diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 11f7812..2b7c60a 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ [![CI](https://github.com/VincentJerico/security-testing/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/VincentJerico/security-testing/actions/workflows/ci.yml) ![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg) -Defensive security checks a QA team can run in CI. The target is +Defensive security checks a QA team can run in CI. The results are written up in +[docs/FINDINGS.md](docs/FINDINGS.md). The target is [OWASP Juice Shop](https://owasp.org/www-project-juice-shop/), a deliberately vulnerable training app from OWASP, running locally in Docker. @@ -71,4 +72,4 @@ endpoints are checked to refuse requests that carry no token. 3. Security header and error-page checks (done) 4. Session cookie and login-required checks (done) 5. Dependency scanning (done) -6. Findings report mapped to the OWASP Top 10 +6. Findings report mapped to the OWASP Top 10 (done): [docs/FINDINGS.md](docs/FINDINGS.md) diff --git a/docs/FINDINGS.md b/docs/FINDINGS.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2eff139 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/FINDINGS.md @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +# Security findings: OWASP Juice Shop (local) + +| Item | Detail | +| --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Target | OWASP Juice Shop v18.0.0, run locally in Docker on `localhost:3000` | +| Mapped to | [OWASP Top 10 (2021)](https://top10.owasp.org/2021/) | +| Date | 2026-10-20 | +| Tester | Vincent Jerico | +| Tools | Playwright 1.63 (API and browser tests), OWASP ZAP 2.17.0 (passive baseline), Trivy 0.76.0, npm audit | + +## Summary + +Juice Shop is OWASP's deliberately vulnerable training app, so finding problems is expected. The +point of this repo is the method: every finding below was observed by hand first, then pinned by a +test that turns red if the finding is fixed or a new one appears. Every check also has a self-test +that proves it can fail. + +The checks found 7 configuration and session findings (S-1 to S-7), 8 passive ZAP warnings that +CI tracks, and 130 unique high or critical CVEs in the app's dependencies. Two protections already +work and are guarded: MIME-sniffing protection and clickjacking protection. + +All testing was passive or used ordinary requests. Every check is limited to the local app, and +[`src/target.ts`](../src/target.ts) refuses any other host. + +## Findings + +| ID | Finding | OWASP 2021 | Severity | Tracked by | +| --- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------ | +| S-1 | No `Content-Security-Policy` header | A05 Security Misconfiguration | Medium | `tests/juice-shop.headers.spec.ts` | +| S-2 | No `Referrer-Policy` header | A05 Security Misconfiguration | Low | `tests/juice-shop.headers.spec.ts` | +| S-3 | Deprecated `Feature-Policy` only, no `Permissions-Policy` | A05 Security Misconfiguration | Low | `tests/juice-shop.headers.spec.ts` | +| S-4 | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every response | A05 Security Misconfiguration | Medium | `tests/juice-shop.headers.spec.ts` | +| S-5 | Unknown API route returns a 500 page with a stack trace | A05 Security Misconfiguration | Low | `tests/juice-shop.headers.spec.ts` | +| S-6 | The login `token` cookie is set without `HttpOnly` | A07 Identification and Auth Failures | Medium | `tests/juice-shop.session.spec.ts` | +| S-7 | Order history without a login returns a 500 with a stack trace | A05 Security Misconfiguration | Low | `tests/juice-shop.session.spec.ts` | +| D-1 | 130 unique high or critical CVEs in the app's dependencies | A06 Vulnerable and Outdated Components | High | `scripts/dependency-scan.sh` (report only) | + +Severity here is a rough rating for this app: High means a known, exploitable weakness class is +present; Medium means a missing defense that makes other bugs worse; Low means information +leakage or a hardening gap. + +--- + +### S-1 · No Content-Security-Policy + +- **Observed:** No response sets `Content-Security-Policy`, on the home page, the product search + API or a product record. ZAP's rule 10038 reports the same thing. +- **Why it matters:** A CSP limits where scripts can load from. Without one, any XSS bug can run + arbitrary script, and S-6 means that script can read the session token. +- **Recommendation:** Start with a report-only policy, such as + `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'`, review the reports, then enforce it. + +### S-2 · No Referrer-Policy + +- **Observed:** No `Referrer-Policy` header, so the browser falls back to its default. +- **Why it matters:** Full URLs, including query strings, can leak to third-party sites in the + `Referer` header. +- **Recommendation:** `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`. + +### S-3 · Feature-Policy instead of Permissions-Policy + +- **Observed:** The app sends `Feature-Policy: payment 'self'`. Browsers replaced that header + with `Permissions-Policy`, and ZAP's rule 10063 flags its absence. +- **Recommendation:** Send the same intent as `Permissions-Policy: payment=(self)`. + +### S-4 · Wildcard CORS + +- **Observed:** Every response, API responses included, sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`. + ZAP's rule 10098 flags the same thing. +- **Why it matters:** Any website a user visits can read these responses from their browser. The + wildcard doesn't send cookies, so this mostly exposes data that doesn't need a login, but it + removes a layer of protection the API doesn't need to give up. +- **Recommendation:** Allow only the app's own origin, or omit the header where cross-origin + access isn't needed. + +### S-5 · Stack trace on an unknown API route + +- **Observed:** `GET /api/DoesNotExist` returns a 500 page that includes a stack trace with + internal paths such as `/juice-shop/node_modules/express/lib/router/layer.js:95`. +- **Why it matters:** It tells an attacker the framework, its layout on disk and the libraries in + use. An unknown route should be a 404, not a server error. +- **Recommendation:** Return 404 for unknown routes and use a production error handler that never + renders stack traces. +- **What works:** `GET /api/Products/abc` returns a clean JSON 404, and a request without a token + is refused with a 401 page that has no trace. + +### S-6 · Session token cookie readable by scripts + +- **Observed:** After logging in through the login page with a throwaway local account, the + browser holds a `token` cookie with `HttpOnly` off. `SameSite=Lax` is fine. `Secure` doesn't + apply, because the local app is served over plain HTTP. +- **Why it matters:** Any script running on the page can read the session token. Combined with an + XSS bug, that means session theft. +- **Recommendation:** Set the session cookie from the server with `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` and, + over HTTPS, `Secure`. The page shouldn't need to read the token itself. + +### S-7 · Order history fails with a stack trace instead of a 401 + +- **Observed:** `GET /rest/order-history` without a token returns a 500 page with a stack trace. + The page title also echoes the requester's IP address. +- **Why it matters:** Same information leak as S-5. A missing login should get a plain 401, like + the basket, users, cards and addresses endpoints already return. +- **Recommendation:** Check authentication before the handler runs and return 401. + +### D-1 · Vulnerable dependencies + +- **Observed:** Trivy found 130 unique high or critical CVEs in the image (46 critical, 84 high). + Most are in Node.js packages. The most affected are `vm2` (45), `multer` (10), `libssl3` (9), + `tar` (9) and `handlebars` (7). `vm2` is a sandboxing library that is no longer maintained. +- **Why it's report-only:** The app is vulnerable on purpose, and Trivy's database changes daily, + so pinned counts would break CI for reasons unrelated to this repo. CI posts the current summary + on every run and keeps the full JSON. +- **Recommendation:** For a real app, replace `vm2` (it has no fixed versions), then upgrade the + remaining packages and the base image. + +## ZAP baseline warnings + +ZAP's passive scan runs in CI. These rules are accepted as warnings, and every other rule fails +the build if it starts triggering ([`zap/rules.conf`](../zap/rules.conf)). + +| ZAP rule | Warning | Covered above | +| -------- | --------------------------------------------- | ------------- | +| 10038 | Content Security Policy header not set | S-1 | +| 10063 | Permissions Policy header not set | S-3 | +| 10098 | Cross-domain misconfiguration | S-4 | +| 10003 | Vulnerable JS library | D-1 | +| 10017 | Cross-domain JavaScript source file inclusion | No | +| 10096 | Timestamp disclosure | No | +| 10110 | Dangerous JS functions | No | +| 90004 | Insufficient site isolation (COEP header) | No | + +Three rules are ignored on purpose: 10116 is about the scanner itself, and 10049 and 10109 are +informational (caching and app type). + +## What works (guarded by tests) + +- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response. +- `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, which blocks clickjacking. +- Account-only endpoints (basket, users, cards and addresses) refuse requests without a token + with 401, and `whoami` returns no user. +- Clean error responses for a missing resource (JSON 404) and a missing token (401 without a + trace). +- This repo's own dependencies: `npm audit` reports 0 high or critical issues and gates CI. + +## How the checks prove themselves + +- The header checker, the cookie checker and the stack-trace detector each have a self-test: a + compliant input passes, and each planted defect is reported by name. +- Each pinned finding was checked to fail when the expected list is wrong. +- The ZAP gate was checked both ways: the real rules pass, and flipping one accepted warning to + FAIL makes the scan fail. +- The dependency scan first scans a fixture lockfile with a known lodash CVE and fails unless + Trivy reports it. + +## Not covered + +- **Active scanning and exploitation.** ZAP runs in passive mode only. Nothing here tries to break + in. +- **Authorization between users.** Checking whether one account can reach another account's data + was deliberately left out of scope. +- **HTTPS-only settings** such as HSTS and `Secure` cookies, because the local app is served over + plain HTTP. +- **Business logic and the app's built-in challenges.** Juice Shop has many intentional flaws that + are outside this repo's scope.