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fix: close the security audit findings across scanner, proxy, sandbox, steward and CI - #84
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…cio certificate sourceRepository and ref came from the SLSA predicate, which any Sigstore signer writes; only the certificate SAN is bound to the OIDC token. Read Fulcio extensions 1.3.6.1.4.1.57264.1.12 (source repository URI) and .14 (source repository ref) from the leaf certificate with a small DER walker. No predicate fallback: a certificate without the extension yields null. trustedPublisherAuthorized now requires an entry to constrain repository or workflowRef, so a signer-written builder (or the issuer alone) never authorizes.
The SBPL profile was written to <tmpdir>/sentinel-sb-*/profile.sb, inside the write floor, so a lingering sandboxed process could rewrite the next run's profile. Pass it with -p and drop the temp file code for run and runArgv.
…urrent proof, bind to loopback - F12: Tier-1 corroboration now requires a homepage/repository host at or under the claimed domain; a same-named GitHub/GitLab org no longer counts (Tier 2). - F15a: transfers need an active claim with no pending change; a transfer is not materialized while the claim is disputed. - F15b: renewal refuses disputed claims and needs a challenge verified after the claim's current proof. - F15c: challenges expire 30 days after issuance for verify/approve/transfer/ renew/ruling; approve re-runs the upstream lookup and recomputes the tier (approve is now async). - F15d: evidenceRef must be a non-empty string; request bodies are type-checked in the server; issueChallenge copies known fields only, so a body-supplied verifiedAt can no longer skip the DNS proof. - Transfer signatures cover the claim's current challenge id, so they cannot be replayed after a renewal or transfer. - New SENTINEL_STEWARD_HOST (default 127.0.0.1) replaces the all-interfaces bind. Tests flipped on purpose: grandfathering fixture (org label no longer corroborates), the renewal test (a fresh challenge is now required), and steward.test.ts awaits the now-async approve.
… F9) F8: add --unshare-pid, --die-with-parent and --new-session so the sandbox no longer sees the host /proc, cannot outlive its parent, and cannot inject keystrokes into the controlling terminal. F9: with no network approval, --unshare-net left pathname unix sockets reachable through the read-only root bind. Mask the docker sockets with /dev/null and mount a tmpfs over /run/user/<uid>, each only when the path exists. Also stop a projectRoot of "/" from being re-bound inside the emptied $HOME (bwrap side).
…tbelt (F10) Each hands work to a process outside the sandbox (launchd job, app launch, Shortcuts or Automator workflow). Add them to SENSITIVE_EXECUTABLES so the exec carve-out denies them unless a process: Grant lifts it.
…input F4: a non-string lifecycle hook, a 20k-deep `exports` object, or an expression that overflows the AST walker no longer disables a whole rule; the walker overflow maps to the existing parseFailed path. F5: remove quadratic regexes and rescans on the sync path (install-scripts referencedFiles, obfuscation dynamic-require and decoded Function patterns, native-payload-loader decode fallback, loader-chain lineOf/snip). Base64 `Buffer.from(...)` detection stays unbounded in literal length via the linear `headsWithTail` helper. Also resolve extension-less and non-JS command tokens (`node setup`, `sh build.sh`) against retained package files in install-scripts, and accept template-literal `require(\`fs\`)` in the loader-chain detector.
…scape workflow commands and Markdown - action.yml: reuse an existing comment only when it carries the marker AND was written by github-actions[bot] (user.type Bot), so a pasted marker cannot redirect the update or hijack the report. - run.ts: escape %, CR and LF in ::error::/::warning:: data (as @actions/core), so a finding cannot start a second workflow command. - report.ts: neutralize backticks, <, [, ] and @ (zero-width space) in table cells, besides the existing backslash, pipe and newline handling. report.test.ts changes on purpose: the escaped coordinate now carries the zero-width space after "@".
…igned A signature list whose keyids match no trusted key returned "unknown" (weight 0), so an attacker-chosen keyid beat having no signature. With a non-empty trusted set it now returns "unsigned". An empty trusted set stays "unknown". Key expiry is deliberately not checked (no wall clock in scoring).
matchPackage compiled a*b*c into ^a.*b.*c$, which backtracks catastrophically on a hostile package name. Replace it with an iterative two-pointer wildcard match with the same semantics (* is the only metacharacter).
…stry The npm parser only skipped file:/link: entries, so git, github shorthand and arbitrary tarball resolutions were audited as the registry package of the same name and version. Coordinate gains nonRegistry (the raw resolved spec), set when the entry is not an http(s) /-/<file>.tgz registry tarball. The yarn v1, yarn berry and pnpm parsers set it from their own resolution fields; local sources (workspace, patch, link, portal, file, directory) are skipped. The flag is sticky when duplicate name@version entries merge.
…store - F19: audit-tree turns a coordinate with a string nonRegistry into a block row without fetching anything. The dedupe and re-expansion keys include the non-registry marker, so a git row never shares a registry row's verdict. A non-string nonRegistry is a 400. - F17: compatibility routes no longer forward authorization, cookie or npm-otp upstream, except POST /-/v1/login (npm's own web login). - F20: compatibility request bodies are capped at 8 MiB (was 128 MiB) and the routes sit behind rateGate. - F18: with SENTINEL_AUTH_PUBKEY unset, POST /-/registry/import and POST /-/retractions require a publish token (always 401 when none are configured). New SENTINEL_HOST, default 127.0.0.1, sets the bind address. - F16: SENTINEL_POLICY must be exactly observe or block, else FATAL. - AuditStore keeps at most 20000 entries and evicts the oldest. Existing tests that pinned the old open-mode and credential-forwarding behavior in retraction-e2e and compatibility-e2e are updated.
~/.node-gyp and ~/.cache/node-gyp were in the write floor, so one package could plant headers a later build trusts. Drop them from the floor (they stay readable). When the approved capabilities include network, point node-gyp at a fresh per-run devdir under tmpdir via npm_config_devdir so a cold-cache build can still download headers. Updates the existing floor tests that pinned the old list.
…the profile A projectRoot of "/" slipped through the strictly-under-$HOME filter in the Seatbelt read re-allow and was added verbatim to the exec floor, which made every path executable (also on the Landlock side). Filter "/" out of the read allow and the exec floor. The sandbox entry points now normalize cwd and projectRoot with path.resolve (projectRoot "/" falls back to cwd) so "." or ".." cannot expand to $HOME or an ancestor.
…s in violations scrubEnv screened names only, so npm_config_https_proxy=http://user:pass@host reached the lifecycle script. Drop any npm_config_* whose value matches ://user@; an explicit env: approval still re-admits a named variable. A package controls its stderr, so a violation target could carry escape sequences into a terminal, the proxy store or an MCP client. Attribution still runs on the raw text; target, deniedResource and the stderr excerpt are stripped of C0, C1 and DEL characters before they are returned.
… path - format.ts: one sanitizeTerminal() strips ESC sequences (CSI, OSC, DCS/SOS/PM/APC, 7-bit and C1 forms), C0 controls except \n and \t, DEL and C1 controls. Every formatter deep-sanitizes its payload (package names, findings, evidence, violation targets, proxy answers) before formatting. - index.ts: apply it to the other places that print package-, proxy- or signer-controlled text (lifecycle commands, un-approved atoms, exec violation target, fail() messages, attestation/token/policy output). - run-scripts: pass path.resolve(dir), so the sandbox profile and cwd no longer depend on how the path was spelled (a relative dir under $HOME denied the script its own directory).
Non-breaking lockfile bumps: body-parser 2.3.0 to 2.4.0 (high), hono 4.13.7 to 4.13.19, @hono/node-server 2.1.0 to 2.1.9, fast-uri 3.1.8 to 3.1.9, qs 6.16.0 to 6.17.1, plus their transitive patch releases. zod (high, GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5) remains: it is a direct dependency of @git-agentic/sentinel-mcp at ^3.23.8 and the fix is zod 4.6.7, a major bump.
…st confusion, nested compression) - F1: node-tar reports typeflag 7 as ContiguousFile; npm installs it as a regular file. Treat any *File entry type as a file. - F2: a text-extension file whose bytes start with binary magic (`MZ:` and `BZh:` are valid JS labels) is still reported as content-mismatch, but is also retained for the rules when it is valid UTF-8 with no NUL byte. - F3: normalize entry paths like npm (drop the first segment whatever it is, collapse ./ and //, reject ..). Count root package.json entries case-insensitively on every path; more than one, a case-variant spelling, or a root manifest over the 2 MiB retain cap raises a critical `manifest-confusion` finding (category metadata), which blocks under the default policy. - F6: refuse a compressed signature (gzip/zstd/xz/bzip2) as the first bytes the tar parser would see, in both the gunzip and raw branches, so nested compression cannot decompress past maxUnpacked. Reported as resource-abuse. - Retain extension-less text files up to 2 MiB (no NUL, text magic) so script hooks like `node setup` can be resolved by rules.
An untrusted signature keyid now scores like unsigned, so the clean fixture needs the fixture signing keys to keep its score of 100.
… SENTINEL_ROOT (F11) The wrapper looked up a dependency's approvals by npm_package_name and npm_package_version, which a git, URL or file dependency declares itself, and decided "root script" from INIT_CWD, which a nested npm (git dependency prepare) resets to the dependency's own directory. - Dependency scripts now require npm_package_integrity to equal the manifest's meta.integrity, compared per algorithm; missing, mismatched or not-comparable integrity fails closed with EnforceError. - sentinel install --enforce pins SENTINEL_ROOT to realpath(cwd) in enforceNpmEnv. isRootScript and resolveProjectRoot use it; a missing or relative SENTINEL_ROOT means "not root". - The per-run node-gyp devdir (network approvals only) is wired into the wrapper. Updates enforce.test.ts, which pinned the old "no INIT_CWD means root" rule.
The release publish job installed the just-published packages with no
lockfile while holding id-token: write and contents: write, so a
compromised transitive dependency could mint an npm OIDC token or push.
The clean-install check now runs in its own job with permissions: {},
and the GitHub prerelease is created in a later job that needs it. The
publish job keeps only contents: read and id-token: write, and checkouts
no longer persist credentials. ci.yml gets a read-only default token.
…proved A network approval means the network, not local IPC. With it, the session bus under /run/user/<uid> and the container runtime sockets stayed reachable, and systemd-run --user or docker is a full escape. Apply the masks always, lifted only by an explicit filesystem grant covering the path: - tmpfs over /run/user/<uid> - /dev/null over the docker, containerd, podman, crio and system bus sockets - tmpfs over /tmp/.X11-unix and every /tmp/ssh-* directory, placed after the rw /tmp bind (skipped when it would hide the cwd, project root or $HOME) Every mount is existence-guarded. Also add systemd-run, busctl, dbus-send and gdbus to SENSITIVE_EXECUTABLES. Flips the F9 test that pinned "no masks with network".
…aviour The per-run devdir was created under tmpdir, which is in every sandbox's write floor, so a process left over from an earlier run could poison headers. Create it under <home>/.cache/sentinel-gyp (mode 0700, outside every write floor) and grant read-write on that one directory for the run through an ordinary filesystem grant, so it works the same under Seatbelt and bwrap. The runner and the script shell pass the grant to the sandbox. Probed a copied /usr/bin/open and /bin/launchctl under real Seatbelt: the kernel SIGKILLs the copy (exit 137) before it can reach LaunchServices, so no mach-lookup rule is added; an effect test pins the behaviour.
The non-registry check used substring tests: a resolution URL that contained "@npm:" counted as a registry entry, one that contained "@file:" was skipped as local, and the package name was cut at the first "@npm:" anywhere in the key. Parse name@protocol:rest instead and treat only npm:<plain version> as registry.
…mask Skipping an IPC mask because the cwd or project root is under it silently left that directory open. Throw the "bubblewrap enforcement unavailable" error instead so the script does not run; an absent directory or an explicit filesystem grant still lifts the mask. Also pin that scrubEnv already drops DISPLAY, WAYLAND_DISPLAY, DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS, SSH_AUTH_SOCK and XDG_RUNTIME_DIR (no env.ts change).
Audit an entry under the name in its resolution (what yarn fetches), so an alias key is not looked up under the wrong name. An entry whose key or resolution does not parse, or that lacks a version, is emitted as a non-registry coordinate instead of being skipped.
…resolved registry entries
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On a host where /var/run is a symlink to /run, a filesystem grant on /run/docker.sock lifted the /run/docker.sock candidate but not the /var/run/docker.sock alias, which resolves to the same node and was masked anyway, so the approved socket stayed unusable. liftedByGrant now also compares the resolved grants against the resolved candidate, as the executable-mask loop does. The same closure serves the /run/user/<uid> and /tmp masks.
- install-scripts: resolve with a mode. A bare command word (`echo`, `node-gyp`, `npm`) matches only an exact package file; a command word written with `/` (`./setup`) may use the suffix trie; an executed operand (interpreter script or code-extension word) keeps the `.js`, `/index.js` and suffix fallbacks. A shell never appends `.js` to a command word. `-r`/`--require`/`--import`/`--loader` values resolve only when relative or absolute, since a bare specifier is a node_modules module. - install-scripts: an unrecognized `--flag=value` whose value is a code file (`--test-reporter=./reporter.js`) is resolved under the same relative-or-absolute rule. - native-payload-loader: the overflow decode signal matches whole identifiers (`inflateSync`, `gunzip`, ...), not words like "inflated".
…ead of flagging a conflict Two entries for the same name@version pinned as sha1 and sha512 of the same bytes were compared as strings and marked nonRegistry, blocking a valid tree. Tokens are now grouped by algorithm: a different digest in the same algorithm is still a conflict (nonRegistry), while different algorithms merge into one space-separated, deduped SRI. audit-tree already checks every token against the served bytes, so a wrong token still blocks.
…grants Symlink-resolving grants let a grant on a package-writable symlink (a link to /run in the cwd) lift every IPC mask. Map only the /var/run to /run alias, and only for safe grant targets.
The backtick case is linear (about 150 ms per MiB locally) but crossed the 1000 ms bound on a loaded CI runner. The test guards against quadratic work, which takes minutes at this size, so a 5 s bound still catches it.
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`node <setup.js` feeds setup.js to node on stdin. The base regex caught it; the word splitter kept `<setup.js` as one token, so the script went unscanned. Split words on `<` and `>` as well.
A `<file` target is scanned (an interpreter reads it as its script) but no longer takes the script operand slot, so `node <README.md setup` still scans setup. `>file` targets are outputs and are not scanned.
…runs PR_SET_PDEATHSIG is tied to the forking thread, not the process. Enforced runs on Node 22 intermittently died before the script ran (no output, exit 1 from a signal). --unshare-pid already ends every orphan with the command, so the flag added nothing. The positive-control effect test now reports bwrap stderr on failure.
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…fixes `NODE_OPTIONS=--require=./hook.js node -v` runs hook.js. The base regex caught it; the new parser skipped assignment words entirely.
`cc -o dist/landlock-exec` rewrote the helper in place. build-native.test runs the script during the test run, so a concurrent bwrap run sometimes executed a half-written file: "execvp .../landlock-exec: Permission denied", the Node 22 CI flake on this branch. Compile to a temp name and rename it into place. Hammer on Linux (60 rebuilds, 3000 concurrent execs): 133 exec failures before, 0 after.
A security audit of Sentinel found ways for a package author, a lockfile, an HTTP client or a sandboxed install script to get past the checks Sentinel promises: malware the scanner never saw, scripts escaping the sandbox, claims granted to the wrong domain, and CI jobs running third-party code while holding publish rights. This PR fixes all of them. ADR-0056 records each decision and what it supersedes.
What changes, by area:
\, PAX paths, trailing separators). A second or hidden rootpackage.jsonnow raises a criticalmanifest-confusionfinding. JS that starts with a magic-byte label is still scanned. Nested compression counts against the unpack cap. One malformed field no longer disables a rule, quadratic regexes on the request path are linear, and install scripts resolve the files they actually run.audit-treeinstead of borrowing a registry verdict, and every SRI token is verified.SENTINEL_POLICYis validated. The compat routes no longer forward client credentials upstream and their bodies are capped. In open mode, import and retraction need a publish token. Stale cached verdicts are invalidated through an audit revision.launchctl,open,systemd-runand similar tools are carved out. Enforced installs bind each dependency script to its audited integrity and toSENTINEL_ROOT.Breaking changes (pre-1.0):
127.0.0.1unlessSENTINEL_HOST/SENTINEL_STEWARD_HOSTis set.SENTINEL_POLICYmust be exactlyobserveorblock.SENTINEL_PUBLISH_TOKENS.--enforceneeds npm 7+ for dependency scripts.audit-tree.ClaimSteward.approveis async, and transfer signing takes the current challenge id.Left as documented trade-offs: steward rate limiting before auth, retraction-window download inflation, open-mode reads.
Proof: every fix has a test that failed before it and passes after it.
npm run buildis clean.npm teston macOS: 1401 tests, 0 failures, 4 Linux-only skips. The sandbox suite also passes on Linux (Debian, Node 22 and 24, bwrap) in a local container.npm audit --omit=devreports 0 vulnerabilities. The bwrap and Landlock effects are verified by this PR's ubuntu CI. Reviewed with sol-loop: 5 rounds with gpt-6.2-sol (budget reached; every finding fixed), plus two Mythos 5.2 security reviews, two Opus contract audits and the Codex review on this PR.Created with Claude Opus 5.5 in Claude Code (T3 Code). Sonnet 5.5 subagents wrote most of the code; Mythos 5.2 ran the audit.