Implement: Contract Access Control Management

.kiro/specs/access-control-management/.config.kiro

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+{"specId": "47427b77-cc14-4111-9aa3-809be85c57c4", "workflowType": "requirements-first", "specType": "feature"}

.kiro/specs/access-control-management/requirements.md

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+# Requirements Document
+
+## Introduction
+
+The Access Control Management System provides a secure, auditable, and testable access
+control ecosystem for Soroban smart contracts deployed on the Stellar network. It
+extends the standard OpenZeppelin-inspired Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with
+granular permission tracking, reusable enforcement guards, structured audit event
+emission, a comprehensive Foundry-based test suite, and a React/TypeScript admin
+dashboard that visualizes the live access matrix across contract addresses.
+
+This feature integrates into the StarForge workspace as a Solidity-compatible smart
+contract module (targeting Soroban/Stellar), a Foundry test suite, and a React frontend
+component surfaced through the StarForge UI layer.
+
+---
+
+## Glossary
+
+- **AccessController**: The primary smart contract that manages role assignments and
+  enforces access policies.
+- **Role**: A named, bytes32-encoded identifier that groups a set of permissions
+  together (e.g., `ADMIN_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE`).
+- **Permission**: A granular, addressable capability that can be attached to or detached
+  from a Role.
+- **RoleAdmin**: The Role whose holders are authorized to grant and revoke a given Role.
+- **Principal**: An Ethereum/Soroban account address that may hold one or more Roles.
+- **AccessMatrix**: A read-only, UI-level data structure mapping contract addresses to
+  their active Roles and associated Permissions.
+- **AccessGuard**: A reusable Solidity modifier or equivalent Soroban guard function
+  that enforces a required Role at a contract entry point.
+- **AuditLog**: The ordered stream of on-chain events emitted by the AccessController
+  for all authorization actions.
+- **TestSuite**: The Foundry test file(s) that exercise the AccessController and
+  AccessGuard logic.
+- **Dashboard**: The React/TypeScript UI component that fetches and renders the
+  AccessMatrix for a connected wallet or admin user.
+- **Foundry**: The Solidity smart-contract testing framework (forge) used for the
+  test suite.
+- **NatSpec**: Ethereum Natural Language Specification format for Solidity inline
+  documentation.
+- **RBAC**: Role-Based Access Control — the authorization model used throughout this
+  feature.
+
+---
+
+## Requirements
+
+### Requirement 1: Role Lifecycle Management
+
+**User Story:** As a contract administrator, I want to create, assign, and revoke roles
+dynamically, so that I can manage which accounts are authorized to perform privileged
+actions on deployed contracts.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. THE AccessController SHALL define a `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` (bytes32 value of `0x00`)
+   that acts as the root administrative role.
+
+2. IF a Principal holds the RoleAdmin for a given Role, THEN THE AccessController SHALL
+   allow that Principal to grant that Role to any non-zero account address.
+
+3. IF a Principal holds the RoleAdmin for a given Role, THEN THE AccessController SHALL
+   allow that Principal to revoke that Role from any account address.
+
+4. WHEN a Role is granted to an account that already holds it, THE AccessController
+   SHALL treat the operation as a no-op and SHALL NOT emit a duplicate `RoleGranted`
+   event.
+
+5. WHEN a Role is revoked from an account that does not hold it, THE AccessController
+   SHALL treat the operation as a no-op and SHALL NOT emit a spurious `RoleRevoked`
+   event.
+
+6. THE AccessController SHALL expose a `hasRole(bytes32 role, address account)` query
+   that returns a boolean indicating whether the account currently holds the role.
+
+7. THE AccessController SHALL expose a `getRoleAdmin(bytes32 role)` query that returns
+   the bytes32 identifier of the role whose holders may grant/revoke the queried role.
+
+8. IF a caller attempts to grant or revoke a Role without holding the corresponding
+   RoleAdmin, THEN THE AccessController SHALL revert the transaction with error code
+   `AccessControl__UnauthorizedAdminAction`.
+
+9. IF a caller holds the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, THEN THE AccessController SHALL allow
+   that caller to change the RoleAdmin of any Role via `setRoleAdmin(bytes32 role,
+   bytes32 adminRole)`.
+
+10. IF a caller does not hold the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` and attempts to call
+    `setRoleAdmin`, THEN THE AccessController SHALL revert with
+    `AccessControl__UnauthorizedAdminAction`.
+
+11. THE AccessController SHALL support a `renounceRole(bytes32 role, address account)`
+    function that allows a Principal to remove a Role from their own address, provided
+    `account == msg.sender`.
+
+12. IF `renounceRole` is called with `account != msg.sender`, THEN THE AccessController
+    SHALL revert with `AccessControl__UnauthorizedAdminAction`.
+
+13. IF `grantRole` is called with `account == address(0)`, THEN THE AccessController
+    SHALL revert with `AccessControl__InvalidAccount`.
+
+---
+
+### Requirement 2: Granular Permission Tracking
+
+**User Story:** As a security auditor, I want each role to carry a defined set of
+granular permissions, so that I can verify that accounts only have the minimum required
+capabilities.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. THE AccessController SHALL store a mapping from each Role to a set of Permission
+   identifiers (bytes32).
+
+2. WHEN a Permission is added to a Role, THE AccessController SHALL emit a
+   `PermissionAdded(bytes32 indexed role, bytes32 indexed permission)` event.
+
+3. WHEN a Permission is removed from a Role, THE AccessController SHALL emit a
+   `PermissionRemoved(bytes32 indexed role, bytes32 indexed permission)` event.
+
+4. THE AccessController SHALL expose a `roleHasPermission(bytes32 role, bytes32 permission)`
+   query that returns `true` if the permission is currently associated with the role,
+   and `false` otherwise — including for roles that have no permissions assigned.
+
+5. THE AccessController SHALL expose a `getPermissionsForRole(bytes32 role)` query that
+   returns the complete list of Permission identifiers currently associated with that
+   role; for a role with no permissions, it SHALL return an empty `bytes32[]` array.
+
+6. IF a caller attempts to add or remove a Permission from a Role without holding the
+   `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, THEN THE AccessController SHALL revert with error code
+   `AccessControl__InsufficientPrivilege`.
+
+7. WHEN the same Permission is added to a Role that already contains it, THE
+   AccessController SHALL treat the operation as a no-op and SHALL NOT emit a duplicate
+   `PermissionAdded` event.
+
+8. WHEN a Permission that is not associated with a Role is removed from that Role, THE
+   AccessController SHALL treat the operation as a no-op and SHALL NOT emit a spurious
+   `PermissionRemoved` event.
+
+---
+
+### Requirement 3: Access Policy Enforcement
+
+**User Story:** As a smart contract developer, I want reusable access guards that I can
+attach to contract entry points, so that unauthorized callers are blocked before any
+state mutation occurs.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. THE AccessController SHALL provide an `onlyRole(bytes32 role)` modifier that reverts
+   with error code `AccessControl__MissingRole(bytes32 role, address account)` when the
+   caller does not hold the specified role.
+
+2. THE AccessController SHALL provide an `onlyPermission(bytes32 permission)` modifier
+   that reverts with error code
+   `AccessControl__MissingPermission(bytes32 permission, address account)` when none of
+   the caller's roles carry the specified permission.
+
+3. WHILE a Role is revoked from an account, THE AccessController SHALL immediately
+   reject any subsequent call gated by `onlyRole` for that role from that account,
+   within the same block.
+
+4. WHEN a contract entry point is guarded by `onlyRole`, THE AccessController SHALL
+   NOT proceed to execute the function body before the role check passes.
+
+5. THE AccessController SHALL provide a `checkRole(bytes32 role, address account)`
+   internal view function that child contracts can call without incurring an external
+   call gas overhead.
+
+6. WHERE a function requires multiple roles simultaneously, THE AccessController SHALL
+   allow composition of guards so that all specified roles must be held by the caller;
+   failure of any single role check SHALL revert with the identifier of the first
+   failing role.
+
+---
+
+### Requirement 4: Access Audit Logging
+
+**User Story:** As a compliance officer, I want every authorization action to be
+recorded as an on-chain event, so that I can reconstruct a complete audit trail for
+regulatory and security review.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. WHEN a Role is granted to an account, THE AccessController SHALL emit a
+   `RoleGranted(bytes32 indexed role, address indexed account, address indexed sender)`
+   event.
+
+2. WHEN a Role is revoked from an account, THE AccessController SHALL emit a
+   `RoleRevoked(bytes32 indexed role, address indexed account, address indexed sender)`
+   event.
+
+3. WHEN a caller is rejected by `onlyRole` or `onlyPermission`, THE AccessController
+   SHALL emit an
+   `UnauthorizedAccessAttempted(bytes32 indexed role, address indexed account, address indexed target, bytes4 indexed selector)`
+   event before reverting the transaction.
+
+4. WHEN a RoleAdmin is changed via `setRoleAdmin`, THE AccessController SHALL emit a
+   `RoleAdminChanged(bytes32 indexed role, bytes32 indexed previousAdminRole, bytes32 indexed newAdminRole)`
+   event.
+
+5. WHEN a Principal renounces a Role, THE AccessController SHALL emit a
+   `RoleRevoked` event with `sender == account`.
+
+6. THE AccessController SHALL index all event parameters marked `indexed` to enable
+   efficient off-chain log filtering without requiring full event log scans.
+
+7. THE AccessController SHALL NOT suppress, batch, or delay event emission; each
+   authorization action SHALL produce exactly one corresponding event in the same
+   transaction.
+
+---
+
+### Requirement 5: Access Control Test Suite
+
+**User Story:** As a smart contract engineer, I want a comprehensive Foundry test suite
+that validates all access control behaviors, so that I can detect regressions before
+deployment.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. THE TestSuite SHALL include a test file `AccessControlTest.t.sol` organized into
+   named test contracts covering: role lifecycle, permission tracking, policy
+   enforcement, and audit logging.
+
+2. WHEN an authorized account calls a role-gated function, THE TestSuite SHALL assert
+   that the call succeeds and that the expected state change occurs.
+
+3. WHEN an unauthorized account calls a role-gated function, THE TestSuite SHALL assert
+   that the call reverts with the exact error code defined in the AccessController.
+
+4. WHEN a Role is revoked mid-test, THE TestSuite SHALL assert that the previously
+   authorized account is blocked on all subsequent role-gated calls within the same test
+   scenario.
+
+5. THE TestSuite SHALL include fuzz tests (using Foundry's `vm.assume`) that generate
+   arbitrary addresses and role bytes32 values to verify that only holders of the correct
+   role pass the `hasRole` check.
+
+6. THE TestSuite SHALL include invariant tests asserting that a Principal with no roles
+   assigned can never satisfy `hasRole` for any non-zero role value.
+
+7. THE TestSuite SHALL include tests for all defined error codes to ensure each revert
+   path produces the expected error identifier.
+
+8. THE TestSuite SHALL achieve 100% statement coverage of the AccessController contract
+   as verified by `forge coverage`.
+
+9. FOR ALL valid role-grant-then-revoke sequences on any address and role pair, THE
+   TestSuite SHALL verify that `hasRole` returns `false` after revocation (round-trip
+   property: grant → revoke → !hasRole).
+
+10. THE TestSuite SHALL include an event-emission test that calls `vm.expectEmit` to
+    assert that each audit event is emitted with the correct indexed parameters.
+
+---
+
+### Requirement 6: Access Control Visualization Dashboard
+
+**User Story:** As a dApp administrator, I want a React/TypeScript UI component that
+displays the current access matrix across all monitored contract addresses, so that I
+can quickly understand and audit role assignments without reading raw contract state.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. THE Dashboard SHALL render a table (AccessMatrix) with rows representing contract
+   addresses and columns representing Role names, with cells indicating whether each
+   Role is active on that contract.
+
+2. WHEN a contract address is selected in the AccessMatrix, THE Dashboard SHALL display
+   a detail panel listing all Principals assigned to each Role for that contract along
+   with their associated Permissions.
+
+3. THE Dashboard SHALL fetch role and permission data via a typed React hook
+   `useAccessMatrix(contractAddresses: string[])` that returns a structured
+   `AccessMatrixData` type.
+
+4. WHEN role or permission data is loading, THE Dashboard SHALL display a loading
+   skeleton in place of the AccessMatrix to prevent layout shift.
+
+5. IF the data fetch fails, THE Dashboard SHALL display an inline error banner with the
+   error message and a retry button, without crashing the component tree; no additional
+   fallback behavior beyond the error banner is required.
+
+6. THE Dashboard SHALL accept a `onRoleSelect` callback prop that is invoked with the
+   selected role bytes32 identifier and contract address whenever a matrix cell is
+   clicked.
+
+7. THE Dashboard component and all sub-components SHALL include JSDoc documentation on
+   all exported props interfaces and hook return types.
+
+8. THE Dashboard SHALL be keyboard-navigable: matrix cells SHALL be focusable via Tab
+   key, and selection SHALL be triggerable via Enter or Space.
+
+9. WHERE the list of contract addresses is empty, THE Dashboard SHALL render an empty
+   state message prompting the administrator to add contract addresses.
+
+10. THE Dashboard SHALL be implemented in TypeScript with strict mode enabled and SHALL
+    export all public types from a single barrel file (`index.ts`).
+
+---
+
+### Requirement 7: Security Invariants and Bypass Prevention
+
+**User Story:** As a security engineer, I want the access control system to enforce
+hard security invariants that prevent privilege escalation and bypass attacks, so that
+compromised or malicious accounts cannot gain unauthorized access.
+
+#### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. THE AccessController SHALL prevent any account from granting itself a Role it does
+   not already hold through the RoleAdmin mechanism; self-escalation SHALL revert with
+   `AccessControl__UnauthorizedAdminAction`.
+
+2. WHEN the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has no current holders and a caller attempts to grant
+   or revoke the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, THE AccessController SHALL revert with
+   `AccessControl__UnauthorizedAdminAction`; checks for other roles SHALL proceed
+   under their own RoleAdmin rules and are not affected by the absence of
+   `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` holders.
+
+3. THE AccessController SHALL use custom Solidity errors (not `require` string messages)
+   for all revert paths to minimize gas consumption and enable precise off-chain error
+   identification.
+
+4. THE AccessController SHALL NOT rely on `tx.origin` for any authorization check;
+   all role checks SHALL use `msg.sender` exclusively.
+
+5. IF a reentrancy attack is attempted against a role-gated function, THE AccessController
+   SHALL revert the reentrant call via a `ReentrancyGuard`-equivalent mechanism before
+   any state mutation is applied in the outer call.
+
+6. THE AccessController SHALL emit `UnauthorizedAccessAttempted` before reverting on
+   every failed authorization check, ensuring failed attacks are visible in the event
+   log even though the transaction reverts.
+
+7. FOR ALL possible sequences of grant and revoke operations, THE AccessController SHALL
+   maintain the invariant that `hasRole(role, account)` reflects the most recent
+   finalized state of that role assignment (no stale caches, no race conditions in
+   single-threaded EVM execution).