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Signing key generator

bin/equislinux-keygen generates the ed25519 signing key for the [x] repository and its public/revocation material. The private keyring is written outside every git worktree, by default to <workspace>/keys.

Defaults

  • Output: <workspace>/keys
  • Algorithm: ed25519, signing only
  • Expiry: never (0); pass --expiry 2y etc. if desired
  • Passphrase: protected by default (pinentry)
  • Refuses to run as root
  • Refuses to write inside a git worktree
  • Refuses a non-empty output directory unless --force

Commands

# Print the plan; no directories or keys are created
./bin/equislinux-keygen --dry-run

# Generate a passphrase-protected key (default)
./bin/equislinux-keygen

# Development/automation only: no passphrase
./bin/equislinux-keygen --no-passphrase

# Custom location, identity or expiry
./bin/equislinux-keygen --out /media/offline/keys \
  --name "X Linux Repository" --email dev@xscriptor.com --expiry 2y

# Rotate: move the previous keys directory to keys.bak.<timestamp>
./bin/equislinux-keygen --force

Other options: --workspace PATH, --protect (explicit default), --no-passphrase, --force, --out, --name, --email, --expiry.

Output

Path Purpose Share
gnupg/ secret keyring and GNUPGHOME never
signing.pub ASCII public key yes
trustedkeys.gpg binary keyring for consumers yes
revoke.asc revocation certificate keep separately
env.sh GNUPGHOME + X_REPO_SIGN_KEY no
README.md generated backup/rotation notes no

keys/ is mode 0700; env.sh and revoke.asc are 0600.

Backup

Copy gnupg/ and revoke.asc to an offline medium; keep a permission- preserving archive if the destination is exFAT/NTFS. Test the backup by listing the secret key from the restored copy. The private keyring must never be committed or uploaded unencrypted.

See the private operations runbook for the backup procedure and inventory.

Rotation

--force does not delete the old key: it moves the whole keys directory to <keys>.bak.<timestamp> before generating the new one. A rotation is still a trust transition:

  1. Re-sign the repository DB/packages with the new key.
  2. Update the keyring embedded in the ISO/live environment and WSL rootfs.
  3. Give existing installations a transition package signed by the old key, if the old private key is still available.
  4. Revoke the old key if it was compromised.
  5. Verify fresh and updated installations.

The private operations runbook contains the full rotation procedure.

Signing

source <workspace>/keys/env.sh
(cd <workspace>/x-repo && ./build-packages.sh --index-only)

env.sh contains an absolute GNUPGHOME. If the workspace path changes, update it deliberately or regenerate the file with the key generator (without rotating the keyring).

Verification

The generator performs a sign/verify self-test. To check an existing keyring:

GNUPGHOME=<workspace>/keys/gnupg gpg --list-secret-keys

Do not paste private key material into logs or chat.

Troubleshooting

  • keys directory is not empty: use --force only if you intend to rotate; it moves the old directory to a backup first.
  • refusing to write keys inside a git worktree: choose --out outside the repositories (the default <workspace>/keys is already outside them).
  • Pinentry/gpg errors: ensure a working pinentry and a local terminal; for automation use --no-passphrase only in a development context.
  • do not run this as root: the keyring must belong to your user.