diff --git a/docs/reports/ENGINEERING_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAYBOOK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md b/docs/reports/ENGINEERING_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAYBOOK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md index d5ed3020..52e854b8 100644 --- a/docs/reports/ENGINEERING_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAYBOOK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md +++ b/docs/reports/ENGINEERING_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAYBOOK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md @@ -38,4 +38,65 @@ This engineering playbook translates governance policy into implementable contro - Forensic evidence export from Kafka+WORM stack. - Post-incident corrective action tracking to closure. + +## 6) Daily DevSecOps Operational Checks — Omni-Sentinel Cognitive Execution Environment + +This daily check is a **control-execution runbook**, not a substitute for live telemetry. Operators must attach signed dashboard exports, endpoint responses, attestation records, and WORM archive proofs before marking a row green. + +### 6.1 Evidence sources and control thresholds + +| Check | System of record | Required evidence | Green threshold | Escalation trigger | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| Sentinel telemetry dashboards | GAI-SOC dashboard, Sentinel v2.4 event API, WorkflowAI Pro workflow audit API | Signed daily dashboard export plus trace IDs for sampled model, agent, and tool events | All critical panels fresh within SLA; no unresolved SEV-1/SEV-2 alerts | Stale telemetry, unexplained event gaps, failed policy-decision correlation, or anomalous autonomous-tool activity | +| Internal health endpoints | `/healthz`, `/readyz`, `/metrics`, `/policy/decision`, `/containment/state`, `/evidence/latest` | Endpoint transcript with timestamp, service identity, response digest, and mTLS peer certificate hash | All Tier-0/Tier-1 services return healthy/ready and policy decision latency remains within SLO | Any unhealthy critical service, missing mTLS identity, or degraded policy latency impacting containment | +| Global Systemic Risk Index (G-SRI) | G-SRI aggregation service and G-Stack systemic-risk dashboard | Daily G-SRI value, component scores, confidence interval, and threshold policy version | `G-SRI < watch_threshold`; no component breach for liquidity, market-integrity, cyber, autonomy, or concentration dimensions | `G-SRI >= watch_threshold`, rapid day-over-day increase, low-confidence score, or conflicting component telemetry | +| PQC WORM audit batches | `pqc_worm_logger.py`, Kafka evidence topics, AWS S3 Object Lock bucket | Batch manifest, Kafka offset range, post-quantum signature bundle, S3 object version ID, retention mode, legal-hold status, and chain hash | Batch committed on schedule; Object Lock governance/compliance mode and retention date match policy; chain hash verifies | Missing batch, late batch, signature failure, retention-mode drift, unexpected delete marker, or chain-hash mismatch | +| TEE and TPM attestation | Attestation broker, enclave quote verifier, TPM event log collector | Quote verification result, PCR digest set, signer/MRENCLAVE or equivalent measurement, nonce, and verifier signature | `PCR_MATCH=TRUE`; approved enclave measurement; quote freshness within policy window | `PCR_MATCH=FALSE`, stale quote, unapproved measurement, verifier outage, or mismatch between Kubernetes node identity and attested identity | +| OPA/Rego compliance-as-code | CI/CD policy gate and runtime PDP | Policy bundle digest, decision logs, test output, and exception register diff | No critical deny-to-allow override; all exceptions time-bound and approved | New critical exception, expired waiver, unreviewed policy bundle, or runtime PDP divergence from CI policy | +| Red Dawn simulation readiness | Simulation controller and crisis-exercise backlog | Last drill date, scenario coverage, open action aging, and kill-switch proof | Latest scheduled scenario completed; corrective actions within SLA | Missed drill, failed kill-switch exercise, or recurring containment gap | +| ZK compliance proof pipeline | Circom/Groth16 or zk-STARK prover, verifier contract/service, GC-IR bridge | Circuit version, proving key hash, verification key hash, proof transcript, public inputs, and regulator profile mapping | Proof verifies for required controls without exposing protected telemetry | Proof generation failure, verifier mismatch, stale circuit, or public-input leakage risk | + +### 6.2 Daily status template + +```xml + + Omni-Sentinel Daily DevSecOps Operational Check + + Point-in-time control-execution summary for Sentinel AI Governance Stack v2.4, + G-Stack, WorkflowAI Pro, Omni-Sentinel containment, GAI-SOC telemetry, + G-SRI systemic-risk scoring, PQC WORM evidence, TEE/TPM attestation, + OPA/Rego policy gates, Red Dawn simulations, and ZK compliance proofs. + + + + + + + Summarize confirmed deviations, severity, owner, ETA, and compensating controls. + Summarize new autonomy, replication, deception, tool-use, cyber, market-contagion, and data-exfiltration risks. + List prioritized engineering, risk, and governance actions. + + +``` + +### 6.3 Deviation triage and remediation rules + +- **Red**: failed containment, `PCR_MATCH=FALSE`, missing WORM batch, G-SRI threshold breach, or critical Sentinel telemetry outage. Freeze affected autonomous workflows, invoke incident command, preserve evidence, notify 2LOD/Legal, and prepare regulator notification analysis. +- **Amber**: delayed batch, stale but recoverable dashboard, non-critical OPA divergence, unverified ZK proof, or overdue Red Dawn action. Open a time-bound remediation ticket, require named owner approval for continued operation, and increase monitoring frequency. +- **Green with observation**: controls pass but trend indicators deteriorate. Record the observation, add it to the next model-governance forum, and review thresholds if the trend persists for three business days. + +### 6.4 Minimum command and API transcript pattern + +```bash +sentinelctl dashboard export --since 24h --sign --out evidence/sentinel-dashboard.json +curl --fail --cert ops.pem --key ops.key https://sentinel.internal/containment/state +python3 pqc_worm_logger.py verify --window 24h --bucket s3:// +attestctl verify --tee --tpm --require-pcr-match --nonce-from kms +opa test policies/ --coverage --format=json +zkctl verify --profile gsifi-oscal --proof evidence/gsri-proof.json +``` + +Store command output in the WORM evidence plane with the operator identity, build/version metadata, monotonic timestamp, trace ID, and SHA-384 digest. + + diff --git a/docs/reports/INSTITUTIONAL_GRADE_AGI_ASI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md b/docs/reports/INSTITUTIONAL_GRADE_AGI_ASI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md index 6007420a..e3804630 100644 --- a/docs/reports/INSTITUTIONAL_GRADE_AGI_ASI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md +++ b/docs/reports/INSTITUTIONAL_GRADE_AGI_ASI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md @@ -388,6 +388,67 @@ resource "kafka_acl" "policy_decisions_read" { --- + +## 9.3 Extension Roadmap (2031–2035): Perpetual Assurance and ZK Regulatory Compliance + +| Horizon | Enterprise-grade capability target | Technical implementation milestones | Assurance and regulator evidence | +|---|---|---|---| +| 2031 | Perpetual assurance fabric for AI, agents, and frontier compute | Normalize BBOM, model cards, system cards, policy bundles, attestation quotes, and incident records into an append-only evidence graph | Continuous OSCAL assessment results, signed evidence manifests, and auditor replay APIs | +| 2032 | Privacy-preserving supervisory reporting | Deploy Circom/Groth16 systemic-risk circuits for near-term deterministic controls and evaluate zk-STARK proofs for transparent, post-quantum-friendly assurance at scale | Verifier transcripts proving control satisfaction without exposing customer data, model weights, prompts, or proprietary trading telemetry | +| 2033 | Cross-institution systemic-risk interoperability | Implement GC-IR bridges that translate G-SRI components, incident categories, and control states into jurisdiction-specific regulator profiles | Multi-jurisdiction proof packs for EU, UK, US, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Basel-aligned supervisors | +| 2034 | Autonomous Supervisory Agents with constrained authority | Deploy read-only or approval-gated agents for evidence sampling, exception aging analysis, policy-drift detection, and regulator Q&A preparation | Agent action logs, policy constraints, human approvals, and formally verified authority boundaries | +| 2035 | Civilizational-scale containment and resilience drills | Run Red Dawn systemic simulations across liquidity shocks, AI-enabled cyber contagion, deceptive-agent behavior, and cross-border market coordination scenarios | Board-ready and regulator-ready technical dossiers with TLA+ invariant results, OPA decision traces, WORM hashes, and ZK verification proofs | + +## 9.4 Reference Architecture: Sentinel AI Governance Stack v2.4, G-Stack, and Omni-Sentinel + +```text +[Model/Agent Runtime] + -> governance sidecar (OPA/Rego PDP, tool allowlist, kill-switch hooks) + -> WorkflowAI Pro orchestration (planner/executor/verifier separation) + -> Sentinel AI Governance Stack v2.4 (inventory, policy, monitoring, evidence) + -> GAI-SOC telemetry lake (events, traces, alerts, CRP divergence, containment state) + -> G-Stack systemic-risk services (G-SRI scoring, Red Dawn scenario controller) + -> Kafka PQC evidence bus (signed topics, offset manifests, chain hashes) + -> WORM archive (S3 Object Lock, legal hold, retention policy, access logs) + -> BBOM/perpetual assurance graph (build, model, data, policy, attestation lineage) + -> ZK proof layer (Circom/Groth16, zk-STARK proofs, GC-IR regulator bridges) + -> Supervisory portal/API (OSCAL profiles, regulator packets, proof verification) +``` + +### Core design requirements + +1. **Control plane isolation**: Sentinel policy administration, OPA bundle publication, WORM retention policy, and attestation trust roots must be isolated from model-runtime administrators. +2. **Evidence plane immutability**: Kafka evidence topics must be append-only, signed, schema-validated, and archived to WORM storage with retention and legal-hold metadata. +3. **Containment plane determinism**: kill-switch, safe-mode, egress-deny, tool revocation, and compute-quota enforcement must not depend on best-effort analytics paths. +4. **Assurance plane cryptography**: ZK proofs should attest to threshold compliance, control execution, and G-SRI bounds while minimizing disclosure of protected telemetry. +5. **Regulator profile portability**: OSCAL control catalogs and regulator profiles should map one canonical control to jurisdiction-specific evidence expectations and notification thresholds. + +## 9.5 Formal Safety and Containment Invariants + +TLA+ specifications should model at least the following invariants before high-autonomy workflows enter production: + +- **No unapproved escalation**: an agent cannot acquire a new privileged tool, data domain, or network route unless a signed policy decision and required human approval exist. +- **Containment dominance**: safe-mode and kill-switch decisions override workflow-completion and business-priority objectives. +- **Evidence completeness**: every material model, agent, policy, and containment decision has a trace ID, policy bundle digest, and immutable evidence record. +- **Attested execution**: critical inference, policy, and evidence services run only on nodes with valid TEE/TPM attestation and `PCR_MATCH=TRUE`. +- **Systemic-risk guardrail**: if G-SRI reaches the watch threshold or confidence falls below policy minimum, autonomous expansion and privileged tool use are suspended until reviewed. + +OPA/Rego gates should enforce the runtime analogues of these invariants in CI/CD and production, with unit tests checked into the same repository as the policy bundle. + +## 9.6 ZK-Proof Compliance Model for G-SRI and Control Assertions + +A regulator-facing proof pack should separate private witnesses from public inputs: + +| Circuit/proof domain | Private witness examples | Public inputs | Proof objective | +|---|---|---|---| +| G-SRI threshold proof | Institution-level telemetry, incident counts, exposure weights, concentration data | Circuit version, regulator profile, threshold, reporting period, salted commitment root | Prove G-SRI remains below threshold without revealing sensitive positions or customer data | +| WORM evidence proof | Object keys, Kafka offsets, chain-hash links, retention metadata | Batch commitment, retention policy ID, timestamp window | Prove all required evidence batches were committed and retained | +| Attestation proof | Raw quote material, PCR digest details, node identity mapping | Approved measurement root, verifier signature, freshness window | Prove critical services ran on approved attested infrastructure | +| Policy-compliance proof | Decision payloads, risk-tier attributes, exception details | Policy bundle digest, control IDs, pass/fail aggregate | Prove material decisions satisfied required OPA/Rego controls | + +Near-term deployments can use Circom/Groth16 for stable, high-value deterministic circuits. Medium-term deployments should add zk-STARK verification where transparency, prover scalability, and post-quantum resilience outweigh proof-size constraints. All proof systems require key-management, circuit-change control, verifier-version governance, and negative-test evidence. + + ## 10. Report Templates for Boards, Regulators, and Engineering Teams ## 10.1 Board quarterly pack diff --git a/docs/reports/REGULATOR_EXAM_PACK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md b/docs/reports/REGULATOR_EXAM_PACK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md index 6b057e43..25f98119 100644 --- a/docs/reports/REGULATOR_EXAM_PACK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md +++ b/docs/reports/REGULATOR_EXAM_PACK_AI_GOVERNANCE_2026_2030.md @@ -47,4 +47,55 @@ This regulator-facing template organizes examination evidence for enterprise AI - Evidence custodian role for artifact provenance and chain-of-custody. - Real-time replay support for selected model/agent decisions. + +## 5) Regulator-Ready Technical Report Structures + +Use the following structures for supervisory submissions, recurring operating attestations, and urgent containment updates. Each report must include immutable evidence URIs, signer identity, control owner, regulator profile, and the applicable OSCAL control mapping. + +```xml +Daily Omni-Sentinel DevSecOps and Containment Attestation + +Point-in-time evidence summary covering Sentinel telemetry freshness, G-SRI status, +PQC WORM audit-batch completion, TEE/TPM attestation, OPA/Rego policy enforcement, +Red Dawn readiness, and ZK compliance-proof verification. + + +
Green/amber/red status by control domain with evidence references.
+
Confirmed deviations, severity, compensating controls, owner, and target remediation date.
+
Emerging AGI/ASI risks across autonomy, deception, replication, cyber, market integrity, and exfiltration.
+
Prioritized remediation actions and regulator-notification assessment.
+ +``` + +```xml +G-SRI Privacy-Preserving Systemic Risk Compliance Proof + +Zero-knowledge proof package demonstrating that systemic-risk indicators remain within +approved thresholds for the reporting period without disclosing protected institution, +customer, model, prompt, trading, or security telemetry. + + +
Regulator profile, threshold, reporting period, circuit version, and commitment roots.
+
Verifier result, verification key hash, proof-system version, and negative-test coverage.
+
OSCAL control IDs and jurisdictional obligations satisfied by the proof.
+
Any failed, stale, or waived proof obligations and remediation plan.
+ +``` + +```xml +Red Dawn AGI/ASI Containment Simulation Technical Dossier + +Technical dossier for systemic containment exercises covering scenario design, +formal invariants, telemetry, kill-switch execution, incident-command decisions, +post-exercise findings, and control improvements. + + +
Scenario assumptions, threat model, scope, and participating services.
+
TLA+ safety invariants, model-checking results, and unresolved counterexamples.
+
Sentinel traces, OPA decisions, WORM hashes, attestation records, and operator actions.
+
Findings, root causes, owners, due dates, and validation plan.
+ +``` + + diff --git a/tool_tests/test_validate_governance_reports.py b/tool_tests/test_validate_governance_reports.py index ac8fc693..418b3027 100644 --- a/tool_tests/test_validate_governance_reports.py +++ b/tool_tests/test_validate_governance_reports.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ validate_manifest, validate_manifest_schema, validate_readme_index, + markdown_without_fenced_code_blocks, ) @@ -32,6 +33,28 @@ def _write_json(path: Path, payload: dict) -> None: class ValidateGovernanceReportsTests(unittest.TestCase): + def test_markdown_without_fenced_code_blocks_handles_markdown_fence_variants(self): + text = ( + "keep before\n" + " ```xml\n" + "Ignored\n" + "```` not a closer because it is inside the fenced block content\n" + " ```\n" + "keep middle\n" + "~~~~ json\n" + "## Ignored Heading\n" + "~~~~~~\n" + "keep after\n" + ) + + stripped = markdown_without_fenced_code_blocks(text) + + self.assertIn("keep before", stripped) + self.assertIn("keep middle", stripped) + self.assertIn("keep after", stripped) + self.assertNotIn("Ignored", stripped) + self.assertNotIn("## Ignored Heading", stripped) + def test_validate_file_accepts_valid_document(self): with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: path = Path(tmpdir) / "doc.md" @@ -84,6 +107,45 @@ def test_validate_file_rejects_duplicate_content_blocks(self): errors = validate_file(path, ["## Required Heading"]) self.assertTrue(any("expected exactly one block" in e for e in errors)) + def test_validate_file_ignores_wrapper_tags_inside_fenced_code_blocks(self): + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: + path = Path(tmpdir) / "doc.md" + path.write_text( + VALID_DOC + + """ +```xml +Example Regulator Template +Example abstract. +Example content. +``` +""", + encoding="utf-8", + ) + errors = validate_file(path, ["## Required Heading"]) + self.assertEqual(errors, []) + + def test_validate_file_does_not_accept_required_headings_inside_fenced_code_blocks(self): + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: + path = Path(tmpdir) / "doc.md" + path.write_text( + """ +Sample Title For Validation + + +Short abstract text. + + +```markdown +## Required Heading +``` +Body without the required heading outside examples. + +""", + encoding="utf-8", + ) + errors = validate_file(path, ["## Required Heading"]) + self.assertTrue(any("missing required heading" in e for e in errors)) + def test_validate_file_rejects_missing_file(self): with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: missing = Path(tmpdir) / "missing.md" diff --git a/tools/validate_governance_reports.py b/tools/validate_governance_reports.py index e6164e58..c8ceb674 100755 --- a/tools/validate_governance_reports.py +++ b/tools/validate_governance_reports.py @@ -36,30 +36,69 @@ REQUIRED_TAGS = ("", "", "", "", "", "") +def markdown_without_fenced_code_blocks(text: str) -> str: + """Return Markdown text with fenced code blocks removed. + + Governance reports may include regulator-ready XML templates that intentionally + contain , <abstract>, and <content> tags inside examples. Those sample + tags should not be counted as document-level wrappers, and headings inside + examples should not satisfy report structure requirements. + + This small CommonMark-style scanner handles backtick and tilde fences, optional + leading indentation up to three spaces, info strings, and closing fences that + are at least as long as the opener. + """ + output_lines: list[str] = [] + in_fence = False + fence_char = "" + fence_length = 0 + + for line in text.splitlines(keepends=True): + if not in_fence: + opener = re.match(r"^ {0,3}(?P<fence>(?P<char>[`~])(?P=char){2,}).*(?:\n)?$", line) + if opener: + in_fence = True + fence_char = opener.group("char") + fence_length = len(opener.group("fence")) + continue + output_lines.append(line) + continue + + closer_pattern = rf"^ {{0,3}}{re.escape(fence_char)}{{{fence_length},}}[ \t]*(?:\n)?$" + closer = re.match(closer_pattern, line) + if closer: + in_fence = False + fence_char = "" + fence_length = 0 + + return "".join(output_lines) + + def validate_file(path: Path, required_headings: list[str]) -> list[str]: errors: list[str] = [] if not path.exists(): return [f"missing file: {path}"] text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + structural_text = markdown_without_fenced_code_blocks(text) for tag in REQUIRED_TAGS: - if tag not in text: + if tag not in structural_text: errors.append(f"{path}: missing tag {tag}") - if text.count("<title>") != 1 or text.count("") != 1: + if structural_text.count("") != 1 or structural_text.count("") != 1: errors.append(f"{path}: expected exactly one block") - if text.count("<abstract>") != 1 or text.count("</abstract>") != 1: + if structural_text.count("<abstract>") != 1 or structural_text.count("</abstract>") != 1: errors.append(f"{path}: expected exactly one <abstract> block") - if text.count("<content>") != 1 or text.count("</content>") != 1: + if structural_text.count("<content>") != 1 or structural_text.count("</content>") != 1: errors.append(f"{path}: expected exactly one <content> block") - title_match = re.search(r"<title>\s*(.*?)\s*", text, re.DOTALL) + title_match = re.search(r"\s*(.*?)\s*", structural_text, re.DOTALL) if not title_match or len(title_match.group(1).strip()) < 10: errors.append(f"{path}: title is empty or too short") for heading in required_headings: - if heading not in text: + if heading not in structural_text: errors.append(f"{path}: missing required heading '{heading}'") return errors