Merge tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "There are two main changes, one feature removal, some code cleanup,
  and a number of bug fixes.

  Main changes:
   - Detecting secure boot mode was limited to IMA. Make detecting
     secure boot mode accessible to EVM and other LSMs
   - IMA sigv3 support was limited to fsverity. Add IMA sigv3 support
     for IMA regular file hashes and EVM portable signatures

  Remove:
   - Remove IMA support for asychronous hash calculation originally
     added for hardware acceleration

  Cleanup:
   - Remove unnecessary Kconfig CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
     tests
   - Add descriptions of the IMA atomic flags

  Bug fixes:
   - Like IMA, properly limit EVM "fix" mode
   - Define and call evm_fix_hmac() to update security.evm
   - Fallback to using i_version to detect file change for filesystems
     that do not support STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE
   - Address missing kernel support for configured (new) TPM hash
     algorithms
   - Add missing crypto_shash_final() return value"

* tag 'integrity-v7.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  evm: Enforce signatures version 3 with new EVM policy 'bit 3'
  integrity: Allow sigv3 verification on EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
  ima: add support to require IMA sigv3 signatures
  ima: add regular file data hash signature version 3 support
  ima: Define asymmetric_verify_v3() to verify IMA sigv3 signatures
  ima: remove buggy support for asynchronous hashes
  integrity: Eliminate weak definition of arch_get_secureboot()
  ima: Add code comments to explain IMA iint cache atomic_flags
  ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
  ima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregate
  ima: Define and use a digest_size field in the ima_algo_desc structure
  powerpc/ima: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
  ima: efi: Drop unnecessary check for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG/CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
  ima: fallback to using i_version to detect file change
  evm: fix security.evm for a file with IMA signature
  s390: Drop unnecessary CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
  evm: Don't enable fix mode when secure boot is enabled
  integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide

Author: torvalds

Documentation/ABI/testing/evm

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Description:
 		2	  Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
 			  runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
 			  creation is enabled (deprecated).
+		3	  Require asymmetric signatures to be version 3
 		31	  Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
 		===	  ==================================================
 

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -53,10 +53,7 @@ Description:
 			    where 'imasig' is the original or the signature
 				format v2.
 			    where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
-			    where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3. (Currently
-				limited to fsverity digest based signatures
-				stored in security.ima xattr. Requires
-				specifying "digest_type=verity" first.)
+			    where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3.
 
 			appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist] (deprecated)
 			Setting the check_blacklist flag is no longer necessary.
@@ -186,6 +183,11 @@ Description:
 			appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
 				appraise_type=sigv3
 
+		Example of a regular IMA file hash 'appraise' rule requiring
+		signature version 3 format stored in security.ima xattr.
+
+			appraise func=BPRM_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3
+
 		All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained
 		either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM
 		labels.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2410,23 +2410,6 @@ Kernel parameters
 			[IMA] Define a custom template format.
 			Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
 
-	ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
-			Format: <min_file_size>
-			Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
-			If left unspecified, ahash usage is disabled.
-
-			ahash performance varies for different data sizes on
-			different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
-			to achieve the best performance for a particular HW.
-
-	ima.ahash_bufsize= [IMA] Asynchronous hash buffer size
-			Format: <bufsize>
-			Set hashing buffer size. Default: 4k.
-
-			ahash performance varies for different chunk sizes on
-			different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
-			to achieve best performance for particular HW.
-
 	ima=		[IMA] Enable or disable IMA
 			Format: { "off" | "on" }
 			Default: "on"

MAINTAINERS

@@ -12732,6 +12732,7 @@ R:	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
 L:	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
+F:	include/linux/secure_boot.h
 F:	security/integrity/
 F:	security/integrity/ima/
 

arch/Kconfig

@@ -1839,4 +1839,7 @@ config ARCH_WANTS_PRE_LINK_VMLINUX
 config ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS
 	bool
 
+config HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
+	def_bool EFI
+
 endmenu

arch/powerpc/Kconfig

@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
 	depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
 	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 	select PSERIES_PLPKS if PPC_PSERIES
+	select HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
 	help
 	  Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security
 	  policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user

arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c

@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <asm/secure_boot.h>
 
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
-	return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
-}
-
 /*
  * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
  * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
@@ -63,8 +58,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
 const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 {
 	if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
-			set_module_sig_enforced();
+		set_module_sig_enforced();
 
 		if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled())
 			return secure_and_trusted_rules;

arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/secure_boot.h>
 #include <linux/string_choices.h>
 #include <asm/secure_boot.h>
 
@@ -44,6 +45,11 @@ bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void)
 	return enabled;
 }
 
+bool arch_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
+}
+
 bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void)
 {
 	struct device_node *node;

arch/s390/Kconfig

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config S390
 	#
 	# Note: keep this list sorted alphabetically
 	#
-	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 	select ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	select ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE
 	select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
@@ -181,6 +180,7 @@ config S390
 	select GENERIC_IOREMAP if PCI
 	select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+	select HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN

arch/s390/kernel/Makefile

@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR)	+= stackprotector.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE)	+= machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE)	+= kexec_elf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CERT_STORE)	+= cert_store.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)	+= ima_arch.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS)	+= perf_event.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS)	+= perf_cpum_cf.o perf_cpum_sf.o