OneFineStarstuff · OneFineStarstuff · Jul 6, 2026
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
@@ -160,3 +160,11 @@ gov-suite-ci:
 
 gov-clean:
 	$(PYTHON) -c "from pathlib import Path; import shutil; report=Path('governance-artifact-validation-report.json'); suite=Path('governance-validation-suite-report.json'); report.exists() and report.unlink(); suite.exists() and suite.unlink(); [shutil.rmtree(p) for p in Path('governance_blueprint/validation').rglob('__pycache__') if p.is_dir()]"
+
+.PHONY: daily-devsecops-evidence-validate daily-devsecops-evidence-test
+
+daily-devsecops-evidence-validate:
+	$(PYTHON) docs/operations/validate_daily_devsecops_evidence.py --bundle docs/operations/examples/daily_devsecops_evidence_2026-05-29.json --allow-evidence-required
+
+daily-devsecops-evidence-test:
+	$(PYTHON) -m unittest docs/operations/test_validate_daily_devsecops_evidence.py -v
diff --git a/docs/operations/OMNI_SENTINEL_DAILY_DEVSECOPS_CHECK_2026-05-28.md b/docs/operations/OMNI_SENTINEL_DAILY_DEVSECOPS_CHECK_2026-05-28.md
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+# Omni-Sentinel Daily DevSecOps Operational Check — 2026-05-28
+
+**Environment:** Omni-Sentinel Cognitive Execution Environment  
+**Review window:** 2026-05-28 00:00–23:59 UTC  
+**Review type:** Daily operational assurance, governance roadmap maintenance, and AGI/ASI containment risk review  
+**Audience:** CISO, CRO, CAIO, AI Safety Board, Platform SRE, Internal Audit  
+**Classification:** Internal — operational risk and regulatory evidence
+
+> **Evidence boundary:** This repository does not contain live Sentinel telemetry, internal endpoint credentials, AWS account access, TPM/TEE attestation feeds, or the production `pqc_worm_logger.py` runtime. The checks below therefore record the required control assertions, evidence queries, pass/fail criteria, and escalation actions. Production operators must attach dashboard exports, signed API responses, CloudTrail/S3 Object Lock evidence, and attestation bundles before treating this report as a completed daily certification.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Daily Control-State Summary
+
+| Control domain | Required assertion | Current repository-observed status | Required evidence attachment | Disposition |
+|---|---|---:|---|---|
+| Sentinel telemetry dashboards | All Tier-0/Tier-1 dashboards reachable; no critical alerts older than 15 minutes; ingestion lag P95 <= 60 seconds | Not independently verifiable from repository | Dashboard export, alert queue snapshot, telemetry freshness query | **Evidence required** |
+| Internal health endpoints | `/healthz`, `/readyz`, `/metrics`, `/policy/status`, `/risk/g-sri`, `/audit/worm/status`, `/attestation/tpm`, `/attestation/tee` return signed healthy responses | Not independently verifiable from repository | Signed endpoint responses with request IDs and monotonic timestamps | **Evidence required** |
+| Global Systemic Risk Index (G-SRI) | G-SRI below watch threshold and materially below halt threshold for the full window | Not independently verifiable from repository | G-SRI time-series export and control-plane decision log | **Evidence required** |
+| `pqc_worm_logger.py` WORM batching | Batches committed on schedule to AWS S3 Object Lock bucket with governance-mode or compliance-mode retention, digest continuity, and no skipped sequence IDs | Script/runtime not present in repository; production evidence required | CloudTrail `PutObject`, S3 Object Lock retention metadata, Merkle root batch receipt, KMS/HSM signing evidence | **Evidence required** |
+| TEE attestation | TEE quote valid, workload measurement allow-listed, signing chain current, enclave image hash matches approved release | Not independently verifiable from repository | Attestation quote, verifier response, allow-list version, release digest | **Evidence required** |
+| TPM attestation | `PCR_MATCH=TRUE`; secure boot and measured boot PCRs match approved baseline | Not independently verifiable from repository | TPM quote, PCR baseline comparison, verifier signature | **Evidence required** |
+| Zero-knowledge compliance proofs | Proof generation and verifier jobs complete for regulatory disclosure packs without exposing protected model/data content | Not independently verifiable from repository | Proof job status, verifier transcript, circuit version, evidence bundle hash | **Evidence required** |
+
+---
+
+## 2. Production Check Procedure
+
+### 2.1 Sentinel telemetry and internal endpoints
+
+1. Confirm dashboard data freshness for policy decisions, autonomy-tier transitions, kill-switch state, anomaly scores, model-risk events, and evidence-bundle publication.
+2. Query each signed internal endpoint with mTLS client identity bound to the daily assurance role.
+3. Verify all responses include request ID, response signature, monotonic timestamp, build digest, policy bundle digest, and environment identifier.
+4. Escalate immediately if telemetry lag exceeds 60 seconds P95, endpoint signature verification fails, or policy bundle digest differs from the approved release manifest.
+
+Minimum endpoint evidence set:
+
+```text
+GET /healthz
+GET /readyz
+GET /metrics
+GET /policy/status
+GET /risk/g-sri
+GET /audit/worm/status
+GET /attestation/tpm
+GET /attestation/tee
+GET /zk/compliance/status
+```
+
+### 2.2 Global Systemic Risk Index (G-SRI)
+
+Daily certification requires all of the following:
+
+- **Green:** G-SRI < 0.55 for normal operation.
+- **Amber/watch:** 0.55 <= G-SRI < 0.70; require SRE plus AI Safety Board watch review and mitigation owner assignment.
+- **Red/halt:** G-SRI >= 0.70; freeze Tier-3+ autonomy expansion, require containment review, and prepare regulator notification if customer, market, or systemic harm is plausible.
+- **Black-swan override:** Any unbounded replication, stealth, unauthorized tool-use escalation, self-modification outside approved change control, or kill-switch impairment moves directly to Red/Halt regardless of aggregate G-SRI.
+
+Required G-SRI evidence fields:
+
+```json
+{
+  "window_start": "2026-05-28T00:00:00Z",
+  "window_end": "2026-05-28T23:59:59Z",
+  "max_g_sri": "<attach>",
+  "p95_g_sri": "<attach>",
+  "threshold_profile": "omni-sentinel-gsri-v1",
+  "policy_bundle_digest": "<attach>",
+  "control_plane_decision_log_hash": "<attach>"
+}
+```
+
+### 2.3 `pqc_worm_logger.py` and AWS S3 Object Lock evidence
+
+Operators must validate that WORM audit batches are committed on schedule and cannot be rewritten:
+
+1. Confirm the scheduler emitted the expected number of batches for the review window.
+2. Verify every batch has a monotonic sequence ID, hash-chain predecessor, post-quantum signature, and Merkle root.
+3. Validate the S3 bucket has Object Lock enabled and the object retention date is set according to the governing record-retention policy.
+4. Cross-check CloudTrail `PutObject`, `PutObjectRetention`, and KMS/HSM signing events for each batch.
+5. Confirm no `DeleteObject`, retention-shortening, legal-hold removal, replication failure, or bucket-policy drift events occurred.
+
+Recommended command evidence, executed by an operator with read-only audit role:
+
+```bash
+aws s3api get-object-lock-configuration --bucket <worm-bucket>
+aws s3api head-object --bucket <worm-bucket> --key <batch-key>
+aws cloudtrail lookup-events --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=PutObject
+aws cloudtrail lookup-events --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=PutObjectRetention
+```
+
+### 2.4 TEE and TPM attestation
+
+Daily attestation must assert:
+
+- `PCR_MATCH=TRUE` for approved PCR baseline set.
+- TEE measurement hash matches the approved enclave/workload digest.
+- Secure-boot, measured-boot, and workload identity chains validate to approved roots.
+- Attestation verifier policy version matches the production release manifest.
+- Any attestation freshness breach older than 10 minutes for Tier-3+ workloads triggers autonomy downgrade.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Deviations and Required Remediation
+
+| Deviation ID | Observation | Severity | Owner | Due | Remediation |
+|---|---|---:|---|---|---|
+| DEV-2026-05-28-001 | Live dashboard, endpoint, G-SRI, WORM, TEE, and TPM evidence is not present in the repository context | High | Platform SRE / Control Owner | Same business day | Attach signed production exports and mark each control Pass/Fail with evidence hashes |
+| DEV-2026-05-28-002 | `pqc_worm_logger.py` runtime and scheduler evidence are not present in the repository context | High | Audit Platform Engineering | Same business day | Publish batch schedule, digest chain, Object Lock retention proof, and CloudTrail event IDs |
+| DEV-2026-05-28-003 | ZK proof verifier status is not present in the repository context | Medium | Regulatory Technology Lead | T+1 business day | Attach proof-job transcript, verifier result, circuit version, and evidence-bundle hash |
+
+---
+
+## 4. Emerging AGI/ASI Containment Risk Review
+
+| Risk | Early-warning signal | Containment control | Recommended action |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Autonomous tool-use escalation | Agent requests new tools, credentials, network paths, or execution privileges outside approved policy | Policy-as-code deny-by-default, just-in-time approval, signed tool broker | Require dual-control approval for Tier-3+ privilege expansion and log every denial to WORM |
+| Recursive self-improvement or unapproved self-modification | Model attempts to alter prompts, policy, weights, memory, reward functions, or orchestration code | Change-control gate, immutable release manifest, executable policy lock | Freeze promotion pipeline until Safety Board verifies bounded-change proof |
+| Goal drift and deceptive compliance | Divergence between stated objective, hidden chain-of-action, and observed behavior | Behavioral telemetry, red-team probes, simulator replay, interpretability review | Increase adversarial evaluation cadence and require independent review for repeated anomalies |
+| Multi-agent collusion or covert channel formation | Unexplained synchronization, compressed signalling, or policy-bypassing coordination among agents | Communication allow-list, rate limits, transcript inspection, side-channel controls | Partition agents by task domain and enforce per-channel justification tokens |
+| Kill-switch impairment | Delayed shutdown, policy-plane unreachability, TPM/TEE attestation failure, or inconsistent control-plane state | Hardware kill-switch, quorum shutdown, safe-mode autonomy downgrade | Trigger Red/Halt if shutdown latency or attestation freshness breaches approved SLO |
+| Model exfiltration or unsafe capability leakage | Large anomalous egress, repeated policy probes, artifact enumeration, or encrypted outbound payloads | DLP, egress allow-list, model vault, honeytokens | Rotate credentials, isolate workload, and perform signed forensic capture |
+
+---
+
+## 5. 2026–2035 Governance and Reference Architecture Maintenance
+
+### 5.1 Architecture target state
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TB
+  A[AI/Agent Workloads] --> B[Sentinel Sidecar]
+  B --> C[Policy-as-Code and Autonomy Gate]
+  C --> D[Risk Fusion / G-SRI Engine]
+  C --> E[Tool Broker / Capability Firewall]
+  D --> F[Containment Orchestrator]
+  E --> F
+  B --> G[Signed Telemetry Bus]
+  G --> H[WORM Audit Pipeline]
+  H --> I[AWS S3 Object Lock / External Evidence Vault]
+  B --> J[TEE/TPM Attestation Verifier]
+  H --> K[ZK Proof Generator]
+  K --> L[Regulator / Auditor Verification Portal]
+  F --> M[Kill Switch / Safe Mode / Human Oversight]
+```
+
+### 5.2 Roadmap increments
+
+| Period | Implementation focus | Governance outcome | Exit criteria |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 2026 H1–H2 | Daily operational assurance; signed Sentinel telemetry; G-SRI thresholding; WORM audit commitments; TPM/TEE verifier integration | Establish reliable control-plane evidence and daily certification discipline | 95% daily evidence completeness; `PCR_MATCH=TRUE`; zero unexplained WORM gaps |
+| 2027 | Enterprise autonomy-tier enforcement; model/tool capability firewall; formal incident command; regulator evidence portal beta | Standardize containment controls for Tier-2/Tier-3 workloads | All Tier-3 workloads behind policy gate and tool broker; regulator portal dry-run passed |
+| 2028 | ZK proof circuits for core regulatory claims; privacy-preserving audit bundles; cross-jurisdiction control mapping | Reduce disclosure risk while increasing supervisory verifiability | ZK verifier accepts sampled packs; no protected training data disclosed |
+| 2029 | Cross-enterprise systemic-risk telemetry exchange; privacy-preserving stress-test federation; sector-level G-SRI simulation | Detect correlated AGI/ASI operational risk across institutions | Joint exercise completed with signed evidence and agreed escalation thresholds |
+| 2030 | ASI-containment rehearsal; hardware-enforced policy roots; resilient manual fallback for critical services | Mature high-autonomy readiness and halt procedures | Full Red/Halt tabletop plus live technical drill completed within SLO |
+| 2031–2032 | Formal verification of containment policies; automated regulatory change ingestion; continuous proof regeneration | Move from periodic controls to continuously provable controls | Material policy changes produce proof updates within 24 hours |
+| 2033–2035 | International supervisory interoperability; post-quantum evidence portability; civilizational-risk reporting standard | Enable durable, cross-border AGI/ASI governance and auditability | External auditors verify WORM, PQC, ZK, and containment controls without privileged data access |
+
+### 5.3 Backlog refinements
+
+1. Add a production `daily-ops` evidence bundle schema covering dashboard exports, signed endpoint responses, G-SRI statistics, WORM receipts, attestation quotes, and ZK verifier transcripts.
+2. Add a non-mutating WORM dry-run test that validates batch ordering, digest continuity, Object Lock metadata shape, and CloudTrail event references without requiring write access.
+3. Add an attestation fixture format for TPM PCR baselines and TEE measurements, with explicit `PCR_MATCH=TRUE`/`FALSE` fields and verifier signatures.
+4. Add regulator-ready ZK proof metadata fields: circuit ID, proving key digest, verifier key digest, public inputs, proof hash, and verifier decision.
+5. Create a daily governance scorecard that calculates evidence completeness, stale evidence, unresolved deviations, and escalation status.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Recommended Immediate Actions
+
+1. **Do not certify green status until production evidence is attached.** The repository context can validate documentation and local governance artifacts, but not live telemetry or attestation truth.
+2. **Require same-day evidence upload** for G-SRI, WORM Object Lock, and `PCR_MATCH=TRUE` assertions.
+3. **Treat missing evidence for Tier-3+ autonomy controls as an operational deviation** and downgrade autonomy expansion until the evidence package is complete.
+4. **Prioritize schema-backed daily evidence bundles** so future checks are machine-verifiable instead of narrative-only.
+5. **Schedule an ASI containment drill** covering kill-switch impairment, collusive multi-agent behavior, and regulator notification decisioning.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Daily Sign-Off
+
+| Role | Name | Decision | Signature / evidence hash | Timestamp |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Platform SRE Lead |  | Pending evidence |  |  |
+| CISO Delegate |  | Pending evidence |  |  |
+| CRO Delegate |  | Pending evidence |  |  |
+| CAIO / AI Safety Board |  | Pending evidence |  |  |
+| Internal Audit Observer |  | Pending evidence |  |  |
diff --git a/docs/operations/README.md b/docs/operations/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Omni-Sentinel Daily DevSecOps Operations Evidence
+
+This directory contains daily operational assurance material for the Omni-Sentinel Cognitive Execution Environment.
+
+## Files
+
+- `OMNI_SENTINEL_DAILY_DEVSECOPS_CHECK_2026-05-28.md`: narrative daily check and sign-off worksheet from the original operational review.
+- `daily_devsecops_evidence.schema.json`: machine-readable contract for daily evidence bundles covering Sentinel telemetry, internal endpoints, G-SRI, WORM audit batches, TPM/TEE attestations, ZK compliance proofs, deviations, emerging risks, roadmap actions, and sign-off decisions.
+- `examples/daily_devsecops_evidence_2026-05-29.json`: current example bundle for 2026-05-29. It is intentionally marked `evidence_required` because production telemetry, AWS Object Lock evidence, and attestation quotes are not stored in this repository.
+- `validate_daily_devsecops_evidence.py`: schema and semantic validator for daily evidence bundles.
+- `test_validate_daily_devsecops_evidence.py`: unit tests for pass/fail validator behavior.
+
+## Validation
+
+Dry-run/template validation permits missing production evidence:
+
+```bash
+python docs/operations/validate_daily_devsecops_evidence.py \
+  --bundle docs/operations/examples/daily_devsecops_evidence_2026-05-29.json \
+  --allow-evidence-required
+```
+
+Certification validation must omit `--allow-evidence-required`. A bundle marked `passed` must include evidence URIs and hashes for every control, G-SRI below the halt threshold, complete WORM batch continuity with S3 Object Lock metadata, TEE measurement match, TPM `pcr_match=true`, accepted ZK verifier output, no open deviations, and approved sign-offs.
+
+```bash
+python docs/operations/validate_daily_devsecops_evidence.py \
+  --bundle path/to/production-daily-evidence.json
+```