fix: DOM XSS hardening and safer GitHub Pages artifact - #14
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Prevent DOM XSS via Markdown preview, line diff output, and regex match rendering by adding escapeHtml() and applying it before innerHTML writes. Co-authored-by: Muki182 <Muki182@users.noreply.github.com>
Avoid bundling the checkout workspace (including .git) into the Pages upload, reducing accidental metadata exposure and deploy size. Co-authored-by: Muki182 <Muki182@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
This change set addresses high-severity correctness and security issues found in the static tool site and its Pages deployment workflow.
Bug and impact
DOM XSS (user-facing breakage / account takeover class in browser context)
Markdown preview, text diff, and regex match output wrote user-controlled strings into
innerHTMLwithout escaping. A concrete trigger is pasting e.g.<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>into Markdown, diff text, or a regex match substring, which previously executed script in the same origin as the page.GitHub Pages artifact scope (information disclosure / unnecessary blast radius)
The deploy workflow uploaded the entire checkout directory (
.) as the Pages artifact, which can include.gitand other non-site files, increasing risk of leaking repository metadata and bloating the published bundle.Root cause
renderMD(),textDiff(), andtestRegex()interpolated raw user text into HTML strings assigned toinnerHTML.upload-pages-artifactwas pointed at the repository root instead of a minimal static bundle.Fix and validation
escapeHtml()and applied it beforeinnerHTMLwrites in the affected tools; Markdown pipeline now escapes first, then applies the existing lightweight markdown transforms.index.htmlinto_site/and uploads_siteas the artifact.Validation: Manual reasoning on trigger scenarios above; repository has no JS test harness. Please smoke-test Markdown preview, text diff, and regex tools in the browser after deploy.
Commits
fix(security): escape user-controlled HTML in tool panelsfix(ci): ship only index.html in GitHub Pages artifact