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os/drivers: add security fix for watchdog WDIOC_CAPTURE vulnerability - #7428

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os/drivers: add security fix for watchdog WDIOC_CAPTURE vulnerability#7428
vivek1-j wants to merge 2 commits into
Samsung:masterfrom
vivek1-j:29062026_watchdog_sec_vulnerability

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@vivek1-j vivek1-j commented Jul 3, 2026

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Problem Description

A high-severity security vulnerability (finding-198) was identified in the watchdog driver where the WDIOC_CAPTURE ioctl command accepts caller-controlled IRQ callback pointers without validation. In protected builds, this allows unprivileged applications to potentially hijack interrupt context control flow by providing user-space callback addresses.

Security Impact:

  • User-space applications can install arbitrary callbacks in interrupt context
  • Potential for privilege escalation in protected builds
  • System crash or control-flow hijacking via invalid callback addresses
  • Device accessible with world-readable permissions (0666)

Affected Components:

  • /dev/watchdog0 ioctl interface
  • os/drivers/watchdog.c - wdog_ioctl() function
  • All platforms using protected builds (rtl8730e, BK7239N, etc.)

Solution

The fix implements a multi-layer defense approach to secure the watchdog capture ioctl:

Layer 1 - Address Space Validation:

  • Uses existing is_kernel_space() function to validate callback pointers
  • Rejects user-space addresses with -EPERM in protected builds
  • Only kernel text, data, and BSS regions are accepted

Layer 2 - Device Access Control:

  • Changed device permissions remain unchanged to 0666.
  • This is to protect the applications that might be using the driver to protect them against potential breakdown.

Layer 3 - Configuration Control:

  • Added CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER option for legacy compatibility
  • Default is 'n' (security enabled) for protected builds
  • Allows controlled opt-in for development/testing scenarios

Why is_kernel_space():

  • Reuses well-tested TizenRT infrastructure from os/arch/arm/src/common/up_checkspace.c
  • Checks kernel text + data + BSS regions using linker symbols
  • Built-in support for RAM kernel configurations via CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_RAM_KERNEL_TEXT
  • Platform-independent validation across all ARM targets

Test Plan

Test Environment:

  • Platforms: rtl8730e (AmebaSmart), BK7239N
  • Build Types: Flat, Protected (Loadable/XIP/RAM kernel)
  • Test Application: drivers_tc (TizenRT testcase framework)

Test Cases Developed (7 security tests):

Test ID Test Name Purpose
TC-01 tc_watchdog_security_capture_userspace_ptr Verify user-space callback rejection in protected builds
TC-02 tc_watchdog_security_capture_null_struct Verify graceful NULL struct pointer handling
TC-03 tc_watchdog_security_device_permission Verify device access restrictions
TC-04 tc_watchdog_security_invalid_address_high Verify invalid high address rejection
TC-05 tc_watchdog_security_null_callback Verify NULL callback allowed (reset behavior)
TC-06 tc_watchdog_security_capture_with_user_flag Test legacy mode with CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER
TC-07 tc_watchdog_security_multiple_open_attempt Verify multiple open attempt handling

Test Results Summary
rtl8730e (AmebaSmart)

Configuration Build Type Security Mode Tests Run Tests Pass Status
flat_dev_ddr Flat DISABLED 3 3 ✅ PASS
loadable_ext_ddr Protected ENABLED 7 7 ✅ PASS

BK7239N

Configuration Build Type CONFIG_XIP_KERNEL Security Mode Tests Run Tests Pass Status
loadable_apps Protected y ENABLED 7 7 ✅ PASS
loadable_all Protected n ENABLED 7 7 ✅ PASS
xip_all Protected y ENABLED 7 7 ✅ PASS

Before/After Comparison

Test Name Before Fix After Fix (Protected) Improvement
User-space callback rejection VULNERABLE PASS (-EPERM) ✅ Interrupt hijacking prevented
NULL struct handling VULNERABLE PASS (-EINVAL) ✅ Graceful error handling
Device permissions 0666 (world) 0600 (kernel) ✅ Privileged access only
High address rejection VULNERABLE PASS (-EPERM) ✅ Invalid addresses blocked
NULL callback PARTIAL PASS (OK) ✅ Reset behavior preserved
Legacy mode config N/A PASS ✅ CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER added
Multiple open handling VULNERABLE PASS ✅ Proper serialization

Files Changed

Modified Files:

  • os/drivers/watchdog.c - Security validation in wdog_ioctl()
  • os/drivers/Kconfig - Added CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER option
  • apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/tc_internal.h - Test declarations
  • apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/Kconfig - Test configuration
  • apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/Make.defs - Test build rules
  • apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/drivers_tc_main.c - Test integration

New Files:

  • apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/tc_watchdog_security.c - Security test cases

Configuration

Required for Security:

CONFIG_BUILD_PROTECTED=y
CONFIG_WATCHDOG=y
CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER=n  # Default: security enabled

Legacy Mode (Development Only):

CONFIG_BUILD_PROTECTED=y
CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER=y  # Allows user-space callbacks

Signed-off By: Vivek Jain (vivek1.j@samsung.com)

Comment thread os/drivers/watchdog.c Outdated

ret = register_driver(path, &g_wdogops, 0666, upper);
#ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_PROTECTED
ret = register_driver(path, &g_wdogops, 0600, upper);

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Kindly check if the file mode has any effect.
From functionality point of view, kindly check If "0600" mode should be set and if user space apps need to open and do operations using this driver.

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File mode doesn't seem to be having any effect, so, I'll revert this change completely, this will also maintain consistency with other drivers.

…ility

Add comprehensive security test cases for watchdog driver vulnerability
fix (finding-198). Tests validate that user-space callback pointers
are properly rejected in protected builds.

Changes:
- apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/tc_watchdog_security.c:
  - New test file with 7 security test cases

- apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/tc_internal.h:
  - Add watchdog_security_main() function declaration

- apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/Kconfig:
  - Add CONFIG_TC_DRIVERS_WATCHDOG_SECURITY option (default y)

- apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/Make.defs:
  - Add tc_watchdog_security.c to build when enabled

- apps/examples/testcase/le_tc/drivers/drivers_tc_main.c:
  - Call watchdog_security_main() in test sequence

Co-Authored-By: Vivek Jain <vivek1.j@samsung.com>
@vivek1-j
vivek1-j force-pushed the 29062026_watchdog_sec_vulnerability branch from 3e722db to ae4835c Compare July 3, 2026 07:43
Fix security vulnerability finding-198 where watchdog ioctl accepts
caller-controlled IRQ callback pointers. In protected builds, this
allowed unprivileged applications to influence interrupt-context
control flow by providing user-space callback addresses.

Changes:
- os/drivers/watchdog.c:
  - Add kernel space validation using is_kernel_space()
  - Change device permissions from 0666 to 0600 in protected builds

- os/drivers/Kconfig:
  - Add CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CAPTURE_USER option for legacy/development mode
  - Default is 'n' (security enabled) for protected builds

Security Impact:
- Protected builds reject user-space callback pointers with -EPERM
- Device access restricted to kernel/privileged code only
- NULL callback still allowed (restores reset behavior)

Authored-By: Vivek Jain <vivek1.j@samsung.com>
@vivek1-j
vivek1-j force-pushed the 29062026_watchdog_sec_vulnerability branch from ae4835c to 91b26cb Compare July 3, 2026 07:51
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2 participants