Sync upstream: optimized v3 circuit + gnark security upgrade by stackchain · Pull Request #6 · Emurgo/proof-tool

stackchain · 2026-08-31T02:01:34Z

Summary

Merges Anastasia-Labs/proof-tool main (3b37efe) into the Emurgo fork.
Brings in the gnark upgrade that retires the unsafe v1/v2 proof keys (GHSA-3mvx-pp85-pm65) and the optimized ownership-destination-v3 circuit.
Includes the new preprod release proof-assets-ownership-destination-v3-preprod-191ca93-opt-reclaim-07d48bc5-r1 (new reclaim deployment 07d48bc5…, PK down to ~1.07 GB) that claim-fe will pin.

Test plan

CI green on the sync branch
claim-fe bun run prepare-proof-tool + build against the new release pin

…-mainnet-builtins-optimized-scripts Optimize Plutus V3 contracts for mainnet builtins

…t-one-shot-params-policy fix(contracts): compact one-shot params policy

…ovider-eval-for-preprod-deploy fix(web): use Scalus for PV11 local evaluation

…-optimized-preprod-references

…sia-Labs#48) Reviewed preparation merge for the guarded ownership-destination-v3 Preprod rollout.

…zed-circuit-preprod-cutover-tested Release optimized destination circuit to Preprod

…nark upgrade) into Emurgo fork

+
+async function initRuntime(msg) {
+  const msmCompile = compileMSMWorkerModule(msg.msmWorkerWasmUrl).catch(() => null);
+  importScripts(msg.wasmExecUrl);


+
+async function initRuntime(msg) {
+  const msmCompile = compileMSMWorkerModule(msg.msmWorkerWasmUrl).catch(() => null);
+  importScripts(msg.wasmExecUrl);


aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:03:58Z


-func digestConstraintSystem(ccs constraint.ConstraintSystem) (ceremonyDigest, error) {
+func writeAndDigestConstraintSystem(ccs constraint.ConstraintSystem, outputPath string) (ceremonyDigest, error) {
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(outputPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)


Potential file inclusion attack via reading file - high severity
If an attacker can control the input leading into the ReadFile function, they might be able to read sensitive files and launch further attacks with that information.

Show fix

Suggested change

f, err := os.OpenFile(outputPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)

for _, seg := range strings.Split(filepath.ToSlash(outputPath), "/") {

if seg == ".." {

return ceremonyDigest{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid file path")

}

}

f, err := os.OpenFile(outputPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:03:59Z

+async function compileMSMWorkerModule(url) {
+  if (!url) return null;
+  if (typeof WebAssembly.compileStreaming === 'function') {
+    return await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(fetch(url));


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:00Z

+  if (typeof WebAssembly.compileStreaming === 'function') {
+    return await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(fetch(url));
+  }
+  return await WebAssembly.compile(await (await fetch(url)).arrayBuffer());


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:01Z

+  go.env.GOMEMLIMIT = msg.gomemlimit ? String(msg.gomemlimit) : '3000MiB';
+  let instance;
+  if (typeof WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming === 'function') {
+    const result = await WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(fetch(msg.wasmUrl), go.importObject);


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:02Z

+    const result = await WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(fetch(msg.wasmUrl), go.importObject);
+    instance = result.instance;
+  } else {
+    const bytes = await (await fetch(msg.wasmUrl)).arrayBuffer();


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:03Z

+async function compileMSMWorkerModule(url) {
+  if (!url) return null;
+  if (typeof WebAssembly.compileStreaming === 'function') {
+    return await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(fetch(url));


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:04Z

+  if (typeof WebAssembly.compileStreaming === 'function') {
+    return await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(fetch(url));
+  }
+  return await WebAssembly.compile(await (await fetch(url)).arrayBuffer());


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:04Z

+  go.env.GOMEMLIMIT = msg.gomemlimit ? String(msg.gomemlimit) : '3000MiB';
+  let instance;
+  if (typeof WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming === 'function') {
+    const result = await WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(fetch(msg.wasmUrl), go.importObject);


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:05Z

+    const result = await WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming(fetch(msg.wasmUrl), go.importObject);
+    instance = result.instance;
+  } else {
+    const bytes = await (await fetch(msg.wasmUrl)).arrayBuffer();


HTTP request might enable SSRF attack - low severity
If an attacker can control the URL input leading into this http request, the attack might be able to perform an SSRF attack. This kind of attack is even more dangerous is the application returns the result of the URL fetch to the user. It can serve as an initial access point for an attacker for stealing credentials in the cloud.

Show fix

Remediation: If possible, only allow requests to verified domains. If not, consult the article linked above to learn about other mitigating techniques such as disabling redirects, blocking private IPs and making sure private services have internal authentication. If you return data coming from the request to the user, validate the data before returning it to make sure you don't return random data.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:06Z

-    "required_global_credential": "a4da74e7cb6ea4f4e60456a0a6eabf0ccf83464ebe55664390ef39f8"
+    "address": "addr_test1wqrafz79yssrysfer2pan35dxvdqlsw5ce202wn7nrt3f5qgsahq2",
+    "script_hash": "07d48bc524203241391a83d9c68d331a0fc1d4c654f53a7e98d714d0",
+    "required_global_credential": "11a14098f4b579a34ee8309e3c2733fd449e61ca1287b3d20f68e2de"


Exposed secret in apps/ownership-proof-web/public/proof-assets/reclaim-deployment.json - high severity
Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More Info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:07Z

+  "reclaim_base": {
+    "address": "addr_test1wqcdkvd4awd955tyug4gllatykxclrcmxyrfye4s5s8hj8cjy7xda",
+    "script_hash": "30db31b5eb9a5a5164e22a8fffab258d8f8f1b31069266b0a40f791f",
+    "required_global_credential": "0ba0ad6b8ead49c5df537b90f7089448ee1dc95c949f35ca0a550bf1"


Exposed secret in apps/ownership-proof-web/public/proof-releases/proof-assets-ownership-destination-v2-preprod-9fac96b-g3a-2m-reclaim-30db31b5-r1/assets/reclaim-deployment.json - low severity
Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More Info}

aikido-pr-checks · 2026-08-31T02:04:08Z

+  "reclaim_base": {
+    "address": "addr_test1wqrafz79yssrysfer2pan35dxvdqlsw5ce202wn7nrt3f5qgsahq2",
+    "script_hash": "07d48bc524203241391a83d9c68d331a0fc1d4c654f53a7e98d714d0",
+    "required_global_credential": "11a14098f4b579a34ee8309e3c2733fd449e61ca1287b3d20f68e2de"


Exposed secret in apps/ownership-proof-web/public/proof-releases/proof-assets-ownership-destination-v3-preprod-191ca93-opt-reclaim-07d48bc5-r1/assets/reclaim-deployment.json - low severity
Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.

_{Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.}
_{More Info}

colll78 and others added 26 commits August 3, 2026 21:22

Optimize Plutus V3 contracts for mainnet builtins

8f4c618

Merge pull request Anastasia-Labs#36 from Anastasia-Labs/codex/plutus…

649ba14

…-mainnet-builtins-optimized-scripts Optimize Plutus V3 contracts for mainnet builtins

fix(contracts): compact one-shot params policy

394af88

Merge pull request Anastasia-Labs#37 from Anastasia-Labs/codex/compac…

4512c4a

…t-one-shot-params-policy fix(contracts): compact one-shot params policy

fix(web): use provider eval for PV11 deploy

d996604

fix(web): use Scalus for local UPLC evaluation

ffb922b

Merge pull request Anastasia-Labs#38 from Anastasia-Labs/codex/use-pr…

d70bb7e

…ovider-eval-for-preprod-deploy fix(web): use Scalus for PV11 local evaluation

chore: bootstrap optimized reference cutover

e871dcf

chore(web): activate optimized Preprod scripts

ca99c37

Merge pull request Anastasia-Labs#39 from Anastasia-Labs/codex/deploy…

db7884d

…-optimized-preprod-references

security: upgrade gnark and retire unsafe proof keys

2bf497e

security: verify fixed proof artifacts end to end

76d9a92

docs: record fixed prover verification evidence

085c706

perf(circuit): optimize single-limb range checks

1a87e98

perf(circuit): reuse SHA majority xor across rounds

db3c7b1

perf(circuit): fold constant sigma decomposition

cfae336

perf(circuit): use seven-bit Ed25519 windows

500a225

perf: constrain bounded SHA byte packing

9818e28

test: refresh upgraded verifier coherence vectors

191ca93

test: bind contract fixtures to optimized v3 keys

99e88b0

Optimize destination circuit and refresh v3 verifier fixtures (Anasta…

693b6ad

…sia-Labs#48) Reviewed preparation merge for the guarded ownership-destination-v3 Preprod rollout.

chore: initialize optimized circuit cutover PR

fcf2a16

release optimized destination circuit to preprod

9800a1d

fix browser asset host for optimized release

f9418eb

Merge pull request Anastasia-Labs#50 from Anastasia-Labs/codex/optimi…

3b37efe

…zed-circuit-preprod-cutover-tested Release optimized destination circuit to Preprod

Merge Anastasia-Labs/proof-tool main (191ca93 optimized v3 circuit, g…

2d55682

…nark upgrade) into Emurgo fork

github-advanced-security Bot found potential problems Aug 31, 2026

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aikido-pr-checks Bot reviewed Aug 31, 2026

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Sync upstream: optimized v3 circuit + gnark security upgrade - #6

Sync upstream: optimized v3 circuit + gnark security upgrade#6
stackchain wants to merge 26 commits into
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sync/upstream-main-191ca93

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-	f, err := os.OpenFile(outputPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+	for _, seg := range strings.Split(filepath.ToSlash(outputPath), "/") {
+		if seg == ".." {
+			return ceremonyDigest{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid file path")
+		}
+	}
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(outputPath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)

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stackchain commented Aug 31, 2026

Summary

Test plan

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