The latest released version receives security fixes.
Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories rather than opening a public issue. You can expect an initial response within a week.
A few things are worth knowing about motionless' threat model:
- The control socket lives in
$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/motionless/(mode 0700, owned by you) and is created mode 0600. Anything that can write to it can show, hide or stop the overlay — the same power as a process running as you. - The
udpmotion source binds127.0.0.1by default. Changingmotion.udp.hostto a routable address lets anything on that network move your dots. The payload is parsed as JSON or CSV into three floats and nothing else, but the exposure is real: only widen the bind address on a network you trust. - The installer runs your package manager through
sudoto install GTK bindings. Read it before piping it to a shell — as you should with any installer.--no-depsskips that step entirely.