Merge branch 'stable/linux-5.15.y' into linux-5.15-mchp

Author: cristibirsan

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
 execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
 
 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
 ---------------------------------------
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
 speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
 victim's data.
 
+Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
+to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
+associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
+the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
+Enhanced IBRS.
+
+Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
+unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
+unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
+retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
 
@@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are:
 
   - Kernel status:
 
-  ====================================  =================================
-  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
-  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
-  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
-  ====================================  =================================
+  ========================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                            The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: None'                        Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Retpolines'                  Use Retpoline thunks
+  'Mitigation: LFENCE'                      Use LFENCE instructions
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'               Hardware-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines'  Hardware-focused + Retpolines
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE'      Hardware-focused + LFENCE
+  ========================================  =================================
 
   - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
     used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
@@ -584,12 +599,13 @@ kernel command line.
 
 		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
-		retpoline
-					replace indirect branches
-		retpoline,generic
-					google's original retpoline
-		retpoline,amd
-					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+                retpoline               auto pick between generic,lfence
+                retpoline,generic       Retpolines
+                retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
+                retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
+                eibrs                   enhanced IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
 
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 		spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -730,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers:
 
 .. _spec_ref6:
 
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
 
 ARM white papers:
 

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -5267,8 +5267,12 @@
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
-			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
-			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
+			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
+			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
+			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.

Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ There are four components to pagemap:
     * Bit  56    page exclusively mapped (since 4.2)
     * Bit  57    pte is uffd-wp write-protected (since 5.13) (see
       :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst <userfaultfd>`)
-    * Bits 57-60 zero
+    * Bits 58-60 zero
     * Bit  61    page is file-page or shared-anon (since 3.5)
     * Bit  62    page swapped
     * Bit  63    page present

Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst

@@ -235,15 +235,23 @@ infrastructure:
      | DPB                          | [3-0]   |    y    |
      +------------------------------+---------+---------+
 
-  6) ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 - Memory model feature register 2
+  6) ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 - Memory model feature register 0
+
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+     | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+     | ECV                          | [63-60] |    y    |
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+
+  7) ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 - Memory model feature register 2
 
      +------------------------------+---------+---------+
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
      +------------------------------+---------+---------+
      | AT                           | [35-32] |    y    |
      +------------------------------+---------+---------+
 
-  7) ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 - SVE feature ID register 0
+  8) ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 - SVE feature ID register 0
 
      +------------------------------+---------+---------+
      | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
@@ -267,6 +275,23 @@ infrastructure:
      | SVEVer                       | [3-0]   |    y    |
      +------------------------------+---------+---------+
 
+  8) ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1 - Memory model feature register 1
+
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+     | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+     | AFP                          | [47-44] |    y    |
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+
+  9) ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 - Instruction set attribute register 2
+
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+     | Name                         |  bits   | visible |
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+     | RPRES                        | [7-4]   |    y    |
+     +------------------------------+---------+---------+
+
+
 Appendix I: Example
 -------------------
 

Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst

@@ -247,6 +247,18 @@ HWCAP2_MTE
     Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.MTE == 0b0010, as described
     by Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst.
 
+HWCAP2_ECV
+
+    Functionality implied by ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.ECV == 0b0001.
+
+HWCAP2_AFP
+
+    Functionality implied by ID_AA64MFR1_EL1.AFP == 0b0001.
+
+HWCAP2_RPRES
+
+    Functionality implied by ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.RPRES == 0b0001.
+
 4. Unused AT_HWCAP bits
 -----------------------
 

Documentation/gpu/i915.rst

@@ -183,25 +183,25 @@ Frame Buffer Compression (FBC)
 Display Refresh Rate Switching (DRRS)
 -------------------------------------
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :doc: Display Refresh Rate Switching (DRRS)
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :functions: intel_dp_set_drrs_state
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :functions: intel_edp_drrs_enable
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :functions: intel_edp_drrs_disable
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :functions: intel_edp_drrs_invalidate
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :functions: intel_edp_drrs_flush
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_drrs.c
    :functions: intel_dp_drrs_init
 
 DPIO

Documentation/trace/events.rst

@@ -198,6 +198,15 @@ The glob (~) accepts a wild card character (\*,?) and character classes
   prev_comm ~ "*sh*"
   prev_comm ~ "ba*sh"
 
+If the field is a pointer that points into user space (for example
+"filename" from sys_enter_openat), then you have to append ".ustring" to the
+field name::
+
+  filename.ustring ~ "password"
+
+As the kernel will have to know how to retrieve the memory that the pointer
+is at from user space.
+
 5.2 Setting filters
 -------------------
 
@@ -230,6 +239,16 @@ Currently the caret ('^') for an error always appears at the beginning of
 the filter string; the error message should still be useful though
 even without more accurate position info.
 
+5.2.1 Filter limitations
+------------------------
+
+If a filter is placed on a string pointer ``(char *)`` that does not point
+to a string on the ring buffer, but instead points to kernel or user space
+memory, then, for safety reasons, at most 1024 bytes of the content is
+copied onto a temporary buffer to do the compare. If the copy of the memory
+faults (the pointer points to memory that should not be accessed), then the
+string compare will be treated as not matching.
+
 5.3 Clearing filters
 --------------------
 

MAINTAINERS

@@ -7031,7 +7031,6 @@ F:	drivers/net/mdio/fwnode_mdio.c
 F:	drivers/net/mdio/of_mdio.c
 F:	drivers/net/pcs/
 F:	drivers/net/phy/
-F:	drivers/of/of_net.c
 F:	include/dt-bindings/net/qca-ar803x.h
 F:	include/linux/*mdio*.h
 F:	include/linux/mdio/*.h
@@ -7043,6 +7042,7 @@ F:	include/linux/platform_data/mdio-gpio.h
 F:	include/trace/events/mdio.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/mdio.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/mii.h
+F:	net/core/of_net.c
 
 EXFAT FILE SYSTEM
 M:	Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 15
-SUBLEVEL = 26
+SUBLEVEL = 32
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Trick or Treat
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-g6-pinctrl.dtsi

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
 	};
 
 	pinctrl_fwqspid_default: fwqspid_default {
-		function = "FWQSPID";
+		function = "FWSPID";
 		groups = "FWQSPID";
 	};