OpenBot is currently a development preview. Security fixes are made on main and included in the
next release. No older release line is guaranteed to receive backports.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main / latest release |
Yes |
| Older releases | No guaranteed backports |
Do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's Security → Report a vulnerability flow to submit a private security advisory. If private vulnerability reporting is unavailable, contact the maintainer through their GitHub profile without publishing technical details.
Include:
- the affected version or commit;
- impact and realistic attack scenario;
- minimal reproduction steps or a proof of concept;
- whether sensitive data may already have been exposed;
- suggested remediation, if known.
Remove unrelated credentials, tokens, personal data, conversations, and private files. You should receive an acknowledgement within seven days. Please allow a reasonable remediation window before public disclosure.
OpenBot is local-first but not sandboxed from the host on behalf of the user. Agents currently run with
danger-full-access and approvalPolicy: never; they may access local files, execute commands, use
the network, and control the embedded browser. This documented behavior alone is not a vulnerability.
Security boundaries that should hold include:
- remote pages cannot access Node.js, the preload bridge, managed attachments, or privileged IPC;
- IPC calls are accepted only from the trusted application renderer;
- managed attachment IDs cannot escape their canonical storage roots;
- Codex and Claude credentials remain owned by their CLIs and are not copied into OpenBot storage;
- diagnostics do not expose tokens or raw sensitive stderr;
- a browser tab is scoped to its owning agent/thread in the application UI.
Reports showing a bypass of those boundaries are welcome.