Description
Kind
Missed detection (should have been flagged, wasn't)
Package name and version
Synthetic pattern, no real package. Found during the security audit hardening (#84); listed as a follow-up in ADR-0056.
Expected vs actual verdict
native-payload-loader correlates a read, decode, write and launch chain through the acorn AST, with binding-resolved primitives and scoped taint (invariant 8). A file that also contains a very deep expression, for example tens of thousands of chained member accesses, overflows acorn-walk's recursive walk.
#84 maps that overflow to a walkOverflow flag and falls back to name matching:
- The file is still rated critical when all four primitive names appear.
- A chain written in a form the regex fallback does not recognise drops to high or below.
- The fallback cannot tell a correlated chain from four unrelated mentions, so a benign overflowing file that mentions all four names is also rated critical.
The pattern
An attacker pads a correlated loader file with a deep expression (inside try { … } catch {} so it never runs) so that the dataflow analysis gives up. The chain is then written in a form the fallback misses, for example renamed primitives reached through an intermediate helper.
Suggested approach
Replace the recursive walk.ancestor in packages/core/src/detect/loader-chain.ts with an iterative walk using an explicit stack, keeping the same visit order and ancestor list. Then a deep expression costs time, not a stack overflow, and the full dataflow analysis always runs.
- Remove the
walkOverflowregex fallback (or keep it only for genuine parse failures). - Bound the work by node count, so the walk stays linear and deterministic.
- Tests:
- the padded correlated chain stays critical with renamed and helper-routed primitives;
- a padded benign file that mentions the four names is not critical;
- a timing bound on a 2 MiB padded file.
Activity