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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions python/packages/core/AGENTS.md
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Expand Up @@ -170,8 +170,8 @@ The vector store API is experimental under the shared `VECTOR_STORES` feature ID
- **`Skill`** - Abstract base for a skill definition bundling instructions (`content`) with frontmatter metadata, resources, and scripts. Concrete subclasses (`InlineSkill`, `FileSkill`, `ClassSkill`) accept a `frontmatter=SkillFrontmatter(...)` argument carrying the spec fields. Adding new spec fields is done in one place — on `SkillFrontmatter` — keeping the subclass constructors stable.
- **`SkillFrontmatter`** - L1 discovery metadata for a skill (`name`, `description`, `license`, `compatibility`, `allowed_tools`, `metadata`). All fields are mutable plain attributes; the constructor validates `name`, `description`, and `compatibility` against the spec but post-construction assignments are not re-validated. Spec fields are reachable on every skill via `skill.frontmatter`.
- **`SkillResource`** - Named supplementary content attached to a skill; holds either static `content` or a dynamic `function` (sync or async). Exactly one must be provided.
- **`SkillScript`** - An executable script attached to a skill; holds either an inline `function` (code-defined, runs in-process) or a `path` to a file on disk (file-based, delegated to a runner). Exactly one must be provided.
- **`SkillScriptRunner`** - Protocol for file-based script execution. Any callable matching `(skill, script, args) -> Any` satisfies it. Code-defined scripts do not use a runner.
- **`SkillScript`** - An executable script attached to a skill; inline scripts run in-process, while file-based scripts are delegated to a runner. Inline callbacks can declare a `FunctionInvocationContext` parameter (hidden from the schema) to access host values separately through `ctx.kwargs`. Custom `run()` overrides opt in with the same annotation; unannotated overrides retain runtime keyword forwarding.
- **`SkillScriptRunner`** - Protocol for file-based script execution. Any callable matching `(skill, script, args) -> Any` satisfies it. Code-defined scripts do not use a runner. Runners can opt into context injection with an additional keyword-bindable `FunctionInvocationContext` parameter that has a default value.
- **`SkillScriptArgumentParser`** - Public type alias for an optional callable `(raw args: dict | list[str] | str | None) -> dict | None` that converts the raw `args` value before an `InlineSkillScript` runs (applied before the inline list-args guard). It is an opt-in customization hook (port of .NET PR #6498) that lets callers support backends sending tool-call arguments in a non-conforming shape (e.g. vLLM JSON strings). The output is constrained to a `dict` (named keyword arguments) or `None`, because inline scripts bind arguments by keyword name. Supply it via the `argument_parser=` constructor arg on `InlineSkillScript`, `InlineSkill` (default for scripts added via `@skill.script`), or `ClassSkill` (default for scripts discovered via `@ClassSkill.script`). When `None` (the default), the raw value is used unchanged. File-based scripts are unaffected (their runner owns arg handling).
- **`SkillsProvider`** - Context provider (extends `ContextProvider`) that discovers file-based skills from `SKILL.md` files and/or accepts code-defined `Skill` instances. Follows progressive disclosure: advertise → load → read resources / run scripts. By default all three tools it exposes (`load_skill`, `read_skill_resource`, `run_skill_script`) are registered with `approval_mode="always_require"`, so every skill operation needs approval. To run unattended, pass one of the static auto-approval rules to `ToolApprovalMiddleware` (via `auto_approval_rules`): `SkillsProvider.read_only_tools_auto_approval_rule` approves only the read-only tools (`load_skill`, `read_skill_resource`) while still prompting for `run_skill_script`, and `SkillsProvider.all_tools_auto_approval_rule` approves every skill tool including script execution. Both rules reject any call carrying a `server_label` so they stay scoped to this provider's local tools and never auto-approve a same-named hosted tool. Alternatively, for trusted skills, the constructor / `from_paths` kwargs `disable_load_skill_approval`, `disable_read_skill_resource_approval`, and `disable_run_skill_script_approval` (all default `False`) opt individual tools out of approval entirely by registering them with `approval_mode="never_require"` (the auto-approval rules only apply to tools that still require approval). The tool names are also exposed as class constants (`LOAD_SKILL_TOOL_NAME`, `READ_SKILL_RESOURCE_TOOL_NAME`, `RUN_SKILL_SCRIPT_TOOL_NAME`).
- **`FileSkillsSource`** - `SkillsSource` that discovers file-based skills by scanning configured root paths for `SKILL.md`. The **configured root paths define the trust boundary** and are used as given (a root may itself be a symlink); everything discovered *below* a root is link-checked and fails closed. `_discover_skill_directories` rejects any entry that is a symbolic link, junction, or other reparse point (via the shared `agent_framework._filesystem.is_link_or_reparse_point` helper) before descending into it, and rejects a directory whose `SKILL.md` is itself such a link — otherwise a link planted under a root would be adopted as the skill root, and since every later guard treats the skill root as the boundary and only inspects segments below it, the link itself would never be inspected. Resource and script discovery apply the same rule per path segment via `_has_link_or_reparse_point_in_path`; source-discovered resources and scripts retain a `_SkillPathScope` pairing their configured root with their skill directory, and repeat containment, regular-file, and link checks immediately before reading or execution — scanning every segment from the configured root down to the file, so a skill directory (or any directory between it and the root) swapped for a link after discovery is rejected too. An `OSError` while inspecting an entry is treated as unsafe (skip / reject), never as "safe".
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