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Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #869 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 90.46% 90.70% +0.24%
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Files 15 15
Lines 1122 1141 +19
Branches 234 228 -6
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+ Hits 1015 1035 +20
- Misses 102 106 +4
+ Partials 5 0 -5
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bingenito
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…F#16) loadLayout replays a layout JSON blob from localStorage on every future session, so a one-shot XSS that plants a malicious desktopJS-layouts entry keeps firing on reload. Close that off: - sanitizeUrl rejects non-http(s)/relative schemes (javascript:, data:, etc.) on persisted window urls before createWindow is called (F#14). - Layout JSON is parsed with a reviver that strips __proto__/constructor/ prototype keys, closing the Object.assign(window.options, ...) prototype-pollution gadget, and malformed/missing storage no longer throws out of getLayoutFromStorage/getLayouts (F#13). - ContainerBase.storage is now set via an overridable constructor parameter instead of being hard-bound to window.localStorage (F#16). F#03 (Object.assign smuggling arbitrary createWindow option keys) is intentionally not addressed here: createWindow is a thin pass-through shim in both remaining containers (window.open features string / fin.desktop.Window options), so smuggled keys carry no more privilege than a caller already has by calling createWindow/window.open directly. The one option key that did escalate privilege, Electron's webPreferences, is removed along with the rest of the Electron package. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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🟡 Changes recommended
Obfuscated JavaScript URLs still allow script execution, and the protected constructor breaks existing subclass instantiation with TypeScript errors.
4 open issues
What changed in this PR
This PR adds safeguards to ContainerBase layout persistence to reduce the risk of replaying malicious data from localStorage.
Changes:
- Centralizes stored JSON parsing, handles malformed data, and strips prototype-related keys.
- Adds URL scheme filtering before restoring windows and guards missing group targets.
- Adds tests for unsafe URLs, valid URLs, corrupt storage, and prototype-key stripping.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
packages/desktopjs/tests/unit/container.spec.ts |
Adds layout-loading security and storage-handling tests. |
packages/desktopjs/src/container.ts |
Adds storage injection, defensive JSON parsing, URL filtering, and guarded group restoration. |
Review effort: Balanced
| : undefined; | ||
| public storage: Storage; | ||
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| protected constructor(storage?: Storage) { |
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| const schemeMatch = /^([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*):/.exec(url); | ||
| if (schemeMatch && !["http", "https"].includes(schemeMatch[1].toLowerCase())) { | ||
| this.log("warn", `Blocked layout window with disallowed url scheme '${schemeMatch[1]}'`); | ||
| return undefined; | ||
| } |
| } | ||
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| try { | ||
| return JSON.parse(raw, (key, value) => ContainerBase.unsafeJsonKeys.has(key) ? undefined : value); |
| await container.loadLayout("Test"); | ||
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| expect(container.createWindow).toHaveBeenCalledWith("url", expect.objectContaining({ name: "1" })); | ||
| expect(({} as any).polluted).toBeUndefined(); |
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Summary
loadLayoutreplays a layout JSON blob fromlocalStorageon every future session, so a one-shot XSS that plants a maliciousdesktopJS-layoutsentry keeps firing on reload. This closes that off inContainerBase: