x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details

commit 21e433b upstream.

Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a:

    dmesg | grep -i spectre

... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages.

Also fix a few other details:

 - clarify a comment about firmware speculation control

 - s/KPTI/PTI

 - remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier

Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Author: ingomolnar

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -161,8 +161,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 	else {
-		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
-					  sizeof(arg));
+		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 
@@ -174,8 +173,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		}
 
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
-			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n",
-			       mitigation_options[i].option);
+			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
 			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 		}
 	}
@@ -184,8 +182,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
 	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
-		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
@@ -255,14 +252,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 			goto retpoline_auto;
 		break;
 	}
-	pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+	pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
 	return;
 
 retpoline_auto:
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
 	retpoline_amd:
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
-			pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+			pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
 			goto retpoline_generic;
 		}
 		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
@@ -280,7 +277,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
 	/*
-	 * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
+	 * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
 	 * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
 	 * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
 	 * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
@@ -294,21 +291,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
 	     !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-		pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
-		pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
 	}
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
-			  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
@@ -317,16 +313,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
 
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
-			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
 
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
-			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");