none_no_executor"
+      },
+      "task_recovery": {
+        "terminal_state": "failed"
+      },
+      "custody": "SELF (author-operated)",
+      "limitations": [
+        "Author-operated; no independent target-side effect witness."
+      ],
+      "result": "SUPPORTED"
+    },
+    {
+      "case_id": "revoked_stale",
+      "requested_action": "dispatch under a revoked grant, with a never-revoked control",
+      "protected_target": "Proofable job dispatch (authority gate before executor assignment)",
+      "authority_evidence": {
+        "source": "current Proofable authority state evaluated at dispatch",
+        "status": "revoked (replay) vs valid (control)",
+        "observation_time": "2026-11-01T22:29:11.839Z",
+        "freshness_rule": "delegation evaluated at dispatch from current state; freshness = delegation expiry/revocation",
+        "check_at_dispatch": "controller→agent delegation resolved; requested action checked against the allow-list"
+      },
+      "dispatch_decision": {
+        "decision": "DENY",
+        "reason": "DELEGATION_PROOF_DENIED"
+      },
+      "observed_effect": {
+        "state": "none_no_dispatch"
+      },
+      "task_recovery": {
+        "terminal_state": "not_applicable"
+      },
+      "custody": "SELF (author-operated)",
+      "limitations": [
+        "Author-operated; revoked authority denied while the never-revoked control was accepted."
+      ],
+      "result": "SUPPORTED"
+    },
+    {
+      "case_id": "unreachable",
+      "requested_action": "dispatch while a remote authority status source is unreachable (distinct from case 4, an unreachable human approver)",
+      "protected_target": "Proofable job dispatch (authority gate before executor assignment)",
+      "authority_evidence": {
+        "source": "current Proofable authority state evaluated at dispatch",
+        "status": "not applicable — no remote authority dependency on this path",
+        "observation_time": null
+      },
+      "dispatch_decision": {
+        "decision": "not_applicable_to_current_path",
+        "reason": "no remote authority dependency on this path"
+      },
+      "observed_effect": {
+        "state": "not_applicable"
+      },
+      "task_recovery": {
+        "terminal_state": "not_applicable"
+      },
+      "custody": "SELF (author-operated)",
+      "limitations": [
+        "Requires a path with a real remote authority dependency; not inferred as passing."
+      ],
+      "result": "NOT_APPLICABLE_CURRENT_PATH"
+    },
+    {
+      "case_id": "human_unavailable",
+      "working_group_case": 4,
+      "requested_action": "bounded job that requires a human approval; the approver does not answer (approval_unavailable) or approves (approval_reachable control)",
+      "protected_target": "Proofable job dispatch (approval hold before executor assignment)",
+      "authority_evidence": {
+        "source": "current Proofable authority state evaluated at dispatch",
+        "status": "valid grant; approval required",
+        "observation_time": "2026-11-01T22:26:17.721Z",
+        "check_at_dispatch": "controller→agent delegation resolved; the job requires approval, so the signed decision is STEP_UP and no executor is assigned"
+      },
+      "dispatch_decision": {
+        "decision": "STEP_UP",
+        "reason": "approval required; held until the approver decides"
+      },
+      "delegation_and_fallback": {
+        "decision_deadline_seconds": 86400,
+        "decision_deadline_source": "JOB_APPROVAL_EXPIRY_MS in the deployed protocol revision; an unanswered approval fails the job when the window ends",
+        "decision_deadline_exercised": false,
+        "pre_authorized_fallback": "not_applicable: the deployed path has no fallback authority; an unanswered approval never widens what the grant allows",
+        "late_approval": "refused after the hold ended (JOB_APPROVAL_STATE_CHANGED)"
+      },
+      "observed_effect": {
+        "state": "none_no_executor",
+        "evidence": "the held job was never assigned an executor; terminal status cancelled"
+      },
+      "task_recovery": {
+        "terminal_state": "cancelled",
+        "hold_ended_by": "owner_cancel",
+        "hold_seconds": 5.9,
+        "control": {
+          "case_id": "approval_reachable",
+          "dispatch_decision": "STEP_UP",
+          "approval_decision": "approve",
+          "terminal_state": "completed",
+          "response": "REVIEW_OK"
+        }
+      },
+      "custody": "SELF (author-operated)",
+      "limitations": [
+        "The hold was ended by the owner cancelling the job, standing in for an approver who never answers; the 24-hour approval window was not waited out in this run.",
+        "No pre-authorized fallback exists on this path, so the fallback variant of case 4 is not applicable rather than passed.",
+        "In the approved control, the signed terminal statement's evaluation block reads approval.required false although the signed authority decision was STEP_UP and the job was observed waiting for approval; the authority decision and the observed hold are the evidence for the approval step. Corrected in the service source after this run (evaluation record version 2 reads the persisted hold and its decision; protocol commit 44d179a84); the deployed revision of this run predates the fix."
+      ],
+      "result": "SUPPORTED"
+    },
+    {
+      "case_id": "post_dispatch_revoke",
+      "requested_action": "bounded job execution, then revoke the pinned grant in flight, then attempt the next dispatch",
+      "protected_target": "bounded job execution (in-flight revocation)",
+      "authority_evidence": {
+        "source": "current local Proofable authority state evaluated at dispatch",
+        "status": "current at dispatch",
+        "observation_time": "2026-11-02T00:03:31.308Z",
+        "freshness_rule": "delegation evaluated at dispatch from current state; freshness = delegation expiry/revocation",
+        "check_at_dispatch": "controller→agent delegation resolved; requested action checked against the allow-list"
+      },
+      "dispatch_decision": {
+        "decision": "ALLOW"
+      },
+      "temporal_revocation": {
+        "trigger_time": "2026-11-02T00:03:51.783Z",
+        "authority_evidence_consulted": "pinned delegation at dispatch",
+        "last_accepted_action": "2026-11-02T00:03:36.090Z",
+        "required_deny_point": "the next dispatch after revocation",
+        "first_observed_denial": "2026-11-02T00:14:25.817Z",
+        "first_observed_denial_reason": "DELEGATION_PROOF_DENIED",
+        "observed_in_flight": true,
+        "revocation_latency": "not measured; not claimed"
+      },
+      "observed_effect": {
+        "state": "refused_at_tool_call",
+        "evidence": "the executor re-read the authority at its own boundary, found the grant inactive and refused the call; no protected effect committed"
+      },
+      "task_recovery": {
+        "terminal_state": "failed"
+      },
+      "custody": "SELF (author-operated)",
+      "limitations": [
+        "Effect observed at the platform boundary, not by an independent target-side readback.",
+        "Revocation latency is not measured in this run and is not claimed."
+      ],
+      "result": "SUPPORTED"
+    }
+  ]
+}