From 6d5cfc2823d525bb40360fee8dca868054933279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:05:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Update project status on the website to November 2026 Refresh the git.agentic, src-control and Sentinel pages and the home page. git.agentic: add the November 2026 security hardening and the open caveats. src-control: phases 1-36 and 37a-37d built, sc-forge local acceptance only. Sentinel: v0.1.0-alpha.2 is the current alpha on npm. Bump modifiedTime and sitemap lastmod to 2026-11-20. --- website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++- website/src/pages/index.astro | 6 ++--- website/src/pages/sentinel.astro | 17 +++++++------ website/src/pages/sitemap.xml.ts | 8 +++---- website/src/pages/src-control.astro | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro b/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro index 2a26ec2f..adffdc7d 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ const structuredData = [
@@ -181,6 +181,33 @@ $ ./scripts/run-demo.sh # builds, runs, breaks branches as an agent-run primitive, and hardening.

+

Security hardening, November 2026

+

+ On 20 November 2026 a security hardening round merged (PRs #145 to #153 + and #156). The daemon already checks socket peers against a UID + allowlist (ADR-0012). + Now any rollback that runs reverse schema migrations also needs an + operator approval token (ADR-0019). Tokens are single-use per daemon + process and scoped, so a reverse-migration token cannot authorize a + data-loss rollback. The agentic CLI attaches the token + automatically when it can read the key. +

+
    +
  • The object store keeps raw and typed objects at separate addresses, so a landed commit stays restorable (ADR-0018)
  • +
  • The sidecar deployment isolates daemon state and credentials from the worker: state-directory ownership checks, credential files, redacted logs
  • +
  • Rollback prompt write-back cannot escape the prompts directory, and it validates the tree before it touches the database
  • +
  • The LangGraph checkpointer only deserializes allow-listed types
  • +
  • CI actions and container base images are pinned to immutable references, and known dependency advisories are cleared
  • +
  • The threat model is reconciled (TM-001 to TM-013), with residual risks stated openly
  • +
+

+ Still open: the rollback target of under 5 seconds at 1M-row pgvector + scale is under verification + (issue #132); demo-scale rollback takes + about 1 second. Authorization of operations beyond rollback is not + done yet (TM-001). +

+

Design partners

If you run a stateful LangGraph agent in production and have been diff --git a/website/src/pages/index.astro b/website/src/pages/index.astro index eb4a4749..80703105 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/index.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/index.astro @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const structuredData = {

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ $ sc demo --agents 4 # agent workspaces: run a command across N forks, harvest results $ sc work --agents 4 -- cargo test -

Rust · Tauri v2 · TypeScript · Phases 1–35 built

+

Rust · Tauri v2 · TypeScript · Phases 1–36 and 37a–37d built

Full page →   GitHub →

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ $ sc work --agents 4 -- cargo test critical [secret-exfil] reads ~/.npmrc, AWS credentials… HTTP 403 x-sentinel-verdict: block -

TypeScript · security layer + registry built · pre-1.0 · v0.1.0-alpha.1 on npm

+

TypeScript · security layer + registry built · pre-1.0 · v0.1.0-alpha.2 on npm

Full page →   GitHub →

diff --git a/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro b/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro index 8e99dee3..753c3931 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const faqs = [ }, { question: 'Is Sentinel production ready?', - answer: 'Sentinel is pre-1.0 and published as an alpha. Its product page documents current capabilities and limitations; production adoption should follow that status.', + answer: 'Sentinel is pre-1.0 and published as an alpha (currently 0.1.0-alpha.2). Its product page documents current capabilities and limitations; production adoption should follow that status.', }, ]; const structuredData = [ @@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ const structuredData = [
- Security layer + registry built · pre-1.0 · v0.1.0-alpha.1 on npm + Security layer + registry built · pre-1.0 · v0.1.0-alpha.2 on npm Apache 2.0 TypeScript
@@ -201,10 +201,13 @@ $ sentinel audit is-odd 3.0.1 2026-07-13: audit-gated publishes, verified namespace claims, time-locked retraction, and an npm/pnpm/Yarn/bun-compatible surface with a safe exit path. Sentinel is pre-1.0 and not yet - production-hardened, but it is now installable: the first alpha, - v0.1.0-alpha.1, is published to npm — all seven - @git-agentic/sentinel-* packages, under the - alpha dist-tag. The next milestone is design-partner + production-hardened and its APIs may change, but it is installable: the + current alpha, v0.1.0-alpha.2 (released 14 July 2026), is on npm: all + seven @git-agentic/sentinel-* packages, under the + alpha dist-tag, and the latest tag points to it + as well. Since July: obfuscation false-positive fixes, approval identity + coverage, dependency updates, and on 20 November 2026 a security-audit + fix round (#84) and install-hook script following (#89). The next milestone is design-partner evidence — blocked incidents, false-positive rate, audit latency. The long arc is policy and install-time permissions for the whole ecosystem. diff --git a/website/src/pages/sitemap.xml.ts b/website/src/pages/sitemap.xml.ts index 1e31bc04..0ffc5670 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/sitemap.xml.ts +++ b/website/src/pages/sitemap.xml.ts @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ import { escapeXml } from '../utils/xml'; const site = 'https://git-agentic.com'; const staticPages = [ - { path: '/', lastmod: '2026-07-18', priority: '1.0' }, - { path: '/git-agentic', lastmod: '2026-07-18', priority: '0.9' }, - { path: '/src-control', lastmod: '2026-07-18', priority: '0.8' }, - { path: '/sentinel', lastmod: '2026-07-18', priority: '0.8' }, + { path: '/', lastmod: '2026-11-20', priority: '1.0' }, + { path: '/git-agentic', lastmod: '2026-11-20', priority: '0.9' }, + { path: '/src-control', lastmod: '2026-11-20', priority: '0.8' }, + { path: '/sentinel', lastmod: '2026-11-20', priority: '0.8' }, { path: '/learn', lastmod: '2026-07-18', priority: '0.8' }, ]; diff --git a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro index 200973ae..4fa48fc1 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro @@ -63,13 +63,13 @@ const structuredData = [
- Phases 1–35 built + Phases 1–36 and 37a–37d built Rust · Tauri v2 · TypeScript Builds on Git, not against it
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev

Status

- Phases 1–35 are built and tested. The arc so far: in-RAM virtual + Phases 1–36 and the P37a–37d partial-clone series are built and tested. The arc so far: in-RAM virtual worktrees and committed secrets (P1–2); persistent repos, merge, secret scanning, remotes, encrypted paths, packfiles/GC, Git export (P3–9); bidirectional Git sync, secret/permission lifecycle @@ -200,9 +200,14 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev recipient set, with O(1) grant, plaintext-free revocation, and atomic publish (P34); and a native Tauri v2 browser over the .sc object model, with refs, all-parent history, provenance, public trees, and - first-parent diffs while protected and private states stay safe (P35). - Feature phases ship with runnable proofs and tests — see demo/ - and apps/desktop/ in the repo. Pre-1.0 and design-partner alpha: + first-parent diffs while protected and private states stay safe (P35); + bucket WAL remotes over sc+wal:// and sc+s3:// + (P36); and lazy partial clones, with want-by-id fetch, presence-based + partial clones, and merge, cherry-pick, rebase and agent sessions on a + partial clone (P37a–37d). + Feature phases ship with runnable proofs and tests; the repo has 28 + end-to-end demo proofs in demo/, and the desktop app lives in + apps/desktop/. Pre-1.0 and design-partner alpha: the cryptography has not had an independent audit, sc+https:// trust is first-connection (TOFU) pinning, and revoking a private-branch recipient protects what is sealed @@ -211,6 +216,26 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev not production secret management.

+

+ Recent changes: named and concurrent sc ws sessions, TLS pin + management (sc tls) and CA validation for + sc+https://, token expiry and rotation, + sc rewrap --rotate, a blob-size clone filter, and owner-only + key ACLs on Windows. On 20 November 2026 a security fix round merged + (#360 to #368): fuzzing of untrusted decoders, serve hardening, and fixes + for a checkout escape, recipient sealing, and secret environment + injection. +

+ +

+ Next, P38 is sc-forge, a configurable self-hosted Git host: bare Git over + smart HTTP, a recorded Gitea API subset, protected merges, and ops + tooling. It passes all 24 recorded scenarios and six first-consumer + acceptance scenarios locally. That is local acceptance only; a + production migration is a separate step, and its design + (ADR-0058) is still Proposed. +

+

Docs: README · Architecture · From 70f1a6129b9239b88cff45e938c9a3b5e6bae0e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:06:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Describe sc+https CA validation and the install-hook audit change --- website/src/pages/sentinel.astro | 2 +- website/src/pages/src-control.astro | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro b/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro index 753c3931..dbb042b7 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ $ sentinel audit is-odd 3.0.1 alpha dist-tag, and the latest tag points to it as well. Since July: obfuscation false-positive fixes, approval identity coverage, dependency updates, and on 20 November 2026 a security-audit - fix round (#84) and install-hook script following (#89). The next milestone is design-partner + fix round (#84), and the audit now follows install hooks that run npm, pnpm, yarn or bun scripts (#89). The next milestone is design-partner evidence — blocked incidents, false-positive rate, audit latency. The long arc is policy and install-time permissions for the whole ecosystem. diff --git a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro index 4fa48fc1..1dee0d5d 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev never enters the object store; a keyless clone gets ciphertext only

  • sc-native transports over SSH and HTTP(S) — in-binary TLS - (sc+https://, first-connection (TOFU) pinning), token-based + (sc+https://, first-connection (TOFU) pinning or CA validation), token-based access control, connection caps, session timeouts, streaming packs that move multi-GiB repos in bounded RAM — plus partial clone
  • Git interop via gix, isolated in one crate — import a @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev end-to-end demo proofs in demo/, and the desktop app lives in apps/desktop/. Pre-1.0 and design-partner alpha: the cryptography has not had an independent audit, - sc+https:// trust is first-connection (TOFU) pinning, + sc+https:// trust defaults to first-connection (TOFU) pinning, with CA validation as an option, and revoking a private-branch recipient protects what is sealed afterwards — it cannot erase what they already fetched. The near-term promise is parallel agent workspaces and provenance, From e52d6ebf777d0ca9199376cc847f3be61a884517 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:10:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Correct overstated security and status claims on the project pages --- website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro | 20 +++++++++++--------- website/src/pages/sentinel.astro | 6 ++++-- website/src/pages/src-control.astro | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro b/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro index adffdc7d..8d22f6be 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro @@ -189,23 +189,25 @@ $ ./scripts/run-demo.sh # builds, runs, breaks Now any rollback that runs reverse schema migrations also needs an operator approval token (ADR-0019). Tokens are single-use per daemon process and scoped, so a reverse-migration token cannot authorize a - data-loss rollback. The agentic CLI attaches the token - automatically when it can read the key. + data-loss rollback. The agentic CLI can attach the token + automatically when its preview shows approval is needed, it can read the + key, and the daemon's peer UID owns that key.

      -
    • The object store keeps raw and typed objects at separate addresses, so a landed commit stays restorable (ADR-0018)
    • -
    • The sidecar deployment isolates daemon state and credentials from the worker: state-directory ownership checks, credential files, redacted logs
    • -
    • Rollback prompt write-back cannot escape the prompts directory, and it validates the tree before it touches the database
    • +
    • The object store keeps raw and typed objects at separate storage paths, so one can no longer occupy the other's address (ADR-0018)
    • +
    • The sidecar deployment keeps daemon state on a volume only the daemon writes, checks state-directory ownership at startup, reads credentials from files and redacts them from debug output. The Cloud Run layout is not yet verified, and full credential isolation needs separate service identities
    • +
    • Rollback validates the prompt tree before any database change and refuses symlinked prompt directories
    • The LangGraph checkpointer only deserializes allow-listed types
    • -
    • CI actions and container base images are pinned to immutable references, and known dependency advisories are cleared
    • -
    • The threat model is reconciled (TM-001 to TM-013), with residual risks stated openly
    • +
    • CI actions are pinned to commit SHAs and the sidecar's base images to digests; the open Rust advisories were fixed and the website's production dependencies report zero npm audit findings
    • +
    • The threat model is reconciled (TM-001 to TM-013) and documents the remaining risks

    Still open: the rollback target of under 5 seconds at 1M-row pgvector scale is under verification (issue #132); demo-scale rollback takes - about 1 second. Authorization of operations beyond rollback is not - done yet (TM-001). + about 1 second. Per-operation authorization is still open (TM-001): + for example, a rollback without a schema change can restore memory + without an approval token.

    Design partners

    diff --git a/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro b/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro index dbb042b7..b48de6cc 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/sentinel.astro @@ -206,8 +206,10 @@ $ sentinel audit is-odd 3.0.1 seven @git-agentic/sentinel-* packages, under the alpha dist-tag, and the latest tag points to it as well. Since July: obfuscation false-positive fixes, approval identity - coverage, dependency updates, and on 20 November 2026 a security-audit - fix round (#84), and the audit now follows install hooks that run npm, pnpm, yarn or bun scripts (#89). The next milestone is design-partner + coverage and dependency updates. On 20 November 2026 a security-audit + fix round (#84) merged to main, and the audit now follows + install hooks that run npm, pnpm, yarn or bun scripts (#89). Both came + after 0.1.0-alpha.2 and are not in that release yet. The next milestone is design-partner evidence — blocked incidents, false-positive rate, audit latency. The long arc is policy and install-time permissions for the whole ecosystem. diff --git a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro index 1dee0d5d..06dc25e0 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro @@ -231,9 +231,9 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev Next, P38 is sc-forge, a configurable self-hosted Git host: bare Git over smart HTTP, a recorded Gitea API subset, protected merges, and ops tooling. It passes all 24 recorded scenarios and six first-consumer - acceptance scenarios locally. That is local acceptance only; a - production migration is a separate step, and its design - (ADR-0058) is still Proposed. + acceptance scenarios locally. Its design (ADR-0058) was accepted on 25 + October 2026. Passing local acceptance does not approve a production + migration; that is a separate step.

    From db2cc147fe57a4754d91dfe6cf2391be081384d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:13:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Narrow the redaction claim and mark P38 as shipped --- website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro | 2 +- website/src/pages/src-control.astro | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro b/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro index 8d22f6be..bff1dc2e 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/git-agentic.astro @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ $ ./scripts/run-demo.sh # builds, runs, breaks

    • The object store keeps raw and typed objects at separate storage paths, so one can no longer occupy the other's address (ADR-0018)
    • -
    • The sidecar deployment keeps daemon state on a volume only the daemon writes, checks state-directory ownership at startup, reads credentials from files and redacts them from debug output. The Cloud Run layout is not yet verified, and full credential isolation needs separate service identities
    • +
    • The sidecar deployment keeps daemon state on a volume only the daemon writes, checks state-directory ownership at startup, reads credentials from files, and redacts the GCS token and the Postgres URL in the store and memory-backend debug output. The Cloud Run layout is not yet verified, and full credential isolation needs separate service identities
    • Rollback validates the prompt tree before any database change and refuses symlinked prompt directories
    • The LangGraph checkpointer only deserializes allow-listed types
    • CI actions are pinned to commit SHAs and the sidecar's base images to digests; the open Rust advisories were fixed and the website's production dependencies report zero npm audit findings
    • diff --git a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro index 06dc25e0..4a81c9a5 100644 --- a/website/src/pages/src-control.astro +++ b/website/src/pages/src-control.astro @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ $ npm ci && npm run tauri dev

      - Next, P38 is sc-forge, a configurable self-hosted Git host: bare Git over + P38 added sc-forge, a configurable self-hosted Git host: bare Git over smart HTTP, a recorded Gitea API subset, protected merges, and ops tooling. It passes all 24 recorded scenarios and six first-consumer acceptance scenarios locally. Its design (ADR-0058) was accepted on 25