feat: data URI and remote fetch

README.md

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 ## Features
 
 - **Auto-detected protocols** — Kitty, Sixel, half-block fallback. Works on any modern terminal.
+- **Multiple sources** — local files, `data:` URIs (base64), and `http(s)://` URLs.
 - **Sandboxed decoder** — image bytes parsed in an isolated subprocess with Landlock + seccomp on Linux.
 - **No CGO required for the consumer** — pure-Go API surface; the C decoder is contained in the worker subprocess.
 - **Terminal pixel detection** — sizes output to the actual cell pixel dimensions when available.
@@ -55,6 +56,23 @@ func main() {
 }
 ```
 
+### Sources
+
+The `src` argument accepts any of:
+
+```go
+termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "/path/to/cat.png", opts)
+termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "https://example.com/cat.png", opts)
+termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "...", opts)
+```
+
+Remote URLs and data URIs are fetched/decoded in the parent process, then handed
+to the sandboxed worker over stdin — the worker still runs with Landlock denying
+all filesystem access. Remote payloads are capped at 64 MiB.
+
+Use `DisplayContext` to pass a `context.Context` for cancellation of HTTP fetches
+and decoding.
+
 ### Options
 
 | Field | Description |

docs/content/api.mdx

@@ -7,11 +7,28 @@ title: API Reference
 ## `termimage.Display`
 
 ```go
-func Display(w io.Writer, path string, opts Options) error
+func Display(w io.Writer, src string, opts Options) error
 ```
 
-Decodes the image at `path` and writes terminal graphics to `w`. Returns the
-first error encountered (file open, decode, or render failure).
+Decodes the image at `src` and writes terminal graphics to `w`. `src` may be:
+
+- a local file path (`/path/to/cat.png`)
+- an `http(s)://` URL
+- a `data:` URI with a base64 payload (`data:image/png;base64,...`)
+
+Remote URLs and data URIs are fetched/decoded in the parent process, then
+piped to the sandboxed worker over stdin. Payloads are capped at **64 MiB**.
+
+Returns the first error encountered (fetch, decode, or render failure).
+
+## `termimage.DisplayContext`
+
+```go
+func DisplayContext(ctx context.Context, w io.Writer, src string, opts Options) error
+```
+
+Same as `Display` but takes a `context.Context` for cancellation of HTTP
+fetches and sandboxed decoding.
 
 ## `termimage.Options`
 
@@ -47,5 +64,6 @@ image, writes raw RGBA to stdout, and calls `os.Exit(0)`.
 | `decode` | CGo stb_image binding. `decode.File(path)` and `decode.Bytes(data)` |
 | `detect` | Protocol detection. `detect.Best()` |
 | `render` | `render.Kitty`, `render.Sixel`, `render.HalfBlock` |
-| `sandbox` | Subprocess worker. `sandbox.Decode(path)` |
+| `sandbox` | Subprocess worker. `sandbox.Decode(path)`, `sandbox.DecodeBytes(data)` |
+| `internal/source` | Source resolver. Branches file path / `data:` URI / `http(s)://` URL |
 | `internal/resize` | `resize.Fit(img, maxW, maxH)` — BiLinear scale |

docs/content/getting-started.mdx

@@ -61,3 +61,30 @@ termimage.Display(os.Stdout, path, termimage.Options{
     MaxHeight: 1080,
 })
 ```
+
+## Remote images and data URIs
+
+`Display` accepts any of these as `src`:
+
+```go
+// Local file
+termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "/path/to/cat.png", opts)
+
+// Remote URL
+termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "https://example.com/cat.png", opts)
+
+// Data URI (base64 only)
+termimage.Display(os.Stdout, "...", opts)
+```
+
+Remote URLs are fetched in the parent process; payloads cap at 64 MiB. The
+sandboxed worker still runs — bytes are piped to it over stdin with Landlock
+denying all filesystem access.
+
+For cancellable fetches, use `DisplayContext`:
+
+```go
+ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+defer cancel()
+termimage.DisplayContext(ctx, os.Stdout, url, opts)
+```

docs/content/introduction.mdx

@@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ the best protocol your terminal supports.
 
 - **Three render modes** — Kitty graphics, DEC Sixel, Unicode half-block
   fallback. Auto-detected from environment.
+- **Multiple sources** — local files, `data:` URIs (base64), and `http(s)://`
+  URLs. Remote payloads capped at 64 MiB.
 - **CGo decode via stb_image** — single-header C library compiled with `-O3`.
   Significantly faster than Go's stdlib `image` package for large JPEG/PNG.
 - **Subprocess sandbox** — decode runs in an isolated child process with
-  Landlock filesystem restriction (read-only access to the target file only).
-  Seccomp allowlist is upcoming.
+  Landlock filesystem restriction (read-only access to the target file only,
+  or full lockdown for remote/data sources). Seccomp allowlist is upcoming.
 - **Zero forced dependencies** — Kitty and half-block use only stdlib. Sixel
   quantization is pure Go median-cut. The sandbox uses `golang.org/x/sys`.
 

docs/content/sandbox.mdx

@@ -16,14 +16,18 @@ do.
 
 When `Sandboxed: true`:
 
-1. The parent process spawns `os.Executable()` as a subprocess with
-   `TERMIMAGE_WORKER=1` and `TERMIMAGE_WORKER_PATH=<path>` in the environment.
-2. The child calls `MaybeRunWorker()`, which detects the env var and takes
+1. The parent resolves the source (file / `data:` URI / `http(s)://` URL).
+   Remote fetches and base64 decode happen here, **outside** the sandbox.
+2. The parent spawns `os.Executable()` as a subprocess with `TERMIMAGE_WORKER=1`
+   and `TERMIMAGE_WORKER_MODE=path|stdin` in the environment. For path mode
+   it also sets `TERMIMAGE_WORKER_PATH=<path>`; for stdin mode it pipes the
+   bytes to the child's stdin.
+3. The child calls `MaybeRunWorker()`, which detects the env var and takes
    over.
-3. **Before opening the file**, the child applies OS restrictions.
-4. The child reads, decodes, and writes raw RGBA pixels (`width[4] + height[4]
-   + pixels`) to stdout.
-5. The parent reads the pixel data over the pipe and renders it.
+4. **Before touching any input**, the child applies OS restrictions.
+5. The child decodes and writes raw RGBA pixels (`width[4] + height[4] +
+   pixels`) to stdout.
+6. The parent reads the pixel data over the pipe and renders it.
 
 > [!CAUTION]
 > The sandboxed child re-execs **your binary**, not a dedicated helper. If your
@@ -33,15 +37,29 @@ When `Sandboxed: true`:
 
 ## Landlock (Linux ≥5.13)
 
-Landlock restricts filesystem access to the target file only, read-only:
+In **path mode** (local file), Landlock restricts filesystem access to the
+target file only, read-only:
 
 ```go
 landlock.V3.BestEffort().RestrictPaths(landlock.ROFiles(path))
 ```
 
+In **stdin mode** (remote URL / data URI), no file access is needed — the
+worker reads bytes from the pipe — so Landlock is configured with no granted
+paths, denying all filesystem access:
+
+```go
+landlock.V3.BestEffort().RestrictPaths() // empty = deny-all
+```
+
 `BestEffort()` silently degrades on older kernels — the binary still runs, just
 without Landlock protection.
 
+> [!NOTE]
+> Network access for remote URLs happens **in the parent**, before the
+> sandboxed child is spawned. The child itself never gets to make network
+> calls — the bytes are already in memory by the time it starts.
+
 ## Seccomp (upcoming)
 
 A syscall allowlist via BPF is in progress. The allowlist must accommodate the

internal/source/source.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Package source resolves image sources: file paths, data URIs, and remote URLs.
+package source
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Kind tags how the source should be loaded.
+type Kind int
+
+const (
+	KindFile Kind = iota
+	KindBytes
+)
+
+// Resolved is the resolver result. Exactly one of Path or Bytes is set.
+type Resolved struct {
+	Kind  Kind
+	Path  string // when Kind == KindFile
+	Bytes []byte // when Kind == KindBytes
+}
+
+// MaxRemoteBytes caps remote/data URI payloads to prevent OOM on hostile servers.
+const MaxRemoteBytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024
+
+// Resolve inspects src and returns either a file path or pre-loaded bytes.
+// HTTP(S) URLs and data: URIs are fetched/decoded here; everything else is
+// treated as a file path.
+func Resolve(ctx context.Context, src string) (*Resolved, error) {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(src, "data:") {
+		b, err := decodeDataURI(src)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &Resolved{Kind: KindBytes, Bytes: b}, nil
+	}
+
+	if u, err := url.Parse(src); err == nil && (u.Scheme == "http" || u.Scheme == "https") {
+		b, err := fetch(ctx, src)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &Resolved{Kind: KindBytes, Bytes: b}, nil
+	}
+
+	return &Resolved{Kind: KindFile, Path: src}, nil
+}
+
+// decodeDataURI parses RFC 2397 data: URIs. Only base64-encoded payloads are
+// supported (the common form for images); plain percent-encoded payloads are
+// rejected — callers wanting that should pre-decode.
+func decodeDataURI(s string) ([]byte, error) {
+	rest := strings.TrimPrefix(s, "data:")
+	comma := strings.IndexByte(rest, ',')
+	if comma < 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: missing comma")
+	}
+	meta, payload := rest[:comma], rest[comma+1:]
+	if !strings.Contains(meta, "base64") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: only base64 payloads supported")
+	}
+	b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: base64 decode: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(b) > MaxRemoteBytes {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("data URI: payload exceeds %d bytes", MaxRemoteBytes)
+	}
+	return b, nil
+}
+
+func fetch(ctx context.Context, rawURL string) ([]byte, error) {
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: build request: %w", err)
+	}
+	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: fetch: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: HTTP %s", resp.Status)
+	}
+	b, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxRemoteBytes+1))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: read body: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(b) > MaxRemoteBytes {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote: response exceeds %d bytes", MaxRemoteBytes)
+	}
+	return b, nil
+}

internal/source/source_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+package source
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestResolve_File(t *testing.T) {
+	r, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "/tmp/cat.png")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
+	}
+	if r.Kind != KindFile {
+		t.Errorf("Kind = %v, want KindFile", r.Kind)
+	}
+	if r.Path != "/tmp/cat.png" {
+		t.Errorf("Path = %q", r.Path)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_DataURI(t *testing.T) {
+	payload := []byte("hello-bytes")
+	uri := "data:image/png;base64," + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
+	r, err := Resolve(context.Background(), uri)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
+	}
+	if r.Kind != KindBytes {
+		t.Fatalf("Kind = %v, want KindBytes", r.Kind)
+	}
+	if string(r.Bytes) != string(payload) {
+		t.Errorf("Bytes mismatch: %q", r.Bytes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_DataURI_RejectsNonBase64(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "data:text/plain,hello")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for non-base64 data URI")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_DataURI_BadBase64(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "data:image/png;base64,!!!not-base64!!!")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for invalid base64")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_HTTP(t *testing.T) {
+	body := []byte("pretend-png-bytes")
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = w.Write(body)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	r, err := Resolve(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/x.png")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
+	}
+	if r.Kind != KindBytes {
+		t.Fatalf("Kind = %v, want KindBytes", r.Kind)
+	}
+	if string(r.Bytes) != string(body) {
+		t.Errorf("body mismatch: %q", r.Bytes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_HTTP_NonOK(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	_, err := Resolve(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/missing.png")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected error for HTTP 404")
+	}
+	if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "404") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention status: %v", err)
+	}
+}