Serve the evidence archive through posix search and read

Dedicated archive tools made the on-disk dump the implied retrieval API.
Primary sessions now search and read archive:/// through search_files,
grep, and read_file. Blob keys reject slash so they cannot nest under
tool-output.

Author: TheGreatAxios

docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -364,7 +364,8 @@ tool call
 **Rejection behavior:** Any plugin can short-circuit by returning a `ToolResult` with `isError: true`; the error propagates to the agent and downstream plugins/execution are skipped.
 
 - **Result truncation / leisure materialization** (`result-truncation-plugin.ts`, `tool-result-materialize.ts`) — Caps model-facing tool results at 10,000 chars (aligned with the reactor size-cap). Over the gate, any non-error result is leisure-materialized first (minified JSON → pretty `application/json`; NDJSON preserved; else `text/plain`), then the formatted bytes are spilled to the session blob store under `{callId}:full` and truncated inline with a `tool-output:///` URI plus absolute `contextDir/tool-output/…` path when plumbed. Under-gate results are unchanged (no pretty, no spill). Posix tools go through the middleware in `buildCorePosixToolPlugins` (Codex `posixTools.run` included). Fleet AgentTools (`wait_agents`, `search_agents`, …) skip that posix chain, so the same helper wraps them at mount in `createAgentToolset` and nested `runSubAgent`. MCP tools apply the same scrub-then-truncate path via `mcpClientToAgentTools` since they skip both.
-- **Path Escape** (`path-escape-plugin.ts`) — Canonicalizes path-like arguments against `cwd` and blocks `..` escapes, except into a root the permission layer's worktree-roots provider allowlists (e.g. a sibling git worktree of the same repo). Runs first so later plugins see resolved paths.
+- **Path Escape** (`path-escape-plugin.ts`) — Canonicalizes path-like arguments against `cwd` and blocks `..` escapes, except into a root the permission layer's worktree-roots provider allowlists (e.g. a sibling git worktree of the same repo). `tool-output://` and `archive:///` refs pass through unresolved. Runs first so later plugins see resolved paths.
+- **Evidence archive** (`evidence-archive-search-plugin.ts`, `evidence-archive-path-guard.ts`) — Primary-session compaction evidence is a first-class search/read surface on `search_files` / `read_file` / `grep` via `archive:///` refs. Dump paths (`evidence-archive/`, `tool-output/archive-*`) stay blocked so the on-disk sidecar is not the retrieval API. Blob keys reject `/` so they cannot nest under `tool-output`.
 - **Tool-output URI** (`tool-output-uri-plugin.ts`) — Normalizes mistaken `read_file` blob URIs to `tool-output:///id` (corbits-only; interchange stays unpatched).
 - **Secret Guard** (`secret-guard-plugin.ts`) — Hard-denies path-keyed tool calls (`read_file`, `write_file`, …) that would put a sensitive file into (or write it from) the model context. Runs before the permission plugin, so the path-arg deny holds even under `--dangerously-skip-permissions`. Shell commands that _reference_ a sensitive path (tokenized so `cat .env`, `bun --env-file=.env run …`, and quote/env-assignment forms are detected) are not hard-denied here: they require operator approval via the permission gate, and auto mode forces an ask through the auto-shell policy (`sensitive-path` rule). Once the operator approves, the command runs. Shell detection is best-effort: token matching defeats quoting and env-assignment/redirection forms but not dynamic path construction (variable indirection, `printf` assembly). Tool-result secret scrub still redacts credential-shaped output.
 - **Authorization** (`run-shell-authz.ts`, wired by `authz-plugin.ts`) — Denies catastrophic shell command patterns by regex, and hard-blocks shell `find`, head-position `rg`, and recursive `grep -r` (they can walk huge trees and OOM the host). Bounded `grep`/`search_files` tools remain practical alternatives (timeout + output caps); the patterns match those three command shapes only — an `ls -R`, `fd`, or scripted `os.walk` is just as unbounded and is not caught, so the block message tells the model not to substitute one. The permission gate’s shell auto-allow path consults the same policy so it never pre-approves a command authz would reject.

docs/IMPLEMENTATION.md

@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ src/
     data-only-agent.ts         Markdown-only agent plugins (agents/*.md)
     loader.ts                  Plugin discovery + loadPluginEntry
     path-escape-plugin.ts      Path sandboxing (first)
+    evidence-archive-search-plugin.ts  archive:/// search/read via posix tools
+    evidence-archive-path-guard.ts     Block dump-path reads of the archive sidecar
     tool-output-uri-plugin.ts  Normalize read_file tool-output URIs
     secret-guard-plugin.ts     Hard-deny path-keyed secret files
     authz-plugin.ts            Catastrophic command blocking (thin wrapper)