test(job-analysis): prove every child table's append-only guard and tenant RLS - #304
test(job-analysis): prove every child table's append-only guard and tenant RLS#304seonghobae wants to merge 3 commits into
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…enant RLS Migration 0013 declares an append-only guard and a tenant-scoped RLS policy on all five job-analysis tables, but the PostgreSQL contracts only proved them on the root job_analysis_snapshot table. A dropped guard or policy on job_analysis_task_item, job_analysis_ksao_item, job_analysis_task_ksao_link, or job_analysis_write_command would have passed both CI contracts silently. The unowned schema-hardening contract now proves, per child table: - UPDATE and DELETE are rejected by the append-only guard on a seeded row (the row-count precondition keeps the proof non-vacuous); - pg_class shows ENABLE+FORCE row-level security and exactly one permissive ALL policy whose USING and WITH CHECK both call current_tenant_record_id(); - a probe role under another tenant sees zero rows. The catalog assertions are required because a missing policy also returns zero rows, so the behavioral read alone cannot distinguish "isolated" from "denied". Verified locally on a clean cluster at develop eb9757f: - parent + hardening contracts PASS (test_job_analysis_snapshot_postgres.sh, then test_job_analysis_snapshot_schema_hardening.sh against one database, as CI runs them inside the same container); - non-vacuity: removing the task_item trigger fails as "job_analysis_task_item UPDATE was not rejected by the append-only guard: UPDATE 1"; removing the write_command RLS policy fails as "job_analysis_write_command must ENABLE and FORCE row-level security: false:false"; - npm run validate EXIT=0 (55 node tests).
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthrough테스트 스크립트가 네 자식 테이블의 RLS 설정, 테넌트 범위 정책, append-only 동작, 테넌트 간 데이터 격리를 검증합니다. ChangesJob Analysis Snapshot 자식 테이블 강화 검증
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Other Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The hardening test can pass despite a child-table policy that permits cross-tenant writes, leaving an important tenant-isolation regression undetected. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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Inline comments:
In `@tests/test_job_analysis_snapshot_schema_hardening.sh`:
- Around line 95-96: Harden the RLS policy validation query using polcmd,
polqual, and polwithcheck: require exactly one permissive policy and compare its
command and normalized USING/WITH CHECK expressions exactly, rather than
matching function names with LIKE. Extend the probe to attempt a valid
cross-tenant INSERT and verify it is rejected, not just validate the SELECT
path.
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tests/test_job_analysis_snapshot_schema_hardening.sh
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Gap
Migration
database/migrations/0013_job_analysis_snapshot.sqldeclares append-only guards and tenant-scoped RLS on the root Job Analysis snapshot plus all four child tables. The CI-wired PostgreSQL contracts originally exercised only the root table, so dropped child triggers or policies could pass silently.This PR remains test-only. It changes
tests/test_job_analysis_snapshot_schema_hardening.sh; no production migration, workflow, domain source, or sealed file is changed.Repair lineage
5fffad571603f0e0be3f69ba8e6122ac898edea8added non-vacuous child-table append-only UPDATE/DELETE checks, ENABLE+FORCE RLS catalog checks, and cross-tenant SELECT isolation for:job_analysis_task_itemjob_analysis_ksao_itemjob_analysis_task_ksao_linkjob_analysis_write_commandFresh review then found that substring matching of
current_tenant_record_id()could accept... OR true, an added permissive INSERT policy could coexist unnoticed, and SELECT-only behavior did not exerciseWITH CHECK.68306194f88b5a6beaf4fa06f8c340135572a180repaired that finding ordinary-forward by requiring exactly one permissive ALL policy with exact normalizedUSING/WITH CHECKsemantics and by issuing constraint-valid cross-tenant INSERT probes under a role with real INSERT privilege. The CodeRabbit Major thread was verified against current migration/source, answered, and resolved; that acknowledgement is not an independent approval.A further evidence audit found a narrower false-green path in
683061...: predicate shape and negative probe behavior did not prove that the policy was actually applicable to the intended probe/runtime role. With RLS enabled, a policy scoped to an unrelated role can default-deny another role and make cross-tenant SELECT/INSERT appear isolated even though the expected PUBLIC tenant policy was not installed.f2f3585395239868f34e2cc28197442873974286is the minimal ordinary-forward repair:NOLOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOREPLICATION NOBYPASSRLS;polcmd='*', with exact normalized tenantUSINGandWITH CHECKexpressions;polroles = ARRAY[0::oid], the catalog representation ofPUBLIC, matching migration 0013'sCREATE POLICY ...declarations without aTOclause;Exact-head authority
develop@eb9757f8649aaad026a9865508d9aad50c1a7a4ff2f3585395239868f34e2cc2819744287397428634572683651is terminal SUCCESS;Repository qualityjob103178042492checked out the exact head and passed the owned suites plus isolated PostgreSQL acceptance34572683648is terminal SUCCESS34572683647is terminal SUCCESS for this test-only scope; Trivy and Scorecard executed successfully while dependency/OSV/gitleaks jobs were scope-skipped and are not promoted as scanner evidence103181288071, Noema103179903944, Strix103179813443, coverage checks, and standalone GHAS Python/JavaScript analyses are terminal SUCCESS34572683653is terminal FAILURE because its consumers settled before the authoritative producer: Python103179885363failed07:25:05Z, Actions103179885381failed07:28:27Z, while dispatch producer103183901521did not start until07:41:07Zand then succeeded at07:41:15Z; this exact consumer-before-producer canary was handed to canonical central ownerContextualWisdomLab/.github#2040in comment5631394898APPROVEDis establishedThe known central CodeQL settlement defect remains non-passing but is not an Orgmetra source RED. The PR is therefore Ready for independent review while normal merge remains fail-closed on then-live required governance.
Acceptance
Protected integration requires one exact head to prove all child-table guarantees together:
USINGandWITH CHECKsemantics;No predecessor-evidence transfer, self/model approval, administrator bypass, gate weakening, force-push, destructive rebase, no-op retrigger, or simple Close is authorized.