diff --git a/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.test.ts b/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.test.ts
index cc3140cf5..b2e8eae4b 100644
--- a/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.test.ts
+++ b/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.test.ts
@@ -96,3 +96,54 @@ describe("read-only git commands pass through the policy", () => {
     ).toBeUndefined();
   });
 });
+
+describe("git worktree force spellings ask (CL-6824)", () => {
+  // Control: a contained non-force add is not flagged at all.
+  test("contained non-force add stays unflagged", () => {
+    expect(
+      autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("git worktree add ./wt-plain")),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  // Git has no --force=<value> form — real git dies with
+  // "error: option `force' takes no value" (exit 129) — but the spelling
+  // still expresses force intent, so the policy asks rather than letting the
+  // --flag=value skip swallow it the way the old exact-match check did.
+  test("--force=<value> spellings hit the worktree ask rule", () => {
+    for (const flag of ["--force=true", "--force=1", "--force="]) {
+      expect(
+        autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall(`git worktree add ${flag} ./wt-eq`))
+          ?.name,
+      ).toBe("git-worktree");
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Short -f takes no value either — real git dies with
+  // "error: unknown switch `='" for `-f=<value>` and
+  // "error: unknown switch `<char>'" for glued `-f<val>` (exit 129 both) —
+  // but the spellings still express force intent, so the policy asks rather
+  // than letting the generic-flag skip swallow them.
+  test("-f=<value> and glued -f<val> spellings hit the worktree ask rule", () => {
+    for (const flag of ["-f=true", "-f=", "-ftrue", "-ff"]) {
+      expect(
+        autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall(`git worktree add ${flag} ./wt-short`))
+          ?.name,
+      ).toBe("git-worktree");
+      expect(
+        autoShellRuleForCall(
+          shellCall(`git worktree remove ${flag} ./wt-short`),
+        )?.name,
+      ).toBe("git-worktree");
+    }
+  });
+
+  // The negation is not force: --no-force must not be caught by the prefix.
+  test("--no-force stays unflagged", () => {
+    expect(
+      autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("git worktree add --no-force ./wt-no")),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(
+      autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("git worktree remove --no-force ./wt-no")),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.ts b/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.ts
index d05176bef..edf997708 100644
--- a/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.ts
+++ b/src/permission/auto-shell-policy.ts
@@ -346,8 +346,18 @@ const WORKTREE_PRUNE_FLAGS = new Set(["-n", "--dry-run", "-v", "--verbose"]);
 // Flags that take a following value on `git worktree add` (branch name, lock reason).
 const WORKTREE_ADD_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(["-b", "-B", "--reason"]);
 
-function isWorktreeForceFlag(arg: string): boolean {
-  return arg === "-f" || arg === "--force";
+export function isWorktreeForceFlag(arg: string): boolean {
+  // Git's --force takes no value (real git rejects --force=<value> with
+  // "error: option `force' takes no value"), but the spelling still expresses
+  // force intent, so the policy treats it as force rather than letting the
+  // --flag=value path skip swallow it.
+  if (arg === "--force" || arg.startsWith("--force=")) return true;
+  // Short -f takes no value either (real git rejects `-f=<value>` with
+  // "error: unknown switch `='" and glued `-f<val>` with
+  // "error: unknown switch `<char>'"); the same fail-closed reasoning applies.
+  // Any `-f`-prefixed token expresses force intent. `--no-force` negations are
+  // unaffected: they start with "--n", not "-f".
+  return arg.startsWith("-f");
 }
 
 // True when the path is safe for unattended worktree add/remove: inside the
diff --git a/src/permission/gate.test.ts b/src/permission/gate.test.ts
index 1bcb68637..070239ae9 100644
--- a/src/permission/gate.test.ts
+++ b/src/permission/gate.test.ts
@@ -286,3 +286,192 @@ describe("standing grant covers a later git worktree command (CL-5638)", () => {
     expect(prompts).toBe(1);
   });
 });
+
+// CL-6824: when a standing grant covers a command but a pre-grant guard still
+// forces an ask, the prompt carries PermissionRequest.notice naming the
+// guard's reason. Matching semantics are unchanged — every case below still
+// asks (and stays deniable); only the prompt gains the why.
+describe("grant-mismatch asks carry the guard reason as a notice (CL-6824)", () => {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "gate-mismatch-notice-"));
+  const sessionCwd = join(root, "main");
+  const git = (args: string[], cwd: string) =>
+    execFileSync("git", args, { cwd, stdio: "ignore" });
+  mkdirSync(sessionCwd);
+  initTemporaryGitRepo(sessionCwd, { initArgs: ["-q"] });
+  writeFileSync(join(sessionCwd, "seed.txt"), "seed\n");
+  git(["add", "."], sessionCwd);
+  git(["commit", "-qm", "seed"], sessionCwd);
+
+  async function askWithGrants(command: string, approvals: Approval[]) {
+    const seen: PermissionRequest[] = [];
+    const gate = createPermissionGate({
+      approvals,
+      interactive: true,
+      skipPermissions: false,
+      reactorGated: false,
+      cwd: sessionCwd,
+      rootsProvider: () => [],
+      requestApproval: async (request) => {
+        seen.push(request);
+        return { allow: false };
+      },
+    });
+    const verdict = await gate.evaluate(shellCall(command));
+    return { verdict, seen };
+  }
+
+  const worktreeGrant: Approval[] = [
+    { tool: "run_shell", pattern: "git worktree *" },
+  ];
+  const catGrant: Approval[] = [{ tool: "run_shell", pattern: "cat *" }];
+
+  test("force worktree names --force in the notice", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      "git worktree add --force ../sib-force",
+      worktreeGrant,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but it uses --force, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("--force=<value> is still force in the notice", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      "git worktree add --force=true ../sib-force-eq",
+      worktreeGrant,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but it uses --force, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("short -f=<value> is still force in the notice", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      "git worktree add -f=true ../sib-force-short-eq",
+      worktreeGrant,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but it uses --force, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("glued -f<val> is still force in the notice", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      "git worktree remove -ftrue ../sib-force-glued",
+      worktreeGrant,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but it uses --force, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("uncontained add destination names the approved locations", async () => {
+    // A direct child of tmpdir() is not a permitted sibling of sessionCwd
+    // (only direct children of root/ are), so the restricted guard trips.
+    const outside = join(tmpdir(), "gate-6824-outside");
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      `git worktree add ${outside}`,
+      worktreeGrant,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but the worktree destination is outside the approved locations, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("uncontained remove names the worktree, not a destination", async () => {
+    // `remove` names an existing worktree — there is no destination — so the
+    // notice drops the destination noun the `add` case uses.
+    const outside = join(tmpdir(), "gate-6824-outside-remove");
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      `git worktree remove ${outside}`,
+      worktreeGrant,
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but the worktree is outside the approved locations, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("secret reference names the sensitive path", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants("cat .env", catGrant);
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but it references a sensitive path, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+    // The secret ask still strips grant scopes; the notice survives it.
+    expect(seen[0]?.scopes).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  test("restricted target names the workspace", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants("cat /etc/passwd", catGrant);
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBe(
+      "A standing grant matches this command, but it targets a path outside the workspace, so it still needs approval.",
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("an ask with no matching grant carries no notice", async () => {
+    const { verdict, seen } = await askWithGrants(
+      "git worktree add --force ../sib-nogrant",
+      [],
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]?.notice).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  test("a covered command still allows with no prompt and no notice", async () => {
+    const seen: PermissionRequest[] = [];
+    const gate = createPermissionGate({
+      approvals: worktreeGrant,
+      interactive: true,
+      skipPermissions: false,
+      reactorGated: false,
+      cwd: sessionCwd,
+      rootsProvider: () => [],
+      requestApproval: async (request) => {
+        seen.push(request);
+        return { allow: false };
+      },
+    });
+    const verdict = await gate.evaluate(
+      shellCall("git worktree add ../sib-plain -b br-plain"),
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  test("a --no-force command still allows with no prompt and no notice", async () => {
+    const seen: PermissionRequest[] = [];
+    const gate = createPermissionGate({
+      approvals: worktreeGrant,
+      interactive: true,
+      skipPermissions: false,
+      reactorGated: false,
+      cwd: sessionCwd,
+      rootsProvider: () => [],
+      requestApproval: async (request) => {
+        seen.push(request);
+        return { allow: false };
+      },
+    });
+    const verdict = await gate.evaluate(
+      shellCall("git worktree add --no-force ../sib-noforce -b br-noforce"),
+    );
+    expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/permission/gate.ts b/src/permission/gate.ts
index a3810da64..2b0bbbec2 100644
--- a/src/permission/gate.ts
+++ b/src/permission/gate.ts
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import {
 import {
   autoShellRuleForCall,
   safeWorktreeCommand,
+  isWorktreeForceFlag,
 } from "./auto-shell-policy.js";
 import { commandReferencesSensitivePath } from "../plugins/secret-guard-plugin.js";
 import {
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ import {
 import {
   splitChainedCommand,
   isShellCommentOnly,
+  tokenize,
   stripCommentLines,
 } from "./command.js";
 import {
@@ -145,6 +147,45 @@ function segmentGuard(
   return undefined;
 }
 
+// Classifies a guarded `git worktree add/remove` segment so a grant-mismatch
+// notice can name the operative reason: a force flag, or a destination the
+// containment authority did not approve. Returns undefined for anything else.
+// Display-only refinement — the guard decision itself is unchanged.
+function worktreeMismatchKind(
+  segment: string,
+): "force" | "destination" | "worktree" | undefined {
+  const tokens = tokenize(segment);
+  if (tokens[0] !== "git" || tokens[1] !== "worktree") return undefined;
+  if (tokens[2] !== "add" && tokens[2] !== "remove") return undefined;
+  if (tokens.slice(3).some(isWorktreeForceFlag)) return "force";
+  // `add` takes a destination for the new worktree; `remove` names an
+  // existing worktree, so only `add` gets the destination noun.
+  return tokens[2] === "remove" ? "worktree" : "destination";
+}
+
+// Explains a grant mismatch: a standing grant covers the segment, but the
+// pre-grant guard still forced an ask. The wording names the guard's reason,
+// never the grant — matching semantics are untouched.
+function grantMismatchNotice(
+  segment: string,
+  kind: "secret" | "restricted",
+): string {
+  if (kind === "secret") {
+    return "A standing grant matches this command, but it references a sensitive path, so it still needs approval.";
+  }
+  const worktreeKind = worktreeMismatchKind(segment);
+  if (worktreeKind === "force") {
+    return "A standing grant matches this command, but it uses --force, so it still needs approval.";
+  }
+  if (worktreeKind === "destination") {
+    return "A standing grant matches this command, but the worktree destination is outside the approved locations, so it still needs approval.";
+  }
+  if (worktreeKind === "worktree") {
+    return "A standing grant matches this command, but the worktree is outside the approved locations, so it still needs approval.";
+  }
+  return "A standing grant matches this command, but it targets a path outside the workspace, so it still needs approval.";
+}
+
 // Relative path tokens in a shell command resolve against the process cwd of the
 // agent that issued the call — not the session cwd that built the gate. Absolute
 // paths pass through unchanged so createPathRestriction still judges them against
@@ -731,6 +772,7 @@ export function createPermissionGate(
 
         let needsOperator = false;
         let anySecret = false;
+        let mismatchNotice: string | undefined;
         for (const segment of segments) {
           // A secret-path reference or restricted target always requires the
           // operator, whether the segment would otherwise auto-allow or match
@@ -747,6 +789,22 @@ export function createPermissionGate(
           if (guard !== undefined) {
             if (guard.kind === "secret") anySecret = true;
             needsOperator = true;
+            // A standing grant may still cover this segment even though the
+            // pre-grant guard forces an ask — record why so the prompt can say
+            // so. Matching semantics are untouched; this only annotates the ask.
+            if (
+              mismatchNotice === undefined &&
+              (await evaluateApprovals({
+                tool: request.tool,
+                subject: segment,
+                approvals,
+                activeProviderModel,
+                requestCwd: effectiveCwd,
+                workspace: grantWorkspace(),
+              }))
+            ) {
+              mismatchNotice = grantMismatchNotice(segment, guard.kind);
+            }
             continue;
           }
           if (
@@ -788,9 +846,19 @@ export function createPermissionGate(
 
         // Secret-path shell must never mint a stored grant — even an exact match
         // would be misleading because future secret-path shell always re-asks.
+        // A grant mismatch carries the guard's reason on the prompt so the
+        // operator sees why the standing grant did not apply.
         const requestForOperator = anySecret
-          ? { ...request, scopes: [] }
-          : request;
+          ? {
+              ...request,
+              scopes: [],
+              ...(mismatchNotice !== undefined
+                ? { notice: mismatchNotice }
+                : null),
+            }
+          : mismatchNotice !== undefined
+            ? { ...request, notice: mismatchNotice }
+            : request;
         return {
           kind: "ask",
           request: requestForOperator,