🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] HMAC DoS 취약점 수정 - #509
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hmac.compare_digest에 non-ASCII 문자가 포함된 헤더가 전달될 경우 발생하는 TypeError를 방지하기 위해 두 문자열을 utf-8 바이트로 인코딩한 후 비교하도록 수정했습니다. 이는 특수 문자로 구성된 X-API-Key를 통한 Denial of Service (DoS) 공격을 방어합니다.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAPI 키 비교를 UTF-8 바이트 비교로 변경했습니다. 비ASCII API 키 입력에 대한 401 회귀 테스트와 취약점 기록을 추가했습니다. ChangesAPI 키 비교 보강
CI 검토 후속 계획
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The HMAC handling fix is localized and addresses malformed non-ASCII API keys safely. Merge is reasonable with owner awareness that the CI-timeout attribution in plan.md should be verified or corrected. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 20.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 5 functions across 2 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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| provided_key = request.headers.get("x-api-key", "") | ||
| if not any( | ||
| hmac.compare_digest(provided_key, key) for key in configured_keys | ||
| hmac.compare_digest(provided_key.encode("utf-8"), key.encode("utf-8")) for key in configured_keys |
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🔍 Runtime secrets still bypass registry
get_configured_api_keys still reads API keys directly from the environment. The mandatory repository rule requires runtime secrets to come from a credential registry.
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| def test_non_ascii_key_rejected_safely(self): | ||
| from fastapi import Request | ||
| import saas_web | ||
| import asyncio | ||
| import json | ||
| with patch.dict(os.environ, {"CODEC_CARVER_API_KEYS": "secret-key"}): | ||
| scope = { | ||
| "type": "http", | ||
| "method": "POST", | ||
| "path": "/shrink", | ||
| "headers": [(b"x-api-key", "안녕".encode("utf-8"))] | ||
| } | ||
| request = Request(scope) | ||
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| async def call_next(req): | ||
| return None | ||
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| response = asyncio.run(saas_web.require_api_key(request, call_next)) | ||
| self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 401) | ||
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| self.assertEqual(json.loads(response.body), {"error": "Invalid or missing API key"}) |
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🔍 Unicode key acceptance remains untested
The direct-ASGI test compares a non-ASCII header only against an ASCII key. It does not establish whether configured non-ASCII keys can authenticate through HTTP.
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| provided_key = request.headers.get("x-api-key", "") | ||
| if not any( | ||
| hmac.compare_digest(provided_key, key) for key in configured_keys | ||
| hmac.compare_digest(provided_key.encode("utf-8"), key.encode("utf-8")) for key in configured_keys |
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🟨 Runtime keys bypass credential registry
Every authenticated request still loads API keys through get_configured_api_keys from the process environment. This violates the mandatory credential-registry policy and leaves runtime secrets environment-backed.
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hmac.compare_digest에 non-ASCII 문자가 포함된 헤더가 전달될 경우 발생하는 TypeError를 방지하기 위해 두 문자열을 utf-8 바이트로 인코딩한 후 비교하도록 수정했습니다. 이는 특수 문자로 구성된 X-API-Key를 통한 Denial of Service (DoS) 공격을 방어합니다.
hmac.compare_digest에 non-ASCII 문자가 포함된 헤더가 전달될 경우 발생하는 TypeError를 방지하기 위해 두 문자열을 utf-8 바이트로 인코딩한 후 비교하도록 수정했습니다. 이는 특수 문자로 구성된 X-API-Key를 통한 Denial of Service (DoS) 공격을 방어합니다.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@plan.md`:
- Around line 1-2: Update the noema-review failure assessment in plan.md to
require verifying CI logs for the sidecar LLM request failure before attributing
the 120-second urllib.request.urlopen TimeoutError to external infrastructure or
recommending a code-free PR resubmission; keep the documented exception limited
to 413 request_too_large and sidecar preflight failed.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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hmac.compare_digest에 non-ASCII 문자가 포함된 헤더가 전달될 경우 발생하는 TypeError를 방지하기 위해 두 문자열을 utf-8 바이트로 인코딩한 후 비교하도록 수정했습니다. 이는 특수 문자로 구성된 X-API-Key를 통한 Denial of Service (DoS) 공격을 방어합니다.
hmac.compare_digest에 non-ASCII 문자가 포함된 헤더가 전달될 경우 발생하는 TypeError를 방지하기 위해 두 문자열을 utf-8 바이트로 인코딩한 후 비교하도록 수정했습니다. 이는 특수 문자로 구성된 X-API-Key를 통한 Denial of Service (DoS) 공격을 방어합니다.
hmac.compare_digest에 non-ASCII 문자가 포함된 헤더가 전달될 경우 발생하는 TypeError를 방지하기 위해 두 문자열을 utf-8 바이트로 인코딩한 후 비교하도록 수정했습니다. 이는 특수 문자로 구성된 X-API-Key를 통한 Denial of Service (DoS) 공격을 방어합니다.
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Noema LLM review
The PR resolves a high-severity Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability where non-ASCII characters in the x-api-key HTTP header triggered a TypeError within hmac.compare_digest, leading to unhandled 500 errors. The fix correctly implements UTF-8 encoding for both the user-provided key and the configured keys before comparison. The fix is validated by a new regression test test_non_ascii_key_rejected_safely which confirms that non-ASCII inputs are handled safely with a 401 response rather than a server crash.
Reviewed changed lines
.jules/sentinel.md:1 (RIGHT): Correctly documents the vulnerability (CWE-400/CWE-20), the technical cause (hmac.compare_digest ASCII limitation), and the prevention strategy.saas_web.py:117 (RIGHT): Implements.encode('utf-8')on both operands ofhmac.compare_digest, ensuring type consistency and preventing the TypeError.tests/test_saas_web.py:710 (RIGHT): Introduces a targeted test case using non-ASCII characters ('안녕') to verify the fix and prevent regression.
Adversarial validation
saas_web.py:117 (RIGHT)falsified: Non-ASCII characters in the x-api-key header will still cause a 500 error. — The testtest_non_ascii_key_rejected_safelyintests/test_saas_web.pyexplicitly simulates this input and asserts a 401 response.saas_web.py:117 (RIGHT)falsified: Encoding the configured key on every request is a performance bottleneck or failure point. — The number of configured keys is typically small; UTF-8 encoding of short strings is computationally trivial and does not introduce a new DoS vector.- Residual risk: Low. The fix addresses the immediate DoS. While prior review threads noted that API keys are sourced from environment variables instead of a credential registry, this is an existing architectural debt and not a regression introduced by this security patch.
Findings
- No blocking findings.
- Result: APPROVE
- Head SHA:
221f4d450b5e696536d4193e634bbd4aec00560b - Reviewer credential:
noema-review-github-app-refresh - Actor:
cwl-noema-review[bot]
1 participant
Verified succession
Exact predecessor
221f4d450b5e696536d4193e634bbd4aec00560b의 net delta는saas_web.py의 decoded-header UTF-8 재인코딩, non-ASCII mismatch→401 regression, 그리고 같은 방식의.jules예방 문구입니다. Canonical #520 exactcf730d007543ee828b7b8e77c9473288924047d4는 raw ASGI header bytes를 직접 읽고 exactly-one header를 요구해 같은 invalid non-ASCII 입력을 예외 없이 401로 거절하면서 configured Unicode credential success와 duplicate-header fail-closed까지 검증합니다.따라서 predecessor의 유효 behavior/test contract는 #520에 완전 승계됐습니다. decoded framework string을 다시 UTF-8 encode하라는 source/doc delta는 Unicode credential을 훼손할 수 있어 유효한 별도 delta가 아니며, #520의
.julesguidance도 raw-ASGI boundary로 code-current하게 교정했습니다. #520은 protectedmain@90717c6e9954bf3b7a351137995ebe89975e46c2대비behind_by=0인 non-force descendant이고 exact-head checks는 새로 검증 중입니다.