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fix(api): store only a SHA-256 digest of session values - #571
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Sessions now store only the SHA-256 digest of the browser session value instead of the value itself, preventing a leaked database from yielding usable session cookies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018MnGTGHzHhFQCa22wRknUS Signed-off-by: valgulnecron <39313199+ValgulNecron@users.noreply.github.com>
Remove unused errors import from migrations_test.go and add the compiled sessions_digest_test.go fixture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018MnGTGHzHhFQCa22wRknUS Signed-off-by: valgulnecron <39313199+ValgulNecron@users.noreply.github.com>
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WalkthroughSession tokens are now stored as lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digests. Cookie issuance still returns the raw token, and authentication, cleanup, and logout hash presented tokens. Migration 014 deletes existing sessions. ChangesSession Digest Storage
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Suggested labels: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 20.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 20 functions across 4 files. (3 skipped: 3 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 2📝 Generate docstrings 💡
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TestLogin_PerUserRateLimit drains the package-singleton per-user bucket for alice, so the login cookie test seeds and logs in as digest-alice from its own client address. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018MnGTGHzHhFQCa22wRknUS Signed-off-by: valgulnecron <39313199+ValgulNecron@users.noreply.github.com>
CI Report - 6b2354drun 37342713837 - attempt 1 0 failed - 14 passed - 6 skipped - 28m4s elapsed Coverageno coverage/* commit statuses found on 6b2354d Changed
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @api/specs.md:
- Line 592: Update the migration-ordering statement for `Store.Migrate`: when
migrations 013 and 014 are both pending, they run in version order; a
later-added 013 can run after 014 only if 014 was recorded during an earlier
startup. Do not describe pending migrations as applying in any order.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
api/internal/auth/sessions.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_digest_test.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_test.goapi/internal/db/migrations/common/014_sessions_digest_reset.sqlapi/internal/db/migrations_test.goapi/specs.mddocs/security.md
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- GitHub Check: github-advanced-security
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⚠️ CI failures not shown inline (2)
GitHub Actions: Code scanning AI findings on PR #571 / 0_github-advanced-security.txt: Code scanning AI findings on PR #571
Conclusion: failure
##[group]Run set -euo pipefail
�[36;1mset -euo pipefail�[0m
�[36;1mecho "RUNNER_TEMP=$RUNNER_TEMP"�[0m
�[36;1mfind "$RUNNER_TEMP" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'git-credentials-*.config' -print -delete�[0m
�[36;1m�[0m
�[36;1m# Generate a unique token and stop processing workflow commands to prevent the runtime from injecting commands�[0m
�[36;1mSTOP_***REDACTED_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT*** /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)�[0m
�[36;1m�[0m
�[36;1m# Use a trap to ensure we always resume command processing and check for�[0m
�[36;1m# fallback error annotations, even if the runtime exits with a non-zero code�[0m
�[36;1m# (which would otherwise cause set -e to abort the shell before we get here).�[0m
�[36;1m# The trap preserves the original exit code.�[0m
�[36;1mcopilot_cleanup() {�[0m
�[36;1m �[0m
�[36;1m if [ -n "${GIT_PROXY_PID:-}" ] && kill -0 "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then�[0m
�[36;1m echo "Stopping git-proxy (pid=$GIT_PROXY_PID)..."�[0m
�[36;1m kill "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true�[0m
�[36;1m for _ in {1..25}; do�[0m
�[36;1m if ! kill -0 "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then break; fi�[0m
�[36;1m sleep 0.2�[0m
�[36;1m done�[0m
�[36;1m if kill -0 "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then�[0m
�[36;1m echo "git-proxy did not stop gracefully; forcing termination."�[0m
�[36;1m kill -KILL "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true�[0m
�[36;1m fi�[0m
�[36;1m wait "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true�[0m
�[36;1m fi�[0m
�[36;1m �[0m
�[36;1m echo "::$STOP_***REDACTED_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT***
�[36;1m FALLBACK_FILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/copilot-fallback-error.txt"�[0m
�[36;1m if [ -f "$FALLBACK_FILE" ]; then�[0m
�[36;1m FALLBACK_MSG=$(head -c 500 "$FALLBACK_FILE" | tr -d '\n\r')�[0m
�[36;1m echo "::error title=Copilot Error::${FALLBACK_MSG}"�[0m
GitHub Actions: Code scanning AI findings on PR #571 / github-advanced-security: Code scanning AI findings on PR #571
Conclusion: failure
##[group]Run set -euo pipefail
�[36;1mset -euo pipefail�[0m
�[36;1mecho "RUNNER_TEMP=$RUNNER_TEMP"�[0m
�[36;1mfind "$RUNNER_TEMP" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'git-credentials-*.config' -print -delete�[0m
�[36;1m�[0m
�[36;1m# Generate a unique token and stop processing workflow commands to prevent the runtime from injecting commands�[0m
�[36;1mSTOP_***REDACTED_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT*** /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)�[0m
�[36;1m�[0m
�[36;1m# Use a trap to ensure we always resume command processing and check for�[0m
�[36;1m# fallback error annotations, even if the runtime exits with a non-zero code�[0m
�[36;1m# (which would otherwise cause set -e to abort the shell before we get here).�[0m
�[36;1m# The trap preserves the original exit code.�[0m
�[36;1mcopilot_cleanup() {�[0m
�[36;1m �[0m
�[36;1m if [ -n "${GIT_PROXY_PID:-}" ] && kill -0 "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then�[0m
�[36;1m echo "Stopping git-proxy (pid=$GIT_PROXY_PID)..."�[0m
�[36;1m kill "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true�[0m
�[36;1m for _ in {1..25}; do�[0m
�[36;1m if ! kill -0 "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then break; fi�[0m
�[36;1m sleep 0.2�[0m
�[36;1m done�[0m
�[36;1m if kill -0 "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then�[0m
�[36;1m echo "git-proxy did not stop gracefully; forcing termination."�[0m
�[36;1m kill -KILL "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true�[0m
�[36;1m fi�[0m
�[36;1m wait "$GIT_PROXY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true�[0m
�[36;1m fi�[0m
�[36;1m �[0m
�[36;1m echo "::$STOP_***REDACTED_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT***
�[36;1m FALLBACK_FILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/copilot-fallback-error.txt"�[0m
�[36;1m if [ -f "$FALLBACK_FILE" ]; then�[0m
�[36;1m FALLBACK_MSG=$(head -c 500 "$FALLBACK_FILE" | tr -d '\n\r')�[0m
�[36;1m echo "::error title=Copilot Error::${FALLBACK_MSG}"�[0m
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📓 Path-based instructions (3)
CRITICAL: Flag test deletions or weakening: A test removed or commented out (sign: test file size decreased) A test case removed from a table-driven test A test condition relaxed (e.g., comparison changed from == to >) A test assertion remo...
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
api/internal/auth/sessions_test.goapi/internal/db/migrations_test.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_digest_test.go
CRITICAL: Behavior changes must update the relevant module's specs.md.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
api/internal/auth/sessions.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_test.goapi/internal/db/migrations_test.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_digest_test.go
CRITICAL: Gameplane's house rules forbid in-source lint suppressions.
⚙️ CodeRabbit configuration file
Files:
api/internal/auth/sessions.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_test.goapi/internal/db/migrations_test.goapi/internal/auth/sessions_digest_test.go
🪛 Betterleaks (1.8.1)
api/internal/auth/sessions_digest_test.go
[high] 311-311: Detected a potential hardcoded password literal, which may expose account credentials.
(generic-password)
🔇 Additional comments (6)
api/internal/auth/sessions.go (1)
6-6: LGTM!Also applies to: 8-8, 54-62, 65-66, 72-72, 156-156, 165-165, 181-181, 185-185, 195-195
api/internal/auth/sessions_digest_test.go (1)
1-345: LGTM!api/internal/auth/sessions_test.go (1)
44-44: LGTM!Also applies to: 58-58, 67-67, 185-185, 208-208, 223-223
docs/security.md (1)
18-18: LGTM!api/internal/db/migrations/common/014_sessions_digest_reset.sql (1)
1-6: LGTM!api/internal/db/migrations_test.go (1)
292-384: LGTM!
Pending migrations run in version order; only a file added after a later version was recorded runs out of order (CodeRabbit on #571). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018MnGTGHzHhFQCa22wRknUS Signed-off-by: valgulnecron <39313199+ValgulNecron@users.noreply.github.com>
Resolve api/specs.md after #561: keep the 013 share-link UID block before the 014 session-digest block and title the schema section 001-014. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018MnGTGHzHhFQCa22wRknUS Signed-off-by: valgulnecron <39313199+ValgulNecron@users.noreply.github.com>
Summary
The
sessionstable now stores only a SHA-256 digest of the browser session value. Previously a database read (backup, SQL access, a PostgreSQL replica) yielded cookies that could be used directly.sessionDigest(raw)returns the hex SHA-256 of the cookie value. It is used for the insert (Create), forlookupand its two cleanup deletes, and forHandleLogout. Thetokencolumn keeps its name and now holds the digest.Createstill returns the opaque raw value for the cookie, solocal.goandoidc.goare unchanged. A stored digest presented as a cookie is hashed again, matches nothing, and gets 401.expires_at) and user-wide revocation (DeleteForUser,DeleteUser, byuser_id) work as before.csrf_tokenis an independent random value compared with the header.common/014_sessions_digest_reset.sql(DELETE FROM sessions;, portable) deliberately invalidates them, so everyone signs in once after the upgrade.common/013. The runner applies any unrecorded file in any order and fails on duplicate versions, so a gap or out-of-order application is safe.api/specs.md(schema, sessions, 014),docs/security.md.Merge note: #561 edits the same
api/specs.mdregion. Whichever PR merges second keeps both migration blocks (013 before 014) and both bullets, and the heading becomesSchema (migrations 001-014).Tests
sessions_digest_test.go(new):csrf_tokenis stored as issued.migrations_test.go: 014 deletes rows that existed before it.sessions_test.gochange their bound argument fromtoktosessionDigest(tok); the logic is otherwise unchanged. They are inLookup_Expired,Lookup_CorruptExpires(two lines),HandleLogout,GCOnce_DeletesExpiredandStartGC.Test plan
go (api),api (postgres), lint (noctx, revive)api-authandupgradebuckets (sessions wiped on upgrade; logins happen after the upgrade)Nothing was built or run locally, at the maintainer's request; CI is the verification. Briefed at sonnet, implemented at haiku, reviewed at opus; the test fix was verified at sonnet.
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