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Reduce what reverse-engineering tools can recover from a release. Keep private material outside it.
Anti-REA Forge combines bounded release inspection, private debug/source-map separation, authenticated native data and trusted service authorization. It gives Python, CMake/C++ and JavaScript builds one set of release decisions, backed by reproducible positive and negative controls.
| Private contents inside bundles | Keys inside stringified JSON | Easier protection setup |
|---|---|---|
| 3 / 3 formerly admitted source wrappers rejected | 6 / 6 real signing/decryption disclosures detected | Save references at initialization · actionable text reports |
| Official v1.3 allowed prefixes, suffixes and concatenation; both real REA distributions still read the source | Official v1.3 allowed all 6; 6 normal controls pass; 6 recoverable budget/ambiguity cases are separately refused | Validated relative paths survive project moves; JSON and SDK decisions remain compatible |
These are owned fixtures and specific publication controls. REA still reads ordinary client code; refusing a release does not make an already disclosed key unreadable. Positive findings, unsupported formats and exhausted budgets are recorded separately. 3 operating systems · 13 required CI jobs, with published REA 6.9.0 and a separate pinned source build. Content evidence · Key evidence · Full assessment · Release gate policy
- Detect complete private contents inside larger payloads. Adding a build header, a trailing newline or a bundle wrapper no longer defeats a declared private-file reference. A bounded locating search verifies the entire candidate content on disk and in inspected ZIP/ASAR payloads. Short references are checked too. Profile and limits
- Inspect keys serialized inside JSON strings. Up to two additional container decodings expose supported private JWKs and configured byte-array keys to the shared rules. Six owned fixtures actually sign or decrypt with Node; all six are positively detected. Depth, byte-budget and ambiguous-input refusals are counted separately. Consumer evidence
- Enable references during initialization. Repeatable
project-init --private-input-fileand--asset-key-filevalidate existing inputs and save the correct configuration-relative paths. Later CLI and SDK checks use them automatically; failed initialization leaves no new configuration bundle. - Show status and the next action.
scan-release,checkandprepare --format textexplain configured references, incomplete inspections, finding locations and repairs. Zero references are explicitly shown as unconfigured. Machine JSON, exit codes and signed sidecar formats remain available unchanged. Workflow evidence - Require the improvements in installed packages. Fresh wheel, source archive and SDK installations must exercise containment and saved references; Python installations also require stringified-key rejection and text reports. Existing Wasm, maps, LLVM, native, authorization and REA controls remain mandatory.
Upgrade notes · Portable release integration · Security boundaries
| Question | Measured result | Exact scope / record |
|---|---|---|
| Can a header, suffix or bundle evade declared private-file checks? | Official v1.3 allows 3 / 3; v1.4 rejects 3 / 3 with complete-content findings | npm / source; actual REA reads each owned function; Node preserves its outputs. Semantic rewrites remain a separate boundary. |
| Can stringified JSON still disclose a usable key? | 6 / 6 actual signatures/decryptions; all rejected, 6 / 6 normal controls accepted | Verified v1.3 comparison; another 6 recoverable incomplete-inspection refusals are excluded from positive detection |
| Must saved protection references be hand-edited? | 0 manual configuration edits; relocated CLI and SDK still enforce both reference types | Workflow measurements; one identical finding: 74 JSON lines → 23 text lines, with location and next action. This is output size, not a speed claim. |
| Can an integer constant expose a configured asset key? | 12 / 12 real REA recoveries authenticate and decrypt; v1.2 allows all, v1.3 blocks all | npm / source; PYC and executable ZIP-app gates; unconfigured/short keys are separate boundaries |
| Can a stripped native program still carry private compiler IR? | Yes: llvm-dis recovers 4 names, a source path and arithmetic from v1.2 output |
Clang control; v1.3 removes that IR channel, preserves its private bytes, .text, dynamic symbols and 3 runtime results |
| Does a changed private source evade an old manual digest? | Yes; live file references reject the updated exact copy | REA layout control: private-source nodes 1 → 0 → 1, all graphs complete; this is file absence, not algorithm secrecy |
| Does wrapping a PEM key preserve its signing power? | 8 / 8 actual signatures verified; v1.3 detects all 8 and permits 2 normal controls | Standard consumers; 2 recoverable budget rejections excluded from the detection count |
| Can REA recover Wasm private names after separation? | 26 → 0 → 26 across 5 programs; 43 numerical checks and 3 failure controls preserved | npm / pinned source; standard sections identical. Public logic remains readable. |
| Does withholding source maps remove the exact-original channel? | 9 → 0 → 9 across 4 builds / 5 bundles; generated JS unchanged | npm / pinned source; one already-unavailable original is excluded |
| Can missing mappings or removed name sections leave disclosures? | Yes: 2 incomplete maps still reveal source; 1 linker-symbol fixture still reveals a helper | Actual v1.1 admits these inputs; v1.2 rejects them. Unsupported outputs are never scored as zero recovery. |
| Do the new encoded-key cases actually work after recovery? | 19 / 19 recovered keys decrypt or sign; v1.2 blocks all 19, while 2 / 2 nonsecret controls pass | Verified official v1.1 wheel comparison and nonsecret controls; case-by-case evidence |
| Can an analyzer recover an embedded plaintext resource? | Yes, with both tools | Positive control in the paired Ghidra/IDA observation |
| Can the same procedure recover the encrypted resource without its external key? | 0 exact payload recoveries; all 18,024 Ghidra and 18,121 IDA contiguous 32-byte candidates tested | Same owned i386 fixture; initialized analyzer bytes checked against input |
| Does accidentally shipping the real key defeat that boundary? | Yes: key recovered, replayed, exact resource read | Both analyzers; the production release gate also reports the leaked key |
| Does patching the local gate supply the missing encryption key? | Plaintext control recovers; encrypted control does not recover exact data | Actual gate patch and forced-GCM-success controls, method |
| What does opening a 1 MiB native asset cost? | 189.860 µs median, 25 calls after 5 warmups; maximum 1,456.005 µs | Historical v0.10 run on one Linux x86-64 host; includes allocation/cleansing, excludes key delivery/startup. All samples |
| What is validated for the downloadable release? | Exact commit, required CI job results, installed-package checks and archive hashes | release-evidence.json, installation-report.json and SHA256SUMS attached to the Release |
Ghidra, compiler, REA CLI/source-map, official ASAR, GNU binutils, macOS and MSVC controls run in CI. Historical observations stay dated and retain their failures. Ordinary and VM-only native samples were independently reconstructed across 1,081,924 hidden evaluations; that failure motivated external-key instruction sealing. Native code research and remaining validation
Python 3.10+ is required. Install the wheel from v1.4.0 into your chosen virtual environment, or run python -m pip install . from this checkout. The public command and import name remain releaseguard.
python -m pip install https://github.com/Afloat16/anti-rea-forge/releases/download/v1.4.0/open_release_guard-1.4.0-py3-none-any.whl
python -m releaseguard --version
python -m releaseguard project-init --root dist --product MyApp --out .releaseguard
python -m releaseguard check --config .releaseguard/project.json --format textBuild your application into dist, review .releaseguard/policy.json, and keep private symbols, keys and signing material outside that directory. If you have private references, add --private-input-file service/private_quote.py and/or --asset-key-file issuer/asset.key to the initialization command; the files must already exist. Zero references are explicitly shown as unconfigured. A failed check returns a nonzero exit code. prepare scans and signs an immutable staging directory and writes its evidence outside the release. Complete workflow
npm install https://github.com/Afloat16/anti-rea-forge/releases/download/v1.4.0/anti-rea-forge-releaseguard-1.4.0.tgzimport { createReleaseGuard } from "@anti-rea-forge/releaseguard";
const guard = createReleaseGuard({ python: process.env.RELEASEGUARD_PYTHON });
const report = await guard.checkProject({ config: ".releaseguard/project.json" });
process.exitCode = report.exitCode;Set RELEASEGUARD_PYTHON to the absolute path of the installed virtual-environment interpreter. The SDK archive is distributed through GitHub Releases; no npm registry publication is implied. SDK guide
| Need | Integration | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Detect accidental release disclosure and packaging ambiguity | Portable release gate | Cross-platform, policy-driven checks |
| Keep declared private service source/config out of the client | Private-service example | Complete-content references; scan-to-sign rechecks |
| Keep selected native data confidential without its external key | Native assets | C++17/OpenSSL; authenticated context binding |
| Keep private source maps and debug/type information off the client | Source maps, ELF symbols, Wasm | Public/private split with controlled inputs |
| Enforce a sensitive operation in trusted code | Service capabilities, analysis gateway | Authenticated identity, fixed policy and replay storage required |
| Encrypt selected VM instruction storage | Native code | Experimental LLVM 18 / Linux x86-64 scalar-integer subset |
A release scan checks configured rules on inspected bytes. It does not disable Ghidra, IDA, REA, Frida or another independent reader. Authorized process memory can hold keys and plaintext; distributed code and public helpers remain observable; a modified local client cannot be the authority for a server operation. Keep staging directories, interpreters, policies, keys and replay storage trusted. Unknown encodings and unsupported formats are not silently promoted to a resistance guarantee.
The 1.x series keeps existing v1 signed-document formats and the CLI/import names. It is not an independent security audit, and experimental native transformations are explicitly scoped. Security policy · Upgrade notes · Historical recovery failures
python -m pip install -e .
python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
npm test --prefix packages/releaseguard
# Set RELEASEGUARD_PYTHON to your installed interpreter before real CLI integration:
npm run test:integration --prefix packages/releaseguardThe CI workflow pins external compiler/analyzer inputs and marks required controls as mandatory. Missing local tools are reported as skips, not successes. Contributions with a small owned fixture and a reproducible failure are welcome. Contributing · MIT license