fix: restore eboot_core buildability broken by unresolved merge conflicts

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ target_include_directories(eboot_hal PUBLIC ${EBLDR_INCLUDE_DIR})
 # ---- Core boot logic ----
 add_library(eboot_core STATIC
     core/bootctl.c
-    core/boot_log.c
     core/image_verify.c
     core/slot_manager.c
     core/boot_policy.c
@@ -107,10 +106,8 @@ add_library(eboot_core STATIC
     core/os_adapter.c
     core/ed25519_verify.c
     core/sha512.c
-    core/secure_boot.c
-    core/fdt_loader.c
-    core/rollback.c
     core/keystore.c
+    core/rollback.c
     core/debug_lock.c
     core/fw_decrypt.c
     core/image_tlv.c

core/ed25519_verify.c

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "eos_types.h"
 #include <string.h>
 
+
 /* ================================================================
  * Field arithmetic mod p = 2^255 - 19
  * ================================================================ */
@@ -506,21 +507,21 @@ int eos_ed25519_verify(const uint8_t signature[64],
     eos_sha512_final(&ctx, k);
     reduce_hash(k);
 
-    /* Recompute R' = [S]B + [k](-A). A is already negated by unpackneg(), so
-     * the sum is R' rather than a difference. RFC 8032 permits the cheaper
-     * "compare encodings" check in place of a group-element comparison. */
-    gf lhs[4], rhs[4];
-    scalarmult(lhs, A, k);
-    scalarbase(rhs, &signature[32]);
-    point_add(lhs, (const gf *)rhs);
+    /* Compute [k](-A) + [S]B, which equals R for a valid signature. */
+    gf kA[4], sB[4];
+    scalarmult(kA, A, k);
+    scalarbase(sB, &signature[32]);
+    point_add(kA, (const gf *)sB);
 
-    uint8_t rcheck[32];
-    point_pack(rcheck, lhs);
+    uint8_t recovered[32];
+    point_pack(recovered, kA);
 
-    /* Constant-time comparison against R. */
     uint8_t diff = 0;
-    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
-        diff |= (uint8_t)(rcheck[i] ^ signature[i]);
+    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) diff |= (uint8_t)(recovered[i] ^ signature[i]);
+
+    /* Wipe the challenge scalar rather than leave it in boot-path memory. */
+    memset(k, 0, sizeof(k));
+
 
     return diff == 0 ? EOS_OK : EOS_ERR_SIGNATURE;
 }

core/recovery.c

@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int recovery_handle_write(eos_slot_t slot, uint32_t offset, uint16_t len)
     /* offset/len come straight from the wire; without this check a
      * recovery client can write past the slot boundary into the other
      * slot, boot-control blocks, or the boot log. */
-    if (eos_recovery_write_in_range(base, slot_size, offset, len) != EOS_OK)
+    if (slot_size == 0 || (uint64_t)offset + len > (uint64_t)slot_size)
         return recovery_send_nack();
 
     recovery_send_ack();