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Security: BryanFiFife/CATL

Security

SECURITY.md

🔒 CATL security policy

Current public release candidate: v0.11.0rc2

CATL is open source under the Apache License 2.0 and is designed as a defensive trust layer for AI-agent and MCP tool execution. It is developer-tested security software, not an independent security certification.

Supported security scope

The protected runtime currently supported by the release candidate is Linux. The intended deployment separates broker, agent, human operator and tool-backend authority across distinct identities and authenticated Unix-socket channels.

Use the protected broker path for consequential testing:

  • catl broker
  • catl backend-service
  • catl shim
  • catl overlay --operator-socket ...

The deliberately unsafe demonstration paths, including catl run --allow-unsandboxed and overlay --unsafe-direct-state, are for disposable evaluation only.

Security principles

  • Default deny: unknown or unauthorised tool actions do not silently pass.
  • No silent trust reset: anchored state must not be automatically reinitialised after integrity failure.
  • Separated authority: broker policy/signing state must not be writable by the untrusted agent.
  • Exact approvals: operator approvals are action-bound and replay-resistant.
  • No blind retry of uncertain effects: externally ambiguous operations are quarantined for reconciliation.
  • Host controls still matter: CATL cannot protect a capability the agent can reach through an unmediated shell, plugin, credential, network route or alternate tool registry.
  • No mandatory cloud control plane: CATL does not require a listening public TCP API, automatic updater or external account for local trust decisions.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue containing exploit details, secrets, customer data or a working bypass.

Preferred route: use GitHub's private security-advisory reporting flow for this repository:

https://github.com/BryanFiFife/CATL/security/advisories/new

If private advisory reporting is unavailable, contact Caledapt through its established business contact channel and clearly mark the message CATL SECURITY.

A useful report includes:

  1. affected CATL version/commit;
  2. platform and deployment mode;
  3. minimal reproducer;
  4. expected vs actual trust-boundary behaviour;
  5. impact and realistic attacker prerequisites;
  6. any proposed mitigation.

Current evidence

For v0.11.0rc2, public evidence includes:

  • 31/31 installer regression tests;
  • 1,000/1,000 hostile-manifest cases rejected;
  • disposable Linux install → verify → reinstall smoke testing;
  • static systemd-analyze verify checks on rendered broker/backend units;
  • offline systemd security analysis scoring 1.3 / OK for both reviewed service profiles;
  • the prior core baseline recording 278 passing Linux regressions;
  • a four-identity signed rootless E2E covering forgery denial, tool execution, approval/replay control, audit verification, channel isolation and broker-key denial.

See:

Known boundaries

CATL does not claim:

  • protected Windows AppContainer or macOS sandbox operation end-to-end;
  • completed hardware-backed FIDO2/WebAuthn presence assurance;
  • independent penetration-test certification;
  • an independently administered off-host witness;
  • proof that an external provider actually settled an email/API/payment effect merely because a tool returned success;
  • protection against a compromised host administrator/kernel or stolen operator authority.

Security changes should include a reproducer and regression test wherever practical.

There aren't any published security advisories