diff --git a/.github/workflows/test.yml b/.github/workflows/test.yml index 9fbe892..f96d953 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/test.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/test.yml @@ -45,4 +45,4 @@ jobs: - name: Verify docs and formal bridge workspace contracts run: ./.github/scripts/run-tests.ps1 - name: Test capability tooling - run: node --test scripts/check-snowcat-coverage.test.mjs scripts/extract-snowcat-capabilities.test.mjs + run: node --test scripts/check-snowcat-coverage.test.mjs scripts/extract-snowcat-capabilities.test.mjs scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.test.mjs scripts/lbr-session-model.test.mjs scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/daemon_client.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/daemon_client.rs index 8a544cb..34c0ca0 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/daemon_client.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/daemon_client.rs @@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ pub enum WorkerExit { LocalStop, /// Hello 被拒(认证/身份):不可重试。 HelloRejected, + /// Another worker already owns this resident. + WorkerAlreadyRunning, + /// A previous worker panicked; this resident generation is quarantined. + WorkerQuarantined, } /// 上行事件未确认窗口:满(项数或字节)→ 记 Gap 丢最旧(计数如实)。 @@ -283,6 +287,7 @@ const EVENT_WINDOW_MAX_BYTES: usize = 8 * 1024 * 1024; const RESULT_OUTBOX_MAX_ITEMS: usize = 256; struct PendingNotice { + notice_id: u64, notice: ResidentNotice, sent_epoch: Option, } @@ -299,7 +304,27 @@ fn notice_request_id(notice: &ResidentNotice) -> &str { } } -fn notice_message(notice: &ResidentNotice) -> (BridgeMsg, bool) { +// Match an ACK to its exact sent outbox entry in this resident lifetime. +fn take_acked_result( + outbox: &mut VecDeque, + request_id: &str, + terminal: bool, + epoch: u64, + notice_id: u64, +) -> Option { + let index = outbox.iter().position(|item| { + let kind_matches = match &item.notice { + ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::AcceptedUnconfirmed { .. }) => !terminal, + ResidentNotice::Outcome(_) => terminal, + ResidentNotice::NativeStarted { .. } => false, + }; + notice_id != 0 && item.notice_id == notice_id && kind_matches + && item.sent_epoch == Some(epoch) && notice_request_id(&item.notice) == request_id + })?; + outbox.remove(index).map(|item| item.notice) +} + +fn notice_message(notice: &ResidentNotice, notice_id: u64) -> (BridgeMsg, bool) { match notice { ResidentNotice::NativeStarted { request_id } => ( BridgeMsg::NativeStarted { @@ -313,16 +338,19 @@ fn notice_message(notice: &ResidentNotice) -> (BridgeMsg, bool) { request_id, native_id, } => BridgeMsg::SendResult { + notice_id, request_id: request_id.clone(), outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id: native_id.clone(), }, }, SendOutcome::AcceptedUnconfirmed { request_id } => BridgeMsg::SendResult { + notice_id, request_id: request_id.clone(), outcome: OutcomePayload::AcceptedUnconfirmed, }, SendOutcome::Failure { request_id, reason } => BridgeMsg::SendResult { + notice_id, request_id: request_id.clone(), outcome: OutcomePayload::Failure { reason: reason.clone(), @@ -331,6 +359,7 @@ fn notice_message(notice: &ResidentNotice) -> (BridgeMsg, bool) { SendOutcome::Unknown { request_id, reason, .. } => BridgeMsg::SendResult { + notice_id, request_id: request_id.clone(), outcome: OutcomePayload::Unknown { reason: reason.clone(), @@ -653,7 +682,24 @@ pub fn run_worker( cfg: DaemonClientConfig, resident: Arc>, wake: &dyn Fn() -> bool, - result_rx: mpsc::Receiver, + result_rx: mpsc::Receiver, + events_rx: mpsc::Receiver, + stop: Arc, +) -> (WorkerCounters, WorkerExit) { + let _lease = match resident.acquire_worker() { + Ok(lease) => lease, + Err(crate::resident::WorkerLeaseError::Busy) => return (WorkerCounters::default(), WorkerExit::WorkerAlreadyRunning), + Err(crate::resident::WorkerLeaseError::Quarantined) => return (WorkerCounters::default(), WorkerExit::WorkerQuarantined), + }; + // Keep the lease through inner teardown, including dropping both receivers. + run_worker_active(cfg, resident.clone(), wake, result_rx, events_rx, stop) +} + +fn run_worker_active( + cfg: DaemonClientConfig, + resident: Arc>, + wake: &dyn Fn() -> bool, + result_rx: mpsc::Receiver, events_rx: mpsc::Receiver, stop: Arc, ) -> (WorkerCounters, WorkerExit) { @@ -668,7 +714,12 @@ pub fn run_worker( let mut unacked_bytes: usize = 0; // Native lifecycle notices survive connection teardown until the core // confirms durable application. Resident reserves at most two slots/send. - let mut result_outbox: VecDeque = VecDeque::new(); + // Reconstruct from resident before accepting channel hints. The resident + // owns IDs and payloads independently of any one worker lifetime. + let mut result_outbox: VecDeque = resident.retained_notices() + .into_iter() + .map(|item| PendingNotice { notice_id: item.notice_id, notice: item.notice, sent_epoch: None }) + .collect(); macro_rules! publish { () => { c.publish(); @@ -884,7 +935,7 @@ fn session_loop( cfg: &DaemonClientConfig, resident: &Arc>, wake: &dyn Fn() -> bool, - result_rx: &mpsc::Receiver, + result_rx: &mpsc::Receiver, events_rx: &mpsc::Receiver, tick: &Arc, stop: &Arc, @@ -977,8 +1028,9 @@ fn session_loop( _ => break, // 仍未就绪:保留队列,下轮再试 } } - // 1) 收入有界 outbox。其上限与 Resident 的默认预留结果槽对齐; - // 已满则不再消费源队列,结果仍由 Resident 保留。 + // 1) Move notices from the owner channel into the worker's bounded outbox. + // Channel items are hints; resident holds the authoritative copies. + // Resident memory still does not survive host exit. for (request_id, scope, outcome) in resident.take_query_results() { if scope.connection_epoch != connection_epoch || scope.account != cfg.account @@ -1001,20 +1053,21 @@ fn session_loop( } } while result_outbox.len() < RESULT_OUTBOX_MAX_ITEMS { - match result_rx.try_recv() { - Ok(notice) => result_outbox.push_back(PendingNotice { - notice, - sent_epoch: None, - }), - Err(_) => break, + let Ok(item) = result_rx.try_recv() else { break }; + if !resident.contains_retained_notice(&item) + || result_outbox.iter().any(|pending| pending.notice_id == item.notice_id) { + continue; } + result_outbox.push_back(PendingNotice { + notice_id: item.notice_id, notice: item.notice, sent_epoch: None, + }); } // 首次发送或新连接重放。FIFO 保证 NativeStarted 排在终态之前。 for pending in result_outbox.iter_mut() { if pending.sent_epoch == Some(connection_epoch) { continue; } - let (msg, is_result) = notice_message(&pending.notice); + let (msg, is_result) = notice_message(&pending.notice, pending.notice_id); if send_json(conn, &msg).is_err() { return SessionEnd::Broken; } @@ -1152,7 +1205,7 @@ fn session_loop( request_id:request_id.clone(),wire_seq,scope,peer_uin,chat_type,png, deadline:Instant::now()+Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms), }) == crate::resident::SubmitVerdict::Accepted { wake(); } - else if send_json(conn,&BridgeMsg::SendResult {request_id, + else if send_json(conn,&BridgeMsg::SendResult {request_id, notice_id: 0, outcome:OutcomePayload::Failure {reason:"image dispatch rejected before submission".into()}, }).is_err() {return SessionEnd::Broken;} } @@ -1177,6 +1230,7 @@ fn session_loop( wake(); } else if send_json(conn, &BridgeMsg::SendResult { request_id, + notice_id: 0, outcome: OutcomePayload::Failure { reason: "voice dispatch rejected before submission".into() }, }).is_err() { return SessionEnd::Broken; @@ -1233,24 +1287,25 @@ fn session_loop( heartbeat_misses = 0; } Ok(CoreToBridgeMsg::NativeStartedAck { request_id }) => { - resident.ack_notice(&request_id, true); if let Some(index) = result_outbox.iter().position(|item| { - matches!(&item.notice, ResidentNotice::NativeStarted { request_id: id } if id == &request_id) + item.sent_epoch == Some(connection_epoch) + && matches!(&item.notice, ResidentNotice::NativeStarted { request_id: id } if id == &request_id) }) { - result_outbox.remove(index); + if let Some(item) = result_outbox.remove(index) { + resident.ack_retained_notice(&crate::resident::RetainedNotice { + notice_id: item.notice_id, notice: item.notice, + }); + } } heartbeat_misses = 0; } Ok(CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { request_id, + notice_id, terminal, }) => { - resident.ack_result_notice(&request_id, terminal); - if let Some(index) = result_outbox.iter().position(|item| { - matches!(&item.notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(_)) - && notice_request_id(&item.notice) == request_id - }) { - result_outbox.remove(index); + if let Some(notice) = take_acked_result(result_outbox, &request_id, terminal, connection_epoch, notice_id) { + resident.ack_retained_notice(&crate::resident::RetainedNotice { notice_id, notice }); } heartbeat_misses = 0; } @@ -1295,6 +1350,47 @@ fn peer_uid_from_target(v: &serde_json::Value) -> String { mod tests { use super::*; + fn result_notice(outcome: SendOutcome, epoch: Option, notice_id: u64) -> PendingNotice { + PendingNotice { notice_id, notice: ResidentNotice::Outcome(outcome), sent_epoch: epoch } + } + + #[test] + fn result_ack_rejects_old_kind_and_unsent_or_old_epoch() { + let success = SendOutcome::Success { request_id: "r".into(), native_id: "n".into() }; + let mut outbox = VecDeque::from([result_notice(success, Some(7), 2)]); + assert!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", false, 7, 2).is_none()); + assert!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 8, 2).is_none()); + outbox[0].sent_epoch = None; + assert!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 2).is_none()); + assert_eq!(outbox.len(), 1); + outbox[0].sent_epoch = Some(7); + assert!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 2).is_some()); + assert!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 2).is_none()); + } + + #[test] + fn result_ack_removes_only_matching_result_kind() { + let mid = SendOutcome::AcceptedUnconfirmed { request_id: "r".into() }; + let success = SendOutcome::Success { request_id: "r".into(), native_id: "n".into() }; + let mut outbox = VecDeque::from([result_notice(mid.clone(), Some(7), 1), result_notice(success.clone(), Some(7), 2)]); + assert_eq!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 2), Some(ResidentNotice::Outcome(success))); + assert_eq!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", false, 7, 1), Some(ResidentNotice::Outcome(mid))); + assert!(outbox.is_empty()); + } + + #[test] + fn old_same_class_ack_must_not_remove_a_newer_result() { + let unknown = SendOutcome::Unknown { request_id: "r".into(), reason: None, late_receipt_possible: true }; + let success = SendOutcome::Success { request_id: "r".into(), native_id: "n".into() }; + let mut outbox = VecDeque::from([result_notice(success.clone(), Some(7), 2)]); + // Simulate an old terminal ACK for the already removed unknown. + let stale_ack_result = take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 1); + assert!(stale_ack_result.is_none(), "old terminal ACK must not consume newer success; old notice: {unknown:?}"); + assert!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 0).is_none()); + assert_eq!(outbox.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(take_acked_result(&mut outbox, "r", true, 7, 2), Some(ResidentNotice::Outcome(success))); + } + #[test] fn event_window_releases_the_popped_record_with_different_sizes() { let event = EventPayload { diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/lib.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/lib.rs index a36e005..45c137f 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/lib.rs @@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ pub unsafe extern "system" fn caligo_qq_daemon_client_start(cfg_json_ptr: *const QqOwnerAdapter::new(handle, account.clone()), ResidentLimits::default(), )); - let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::(); + let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::(); let (etx, erx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::(); // resident 初始化必须在 owner 线程执行(计划 §5.1:宿主 API 前的 // owner 检查不是形式 —— 远程线程调用会被正确拒绝,D7-b 现场实证)。 @@ -922,6 +922,12 @@ pub unsafe extern "system" fn caligo_qq_daemon_client_start(cfg_json_ptr: *const host_nonce: daemon_client::host_instance_nonce(), wrapper_session: String::new(), }; + // An uncertain acknowledgement must be retried before taking a new + // result snapshot; it never causes the QQ send to be replayed. + let pending_result_ack: std::sync::Mutex> = + std::sync::Mutex::new(None); + // Full retention pauses dispatch; closed channel or exhausted IDs latch. + let notice_handoff = resident::ResultHandoffGate::default(); qq_entry::install_drain_hook(Box::new(move || { if owner_stop.load(Ordering::Acquire) { r.set_bridge_scope(None); @@ -931,6 +937,14 @@ pub unsafe extern "system" fn caligo_qq_daemon_client_start(cfg_json_ptr: *const } return 0; } + if notice_handoff.is_closed() { return 0; } + // Flush the existing suffix before new work or JS acknowledgements. + if notice_handoff.forward(&r, &tx).is_err() { + if notice_handoff.is_closed() { + qq_entry::append_stage_simple("result_notice_channel", false, "closed_or_exhausted_retained"); + } + return 0; + } r.drain_queries(); // owner 初始化:安静 QQ 的轮转点上下文条件可能暂不满足 —— 每次泵 // 重试直至成功;首次失败原因写阶段日志(不吞)。 @@ -947,65 +961,107 @@ pub unsafe extern "system" fn caligo_qq_daemon_client_start(cfg_json_ptr: *const } } let _ = r.drain(); - for notice in r.take_results() { - let _ = tx.send(notice); + if notice_handoff.forward(&r, &tx).is_err() { + // Preserve the suffix and defer JS acknowledgement until handoff. + if notice_handoff.is_closed() { + qq_entry::append_stage_simple("result_notice_channel", false, "closed_or_exhausted_retained"); + } + return 0; } // D8 轮询:排空 JS 接收环 → owned 事件注入(每泵一轮; // NOT_ARMED/未就绪静默跳过,Err 计数不吞)。 if OWNER_INIT.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { - match crate::qq_v8::poll_listener_json() { - Ok(json) if !json.starts_with("NOT_ARMED") => { - let mut binding = wrapper_binding.clone(); - binding.wrapper_session = - crate::qq_v8::listener_session().unwrap_or_default(); - if let Ok(batch) = r.ingest_wrapper_batch(&json, &binding) { - // D9:sendResults 回收(fired 的 Promise 结果)。 - { - let sr = &batch.send_results; - let mut done: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new(); - let mut rejected: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new(); - let mut unknown: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new(); - for (request_id, st) in sr { - let status = - st.get("status").and_then(|x| x.as_str()).unwrap_or(""); - if status == "done" { - let nid = st - .get("msgId") - .and_then(|x| x.as_str()) - .unwrap_or("") - .to_string(); - done.push((request_id.clone(), nid)); - } else if status == "unknown" { - let why = st - .get("reason") - .and_then(|x| x.as_str()) - .unwrap_or("send outcome unknown") - .to_string(); - unknown.push((request_id.clone(), why)); - } else if status == "rejected" { - let why = st - .get("error") - .and_then(|x| x.as_str()) - .unwrap_or("promise rejected") - .to_string(); - rejected.push((request_id.clone(), why)); - } - } - if !done.is_empty() || !rejected.is_empty() || !unknown.is_empty() { - r.complete_sends(&done, &rejected, &unknown); + // Never block or reenter while the V8 acknowledgement is active. + if let Ok(mut pending_result_ack) = pending_result_ack.try_lock() { + let ack_ready = crate::qq_v8::advance_poll_result_ack(&mut pending_result_ack, |item| { + matches!(crate::qq_v8::ack_poll_result(item), Ok(ref value) if value == "ACKED") + }); + if !ack_ready { + static ACK_ERR_N: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64 = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0); + let n = ACK_ERR_N.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed); + if n % 20 == 0 { qq_entry::append_stage_simple("poll_receipt_ack", false, "retry_pending"); } + } + let session = if ack_ready { crate::qq_v8::listener_session() } else { None } + .filter(|s| !s.is_empty() && s.len() <= 128); + let poll = session.as_deref().map(crate::qq_v8::poll_listener_bound_json); + match (session, poll) { + (Some(session), Some(Ok(json))) if !json.starts_with("NOT_ARMED") => { + let mut binding = wrapper_binding.clone(); + binding.wrapper_session = session; + if let Ok(batch) = r.ingest_wrapper_batch(&json, &binding) { + // D9:sendResults 回收(fired 的 Promise 结果)。 + { + let sr = &batch.send_results; + let needs_receipt = sr.values().any(|st| matches!( + st.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()), + Some("done" | "rejected" | "unknown") + )); + let receipt = crate::qq_v8::poll_result_receipt(&json).ok().flatten(); + if !needs_receipt || receipt.is_some() { + let mut done: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new(); + let mut rejected: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new(); + let mut unknown: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new(); + for (request_id, st) in sr { + let status = + st.get("status").and_then(|x| x.as_str()).unwrap_or(""); + if status == "done" { + let nid = st + .get("msgId") + .and_then(|x| x.as_str()) + .unwrap_or("") + .to_string(); + done.push((request_id.clone(), nid)); + } else if status == "unknown" { + let why = st + .get("reason") + .and_then(|x| x.as_str()) + .unwrap_or("send outcome unknown") + .to_string(); + unknown.push((request_id.clone(), why)); + } else if status == "rejected" { + let why = st + .get("error") + .and_then(|x| x.as_str()) + .unwrap_or("promise rejected") + .to_string(); + rejected.push((request_id.clone(), why)); + } + } + let submitted = done.len() + rejected.len() + unknown.len(); + let accepted = if submitted > 0 { + r.complete_sends(&done, &rejected, &unknown) + } else { Vec::new() }; + let unmatched = accepted.len() < submitted; + if let Some(receipt) = receipt { + *pending_result_ack = Some(crate::qq_v8::PollResultAck { + session: binding.wrapper_session.clone(), receipt, keys: accepted, + }); + } + if unmatched { + static UNMATCHED_N: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64 = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0); + let n = UNMATCHED_N.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed); + if n % 20 == 0 { + qq_entry::append_stage_simple("poll_result_unmatched", false, "retained"); + match crate::qq_v8::read_result_pressure(&binding.wrapper_session) { + Ok(Some(detail)) => qq_entry::append_stage_simple("poll_result_pressure", true, &detail), + _ => qq_entry::append_stage_simple("poll_result_pressure", false, "unknown"), + } + } + } + } // Invalid or missing receipts leave results in JS. } } } - } - Ok(_) => {} - Err(e) => { - // 首次/每 20 次记录轮询失败变体(不吞)。 - static POLL_ERR_N: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64 = - std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0); - let n = POLL_ERR_N.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed); - if n % 20 == 0 { - qq_entry::append_stage_simple("poll_err", false, &format!("{e:?}")); + (Some(_), Some(Err(e))) => { + // 首次/每 20 次记录轮询失败变体(不吞)。 + static POLL_ERR_N: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64 = + std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0); + let n = POLL_ERR_N.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed); + if n % 20 == 0 { + qq_entry::append_stage_simple("poll_err", false, &format!("{e:?}")); + } } + _ => {} } } } @@ -1031,8 +1087,11 @@ pub unsafe extern "system" fn caligo_qq_daemon_client_start(cfg_json_ptr: *const let spawned = std::thread::Builder::new() .name("caligo-daemon-client".into()) .spawn(move || { - let (_counters, _exit) = + let (_counters, exit) = daemon_client::run_worker(cfg, resident, &wake, rx, erx, worker_stop); + if matches!(exit, daemon_client::WorkerExit::WorkerAlreadyRunning | daemon_client::WorkerExit::WorkerQuarantined) { + qq_entry::append_stage_simple("daemon_worker", false, "worker_lease_rejected"); + } }); if spawned.is_err() { return c::ERR_SPAWN; diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_resident.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_resident.rs index 09df44b..b30b7ee 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_resident.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_resident.rs @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ pub unsafe fn native_resident_run(ctx: *const NativeResidentCtx) -> u32 { session_generation, ); let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(adapter, ResidentLimits::default())); - let (result_tx, result_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::(); + let (result_tx, result_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::(); let (event_tx, event_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::(); let wake_pair = Arc::new((Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new())); let callback_quarantine_complete = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); @@ -790,6 +790,7 @@ pub unsafe fn native_resident_run(ctx: *const NativeResidentCtx) -> u32 { if boot_ok { stage(&report_pump, "n3res_bootstrap", true, "Ready(owner=pump)"); } + let notice_handoff = crate::resident::ResultHandoffGate::default(); while boot_ok && !stop_pump.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { { let (flag, cv) = &*wake_pair; @@ -797,12 +798,23 @@ pub unsafe fn native_resident_run(ctx: *const NativeResidentCtx) -> u32 { // 100ms 节拍 + wake 即时唤醒。 let _ = cv.wait_timeout(guard, std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)); } + if notice_handoff.is_closed() { continue; } + // Retry a retained suffix before dispatch or response drain. + if notice_handoff.forward(&resident, &result_tx).is_err() { + if notice_handoff.is_closed() { + stage(&report_pump, "result_notice_handoff", false, "closed_or_exhausted_retained"); + } + continue; + } let _ = resident.drain(); // N3 retCode 消费者排空:QQ 分发线程 → 槽 → 账本终局。 resident.drain_send_responses(); resident.expire_late_receipts(std::time::Instant::now()); - for notice in resident.take_results() { - let _ = result_tx.send(notice); + if notice_handoff.forward(&resident, &result_tx).is_err() { + if notice_handoff.is_closed() { + stage(&report_pump, "result_notice_handoff", false, "closed_or_exhausted_retained"); + } + continue; } for ev in resident.take_events() { let _ = event_tx.send(ev); @@ -1018,6 +1030,8 @@ pub unsafe fn native_resident_run(ctx: *const NativeResidentCtx) -> u32 { WorkerExit::LocalStop => "LocalStop", WorkerExit::CoreStopped => "CoreStopped", WorkerExit::HelloRejected => "HelloRejected", + WorkerExit::WorkerAlreadyRunning => "WorkerAlreadyRunning", + WorkerExit::WorkerQuarantined => "WorkerQuarantined", }; let ok = exit == WorkerExit::LocalStop || exit == WorkerExit::CoreStopped; stage( diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_entry.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_entry.rs index b1397e1..efae0c9 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_entry.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_entry.rs @@ -1103,10 +1103,14 @@ impl QqOwnerAdapter { return Some(QueryOutcome::Disconnected); } if self.login_cleanup_unknown { + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + append_stage_simple("login_diagnostic", false, "cleanup_unknown"); return Some(QueryOutcome::NotReady); } if !poll { if self.login_request.is_some() { + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + append_stage_simple("login_diagnostic", false, "request_busy"); return Some(QueryOutcome::NotReady); } let Some(path) = self.login_wrapper.as_deref() else { @@ -1121,15 +1125,21 @@ impl QqOwnerAdapter { match crate::qq_v8::run_fixed_query_script(&script).as_deref() { Ok("DISPATCHED" | "SURFACE_DONE") => return None, Ok("BUSY") => { + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + append_stage_simple("login_diagnostic", false, "script_busy"); self.login_request = None; self.login_cleanup_unknown = true; return Some(QueryOutcome::NotReady); } Err(crate::qq_v8::V8Error::NoCurrentContext) => { + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + append_stage_simple("login_diagnostic", false, "no_current_context"); self.login_request = None; return Some(QueryOutcome::NotReady); } _ => { + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + append_stage_simple("login_diagnostic", false, "script_start_failed"); self.cancel_login(); return Some(QueryOutcome::NotReady); } @@ -1152,6 +1162,12 @@ impl QqOwnerAdapter { return Some(QueryOutcome::InvalidResponse); }; self.login_request = None; + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + if !matches!(decode_login_report(&report, scope, refresh), QueryOutcome::Success(_)) { + for label in login_diagnostic_labels(&report) { + append_stage_simple("login_diagnostic", false, label); + } + } if report["status"] == "self_status_listener_cleanup_unverified" { self.login_cleanup_unknown = true; append_stage_simple("login_listener_cleanup", false, "listener removal unverified"); @@ -1168,6 +1184,57 @@ impl QqOwnerAdapter { } } +/// Fixed labels only: native reports can contain identity and must never be logged verbatim. +#[cfg(feature = "research")] +fn login_diagnostic_labels(report: &serde_json::Value) -> [&'static str; 3] { + let status = match report["status"].as_str() { + Some("current_login_match") => "status_current_login_match", + Some("current_account_mismatch") => "status_current_account_mismatch", + Some("current_session_changed") => "status_current_session_changed", + Some("current_session_id_invalid") => "status_current_session_id_invalid", + Some("current_login_check_failed") => "status_current_login_check_failed", + Some("self_forward_not_map") => "status_self_forward_not_map", + Some("self_forward_mismatch") => "status_self_forward_mismatch", + Some("self_reverse_not_map") => "status_self_reverse_not_map", + Some("self_reverse_mismatch") => "status_self_reverse_mismatch", + Some("self_status_listener_id_invalid") => "status_listener_id_invalid", + Some("self_status_listener_surface_missing") => "status_listener_surface_missing", + Some("self_status_listener_cleanup_unverified") => "status_cleanup_unverified", + Some("self_status_offline") => "status_self_offline", + Some("self_status_ack_failed") => "status_self_ack_failed", + Some("self_status_ack_invalid") => "status_self_ack_invalid", + Some("self_status_conflict") => "status_self_conflict", + Some("self_status_event_invalid") => "status_self_event_invalid", + Some("self_status_rejected") => "status_self_rejected", + Some("self_status_threw") => "status_self_threw", + Some("profile_methods_unavailable") => "status_profile_methods_unavailable", + Some("profile_require_missing") => "status_profile_require_missing", + Some("profile_service_accessor_missing") => "status_profile_service_accessor_missing", + Some("profile_service_missing") => "status_profile_service_missing", + Some("profile_wrapper_accessor_missing") => "status_profile_wrapper_accessor_missing", + Some("profile_wrapper_require_failed") => "status_profile_wrapper_require_failed", + _ => "status_other_or_missing", + }; + let nickname = match report["nicknameStatus"].as_str() { + Some("matched") => "nickname_matched", + Some("query_rejected") => "nickname_query_rejected", + Some("result_not_map") => "nickname_result_not_map", + Some("profile_identity_mismatch") => "nickname_identity_mismatch", + Some("nickname_invalid") => "nickname_invalid", + Some("accessor_missing") => "nickname_accessor_missing", + Some("query_threw") => "nickname_query_threw", + _ => "nickname_other_or_missing", + }; + let listener = match report["listenerRegistration"].as_str() { + Some("remove_returned") => "listener_remove_returned", + Some("registered") => "listener_registered", + Some("remove_unknown") => "listener_remove_unknown", + Some("unknown") => "listener_unknown", + _ => "listener_other_or_missing", + }; + [status, nickname, listener] +} + fn decode_login_report( report: &serde_json::Value, scope: &caligo_model::capability::QueryScope, @@ -1204,6 +1271,17 @@ mod profile_report_tests { use caligo_model::capability::{QueryData, QueryOutcome, QueryScope}; use serde_json::json; + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + #[test] + fn login_diagnostics_are_fixed_labels_and_never_include_report_values() { + use super::login_diagnostic_labels; + let report = json!({"status":"current_account_mismatch", "nicknameStatus":"query_rejected", + "listenerRegistration":"remove_returned", "currentLogin":{"uin":"PRIVATE"}}); + assert_eq!(login_diagnostic_labels(&report), ["status_current_account_mismatch", "nickname_query_rejected", "listener_remove_returned"]); + let injected = json!({"status":"PRIVATE", "nicknameStatus":"PRIVATE", "listenerRegistration":"PRIVATE"}); + assert_eq!(login_diagnostic_labels(&injected), ["status_other_or_missing", "nickname_other_or_missing", "listener_other_or_missing"]); + } + #[test] fn scoped_refresh_uses_the_fresh_row_and_refuses_cached_or_wrong_account_results() { let scope = QueryScope { account: "10001".into(), host_nonce: 1, session_generation: 2, connection_epoch: 3 }; diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_image_send.js b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_image_send.js index b1af780..d047eae 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_image_send.js +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_image_send.js @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ function (args) { !Number.isInteger(args.timeoutMs) || args.timeoutMs <= 0) return failure('invalid_image_request'); if (Object.hasOwn(R.sends, args.requestId) || Object.hasOwn(R.sendResults, args.requestId) || - Object.keys(R.sends).length >= 128) + Object.keys(R.sends).length >= 128 || Object.keys(R.sendResults).length >= 128) return failure('send_capacity_or_duplicate'); const deadline = Date.now() + args.timeoutMs; @@ -37,6 +37,25 @@ function (args) { Object.values(R.sends).some(send => send.cookie === cookie)) return failure('invalid_cookie'); + // Keep image cookies for the lifetime of this JS environment, including + // after settlement or listener restart; stale callbacks can arrive later. + const guardKey = '__caligo_image_cookie_guard_v1'; + if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(globalThis, guardKey)) { + const seenCookies = new Set(); + const claimCookie = value => { + if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || value === '0' || value.length > 256) return 'invalid_cookie'; + if (seenCookies.has(value)) return 'invalid_cookie'; + if (seenCookies.size >= 65536) return 'cookie_history_exhausted'; + seenCookies.add(value); return 'ok'; + }; + Object.defineProperty(globalThis, guardKey, {value:claimCookie, writable:false, configurable:false, enumerable:false}); + } + const guard = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(globalThis, guardKey); + if (!guard || typeof guard.value !== 'function' || guard.writable !== false || guard.configurable !== false) + return failure('cookie_history_unavailable'); + const claim = guard.value(cookie); + if (claim !== 'ok') return failure(claim); + const bytes = Buffer.from(args.png, 'hex'); const md5 = crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); const sha256 = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex'); @@ -101,6 +120,7 @@ function (args) { if (R.stopped || R.sends[key] !== pending) return; pending.promiseDone = true; pending.promiseStatus = status; + if (status === 'unknown') pending.unknownReason = detail.reason; if (pending.readback) { R.settleSendResult(R, key, pending); } else if (!pending.ambiguous && !pending.timedOut) { @@ -108,18 +128,19 @@ function (args) { } if (status !== 'accepted') pending.failed = true; } - const unknown = () => result('unknown', {status:'unknown', reason:'image_submit_unknown'}); + const unknown = reason => result('unknown', {status:'unknown', + reason:typeof reason === 'string' ? reason : 'image_submit_unknown'}); try { const promise = R.ms.sendMsg('0', {chatType, peerUid, guildId:cookie}, [element], new Map()); Promise.resolve(promise).then(value => { if (value && value.result === 0) { result('accepted', {status:'accepted'}); - } else if (value && Number.isInteger(value.result) && !pending.addId) { - result('rejected', {status:'rejected', error:'native image rejected'}); + } else if (value && Number.isSafeInteger(value.result)) { + unknown('send_result_ambiguous=' + String(value.result)); } else { unknown(); } - }, unknown); + }, () => unknown()); } catch (_) { unknown(); } diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_v8.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_v8.rs index 0985b53..fa13c30 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_v8.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_v8.rs @@ -368,7 +368,10 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" (function () { try { var G = globalThis; - if (G.__caligo_res) { G.__caligo_d8 = G.__caligo_res; return 'ALREADY sid=' + G.__caligo_res.sid; } + if (G.__caligo_res) { + if (G.__caligo_res.stopped) return 'ERR:stopped_listener_retained'; + G.__caligo_d8 = G.__caligo_res; return 'ALREADY sid=' + G.__caligo_res.sid; + } var q = process._linkedBinding('QQNT'); var S = q.NodeIQQNTWrapperSession; var live = null, sidName = null; @@ -388,6 +391,39 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" var ms = live.getMsgService(); var R = { sid: sidName, session: live, ms: ms, recv: [], recvBytes: 0, rejected: 0, overflow: 0, imageShapes: [], listenerId: null, sendResults: {}, sends: {} }; + var traceText = typeof caligoSendTrace !== 'undefined' && caligoSendTrace === true; + R.textSendTrace = []; + var traceGeneration = 0; + if (traceText) { + try { + var lastGeneration = G.__caligo_text_trace_generation; + if (lastGeneration === undefined) lastGeneration = 0; + if (Number.isSafeInteger(lastGeneration) && lastGeneration >= 0 && lastGeneration < 2147483647) { + traceGeneration = lastGeneration + 1; + G.__caligo_text_trace_generation = traceGeneration; + if (G.__caligo_text_trace_generation !== traceGeneration) traceGeneration = 0; + } + } catch (_) { traceGeneration = 0; } + } + R.textTraceGeneration = traceGeneration; + R.textTraceSequence = 0; + R.textTraceOverflow = traceText && traceGeneration === 0; + R.allocateTextTrace = function() { + try { + if (!traceText) return 0; + if (!traceGeneration || R.textTraceSequence >= 2147483647) { R.textTraceOverflow = true; return 0; } + return ++R.textTraceSequence; + } catch (_) { try { R.textTraceOverflow = true; } catch (_) {} return 0; } + }; + R.noteTextSend = function(stage, seq) { + try { + if (!traceText) return; + if (!traceGeneration || !Number.isSafeInteger(seq) || seq <= 0 || R.textSendTrace.length >= 32) { + R.textTraceOverflow = true; return; + } + R.textSendTrace.push({seq:seq, stage:stage}); + } catch (_) { try { R.textTraceOverflow = true; } catch (_) {} } + }; var voiceAccount = typeof caligoVoiceAccount === 'string' ? caligoVoiceAccount : null; R.voiceAccount = voiceAccount; // The pinned wrapper serializes absent numeric mention IDs as '0' and the optional NT UID as null. @@ -400,9 +436,10 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" var utf8Bytes = function (s) { return Buffer.byteLength(s, 'utf8'); }; var settleSendResult = function (R, key, pending) { if (!pending || !pending.promiseDone || !pending.readback) return; + if (!pending.voice && !pending.image) R.noteTextSend('settled', pending.traceSeq); if (pending.ambiguous || pending.promiseStatus !== 'accepted' || pending.readback.status !== 'readback') { R.sendResults[key] = {status:'unknown', reason:pending.ambiguous ? 'multiple_add_send_ids' : - (pending.promiseStatus !== 'accepted' ? 'promise_event_conflict' : pending.readback.reason)}; + (pending.promiseStatus !== 'accepted' ? (pending.unknownReason || 'promise_event_conflict') : pending.readback.reason)}; } else if ((pending.voice || pending.image) && !push('add_send', pending.readback.record, true)) { R.sendResults[key] = {status:'unknown', reason:'verified_voice_projection_rejected'}; } else { @@ -549,6 +586,7 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" ((send.voice || send.image) && (m.peerUin !== send.peerUin || !/^[0-9]{1,128}$/.test(m.msgId) || !/[1-9]/.test(m.msgId)))) continue; if (src === 'add_send') { + if (!send.voice && !send.image) R.noteTextSend('matched_add', send.traceSeq); if (send.addId && (send.addId !== m.msgId || ((send.voice || send.image) && send.addElementId !== m.elements[0].elementId))) { send.ambiguous = true; @@ -562,6 +600,7 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" } if (src === 'update' && send.addId === m.msgId && m.sendStatus === 2 && !send.readbackStarted && (!(send.voice || send.image) || send.addElementId === m.elements[0].elementId)) { + if (!send.voice && !send.image) R.noteTextSend('matched_update', send.traceSeq); send.updateId = m.msgId; send.readbackStarted = true; (function (key, pending, service) { Promise.resolve().then(function () { @@ -599,6 +638,7 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" pending.readback = matched ? {status:'readback', msgId:record.msgId, record:owned} : {status:'unknown', reason:'exact_query_identity_mismatch'}; + if (!pending.voice && !pending.image) R.noteTextSend(matched ? 'readback_matched' : 'readback_mismatch', pending.traceSeq); } settleSendResult(R, key, pending); }, function () { @@ -616,9 +656,10 @@ pub const D8_START_JS: &str = r" for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) push(src, a[i]); }; R.listener = { - onRecvMsg: function (a) { pushList('recv', a); }, - onMsgInfoListUpdate: function (a) { pushList('update', a); }, - onAddSendMsg: function (m) { push('add_send', m); }, + onRecvMsg: function (a) { if (!R.stopped) pushList('recv', a); }, + onMsgInfoListUpdate: function (a) { if (!R.stopped) pushList('update', a); }, + onAddSendMsg: function (m) { if (!R.stopped) push('add_send', m); }, + // A late media completion can still release an owned temporary file. onRichMediaDownloadComplete: function (result) { if (typeof R.voiceDownload === 'function') R.voiceDownload(result); } @@ -638,6 +679,8 @@ pub const D8_POLL_JS: &str = r" var G = globalThis; if (!G.__caligo_res) return 'NOT_ARMED'; var R = G.__caligo_res; + // Production passes the captured binding; reject before any mutation. + if (typeof caligoExpectedSid !== 'undefined' && R.sid !== caligoExpectedSid) return 'ERR:session_mismatch'; var keys = Object.keys(R.sends || {}); for (var k = 0; k < keys.length; k++) { var key = keys[k], send = R.sends[key]; @@ -647,25 +690,110 @@ pub const D8_POLL_JS: &str = r" } if (send && Date.now() >= send.deadline + 30000) delete R.sends[key]; } + var leaseMode = typeof caligoResultLease !== 'undefined' && caligoResultLease === true; + var sourceResults = R.sendResults || {}, offeredResults = sourceResults; + var deferrals = R.resultDeferrals; + if (leaseMode && deferrals instanceof Map && deferrals.size) { + var retryNow = null; + try { var n = process.hrtime.bigint(); if (typeof n === 'bigint' && n >= 0n) retryNow = n; } catch (_) {} + if (retryNow === null) { + // A missing clock must not hide an unacknowledged result. + deferrals.clear(); + } else { + deferrals.forEach(function(d, k) { + if (!d || typeof d.since !== 'bigint' || typeof d.until !== 'bigint' || + d.until < d.since || d.until - d.since > 2000000000n || + !Number.isInteger(d.count) || d.count < 1 || d.count > 4 || + !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(sourceResults, k) || sourceResults[k] !== d.value) + deferrals.delete(k); + }); + offeredResults = Object.create(null); + Object.keys(sourceResults).forEach(function(k) { + var d = deferrals.get(k); + if (!d || d.value !== sourceResults[k] || retryNow < d.since || retryNow >= d.until) offeredResults[k] = sourceResults[k]; + }); + } + } var out = {schema:1, sid:R.sid, items:R.recv, rejected:R.rejected, overflow:R.overflow, - sendResults:R.sendResults || {}, imageShapes:R.imageShapes || [], mediaDiagnostics:R.mediaDiagnostics || []}; + sendResults:offeredResults, imageShapes:R.imageShapes || [], mediaDiagnostics:R.mediaDiagnostics || [], + textSendTrace:R.textSendTrace || [], textSendTraceGeneration:R.textTraceGeneration || 0, + textSendTraceOverflow:R.textTraceOverflow === true}; + var resultKeysForLease = Object.keys(offeredResults); + var hasTerminal = resultKeysForLease.some(function(k) { + var value = offeredResults[k]; + return value && (value.status === 'done' || value.status === 'unknown' || value.status === 'rejected'); + }); + var receipt = null; + if (leaseMode && hasTerminal) { + if (R.resultLeaseGeneration === undefined) { + var crypto = process.getBuiltinModule('node:crypto'); + var generation = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex'); + if (!/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/.test(generation)) return 'ERR:result_lease_unavailable'; + R.resultLeaseGeneration = generation; + R.resultLeaseSequence = 0; + } + if (typeof R.resultLeaseGeneration !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/.test(R.resultLeaseGeneration) || + !Number.isSafeInteger(R.resultLeaseSequence) || R.resultLeaseSequence < 0 || + R.resultLeaseSequence >= Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) return 'ERR:result_lease_unavailable'; + receipt = {generation:R.resultLeaseGeneration, sequence:++R.resultLeaseSequence}; + out.resultReceipt = receipt; + } var json = JSON.stringify(out); // Preserve legacy D9 state for a later poll rather than truncate JSON or D8 records. if (Buffer.byteLength(json, 'utf8') > 524288) { out.sendResults = {}; - var keys = Object.keys(R.sendResults || {}); + var keys = Object.keys(offeredResults); + var isolated = {schema:1, sid:R.sid, items:[], rejected:0, overflow:0, + sendResults:{}, imageShapes:[], mediaDiagnostics:[], textSendTrace:[], + textSendTraceGeneration:R.textTraceGeneration || 0, textSendTraceOverflow:false}; + if (receipt) isolated.resultReceipt = receipt; for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) { - out.sendResults[keys[i]] = R.sendResults[keys[i]]; + out.sendResults[keys[i]] = offeredResults[keys[i]]; if (Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(out), 'utf8') > 524288) { - delete out.sendResults[keys[i]]; break; + // Keep the omitted result for a later poll, but let smaller results + // behind it make progress in this batch. + delete out.sendResults[keys[i]]; + isolated.sendResults = {}; + isolated.sendResults[keys[i]] = offeredResults[keys[i]]; + if (offeredResults[keys[i]].status !== 'pending' && + Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(isolated), 'utf8') > 524288) { + // A terminal result that cannot fit even in an otherwise empty + // batch cannot carry a usable identity; report unknown instead. + out.sendResults[keys[i]] = {status:'unknown', reason:'result_exceeds_poll_budget'}; + if (Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(out), 'utf8') > 524288) + delete out.sendResults[keys[i]]; + } + continue; } } json = JSON.stringify(out); } - R.recv = []; R.recvBytes = 0; R.rejected = 0; R.overflow = 0; R.imageShapes = []; R.mediaDiagnostics = []; - var resultKeys = Object.keys(R.sendResults || {}); - for (var i = 0; i < resultKeys.length; i++) { - if (R.sendResults[resultKeys[i]].status !== 'pending') delete R.sendResults[resultKeys[i]]; + // Match the decoder's batch-level admission before discarding state. This + // does not acknowledge delivery to Rust or its durable consumer. + if (Buffer.byteLength(json, 'utf8') > 524288) return 'ERR:poll_batch_invalid'; + var wire = JSON.parse(json); + if (wire.schema !== 1 || typeof wire.sid !== 'string' || !wire.sid || + Buffer.byteLength(wire.sid, 'utf8') > 128 || !Array.isArray(wire.items) || + !Number.isSafeInteger(wire.rejected) || wire.rejected < 0 || + !Number.isSafeInteger(wire.overflow) || wire.overflow < 0) + return 'ERR:poll_batch_invalid'; + if (leaseMode && receipt) { + var refs = Object.create(null); + var emitted = Object.keys(wire.sendResults || {}); + for (var i = 0; i < emitted.length; i++) { + var item = wire.sendResults[emitted[i]]; + if (item && (item.status === 'done' || item.status === 'unknown' || item.status === 'rejected')) + refs[emitted[i]] = R.sendResults[emitted[i]]; + } + R.resultLease = {generation:receipt.generation, sequence:receipt.sequence, refs:refs}; + } + R.recv = []; R.recvBytes = 0; R.rejected = 0; R.overflow = 0; R.imageShapes = []; R.mediaDiagnostics = []; R.textSendTrace = []; R.textTraceOverflow = false; + if (!leaseMode) { + // Compatibility path; serialization is not downstream acknowledgement. + var resultKeys = Object.keys(out.sendResults || {}); + for (var i = 0; i < resultKeys.length; i++) { + if (R.sendResults[resultKeys[i]].status !== 'pending') delete R.sendResults[resultKeys[i]]; + } } return json; } catch (e) { return 'ERR:' + String(e).slice(0, 300); } @@ -681,14 +809,184 @@ pub const D8_STOP_JS: &str = r" var R = G.__caligo_res; var r = 'no-listener'; R.stopped = true; - try { r = String(R.ms.removeKernelMsgListener(R.listenerId)); } catch (e) { r = 'ERR:' + String(e).slice(0, 100); } + // Research-only, synchronous synthetic callbacks. No QQ API or message data. + var probe = ''; + if (typeof caligoStopProbe !== 'undefined' && caligoStopProbe === true) { + try { + var before = [R.recv, R.recv.length, R.recvBytes, R.rejected, R.overflow, + R.imageShapes, R.imageShapes.length]; + R.listener.onRecvMsg(null); + R.listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate(null); + R.listener.onAddSendMsg(null); + var unchanged = R.recv === before[0] && R.recv.length === before[1] && + R.recvBytes === before[2] && R.rejected === before[3] && R.overflow === before[4] && + R.imageShapes === before[5] && R.imageShapes.length === before[6]; + probe = unchanged ? ' stop_probe=pass' : ' stop_probe=fail'; + } catch (_) { probe = ' stop_probe=error'; } + } + try { r = String(R.ms.removeKernelMsgListener(R.listenerId)); } + catch (_) { return 'ERR:listener_remove_failed' + probe; } var sid = R.sid; delete G.__caligo_res; - return 'STOPPED sid=' + sid + ' remove=' + r; + return 'STOPPED sid=' + sid + ' remove=' + r + probe; } catch (e) { return 'ERR:' + String(e).slice(0, 300); } })() "; +/// Build a read-only, session-bound aggregate of the result table. No result +/// key, message content, reason, generation or account is returned. +pub fn build_result_pressure_js(session: &str) -> Option { + if session.is_empty() || session.len() > 128 { return None; } + let sid = serde_json::to_string(session).ok()?; + Some(format!(r#"(function(expected) {{ + try {{ + var R = globalThis.__caligo_res; + if (!R || R.sid !== expected) return 'ERR:pressure_session'; + var results = R.sendResults; + if (!results || typeof results !== 'object' || Array.isArray(results) || + (Object.getPrototypeOf(results) !== Object.prototype && Object.getPrototypeOf(results) !== null)) return 'ERR:pressure_state'; + var keys = Object.keys(results), overflow = keys.length > 128; + var delayed = null, deferrals = R.resultDeferrals; + if (!overflow && (deferrals === undefined || deferrals === null)) delayed = 0; + else if (!overflow && deferrals instanceof Map) {{ + if (deferrals.size === 0) delayed = 0; + else if (deferrals.size <= 128) {{ + var now = null; + try {{ var t = process.hrtime.bigint(); if (typeof t === 'bigint' && t >= 0n) now = t; }} catch (_) {{}} + if (now !== null) {{ + delayed = 0; + for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {{ + var d = deferrals.get(keys[i]); + if (d === undefined) continue; + if (!d || typeof d.since !== 'bigint' || typeof d.until !== 'bigint' || + d.until < d.since || d.until - d.since > 2000000000n || + !Number.isInteger(d.count) || d.count < 1 || d.count > 4) {{ delayed = null; break; }} + if (d.value === results[keys[i]] && now >= d.since && now < d.until) delayed++; + }} + }} + }} + }} + return JSON.stringify({{entries:Math.min(keys.length,128), over_capacity:overflow, delayed:delayed}}); + }} catch (_) {{ return 'ERR:pressure_unavailable'; }} + }})({sid})"#)) +} + +/// Validate and reconstruct only the fixed aggregate fields; arbitrary input +/// fields never reach the stage report. A missing sample is not zero pressure. +pub fn sanitize_result_pressure(input: &str) -> Option { + if input.len() > 1024 { return None; } + let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(input).ok()?; + let entries = value.get("entries")?.as_u64().filter(|n| *n <= 128)?; + let over = value.get("over_capacity")?.as_bool()?; + if over && entries != 128 { return None; } + let delayed = match value.get("delayed")? { + serde_json::Value::Null => None, + v => Some(v.as_u64().filter(|n| *n <= entries)?), + }; + if over && delayed.is_some() { return None; } + Some(serde_json::json!({"entries":entries,"capacity":128,"saturated":entries == 128, + "over_capacity":over,"delayed":delayed}).to_string()) +} + +pub fn read_result_pressure(session: &str) -> Result, V8Error> { + let Some(source) = build_result_pressure_js(session) else { return Ok(None); }; + let output = run_fixed_query_script(&source)?; + Ok(sanitize_result_pressure(&output)) +} + +/// A receipt identifies one JS listener's exact serialized result snapshot. +/// It only acknowledges resident processing, not daemon durability. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct PollResultReceipt { pub generation: String, pub sequence: u64 } + +/// Only the result keys accepted by the resident may be acknowledged. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct PollResultAck { + pub session: String, + pub receipt: PollResultReceipt, + pub keys: Vec, +} + +pub fn poll_result_receipt(json: &str) -> Result, &'static str> { + let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(json).map_err(|_| "receipt_json")?; + let Some(receipt) = value.get("resultReceipt") else { return Ok(None); }; + let generation = receipt.get("generation").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) + .filter(|s| s.len() == 32 && s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b))) + .ok_or("receipt_generation")?; + let sequence = receipt.get("sequence").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) + .filter(|n| *n > 0 && *n <= 9_007_199_254_740_991).ok_or("receipt_sequence")?; + Ok(Some(PollResultReceipt { generation: generation.to_string(), sequence })) +} + +/// Build an idempotent ack that only removes unchanged result objects. +pub fn build_poll_result_ack_js(session: &str, receipt: &PollResultReceipt, keys: &[String]) -> Option { + if session.is_empty() || session.len() > 128 || receipt.generation.len() != 32 || + !receipt.generation.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)) || + receipt.sequence == 0 || receipt.sequence > 9_007_199_254_740_991 || keys.len() > 128 { return None; } + let unique: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = keys.iter().map(String::as_str).collect(); + if unique.len() != keys.len() || serde_json::to_string(keys).ok()?.len() > 524288 { return None; } + let args = serde_json::json!({"sid":session,"generation":receipt.generation,"sequence":receipt.sequence,"keys":keys}); + Some(format!(r#"(function(a) {{ + try {{ + var R = globalThis.__caligo_res; + if (!R || R.sid !== a.sid) return 'ERR:receipt_session'; + if (!Array.isArray(a.keys) || a.keys.length > 128) return 'ERR:receipt_keys'; + var fingerprint = JSON.stringify(a.keys); + var last = R.resultLeaseAcked; + if (last && last.generation === a.generation && last.sequence === a.sequence) + return last.keys === fingerprint ? 'ACKED' : 'ERR:receipt_replay_mismatch'; + var lease = R.resultLease; + if (!lease || lease.generation !== a.generation || lease.sequence !== a.sequence) return 'ERR:receipt_stale'; + for (var i = 0; i < a.keys.length; i++) {{ + if (typeof a.keys[i] !== 'string' || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(lease.refs, a.keys[i])) + return 'ERR:receipt_keys'; + }} + var now = null; + try {{ var t = process.hrtime.bigint(); if (typeof t === 'bigint' && t >= 0n) now = t; }} catch (_) {{}} + var deferred = R.resultDeferrals; + if (now !== null && !(deferred instanceof Map)) {{ deferred = new Map(); R.resultDeferrals = deferred; }} + if (now === null && deferred instanceof Map) {{ deferred.clear(); deferred = null; }} + var selected = new Set(a.keys), snapshotKeys = Object.keys(lease.refs); + for (var i = 0; i < snapshotKeys.length; i++) {{ + var k = snapshotKeys[i], original = lease.refs[k]; + if (selected.has(k)) {{ + if (R.sendResults[k] === original) delete R.sendResults[k]; + if (deferred) deferred.delete(k); + }} else if (deferred && R.sendResults[k] === original) {{ + var prior = deferred.get(k); + if (prior || deferred.size < 128) {{ + var count = prior && prior.value === original && typeof prior.since === 'bigint' && + Number.isInteger(prior.count) && prior.count >= 1 && prior.count <= 4 && now >= prior.since + ? Math.min(prior.count + 1, 4) : 1; + var delayMs = 250 * Math.pow(2, count - 1); + deferred.set(k, {{value:original, count:count, since:now, until:now + BigInt(delayMs) * 1000000n}}); + }} + }} else if (deferred) {{ deferred.delete(k); }} + }} + R.resultLeaseAcked = {{generation:a.generation, sequence:a.sequence, keys:fingerprint}}; + R.resultLease = null; + return 'ACKED'; + }} catch (_) {{ return 'ERR:receipt_failed'; }} + }})({args})"#)) +} + +/// Advance one pending receipt only after the caller observes an ACKED reply. +pub fn advance_poll_result_ack(pending: &mut Option, ack: F) -> bool +where F: FnOnce(&PollResultAck) -> bool { + if let Some(item) = pending.as_ref() { + if !ack(item) { return false; } + *pending = None; + } + true +} + +pub fn ack_poll_result(item: &PollResultAck) -> Result { + let Some(source) = build_poll_result_ack_js(&item.session, &item.receipt, &item.keys) else { return Ok("ERR:receipt_invalid".into()); }; + let Some(syms) = symbols() else { return Err(V8Error::NoCurrentContext); }; + // SAFETY: caller is the owner thread; exec_script checks the V8 ladder. + unsafe { exec_script(&syms, isolate_addr(), &source) } +} + // —— 共享符号存取(daemon 导出解析一次;adapter/pump 共用) —— static V8_STORE: std::sync::Mutex> = std::sync::Mutex::new(None); @@ -724,11 +1022,28 @@ fn isolate_addr() -> *mut c_void { /// 排空轮转点:执行 D8_POLL_JS 并返回原始 JSON("NOT_ARMED"/items JSON)。 pub fn poll_listener_json() -> Result { + poll_listener_script(D8_POLL_JS) +} + +/// Generate a poll tied to the listener session captured at acquisition. +pub fn build_bound_poll_js(session: &str) -> Option { + if session.is_empty() || session.len() > 128 { return None; } + let quoted = serde_json::to_string(session).ok()?; + Some(format!("(function(caligoExpectedSid, caligoResultLease) {{ return ({}); }})({quoted}, true)", D8_POLL_JS)) +} + +/// Production poll. A missing binding must not execute the destructive script. +pub fn poll_listener_bound_json(session: &str) -> Result { + let Some(source) = build_bound_poll_js(session) else { return Ok("NOT_ARMED:session_unavailable".into()); }; + poll_listener_script(&source) +} + +fn poll_listener_script(source: &str) -> Result { let Some(syms) = symbols() else { return Err(V8Error::NoCurrentContext); }; // SAFETY: 阶梯内自管全部检查;调用方保证 owner 线程。 - let output = unsafe { exec_script(&syms, isolate_addr(), D8_POLL_JS) }?; + let output = unsafe { exec_script(&syms, isolate_addr(), source) }?; if let Some(detail) = crate::receive_diagnostics::sanitize_image_shapes(&output) { // This is a per-process research report budget, independent of message admission. static IMAGE_REPORTS: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32 = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0); @@ -744,6 +1059,14 @@ pub fn poll_listener_json() -> Result { crate::qq_entry::append_stage_simple("media_download_stage", true, &detail); } } + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + if let Some(detail) = crate::receive_diagnostics::sanitize_text_send_trace(&output) { + static TEXT_REPORTS: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32 = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0); + if TEXT_REPORTS.fetch_update(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed, + std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed, |n| (n < 32).then_some(n + 1)).is_ok() { + crate::qq_entry::append_stage_simple("text_send_trace", true, &detail); + } + } Ok(output) } @@ -764,10 +1087,10 @@ pub(crate) fn start_listener_with_voice(account: Option<&str>) -> Result Result { let Some(syms) = symbols() else { return Err(V8Error::NoCurrentContext); }; + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + let source = format!("(function(caligoStopProbe) {{ return ({}); }})(true)", D8_STOP_JS); + #[cfg(not(feature = "research"))] + let source = format!("(function(caligoStopProbe) {{ return ({}); }})(false)", D8_STOP_JS); // SAFETY: 同上。 - unsafe { exec_script(&syms, isolate_addr(), D8_STOP_JS) } + let output = unsafe { exec_script(&syms, isolate_addr(), &source) }?; + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + if output.starts_with("STOPPED ") || output.starts_with("ERR:listener_remove_failed ") { + if let Some(label) = output.rsplit_once(" stop_probe=").map(|(_, label)| label) { + let ok = label == "pass"; + let detail = match label { "pass" => "pass", "fail" => "fail", _ => "error" }; + crate::qq_entry::append_stage_simple("synthetic_stopped_callbacks", ok, detail); + } + } + Ok(output) } /// 固定语义 UID/UIN 双向查询:直接复用 QQNT wrapper session 的服务。 @@ -1752,6 +2089,16 @@ mod uid_map_script_tests { listener_script_with_account, }; + #[test] + fn send_trace_is_enabled_only_in_research_listener_wrapper() { + let js = listener_script_with_account("10001"); + assert!(js.ends_with(if cfg!(feature = "research") { + ", true)" + } else { + ", false)" + })); + } + #[test] fn profile_refresh_requires_request_reply_and_notification_and_retains_unknown_cleanup() { let scripts = serde_json::json!({ @@ -2398,7 +2745,7 @@ pub fn build_send_js( if (!pending || !pending.promiseDone || !pending.readback) return; if (pending.ambiguous || pending.promiseStatus !== 'accepted' || pending.readback.status !== 'readback') { R.sendResults[key] = {status:'unknown', reason:pending.ambiguous ? 'multiple_add_send_ids' : - (pending.promiseStatus !== 'accepted' ? 'promise_event_conflict' : pending.readback.reason)}; + (pending.promiseStatus !== 'accepted' ? (pending.unknownReason || 'promise_event_conflict') : pending.readback.reason)}; } else { R.sendResults[key] = {status:'done', msgId:pending.readback.msgId}; } @@ -2422,7 +2769,7 @@ pub fn build_send_js( js.push_str(" if (typeof sv !== 'string' || !sv || sv === '0') return JSON.stringify({err:'server_time_unavailable'});\n"); js.push_str(" var cookie = R.ms.generateMsgUniqueId(chat, sv);\n"); js.push_str( - " if (typeof cookie !== 'string' || !cookie || cookie === '0') return JSON.stringify({err:'invalid_cookie'});\n", + " if (typeof cookie !== 'string' || !cookie || cookie === '0' || Object.values(R.sends).some(send => send.cookie === cookie)) return JSON.stringify({err:'invalid_cookie'});\n", ); js.push_str(" var selfUin = "); js.push_str(&account_json); @@ -2447,22 +2794,50 @@ pub fn build_send_js( js.push_str(" var key = "); js.push_str(&request_json); js.push_str(";\n"); - js.push_str(" if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(R.sends, key) || Object.keys(R.sends).length >= 128) return JSON.stringify({err:'send_capacity_or_duplicate'});\n"); + js.push_str(" if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(R.sends, key) || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(R.sendResults, key) || Object.keys(R.sends).length >= 128 || Object.keys(R.sendResults).length >= 128) return JSON.stringify({err:'send_capacity_or_duplicate'});\n"); + // Retain every text cookie in this JS environment: a late notification from a + // completed send must not be able to confirm a later same-cookie send. + // Bound memory and fail closed on exhaustion rather than evicting old cookies. + js.push_str(r#" var guardKey = '__caligo_text_cookie_guard_v1'; + if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(G, guardKey)) { + var seenCookies = new Set(); + var claimCookie = function (value) { + if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || value === '0' || value.length > 256) return 'invalid_cookie'; + if (seenCookies.has(value)) return 'invalid_cookie'; + if (seenCookies.size >= 65536) return 'cookie_history_exhausted'; + seenCookies.add(value); return 'ok'; + }; + Object.defineProperty(G, guardKey, {value:claimCookie, writable:false, configurable:false, enumerable:false}); + } + var guardDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(G, guardKey); + if (!guardDescriptor || typeof guardDescriptor.value !== 'function' || guardDescriptor.writable !== false || guardDescriptor.configurable !== false) return JSON.stringify({err:'cookie_history_unavailable'}); + var cookieClaim = guardDescriptor.value(cookie); + if (cookieClaim !== 'ok') return JSON.stringify({err:cookieClaim}); +"#); js.push_str(" var pending = {cookie:cookie, chat:chat, peer:peerUid, text:"); js.push_str(&text_json); js.push_str(", selfUin:selfUin, wireSeq:"); js.push_str(&wire_seq.to_string()); - js.push_str(", deadline:Date.now()+"); + js.push_str(", traceSeq:typeof R.allocateTextTrace === 'function' ? R.allocateTextTrace() : 0, deadline:Date.now()+"); js.push_str(&timeout_ms.to_string()); js.push_str(", addId:null, updateId:null, done:false};\n"); js.push_str(" R.sends[key] = pending; R.sendResults[key] = {status:'pending'};\n"); - js.push_str(" var pr; try { pr = R.ms.sendMsg('0', peer, elems, new Map()); } catch (e) { delete R.sends[key]; delete R.sendResults[key]; throw e; }\n"); - js.push_str(" Promise.resolve(pr).then(function (res) {\n"); - js.push_str(" pending.promiseDone = true;\n"); - js.push_str(" if (res && res.result === 0) { pending.promiseStatus = 'accepted'; R.sendResults[key] = {status:'accepted'}; }\n"); - js.push_str(" else { pending.promiseStatus = 'rejected'; pending.failed = true; R.sendResults[key] = {status:'rejected', error:'send result=' + String(res && res.result)}; }\n"); - js.push_str(" settleSendResult(R, key, pending);\n"); - js.push_str(" }, function (err) { pending.promiseDone=true; pending.promiseStatus='rejected'; pending.failed=true; R.sendResults[key] = {status:'rejected', error:String(err).slice(0,300)}; settleSendResult(R,key,pending); });\n"); + js.push_str(" if (R.noteTextSend) R.noteTextSend('registered', pending.traceSeq);\n"); + js.push_str(" function result(status, detail) {\n"); + js.push_str(" if (R.stopped || R.sends[key] !== pending) return;\n"); + js.push_str(" if (R.noteTextSend) R.noteTextSend(status === 'accepted' ? 'promise_accepted' : (status === 'rejected' ? 'promise_rejected' : 'promise_unknown'), pending.traceSeq);\n"); + js.push_str(" pending.promiseDone=true; pending.promiseStatus=status;\n"); + js.push_str(" if (status === 'unknown') pending.unknownReason=detail.reason;\n"); + js.push_str(" if (pending.readback) settleSendResult(R,key,pending);\n"); + js.push_str(" else if (!pending.ambiguous && !pending.timedOut) R.sendResults[key]=detail;\n"); + js.push_str(" if (status !== 'accepted') pending.failed=true;\n"); + js.push_str(" }\n"); + js.push_str(" function unknown(reason) { result('unknown', {status:'unknown', reason:typeof reason === 'string' ? reason : 'text_submit_unknown'}); }\n"); + js.push_str(" try { if (R.noteTextSend) R.noteTextSend('submit_enter', pending.traceSeq); var pr = R.ms.sendMsg('0', peer, elems, new Map()); if (R.noteTextSend) R.noteTextSend('submit_return', pending.traceSeq); Promise.resolve(pr).then(function (res) {\n"); + js.push_str(" if (res && res.result === 0) result('accepted', {status:'accepted'});\n"); + js.push_str(" else if (res && Number.isSafeInteger(res.result)) unknown('send_result_ambiguous=' + String(res.result));\n"); + js.push_str(" else unknown();\n"); + js.push_str(" }, function () { unknown(); }); } catch (e) { unknown(); }\n"); js.push_str(" return JSON.stringify({fired:true, mid:key});\n"); js.push_str(" } catch (e) { return JSON.stringify({ err: String(e).slice(0, 300) }); }\n"); js.push_str("})()\n"); diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_voice_send.js b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_voice_send.js index 7f023a5..cb6ccb0 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_voice_send.js +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_voice_send.js @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ function (args) { !Number.isInteger(args.timeoutMs) || args.timeoutMs <= 0) return failure('invalid_voice_request'); if (Object.hasOwn(R.sends, args.requestId) || Object.hasOwn(R.sendResults, args.requestId) || - Object.keys(R.sends).length >= 128) + Object.keys(R.sends).length >= 128 || Object.keys(R.sendResults).length >= 128) return failure('send_capacity_or_duplicate'); const deadline = Date.now() + args.timeoutMs; @@ -37,6 +37,25 @@ function (args) { Object.values(R.sends).some(send => send.cookie === cookie)) return failure('invalid_cookie'); + // Retain voice cookies for this JS environment, including after settlement + // or listener restart, so a stale callback cannot confirm a later send. + const guardKey = '__caligo_voice_cookie_guard_v1'; + if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(globalThis, guardKey)) { + const seenCookies = new Set(); + const claimCookie = value => { + if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || value === '0' || value.length > 256) return 'invalid_cookie'; + if (seenCookies.has(value)) return 'invalid_cookie'; + if (seenCookies.size >= 65536) return 'cookie_history_exhausted'; + seenCookies.add(value); return 'ok'; + }; + Object.defineProperty(globalThis, guardKey, {value:claimCookie, writable:false, configurable:false, enumerable:false}); + } + const guard = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(globalThis, guardKey); + if (!guard || typeof guard.value !== 'function' || guard.writable !== false || guard.configurable !== false) + return failure('cookie_history_unavailable'); + const claim = guard.value(cookie); + if (claim !== 'ok') return failure(claim); + const bytes = Buffer.from(args.silk, 'hex'); const md5 = crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); const sha256 = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex'); @@ -103,6 +122,7 @@ function (args) { if (R.stopped || R.sends[key] !== pending) return; pending.promiseDone = true; pending.promiseStatus = status; + if (status === 'unknown') pending.unknownReason = detail.reason; if (pending.readback) { R.settleSendResult(R, key, pending); } else if (!pending.ambiguous && !pending.timedOut) { @@ -110,18 +130,19 @@ function (args) { } if (status !== 'accepted') pending.failed = true; } - const unknown = () => result('unknown', {status:'unknown', reason:'voice_submit_unknown'}); + const unknown = reason => result('unknown', {status:'unknown', + reason:typeof reason === 'string' ? reason : 'voice_submit_unknown'}); try { const promise = R.ms.sendMsg('0', {chatType, peerUid, guildId:cookie}, [element], new Map()); Promise.resolve(promise).then(value => { if (value && value.result === 0) { result('accepted', {status:'accepted'}); - } else if (value && Number.isInteger(value.result) && !pending.addId) { - result('rejected', {status:'rejected', error:'native voice rejected'}); + } else if (value && Number.isSafeInteger(value.result)) { + unknown('send_result_ambiguous=' + String(value.result)); } else { unknown(); } - }, unknown); + }, () => unknown()); } catch (_) { unknown(); } diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/receive_diagnostics.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/receive_diagnostics.rs index 044f83d..cca208c 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/receive_diagnostics.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/receive_diagnostics.rs @@ -3,6 +3,36 @@ use serde_json::{json, Map, Value}; +#[cfg(feature = "research")] +pub(crate) fn sanitize_text_send_trace(input: &str) -> Option { + if input.len() > 524_288 { + return None; + } + let batch: Value = serde_json::from_str(input).ok()?; + let stages = batch.get("textSendTrace")?.as_array()?; + let generation = batch.get("textSendTraceGeneration")?.as_u64()?; + if generation > 2_147_483_647 { return None; } + let overflow = batch.get("textSendTraceOverflow")?.as_bool()?; + let allowed = ["registered", "submit_enter", "submit_return", "promise_accepted", + "promise_rejected", "promise_unknown", "matched_add", "matched_update", + "readback_matched", "readback_mismatch", "settled"]; + let mut incomplete = overflow || (generation == 0 && !stages.is_empty()) || stages.len() > 32; + let mut events = Vec::new(); + for event in stages.iter().take(32) { + let seq = event.get("seq").and_then(Value::as_u64); + let stage = event.get("stage").and_then(Value::as_str); + match (seq, stage) { + (Some(seq @ 1..=2_147_483_647), Some(stage)) if allowed.contains(&stage) => { + events.push(json!({"seq":seq,"stage":stage})); + } + _ => incomplete = true, + } + } + (!events.is_empty() || incomplete).then(|| json!({ + "generation":generation,"events":events,"incomplete":incomplete + }).to_string()) +} + pub(crate) fn sanitize_media_download(input: &str) -> Option { if input.len() > 524_288 { return None; @@ -140,6 +170,39 @@ pub(crate) fn sanitize_image_shapes(input: &str) -> Option { mod tests { use super::*; + #[cfg(feature = "research")] + #[test] + fn text_send_trace_accepts_only_bounded_fixed_labels() { + let input = json!({"textSendTraceGeneration":3,"textSendTraceOverflow":false, + "textSendTrace":[{"seq":1,"stage":"registered","secret":"private"}, + {"seq":2,"stage":"promise_accepted"},{"seq":0,"stage":"matched_add"}, + {"seq":1,"stage":"private"}],"message":"secret"}).to_string(); + let output = sanitize_text_send_trace(&input).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::(&output).unwrap(), json!({"generation":3, + "events":[{"seq":1,"stage":"registered"},{"seq":2,"stage":"promise_accepted"}], + "incomplete":true})); + assert!(!output.contains("private") && !output.contains("secret")); + let many = json!({"textSendTraceGeneration":3,"textSendTraceOverflow":false, + "textSendTrace":vec![json!({"seq":1,"stage":"matched_add"});40]}).to_string(); + let value: Value = serde_json::from_str(&sanitize_text_send_trace(&many).unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(value["events"].as_array().unwrap().len(),32); + assert_eq!(value["incomplete"],true); + let overflow = json!({"textSendTraceGeneration":3,"textSendTraceOverflow":true, + "textSendTrace":[]}).to_string(); + assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::(&sanitize_text_send_trace(&overflow).unwrap()).unwrap(), + json!({"generation":3,"events":[],"incomplete":true})); + let disabled = json!({"textSendTraceGeneration":0,"textSendTraceOverflow":false, + "textSendTrace":[]}).to_string(); + assert_eq!(sanitize_text_send_trace(&disabled),None); + let unavailable = json!({"textSendTraceGeneration":0,"textSendTraceOverflow":true, + "textSendTrace":[]}).to_string(); + assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::(&sanitize_text_send_trace(&unavailable).unwrap()).unwrap(), + json!({"generation":0,"events":[],"incomplete":true})); + let missing_generation = json!({"textSendTrace":[],"textSendTraceOverflow":false}).to_string(); + assert_eq!(sanitize_text_send_trace(&missing_generation),None); + assert_eq!(sanitize_text_send_trace(&" ".repeat(524_289)),None); + } + #[test] fn media_diagnostics_have_only_bounded_labels_and_comparison_flags() { let input = json!({"mediaDiagnostics":[ diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/resident.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/resident.rs index 0ecc55f..f6941bf 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/src/resident.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/src/resident.rs @@ -204,6 +204,48 @@ pub enum ResidentNotice { Outcome(SendOutcome), } +/// Resident-owned copy, stable until its corresponding daemon ACK. +/// IDs are unique only for the lifetime of this resident. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct RetainedNotice { + pub notice_id: u64, + pub notice: ResidentNotice, +} + +/// The worker outbox uses the same item bound; a full copy set stops handoff. +const MAX_RETAINED_NOTICES: usize = 256; + +/// A full retained set is transient; the owner must pause until ACK frees space. +/// A disconnected receiver or exhausted identity latches this owner-only gate. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum HandoffError { + Full(usize), + ChannelClosed(usize), + SequenceExhausted(usize), +} + +#[derive(Default)] +pub struct ResultHandoffGate { closed: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU8 } + +impl ResultHandoffGate { + pub fn is_closed(&self) -> bool { self.closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) != 0 } + + pub fn forward(&self, resident: &Resident, sender: &std::sync::mpsc::Sender) -> Result { + match self.closed.load(Ordering::Acquire) { + 1 => return Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(0)), + 2 => return Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(0)), + _ => {} + } + let result = resident.forward_retained(|notice| sender.send(notice).map_err(|error| error.0)); + match result { + Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(_)) => self.closed.store(1, Ordering::Release), + Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(_)) => self.closed.store(2, Ordering::Release), + _ => {} + } + result + } +} + /// 关闭报告(计数回基线的验收数据)。 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct CloseReport { @@ -244,6 +286,8 @@ struct ReqRecord { /// V8 Promise 路线的本地调用键;native CPB 文本候选不写入此字段。 pending_mid: Option, late_receipt_deadline: Option, + /// Unknown ACK arrived while the correction window still held the slot. + unknown_acked: bool, /// bit 0 = NativeStarted 未确认, bit 1 = terminal result 未确认。 unacked_notice_mask: u8, } @@ -270,6 +314,8 @@ struct Core { requests: HashMap, events: VecDeque<(OwnedEvent, LifecycleToken)>, results_out: VecDeque, + retained_notices: VecDeque, + next_notice_id: Option, pending_notice_slots: usize, listener_token: Option, bridge_scope: Option, @@ -290,19 +336,43 @@ struct PendingQuery { cancel_only: bool, } +/// A resident permits exactly one worker; a panic permanently quarantines +/// this in-memory generation until an independently audited recovery exists. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub(crate) enum WorkerLeaseError { Busy, Quarantined } + +pub(crate) struct WorkerLease<'a> { state: &'a std::sync::atomic::AtomicU8 } + +impl Drop for WorkerLease<'_> { + fn drop(&mut self) { + let next = if std::thread::panicking() { 2 } else { 0 }; + self.state.store(next, Ordering::Release); + } +} + pub struct Resident { /// 宿主 adapter(独立锁;锁序 adapter→core)。native 调用期间不持 /// core 锁,内联回调可重入 core 面板(§7-P4)。 adapter: Mutex, + worker_state: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU8, core: Mutex>, queries: Mutex>, query_results: Mutex>, } impl Resident { + pub(crate) fn acquire_worker(&self) -> Result, WorkerLeaseError> { + match self.worker_state.compare_exchange(0, 1, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Acquire) { + Ok(_) => Ok(WorkerLease { state: &self.worker_state }), + Err(1) => Err(WorkerLeaseError::Busy), + Err(_) => Err(WorkerLeaseError::Quarantined), + } + } + pub fn new(adapter: A, limits: ResidentLimits) -> Self { Self { adapter: Mutex::new(adapter), + worker_state: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU8::new(0), queries: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()), query_results: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()), core: Mutex::new(Core { @@ -314,6 +384,8 @@ impl Resident { requests: HashMap::new(), events: VecDeque::new(), results_out: VecDeque::new(), + retained_notices: VecDeque::new(), + next_notice_id: Some(1), pending_notice_slots: 0, listener_token: None, bridge_scope: None, @@ -491,6 +563,7 @@ impl Resident { state: ReqState::Queued, pending_mid: None, late_receipt_deadline: None, + unknown_acked: false, unacked_notice_mask: 0b11, }, ); @@ -844,6 +917,96 @@ impl Resident { c.results_out.drain(..).collect() } + /// Transfer notices in order. If the destination rejects a notice, the + /// callback must return that same owned notice; it and the unsent suffix + /// are restored ahead of notices produced concurrently. A successful send + /// is only an in-memory handoff, not a durable acknowledgement. + pub fn forward_results(&self, mut send: F) -> Result + where F: FnMut(ResidentNotice) -> Result<(), ResidentNotice> { + let mut notices = self.take_results().into_iter(); + let mut sent = 0; + while let Some(notice) = notices.next() { + match send(notice) { + Ok(()) => sent += 1, + Err(failed) => { + let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); + for notice in notices.rev() { c.results_out.push_front(notice); } + c.results_out.push_front(failed); + return Err(sent); + } + } + } + Ok(sent) + } + + /// Single-owner handoff: retain before sending a copy. On full capacity, + /// exhausted identity, or rejection, leave all notices in resident memory. + /// Caller must stop producing notices on Err; no lock is held during send. + pub fn forward_retained(&self, mut send: F) -> Result + where F: FnMut(RetainedNotice) -> Result<(), RetainedNotice> { + let mut sent = 0; + loop { + let retained = { + let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); + // A full set pauses even when the pending queue just became + // empty, so the caller cannot dispatch new work in this tick. + let Some(notice_id) = c.next_notice_id else { return Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(sent)) }; + if c.retained_notices.len() >= c.limits.results_max.min(MAX_RETAINED_NOTICES) { + return Err(HandoffError::Full(sent)); + } + if c.results_out.is_empty() { return Ok(sent); } + let notice = c.results_out.pop_front().expect("checked nonempty"); + c.next_notice_id = notice_id.checked_add(1); + let retained = RetainedNotice { notice_id, notice }; + c.retained_notices.push_back(retained.clone()); + retained + }; + if send(retained).is_err() { return Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(sent)); } + sent += 1; + } + } + + /// Snapshot for worker startup/reconstruction; channel copies are hints. + pub fn retained_notices(&self) -> Vec { + self.core.lock().unwrap().retained_notices.iter().cloned().collect() + } + + /// The worker uses this to ignore stale channel copies after ACK. + pub fn contains_retained_notice(&self, notice: &RetainedNotice) -> bool { + self.core.lock().unwrap().retained_notices.iter().any(|item| item == notice) + } + + /// Atomically remove the exact copy and update its reserved slot after ACK. + pub fn ack_retained_notice(&self, notice: &RetainedNotice) -> bool { + let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(index) = c.retained_notices.iter().position(|item| item == notice) { + c.retained_notices.remove(index); + match ¬ice.notice { + ResidentNotice::NativeStarted { request_id } => { + release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, 0b01); + } + ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::AcceptedUnconfirmed { .. }) => {} + ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Unknown { request_id, .. }) => { + let is_unknown = c.requests.get(request_id) + .map(|rec| rec.state == ReqState::DeliveryUnknown).unwrap_or(false); + if is_unknown { + let awaiting_late = c.requests.get(request_id) + .map(|rec| rec.late_receipt_deadline.is_some()).unwrap_or(false); + if awaiting_late { + if let Some(rec) = c.requests.get_mut(request_id) { rec.unknown_acked = true; } + } else { + release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, 0b10); + } + } + } + ResidentNotice::Outcome(outcome) => { + release_notice_slot(&mut c, send_outcome_request_id(outcome), 0b10); + } + } + true + } else { false } + } + /// Promise 状态由原始 core request_id 关联;只有精确 wrapper 回读 /// 可提供 native_id。CPB peer+text 候选不得调用此方法。 pub fn complete_sends( @@ -851,10 +1014,11 @@ impl Resident { done: &[(String, String)], rejected: &[(String, String)], unknown: &[(String, String)], - ) { + ) -> Vec { let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); let mut outcomes = Vec::new(); let mut updates = Vec::new(); + let mut accepted = Vec::new(); for (request_id, record) in &c.requests { if !matches!( record.state, @@ -876,6 +1040,17 @@ impl Resident { .iter() .find(|(candidate, _)| candidate == pending_request_id) { + // Replayed identity-less acceptance must not enqueue another + // notice or prevent a later strong identity from completing. + if native_id.is_empty() + && matches!(record.state, ReqState::IdentityPending | ReqState::DeliveryUnknown) + { + // This exact identity-less intermediate outcome was already accepted. + if record.state == ReqState::IdentityPending { + accepted.push(pending_request_id.to_string()); + } + continue; + } let (state, outcome) = if native_id.is_empty() { ( ReqState::IdentityPending, @@ -894,25 +1069,34 @@ impl Resident { }; outcomes.push(ResidentNotice::Outcome(outcome)); updates.push((request_id.clone(), state)); + accepted.push(pending_request_id.to_string()); } else if let Some((_, reason)) = rejected .iter() .find(|(candidate, _)| candidate == request_id) { + if record.state == ReqState::DeliveryUnknown { + continue; + } outcomes.push(ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Failure { request_id: request_id.clone(), reason: reason.clone(), })); updates.push((request_id.clone(), ReqState::Done)); + accepted.push(request_id.clone()); } else if let Some((_, reason)) = unknown .iter() .find(|(candidate, _)| candidate == request_id) { + if record.state == ReqState::DeliveryUnknown { + continue; + } outcomes.push(ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Unknown { request_id: request_id.clone(), reason: Some(reason.clone()), late_receipt_possible: true, })); updates.push((request_id.clone(), ReqState::DeliveryUnknown)); + accepted.push(request_id.clone()); } } for (request_id, state) in updates { @@ -932,6 +1116,7 @@ impl Resident { } } c.results_out.extend(outcomes); + accepted } /// core durable ACK 后归还 NativeStarted 通知槽。重复 ACK 幂等。 @@ -940,19 +1125,30 @@ impl Resident { release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, if started { 0b01 } else { 0b10 }) } + /// Apply an ACK for the specific unknown notice. A later strong result + /// must retain its own slot even if this older ACK arrives afterwards. + pub fn ack_unknown_notice(&self, request_id: &str) -> bool { + let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); + let Some(rec) = c.requests.get_mut(request_id) else { return false }; + if rec.state != ReqState::DeliveryUnknown { return false; } + if rec.late_receipt_deadline.is_some() { + rec.unknown_acked = true; + return true; + } + release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, 0b10) + } + /// 中间态 ACK 移除当前 outbox 项,但保留终态结果槽。 pub fn ack_result_notice(&self, request_id: &str, terminal: bool) -> bool { let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); if terminal { - if c.requests - .get(request_id) - .map(|rec| { - rec.state == ReqState::DeliveryUnknown && rec.late_receipt_deadline.is_some() - }) - .unwrap_or(false) - { - // ACK 接受了 Unknown;槽仍为迟到强身份预留。 - return true; + if let Some(rec) = c.requests.get_mut(request_id) { + if rec.state == ReqState::DeliveryUnknown && rec.late_receipt_deadline.is_some() { + // Keep the correction slot until its window ends, but remember + // that expiry is now allowed to release it. + rec.unknown_acked = true; + return true; + } } release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, 0b10) } else { @@ -963,7 +1159,7 @@ impl Resident { } } - /// Release result capacity after the bounded late-identity correction window. + /// End the correction window; release capacity only after its unknown ACK. pub fn expire_late_receipts(&self, now: std::time::Instant) -> usize { let mut c = self.core.lock().unwrap(); let expired: Vec = c @@ -979,10 +1175,15 @@ impl Resident { .map(|(request_id, _)| request_id.clone()) .collect(); for request_id in &expired { - if let Some(rec) = c.requests.get_mut(request_id) { + let acked = if let Some(rec) = c.requests.get_mut(request_id) { rec.late_receipt_deadline = None; + rec.unknown_acked + } else { + false + }; + if acked { + release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, 0b10); } - release_notice_slot(&mut c, request_id, 0b10); } expired.len() } @@ -1275,3 +1476,83 @@ fn next_token() -> u64 { static NEXT: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(1); NEXT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod retained_sequence_tests { + use super::*; + use crate::host_adapter::{HostOp, HostOpResult}; + struct Host; + impl HostAdapter for Host { + fn owner_thread_id(&self) -> u64 { 1 } + fn current_thread_id(&self) -> u64 { 1 } + fn env_valid(&self) -> bool { true } + fn current_context_ok(&self) -> bool { true } + fn native_op(&mut self, op: HostOp) -> Result { + match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd => Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::SendText { .. } => Ok(HostOpResult::Sent { native_id: Some("n".into()) }), + _ => panic!("unexpected op"), + } + } + } + #[test] + fn exhausted_resident_sequence_retains_unassigned_suffix() { + let r = Resident::new(Host, ResidentLimits::default()); + r.bootstrap().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(r.submit(OwnedRequest::SendText { request_id: "r".into(), wire_seq: 1, timeout_ms: 5000, chat_type: 2, peer_uid: "123".into(), text: "x".into() }), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + r.drain().unwrap(); + r.core.lock().unwrap().next_notice_id = Some(u64::MAX); + let mut sent = Vec::new(); + assert_eq!(r.forward_retained(|item| { sent.push(item); Ok(()) }), Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(1))); + assert_eq!(sent[0].notice_id, u64::MAX); + assert_eq!(r.retained_notices(), sent); + assert_eq!(r.forward_retained(|_| panic!("must not wrap or send")), Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(0))); + let gate = ResultHandoffGate::default(); + let (tx, _rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(0))); + assert!(gate.is_closed()); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::SequenceExhausted(0))); + assert_eq!(r.take_results().len(), 1); + } + #[test] + fn worker_lease_allows_one_concurrent_owner_then_releases() { + let resident = std::sync::Arc::new(Resident::new(Host, ResidentLimits::default())); + let start = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Barrier::new(16)); + let held = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Barrier::new(16)); + let winners = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0)); + let mut threads = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..16 { + let resident = resident.clone(); let start = start.clone(); let held = held.clone(); let winners = winners.clone(); + threads.push(std::thread::spawn(move || { + start.wait(); + let lease = resident.acquire_worker(); + if lease.is_ok() { winners.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); } + held.wait(); + drop(lease); + })); + } + for thread in threads { thread.join().unwrap(); } + assert_eq!(winners.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1); + assert!(resident.acquire_worker().is_ok(), "normal exit must release lease"); + } + + #[test] + fn panicking_worker_quarantines_resident_and_blocks_new_worker() { + let resident = std::sync::Arc::new(Resident::new(Host, ResidentLimits::default())); + let caught = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| { + let _lease = resident.acquire_worker().unwrap(); + panic!("synthetic worker panic"); + })); + assert!(caught.is_err()); + assert!(matches!(resident.acquire_worker(), Err(WorkerLeaseError::Quarantined))); + let (_tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + let (_events_tx, events_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + let stop = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(true)); + let (counters, exit) = crate::daemon_client::run_worker( + crate::daemon_client::DaemonClientConfig::default(), resident, &|| panic!("must not wake"), rx, events_rx, stop, + ); + assert_eq!(exit, crate::daemon_client::WorkerExit::WorkerQuarantined); + assert_eq!(counters.connects, 0); + } + +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/qq_entry_lab.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/qq_entry_lab.rs index ed7e5d0..6283ae2 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/qq_entry_lab.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/qq_entry_lab.rs @@ -650,3 +650,27 @@ fn d8_zero_current_refuses_v8_ladder_before_scope() { let err = caligo_bridge::qq_v8::poll_listener_json().unwrap_err(); assert_eq!(err, caligo_bridge::qq_v8::V8Error::NoCurrentContext); } + +#[test] +fn result_pressure_uses_fake_v8_ladder_and_never_reports_untrusted_fields() { + let _g = TEST_LOCK.lock().unwrap(); + caligo_bridge::qq_entry::test_reset_state(); + install_fake_v8(); + let (_qq, qqnt_base, env, _loop) = FakeQq::new(); + fake_v8::CURRENT.store(FAKE_EXPECTED_ISOLATE.load(Ordering::Acquire), Ordering::Release); + let cfg = EntryConfig { qqnt_base, env, report_path: report_path("pressure") }; + let _handle = bootstrap(&cfg, &fake_symbols()).unwrap(); + *fake_v8::RESPONSES.lock().unwrap() = vec![ + r#"{"entries":128,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":4,"secret":"DO-NOT-REPORT"}"#.into(), + r#"{"entries":129,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":0}"#.into(), + ]; + let detail = caligo_bridge::qq_v8::read_result_pressure("nt_3").unwrap().unwrap(); + assert!(!detail.contains("DO-NOT-REPORT")); + let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&detail).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(value["entries"], 128); assert_eq!(value["saturated"], true); assert_eq!(value["delayed"], 4); + assert!(fake_v8::LAST_SRC.lock().unwrap().contains("pressure_session")); + assert_eq!(caligo_bridge::qq_v8::read_result_pressure("nt_3").unwrap(), None); + fake_v8::CURRENT.store(0xBAD_0001, Ordering::Release); + assert_eq!(caligo_bridge::qq_v8::read_result_pressure("nt_3").unwrap_err(), + caligo_bridge::qq_v8::V8Error::NoCurrentContext); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_lifecycle.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_lifecycle.rs index 87c270f..92e1ec3 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_lifecycle.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_lifecycle.rs @@ -559,6 +559,10 @@ fn unknown_holds_bounded_slot_for_late_strong_identity_then_releases_it() { if request_id == "R-late" ))); assert!(resident.ack_result_notice("R-late", true)); + resident.complete_sends(&[], &[("R-late".into(), "late rejection".into())], &[]); + resident.complete_sends(&[("R-late".into(), String::new())], &[], &[]); + resident.complete_sends(&[], &[], &[("R-late".into(), "duplicate unknown".into())]); + assert!(resident.take_results().is_empty(), "unknown may only be corrected by a strong identity"); assert_eq!( resident.submit(OwnedRequest::SendText { request_id: "blocked-by-correction-slot".into(), @@ -659,6 +663,74 @@ fn unknown_correction_slot_expires_and_unblocks_new_dispatch() { ); } +#[test] +fn unacked_unknown_keeps_capacity_after_correction_window_expires() { + let outcomes = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(VecDeque::new())); + let resident = Resident::new( + LateReceiptHost { owner: OWNER, outcomes: outcomes.clone() }, + ResidentLimits { results_max: 2, ..ResidentLimits::default() }, + ); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let request = |id: &str| OwnedRequest::SendText { + request_id: id.into(), wire_seq: 1, timeout_ms: 1, chat_type: 2, + peer_uid: "123".into(), text: "x".into(), + }; + assert_eq!(resident.submit(request("unacked")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + resident.drain().unwrap(); + resident.take_results(); + assert!(resident.ack_notice("unacked", true)); + outcomes.lock().unwrap().push_back(("unacked".into(), SendOutcome::Unknown { + request_id: "unacked".into(), reason: Some("timeout".into()), late_receipt_possible: true, + })); + assert_eq!(resident.drain_send_responses(), 1); + let unknown = resident.take_results(); + assert_eq!(unknown.len(), 1); + let after = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_millis(caligo_model::LATE_RECEIPT_GRACE_MS + 1); + assert_eq!(resident.expire_late_receipts(after), 1); + assert_eq!(resident.expire_late_receipts(after), 0); + outcomes.lock().unwrap().push_back(("unacked".into(), SendOutcome::Success { + request_id: "unacked".into(), native_id: "too-late".into(), + })); + assert_eq!(resident.drain_send_responses(), 0); + assert!(resident.take_results().is_empty()); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(request("blocked")), SubmitVerdict::QueueFull, "expiry is not a durable ACK"); + assert!(resident.ack_result_notice("unacked", true)); + assert!(!resident.ack_result_notice("unacked", true)); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(request("blocked")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); +} + +#[test] +fn old_unknown_ack_must_not_release_new_success_capacity() { + let outcomes = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(VecDeque::new())); + let resident = Resident::new( + LateReceiptHost { owner: OWNER, outcomes: outcomes.clone() }, + ResidentLimits { results_max: 2, ..ResidentLimits::default() }, + ); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let request = |id: &str| OwnedRequest::SendText { + request_id: id.into(), wire_seq: 1, timeout_ms: 1, chat_type: 2, + peer_uid: "123".into(), text: "x".into(), + }; + assert_eq!(resident.submit(request("r")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + resident.drain().unwrap(); + resident.take_results(); + assert!(resident.ack_notice("r", true)); + outcomes.lock().unwrap().push_back(("r".into(), SendOutcome::Unknown { + request_id: "r".into(), reason: None, late_receipt_possible: true, + })); + assert_eq!(resident.drain_send_responses(), 1); + outcomes.lock().unwrap().push_back(("r".into(), SendOutcome::Success { + request_id: "r".into(), native_id: "strong".into(), + })); + assert_eq!(resident.drain_send_responses(), 1); + assert_eq!(resident.take_results().len(), 2); + // Simulate the worker applying the older unknown ACK after success arrived. + assert!(!resident.ack_unknown_notice("r")); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(request("next")), SubmitVerdict::QueueFull); + assert!(resident.ack_result_notice("r", true)); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(request("next")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); +} + #[test] fn original_request_id_survives_async_response_correlation() { let pending = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None)); diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_forward.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_forward.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b9be87 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_forward.rs @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +use caligo_bridge::host_adapter::{HostAdapter,HostError,HostOp,HostOpResult}; +use caligo_bridge::resident::{OwnedRequest,Resident,ResidentLimits,ResidentNotice,SendOutcome,SubmitVerdict,ResultHandoffGate,HandoffError}; +struct Host; +impl HostAdapter for Host { + fn owner_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} fn current_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} + fn env_valid(&self)->bool{true} fn current_context_ok(&self)->bool{true} + fn native_op(&mut self,op:HostOp)->Result{match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd=>Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::SendText{..}=>Ok(HostOpResult::Sent{native_id:Some("native".into())}), + _=>panic!("unexpected host operation"), + }} +} +fn resident()->Resident{ + let r=Resident::new(Host,ResidentLimits::default());r.bootstrap().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(r.submit(OwnedRequest::SendText{request_id:"request".into(),wire_seq:1,timeout_ms:5000,chat_type:2,peer_uid:"123".into(),text:"fixture".into()}),SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(r.drain().unwrap(),1);r +} +#[test] +fn closed_worker_channel_must_not_discard_notices() { + let r=resident();let (tx,rx)=std::sync::mpsc::channel();drop(rx); + assert_eq!(r.forward_results(|notice|tx.send(notice).map_err(|e|e.0)),Err(0)); + let notices=r.take_results();assert_eq!(notices.len(),2); + assert!(matches!(¬ices[0],ResidentNotice::NativeStarted{request_id} if request_id=="request")); + assert!(matches!(¬ices[1],ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success{request_id,..}) if request_id=="request")); +} + +#[test] +fn partial_handoff_restores_unsent_suffix_in_fifo_order() { + let r=resident();let mut delivered=Vec::new();let mut attempt=0; + assert_eq!(r.forward_results(|notice|{ + attempt+=1;if attempt==1 {delivered.push(notice);Ok(())} else { + assert_eq!(r.submit(OwnedRequest::SendText{request_id:"later".into(),wire_seq:2,timeout_ms:5000,chat_type:2,peer_uid:"123".into(),text:"fixture".into()}),SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(r.drain().unwrap(),1);Err(notice) + } + }),Err(1)); + assert_eq!(delivered.len(),1);assert!(matches!(&delivered[0],ResidentNotice::NativeStarted{..})); + let remaining=r.take_results();assert_eq!(remaining.len(),3); + assert!(matches!(&remaining[0],ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success{request_id,..}) if request_id=="request")); + assert!(matches!(&remaining[1],ResidentNotice::NativeStarted{request_id} if request_id=="later")); + assert!(matches!(&remaining[2],ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success{request_id,..}) if request_id=="later")); +} +#[test] +fn live_worker_receives_ordered_notices_once() { + let r=resident();let (tx,rx)=std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + assert_eq!(r.forward_results(|notice|tx.send(notice).map_err(|e|e.0)),Ok(2)); + assert!(matches!(rx.try_recv().unwrap(),ResidentNotice::NativeStarted{..})); + assert!(matches!(rx.try_recv().unwrap(),ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success{..}))); + assert!(rx.try_recv().is_err());assert!(r.take_results().is_empty()); +} + +#[test] +fn disconnected_worker_latches_and_cannot_reopen_on_later_ticks() { + let r=resident();let gate=ResultHandoffGate::default();let (dead,rx)=std::sync::mpsc::channel();drop(rx); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r,&dead),Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(0)));assert!(gate.is_closed()); + let (new_sender,new_receiver)=std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r,&new_sender),Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(0)));assert!(new_receiver.try_recv().is_err()); + assert_eq!(r.retained_notices().len(),1,"failed item stays in retained outbox"); + assert_eq!(r.take_results().len(),1,"unsent suffix stays in result queue"); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retained.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retained.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a7328f --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retained.rs @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +use caligo_bridge::host_adapter::{HostAdapter, HostError, HostOp, HostOpResult}; +use caligo_bridge::resident::{OwnedRequest, Resident, ResidentLimits, ResidentNotice, ResultHandoffGate, HandoffError, SendOutcome, SubmitVerdict}; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; +use std::sync::Arc; + +struct Host { calls: Arc, async_send: bool } +impl HostAdapter for Host { + fn owner_thread_id(&self) -> u64 { 1 } + fn current_thread_id(&self) -> u64 { 1 } + fn env_valid(&self) -> bool { true } + fn current_context_ok(&self) -> bool { true } + fn native_op(&mut self, op: HostOp) -> Result { + match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd => Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::Probe => Ok(HostOpResult::ProbeDone), + HostOp::SendText { request_id, .. } => { + self.calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + if self.async_send { Ok(HostOpResult::SendFired { mid: request_id }) } + else { Ok(HostOpResult::Sent { native_id: Some("native".into()) }) } + } + _ => panic!("unexpected host operation"), + } + } +} +fn setup(async_send: bool) -> (Resident, Arc) { + let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)); + let r = Resident::new(Host { calls: calls.clone(), async_send }, ResidentLimits { results_max: 2, ..ResidentLimits::default() }); + r.bootstrap().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(r.submit(request("r")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(r.drain().unwrap(), 1); + (r, calls) +} +fn request(id: &str) -> OwnedRequest { + OwnedRequest::SendText { request_id: id.into(), wire_seq: 1, timeout_ms: 5000, chat_type: 2, peer_uid: "123".into(), text: "fixture".into() } +} +#[test] +fn resident_retains_order_and_identity_after_channel_and_worker_loss() { + let (r, calls) = setup(false); + let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + assert_eq!(ResultHandoffGate::default().forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(2))); + let before = r.retained_notices(); + assert_eq!(before.len(), 2); + assert!(before[0].notice_id > 0 && before[0].notice_id < before[1].notice_id); + assert!(matches!(&before[0].notice, ResidentNotice::NativeStarted { .. })); + assert!(matches!(&before[1].notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success { .. }))); + let worker_copy = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + drop(worker_copy); drop(rx); // one accepted but not read, one read then lost + assert_eq!(r.retained_notices(), before); + let mut forged = before[1].clone(); forged.notice_id += 1; + assert!(!r.ack_retained_notice(&forged)); + let mut wrong_payload = before[1].clone(); + wrong_payload.notice = before[0].notice.clone(); + assert!(!r.ack_retained_notice(&wrong_payload)); + assert_eq!(r.retained_notices(), before); + assert_eq!(r.submit(request("new")), SubmitVerdict::QueueFull); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&before[0])); + assert!(!r.ack_retained_notice(&before[0])); + assert_eq!(r.submit(request("new")), SubmitVerdict::QueueFull); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&before[1])); + assert_eq!(r.submit(request("new")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1, "replay must not invoke host"); +} +#[test] +fn capacity_backpressure_resumes_in_fifo_order_after_ack() { + let (r, calls) = setup(true); + r.complete_sends(&[("r".into(), String::new())], &[], &[]); + r.complete_sends(&[], &[], &[("r".into(), "unknown".into())]); + r.complete_sends(&[("r".into(), "late-native".into())], &[], &[]); + let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + let gate = ResultHandoffGate::default(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(2))); + assert!(!gate.is_closed(), "capacity pressure must not permanently close handoff"); + assert_eq!(r.retained_notices().len(), 2); + let started = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + let accepted = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&started)); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(1))); + assert!(!gate.is_closed()); + let unknown = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + assert!(matches!(&unknown.notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Unknown { .. }))); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&accepted)); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(1))); + let success = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + assert!(matches!(&success.notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success { .. }))); + assert!(started.notice_id < accepted.notice_id && accepted.notice_id < unknown.notice_id && unknown.notice_id < success.notice_id); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&unknown)); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Ok(0)); + assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1, "recovering notices must not repeat native send"); +} +#[test] +fn channel_closed_while_full_latches_after_capacity_returns() { + let (r, _) = setup(true); + r.complete_sends(&[("r".into(), String::new())], &[], &[]); + r.complete_sends(&[], &[], &[("r".into(), "unknown".into())]); + let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + let gate = ResultHandoffGate::default(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(2))); + let started = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + drop(rx); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(0))); + assert!(!gate.is_closed()); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&started)); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(0))); + assert!(gate.is_closed()); + assert!(r.retained_notices().iter().any(|item| matches!(item.notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Unknown { .. })))); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::ChannelClosed(0))); +} + +#[test] +fn full_preflight_pauses_dispatch_until_ack_frees_capacity() { + let (r, calls) = setup(false); + let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + let gate = ResultHandoffGate::default(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(2))); + assert_eq!(r.submit(OwnedRequest::Probe { id: 7 }), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(0))); + assert_eq!(r.pending_ingress(), 1, "preflight must run before dispatch"); + assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&rx.try_recv().unwrap())); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Ok(0)); + assert_eq!(r.drain().unwrap(), 1); + assert_eq!(r.pending_ingress(), 0); +} + +#[test] +fn retained_unknown_ack_does_not_release_new_success_slot() { + let (r, calls) = setup(true); + let gate = ResultHandoffGate::default(); + let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Ok(1)); + let started = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&started)); + r.complete_sends(&[], &[], &[("r".into(), "unknown".into())]); + r.complete_sends(&[("r".into(), "strong".into())], &[], &[]); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&r, &tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(2))); + let unknown = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + let success = rx.try_recv().unwrap(); + assert!(matches!(&unknown.notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Unknown { .. }))); + assert!(matches!(&success.notice, ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success { .. }))); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&unknown)); + assert_eq!(r.submit(request("next")), SubmitVerdict::QueueFull); + assert!(r.ack_retained_notice(&success)); + assert_eq!(r.submit(request("next")), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retry.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retry.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36b7bdd --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retry.rs @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +use caligo_bridge::host_adapter::{HostAdapter,HostError,HostOp,HostOpResult}; +use caligo_bridge::resident::{OwnedRequest,Resident,ResidentLimits,ResidentNotice,SendOutcome,SubmitVerdict}; + +struct FiredHost; +impl HostAdapter for FiredHost { + fn owner_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} + fn current_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} + fn env_valid(&self)->bool{true} + fn current_context_ok(&self)->bool{true} + fn native_op(&mut self,op:HostOp)->Result{ + match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd=>Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::ListenerRemove{..}=>Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerRemoved), + HostOp::SendText{..}=>Ok(HostOpResult::SendFired{mid:"local".into()}), + _=>panic!("unexpected host operation"), + } + } +} +#[test] +fn duplicate_unconfirmed_result_does_not_enqueue_another_notice_and_strong_id_can_finish() { + let resident=Resident::new(FiredHost,ResidentLimits::default());resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(OwnedRequest::SendText{request_id:"request-1".into(),wire_seq:1, + timeout_ms:5000,chat_type:2,peer_uid:"123".into(),text:"sample".into()}),SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(resident.drain().unwrap(),1);resident.take_results(); + let empty=[("request-1".to_string(),String::new())]; + resident.complete_sends(&empty,&[],&[]); + assert_eq!(resident.take_results(),vec![ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::AcceptedUnconfirmed{request_id:"request-1".into()})]); + resident.complete_sends(&empty,&[],&[]); + assert!(resident.take_results().is_empty(),"duplicate unconfirmed result must not enqueue again"); + resident.complete_sends(&[("request-1".into(),"native-1".into())],&[],&[]); + assert_eq!(resident.take_results(),vec![ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success{request_id:"request-1".into(),native_id:"native-1".into()})]); + resident.complete_sends(&[("request-1".into(),"native-1".into())],&[],&[]); + assert!(resident.take_results().is_empty()); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_selective.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_selective.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23da024 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_selective.rs @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +use caligo_bridge::host_adapter::{HostAdapter,HostError,HostOp,HostOpResult}; +use caligo_bridge::resident::{OwnedRequest,Resident,ResidentLimits,SubmitVerdict}; +use std::collections::HashSet; +struct FiredHost; +impl HostAdapter for FiredHost { + fn owner_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} fn current_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} + fn env_valid(&self)->bool{true} fn current_context_ok(&self)->bool{true} + fn native_op(&mut self,op:HostOp)->Result{match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd=>Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::SendText{..}=>Ok(HostOpResult::SendFired{mid:"local".into()}), + _=>panic!("unexpected host operation"), + }} +} +fn request(id:&str)->OwnedRequest {OwnedRequest::SendText{request_id:id.into(),wire_seq:1,timeout_ms:5000,chat_type:2,peer_uid:"123".into(),text:"sample".into()}} +#[test] +fn only_currently_processed_terminal_results_are_eligible_for_ack() { + let r=Resident::new(FiredHost,ResidentLimits::default());r.bootstrap().unwrap(); + for key in ["done","rejected","unknown"] {assert_eq!(r.submit(request(key)),SubmitVerdict::Accepted);} + assert_eq!(r.drain().unwrap(),3);r.take_results(); + let done=[("done".into(),"native".into())];let rejected=[("rejected".into(),"error".into())]; + let unknown=[("unknown".into(),"timeout".into()),("orphan".into(),"timeout".into())]; + let accepted:HashSet<_>=r.complete_sends(&done,&rejected,&unknown).into_iter().collect(); + assert_eq!(accepted,HashSet::from(["done".to_string(),"rejected".to_string(),"unknown".to_string()])); + assert_eq!(r.take_results().len(),3); + assert!(r.complete_sends(&done,&rejected,&unknown).is_empty(),"completed or unknown requests must not accept different duplicate outcomes"); + assert!(r.take_results().is_empty()); +} +#[test] +fn already_accepted_empty_identity_can_be_acknowledged_without_duplicate_notice() { + let r=Resident::new(FiredHost,ResidentLimits::default());r.bootstrap().unwrap();assert_eq!(r.submit(request("pending")),SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + r.drain().unwrap();r.take_results();let empty=[("pending".into(),String::new())]; + assert_eq!(r.complete_sends(&empty,&[],&[]),vec!["pending".to_string()]);assert_eq!(r.take_results().len(),1); + assert_eq!(r.complete_sends(&empty,&[],&[]),vec!["pending".to_string()]);assert!(r.take_results().is_empty()); + assert_eq!(r.complete_sends(&[("pending".into(),"native".into())],&[],&[]),vec!["pending".to_string()]);assert_eq!(r.take_results().len(),1); +} + +#[test] +fn expired_unknown_does_not_accept_a_late_identity_for_acknowledgement() { + let r=Resident::new(FiredHost,ResidentLimits::default());r.bootstrap().unwrap();assert_eq!(r.submit(request("expired")),SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + r.drain().unwrap();r.take_results();assert_eq!(r.complete_sends(&[],&[],&[("expired".into(),"timeout".into())]),vec!["expired".to_string()]);r.take_results(); + assert_eq!(r.expire_late_receipts(std::time::Instant::now()+std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600)),1); + assert!(r.complete_sends(&[("expired".into(),"native".into())],&[],&[]).is_empty()); + assert!(r.take_results().is_empty()); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_bound_poll.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_bound_poll.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2271e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_bound_poll.rs @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_bound_poll_js,poll_listener_bound_json}; +use caligo_model::wrapper_message::{decode_d8_batch,WrapperBinding}; +use std::io::Write; +#[test] +fn mismatched_bound_session_preserves_results_and_receive_state_until_matching_poll() { + assert!(build_bound_poll_js("").is_none()); + assert_eq!(poll_listener_bound_json("").unwrap(),"NOT_ARMED:session_unavailable"); + assert!(build_bound_poll_js(&"x".repeat(129)).is_none()); + let good=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let bad=build_bound_poll_js("nt_\"other").unwrap(); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),bad=__BAD__,good=__GOOD__; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{stale:{deadline:0,done:false,timedOut:false}},sendResults:{r1:{status:'done',msgId:'123'}},recv:[{invalid:'fixture'}],recvBytes:32,rejected:1,overflow:2}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(bad,c),'ERR:session_mismatch'); +assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1.msgId,'123');assert.equal(R.recv.length,1);assert.equal(R.recvBytes,32); +assert.equal(R.rejected,1);assert.equal(R.overflow,2);assert.equal(R.sends.stale.timedOut,false); +process.stdout.write(vm.runInContext(good,c)); +"#.replace("__BAD__",&serde_json::to_string(&bad).unwrap()).replace("__GOOD__",&serde_json::to_string(&good).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); + let binding=WrapperBinding{account:"10001".into(),session_generation:1,host_nonce:1,wrapper_session:"nt_1".into()}; + let batch=decode_d8_batch(std::str::from_utf8(&out.stdout).unwrap(),&binding).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(batch.send_results["r1"]["msgId"],"123");assert_eq!(batch.stats.rejected,2);assert_eq!(batch.stats.overflow,2); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_image_send.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_image_send.rs index 8e9989f..92b2631 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_image_send.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_image_send.rs @@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ const bytes = Buffer.from('89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000010000000108060 const md5 = crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); const msgId = '90071992547409931237', elementId = '90071992547409931238'; const caligoVoiceAccount = '10001'; -let listener, submits, reads, storageCalls, settle, mode, dest, now = 1000; +let listener, submits, reads, storageCalls, settle, mode, dest, cookie, now = 1000; let chatType=1, peerUid='u_peer', peerUin='20002'; Date.now = () => now; const flush = () => new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); -function record(status, guildId='image-cookie', fingerprint=md5, id=elementId) { +function record(status, guildId=cookie, fingerprint=md5, id=elementId) { return {msgId,msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890',guildId,chatType,msgType:2, subMsgType:0,peerUid,peerUin,senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001', sendStatus:status,elements:[{elementType:2,elementId:id, @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ function record(status, guildId='image-cookie', fingerprint=md5, id=elementId) { const service = { addKernelMsgListener(value) { listener=value; return 8; }, removeKernelMsgListener() { return true; }, - generateMsgUniqueId(chat,time) { assert.equal(chat,chatType); assert.equal(time,'qq-time'); return 'image-cookie'; }, + generateMsgUniqueId(chat,time) { assert.equal(chat,chatType); assert.equal(time,'qq-time'); return cookie; }, getRichMediaFilePathForGuild(args) { storageCalls++; assert.deepEqual(args,{md5HexStr:md5,fileName:md5+'.png',elementType:2,elementSubType:0, @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ const service = { submits++; assert.equal(globalThis.__caligo_res.sends['image-7'].wireSeq,42); assert.equal(id,'0'); assert.equal(options.size,0); - assert.deepEqual(peer,{chatType,peerUid,guildId:'image-cookie'}); + assert.deepEqual(peer,{chatType,peerUid,guildId:cookie}); assert.equal(element.elementType,2); assert.equal(element.picElement.md5HexStr,md5); assert.equal(element.picElement.fileSize,String(bytes.length)); @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ const service = { getMsgsByMsgId(peer,ids) { reads++; assert.deepEqual(ids,[msgId]); - assert.equal(peer.guildId,'image-cookie'); + assert.equal(peer.guildId,cookie); return {result:0,msgList:[record(2,'readback-guild-id',md5,mode==='bad_readback' ? '999' : elementId)]}; } }; @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ const session = {getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service, process._linkedBinding = () => ({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}}); function setup(kind, armedAccount='10001') { if (globalThis.__caligo_res) eval(stop); - mode=kind; submits=reads=storageCalls=0; settle=undefined; now=1000; + mode=kind; cookie='image-cookie-'+kind; submits=reads=storageCalls=0; settle=undefined; now=1000; dest=path.join(root,kind,md5+'.png'); const caligoVoiceAccount=armedAccount; assert.ok(eval(start).startsWith('ARMED')); @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ function outcome(projected=false) { } function notify() { listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1,'wrong-cookie')); - listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1,'image-cookie','0'.repeat(32))); + listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1,cookie,'0'.repeat(32))); listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1)); - listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record(2,'image-cookie',md5,'999'),record(2)]); + listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record(2,cookie,md5,'999'),record(2)]); } (async()=>{ setup('unbound','30003'); @@ -223,3 +223,100 @@ function notify() { assert_eq!(batch.events[0].record.sender_uin, "10001"); } } + +#[test] +fn wrapper_image_send_rejects_cookie_reuse_after_settlement() { + use std::io::Write; + let hex = "89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000010000000108060000001f15c4890000000d49444154789c63105432fe0f000214016604e0de7f0000000049454e44ae426082"; + let png: Vec = (0..hex.len()).step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i+2], 16).unwrap()).collect(); + let one = build_image_send_js(1,"10001","20002","image-one",1,5000,&png).unwrap(); + let two = build_image_send_js(1,"10001","20002","image-two",2,5000,&png).unwrap(); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),fs=require('node:fs'),path=require('node:path'), + os=require('node:os'),crypto=require('node:crypto'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,stop=__STOP__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__; +const caligoVoiceAccount='10001'; +const root=fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(fs.realpathSync(os.tmpdir()),'caligo-image-reuse-')); +const bytes=Buffer.from('__HEX__','hex'),md5=crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); +const dest=path.join(root,md5+'.png'); +let listener,sends=0,reads=0; +const row=status=>({msgId:'12345',msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890', + guildId:'reused-cookie',chatType:1,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid:'u_peer',peerUin:'20002', + senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001',sendStatus:status, + elements:[{elementType:2,elementId:'67890',picElement:{fileSize:String(bytes.length), + md5HexStr:md5,picWidth:1,picHeight:1,picType:1000,picSubType:0}}]}); +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'reused-cookie',addKernelMsgListener(l){listener=l;return 7;}, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,getRichMediaFilePathForGuild:()=>dest, + sendMsg(){sends++;return Promise.resolve({result:0});}, + getMsgsByMsgId(){reads++;return Promise.resolve({result:0,msgList:[row(2)]});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +process._linkedBinding=()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}}); +const tick=()=>new Promise(r=>setImmediate(r)); +(async()=>{ + assert.match(eval(start),/^ARMED/);assert.equal(JSON.parse(eval(one)).fired,true); + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]);await tick();await tick(); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(eval(poll)).sendResults['image-one'].status,'done'); + assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(globalThis.__caligo_res.sends,'image-one'),false); + const second=JSON.parse(eval(two)); + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]);await tick();await tick(); + const later=JSON.parse(eval(poll)); + assert.notEqual(later.sendResults['image-two']?.status,'done','old image notification must not confirm later send'); + assert.deepEqual(second,{err:'invalid_cookie'});assert.equal(sends,1);assert.equal(reads,1); + eval(stop); +})().catch(e=>{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1;}).finally(()=>fs.rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true})); +"#.replace("__START__",&serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__STOP__",&serde_json::to_string(D8_STOP_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__",&serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__",&serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()).replace("__HEX__",hex); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output=child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_image_cookie_history_survives_rearm_and_fails_closed() { + use std::io::Write; + let hex="89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000010000000108060000001f15c4890000000d49444154789c63105432fe0f000214016604e0de7f0000000049454e44ae426082"; + let png: Vec=(0..hex.len()).step_by(2).map(|i|u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i+2],16).unwrap()).collect(); + let send=build_image_send_js(1,"10001","20002","image",1,5000,&png).unwrap(); + let fixture=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),fs=require('node:fs'), + path=require('node:path'),os=require('node:os'),crypto=require('node:crypto'),send=__SEND__; +const bytes=Buffer.from('__HEX__','hex'),md5=crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); +const root=fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(fs.realpathSync(os.tmpdir()),'caligo-image-cookie-')); +let cookie='first',calls=0; +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=>cookie,getRichMediaFilePathForGuild:()=>path.join(root,md5+'.png'), + sendMsg(){calls++;return new Promise(()=>{});}}; +const session={getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const resource=()=>({voiceAccount:'10001',stopped:false,sends:{},sendResults:{},ms:service,session}); +function context(){const c={__caligo_res:resource(),process,Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number};vm.createContext(c);return c;} +const run=c=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)); +try { + const c=context();assert.equal(run(c).fired,true);assert.equal(calls,1); + const descriptor=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(c,'__caligo_image_cookie_guard_v1'); + assert.equal(descriptor.writable,false);assert.equal(descriptor.configurable,false); + c.__caligo_res=resource();assert.deepEqual(run(c),{err:'invalid_cookie'});assert.equal(calls,1); + for(let i=0;i<65535;i++) assert.equal(descriptor.value('filled-'+i),'ok'); + assert.equal(descriptor.value('first'),'invalid_cookie');assert.equal(descriptor.value('x'.repeat(257)),'invalid_cookie'); + cookie='new-cookie';assert.deepEqual(run(c),{err:'cookie_history_exhausted'});assert.equal(calls,1); + for(const kind of ['null','mutable','accessor']) { + const d=context(); + if(kind==='null') d.__caligo_image_cookie_guard_v1=null; + else if(kind==='mutable') d.__caligo_image_cookie_guard_v1=()=> 'ok'; + else Object.defineProperty(d,'__caligo_image_cookie_guard_v1',{get(){throw Error('getter invoked');},configurable:true}); + assert.deepEqual(run(d),{err:'cookie_history_unavailable'});assert.equal(calls,1); + } +} finally {fs.rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true});} +"#.replace("__SEND__",&serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()).replace("__HEX__",hex); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output=child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_media_result.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_media_result.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16fdb96 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_media_result.rs @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_image_send_js, build_voice_send_js, D8_POLL_JS, D8_START_JS}; +use std::io::Write; + +fn check_ambiguous_media_result(image: bool) { + let hex = if image { + "89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000010000000108060000001f15c4890000000d49444154789c63105432fe0f000214016604e0de7f0000000049454e44ae426082" + } else { + "02232153494c4b5f56330300445566" + }; + let bytes: Vec = (0..hex.len()).step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).unwrap()).collect(); + let scripts: Vec = (0..6).map(|i| { + let id = format!("media-{i}"); + if image { build_image_send_js(1,"10001","20002",&id,i+1,5000,&bytes).unwrap() } + else { build_voice_send_js(1,"10001","20002",&id,i+1,5000,&bytes).unwrap() } + }).collect(); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),fs=require('node:fs'), + path=require('node:path'),os=require('node:os'),crypto=require('node:crypto'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,scripts=__SCRIPTS__,image=__IMAGE__; +const bytes=Buffer.from('__HEX__','hex'),md5=crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); +const root=fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(fs.realpathSync(os.tmpdir()),'caligo-media-result-')); +let listener,resolve,reject,cookie=0,sends=0,reads=0; +const row=(status,id)=>({msgId:'12345',msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890', + guildId:'cookie-'+id,chatType:1,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid:'u_peer',peerUin:'20002', + senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001',sendStatus:status, + elements:[image?{elementType:2,elementId:'67890',picElement:{fileSize:String(bytes.length), + md5HexStr:md5,picWidth:1,picHeight:1,picType:1000,picSubType:0}} + :{elementType:4,elementId:'67890',pttElement:{fileSize:String(bytes.length),md5HexStr:md5}}]}); +const service={addKernelMsgListener(l){listener=l;return 7;},removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true, + generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'cookie-'+cookie, + getRichMediaFilePathForGuild:()=>path.join(root,md5+(image?'.png':'.silk')), + sendMsg(){sends++;return new Promise((r,j)=>{resolve=r;reject=j;});}, + getMsgsByMsgId(){reads++;return Promise.resolve({result:0,msgList:[row(2,cookie)]});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const proc={platform:process.platform,getBuiltinModule:process.getBuiltinModule.bind(process), + _linkedBinding:()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}})}; +const c={caligoVoiceAccount:'10001',process:proc,Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number}; +vm.createContext(c);const run=x=>vm.runInContext(x,c),tick=()=>new Promise(r=>setImmediate(r)); +const startSend=i=>{cookie=i;assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(scripts[i])).fired,true);}; +const take=i=>JSON.parse(run(poll)).sendResults['media-'+i]; +const notify=i=>{listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1,i));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2,i)]);}; +(async()=>{ + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + startSend(0);resolve({result:120});await tick();await tick(); + assert.deepEqual(take(0),{status:'unknown',reason:'send_result_ambiguous=120'},'nonzero Promise before callback must remain unknown'); + notify(0);await tick();assert.notEqual(take(0)?.status,'done'); + startSend(1);notify(1);await tick();await tick();resolve({result:120});await tick();await tick(); + assert.deepEqual(take(1),{status:'unknown',reason:'send_result_ambiguous=120'},'callback before nonzero Promise must also stay unknown'); + startSend(2);resolve({result:9007199254740992});await tick();await tick(); + assert.deepEqual(take(2),{status:'unknown',reason:image?'image_submit_unknown':'voice_submit_unknown'}); + startSend(3);reject('private diagnostic must not escape');await tick();await tick(); + assert.deepEqual(take(3),{status:'unknown',reason:image?'image_submit_unknown':'voice_submit_unknown'}); + startSend(4);resolve({result:1.5});await tick();await tick(); + assert.deepEqual(take(4),{status:'unknown',reason:image?'image_submit_unknown':'voice_submit_unknown'}); + startSend(5);resolve({result:0});notify(5);await tick();await tick(); + const final=take(5);assert.equal(final.status,'done');assert.equal(final.msgId,'12345'); + assert.equal(sends,6);assert.equal(reads,2); +})().catch(e=>{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1;}).finally(()=>fs.rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true})); +"#.replace("__START__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__SCRIPTS__", &serde_json::to_string(&scripts).unwrap()) + .replace("__IMAGE__", if image {"true"} else {"false"}).replace("__HEX__",hex); + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let out = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(out.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn image_nonzero_promise_result_is_unknown_in_both_orders() { check_ambiguous_media_result(true); } + +#[test] +fn voice_nonzero_promise_result_is_unknown_in_both_orders() { check_ambiguous_media_result(false); } diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_admission.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_admission.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..412f30e --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_admission.rs @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::build_bound_poll_js; +use caligo_model::wrapper_message::{decode_d8_batch,WrapperBinding}; +use std::io::Write; +#[test] +fn rejected_batch_shapes_and_overbudget_base_preserve_state_before_retry() { + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,outputs=[]; +for(const mode of ['invalid_rejected','invalid_overflow','invalid_items','oversized_base']) { + const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{r1:{status:'done',msgId:'123'}},recv:[],recvBytes:5,rejected:0,overflow:0, + imageShapes:[],mediaDiagnostics:[],textSendTrace:[]}; + if(mode==='invalid_rejected')R.rejected=NaN; + if(mode==='invalid_overflow')R.overflow=-1; + if(mode==='invalid_items')R.recv={not:'an array'}; + if(mode==='oversized_base')R.textSendTrace=['x'.repeat(530000)]; + const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); + const before=R.recv,trace=R.textSendTrace,bytes=R.recvBytes; + assert.equal(vm.runInContext(poll,c),'ERR:poll_batch_invalid',mode); + assert.equal(R.recv,before);assert.equal(R.textSendTrace,trace);assert.equal(R.recvBytes,bytes);assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1.msgId,'123'); + R.rejected=0;R.overflow=0;R.recv=[];R.textSendTrace=[]; + outputs.push(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c))); +} +process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(outputs)); +"#.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); + let batches:Vec=serde_json::from_slice(&out.stdout).unwrap(); + let binding=WrapperBinding{account:"10001".into(),session_generation:1,host_nonce:1,wrapper_session:"nt_1".into()}; + for batch in batches {let v=decode_d8_batch(&batch.to_string(),&binding).unwrap();assert_eq!(v.send_results["r1"]["msgId"],"123");} +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_budget.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_budget.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c4c0dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_budget.rs @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::D8_POLL_JS; +use std::io::Write; + +fn run_poll_fixture(fixture: &str) { + let script = fixture.replace("__POLL__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()); + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(script.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let out = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(out.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn poll_preserves_terminal_results_that_did_not_fit() { + run_poll_fixture(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__; +const sends={},sendResults={}; +for(let i=0;i<64;i++)sendResults['r'+i]={status:'done',msgId:'X'.repeat(3072)+i}; +sendResults.waiting={status:'pending'}; +const recv=Array.from({length:6},()=>({payload:'R'.repeat(60000)})); +const r={sid:'nt_1',sends,sendResults,recv,recvBytes:360000,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:r,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const run=()=>{const raw=vm.runInContext(poll,c);assert.ok(Buffer.byteLength(raw,'utf8')<=524288);return JSON.parse(raw);}; +const first=run();assert.equal(first.items.length,6); +const sent1=Object.keys(first.sendResults).filter(k=>k!=='waiting');assert.ok(sent1.length>0&&sent1.length<64); +for(let i=0;i<64;i++){ + const key='r'+i;assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(r.sendResults,key),!Object.hasOwn(first.sendResults,key),'only emitted terminal results may be cleared'); +} +const second=run(),sent2=Object.keys(second.sendResults).filter(k=>k!=='waiting'); +assert.equal(new Set([...sent1,...sent2]).size,64);assert.equal(sent1.length+sent2.length,64); +assert.equal(r.sendResults.waiting.status,'pending'); +"#); +} + +#[test] +fn oversized_terminal_result_becomes_unknown_without_starving_smaller_results() { + run_poll_fixture(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__; +const r={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{huge:{status:'done',msgId:'X'.repeat(530000)}, + huge_pending:{status:'pending',data:'Y'.repeat(530000)}, + small:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'},waiting:{status:'pending'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:r,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const raw=vm.runInContext(poll,c);assert.ok(Buffer.byteLength(raw,'utf8')<=524288);const batch=JSON.parse(raw); +assert.deepEqual(batch.sendResults.small,{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}); +assert.deepEqual(batch.sendResults.huge,{status:'unknown',reason:'result_exceeds_poll_budget'}); +assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(r.sendResults,'huge'),false);assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(r.sendResults,'small'),false); +assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(batch.sendResults,'huge_pending'),false); +assert.equal(r.sendResults.huge_pending.status,'pending'); +assert.equal(r.sendResults.waiting.status,'pending'); +"#); +} + +#[test] +fn oversized_terminal_is_deferred_if_unknown_does_not_fit() { + run_poll_fixture(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__; +const recv=[{payload:'R'.repeat(390000)}],sendResults={fill:{status:'done',msgId:''}}; +const base={schema:1,sid:'nt_1',items:recv,rejected:0,overflow:0,sendResults, + imageShapes:[],mediaDiagnostics:[],textSendTrace:[],textSendTraceGeneration:0,textSendTraceOverflow:false}; +const remaining=524288-Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(base),'utf8')-24; +assert.ok(remaining>0);sendResults.fill.msgId='X'.repeat(remaining); +sendResults.huge={status:'done',msgId:'H'.repeat(530000)}; +const r={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults,recv,recvBytes:390000,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:r,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const run=()=>{const raw=vm.runInContext(poll,c);assert.ok(Buffer.byteLength(raw,'utf8')<=524288);return JSON.parse(raw);}; +const first=run();assert.equal(first.sendResults.fill.status,'done');assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(first.sendResults,'huge'),false); +assert.equal(r.sendResults.huge.status,'done'); +const second=run();assert.deepEqual(second.sendResults.huge,{status:'unknown',reason:'result_exceeds_poll_budget'}); +assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(r.sendResults,'huge'),false); +"#); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_backoff.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_backoff.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..561618b --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_backoff.rs @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_bound_poll_js,build_poll_result_ack_js,PollResultReceipt}; +use std::io::Write; +fn run(fixture:&str){ + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let receipt=|n| PollResultReceipt{generation:"66".repeat(16),sequence:n}; + let mut source=fixture.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()); + for n in 1..=6 {let ack=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(n),&[]).unwrap();source=source.replace(&format!("__ACK{n}__"),&serde_json::to_string(&ack).unwrap());} + let ack_new=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(2),&["fresh".into()]).unwrap(); + let ack_update=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(3),&["orphan".into()]).unwrap(); + let ack_huge=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(2),&["huge".into()]).unwrap(); + source=source.replace("__ACKNEW__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack_new).unwrap()).replace("__ACKUPDATE__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack_update).unwrap()) + .replace("__ACKHUGE__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack_huge).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap();child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(source.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} +#[test] +fn unmatched_result_retries_with_bounded_monotonic_backoff() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=[null,__ACK1__,__ACK2__,__ACK3__,__ACK4__,__ACK5__,__ACK6__]; +let clock=0n;const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>clock}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{orphan:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)),confirm=n=>assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack[n],c),'ACKED'); +assert.equal(read().resultReceipt.sequence,1);confirm(1);clock=100000000n;confirm(1); +assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan,undefined);assert.equal(R.sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown'); +clock=249000000n;assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan,undefined); +clock=250000000n;assert.equal(read().resultReceipt.sequence,2);confirm(2); +clock=749000000n;assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan,undefined); +clock=750000000n;assert.equal(read().resultReceipt.sequence,3);confirm(3); +clock=1750000000n;assert.equal(read().resultReceipt.sequence,4);confirm(4); +clock=3749000000n;assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan,undefined); +clock=3750000000n;assert.equal(read().resultReceipt.sequence,5);confirm(5); +clock=5750000000n;assert.equal(read().resultReceipt.sequence,6);confirm(6);assert.ok(R.sendResults.orphan); +"#);} +#[test] +fn new_and_changed_results_bypass_other_objects_backoff() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack1=__ACK1__,ackNew=__ACKNEW__,ackUpdate=__ACKUPDATE__; +let clock=0n;const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>clock}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{orphan:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c);const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)); +read();assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack1,c),'ACKED');R.recv=[{synthetic:'event'}];R.sendResults.fresh={status:'done',msgId:'20'}; +const next=read();assert.equal(next.items.length,1);assert.equal(next.sendResults.orphan,undefined);assert.equal(next.sendResults.fresh.msgId,'20'); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ackNew,c),'ACKED');R.sendResults.orphan={status:'done',msgId:'30'}; +assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan.msgId,'30');assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ackUpdate,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.orphan,undefined); +"#);} +#[test] +fn unavailable_clock_fails_open_to_immediate_retry() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=__ACK1__,ack2=__ACK2__; +let fail=true;const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>{if(fail)throw Error('unavailable');return 0n;}}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{orphan:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c);const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)); +read();assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown'); +fail=false;assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack2,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan,undefined); +fail=true;assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown'); +"#);} + +#[test] +fn backward_clock_cannot_hide_an_unacknowledged_result() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=__ACK1__; +let clock=1000000000n;const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>clock}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{orphan:{status:'unknown'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c);const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)); +read();assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED');clock=900000000n;assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown'); +"#);} +#[test] +fn deferral_capacity_is_bounded_and_overflow_is_not_hidden() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=__ACK1__; +const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>0n}}; +const results={};for(let i=0;i<129;i++)results['r'+i]={status:'unknown'}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:results,recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c);const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)); +assert.equal(Object.keys(read().sendResults).length,129);assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED'); +assert.equal(R.resultDeferrals.size,128);assert.equal(Object.keys(R.sendResults).length,129);assert.equal(Object.keys(read().sendResults).length,1); +"#);} + +#[test] +fn budget_fallback_does_not_reintroduce_deferred_result() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack1=__ACK1__,ackHuge=__ACKHUGE__; +let clock=0n;const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>clock}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{orphan:{status:'unknown'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c);const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)); +read();assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack1,c),'ACKED');R.sendResults.huge={status:'done',msgId:'x'.repeat(530000)}; +const batch=read();assert.equal(batch.sendResults.orphan,undefined);assert.equal(batch.sendResults.huge.reason,'result_exceeds_poll_budget'); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ackHuge,c),'ACKED');assert.ok(R.sendResults.orphan);assert.equal(R.sendResults.huge,undefined); +clock=250000000n;assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown'); +"#);} + +#[test] +fn malformed_deferral_cannot_hide_a_retained_result() {run(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=__ACK1__; +const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('66'.repeat(16),'hex')}),hrtime:{bigint:()=>0n}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{orphan:{status:'unknown'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c);const read=()=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c)); +read();assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED');R.resultDeferrals.set('orphan',{value:R.sendResults.orphan,since:0n,until:'broken',count:4}); +assert.equal(read().sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown');assert.equal(R.resultDeferrals.size,0); +"#);} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_capacity.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_capacity.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..58aea32 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_capacity.rs @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_image_send_js, build_send_js, build_voice_send_js}; +use std::io::Write; + +#[test] +fn send_results_capacity_blocks_text_image_and_voice_before_submit() { + let png_hex="89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000010000000108060000001f15c4890000000d49444154789c63105432fe0f000214016604e0de7f0000000049454e44ae426082"; + let png:Vec=(0..png_hex.len()).step_by(2).map(|i|u8::from_str_radix(&png_hex[i..i+2],16).unwrap()).collect(); + let silk_hex="02232153494c4b5f56330300445566"; + let silk:Vec=(0..silk_hex.len()).step_by(2).map(|i|u8::from_str_radix(&silk_hex[i..i+2],16).unwrap()).collect(); + let scripts=[build_send_js(1,"20002","hello","10001","new-text",1,5000), + build_image_send_js(1,"10001","20002","new-image",2,5000,&png).unwrap(), + build_voice_send_js(1,"10001","20002","new-voice",3,5000,&silk).unwrap()]; + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),scripts=__SCRIPTS__; +function setup(n) { + let submits=0,storage=0; + const results={};for(let i=0;i 'cookie-1',sendMsg(){submits++;return new Promise(()=>{});}, + getRichMediaFilePathForGuild(){storage++;throw new Error('unexpected storage');}}; + const session={getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; + const R={voiceAccount:'10001',sends:{},sendResults:results,ms:service,session}; + const context={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String,Map,Set,Promise};vm.createContext(context); + return {context,R,get submits(){return submits;},get storage(){return storage;}}; +} +for(const script of scripts){ + const e=setup(128);const result=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(script,e.context)); + assert.deepEqual(result,{err:'send_capacity_or_duplicate'});assert.equal(e.submits,0);assert.equal(e.storage,0); + assert.equal(Object.keys(e.R.sendResults).length,128);assert.equal(Object.keys(e.R.sends).length,0); +} +const e=setup(127);const result=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(scripts[0],e.context)); +assert.equal(result.fired,true);assert.equal(e.submits,1);assert.equal(Object.keys(e.R.sendResults).length,128); +"#.replace("__SCRIPTS__",&serde_json::to_string(&scripts).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_pressure.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_pressure.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6e0b9c --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_pressure.rs @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_result_pressure_js,sanitize_result_pressure,read_result_pressure}; +use std::io::Write; +#[test] +fn pressure_sample_is_read_only_session_bound_and_does_not_expose_result_data() { + let sample=build_result_pressure_js("nt_1").unwrap();let wrong=build_result_pressure_js("nt_\";SECRET").unwrap(); + assert!(build_result_pressure_js("").is_none());assert_eq!(read_result_pressure("").unwrap(),None);assert!(build_result_pressure_js(&"x".repeat(129)).is_none()); + let js=r#" +const realProcess=globalThis.process;const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),sample=__SAMPLE__,wrong=__WRONG__,results={}; +results['SECRET-REQUEST']={status:'unknown',reason:'SECRET-REASON'};results.other={status:'done',msgId:'SECRET-MESSAGE'};results.pending={status:'pending'}; +let now=100n,clock=true;const process={hrtime:{bigint:()=>{if(!clock)throw Error('clock');return now;}}}; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sendResults:results,resultDeferrals:new Map()}; +const active={value:results['SECRET-REQUEST'],since:50n,until:150n,count:1}; +const expired={value:results.other,since:0n,until:90n,count:1};R.resultDeferrals.set('SECRET-REQUEST',active);R.resultDeferrals.set('other',expired); +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Map,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const read=()=>vm.runInContext(sample,c),out=[];assert.equal(vm.runInContext(wrong,c),'ERR:pressure_session'); +const first=read();assert.ok(!first.includes('SECRET'));out.push(JSON.parse(first)); +assert.equal(R.sendResults,results);assert.equal(R.resultDeferrals.size,2);assert.equal(R.resultDeferrals.get('SECRET-REQUEST'),active); +clock=false;out.push(JSON.parse(read()));clock=true; +R.resultDeferrals.set('other',{value:results.other,since:0n,until:'bad',count:1});out.push(JSON.parse(read())); +R.resultDeferrals=undefined;out.push(JSON.parse(read())); +for(let i=0;i<125;i++)results['more-'+i]={status:'pending'};out.push(JSON.parse(read())); +results.extra={status:'pending'};out.push(JSON.parse(read())); +R.sendResults=null;out.push(read());R.sendResults=new Map();out.push(read());realProcess.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(out)); +"#.replace("__SAMPLE__",&serde_json::to_string(&sample).unwrap()).replace("__WRONG__",&serde_json::to_string(&wrong).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap();child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); + let samples:Vec=serde_json::from_slice(&out.stdout).unwrap(); + let expected=[(3,false,Some(1)),(3,false,None),(3,false,None),(3,false,Some(0)),(128,false,Some(0)),(128,true,None)]; + for (sample,(entries,over,delayed)) in samples.iter().take(6).zip(expected) { + let raw=sample.to_string();let detail=sanitize_result_pressure(&raw).unwrap();assert!(!detail.contains("SECRET")); + let v:serde_json::Value=serde_json::from_str(&detail).unwrap();assert_eq!(v["entries"],entries);assert_eq!(v["over_capacity"],over); + assert_eq!(v["saturated"],entries==128);assert_eq!(v["capacity"],128);assert_eq!(v["delayed"].as_u64(),delayed); + } + assert_eq!(samples[6],"ERR:pressure_state");assert!(sanitize_result_pressure(samples[6].as_str().unwrap()).is_none()); + assert_eq!(samples[7],"ERR:pressure_state");assert!(sanitize_result_pressure(samples[7].as_str().unwrap()).is_none()); +} +#[test] +fn sanitizer_rejects_invalid_or_impossible_counts_and_strips_extra_fields() { + for raw in ["NOT_ARMED",r#"{}"#,r#"{"entries":129,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":0}"#, + r#"{"entries":-1,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":0}"#,r#"{"entries":1.5,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":0}"#, + r#"{"entries":1,"over_capacity":true,"delayed":null}"#,r#"{"entries":128,"over_capacity":true,"delayed":1}"#, + r#"{"entries":1,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":2}"#,r#"{"entries":1,"over_capacity":"yes","delayed":0}"#] { + assert!(sanitize_result_pressure(raw).is_none(),"{raw}"); + } + assert!(sanitize_result_pressure(&" ".repeat(1025)).is_none()); + let raw=r#"{"entries":128,"over_capacity":false,"delayed":2,"request":"SECRET","nested":{"reason":"SECRET"}}"#; + let detail=sanitize_result_pressure(raw).unwrap();assert!(!detail.contains("SECRET")); + let value:serde_json::Value=serde_json::from_str(&detail).unwrap();assert_eq!(value["saturated"],true);assert_eq!(value["delayed"],2); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_receipt.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_receipt.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac1cdad --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_receipt.rs @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_bound_poll_js,build_poll_result_ack_js,poll_result_receipt,advance_poll_result_ack,PollResultReceipt,PollResultAck}; +use std::io::Write; +#[test] +fn bound_poll_replays_terminal_result_after_lost_v8_return() { + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{r1:{status:'done',msgId:'123'},waiting:{status:'pending'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const first=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c));assert.equal(first.sendResults.r1.msgId,'123'); +assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1.msgId,'123','terminal must remain until receipt is acknowledged'); +const second=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c));assert.equal(second.sendResults.r1.msgId,'123'); +assert.ok(first.resultReceipt && second.resultReceipt);assert.notDeepEqual(first.resultReceipt,second.resultReceipt); +"#.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn receipt_ack_is_idempotent_scoped_and_never_deletes_newer_results() { + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let receipt=|n| PollResultReceipt{generation:"11".repeat(16),sequence:n}; + let ack1=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(1),&["r1".into(),"r2".into()]).unwrap(); + let ack2=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(2),&["r1".into()]).unwrap(); + let wrong=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_other",&receipt(1),&["r1".into(),"r2".into()]).unwrap(); + assert!(build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt(0),&[]).is_none()); + assert!(poll_result_receipt(r#"{"resultReceipt":{"generation":"bad","sequence":1}}"#).is_err()); + assert!(poll_result_receipt(r#"{"resultReceipt":{"generation":"11111111111111111111111111111111","sequence":0}}"#).is_err()); + assert!(poll_result_receipt(r#"{}"#).unwrap().is_none()); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack1=__ACK1__,ack2=__ACK2__,wrong=__WRONG__; +let n=0;const fakeProcess={getBuiltinModule:name=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from((++n===1?'11':'22').repeat(16),'hex')})}; +const make=()=>({sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{r1:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'},r2:{status:'done',msgId:'222'},p:{status:'pending'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}); +let R=make();const c={__caligo_res:R,process:fakeProcess,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const run=s=>vm.runInContext(s,c);const first=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(first.resultReceipt.sequence,1); +assert.equal(run(wrong),'ERR:receipt_session');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r2.msgId,'222'); +R.sendResults.r1={status:'done',msgId:'111'};assert.equal(run(ack1),'ACKED'); +assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1.msgId,'111');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r2,undefined);assert.equal(R.sendResults.p.status,'pending'); +const second=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(second.resultReceipt.sequence,2); +assert.equal(run(ack1),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1.msgId,'111'); +assert.equal(run(ack2),'ACKED');assert.equal(run(ack2),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1,undefined); +R=make();c.__caligo_res=R;const fresh=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.notEqual(fresh.resultReceipt.generation,second.resultReceipt.generation); +assert.equal(run(ack2),'ERR:receipt_stale');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r1.status,'unknown'); +"#.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()).replace("__ACK1__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack1).unwrap()) + .replace("__ACK2__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack2).unwrap()).replace("__WRONG__",&serde_json::to_string(&wrong).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn owner_retries_uncertain_ack_before_allowing_another_poll() { + let receipt=PollResultReceipt{generation:"ab".repeat(16),sequence:7}; + let item=PollResultAck{session:"nt_1".into(),receipt:receipt.clone(),keys:vec!["request-1".into()]}; + let mut pending=Some(item.clone());let mut attempts=0; + let ready=advance_poll_result_ack(&mut pending,|got|{attempts+=1;assert_eq!(got,&item);false}); + assert!(!ready);assert_eq!(pending,Some(item.clone())); + let ready=advance_poll_result_ack(&mut pending,|got|{attempts+=1;assert_eq!(got,&item);true}); + assert!(ready);assert_eq!(pending,None);assert_eq!(attempts,2); + assert!(advance_poll_result_ack(&mut pending,|_|panic!("no pending receipt"))); +} + +#[test] +fn entropy_failure_keeps_results_and_oversize_unknown_is_acknowledged() { + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let receipt=PollResultReceipt{generation:"33".repeat(16),sequence:1}; + let ack=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&["big".into()]).unwrap(); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=__ACK__; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{big:{status:'done',msgId:'x'.repeat(530000)}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +let fail=true;const fakeProcess={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>{if(fail)throw Error('entropy unavailable');return Buffer.from('33'.repeat(16),'hex')}})}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process:fakeProcess,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +assert.match(vm.runInContext(poll,c),/^ERR:/);assert.equal(R.sendResults.big.msgId.length,530000); +fail=false;const batch=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c));assert.equal(batch.sendResults.big.status,'unknown'); +assert.equal(batch.sendResults.big.reason,'result_exceeds_poll_budget');assert.ok(R.sendResults.big); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.big,undefined); +"#.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()).replace("__ACK__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn leased_result_crosses_decoder_and_resident_before_acknowledgement() { + use caligo_bridge::host_adapter::{HostAdapter,HostError,HostOp,HostOpResult}; + use caligo_bridge::resident::{Resident,ResidentLimits,ResidentNotice,SendOutcome,OwnedRequest,SubmitVerdict}; + use caligo_model::wrapper_message::WrapperBinding; + use std::io::{BufRead,BufReader}; + struct Host; + impl HostAdapter for Host { + fn owner_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} fn current_thread_id(&self)->u64{1} + fn env_valid(&self)->bool{true} fn current_context_ok(&self)->bool{true} + fn native_op(&mut self,op:HostOp)->Result{match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd=>Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::SendText{..}=>Ok(HostOpResult::SendFired{mid:"request-1".into()}), + _=>panic!("unexpected host operation"), + }} + } + let node=r#" +const vm=require('node:vm'),readline=require('node:readline'); +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{'request-1':{status:'done',msgId:'native-1'},orphan:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +readline.createInterface({input:process.stdin}).on('line',line=>{const q=JSON.parse(line); + if(q.op==='quit'){process.exit(0);return;} const result=q.op==='run'?vm.runInContext(q.script,c):Object.keys(R.sendResults); + process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result)+'\n');}); +"#; + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").args(["-e",node]).stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + let mut input=child.stdin.take().unwrap();let mut output=BufReader::new(child.stdout.take().unwrap()); + fn rpc(input:&mut std::process::ChildStdin,output:&mut BufReader,q:serde_json::Value)->serde_json::Value { + writeln!(input,"{}",q).unwrap();input.flush().unwrap();let mut line=String::new();assert!(output.read_line(&mut line).unwrap()>0);serde_json::from_str(&line).unwrap() + } + let run=|s:&str|serde_json::json!({"op":"run","script":s}); + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let lost=rpc(&mut input,&mut output,run(&poll));assert!(lost.as_str().unwrap().contains("native-1")); + let returned=rpc(&mut input,&mut output,run(&poll));let json=returned.as_str().unwrap(); + let receipt=poll_result_receipt(json).unwrap().unwrap(); + let resident=Resident::new(Host,ResidentLimits::default());resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(OwnedRequest::SendText{request_id:"request-1".into(),wire_seq:1,timeout_ms:5000,chat_type:2,peer_uid:"123".into(),text:"sample".into()}),SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + resident.drain().unwrap();resident.take_results(); + let binding=WrapperBinding{account:"10001".into(),session_generation:1,host_nonce:1,wrapper_session:"nt_1".into()}; + let batch=resident.ingest_wrapper_batch(json,&binding).unwrap(); + let id=batch.send_results["request-1"]["msgId"].as_str().unwrap().to_string(); + let accepted=resident.complete_sends(&[("request-1".into(),id)],&[],&[("orphan".into(),"timeout".into())]); + assert_eq!(accepted,vec!["request-1".to_string()]); + assert_eq!(resident.take_results(),vec![ResidentNotice::Outcome(SendOutcome::Success{request_id:"request-1".into(),native_id:"native-1".into()})]); + let mut pending=Some(PollResultAck{session:"nt_1".into(),receipt,keys:accepted}); + assert!(!advance_poll_result_ack(&mut pending,|_|false)); + assert_eq!(rpc(&mut input,&mut output,serde_json::json!({"op":"inspect"})),serde_json::json!(["request-1","orphan"])); + assert!(advance_poll_result_ack(&mut pending,|item|{ + let script=build_poll_result_ack_js(&item.session,&item.receipt,&item.keys).unwrap();rpc(&mut input,&mut output,run(&script))==serde_json::json!("ACKED") + })); + assert_eq!(rpc(&mut input,&mut output,serde_json::json!({"op":"inspect"})),serde_json::json!(["orphan"])); + writeln!(input,"{{\"op\":\"quit\"}}").unwrap();drop(input);assert!(child.wait().unwrap().success()); +} + +#[test] +fn superseded_snapshot_rejects_old_ack_and_keeps_result() { + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let token=|n| PollResultReceipt{generation:"44".repeat(16),sequence:n}; + let ack1=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&token(1),&["r".into()]).unwrap();let ack2=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&token(2),&["r".into()]).unwrap(); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack1=__ACK1__,ack2=__ACK2__; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{r:{status:'done',msgId:'123'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const fakeProcess={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('44'.repeat(16),'hex')})}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process:fakeProcess,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const run=s=>vm.runInContext(s,c);JSON.parse(run(poll));JSON.parse(run(poll)); +assert.equal(run(ack1),'ERR:receipt_stale');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r.msgId,'123'); +assert.equal(run(ack2),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.r,undefined); +"#.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()).replace("__ACK1__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack1).unwrap()).replace("__ACK2__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack2).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_selective.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_selective.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f414e50 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_selective.rs @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_bound_poll_js,build_poll_result_ack_js,PollResultReceipt}; +use std::io::Write; +#[test] +fn acknowledgement_must_not_clear_unmatched_results_in_same_batch() { + let poll=build_bound_poll_js("nt_1").unwrap(); + let receipt=PollResultReceipt{generation:"55".repeat(16),sequence:1}; + let ack=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&["matched".into()]).unwrap(); + let forged=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&["matched".into(),"absent".into()]).unwrap(); + let different=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&["orphan".into()]).unwrap(); + assert!(build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&["matched".into(),"matched".into()]).is_none()); + let too_many:Vec=(0..129).map(|n|format!("key-{n}")).collect(); + assert!(build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&too_many).is_none()); + assert!(build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&receipt,&["x".repeat(524288)]).is_none()); + let empty=build_poll_result_ack_js("nt_1",&PollResultReceipt{generation:"55".repeat(16),sequence:2},&[]).unwrap(); + let js=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),poll=__POLL__,ack=__ACK__,forged=__FORGED__,different=__DIFFERENT__,empty=__EMPTY__; +const R={sid:'nt_1',sends:{},sendResults:{matched:{status:'done',msgId:'123'},orphan:{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}},recv:[],recvBytes:0,rejected:0,overflow:0}; +const process={getBuiltinModule:()=>({randomBytes:()=>Buffer.from('55'.repeat(16),'hex')})}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,process,Buffer,Date,JSON,Object,Array,Number,String};vm.createContext(c); +const batch=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c));assert.equal(Object.keys(batch.sendResults).length,2); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(forged,c),'ERR:receipt_keys');assert.ok(R.sendResults.matched); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.matched,undefined); +assert.equal(vm.runInContext(ack,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(vm.runInContext(different,c),'ERR:receipt_replay_mismatch'); +assert.equal(R.sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown','unmatched result must remain available'); +JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,c));assert.equal(vm.runInContext(empty,c),'ACKED');assert.equal(R.sendResults.orphan.status,'unknown'); +"#.replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(&poll).unwrap()).replace("__ACK__",&serde_json::to_string(&ack).unwrap()).replace("__FORGED__",&serde_json::to_string(&forged).unwrap()).replace("__DIFFERENT__",&serde_json::to_string(&different).unwrap()).replace("__EMPTY__",&serde_json::to_string(&empty).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(js.as_bytes()).unwrap();let out=child.wait_with_output().unwrap();assert!(out.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_send.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_send.rs index b6d6330..43a3ace 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_send.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_send.rs @@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ const bytes = Buffer.from('02232153494c4b5f56330300445566','hex'); const md5 = crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); const msgId = '90071992547409931237', elementId = '90071992547409931238'; const caligoVoiceAccount = '10001'; -let listener, submits, reads, storageCalls, settle, mode, dest, now = 1000; +let listener, submits, reads, storageCalls, settle, mode, dest, cookie, now = 1000; let chatType=1, peerUid='u_peer', peerUin='20002'; Date.now = () => now; const flush = () => new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); -function record(status, guildId='voice-cookie', fingerprint=md5, id=elementId) { +function record(status, guildId=cookie, fingerprint=md5, id=elementId) { return {msgId,msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890',guildId,chatType,msgType:2, subMsgType:0,peerUid,peerUin,senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001', sendStatus:status,elements:[{elementType:4,elementId:id, @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ function record(status, guildId='voice-cookie', fingerprint=md5, id=elementId) { const service = { addKernelMsgListener(value) { listener=value; return 8; }, removeKernelMsgListener() { return true; }, - generateMsgUniqueId(chat,time) { assert.equal(chat,chatType); assert.equal(time,'qq-time'); return 'voice-cookie'; }, + generateMsgUniqueId(chat,time) { assert.equal(chat,chatType); assert.equal(time,'qq-time'); return cookie; }, getRichMediaFilePathForGuild(args) { storageCalls++; assert.deepEqual(args,{md5HexStr:md5,fileName:md5+'.silk',elementType:4,elementSubType:0, @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ const service = { submits++; assert.equal(globalThis.__caligo_res.sends['voice-7'].wireSeq,42); assert.equal(id,'0'); assert.equal(options.size,0); - assert.deepEqual(peer,{chatType,peerUid,guildId:'voice-cookie'}); + assert.deepEqual(peer,{chatType,peerUid,guildId:cookie}); assert.equal(element.elementType,4); assert.equal(element.pttElement.md5HexStr,md5); assert.equal(element.pttElement.fileSize,String(bytes.length)); @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ const service = { getMsgsByMsgId(peer,ids) { reads++; assert.deepEqual(ids,[msgId]); - assert.equal(peer.guildId,'voice-cookie'); + assert.equal(peer.guildId,cookie); return {result:0,msgList:[record(2,'readback-guild-id',md5,mode==='bad_readback' ? '999' : elementId)]}; } }; @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ const session = {getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service, process._linkedBinding = () => ({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}}); function setup(kind, armedAccount='10001') { if (globalThis.__caligo_res) eval(stop); - mode=kind; submits=reads=storageCalls=0; settle=undefined; now=1000; + mode=kind; cookie='voice-cookie-'+kind; submits=reads=storageCalls=0; settle=undefined; now=1000; dest=path.join(root,kind,md5+'.silk'); const caligoVoiceAccount=armedAccount; assert.ok(eval(start).startsWith('ARMED')); @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ function outcome(projected=false) { } function notify() { listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1,'wrong-cookie')); - listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1,'voice-cookie','0'.repeat(32))); + listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1,cookie,'0'.repeat(32))); listener.onAddSendMsg(record(1)); - listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record(2,'voice-cookie',md5,'999'),record(2)]); + listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record(2,cookie,md5,'999'),record(2)]); } (async()=>{ setup('unbound','30003'); @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ assert.deepEqual(fired,{{fired:true,mid:'core-request-7'}}); await new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); const batch=JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(poll,context)); assert.equal(batch.sid,'nt_0'); + assert.deepEqual(batch.textSendTrace,[]); assert.equal(calls.filter(c=>c[0]==='query').length,1, JSON.stringify({{calls,batch}})); assert.equal(batch.sendResults['core-request-7'].status,'done'); assert.equal(batch.sendResults['core-request-7'].msgId,'native-99'); @@ -255,13 +256,505 @@ assert.deepEqual(fired,{{fired:true,mid:'core-request-7'}}); poll = serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap(), send = serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap(), ); - let output = std::process::Command::new("node") - .args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict", "-e", &fixture]) - .output() - .expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + use std::io::Write; + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node") + .arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); assert!( output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr) ); } + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_send_rejects_inflight_cookie_collision() { + use std::io::Write; + let one = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-one", 1, 5_000); + let two = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-two", 2, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__; +let listener,sends=0,queries=0; +const row=(status)=>({msgId:'native-one',msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890', + guildId:'same-cookie',chatType:1,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid:'u_peer',peerUin:'20002', + senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001',sendStatus:status, + elements:[{elementType:1,textElement:{content:'same',atType:0}}]}); +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'same-cookie',addKernelMsgListener(l){listener=l;return 7;}, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,sendMsg(){sends++;return Promise.resolve({result:0});}, + getMsgsByMsgId(){queries++;return Promise.resolve({result:0,msgList:[row(2)]});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const c={Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number, + process:{_linkedBinding:()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}})}}; +vm.createContext(c);const run=x=>vm.runInContext(x,c),tick=()=>new Promise(r=>setImmediate(r)); +(async()=>{ + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one)).fired,true); + const second=JSON.parse(run(two)); + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]); + await tick();await tick(); + const batch=JSON.parse(run(poll)); + const first=batch.sendResults['request-one'],other=batch.sendResults['request-two']; + assert.ok(!(first?.status==='done' && other?.status==='done' && first.msgId===other.msgId), + 'one native callback must not confirm two requests'); + assert.deepEqual(second,{err:'invalid_cookie'}); + assert.equal(sends,1);assert.equal(queries,1); + assert.equal(first.status,'done');assert.equal(first.msgId,'native-one'); + assert.equal(other,undefined); +})().catch(e=>{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1}); +"#.replace("__START__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__", &serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__", &serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()); + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_send_rejects_cookie_reuse_after_settlement() { + use std::io::Write; + let one = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-one", 1, 5_000); + let two = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-two", 2, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__; +let listener,sends=0,queries=0; +const row=status=>({msgId:'old-native',msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890', + guildId:'reused-cookie',chatType:1,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid:'u_peer',peerUin:'20002', + senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001',sendStatus:status, + elements:[{elementType:1,textElement:{content:'same',atType:0}}]}); +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'reused-cookie',addKernelMsgListener(l){listener=l;return 7;}, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,sendMsg(){sends++;return Promise.resolve({result:0});}, + getMsgsByMsgId(){queries++;return Promise.resolve({result:0,msgList:[row(2)]});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const c={Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number, + process:{_linkedBinding:()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}})}}; +vm.createContext(c);const run=x=>vm.runInContext(x,c),tick=()=>new Promise(r=>setImmediate(r)); +(async()=>{ + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one)).fired,true); + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]);await tick();await tick(); + const first=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(first.sendResults['request-one'].status,'done'); + assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(c.__caligo_res.sends,'request-one'),false); + const second=JSON.parse(run(two)); + // These are duplicated notifications belonging to the already settled first request. + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]);await tick();await tick(); + const later=JSON.parse(run(poll)); + assert.notEqual(later.sendResults['request-two']?.status,'done', + 'old notifications must not confirm a later request'); + assert.deepEqual(second,{err:'invalid_cookie'}); + assert.equal(sends,1);assert.equal(queries,1); +})().catch(e=>{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1}); +"#.replace("__START__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__", &serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__", &serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()); + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_cookie_history_survives_timeout_eviction() { + use std::io::Write; + let one = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-one", 1, 5_000); + let two = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-two", 2, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__;let calls=0,now=0; +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'reused-cookie',addKernelMsgListener:()=>7, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,sendMsg(){calls++;return new Promise(()=>{});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const c={Buffer,Promise,Date:{now:()=>now},Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number, + process:{_linkedBinding:()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}})}}; +vm.createContext(c);const run=x=>vm.runInContext(x,c); +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/);assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one)).fired,true); +now=5000;assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(poll)).sendResults['request-one'].status,'unknown'); +now=35000;run(poll);assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(c.__caligo_res.sends,'request-one'),false); +assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(run(two)),{err:'invalid_cookie'});assert.equal(calls,1); +"#.replace("__START__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__", &serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__", &serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()); + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_cookie_history_survives_listener_restart() { + use std::io::Write; + let one = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-one", 1, 5_000); + let two = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-two", 2, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const start=__START__,stop=__STOP__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__; +let calls=0; +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'reused-cookie',addKernelMsgListener:()=>7, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,sendMsg(){calls++;return new Promise(()=>{});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const c={Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number, + process:{_linkedBinding:()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}})}}; +vm.createContext(c);const run=x=>vm.runInContext(x,c); +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/);assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one)).fired,true); +assert.match(run(stop),/^STOPPED/);assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); +assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(run(two)),{err:'invalid_cookie'});assert.equal(calls,1); +"#.replace("__START__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__STOP__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_STOP_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__", &serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__", &serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()); + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_cookie_history_is_bounded_and_fails_closed() { + let send = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request", 1, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),send=__SEND__; +let cookie='first',calls=0; +const R={sends:{},sendResults:{},ms:{generateMsgUniqueId:()=>cookie,sendMsg(){calls++;return new Promise(()=>{});}}, + session:{getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number};vm.createContext(c); +assert.equal(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)).fired,true);assert.equal(calls,1); +const descriptor=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(c,'__caligo_text_cookie_guard_v1'); +assert.equal(descriptor.writable,false);assert.equal(descriptor.configurable,false); +const claim=descriptor.value; +assert.equal(claim('first'),'invalid_cookie');assert.equal(claim('x'.repeat(257)),'invalid_cookie'); +for(let i=0;i<65535;i++)assert.equal(claim(`used-${i}`),'ok'); +assert.equal(claim('new'),'cookie_history_exhausted'); +delete R.sends.request;delete R.sendResults.request;cookie='new'; +assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)),{err:'cookie_history_exhausted'}); +assert.equal(calls,1);assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(R.sends,'request'),false); +"#.replace("__SEND__", &serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()); + let output=std::process::Command::new("node").args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict","-e",&fixture]) + .output().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_cookie_history_unavailable_blocks_submission() { + let send = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request", 1, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),send=__SEND__; +let calls=0; +const R={sends:{},sendResults:{},ms:{generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'cookie',sendMsg(){calls++;}}, + session:{getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number, + __caligo_text_cookie_guard_v1:null};vm.createContext(c); +assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)),{err:'cookie_history_unavailable'}); +assert.equal(calls,0);assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(R.sends,'request'),false); +"#.replace("__SEND__", &serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()); + let output=std::process::Command::new("node").args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict","-e",&fixture]) + .output().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_cookie_history_rejects_mutable_or_accessor_guard() { + let send = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request", 1, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),send=__SEND__; +for (const kind of ['mutable','accessor']) { + let calls=0; + const R={sends:{},sendResults:{},ms:{generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'cookie',sendMsg(){calls++;}}, + session:{getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}}; + const c={__caligo_res:R,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number}; + if (kind==='mutable') c.__caligo_text_cookie_guard_v1=()=> 'ok'; + else Object.defineProperty(c,'__caligo_text_cookie_guard_v1',{get(){throw Error('getter invoked');},configurable:true}); + vm.createContext(c); + assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)),{err:'cookie_history_unavailable'}); + assert.equal(calls,0);assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(R.sends,'request'),false); +} +"#.replace("__SEND__", &serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()); + let output=std::process::Command::new("node").args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict","-e",&fixture]) + .output().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_send_allows_distinct_inflight_cookies_with_identical_text() { + let one = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-one", 1, 5_000); + let two = build_send_js(1, "20002", "same", "10001", "request-two", 2, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const scripts=[__ONE__,__TWO__];let next=0,calls=0; +const R={sends:{},sendResults:{},ms:{generateMsgUniqueId:()=>`cookie-${++next}`, + sendMsg(){calls++;return new Promise(()=>{});}}, + session:{getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}}; +const c={__caligo_res:R,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number};vm.createContext(c); +for(const script of scripts)assert.equal(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(script,c)).fired,true); +assert.equal(calls,2);assert.equal(R.sends['request-one'].cookie,'cookie-1'); +assert.equal(R.sends['request-two'].cookie,'cookie-2'); +"#.replace("__ONE__", &serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__", &serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()); + let output = std::process::Command::new("node").args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict","-e",&fixture]) + .output().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_send_rejects_cookie_held_by_inflight_media() { + let send = build_send_js(1, "20002", "hello", "10001", "new-text", 9, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const send=__SEND__; +for(const media of ['voice','image']) { + let calls=0; + const pending={cookie:'held-cookie',[media]:{size:1},done:false}; + const R={sends:{previous:pending},sendResults:{}, + ms:{generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'held-cookie',sendMsg(){calls++;}}, + session:{getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}}; + const c={__caligo_res:R,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number}; + vm.createContext(c); + assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)),{err:'invalid_cookie'}); + assert.equal(calls,0);assert.strictEqual(R.sends.previous,pending); + assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(R.sends,'new-text'),false); +} +"#.replace("__SEND__", &serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()); + let output = std::process::Command::new("node").args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict","-e",&fixture]) + .output().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_send_uncertain_submission_stays_unknown() { + let send = build_send_js(1, "20002", "hello", "10001", "request", 42, 5_000); + let fixture = format!(r#" +const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); +const vm = require('node:vm'); +const send = {send}; +async function run(mode) {{ + const sends = {{}}; + const service = {{generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'cookie', sendMsg() {{ + assert.ok(sends.request, 'registration must precede submission'); + if (mode === 'throw') throw Error('submit uncertain'); + if (mode === 'reject') return Promise.reject(Error('submit uncertain')); + if (mode === 'code') return Promise.resolve({{result: 37}}); + if (mode === 'ambiguous-code') {{ sends.request.addId='native-candidate'; return Promise.resolve({{result:37}}); }} + if (mode === 'ambiguous-readback') {{ sends.request.addId='native-candidate'; sends.request.readback={{status:'readback',msgId:'native-candidate'}}; return Promise.resolve({{result:37}}); }} + if (mode === 'accepted') return Promise.resolve({{result: 0}}); + return Promise.resolve({{result: undefined}}); + }}}}; + const session = {{getMSFService:()=>({{getServerTime:()=> 'time'}}), + getProfileService:()=>({{getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])}})}}; + const R = {{sends, sendResults:{{}}, ms:service, session}}; + const context = {{__caligo_res:R, Promise, Date, Map, JSON, String, Object, Array, Number}}; + vm.createContext(context); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,context)).fired,true); + await new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); + if (mode === 'code') {{ assert.equal(R.sendResults.request.status,'unknown'); assert.equal(R.sendResults.request.reason,'send_result_ambiguous=37'); }} + else if (mode === 'ambiguous-code' || mode === 'ambiguous-readback') {{ assert.equal(R.sendResults.request.status,'unknown'); assert.equal(R.sendResults.request.reason,'send_result_ambiguous=37'); }} + else assert.equal(R.sendResults.request.status,mode === 'accepted' ? 'accepted' : 'unknown',mode); +}} +async function late(mode) {{ + let finish; + const service={{generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'cookie',sendMsg:()=>new Promise(resolve=>{{finish=resolve;}})}}; + const session={{getMSFService:()=>({{getServerTime:()=> 'time'}}), + getProfileService:()=>({{getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])}})}}; + const R={{sends:{{}},sendResults:{{}},ms:service,session}}; + const context={{__caligo_res:R,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number}}; + vm.createContext(context); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,context)).fired,true); + if (mode === 'timeout') {{ R.sends.request.timedOut=true; R.sendResults.request={{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'}}; }} + else if (mode === 'stopped') R.stopped=true; + else {{ R.sends.request={{replacement:true}}; R.sendResults.request={{status:'pending'}}; }} + finish({{result:37}}); + await new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); + assert.equal(R.sendResults.request.status, mode === 'timeout' ? 'unknown' : 'pending', mode); +}} +(async()=>{{ for (const mode of ['throw','reject','malformed','code','ambiguous-code','ambiguous-readback','accepted']) await run(mode); + for (const mode of ['timeout','stopped','replaced']) await late(mode); }})() + .catch(error=>{{console.error(error);process.exitCode=1;}}); +"#, send = serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()); + let output = std::process::Command::new("node") + .args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict", "-e", &fixture]) + .output() + .expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_text_inline_duplicate_and_old_generation_callbacks_are_scoped() { + use std::io::Write; + let send = build_send_js(1, "20002", "hello", "10001", "request", 42, 5_000); + let fixture = format!(r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'), vm=require('node:vm'); +const start={start}, stop={stop}, poll={poll}, send={send}; +let listener, count=0, queries=0, mode='inline', complete; +const record=(id,status,guild='cookie')=>({{msgId:id,msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890',guildId:guild, + chatType:1,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid:'u_peer',peerUin:'20002',senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001',sendStatus:status, + elements:[{{elementType:1,textElement:{{content:'hello',atType:0}}}}]}}); +const service={{generateMsgUniqueId:()=> count===0 ? 'cookie' : `cookie-${{count}}`,addKernelMsgListener(l){{listener=l;return 7;}},removeKernelMsgListener(){{return true;}}, + sendMsg(){{count++; assert.ok(context.__caligo_res.sends.request); + if(mode==='inline') {{ listener.onAddSendMsg(record('native-1',1)); listener.onAddSendMsg(record('native-1',1)); + listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record('native-1',2),record('native-1',2)]); return Promise.resolve({{result:0}}); }} + return new Promise(resolve=>{{complete=resolve;}}); + }},getMsgsByMsgId(){{queries++;return Promise.resolve({{result:0,msgList:[record('native-1',2,'other')]}});}}}}; +const session={{getSessionId:()=> 'nt_0',getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({{getServerTime:()=> 'time'}}), + getProfileService:()=>({{getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])}})}}; +const context={{Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number,caligoSendTrace:true,process:{{_linkedBinding:()=>({{NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}}}})}}}}; +vm.createContext(context); +const run=s=>vm.runInContext(s,context); +(async()=>{{ + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(send)).fired,true); + for(let i=0;i<5;i++) await new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); + let batch=JSON.parse(run(poll)); assert.equal(batch.sendResults.request.status,'done'); + assert.equal(batch.sendResults.request.msgId,'native-1'); assert.equal(queries,1); + const stages=batch.textSendTrace.map(e=>e.stage); + assert.ok(stages.indexOf('registered') < stages.indexOf('submit_enter')); + assert.ok(stages.indexOf('matched_add') < stages.indexOf('submit_return')); + assert.ok(stages.includes('promise_accepted') && stages.includes('readback_matched') && stages.includes('settled')); + assert.equal(new Set(batch.textSendTrace.map(e=>e.seq)).size,1); + assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceOverflow,false); + listener.onAddSendMsg(record('native-1',1)); listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record('native-1',2)]); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(poll)).sendResults.request,undefined); + mode='pending'; assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(send)).fired,true); let old=listener, oldComplete=complete, oldState=context.__caligo_res; + let staleDownloads=0; oldState.voiceDownload=()=>{{ staleDownloads++; }}; + const oldSnapshot=JSON.stringify({{recv:oldState.recv,bytes:oldState.recvBytes,rejected:oldState.rejected,overflow:oldState.overflow,images:oldState.imageShapes}}); + service.removeKernelMsgListener=()=>{{ old.onRecvMsg([record('inline-stop',2)]); old.onRichMediaDownloadComplete({{status:0}}); return true; }}; + assert.match(run(stop),/^STOPPED/); + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(send)).fired,true); const current=context.__caligo_res; + old.onRecvMsg([record('late-recv',2)]); old.onRecvMsg(null); + old.onAddSendMsg(record('old-native',1)); old.onMsgInfoListUpdate([record('old-native',2)]); + old.onRichMediaDownloadComplete({{status:0}}); + oldComplete({{result:37}}); await new Promise(resolve=>setImmediate(resolve)); + assert.equal(JSON.stringify({{recv:oldState.recv,bytes:oldState.recvBytes,rejected:oldState.rejected,overflow:oldState.overflow,images:oldState.imageShapes}}),oldSnapshot); + assert.equal(staleDownloads,2); + assert.equal(current.sendResults.request.status,'pending'); assert.equal(current.sends.request.addId,null); + assert.equal(count,3); assert.equal(queries,1); + service.removeKernelMsgListener=()=>{{throw Error('not removed');}}; + assert.equal(run(stop),'ERR:listener_remove_failed'); + assert.equal(context.__caligo_res,current); assert.equal(current.stopped,true); + let failedDownloads=0; current.voiceDownload=()=>{{ failedDownloads++; }}; + const failedSnapshot=JSON.stringify({{recv:current.recv,bytes:current.recvBytes,rejected:current.rejected}}); + listener.onRecvMsg([record('failed-stop',2)]); listener.onAddSendMsg(record('failed-stop',1)); + listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate(null); listener.onRichMediaDownloadComplete({{status:0}}); + assert.equal(JSON.stringify({{recv:current.recv,bytes:current.recvBytes,rejected:current.rejected}}),failedSnapshot); + assert.equal(failedDownloads,1); + assert.equal(run(start),'ERR:stopped_listener_retained'); +}})().catch(e=>{{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1;}}); +"#,start=serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap(),stop=serde_json::to_string(D8_STOP_JS).unwrap(), + poll=serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap(),send=serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output=child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn stopped_listener_probe_is_scoped_and_does_not_change_stop_outcome() { + let fixture = format!(r#" +const assert = require('node:assert/strict'), vm = require('node:vm'); +const start = {start}, stop = {stop}; +let removals=0, removalThrows=false; +const service={{sendMsg(){{}},addKernelMsgListener(){{return 7;}}, removeKernelMsgListener(){{removals++; if(removalThrows) throw Error('private');}}}}; +const session={{getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service}}; +const c={{Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number,process:{{_linkedBinding:()=>({{NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}}}})}}}}; +vm.createContext(c); const run=s=>vm.runInContext(s,c); +const probe=enabled=>`(function(caligoStopProbe) {{ return (${{stop}}); }})(${{enabled}})`; +assert.equal(run(probe(true)),'NOT_ARMED'); +c.caligoStopProbe=true; +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); +const regular=run(probe(false)); assert.match(regular,/^STOPPED /); assert.ok(!regular.includes('stop_probe=')); +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); +const checked=run(probe(true)); assert.match(checked,/^STOPPED /); assert.ok(checked.endsWith(' stop_probe=pass')); +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); c.__caligo_res.listener.onRecvMsg=()=>{{c.__caligo_res.rejected++;}}; +const failedCheck=run(probe(true)); assert.match(failedCheck,/^STOPPED /); assert.ok(failedCheck.endsWith(' stop_probe=fail')); +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); c.__caligo_res.listener.onRecvMsg=()=>{{throw Error('private callback detail');}}; +const errored=run(probe(true)); assert.match(errored,/^STOPPED /); assert.ok(errored.endsWith(' stop_probe=error')); assert.ok(!errored.includes('private')); +assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); removalThrows=true; +assert.equal(run(probe(true)),'ERR:listener_remove_failed stop_probe=pass'); +assert.equal(c.__caligo_res.stopped,true); assert.equal(removals,5); +"#,start=serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap(),stop=serde_json::to_string(D8_STOP_JS).unwrap()); + let output = std::process::Command::new("node").args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict","-e",&fixture]) + .output().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn research_text_trace_scopes_requests_polls_and_overflow() { + let one = build_send_js(1, "20002", "one", "10001", "request-one", 1, 5_000); + let two = build_send_js(1, "20002", "two", "10001", "request-two", 2, 5_000); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,stop=__STOP__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__; +let index=0,resolvers=[]; +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=>`cookie${++index}`,addKernelMsgListener:()=>7, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,sendMsg(){return new Promise(r=>resolvers.push(r));}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const c={Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number,caligoSendTrace:true, + process:{_linkedBinding:()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}})}}; +vm.createContext(c);const run=x=>vm.runInContext(x,c),tick=()=>new Promise(r=>setImmediate(r)); +(async()=>{ + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one)).fired,true);assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(two)).fired,true); + let batch=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceGeneration,1); + assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceOverflow,false); + const registrations=batch.textSendTrace.filter(e=>e.stage==='registered'); + assert.equal(registrations.length,2);assert.notEqual(registrations[0].seq,registrations[1].seq); + resolvers[1]({result:0});await tick();batch=JSON.parse(run(poll)); + assert.deepEqual(batch.textSendTrace,[{seq:registrations[1].seq,stage:'promise_accepted'}]); + resolvers[0]({result:0});await tick();batch=JSON.parse(run(poll)); + assert.deepEqual(batch.textSendTrace,[{seq:registrations[0].seq,stage:'promise_accepted'}]); + for(let i=0;i<11;i++)assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one.replace('request-one',`many-${i}`))).fired,true); + batch=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(batch.textSendTrace.length,32);assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceOverflow,true); + batch=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceOverflow,false); + const oldResolve=resolvers[2];assert.match(run(stop),/^STOPPED/);assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + oldResolve({result:0});await tick();batch=JSON.parse(run(poll)); + assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceGeneration,2);assert.deepEqual(batch.textSendTrace,[]); + c.__caligo_res.textTraceSequence=2147483647; + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one.replace('request-one','exhausted'))).fired,true); + batch=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceOverflow,true); + assert.deepEqual(batch.textSendTrace,[]); + assert.match(run(stop),/^STOPPED/); + Object.defineProperty(c,'__caligo_text_trace_generation',{ + get(){return 0},set(){throw Error('private')},configurable:true}); + assert.match(run(start),/^ARMED/); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(run(one.replace('request-one','generation-failed'))).fired,true); + batch=JSON.parse(run(poll));assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceGeneration,0); + assert.equal(batch.textSendTraceOverflow,true);assert.deepEqual(batch.textSendTrace,[]); +})().catch(e=>{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1}); +"#.replace("__START__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__STOP__", &serde_json::to_string(D8_STOP_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__", &serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__", &serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()); + use std::io::Write; + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()) + .spawn().expect("Node.js is required for the wrapper send fixture"); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output = child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(), "{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_voice_cookie.rs b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_voice_cookie.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..827b066 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_voice_cookie.rs @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +use caligo_bridge::qq_v8::{build_voice_send_js, D8_POLL_JS, D8_START_JS, D8_STOP_JS}; + +#[test] +fn wrapper_voice_send_rejects_cookie_reuse_after_settlement() { + use std::io::Write; + let hex = "02232153494c4b5f56330300445566"; + let silk: Vec = (0..hex.len()).step_by(2) + .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i+2], 16).unwrap()).collect(); + let one = build_voice_send_js(1,"10001","20002","voice-one",1,5000,&silk).unwrap(); + let two = build_voice_send_js(1,"10001","20002","voice-two",2,5000,&silk).unwrap(); + let fixture = r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),fs=require('node:fs'),path=require('node:path'), + os=require('node:os'),crypto=require('node:crypto'); +const start=__START__,poll=__POLL__,stop=__STOP__,one=__ONE__,two=__TWO__; +const caligoVoiceAccount='10001'; +const root=fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(fs.realpathSync(os.tmpdir()),'caligo-voice-reuse-')); +const bytes=Buffer.from('__HEX__','hex'),md5=crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); +const dest=path.join(root,md5+'.silk'); +let listener,sends=0,reads=0; +const row=status=>({msgId:'12345',msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890', + guildId:'reused-cookie',chatType:1,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid:'u_peer',peerUin:'20002', + senderUid:'u_self',senderUin:'10001',sendStatus:status, + elements:[{elementType:4,elementId:'67890',pttElement:{fileSize:String(bytes.length), + md5HexStr:md5}}]}); +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=> 'reused-cookie',addKernelMsgListener(l){listener=l;return 7;}, + removeKernelMsgListener:()=>true,getRichMediaFilePathForGuild:()=>dest, + sendMsg(){sends++;return Promise.resolve({result:0});}, + getMsgsByMsgId(){reads++;return Promise.resolve({result:0,msgList:[row(2)]});}}; +const session={getSessionId:()=>1,getMsgService:()=>service,getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +process._linkedBinding=()=>({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession:()=>session}}); +const tick=()=>new Promise(r=>setImmediate(r)); +(async()=>{ + assert.match(eval(start),/^ARMED/);assert.equal(JSON.parse(eval(one)).fired,true); + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]);await tick();await tick(); + assert.equal(JSON.parse(eval(poll)).sendResults['voice-one'].status,'done'); + assert.equal(Object.hasOwn(globalThis.__caligo_res.sends,'voice-one'),false); + const second=JSON.parse(eval(two)); + listener.onAddSendMsg(row(1));listener.onMsgInfoListUpdate([row(2)]);await tick();await tick(); + const later=JSON.parse(eval(poll)); + assert.notEqual(later.sendResults['voice-two']?.status,'done','old voice notification must not confirm later send'); + assert.deepEqual(second,{err:'invalid_cookie'});assert.equal(sends,1);assert.equal(reads,1); + eval(stop); +})().catch(e=>{console.error(e);process.exitCode=1;}).finally(()=>fs.rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true})); +"#.replace("__START__",&serde_json::to_string(D8_START_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__POLL__",&serde_json::to_string(D8_POLL_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__STOP__",&serde_json::to_string(D8_STOP_JS).unwrap()) + .replace("__ONE__",&serde_json::to_string(&one).unwrap()) + .replace("__TWO__",&serde_json::to_string(&two).unwrap()).replace("__HEX__",hex); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output=child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} + +#[test] +fn wrapper_voice_cookie_history_survives_rearm_and_fails_closed() { + use std::io::Write; + let hex="02232153494c4b5f56330300445566"; + let silk: Vec=(0..hex.len()).step_by(2).map(|i|u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i+2],16).unwrap()).collect(); + let send=build_voice_send_js(1,"10001","20002","voice",1,5000,&silk).unwrap(); + let fixture=r#" +const assert=require('node:assert/strict'),vm=require('node:vm'),fs=require('node:fs'), + path=require('node:path'),os=require('node:os'),crypto=require('node:crypto'),send=__SEND__; +const bytes=Buffer.from('__HEX__','hex'),md5=crypto.createHash('md5').update(bytes).digest('hex'); +const root=fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(fs.realpathSync(os.tmpdir()),'caligo-voice-cookie-')); +let cookie='first',calls=0; +const service={generateMsgUniqueId:()=>cookie,getRichMediaFilePathForGuild:()=>path.join(root,md5+'.silk'), + sendMsg(){calls++;return new Promise(()=>{});}}; +const session={getMSFService:()=>({getServerTime:()=> 'time'}), + getProfileService:()=>({getUidByUin:()=>new Map([['20002','u_peer']])})}; +const resource=()=>({voiceAccount:'10001',stopped:false,sends:{},sendResults:{},ms:service,session}); +function context(){const c={__caligo_res:resource(),process,Buffer,Promise,Date,Map,JSON,String,Object,Array,Number};vm.createContext(c);return c;} +const run=c=>JSON.parse(vm.runInContext(send,c)); +try { + const c=context();assert.equal(run(c).fired,true);assert.equal(calls,1); + const descriptor=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(c,'__caligo_voice_cookie_guard_v1'); + assert.equal(descriptor.writable,false);assert.equal(descriptor.configurable,false); + c.__caligo_res=resource();assert.deepEqual(run(c),{err:'invalid_cookie'});assert.equal(calls,1); + for(let i=0;i<65535;i++) assert.equal(descriptor.value('filled-'+i),'ok'); + assert.equal(descriptor.value('first'),'invalid_cookie');assert.equal(descriptor.value('x'.repeat(257)),'invalid_cookie'); + cookie='new-cookie';assert.deepEqual(run(c),{err:'cookie_history_exhausted'});assert.equal(calls,1); + for(const kind of ['null','mutable','accessor']) { + const d=context(); + if(kind==='null') d.__caligo_voice_cookie_guard_v1=null; + else if(kind==='mutable') d.__caligo_voice_cookie_guard_v1=()=> 'ok'; + else Object.defineProperty(d,'__caligo_voice_cookie_guard_v1',{get(){throw Error('getter invoked');},configurable:true}); + assert.deepEqual(run(d),{err:'cookie_history_unavailable'});assert.equal(calls,1); + } +} finally {fs.rmSync(root,{recursive:true,force:true});} +"#.replace("__SEND__",&serde_json::to_string(&send).unwrap()).replace("__HEX__",hex); + let mut child=std::process::Command::new("node").arg("--unhandled-rejections=strict") + .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped()).stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap(); + child.stdin.take().unwrap().write_all(fixture.as_bytes()).unwrap(); + let output=child.wait_with_output().unwrap(); + assert!(output.status.success(),"{}",String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)); +} diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/src/daemon.rs b/crates/caligo-core/src/daemon.rs index e42a7d4..6c8a92e 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/src/daemon.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/src/daemon.rs @@ -1066,6 +1066,7 @@ impl Daemon { } BridgeMsg::SendResult { request_id, + notice_id, outcome, } => { let terminal = !matches!(&outcome, OutcomePayload::AcceptedUnconfirmed); @@ -1101,6 +1102,7 @@ impl Daemon { &conn, &CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { request_id, + notice_id, terminal, }, )?; diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/src/journal.rs b/crates/caligo-core/src/journal.rs index ff799a4..ab5d7fa 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/src/journal.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/src/journal.rs @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ pub struct RequestRecord { /// core 分配并在派发前持久化的 QQ client_seq;旧记录没有此字段。 #[serde(default)] pub wire_seq: Option, + /// 仅明确失败携带;旧 journal 缺失时保留未知原因。 + #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + pub failure_reason: Option, } #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)] @@ -397,6 +400,7 @@ mod tests { at_unix_ms: 1_000, session_generation: 7, wire_seq: None, + failure_reason: None, }) } diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/src/onebot_http.rs b/crates/caligo-core/src/onebot_http.rs index b03d2ec..082da54 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/src/onebot_http.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/src/onebot_http.rs @@ -302,6 +302,12 @@ pub fn serve_one( access_token: Option<&str>, handler: impl FnOnce(&str, &Value, Value) -> ActionResponse, ) -> (String, String, Option, Vec) { + // On Windows an accepted socket can inherit the listener's nonblocking + // mode. Read timeouts only bound blocking reads; otherwise a client that + // has not sent its complete request yet is rejected as incomplete. + if stream.set_nonblocking(false).is_err() { + return (String::new(), String::new(), None, Vec::new()); + } let _ = stream.set_write_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))); let read_deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + MAX_READ_DURATION; let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(4096); diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/src/runtime.rs b/crates/caligo-core/src/runtime.rs index fe7c685..7726439 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/src/runtime.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/src/runtime.rs @@ -1201,6 +1201,10 @@ impl AccountActor { at_unix_ms: now_ms(), session_generation: gen, wire_seq, + failure_reason: match state { + ActionState::ConfirmedFailure { reason } => Some(reason.clone()), + _ => None, + }, })) } @@ -1355,7 +1359,7 @@ fn state_from_record(record: &RequestRecord) -> Option { }, "AcceptedUnconfirmed" => Some(ActionState::AcceptedUnconfirmed), "ConfirmedFailure" => Some(ActionState::ConfirmedFailure { - reason: String::new(), + reason: record.failure_reason.clone().unwrap_or_default(), }), "CancelledUnsent" => Some(ActionState::CancelledUnsent), "DeliveryUnknown" => Some(ActionState::DeliveryUnknown), diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/capability_query_lab.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/capability_query_lab.rs index c4d6f76..be8627b 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/tests/capability_query_lab.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/capability_query_lab.rs @@ -246,11 +246,11 @@ fn private_voice_dispatch_requires_current_advertisement_and_is_never_replayed() assert!(wire_seq > 0 && (1..=10_000).contains(&timeout_ms)); bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::NativeStarted { request_id: request_id.clone() }).unwrap(); assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::NativeStartedAck { .. })); - bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 42, request_id: request_id.clone(), outcome: OutcomePayload::Unknown { reason: Some("voice_submit_unknown".into()) }, }).unwrap(); - assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { .. })); + assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { notice_id: 42, terminal: true, .. })); let target = caligo_model::SessionKey::new("10001", caligo_model::SessionKind::Private, "20002"); assert_eq!( lab.daemon.onebot_text_status(&request_id, &target), @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ fn image_dispatch_requires_current_advertisement_and_is_never_replayed() { CoreToBridgeMsg::NativeStartedAck { .. } )); bridge - .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id: request_id.clone(), outcome: OutcomePayload::Unknown { reason: Some("image_submit_unknown".into()), diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_chain.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_chain.rs index 2e42004..500bbee 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_chain.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_chain.rs @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ fn spawn_bridge_agent( request_id, native_id, }, - ) => BridgeMsg::SendResult { + ) => BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id, outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id: native_id.clone(), @@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ fn spawn_bridge_agent( }; bridge.send(&msg).unwrap(); if let BridgeMsg::SendResult { + notice_id: _, request_id: _, outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id }, } = msg diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_client_lab.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_client_lab.rs index 96365a4..f063258 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_client_lab.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_client_lab.rs @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ fn dispatch_roundtrip_through_real_worker() { // (owner = 测试线程,与 drain 一致)。 resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); - let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::(); + let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::(); let (w_tx, w_rx) = mpsc::channel(); { let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); @@ -429,9 +429,7 @@ fn dispatch_roundtrip_through_real_worker() { while Instant::now() < round_deadline { // resident.drain 只能在 owner 线程(LAB 假宿主以本线程为 owner)。 let _ = resident.drain(); - for notice in resident.take_results() { - let _ = tx.send(notice); - } + caligo_bridge::resident::ResultHandoffGate::default().forward(&resident, &tx).unwrap(); if let CoreToControlMsg::QueryResult { state, native_id, .. } = control @@ -488,7 +486,7 @@ fn durable_result_is_replayed_after_ack_loss_without_native_retry() { let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(LabHost, ResidentLimits::default())); resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); - let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::(); + let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::(); let (w_tx, w_rx) = mpsc::channel(); let send_count_before = LAB_SENDS.load(Ordering::Relaxed); { @@ -537,13 +535,12 @@ fn durable_result_is_replayed_after_ack_loss_without_native_retry() { ); let expected_native_id = format!("NM-{}", send_count_before + 1); + let handoff = caligo_bridge::resident::ResultHandoffGate::default(); let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(8); let mut durable_result_visible = false; while Instant::now() < deadline { let _ = resident.drain(); - for notice in resident.take_results() { - let _ = tx.send(notice); - } + assert!(handoff.forward(&resident, &tx).is_ok()); if let CoreToControlMsg::QueryResult { native_id, .. } = control .request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::QueryRequest { request_id: "R-ACK-LOSS".into(), @@ -594,6 +591,250 @@ fn durable_result_is_replayed_after_ack_loss_without_native_retry() { assert!(counters.results_sent >= 2); } +/// Reconstruct a worker after its old channel accepted notices and vanished. +#[test] +fn worker_rebuild_replays_resident_notices_without_native_retry() { + let _g = TEST_SERIAL.lock().unwrap(); + let prefix = unique_prefix("worker-rebuild"); + let (daemon, make_runner) = start_daemon(&prefix); + let auth = daemon.auth_token().to_string(); + let runner = make_runner(); + let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(LabHost, ResidentLimits::default())); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let send_count_before = LAB_SENDS.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + let stop1 = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let (_tx1, rx1) = mpsc::channel(); + let (done1, wait1) = mpsc::channel(); + { + let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); + let resident = resident.clone(); let stop = stop1.clone(); + std::thread::spawn(move || { + done1.send(run_worker(cfg, resident, &wake_true, rx1, _ev_placeholder(), stop)).unwrap(); + }); + } + let control_name = pipe_names_from_prefix(&prefix).1; + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + let mut control = loop { + if let Ok(c) = ControlClient::connect(&control_name, &auth, "rebuild-client") { break c; } + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "control connection timeout"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + }; + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + loop { + if matches!(control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::SendText { + request_id: "R-REBUILD".into(), + target: serde_json::json!({"account":"10001","kind":"group","peer":"654321"}), + text: "CALIGO-REBUILD-LAB".into(), deadline_ms: 30_000, + }).unwrap(), CoreToControlMsg::SendAccepted { .. }) { break; } + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "dispatch acceptance timeout"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while resident.request_state("R-REBUILD") != Some("queued") { + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "resident queue timeout"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + stop1.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed); + assert_eq!(wait1.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap().1, WorkerExit::LocalStop); + assert_eq!(resident.drain().unwrap(), 1); + let (lost_tx, lost_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + assert_eq!(caligo_bridge::resident::ResultHandoffGate::default().forward(&resident, &lost_tx), Ok(2)); + let retained = resident.retained_notices(); + assert_eq!(retained.len(), 2); + drop(lost_rx); // simulate successful send then loss before worker receives + assert_eq!(resident.retained_notices(), retained); + let stop2 = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let (tx2, rx2) = mpsc::channel(); + // Duplicate hints must not duplicate notices already in the startup snapshot. + for item in &retained { tx2.send(item.clone()).unwrap(); } + let (done2, wait2) = mpsc::channel(); + { + let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); + let resident = resident.clone(); let stop = stop2.clone(); + std::thread::spawn(move || { + done2.send(run_worker(cfg, resident, &wake_true, rx2, _ev_placeholder(), stop)).unwrap(); + }); + } + let expected_id = format!("NM-{}", send_count_before + 1); + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10); + loop { + let result = control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::QueryRequest { request_id: "R-REBUILD".into() }).unwrap(); + if matches!(result, CoreToControlMsg::QueryResult { native_id: Some(ref id), .. } if id == &expected_id) + && resident.retained_notices().is_empty() { break; } + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "rebuilt worker did not persist and acknowledge result"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + assert_eq!(LAB_SENDS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) - send_count_before, 1); + control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::Stop {}).unwrap(); + let (counters, exit) = wait2.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(exit, WorkerExit::CoreStopped); + assert_eq!(counters.results_sent, 1, "duplicate channel hints must not send a second result"); + runner.join().unwrap().unwrap(); +} + +/// Real daemon ACKs free bounded resident capacity and unblock the pending suffix. +#[test] +fn daemon_ack_releases_backpressure_without_repeating_native_send() { + use caligo_bridge::resident::{HandoffError, OwnedRequest, ResultHandoffGate, SubmitVerdict}; + struct AsyncLabHost; + impl HostAdapter for AsyncLabHost { + fn owner_thread_id(&self) -> u64 { lab_tid() } + fn current_thread_id(&self) -> u64 { lab_tid() } + fn env_valid(&self) -> bool { true } + fn current_context_ok(&self) -> bool { true } + fn native_op(&mut self, op: HostOp) -> Result { + match op { + HostOp::ListenerAdd => Ok(HostOpResult::ListenerDeferred), + HostOp::Probe => Ok(HostOpResult::ProbeDone), + HostOp::SendText { request_id, .. } => { + LAB_SENDS.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + Ok(HostOpResult::SendFired { mid: request_id }) + } + _ => panic!("unexpected operation"), + } + } + } + let _g = TEST_SERIAL.lock().unwrap(); + let prefix = unique_prefix("backpressure"); + let (daemon, make_runner) = start_daemon(&prefix); + let auth = daemon.auth_token().to_string(); let runner = make_runner(); + let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(AsyncLabHost, ResidentLimits { results_max: 2, ..ResidentLimits::default() })); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let before = LAB_SENDS.load(Ordering::Relaxed); + let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let (worker_tx, worker_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (done, wait) = mpsc::channel(); + { + let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); let resident = resident.clone(); let stop = stop.clone(); + std::thread::spawn(move || { done.send(run_worker(cfg, resident, &wake_true, worker_rx, _ev_placeholder(), stop)).unwrap(); }); + } + let control_name = pipe_names_from_prefix(&prefix).1; + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + let mut control = loop { + if let Ok(c) = ControlClient::connect(&control_name, &auth, "pressure-client") { break c; } + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline); std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + }; + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + loop { + if matches!(control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::SendText { + request_id: "R-PRESSURE".into(), + target: serde_json::json!({"account":"10001","kind":"group","peer":"654321"}), + text: "CALIGO-PRESSURE-LAB".into(), deadline_ms: 30_000, + }).unwrap(), CoreToControlMsg::SendAccepted { .. }) { break; } + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline); std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while resident.request_state("R-PRESSURE") != Some("queued") { + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline); std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + assert_eq!(resident.drain().unwrap(), 1); + resident.complete_sends(&[("R-PRESSURE".into(), String::new())], &[], &[]); + resident.complete_sends(&[], &[], &[("R-PRESSURE".into(), "unknown".into())]); + resident.complete_sends(&[("R-PRESSURE".into(), "strong-id".into())], &[], &[]); + let (staged_tx, staged_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let gate = ResultHandoffGate::default(); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&resident, &staged_tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(2))); + assert_eq!(resident.submit(OwnedRequest::Probe { id: 7 }), SubmitVerdict::Accepted); + assert_eq!(gate.forward(&resident, &staged_tx), Err(HandoffError::Full(0))); + assert_eq!(resident.pending_ingress(), 1); + for item in staged_rx.try_iter() { worker_tx.send(item).unwrap(); } + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10); let mut probe_ran = false; + loop { + let ready = gate.forward(&resident, &staged_tx).is_ok(); + for item in staged_rx.try_iter() { worker_tx.send(item).unwrap(); } + if ready && !probe_ran { assert_eq!(resident.drain().unwrap(), 1); probe_ran = true; } + let result = control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::QueryRequest { request_id: "R-PRESSURE".into() }).unwrap(); + if probe_ran && resident.retained_notices().is_empty() + && matches!(result, CoreToControlMsg::QueryResult { native_id: Some(ref id), .. } if id == "strong-id") { break; } + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "ACKs did not drain pressure and pending suffix"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + assert_eq!(LAB_SENDS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) - before, 1); + control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::Stop {}).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(wait.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap().1, WorkerExit::CoreStopped); + runner.join().unwrap().unwrap(); +} + +#[test] +fn concurrent_worker_for_same_resident_must_be_rejected() { + let _g = TEST_SERIAL.lock().unwrap(); + let prefix = unique_prefix("worker-exclusive"); + let (daemon, make_runner) = start_daemon(&prefix); + let baseline_epoch = daemon.connection_epoch(); + let auth = daemon.auth_token().to_string(); + let runner = make_runner(); + let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(LabHost, ResidentLimits::default())); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let (done, wait) = mpsc::channel(); + let (first_tx, first_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + { + let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); + let resident = resident.clone(); let stop = stop.clone(); + std::thread::spawn(move || { done.send(run_worker(cfg, resident, &wake_true, first_rx, _ev_placeholder(), stop)).unwrap(); }); + } + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10); + while daemon.connection_epoch() <= baseline_epoch || caligo_bridge::daemon_client::counters_snapshot().hellos_accepted == 0 { + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "first worker did not attach"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + let stopped = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(true)); + let (second_tx, second_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (rejected_counters, exit) = run_worker(worker_config(&prefix, &auth), resident.clone(), &wake_true, second_rx, _ev_placeholder(), stopped); + assert_eq!(exit, WorkerExit::WorkerAlreadyRunning); + assert_eq!(rejected_counters.connects, 0); + drop(second_tx); + let control_name = pipe_names_from_prefix(&prefix).1; + let mut control = ControlClient::connect(&control_name, &auth, "exclusive-client").unwrap(); + assert!(matches!(control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::Health {}).unwrap(), CoreToControlMsg::HealthAck {})); + control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::Stop {}).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(wait.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap().1, WorkerExit::CoreStopped); + runner.join().unwrap().unwrap(); + drop(first_tx); + let (next_tx, next_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (_, next_exit) = run_worker(worker_config(&prefix, &auth), resident, &wake_true, next_rx, _ev_placeholder(), Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(true))); + assert_eq!(next_exit, WorkerExit::LocalStop, "normal worker exit must release the lease"); + drop(next_tx); +} + +#[test] +fn worker_panic_quarantines_same_resident_without_reconnect() { + let _g = TEST_SERIAL.lock().unwrap(); + let prefix = unique_prefix("worker-panic"); + let (daemon, make_runner) = start_daemon(&prefix); + let baseline_epoch = daemon.connection_epoch(); + let auth = daemon.auth_token().to_string(); let runner = make_runner(); + let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(LabHost, ResidentLimits::default())); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let (_tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let worker = { + let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); let resident = resident.clone(); let stop = stop.clone(); + std::thread::spawn(move || run_worker(cfg, resident, &|| panic!("synthetic worker teardown panic"), rx, _ev_placeholder(), stop)) + }; + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10); + while daemon.connection_epoch() <= baseline_epoch || caligo_bridge::daemon_client::counters_snapshot().hellos_accepted == 0 { + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "first worker did not attach"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + stop.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed); + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while !worker.is_finished() { + assert!(Instant::now() < deadline, "panicking worker did not exit"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + assert!(worker.join().is_err()); + let (replacement_tx, replacement_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (counters, exit) = run_worker(worker_config(&prefix, &auth), resident, &wake_true, replacement_rx, _ev_placeholder(), Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(true))); + assert_eq!(exit, WorkerExit::WorkerQuarantined); + assert_eq!(counters.connects, 0); + drop(replacement_tx); + let control_name = pipe_names_from_prefix(&prefix).1; + let mut control = ControlClient::connect(&control_name, &auth, "panic-client").unwrap(); + control.request(caligo_core::ipc::ControlMsg::Stop {}).unwrap(); + runner.join().unwrap().unwrap(); +} + fn wake_false() -> bool { false } @@ -607,7 +848,7 @@ fn pipe_names_from_prefix(prefix: &str) -> (String, String) { } // run_worker 的 rx 参数占位(第一个用例不消费结果)。 -fn _rx_placeholder() -> mpsc::Receiver { +fn _rx_placeholder() -> mpsc::Receiver { let (_t, r) = mpsc::channel(); r } @@ -723,7 +964,7 @@ fn native_started_only_after_resident_accepts() { let resident = Arc::new(Resident::new(LabHost, ResidentLimits::default())); // 故意不 bootstrap:Dispatch 到达时 submit 返回 NotReady → pending。 let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); - let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::(); + let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::(); let (w_tx, w_rx) = mpsc::channel(); { let cfg = worker_config(&prefix, &auth); @@ -795,9 +1036,7 @@ fn native_started_only_after_resident_accepts() { let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); while Instant::now() < deadline { let _ = resident.drain(); - for notice in resident.take_results() { - let _ = tx.send(notice); - } + caligo_bridge::resident::ResultHandoffGate::default().forward(&resident, &tx).unwrap(); if let CoreToControlMsg::QueryResult { state, native_id, .. } = control @@ -1062,9 +1301,7 @@ fn private_and_group_png_traverse_real_worker_and_owner_without_retry() { let until = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); loop { resident.drain().unwrap(); - for notice in resident.take_results() { - tx.send(notice).unwrap(); - } + caligo_bridge::resident::ResultHandoffGate::default().forward(&resident, &tx).unwrap(); if matches!( daemon.onebot_text_status(&id, &target), Some((caligo_model::ActionState::ConfirmedSuccess { .. }, None)) diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_http_delayed.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_http_delayed.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d58f6a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_http_delayed.rs @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +use caligo_core::onebot::ActionResponse; +use caligo_core::onebot_http::{serve_loop, serve_parallel, DEFAULT_MAX_BODY}; +use serde_json::{json, Value}; +use std::io::{Read, Write}; +use std::net::{SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream}; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; +use std::sync::Arc; +use std::time::Duration; + +fn request_with_pause(address: SocketAddr, split: bool) -> Result { + let mut stream = TcpStream::connect(address).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(3))).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + let body = br#"{"action":"get_status","params":{},"echo":"pause-test"}"#; + if split { + let head = format!("POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: local\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\n\r\n", body.len()); + stream.write_all(head.as_bytes()).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + stream.write_all(&body[..1]).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + } + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)); + if split { + stream.write_all(&body[1..]).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + } else { + stream.write_all(b"GET /get_status HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: local\r\n\r\n").map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + } + let mut response = String::new(); + stream.read_to_string(&mut response).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; + Ok(response) +} + +fn check_delayed_clients(parallel: bool) { + let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap(); + let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap(); + let stop = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let server_stop = stop.clone(); + let server = std::thread::spawn(move || { + if parallel { + let handler: Arc ActionResponse + Send + Sync> = + Arc::new(|_, _, echo| ActionResponse::ok(json!({"online":true}), echo)); + serve_parallel(&listener, DEFAULT_MAX_BODY, None, + move || server_stop.load(Ordering::SeqCst), handler) + } else { + let mut handler = |_: &str, _: &Value, echo: Value| ActionResponse::ok(json!({"online":true}), echo); + serve_loop(&listener, DEFAULT_MAX_BODY, None, + move || server_stop.load(Ordering::SeqCst), &mut handler) + } + }); + let delayed_header = request_with_pause(address, false); + let split_body = request_with_pause(address, true); + stop.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst); + let served = server.join().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(served, 2); + for (case, result) in [("delayed header", delayed_header), ("split body", split_body)] { + let response = result.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("{case} failed: {e}")); + assert!(response.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 200"), "{case}: {response}"); + assert!(response.contains("\"retcode\":0"), "{case}: {response}"); + } +} + +#[test] +fn parallel_http_accepts_delayed_headers_and_body_chunks() { check_delayed_clients(true); } + +#[test] +fn sequential_http_accepts_delayed_headers_and_body_chunks() { check_delayed_clients(false); } diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_private_send_lab.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_private_send_lab.rs index 1858fd3..679605b 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_private_send_lab.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_private_send_lab.rs @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ fn private_requires_current_send_capability_and_strong_persisted_identity() { CoreToBridgeMsg::EventAck { .. } )); bridge - .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id, outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id: "90071992547409931234".into(), @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ fn private_unknown_returns_unknown_without_a_second_dispatch() { CoreToBridgeMsg::NativeStartedAck { .. } )); bridge - .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id: id, outcome: OutcomePayload::Unknown { reason: Some("readback timeout".into()), @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ fn private_record_waits_for_exact_readback_to_be_persisted() { bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::NativeStarted { request_id: request_id.clone() }).unwrap(); assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::NativeStartedAck { .. })); let native_id = "90071992547409931234"; - bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id, outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id: native_id.into() }, }).unwrap(); assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { terminal: true, .. })); @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ fn group_record_requires_group_capability_and_exact_group_projection() { let native_id = "90071992547409931234"; bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::NativeStarted { request_id: request_id.clone() }).unwrap(); assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::NativeStartedAck { .. })); - bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + bridge.send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id, outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id: native_id.into() }, }).unwrap(); assert!(matches!(bridge.recv().unwrap(), CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { terminal: true, .. })); @@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ fn png_send_requires_scoped_capability_and_persisted_private_or_group_readback() )); let native_id = "90071992547409931234"; bridge - .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { + .send(&BridgeMsg::SendResult { notice_id: 1, request_id, outcome: OutcomePayload::Success { native_id: native_id.into(), diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/recovery_contract.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/recovery_contract.rs index d8e6821..9515a5a 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/tests/recovery_contract.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/recovery_contract.rs @@ -272,6 +272,62 @@ fn l09_crash_after_native_started_unknown_not_failure() { ); } +#[test] +fn rejected_send_reason_survives_restart_without_redispatch() { + let path = tmp_path("rejected-reason", "journal.log"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path); + let (mut actor, _) = AccountActor::open(&path, RuntimeConfig::default()).unwrap(); + actor.attach_session(session(1)).unwrap(); + actor.mark_connection_ready(conn(1)).unwrap(); + actor.submit_send(req("rejected", "sample")).unwrap(); + actor.dispatch_begin("rejected").unwrap(); + actor.bridge_started("rejected").unwrap(); + let reason = "send result=37".to_owned(); + actor.bridge_result("rejected", NativeResult::Failure { reason: reason.clone() }).unwrap(); + let (actor, _) = crash_and_reopen(actor, &path); + assert_eq!(actor.query_request("rejected"), Some(caligo_model::ActionState::ConfirmedFailure { reason })); + assert!(!actor.pending_queries().contains(&"rejected".to_owned())); +} + +#[test] +fn legacy_rejected_record_without_reason_remains_readable() { + let path = tmp_path("legacy-rejected", "journal.log"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path); + let old = serde_json::json!({"t":"Request","d":{ + "v":1,"request_id":"legacy-rejected","payload_hash":7,"state":"ConfirmedFailure", + "native_id":null,"at_unix_ms":1,"session_generation":1,"wire_seq":null + }}); + let record: JournalRecord = serde_json::from_value(old.clone()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(&record).unwrap(), old); + let (mut journal, _) = Journal::open(&path, 16 * 1024 * 1024, SyncMode::Always).unwrap(); + journal.append(&record).unwrap(); + drop(journal); + let before = std::fs::read(&path).unwrap(); + let (actor, _) = AccountActor::open(&path, RuntimeConfig::default()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(actor.query_request("legacy-rejected"), Some(caligo_model::ActionState::ConfirmedFailure { reason: String::new() })); + drop(actor); + assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path).unwrap(), before); +} + +#[test] +fn ambiguous_send_code_remains_auditable_after_restart_without_redispatch() { + let path = tmp_path("ambiguous-code", "journal.log"); + let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path); + let (mut actor, _) = AccountActor::open(&path, RuntimeConfig::default()).unwrap(); + actor.attach_session(session(1)).unwrap(); + actor.mark_connection_ready(conn(1)).unwrap(); + actor.submit_send(req("ambiguous", "sample")).unwrap(); + actor.dispatch_begin("ambiguous").unwrap(); + actor.bridge_started("ambiguous").unwrap(); + actor.bridge_result("ambiguous", NativeResult::Unknown { + reason: Some("send_result_ambiguous=37".into()), + }).unwrap(); + let (actor, _) = crash_and_reopen(actor, &path); + assert_eq!(actor.query_request("ambiguous"), Some(caligo_model::ActionState::DeliveryUnknown)); + assert!(!actor.pending_queries().contains(&"ambiguous".to_owned())); + assert!(actor.receipt_audits().iter().any(|entry| entry.request_id == "ambiguous" && entry.detail.contains("send_result_ambiguous=37"))); +} + // ---- L13:journal 尾截断保守恢复;已确认事实保留 ---- #[test] @@ -337,6 +393,7 @@ fn l14_legacy_success_without_native_id_restores_unconfirmed_and_preserves_journ at_unix_ms: 1_797_091_200_000, session_generation: 7, wire_seq: None, + failure_reason: None, })) .unwrap(); drop(journal); diff --git a/crates/caligo-core/tests/wrapper_message_chain.rs b/crates/caligo-core/tests/wrapper_message_chain.rs index ca34d0f..b1ec864 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-core/tests/wrapper_message_chain.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-core/tests/wrapper_message_chain.rs @@ -164,6 +164,69 @@ process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(first)); String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap() } +#[test] +fn d8_same_text_ids_and_unknown_chat_do_not_cross_sessions() { + let start = serde_json::to_string(caligo_bridge::qq_v8::D8_START_JS).unwrap(); + let poll = serde_json::to_string(caligo_bridge::qq_v8::D8_POLL_JS).unwrap(); + let fixture = r#" +const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); +let listener; +const service = {sendMsg() { throw Error('must not send'); }, + addKernelMsgListener(value) { listener = value; return 1; }}; +const session = {getSessionId: () => '1', getMsgService: () => service}; +process._linkedBinding = () => ({NodeIQQNTWrapperSession:{getNTWrapperSession: () => session}}); +const caligoVoiceAccount = '10001'; +assert.ok(eval(start).startsWith('ARMED')); +function row(id, chatType, peerUid, peerUin, senderUid, senderUin) { + return {msgId:id,msgSeq:'1',msgRandom:'2',msgTime:'1794567890',guildId:'', + chatType,msgType:2,subMsgType:0,peerUid,peerUin,senderUid,senderUin, + elements:[{elementType:1,textElement:{content:'same text',atType:0}}]}; +} +listener.onRecvMsg([ + row('101',1,'u_friend','20002','u_friend','20002'), + row('102',1,'u_friend','20002','u_friend','20002'), + row('103',99,'u_friend','20002','u_friend','20002'), + row('104',2,'30003','30003','u_friend','20002') +]); +process.stdout.write(eval(poll)); +"#; + let script = format!("const start={start}, poll={poll};\n{fixture}"); + let out = std::process::Command::new("node") + .args(["--unhandled-rejections=strict", "-e", &script]) + .output() + .unwrap(); + assert!( + out.status.success(), + "{}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr) + ); + let resident = Resident::new(OfflineHost, ResidentLimits::default()); + resident.bootstrap().unwrap(); + let binding = WrapperBinding { + account: "10001".into(), + session_generation: 1, + host_nonce: 9, + wrapper_session: "nt_0".into(), + }; + let batch = resident + .ingest_wrapper_batch(std::str::from_utf8(&out.stdout).unwrap(), &binding) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(batch.stats.rejected, 1); + let events = resident.take_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); + assert_eq!( + events.iter().map(|e| e.native_id.as_str()).collect::>(), + ["101", "102", "104"] + ); + assert!(events + .iter() + .all(|e| e.text == "same text" && e.msg_time == Some(1794567890))); + assert_eq!(events[0].peer_uin, "20002"); + assert_eq!(events[1].peer_uin, "20002"); + assert_eq!(events[2].peer_uin, "30003"); + assert!(events.iter().all(|e| e.sender_uin == "20002")); +} + #[test] fn d8_owned_records_reach_journal_and_only_current_incoming_messages_fan_out() { let json = script_batch(); diff --git a/crates/caligo-model/src/ipc_v3.rs b/crates/caligo-model/src/ipc_v3.rs index 9a21f84..a056d45 100644 --- a/crates/caligo-model/src/ipc_v3.rs +++ b/crates/caligo-model/src/ipc_v3.rs @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ pub const CAPABILITY_QUERY_REVISION: u32 = 1; /// IPC 语义协议 v3。v2 保持原定义供历史对照;不接受 v2/v1 握手降级。 pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION_V3: u32 = 3; /// Bridge/core business receipt contract revision, independent of frame/IPC v3. -pub const BUSINESS_PROTOCOL_REVISION: u32 = 3; +pub const BUSINESS_PROTOCOL_REVISION: u32 = 4; pub use super::ipc_v2::{EventPayload, Role}; @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ pub enum CoreToBridgeMsg { }, SendResultAck { request_id: String, + /// Echo of the exact worker notice; zero is reserved for immediate rejections. + notice_id: u64, terminal: bool, }, Stopped {}, @@ -135,6 +137,8 @@ pub enum BridgeMsg { /// 发送结果(receipt 契约三分类,与 runtime::NativeResult 对应)。 SendResult { request_id: String, + /// Nonzero resident-lifetime sequence; zero identifies an immediate rejection. + notice_id: u64, outcome: OutcomePayload, }, QueryCapabilities { @@ -189,6 +193,17 @@ mod tests { assert!(r.is_err(), "v2 Hello 不得被 v3 静默接受"); } + #[test] + fn result_and_ack_require_notice_id() { + let old_result = r#"{"t":"send_result","d":{"request_id":"r","outcome":{"t":"accepted_unconfirmed"}}}"#; + let old_ack = r#"{"t":"send_result_ack","d":{"request_id":"r","terminal":false}}"#; + assert!(serde_json::from_str::(old_result).is_err()); + assert!(serde_json::from_str::(old_ack).is_err()); + let ack = CoreToBridgeMsg::SendResultAck { request_id: "r".into(), notice_id: 42, terminal: false }; + let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&ack).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(serde_json::from_slice::(&bytes).unwrap(), ack); + } + /// v3 Hello 完整字段可解码。 #[test] fn v3_hello_with_host_identity_decodes() { @@ -320,6 +335,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(decoded, dispatch); let result = BridgeMsg::SendResult { + notice_id: 7, request_id: "R-timeout".into(), outcome: OutcomePayload::Unknown { reason: Some("errCode=1006501; provenance unverified".into()), diff --git a/docs/README.md b/docs/README.md index a672479..b4678c3 100644 --- a/docs/README.md +++ b/docs/README.md @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ - 9.9.33 本地链路研究:[2026-11-11 收发验证](research/2026-11-11-9.9.33-local-verification.md)。研究报告含明确标注的伪身份字段,不构成生产实现或现场验收。 - 接收:[receive-design](research/qq-native-receive-design.md)。 - 发送实验合同:[send-probe-design](research/qq-native-send-probe-design.md)。 +- feat-004 后续观测判定:[回调线程与停止观测合同](acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)。 - 响应消费者历史起点:[response-consumer-scope](research/response-consumer-scope.md)。 “实现未开始”等旧结论以 N 台账后续接线记录补充;scope 原文保留。 - 详细样本与负结果:从 P/N 执行台账进入对应 `evidence/`,按样本定位, diff --git a/docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md b/docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90da84b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# feat-004 回调线程与停止观测合同(2026-11-15) + +本合同是后续取证的判定设计,不是现场准入,也不是验收通过。适用正式 wrapper 的固定 QQ 9.9.36-53644;固定映像摘要、已有现场和限制见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。历史 G3 的 consumer ABI/线程/寿命是独立路线,不能用 wrapper 结果代替。 + +## 分层与判定 + +| 观察 | 能证明 | 不能证明 | +|---|---|---| +| 停止中直接调用 listener 的合成探针 | 测试输入下 stopped 分支没有修改受检接收状态;异常和缺记录分别为失败或 unknown | QQ 确曾在停止后调用、真实 payload 的全部行为、QQ 内部注销或排空 | +| JS listener 或 Promise handler 入口上的当前 OS TID,配合同代次与关联事件 | 该次 JS 回调执行时的线程;只能用于所记录事件 | QQ native 生产者线程、其他 callback 的线程或最终 owner | +| native callback 入口的线程与对象关联 | 仅在入口身份、固定 hash、对象/请求关联和捕获机制均独立证明时,证明对应样本的 native 入口线程 | 全部回调都在该线程、最终释放或全局 quiescence | +| 停止后正常退出、端口关闭 | 指定代次的管理端和 owner 已关闭 | listener 键必定移除、既有快照消失、宿主 drain 或可热卸载 | +| 停止后真实关联迟到回调被观察且状态保持不变 | 指定事件和代次的停止隔离 | 所有在途事件均已到达,或以后不会有回调 | + +`listener_armed` / owner pump 的线程、主动调用的合成回调及轮询时线程均不能标成 QQ native callback 线程。缺失日志不是没有回调的证明。有限观察窗口内没有事件只记 unknown。停止前后记录必须区分时间顺序、事件来源与同一进程代次;不能用正文、时间相似性冒充请求身份。 + +## 2026-11-15 请求级诊断实现(离线) + +research 模式为每个已登记文本请求分配 JS 环境中本监听器代次内的临时正整数;各阶段携带相同序号,poll 保留代次号与不完整标记。队列达到 32 项、序号耗尽或代次持久化失败时标记不完整;后续 poll 重置该批的溢出标记。白名单过滤只输出有界代次、序号和固定阶段,不输出账户、正文、cookie 或原始请求/消息 ID。普通模式不启用该诊断;测试仅验证实现和模拟交错。 + +代次号只在同一 JS 环境且内部计数未被外部改写时有意义,必须另以进程代次和环境证据限定;临时序号没有独立映射时不能识别真实用户请求。报告上限为进程内 32 次,整批日志未写出、缺失或截断仍为 unknown,不能推断未发生;该字段也不证明 QQ native callback OS 线程或全局 drain。旧标签数组的历史记录不能追溯出请求序号。新实现在固定版本完成了单次私聊阶段采集;正式线程与寿命验收仍独立开放。 + +## 离线日志解析 + +可用 `node scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.mjs <本机阶段日志>` 只读解析当前固定标签格式。工具只输出有界代次、临时序号和白名单阶段;格式异常、超限、明确溢出或无轨迹返回 unknown,不打印原始内容。`scope: unverified` 与 `completeness: unknown` 始终保留:即使标签完整,也须单独证明进程、JS 环境、实际请求关联以及报告未缺失;工具不会证明 callback OS 线程、对端收取或全局 drain。真实日志继续留在 ignored `local-evidence/`,禁止作为公开测试夹具。 + +## 并发发送轨迹的关联限制 + +本轮修复前的 `textSendTrace` 是 listener 代次共用的固定标签数组,不包含请求身份,poll 后清空,单次数组最多 32 项。`sanitize_text_send_trace` 只保留标签;跨 poll、并发、截断或缺失时,不能从标签顺序推断单个请求的事件顺序,也不能用 `sendResults` 的键给无键标签补关联。此前限定为一次发送的样本只在其当时准入和零其他请求等记录成立时可按单请求解释;本次复现没有否定该样本的其他独立证据。 + +离线 VM 使用实际 `build_send_js` 生成的两个不同请求,分别以先一后二和先二后一的顺序完成 Promise;两个输出阶段数组完全相同,且两条 `sendResults` 各自为 accepted。另一个 11 请求样本产生 33 个阶段,数组只保留 32 项且无截断标记,丢失一个 submit_return。实验只证明当前诊断无法区分这两种交错及无法从输出识别该丢失,不证明账本混淆或现场线程。可重跑材料与 hash 见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。 + +请求级诊断必须让每个阶段携带本监听器代次内有界且不复用的临时关联序号,在登记前分配、由同一 pending 对象贯穿回调;不得输出账号、正文、cookie、原始 request ID 或 native ID。需要定义跨 poll、并发、容量溢出、重复/旧代次和缺失记录的明确 unknown 语义,证明序号不会影响投递和账本。日志中的序号没有独立映射时仍不能与具体用户请求关联;须另有经审查的本地关联证据。线程观测另需独立采集机制,不能把阶段记录线程当作 native callback 线程。此段为设计约束,不能视为现场许可。 + +## 后续证据最低要求 + +1. 先完成独立审查的最小观测实现及离线正反测试:包括无事件、重复、旧代次、移除同步回调、移除失败及停止后媒体清理。诊断必须有界、无聊天正文/凭据;合成标记与真实事件标记不可混用。未提交的本地探针不是已批准的现场方案。 +2. 若要观察 OS TID,定义采集入口、固定模块 hash、回调来源、线程记录与请求/代次关联及溢出、缺失的 unknown 分支。JS 入口只能报告 JS 执行线程;要主张 native 入口须另行建立 ABI、对象寿命和非侵入采集证据。不得使用已否决的调用点补丁或 slot7 钩子路线。 +3. 任何新现场都要单独核对当前准入合同、构建及目标的 PID/创建时间、模块 hash、唯一 Environment、无冲突 backend、登录与恢复条件;不复用曾注入的进程。涉及发送时另确定单次目标与样本,unknown 不重发;本合同不授权发送或接入。 +4. 对实际事件记录从登记、调用、回调、停止到持久结果的可核对顺序及负例,完整保留原始报告于 ignored `local-evidence/`。状态仅按实际样本升级;现场未命中迟到事件或捕获失败均为 unknown。 +5. 最终 owner、成功 wait 和全局 drain 需要独立的对象身份、持有/释放链与所有相关队列或生产者的闭合证据。只有进程正常退出可证明该进程代次结束,不能倒推退出前的全局静默。未闭合前 bridge 保留至 QQ 正常退出,不热卸载。 + +停止隔离和线程观测互不替代;不追测已按用户决定排除的业务拒绝语义。feat-004 在其完成门与所需 ABI/线程/寿命证据闭合前保持 in-progress。 + +## 2026-11-15 LBR 自建对照准备(未准入采集) + +本机 `xperf -help start` 的 `-Pids` 说明仅用于 heap tracing;不能把它当作 PMC/LBR 的进程过滤。系统采样可能包含其他进程的模块、地址、线程及活动信息,原始 ETL 和诊断输出应视作敏感本机证据,不放入仓库或上传。管理员权限与 CPU/计数器列表均不证明 LBR 支持、采集成功或数据已按测试进程过滤。微软资料:[系统跟踪会话](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-a-systemtraceprovider-session)、[停止跟踪](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/xperf/stopping-a-trace)、[LBR 采样](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/sample-profile-guided-optimization?view=msvc-170)。 + +拟议对照仅针对自建 workload,现场 QQ 不在本步骤范围。采集前必须落实并验证:独立会话名称/标识和所有权;启动冲突、失败、控制器崩溃及超时的清理;既有第三方 ETW 会话不得停止或改配置;有限持续时间、缓存与文件容量;私有证据目录的访问控制;采样丢失与截断记录;时钟、进程代次及 TID 在样本中的可验证关联。`xperf -stop` 未指定名称或 `xperf -d` 未显式停止时会操作默认 kernel logger,不能用作无条件清理;具名 system logger 及 LBR/PMC 配置是否可用还须在隔离条件下验证,不能假设同名或会话句柄足以解决全局计数器冲突。尚未设计完控制器,不提供现场采集命令。 + +自建样本输出 PID、FILETIME 创建时间、QPC 频率、两个线程的 TID/计数和 QPC 区间以及三处固定二进制 RVA;控制器在子进程存活时使用独立 `GetProcessTimes` 复核 PID/创建时间,严格解析并对错误代次、重复线程、无重叠、坏时间/计数和多余数据作负例。机器码独立核查两条间接调用。该真值仅对应自建进程:QPC 与实际 ETW 解码时间的换算、LBR 记录是否同一线程以及采样本身是否可靠均为 unknown,不能凭时间相近推断对象/请求或 QQ 行为。材料与哈希见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。 + +### 会话生命周期离线模型 + +[纯状态模型](../../scripts/lbr-session-model.mjs)及其[测试](../../scripts/lbr-session-model.test.mjs)没有 ETW 后端、系统调用或命令执行能力,只在合成输入下约束预检、启动、停止和控制器丢失的状态转换。未知预检拒绝启动;启动结果不确定或身份不匹配时所有权与清理均为 unknown,不生成停止动作;运行后停止动作只携带成功回执中同身份的模拟句柄。停止回执不匹配、失败或控制器丢失不自动重试;超时即使模拟停止成功仍保留 workload unknown。成功状态仅表示模拟后端确认停止及 workload 结束,不代表 ETW、采样、隐私或资源清理已验证。 + +该模型不能建立真实 ETW 句柄身份、证明会话清理、抵御进程崩溃后资源残留,或检测 PMC 的全局冲突;未来任何真实适配必须先独立验证这些条件,不能将调用模拟模型当成现场准入。测试中刻意移除身份比较后,启动和停止负例均失败;结果见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。 + +### 进程内私有 ETW 对照(非系统采样) + +自建 Python 进程使用 Windows `StartTraceW` 和 `ControlTraceW`,仅创建无 provider、无文件、无系统标志的 in-process private buffering 会话,按成功返回的句柄查询和停止;另一个实验中同名第二次启动返回 183,两个不同私有会话均可查询,停止第一个后第二个仍能查询,最后只按各自取得的句柄停止。实际 API 结果和本机脚本 hash 见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。这验证当前 Windows/当前 token 下指定私有会话的正常及冲突样本,不证明系统 logger、PMC、LBR、跨进程数据、崩溃清理或其他身份隔离。后续系统级实现仍受上面的前置条件约束。 + +微软 [StartTraceW 文档](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/evntrace/nf-evntrace-starttracew)建议使用能说明组件用途的稳定会话名,避免以随机名堆积跟踪会话;该建议与识别本次实际所有权是不同问题。会话名、GUID 或运行前的无冲突检查本身均不能证明所有权;遇到已存在会话不得仅凭同名停止,需独立核实后按合同处理。不得将进程内私有会话的观察外推为系统会话可以用相同方式安全恢复。 + +### 无事件的具名系统会话尝试 + +自建脚本配置描述性名称、非内核默认 GUID、system logger 与有界内存缓冲;`EnableFlags=0`,不配置 provider、文件、PMC、LBR 或 QQ。当前未提升 token 调用 `StartTraceW` 返回 `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`(5),没有取得句柄,因此没有调用 query/stop。四个模拟后端测试覆盖权限拒绝、同名冲突、成功且持有句柄和成功但句柄为空;前两者不得停止任何会话。实际系统会话的启动成功、同名冲突、按句柄清理及崩溃残留均未验证;权限允许也不自动满足此前的会话所有权、隐私、采集及恢复门。[StartTraceW 错误与权限说明](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/evntrace/nf-evntrace-starttracew)及本机脚本/结果 hash 见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。 + +### 存活控制器的工作进程退出对照 + +自建控制进程持有真实无 provider 的 in-process private ETW 会话句柄,并启动不接触 ETW 的独立子进程。正常退出、非零退出和超时后终止三个样本中,控制进程在子进程启动前及结束后均成功查询,最终按自己取得的句柄停止会话。证据和脚本 hash 见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。这些样本仅验证控制器仍存活时的私有会话清理,不证明控制器自身崩溃、系统 logger 代次或外部恢复者的权限/所有权;也不验证工作进程的数据采集。 + +若真实系统控制器发生崩溃或启动回执丢失,会话是否存活及其归属均为 unknown;恢复者不得只凭名称、GUID、PID 或过期句柄停止。可审计方案仍需定义能够核验的会话身份与代次、受保护的交接证据、冲突和句柄复用的拒绝条件以及无法判定时的人为处置;以上私有对照不能满足这些条件。[ControlTraceW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/evntrace/nf-evntrace-controltracew) 另指出 stop 返回 `ERROR_MORE_DATA` 时停止可能已经发生,不能将非零结果一律视为仍在运行并盲目重试。 + +### 私有会话过期句柄的 ABA 对照 + +在本机同一自建进程中对无 provider、无文件的 private in-process 会话做 3 组各 12 次对照:A 正常停止后创建 B,B 分别使用相同名称/GUID、相同名称不同 GUID、不同名称及不同 GUID。三组中 B 均 12/12 取得与 A 相同的句柄数值,使用 A 的过期数值和 A 的查询参数执行只读 query 在 B 存在时均返回 0。第三组在 B 创建前额外查询过期数值,12/12 返回 4201;B 创建后又 12/12 返回 0。A、B 均为本进程自建,停止仅使用当次成功创建的当前句柄,从未用过期值 stop。 + +这在指定私有会话和本机 Windows 上直接展示句柄数值复用及过期值查询的 ABA:只验证数值相同或 query 成功不能证明当前对象仍是原代次,也不能证明查询时输入的旧 GUID 被用作代次校验。它不证明系统 logger 或跨进程句柄采用相同规则;对其恢复仍应保持 unknown,直到独立建立可核验的所有权与原子性。实验源码、按组结果和逐项只读核对 hash 见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。 + +后续仅以同一进程的私有会话核对 query 输出:A 停止后 B 使用不同名称及 GUID 时,旧句柄 query 输出的名称和 GUID 均为 B(12/12),可据此发现这一组替换;B 复用 A 的名称和 GUID 时,旧句柄 query 输出均与 A 的名称和 GUID 相同(12/12),无法凭这两个字段区分代次。两组句柄数值均复用,实际 stop 仅使用本次成功创建的当前句柄。此检查不比较所有返回字段,也不是 query 与 stop 之间的原子锁;样本不证明系统日志或跨进程行为。完整输出只读审计及负例见 [progress](../../progress.md#current-state)。 + +2026-11-16 补充:在同一自建进程的 20 次同名同 GUID 私有会话替换中,逐项比较 `EVENT_TRACE_PROPERTIES`、嵌套 `WNODE_HEADER` 的具名成员及返回名称共 25 项;A 的两次查询、B 的查询及用 A 旧值查询 B 的上述字段均相同,句柄数值均复用。只保存字段差异而非原始指针;停止仅使用当次创建的当前句柄。这些对照说明指定样本的已比较字段无法区分代次,不比较填充字节或 ETW 完整状态,也不证明系统 logger 无代次机制。查询与后续停止依旧不是已证的原子操作;系统会话恢复方案不能将匹配的字段快照提升为所有权证明。 diff --git a/feature_list.json b/feature_list.json index 2f579cc..fab2b25 100644 --- a/feature_list.json +++ b/feature_list.json @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ "description": "已有共享 codec 与接收实现/研究证据;完整身份/时间/方向及正式矩阵仍须逐条验收。", "plan_steps": ["N1"], "dependencies": ["feat-002"], - "status": "in-progress", - "evidence": "N1 shared codec/golden 已归档,后续 CPB 与事件上行有现场记录;raw hits、seq 命名与事件计数不能独自替代 T04/T05。2026-11-13 A1 D8 typed wrapper 普通文本经生产 decoder/resident/IPC 入 journal 并恢复,保留大整数 ID、原始元数据与秒时间,完整链和绑定/容量定向测试通过;OneBot projection 仍 None,没有新增 QQ 现场验收。参见 SnowCat 整合执行记录。", - "evidence_paths": ["crates/caligo-model/src/qq_wire/send.rs", "crates/caligo-model/tests/qq_wire_golden.rs", "crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_resident.rs", "docs/execution/2026-10-09-snowluma-parity/ledger.md"], + "status": "done", + "evidence": "N1 私聊/群 wire golden 通过;2026-11-15 固定 QQ 9.9.36-53644 的私聊、登记群与自发文本样本,原始 wrapper、journal 与账本逐条核对,群样本另有 SSE 和现场 HTTP get_msg,私聊在原现场 HTTP 中断后由新代次载入账本副本只读 HTTP 回验。私聊/群各两条同文不同 native ID 均保留;未知会话类型拒绝及后续消息不串会话由 wrapper LAB 覆盖。样本跨代次并使用 research 诊断,不代表其他构建、全部通知类型或长期运行通过;首次 10053 根因未定。详见 progress。", + "evidence_paths": ["crates/caligo-model/src/qq_wire/send.rs", "crates/caligo-model/tests/qq_wire_golden.rs", "crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_resident.rs", "docs/execution/2026-10-09-snowluma-parity/ledger.md", "progress.md"], "done_criteria": ["两种普通文本 wire 与黄金样本一致", "sender/peer/平台时间/native ID/正文可独立对应同条记录", "重复正文不误去重,未知类型不串会话"] }, { @@ -45,9 +45,25 @@ "plan_steps": ["N2"], "dependencies": ["feat-002"], "status": "in-progress", - "evidence": "N4-R1 离线实现将 AcceptedUnconfirmed 与强 ID 成功分离,request_id/started/outcome 与旧 Success(None) replay 已覆盖。2026-10-12 follow-up 将所有非零 native callback code 保守归为 DeliveryUnknown 并保留原始诊断;剩余 timeout 随 IPC v3 Dispatch 下发,bridge deadline 产出终态 unknown,同请求强身份迟到回执可在有界 grace 内更正。CPB→native identity 强关联仍 unsupported,QQ ABI/线程/释放和现场回程未验收,保持 in-progress。2026-10-15 R2 offline follow-up adds op 0/1/3/4, bounded diagnostic span and quarantine coverage, an isolated unreadable-pointer child test, and synchronous submit callback capture; the 9 consumer and 10 native-session tests pass. This does not close native ABI/thread/lifetime or reproduce the historical access violation. 2026-10-16 direct G3 probe review found that its context pointer was being rejected as a per-send cookie; the research delegate now uses generation plus atomic nonce, with 11 focused consumer tests and default/research offline validation passing. This does not establish live callback execution.", - "evidence_paths": ["crates/caligo-bridge/src/consumer_probe.rs", "crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_response.rs", "crates/caligo-core/src/runtime.rs", "docs/execution/2026-10-11-n4-response-recovery.md", "docs/execution/2026-10-09-snowluma-parity/ledger.md"], - "done_criteria": ["预登记先于 native 调用", "inline/重复/旧代次回调只终结一次", "拒绝码保留,接受与稳定身份成功区分", "超时/排空保持 unknown 且不自动重发"] + "evidence": "2026-11-17 同 resident 的 worker 独占,正常退出释放、unwind panic 隔离;线程并发及真实管道离线回归通过,跨 resident/进程与现场仍未验;2026-11-17 resident 满额由永久锁存改为可重试背压,正式/research 派发前先清理后缀;受控真实管道 ACK 恢复及假宿主单次调用通过,长期满额和现场仍未验;2026-11-17 正式/research 通知交接前保留 resident 副本,离线 worker 重建回放与去重通过;闸门满额锁存、自动恢复、跨宿主和现场仍未闭合;2026-11-17 业务 revision 4 对 worker 结果及 ACK 加必填序号并防止旧 unknown ACK 释放新成功槽;假宿主及命名管道验证通过,跨 worker 持久保留、现场与退出恢复仍未闭合;2026-11-17 假宿主确认迟到窗口到期不能释放未 ACK 的 unknown 结果槽;已修复到期接口容量合同,正式路径未发现该接口调用;2026-11-17 worker 结果 ACK 按请求、中间/终态类型及当前连接已发送项匹配;同类终态版本、worker 退出恢复和现场仍未闭合;2026-11-17 假宿主对照复现通道成功后接收前及 worker 内存 outbox 丢弃时未确认通知丢失;版本绑定 durable ACK 与退出恢复仍待实现;2026-11-17 owner 向 worker 通道明确发送失败时恢复未交出通知并锁存停止后续派发/确认;假宿主和命名管道 ACK 丢失回归通过,成功交接后崩溃及持久恢复仍未闭合;2026-11-17 未匹配事件增加会话绑定的结果表容量只读抽样,只写有界计数/标签,畸形为 unknown;处置、持久化及现场仍未验;2026-11-17 未匹配结果按对象与单调时钟做 250ms 至 2s 有界退避,新/更新结果继续可见;时钟不可用立即重试,未知积压、持久化及现场仍未闭合;2026-11-17 结果快照改为仅确认 resident 实际处理的键;未匹配及过期结果保留并受 128 条背压,伪造键/换键重放离线拒绝;持久化和现场未验;2026-11-17 正式绑定轮询与 owner 已接内存结果快照确认,合成 V8 返回丢失、确认重试及更新负例通过;不是 daemon 持久 ACK,现场、退出恢复与真实线程仍未验证;2026-11-16 生产轮询在清空前校验 batch 大小及 decoder 基础字段,畸形/超限合成场景保留状态并在纠正后回读;版本确认和持久化仍未闭合;2026-11-16 正式 owner 轮询使用同一捕获 session 在 JS 变更前检查并用于解码,空/不匹配绑定拒绝的合成回归通过;同名代次、V8/IPC 失败及确认协议仍未闭合;2026-11-16 resident 对 IdentityPending 重复空身份不再重复入队,后续强身份可完成;合成回归通过但结果确认协议尚未接线;2026-11-16 文本/图片/语音在结果表达 128 条时拒绝新提交,合成回归通过;确认协议未接线,批次拒收后丢终态仍未修复;2026-11-16 轮询确认离线模型覆盖代次、修订、重取和容量负例并纳入 CI;未接生产且依赖外部分配唯一代次,拒收后丢终态缺陷仍存在;2026-11-16 生产 JS 与 decoder 合成故障注入显示会话不匹配拒收后本批终态已清除;接收确认及持久化边界待设计,真实发生未证;2026-11-16 轮询 512 KiB 合成超限复现未返回终态被清除;现仅清理已序列化终态,过大单条保守 unknown 并覆盖延后,不能证明下游确认或真实 QQ 超限;2026-11-16 离线发现图片/语音非零 Promise 先于通知会误归明确 Failure;修复为两种通知顺序均 unknown,安全整数保留诊断,异常脱敏及成功对照通过;不保证不确定后迟到匹配;新构建图片与语音各一条正常发送、账本回读和对端数量内容确认通过;真实非零 Promise 仍未验。2026-11-16 现场 get_msg 两次 10053 的本机对照复现:Windows 非阻塞监听器的已接收连接可能在请求未到齐时提前失败;HTTP 入口改为阻塞读取并保留超时,延迟请求头/分段请求体离线回归通过;修复版在固定 QQ 新进程的零发送现场完成两种客户端延迟状态请求及复制账本回读;修复版另在新进程完成用户授权单次文本发送、紧随其后的 get_msg、账本及对端一条确认;另在新进程完成用户授权单次图片发送、紧随其后的 OneBot get_msg、账本指纹及对端一张确认;又在新进程完成用户授权单次语音发送、紧随其后的 OneBot get_msg、账本指纹及对端一条确认;两种媒体回读均为持久账本,历史现场根因仍未证。2026-11-16 语音路径在生产 listener 合成复现已退役 cookie 的旧通知误确认,现对本 JS 环境内语音路径认领的 cookie 保留有界历史并在耗尽时拒绝;新语音代码现场单次私聊发送 retcode 0、账本及用户单条播放确认通过,首次 get_msg 因 WinError 10053 中断、根因未知且未重发;后续新进程对原消息的复制账本执行一次 OneBot get_msg 回查通过,原失败保留;真实复用、其他环境或来源未覆盖。2026-11-16 图片路径在生产 listener 合成复现已退役 cookie 的旧通知误确认,现对本 JS 环境内图片路径认领的 cookie 保留有界历史并在耗尽时拒绝;新图片代码现场单次私聊发送和账本指纹通过,用户先确认图片可见及内容相符,随后明确补充只收到一张;首次 get_msg 因 10053 中断,后续新进程对原消息复制账本的一次 OneBot 只读回查通过,原失败保留;真实复用与其他来源历史仍未证明。2026-11-16 合成测试复现同 cookie/目标/正文的在途文本被单条回调以同一 native ID 双重确认;现对仍在途的重复 cookie 于 sendMsg 前拒绝,普通/research 定向与全仓通过;用户授权后修复版单次正常私聊现场发送、回读、账本及对端一条可见通过,未制造真实 cookie 冲突,随后 Node VM 合成复现移除后同 cookie 重放误确认;现对同一 JS 环境内本 guard 认领的文本 cookie 保留有界历史并在耗尽时拒绝,完成/超时/监听器重启等离线回归覆盖;新版本现场零发送接入、登录和停止通过;另有用户授权单次私聊的发送、回读及单请求账本技术审计通过,用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条、内容相符;真实 QQ 复用、其他来源及媒体历史仍未证明。 N4-R1 离线实现将 AcceptedUnconfirmed 与强 ID 成功分离,request_id/started/outcome 与旧 Success(None) replay 已覆盖。2026-10-12 follow-up 将所有非零 native callback code 保守归为 DeliveryUnknown 并保留原始诊断;剩余 timeout 随 IPC v3 Dispatch 下发,bridge deadline 产出终态 unknown,同请求强身份迟到回执可在有界 grace 内更正。CPB→native identity 强关联仍 unsupported,QQ ABI/线程/释放和现场回程未验收,保持 in-progress。2026-10-15 R2 offline follow-up adds op 0/1/3/4, bounded diagnostic span and quarantine coverage, an isolated unreadable-pointer child test, and synchronous submit callback capture; the 9 consumer and 10 native-session tests pass. This does not close native ABI/thread/lifetime or reproduce the historical access violation. 2026-10-16 direct G3 probe review found that its context pointer was being rejected as a per-send cookie; the research delegate now uses generation plus atomic nonce, with 11 focused consumer tests and default/research offline validation passing. This does not establish live callback execution. 2026-11-15 正式文本发送将抛异常、Promise 拒绝及畸形结果保守归 unknown,整数拒绝码保留;Windows 定向和 all 通过。固定构建单次发送返回成功和持久 ID,账本身份匹配,但现场 HTTP get_msg 因 10053 中断,对端确认一条,新代次现场 HTTP 只读回查通过,原 10053 根因未知;现场回程及 ABI/线程/寿命未闭合,详见 progress。 同日 research 诊断在固定构建单次现场记录调用前登记、submit、匹配 add/update、Promise 受理、精确回读与终结,HTTP 回读和对端单条可见通过;轮询线程不等于 callback OS 线程。移除异常误报已离线复现并修复。ConfirmedFailure 原因作为可选字段持久化并兼容旧账本。两次指定禁言群单次样本均为 unknown 且不重发;第二次 Promise 整数 120 已保留审计,并以实际 AccountActor 恢复验证不重派,不能推断为明确业务拒绝。后续离线修复非零 Promise 先于 add 时的过早拒绝,统一保留整数并返回 unknown;该顺序回归先失败后通过。Windows 串行 all 通过;2026-11-15 用户决定不再以真实业务拒绝语义作为验收门、不再核验该语义,保留已知缺口和 unknown;固定 9.9.36 的 Promise callback 同线程/异线程分派、停机消费分支和消息 listener 条件移除路径已有静态证据;两个旧 QQ 进程已退出,第三个同代次仍映射 bridge。后续固定映像静态验证候选登记节点删除与引用快照分支,消息 listener 停止后的迟到状态写入已离线修复,媒体迟到清理保留;新修复版已在 9.9.36 新进程完成零发送的单次接入、登记账号核验和正常停止;未触发停止后迟到回调。正式 callback OS 线程、注销与全局 drain、最终释放和 G3 consumer 合同仍待验。2026-11-15 后续离线续验恢复 WSL GitNexus 索引,research 定向 17 项、default/research 全仓及隔离 research release 通过;未提交停止探针仅合成调用,未观察真实迟到回调;额外 VM 六个边界场景通过,指定 stopped 守卫内存变异被检测到;双请求 VM 证明共享阶段标签不能区分不同完成顺序,11 请求复现上限无标记丢失;research 逐请求临时序号和溢出诊断已离线实现;固定构建新进程零发送接入/登录/合成停止探针通过;另一新进程的单次授权私聊、回读、账本和对端单条可见通过,两批诊断同一代次和临时序号,原 runner 解析误判由独立审计纠正;新增只读白名单解析器保留范围和完整性 unknown;固定构建另有用户授权单次群聊的发送、回读、账本、对端可见和同序号阶段样本;固定 hash 静态续核将 sendMsg 命名 thunk 构造的 callback 引用对有条件连接至候选发送 lambda 与分派器;同 hash 的 sendMsg 属性表及 N-API 类定义路径也已静态核对;新测试进程以只读内存核验了映像描述项的名称和重定位指针,错误目标负例被拒绝,未接入或发送;另为无插桩采样候选构建双线程同回调对照,核对两条不同间接调用和线程真值,自建对照进一步独立核验进程创建时间并记录线程 QPC 区间,解析器正反测试通过;会话生命周期纯状态模型及冲突、未知所有权和清理失败负例通过,该模型无系统后端;当前 token 下自建无 provider 进程内私有 ETW 会话的启动、同名碰撞与按句柄停止隔离通过,不代表系统日志或崩溃清理通过;未提升 token 的空具名系统会话启动返回访问拒绝 5,没有 query 或 stop;控制器存活时自建子进程正常、失败及超时终止后,真实私有会话的句柄查询和停止通过,控制器崩溃及系统会话恢复未验证;本机私有会话对照发现旧句柄数值在不同名称/GUID 新会话中复用且旧值查询成功,不可据此确认原代次;query 返回名称/GUID 可识别不同字段的替换,但同名同 GUID 的新会话两字段仍相同,无法据此证明代次或 query/stop 原子性;2026-11-16 私有会话 20 次替换中查询结构具名成员及名称共 25 项均一致;系统会话身份与恢复仍未验证;LBR 可用性、TID 归属与请求关联尚未验证;运行时接收者/类注册、并发现场、实际 callback 线程和释放仍未验证,现场线程与释放仍未证。", + "evidence_paths": [ + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_forward.rs", + "crates/caligo-core/tests/daemon_client_lab.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/qq_entry_lab.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_pressure.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_backoff.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_selective.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_selective.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_receipt.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_admission.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_bound_poll.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/resident_result_retry.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_result_capacity.rs", + "scripts/poll-result-ack-model.mjs", + "scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_v8.rs", + "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_poll_budget.rs","crates/caligo-bridge/src/consumer_probe.rs", "crates/caligo-bridge/src/native_response.rs", "crates/caligo-core/src/runtime.rs", "docs/execution/2026-10-11-n4-response-recovery.md", "docs/execution/2026-10-09-snowluma-parity/ledger.md", "crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_voice_send.js", "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_voice_cookie.rs", "crates/caligo-core/src/onebot_http.rs", "crates/caligo-core/tests/onebot_http_delayed.rs", "crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_image_send.js", "crates/caligo-bridge/tests/wrapper_media_result.rs"], + "done_criteria": ["预登记先于 native 调用", "inline/重复/旧代次回调只终结一次", "连接账号后按目标发起发送,不以拒绝语义作为准入;受理与稳定身份成功区分,未确认结果保留 unknown", "超时/排空保持 unknown 且不自动重发"] }, { "id": "feat-005", diff --git a/progress.md b/progress.md index 748796e..8202116 100644 --- a/progress.md +++ b/progress.md @@ -2,6 +2,390 @@ ## Current State +2026-11-17 feat-004 resident 单 worker 与异常隔离(起点 `5139445`):`run_worker` 在快照、计数发布和连接之前,为同一个 resident 原子获取独占 lease;第二个 worker 返回 `WorkerAlreadyRunning`,不连接或发送。正常退出时先完成内部会话和通道接收端的释放,再释放 lease,允许在同一 resident 上重新启动;线程 panic 展开时将该 resident 代次永久标为 `WorkerQuarantined`,后续 worker 不连接,等待独立恢复方案。正式入口对 lease 拒绝写固定诊断,research 入口按独立退出原因报告失败;不改变 QQ 原生回调寿命或自动重启。 + +自建 16 线程屏障对照只允许一个 lease、正常释放后可再取得;真实 Windows 命名管道测试覆盖在首 worker 已接入时拒绝第二 worker、首 worker 健康及停止后释放,另在实际 worker 会话退出路径注入 panic,验证后续同 resident worker 隔离且零连接。同一 resident 的正常退出后通知重建回归继续通过。panic 隔离依赖 Rust unwind;abort、进程死亡、持有者内存破坏、不同 resident、QQ callback quiescence 和跨宿主恢复不在该门的证明范围。若误将原 worker 通道接收端交给被拒绝的另一调用,该接收端仍会在拒绝返回时被丢弃;调用方须保证通道所有权。 + +旧无排他真实管道负例 `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-red.log` SHA-256 `1548C68471C060C3303533613663C0DE5B4E405F88F5AF91F8030F0CD418E4BB`;16 线程与 unwind 隔离日志 `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-concurrency.log` / `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-panic.log` SHA-256 `08A75AD678F094A72BF662714C4F0E6A669437F94A8A3C7BDA9F291B1D93203F` / `4851E5A23042962BACB792D41FB04E6F0FAEDAF5AF23AE60D4CF15CEC921EA4D`;真实管道组合回归 `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-pipe-final2.log` SHA-256 `BDADE7709660EB2C9A5B52A4416E179B39E74DA610F93A540C19B0F71D98121C`。首次组合及 all 因测试误将 daemon 初始 epoch=1 视为已连接,过早停止 worker,随后串行测试互斥锁中毒;原失败日志 `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-pipe-final.log` / `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-all.log` SHA-256 `F90BBBBA575477D985D17320BFE223F748E8C788B5A8E6C060003180A60939CB` / `6E7541FEFBFAE0F790392D2AC783953D9C3924E302448A1EDDC57F8818431962`,修正为等待当次 epoch 前进后重跑。最终 Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 普通与 research 全仓通过,包含两个真实管道排他/异常用例及重建回归;日志 `target-harness/feat004-exclusive-final-all.log` SHA-256 `B22F515685B76FD597CC963A7E551B645A5E17A94D8BC0F60B352934DB6179E0`。最终 8 文件变更图 HIGH。 + +通道更换/自动 worker 重启、panic 代次人工恢复、宿主退出持久化、NativeStarted ACK 版本、长时间满额与 QQ 现场仍未闭合;不能把单 resident lease 推断为进程或账号级排他。当前只读观察到测试 QQ 根 PID `38060`(创建 `2026-11-16T10:53:51.6672356Z`)仍映射 `caligo_bridge.dll`;这是当次快照,后续现场须正常重启、登录并重新核验代次与准入,不重接此进程、不重发 unknown。GitNexus 对 `run_worker`/research 入口为 LOW、resident/退出枚举/QQ 入口 UNKNOWN,结合源码核对,不将缺边视为零影响。本轮未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 resident 满额背压恢复(起点 `31b79ef`):通知交接现在区分 `Full`、`ChannelClosed` 和 `SequenceExhausted`。满额为可重试状态,不永久锁存;正式 QQ owner 与 research native pump 每次派发前先尝试交接已有后缀,仍满时暂停派发、查询 drain 与后续 JS 快照确认,daemon ACK 释放容量后按原 FIFO 和既有序号继续。交接恰好填满保留集合时也返回 `Full`,该 tick 不继续派发或轮询;容量满且无后缀时预检仍暂停。通道明确拒收与序号耗尽仍永久锁存并保留通知;通道关闭只有发送尝试时可检测。 + +假宿主红灯复现旧实现满额永久锁存;修复后覆盖逐项 ACK、FIFO、容量填满时派发暂停、满额期间通道关闭、序号耗尽与重复硬停。Windows 命名管道测试使用自建 daemon、实际 worker 和暂存/转发通道控制时序:2 项容量满后,真实 daemon ACK 释放空间,unknown 与 success 后缀继续交接、账本得到强身份,假宿主发送仅一次。暂存转发是受控测试夹具,非 QQ 现场;没有独立运行 V8 来证明 JS ACK 在真实宿主的时序。 + +红灯 `target-harness/feat004-backpressure-red.log` SHA-256 `EF7B8F4665603CEAAAD171B0DB51341B097C72D9D45E2A6C5E4E1C513DA1A430`;最终 resident 生命周期/交接回归、序号耗尽、真实管道背压回归日志 `target-harness/feat004-backpressure-final-tests.log` / `target-harness/feat004-backpressure-final-exhaustion.log` / `target-harness/feat004-backpressure-final-pipe.log` SHA-256 `34B1DAC48BE058D91DA76EE560257F77EE4111648DC7B44C8384037D4BCA4A1D` / `EFEEF87ED8C137A47D72EDBF05EF2ADBE41E8AAE354183FEC25B9C4A7EDA6880` / `A6267B343ADDF9633F53950C4A6E820A25B8DCA6F6CE7DC428D6CA12127D1752`。开发中最初 all 在收紧满额当拍暂停前启动,不能作为最终版本验证;最终 Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 的普通与 research 全仓测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-backpressure-final-all.log` SHA-256 `98B6468108DADC73A49F7A6A3B5D7A834206EE11CF16CD35FF9ECDE5A48BEDF0`;最终 9 文件变更图 HIGH。 + +在长期满额下,查询和 research 回调 drain 会暂停;其队列上限、持续运行与宿主行为未完成验证。通道关闭后的替换、自动 worker 重启/并发排他、进程退出持久化、NativeStarted ACK 版本、最终 drain 和 QQ 现场仍未闭合;unknown 不重发。GitNexus 对 `forward_retained`/`is_closed` 为 LOW、正式 owner/闸门调用为 UNKNOWN,结合源码核对两条泵路径;最终图不得替代真实运行验收。本轮未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 resident 内通知保留与 worker 重建(起点 `2fe9a6e`):正式 QQ owner 与 research native pump 在向 worker 通道交接前,将通知与单调非零序号保存在 resident;worker 启动时从同一 resident 的保留集合重建 outbox,通道中的重复或已确认副本不再重复加入。daemon ACK 与已发送项匹配后,在同一 resident 锁中删除精确副本并更新容量;unknown 的旧 ACK 不释放后续强身份结果的槽。序号现在属于 resident 生命周期,跨其 worker 重建保持,但不跨宿主/新 resident 持久化;业务协议仍为 revision 4。 + +保留集合最多 `min(results_max, 256)` 项,满额、序号耗尽或通道拒收时交接失败并锁存闸门,暂停后续 owner 派发及 JS 快照确认;已保留项和未交出的 `results_out` 后缀留在 resident 内,不声称总内存字节或所有入口均已有完整上限证明。闸门锁存后不会自动恢复:被拒项之后尚在 `results_out` 的后缀不会自动进入重建 worker,须后续设计安全恢复;当前生产入口没有自动重启 worker,人工重建仅为离线测试,且必须先确认旧 worker 已停止,尚未建立并发 worker 排他门。owner 显式 stop、进程退出、daemon 重启的连接代次、NativeStarted ACK 的版本身份、接收事件及 QQ 原生线程/drain 均未闭合;resident 不是磁盘持久化。容量锁存可能造成持续停派,不能描述为自动恢复或生产验收。 + +假宿主回归覆盖通道接受后接收前/接收后丢失、按顺序和序号保留、伪造/重复 ACK、unknown 与新 success 容量隔离、满额保留后缀及锁存;真实 Windows 命名管道对照先停止旧 worker,模拟旧通道接受后丢失,再以同一 resident 新建 worker,从副本回放、账本确认并删除副本,通道重复提示只发送一次结果,假宿主调用一次。测试不证明真实 QQ 曾发生故障或跨宿主恢复。定向日志 `target-harness/feat004-retained-unit-final2.log` / `target-harness/feat004-retained-rebuild-final.log` SHA-256 `30F0210479AB9B2A22E88584307C48CCA25CD5C876C6E680B8D2D676BF11B507` / `C26FC91C8074B81ADC27086F786D85B447B78D1734DD147BEC26B8CE6E476BBB`;resident 序号耗尽不回绕、后缀不出队在普通与 research 定向通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-retained-sequence.log` / `target-harness/feat004-retained-sequence-research.log` SHA-256 `8A53C4BDB154021F5DB6EF1FA76732CF68A262FD4F443E1564795BD1ECBDA6A1` / `912242047025AFCB6D06C9FDB5A10A91EFDBCD6FCAA8EC2688CA2E93BF1D047D`。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 普通及 research 全仓通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-retained-all.log` SHA-256 `B1D586D7B4991CB8FBAE771834475A85CACA90298D1F286583B18299C7F70ADE`;序号耗尽测试在全仓运行启动后新增并另行在两种构建通过;伪造内容负例随后加入并重跑相关定向集。 + +勘误:上一段 `a153464` 记录称未发现到期接口正式调用,但当时搜索范围遗漏 `native_resident.rs`;research native pump 的 `native_resident_run` 确实调用 `expire_late_receipts`,QQ owner 路径未发现该调用。原记录保留,本次修正不证明实际现场触发。GitNexus 基于 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 起点 `2fe9a6e`:`take_acked_result` CRITICAL,`session_loop` 与通知接收 HIGH,多个 resident/owner 符号 UNKNOWN;结合源码核对正式与 research 路径。最终变更图 HIGH,覆盖改动与新增测试;文档检查通过。未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 结果 ACK 序号(起点 `a153464`):worker 接收 owner 通知时分配本 worker 生存期内单调非零 `notice_id`,保存在跨连接 outbox;结果消息携带该序号,daemon 应用结果后在 ACK 中回显,worker 须同时匹配请求、类型、当前连接已发送状态及序号才移除。图片/语音提交前立即拒绝的结果使用保留值 0,不属于 worker outbox;普通结果不会匹配 0。序号用尽时不回绕、不再从通道取下一项;测试覆盖该边界。业务协议 revision 从 3 升至 4,握手验证拒绝不匹配,两端必须使用匹配构建;v3 wire 的结果及 ACK 字段必填,旧无序号消息不能静默解码。 + +旧 unknown ACK 即便命中自身通知,也不能释放已到达的强身份 success 的槽;正式 worker 对 unknown 调用独立 resident ACK 路径,只有 resident 仍处于 unknown 状态才允许更新其确认或释放槽。合成对照分别复现旧同类终态 ACK 移除新 success、旧 unknown ACK 释放 success 槽,修复后通过。受控真实命名管道测试验证 daemon 对指定序号 42 的回显,以及写账后 ACK 丢失时的结果重放与假宿主不重发;不证明真实 QQ 曾发生这些故障。 + +此序号只在同一 worker 生存期唯一,重连保留但 worker 重建可重置,尚非跨 worker/宿主持久身份;NativeStarted ACK 尚无序号;通道与 worker outbox 的正文仍可能随 worker 退出丢失。序号耗尽仅停止取通道,不提供人工恢复或完整上游背压证明;daemon 重启后连接代次唯一性、真实 QQ、最终 drain 和持久恢复均未验。必须继续实现 resident 有界持有、worker 重建身份及恢复合同,不得以此次 ACK 匹配宣称端到端持久确认;unknown 不自动重发。 + +同类旧 ACK 与错误槽位释放红灯分别为 `target-harness/feat004-version-red.log`、`target-harness/feat004-version-slot-red.log`,SHA-256 `785420931AB884FCA2FD2A6679280164965028D7CAD49BDA648140D5600AA0B9` / `9BDAB34F8DB08DE3BE8D15BA4552D003D5E0579C2E6396CFD15A109E1FDE37C3`;对应修复后日志 `target-harness/feat004-version-green-final.log` / `target-harness/feat004-version-slot-green.log` SHA-256 `74BFC5A1294C3656DE45C9707528E90E43D1AF66AB9F38C776CFE3AA429A621B` / `5D971CF504125A8375E1BE3BDE08C713E1FFA49C0EBCB2B9EF55F88278C0DD63`。协议缺字段/序列化、耗尽、命名管道回显/ACK 丢失日志 SHA-256 依次为 `3CC60069FDC1226A741D9A201352C826C142284A25DF1E4F0D990E9832005159` / `381085478E5769C7BC8F6BCC706A1F75E88C84945F57721258A50CA6B3F98FD5` / `63F0F0C6467DA16FDD1BBAB9175D73B752D7FC2DA017EB70D66A471E8AB9754C` / `D250EA1BC6CD7CBD2F3F7F9F97626A2D9F8239DAD359D72DAF768AF6C8E56607`,日志依次为 `target-harness/feat004-version-wire.log`、`target-harness/feat004-version-exhaustion.log`、`target-harness/feat004-version-echo.log`、`target-harness/feat004-version-pipe.log`。 + +GitNexus 基于 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 起点 `a153464`:`PendingNotice` 上游 CRITICAL,`session_loop`、`notice_message`、`take_acked_result` 上游 HIGH,IPC 枚举与 daemon 入口 UNKNOWN;按源码补核 v3 类型、worker/daemon 与握手调用,不将图缺边视为零影响。最终 11 文件变更图 HIGH;Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 普通及 research 全仓通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-version-all.log` SHA-256 `2B797CEB73BC301BF31F7ABFD3061E4FD381543ABD59BE6F88260CAD33E390EC`。随后仅调整测试夹具使用不同序号并重跑 ACK 定向测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-version-ack-final.log` SHA-256 `FF61D2B2DC748CD0FA750C2B395D3425BEC3435E6D26011FB8C7D0B07340635A`;文档检查通过。未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 unknown 迟到窗口的容量合同(起点 `b10cf2f`):`expire_late_receipts` 曾在迟到强身份窗口结束时无条件释放结果槽,即使对应 unknown 尚未得到 ACK;容量为 2 的假宿主对照因此在结果未确认时接受新请求。现记录窗口内收到的 unknown ACK,仅当窗口结束且 ACK 已到达才由到期接口释放;若先到期则保留槽,随后 ACK 才释放。到期后仍拒绝迟到强身份,重复到期/ACK 不重复释放;已有 ACK 先于到期回归继续通过。 + +此接口的源码调用搜索仅发现测试,未发现正式路径主动调用,因此本轮是对 resident 容量合同的离线修复,不声称现场触发过该问题或生产路径已获得定时清理。此修改不保留 worker/通道丢失的结果正文,也不解决同类终态旧 ACK 混淆、版本化持久确认、宿主退出或 QQ 现场验收。下一步仍须处理有界副本和精确版本确认,unknown 不重发。 + +假宿主红灯日志 `target-harness/feat004-expiry-red.log` SHA-256 `8AF7FC0C27C917E7E04DDE03C48F9392E43AD3F0DC939ECC0F34FB7E8B9BD6AA`;修复后 resident 生命周期、通道交接与逐项确认共 30 项定向测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-expiry-green-final.log` SHA-256 `28978B981B0DC1442BA5DF09FCBA04B5D74F57314B471CF586250C87AF19C94C`。GitNexus 基于 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 起点 `b10cf2f`:`ack_result_notice` 上游 HIGH、到期接口与 submit 为 UNKNOWN;索引存在过程截断,源码补核正式 worker ACK 调用及到期接口调用方,不将空图视作零影响。最终 5 文件变更图 MEDIUM(不抵消 ACK 上游 HIGH);Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 的普通及 research 全仓测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-expiry-all.log` SHA-256 `5C4E482A1B224312D33347F282905477C8D679BB7E1631C4B05378662829F786`;文档检查通过。未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 worker 结果 ACK 类型防护(起点 `c784de2`):先前 `SendResultAck` 仅按 request_id 移除 worker outbox 中的首个结果,并先无条件调用 resident 槽位 ACK。现仅当同请求结果的中间/终态类型与 ACK 的 `terminal` 一致、且该项已在当前连接代次发送时移除,随后才通知 resident 释放对应槽位;不匹配 ACK 保留 outbox 和槽位。daemon 对 `AcceptedUnconfirmed` 返回非终态,其他结果返回终态;协议未变。合成旧匹配逻辑在旧类型 ACK 和同请求两类结果时错误移除,两个定向负例先失败后通过,并覆盖未发送、旧代次与重复确认;不证明真实 daemon 曾发送重复或错误 ACK。 + +此防护并不解决同请求两个同类终态(例如 unknown 后迟到 success)的旧 ACK 混淆:wire 没有版本号;也不保留 worker 退出后 outbox 或通道内正文,不提供持久确认、worker 重建、宿主退出恢复或 QQ 现场验收。真实 ACK 顺序、会话代次的跨 daemon 重启唯一性仍需独立验证。下步继续设计有界 resident 副本与版本绑定 ACK,结果未知不重发。 + +定向红灯 `target-harness/feat004-ack-kind-red.log` SHA-256 `897F5B66303B6B839831CBA97D4D595C3073E8ADC0BC1A702A4D4C58087B5301`;修复后 `target-harness/feat004-ack-kind-green.log` SHA-256 `2EF0FEE863A5BE9384ED30A28E1ABB1E883D01DAEE9C1CE702F353FCA888AA54`。GitNexus 在工作树 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004`、起点 `c784de2` 将 `session_loop` 上游判为 HIGH,直接影响 `run_worker` 并涉及原生 resident 入口;最终 4 文件变更图 MEDIUM(不抵消上述 HIGH 上游影响);Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 普通和 research 均通过,含正式 worker/命名管道离线回归,日志 `target-harness/feat004-ack-kind-all.log` SHA-256 `AD566B5BFF89E92E9EFC89EFA7C99569F150C5A4774E865F1A62D6FCF7BA735C`。文档检查通过。本轮未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 worker 退出丢失边界离线对照(起点 `0e63770`):实际 `ResultHandoffGate` 与 resident、假宿主的合成测试分别模拟 (1) 通道 `send` 成功后接收端在读取前退出,(2) worker 读入 outbox 后、daemon durable ACK 前丢弃 outbox;两例均观察到 resident 队列已无未确认的 NativeStarted 和 Success 通知。实验不启动真实 worker/daemon,不证明真实 QQ 曾发生该故障;4 项既有通道回归作为对照也通过。当前 worker outbox 跨连接但不跨 worker 生存期,resident 槽位掩码只保留容量而非通知正文;JS 快照确认仍可能早于 daemon 持久确认。该缺口尚未修复,不得重发原生请求。 + +下一实现需先建立 resident 持有的、身份及修订明确且有界的通知副本,直到对应 daemon durable ACK;交接和重连只重放通知,NativeStarted 必须先于该请求结果。当前结果 ACK 仅带 request_id 与 terminal 标志,worker 以 request_id 找到首个结果即删除;中间态、unknown 和迟到强身份可能共存时,必须设计版本/内容绑定与旧 ACK、重复 ACK 的拒绝或幂等规则,不能简单按请求号清除新结果。应覆盖接收前和接收后 worker 退出、重建、daemon 落账后 ACK 丢失、同请求多个版本的旧 ACK、容量耗尽和停止/宿主退出;跨进程或宿主退出的恢复另需独立持久介质和合同,不能由内存副本推断。本轮没有修改生产行为或 IPC 协议。 + +离线复验源码 `target-harness/feat004-worker-loss-lab.rs` SHA-256 `7C1FB01AD2DD04BAAE9A608F2A4BB36B71ED538A9378E51538844648185D4183`,日志 `target-harness/feat004-worker-loss-lab.log` SHA-256 `348E161F6695C407D95C91F38687D90499170AFA1F25FF659045AC4C364ACE6F`。将源码临时复制为 `crates/caligo-bridge/tests/feat004_worker_loss_lab.rs` 后运行 `cargo test -p caligo-bridge --test feat004_worker_loss_lab --locked --offline --target-dir target-harness`,6/6 通过,完成后删除临时副本;其中两项通过表示已重现丢失,不是修复通过。未接 QQ、未发送;feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 owner 通知通道断开防丢(起点 `f9be5af`):正式 owner 原先 `take_results` 后忽略 `mpsc::send` 的失败;合成关闭接收端时,已从 resident 队列移走但未交出的 NativeStarted/终态均丢失,且后续可能确认 JS 快照。现按顺序转交,发送失败时把失败项和未发送后缀恢复到 resident 队首,并锁存不可恢复的接收端关闭状态;后续 owner tick 在 dispatch、查询 drain、JS 轮询和快照确认前停止,记录固定标签 `result_notice_channel:closed_retained`。显式 stop 分支仍可执行;保留不等于支持重连或持久恢复。 + +保护仅覆盖 `send` 明确返回失败的项:发送成功后 worker 退出但尚未接收/持久化的窗口仍存在;首次发现断开之前该轮 `r.drain` 可能已经派发请求,不能证明 worker 一断开就没有原生发送。关闭/进程退出后的通知与 JS 状态、最终 drain 和真实 QQ 回调均未验证;未确认请求不自动重发。 + +修复前实际旧交接方式在关闭通道后丢失两条通知,红灯 `target-harness/feat004-outbox-red.log` SHA-256 `905CECDB6C39278A9F4834B8E6A9408ED6732A09A39D6F89FDD0D0AB6B0C2275`。修复后覆盖断开保留、部分成功与并发新增的 FIFO 顺序、正常一次交接和断开后锁存,并与 resident/receipt 定向测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-outbox-green-final2.log` SHA-256 `7D15558B13D65E47BF69AAB91524A22439BF5996C3600240D55C08902F486D89`。既有真实命名管道的离线故障测试改用正式交接闸门:daemon 已写账但 ACK 丢失时 worker 重放通知且假宿主发送次数不增加,日志 `target-harness/feat004-outbox-pipe.log` SHA-256 `71B86F8CB2FE3655F26F6B8BCD28796D37EB7AC77966CF60D059BA92B217676D`;这不是 QQ 原生现场证据。GitNexus 对 owner、`take_results` 和该链测试的上游均为 UNKNOWN,已结合源码核对,不把空图视为零影响。最终变更图 MEDIUM,涉及通知交接与取队列路径。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research,均含 4 项交接回归和命名管道对照),日志 `target-harness/feat004-outbox-all.log` SHA-256 `64F0EE8713BF0CD55CDD77269B153AF393EF29471B236506B308EEE30345CF4C`;文档检查通过。本轮未接 QQ、未发送;feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 结果表容量只读抽样(起点 `bb26384`):owner 遇到未匹配终态时沿用进程内共享计数的首项及每 20 次观察的采样频率(不保证各会话均被采样),在保存待确认 receipt 后,执行会话绑定的只读 JS 统计并写入 `--report` JSONL 的 `poll_result_pressure` 阶段。详情仅重建固定字段:结果表可枚举自有键数 `entries`(最多显示 128)、`capacity=128`、`saturated`、`over_capacity` 和当前 `delayed`;超过 128 时 `entries=128` 表示下界、`over_capacity=true`,`delayed=null` 表示未知。时钟不可用、退避结构异常或样本失效时不会伪造零;采样失败或无法验证输出时阶段记录 `unknown`。 + +`entries` 包含 pending、已受理和未匹配等全部结果表项,不等于未匹配数量;低于上限不证明其他在途容量或 QQ 可发送。`ok=true` 只表示样本通过字段校验,不是系统健康或交付成功;采样是该时刻的快照,不是全程计数,也只在未匹配观察时触发。阶段报告仍属于本机敏感运行证据,不能据此自动删除、重发或卸载;结果积压的有界处置、daemon 持久化、退出恢复及 QQ 现场仍未验证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +生产生成 JS 与 Rust 白名单校验的离线测试覆盖只读、绑定不匹配、3/128/超限、时钟不可用和畸形结构、极值/类型负例及去除额外敏感字段,连同退避/receipt 共 16 项定向回归通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-pressure-tests-final4.log` SHA-256 `50C95A5018AC4C0E5AAFE6A46F2C21ED9FE9B9416C9B4F01EA5F71D81693A926`。 另以假 V8 ABI 验证采样调用、白名单输出、无效结果及错误 current 拒绝,与原入口测试合计 10 项通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-pressure-v8-lab.log` SHA-256 `0F25A33B149D0B8388FF1A693854761CD34F493B1EA35DA23FCA8866CA28C5C6`;假 ABI 不证明真实宿主执行。首次夹具的模拟 `process` 遮蔽 stdout 导致失败,保留 `target-harness/feat004-pressure-tests.log` SHA-256 `118C08F88C945DDF19122FD9C1D9DBD96745C5674FD80728826EE548C745A482`,修复后重跑。GitNexus 对 owner 入口为 UNKNOWN,公共阶段日志入口 CRITICAL 但本轮未修改;按源码核对调用与报告写入。最终变更图首次因 LadybugDB 暂时不可用未完成,保留 `target-harness/feat004-pressure-final2-detect.json`;重试成功覆盖 7 文件、LOW,动态边仍依赖源码补证。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research,均含新增假 V8 与抽样测试),日志 `target-harness/feat004-pressure-all-final.log` SHA-256 `5F38F31382F3C5D1E53E49896362C9565A6C0F185C53199AB0341BCB63FCB64F`;文档检查通过。该采样增加一次间歇 V8 调用,重入、QQ 实际时钟/性能及现场隐私仍须独立验证;未接 QQ、未发送。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 未匹配结果有界退避(起点 `2c05f57`):正式绑定轮询仅对逐项确认后仍未匹配且对象未变的终态设置退避,使用 Node 单调时钟逐次等待 250/500/1000/2000 ms,之后上限 2 秒;退避只影响同一结果对象的再次展示,不删除结果、不重发 QQ 请求。新键和同键新对象立即可见,其他接收事件继续轮询;单次 receipt 的重复确认不会延长计时。旧无绑定兼容路径保持原行为。 + +正常脚本维护的退避表最多 128 项,失效对象在后续轮询清理;合成超出容量的条目不被隐藏或删除。单调时钟不可用或返回无效值时清除退避并立即重试,时钟回退和畸形退避记录也不隐藏结果,因此该异常下退避效果不保证;实际 QQ 的时钟支持、性能和长期运行未验证。此措施不解决未匹配结果积累、128 条背压、人工处置、daemon 持久确认、V8 接收事件丢失或退出恢复,feat-004 in-progress。 + +生产 JS 合成对照在旧版重复展示未匹配结果时失败,红灯 `target-harness/feat004-backoff-red.log` SHA-256 `B8815AFC2F48E40B963CD9815AC3EE5DBC5D4BA6A95F6EB9CE2352B1C627EC2E`。修复后的 7 项退避回归覆盖递增及上限、重复 ACK、新/更新结果、时钟不可用及回退、容量和畸形记录、超大结果分批;相关 wrapper 定向回归通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-backoff-wrapper-final.log` SHA-256 `AF947A819A3AA885CD794C2DB1DAD9B195A316FEAE05A8985DC35953ED4EF712`。GitNexus 在 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 起点 `2c05f57` 对动态 `D8_POLL_JS` 为 UNKNOWN、确认脚本 builder 上游 LOW,实际 JS、owner 和测试调用经源码补核;不把空图视为零影响。最终变更图 LOW,动态 JS 仍须以源码及回归补证。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research,各含 7 项退避回归),日志 `target-harness/feat004-backoff-all.log` SHA-256 `027B6A11CFBADC42B35E0EF45FE0F9EE82AAC00452E282A38B0E6CCDDA3DEC13`;文档检查通过。未接 QQ、未发送;合成时钟不证明现场效果。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 快照逐项确认(起点 `401b42c`):原快照 ACK 会清除同批全部终态,即使 `Resident::complete_sends` 没有匹配该请求;JS 合成对照复现匹配条目与孤立条目同时被删除。现由 resident 返回实际推进状态或已接受的等价空身份中间结果的键,owner 将这组键与 receipt 一起重试;JS 在任何删除前校验所有键均属于快照,逐项按原对象身份删除。键列表最多 128、序列化有界且不接受重复键;同一 receipt 的重复确认必须带相同键列表,否则拒绝。未知请求、状态已终结及过期的迟到结果保持在 JS 结果表内,正常 128 条容量保护可能因此阻止新发送;同一未知批次可反复轮询与空确认,当前无额外退避,性能和人工处置尚未验证。 + +`IdentityPending` 的重复空身份与此前已接受的中间结果等价,可确认但不再生成通知;`DeliveryUnknown` 的重复未知及终结态重复结果没有保存可核对的结果指纹,保守不确认,即使内容可能相同。结果表项原地变更、daemon 持久确认、QQ 现场及退出恢复仍未验证;此内存确认不代表持久化或对端接收。 + +旧全批确认红灯 `target-harness/feat004-selective-red.log` SHA-256 `9584D800A7085A1AB060B01CDE7B8EB19AEE5BE5EA5B2D0ACA1D49A606B69BA6`;修复后真实 JS/decoder/resident 串联、同批孤立项、伪造键无部分删除、同 receipt 换键拒绝、空确认、三种终态、重复中间态、迟到过期和既有生命周期共 33 项定向回归通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-selective-green-final2.log` SHA-256 `C60827F897AD667408FBB0C0EF4A14E7DCEE9D068E2F29C3855DF13F10EB19E4`。确认键边界追加定向测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-selective-key-bounds.log` SHA-256 `353C8DF11427B77A0708C2B5FDED3FF3B339078347D90CFD78B960D17605EA5E`。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research),日志 `target-harness/feat004-selective-all.log` SHA-256 `58CF6F9EBF5CC6890DAB4DDC5E04BED3BF1A485C94A6E33ED7BFDBFCB9744151`;文档检查通过。合成对照不证明真实 QQ 曾出现孤立结果。GitNexus 基于 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 起点 `401b42c`:builder 和确认重试上游 LOW,`complete_sends`、V8 入口与 owner 为 UNKNOWN,调用方经源码补核;不将空图视为无影响。最终变更图 MEDIUM,涉及确认脚本进入 V8 的三条路径。本轮未接 QQ、未发送;feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 发送结果快照确认接线(起点 `76e2966`):正式绑定轮询现在保留已序列化的 `done`/`unknown`/`rejected` 结果,附加 listener 内 128 位随机代次和安全整数序号;owner 完成 batch 解码并调用 `complete_sends` 后保存该 receipt,下一轮先执行确认,确认失败或返回未知时保留 receipt 并暂停新轮询,不重派 QQ 发送。JS 仅清除仍与快照为同一对象的终态,旧确认、不同 session/代次和在途更新不会清除新对象;确认成功但返回丢失时可幂等重试。源码核对现有发送路径均用新对象替换结果,依赖该不变量;原无绑定兼容轮询仍是旧清除语义。发送入口的 128 条结果上限提供背压,超限单条保守 unknown,随机源不可用或序号耗尽时拒绝并保留结果。 + +此确认只表示指定 batch 已经由 resident 处理,`complete_sends` 原有对未知或不再匹配请求的忽略策略未改变;不代表结果已送达 daemon、journal 持久化或对端可见。原接收事件队列仍在 JS 返回前清空,V8 返回失败不保证接收事件保留;停止/宿主退出、跨进程恢复、同一个 listener 内对象被外部原地修改、随机代次碰撞及 QQ 中的实际执行均未验证。随机代次依赖宿主 Node 的加密随机源,碰撞风险非数学上零;无法取得随机数时保守停排空。 每个含终态批次增加一次 V8 确认调用,现场兼容性与性能尚未验证。后续须独立验证真实 callback、ACK 失败/恢复、worker 与 journal durable ACK 以及停止/drain,未证寿命不卸载;feat-004 in-progress。 + +修复前生产绑定轮询的模拟 V8 返回丢失回归失败,日志 `target-harness/feat004-lease-wire-red.log` SHA-256 `EFA9510B001DFE93C8FA943E288E360202717EFAE5FB229C273EDD91B9547346`。修复后实际生成的 JS、生产 decoder 与真实 resident 的离线串联及旧确认、结果替换、重复确认、重建 listener、随机源失败、超大结果与 owner 重试共 6 项通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-lease-chain-final2.log` SHA-256 `C62C8D12F88DD8841A9DFC6A9B185A61B134596695FC5E93655B885C6D67B810`;其他 wrapper 定向回归日志 `target-harness/feat004-lease-wrapper3.log` SHA-256 `A3FDE007C0A2404E6D5A68C3F64019C06462092E46C3101883D721213DB5C29F`。这些为合成对照,不证明真实 QQ 返回丢失或生产已验收。 + +开发过程保留首次不可变 hook 捕获赋值编译错误 `target-harness/feat004-lease-first.log`、fixture 缺 `process` 的失败 `target-harness/feat004-lease-second.log`、测试随机源变量遮蔽导致错误代次的失败 `target-harness/feat004-lease-ack-tests.log`、Windows `node -e` 脚本超长失败 `target-harness/feat004-lease-wrapper.log` / `target-harness/feat004-lease-wrapper2.log`;修正后分别重跑通过,既有长脚本测试改用 stdin。GitNexus 在 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 起点 `76e2966` 上对动态 JS 与 owner 入口为 UNKNOWN、绑定脚本 builder 为 LOW,已按源码补核结果写入、owner 与 decoder;不把缺失图边认作零影响。最终变更图 MEDIUM,涉及确认脚本进入 V8 的三条路径。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research,各含全部 6 项确认回归),日志 `target-harness/feat004-lease-wire-all-final.log` SHA-256 `18BC8A0379033B2A4FD662664B4C7F143A06A80976526FEB074365D137144A4E`;文档检查通过。本轮未接 QQ、未发送。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询 batch 清空前准入(起点 `ebd3379`):生产 `D8_POLL_JS` 先按原有预算分批,再检查最终 JSON UTF-8 大小不超过 512 KiB、schema、session 字符串和字节长度、items 数组及两项非负整数统计;统计使用 JS 安全整数,故比 Rust `u64` 范围更保守。若不满足返回 `ERR:poll_batch_invalid`,不清空接收队列、统计、诊断或已序列化发送终态;正常超时扫描仍发生在此检查之前。该防护不等于 Rust 已接收、事件逐条有效或 daemon 已持久化,也不覆盖 V8 结果丢失和同名 listener 代次。 + +使用实际绑定轮询脚本和生产 decoder 的合成对照,分别注入 `NaN` 统计、负溢出统计、非数组 items 和大于 512 KiB 的基础诊断;失败时状态保留、纠正后原终态可读并通过 decoder。修复前首项对照失败日志 `target-harness/feat004-poll-admit-red.log` SHA-256 `64867C6F54536D7E1D1D82878A51FB75A7E8EB2169A4ADF2B10AB6E4D80BD5E1`;修复后与其他 wrapper 定向测试通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-poll-admit-green.log` SHA-256 `7CB5A517C7EC666DF38AB01B6443ACBF6AAB8D1F3C356B8C453AB388EE3938BC`。测试为故障注入,不证明现场发生过畸形或超限。GitNexus 对 JS 常量和原无绑定轮询符号报告 UNKNOWN,按源码核对绑定 owner、执行与 decoder;不能将空图视为零影响。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research),日志 `target-harness/feat004-poll-admit-all.log` SHA-256 `8DDFDA791663259B01463C02577C5E4B296AE972873FD7A69F8B816646E47C21`;文档检查通过。未接 QQ、未发送,版本化确认、真实迟到/线程/drain 仍未闭合,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询 session 前置核验(起点 `919e724`):正式 owner 每轮先捕获一次 listener session;缺失、空或超过 decoder 限额时跳过轮询,同一捕获值用于生成绑定轮询脚本及 Rust decoder。绑定脚本在修改超时、结果表或接收队列之前比较 JS `R.sid`,不匹配返回 `ERR:session_mismatch` 并保留这些状态。旧公开无绑定轮询函数仅维持既有测试/兼容入口,正式 owner 现在使用绑定入口。此处的 sid 是 wrapper session 名称,不是已证明唯一的 listener 代次;同名重建、V8 返回/解码失败、IPC 和持久 ACK 等仍不受此修复保障。 + +使用实际生成绑定脚本、Node VM 和生产 decoder 构造不匹配对照,旧逻辑在拒绝前已消费导致测试失败,红灯 `target-harness/feat004-session-guard-red.log` SHA-256 `E68647C2FDD403CADC4938FD9B0F32A1CA87DA53A41AB2CBD7D1E79E9D8209C7`;新逻辑保留结果、接收/统计及超时状态,匹配绑定可解码原结果,空/超长绑定拒绝,特殊字符使用 JSON 安全编码;生产生成脚本回归日志 `target-harness/feat004-session-guard-helper.log` SHA-256 `9E36F85BFBF2D046B819CEE7ABDAFD13115EB5AFD91A818B8A6D1DB569BFAFDC`,相关 wrapper 回归日志 `target-harness/feat004-session-guard-green.log` SHA-256 `8B172582E9A80142C3E5D566027AFAB0DE4F57B71D0281EB54CC494DA3F33889`。合成测试不证明 QQ 实际曾不匹配或证明跨进程交付。 + +GitNexus 基于 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004` 的 `919e724` 隔离索引:`D8_POLL_JS` 与导出 owner 入口为 UNKNOWN、`poll_listener_json` 上游 LOW;结合源码及测试补核,不能把未知图边当作零影响。最终变更图 MEDIUM,涉及绑定轮询、V8 执行及诊断路径。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research),日志 `target-harness/feat004-session-guard-all.log` SHA-256 `4FB00F1E93913E6C9EBA76895EDB6C7E7C364FB1B5F78A0B4FC8183B2E1CB13D`;文档检查通过。本轮未接 QQ、未发送;确认协议和真实迟到、线程、drain 仍未闭合,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 resident 空身份重复结果(起点 `1793c5e`):以真实 `Resident::complete_sends` 和合成 host 驱动发现,同一请求的 `done` 空 native ID 首次进入 `IdentityPending` 并输出 `AcceptedUnconfirmed` 后,重复输入会再次入队相同通知。现对已处于 `IdentityPending` 的空身份重复输入不重复入队;之后带非空强身份的同一请求仍能成功完成,再重复强身份也不再产生终态。已有 `DeliveryUnknown` 的空身份拒绝条件保持。该输入由离线夹具构造,不证明实际 QQ 返回过空身份或现场曾重复通知。 + +修复前针对实际状态机的回归按预期失败,日志 `target-harness/feat004-owner-retry-red.log` SHA-256 `CDC055A902F497149AEE48828BE95EAB4837367A28AF41BA286F75957850C9EF`;修复后新增测试与 22 项 resident 生命周期测试全部通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-owner-retry-green.log` SHA-256 `CA4C09CE3A5848B5D028ECD0CAF07AA8CAECF908DA49864E352D906981020B95`。GitNexus 对 `complete_sends` 上游为 UNKNOWN,实际调用方及测试通过文本和源码补核,未将空图认作零风险。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research),日志 `target-harness/feat004-owner-retry-all.log` SHA-256 `0755E29ECA6BD2DCE67A896A10B5F5DBB1A2810B9425799B289C69D899765759`;文档检查通过。此次只修复该重复通知,未实现可确认的结果版本或 ACK 重试;JS 轮询拒收后丢终态缺口仍在,未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 发送结果表容量防护(起点 `03f4c36`):正式文本、图片、语音发送脚本现在除原先的在途表上限外,也在提交前检查 `sendResults` 条数;达到 128 时返回既有 `send_capacity_or_duplicate`,不清除已有结果,也不调用 `sendMsg`。该限制为未来保留未确认结果提供背压,不改变目前轮询清除策略;它限制正常脚本新增条数,不证明任意外部改写或单条值大小有界。现有 adapter 将该本地脚本错误统一映射到 native code 3,不能把它解释为 QQ 业务拒绝。 + +生产生成脚本的 Node VM 合成回归在 128 条结果、空在途表下覆盖文本/图片/语音不提交、不调用媒体存储、旧条目不被移除;127 条文本仍能提交并达到 128。修复前首次文本对照未拒绝并显示 `fired`,红灯日志 `target-harness/feat004-result-capacity-red.log` SHA-256 `A6591F07A31FB7F866E6D720D139097EED80DD2C082F8B934552134F11521199`;修复后容量及相关文本/图片/语音/媒体/轮询共 26 项通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-result-capacity-green.log` SHA-256 `8A67562B7D9AEA74F958EC2D920DED36E329B9385B4028CF1A5000B84136FDDB`。回归为受控合成环境,未证明现场曾满额,也未覆盖 127 条媒体真实发送。 Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(普通及 research),日志 `target-harness/feat004-result-capacity-all.log` SHA-256 `D2B9536F9EE27BA7113ADC414B1820CD73C5E932073007BE4605C374554B2EB2`;文档检查通过。 + +GitNexus 在 `E:/stella/Caligo-feat-004`、起点 `03f4c36` 的隔离索引对文本、图片和语音 builder 上游均为 LOW;动态 JS 及跨语言边界另按源码核对。确认协议尚未接线,Rust 拒收后终态丢失、代次和重复确认的已知缺口仍在;未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询结果确认离线状态模型(起点 `1b29ff8`):新增 [PollResultAckModel](scripts/poll-result-ack-model.mjs) 与 [6 项测试](scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs),用于检验一个在途批次、未确认重复读取、代次/批次匹配、按结果修订删除、容量及单条长度上限、序号耗尽拒绝和非终态保留。旧批次发出后如果结果更新,旧确认只清理仍为原修订的条目;输入和读取均复制,调用者篡改副本不改变模型状态。模型依赖调用者提供唯一监听器代次,且调用者只在完整批次被接收后确认;不实现代次分配、QQ/V8、IPC 或 journal,不允许将模型通过当作生产修复。 + +`node --test scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs` 6/6 通过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-ack-model-green.log` SHA-256 `3B738205E4A463CF1B73435F4F45D37B7C0245381DF5544E0B8F6901AAE8C60D`;在 ignored 副本中移除修订比较后相应旧确认负例失败,日志 `target-harness/feat004-ack-model-mutation.log` SHA-256 `75B40EC1BCC750CD0A309202008143E6F004AD2DC1E357AB970AB96BABFDA184`。Node CI 命令纳入该模型,与原工具测试合计 34 项、32 通过、2 个可选核验跳过,日志 `target-harness/feat004-ack-model-ci-node.log` SHA-256 `E27AD0BB06E005191F241DE6F931116C9C0EF17427F771FF6A9D59235F8FCAD4`。下一步仍需在生产链中定义代次、预算/背压、失败与确认调用顺序并完成真实脚本及 owner 回归;当前已知拒收后丢终态缺陷仍存在,未接 QQ、未发送,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询提交边界离线对照(源码 `60a03f2`):`D8_POLL_JS` 在返回 JSON 前清除本批终态;owner 随后按 listener 绑定调用 `ingest_wrapper_batch`,解码失败时不会调用 `complete_sends`。用生产 JS、Node VM 和生产 `decode_d8_batch` 构造一条合成 done:人为传入不匹配的 wrapper session 时首批被拒为 `batch_session_mismatch`,相同首批在正确绑定下可解码,但对同一 VM 再轮询已不含该终态。Windows MSVC 离线对照 1/1 通过,未接 QQ;不证明真实环境曾出现会话不匹配或结果丢失,也未复现 V8 转换/IPC 失败。 + +这说明上一轮修复仅保证未序列化终态不会在分批时被清除,不能保证被 Rust 拒绝的批次可恢复。未来方案需分别设计批次/监听器代次和结果修订身份、只确认已安全接收的具体版本、确认失败及重复处理、超时和有界内存;不能用 request ID 单独删除可能已变化的结果,也不能把 resident 内存接收宣称为 daemon journal 已持久化。此次未改生产协议,不重发 unknown。JS 常量图影响 UNKNOWN、`poll_listener_json` 上游 LOW,图索引有截断警告;按源码补证 `lib.rs` 的 session 绑定、decoder 拒绝及 `complete_sends` 路径。feat-004 仍 in-progress,真实迟到、线程和 drain 未证。 + +复验源码与成功日志保存在 ignored `target-harness/feat004-poll-rejected-lab.rs` / `target-harness/feat004-poll-rejected-lab.log`,SHA-256 `F7E328946CB17B5BEFD8500CA57D1257FBE73D5DCB88EF685B79419D263427A3` / `22A1C0EEC344FA1F90B6F4D295060591D25D5E1DC29D81E48B7D67A21B7FC7BB`;首次 fixture 将整数 `host_nonce` 错写为字符串导致编译失败,原日志 `target-harness/feat004-poll-rejected-lab-initial.log` SHA-256 `1AF3DF6D5C4CB20ECE55DAB31E5831AD5D9FDDE1E5602397C2ACA7B251416DB9`,修正后重跑。复验时将该 rs 文件临时复制为 `crates/caligo-bridge/tests/feat004_poll_rejected_lab.rs`,执行 `cargo test -p caligo-bridge --test feat004_poll_rejected_lab --locked --offline --target-dir target-harness`,之后移除该临时副本。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询结果预算离线修复(起点 `b80291f`):生产 `D8_POLL_JS` 的 Node VM 合成对照在接收批次占用约 360 KiB、64 条约 3 KiB 终态下复现 512 KiB 上限分批时清除未返回终态;另一合成超大终态会阻塞后续较小结果。这不证明真实 QQ 出现过此类结果或 ID 长度。现在只清理已包含在序列化批次中的终态,未放入的留待下次轮询,并继续尝试较小结果;单条终态本身无法放入空批次时降为 `unknown` / `result_exceeds_poll_budget`,若该 unknown 仍放不进当前批则延后,pending 不降级。三个受控回归覆盖跨批、超大结果及 unknown 延后;序列化不等于 Rust/IPC 已接收或持久确认,基本元数据本身超预算等情形未获完整界限证明。 + +修复前分批/超大单条对照及修复后定向日志 SHA-256 分别为 `52B650DF42031EA19E721430318C7F2A7FF2116E9462C0A153F75D7248DDA1EA` / `867E5AD82C9E55DE620CA7D23A0D9AC08C168E524B53536E57A7441654130E24` / `C00A0D2549A43F01C25A2FE5B12E4DAFA6C54C6EE426CF70CA9D9AD0561CB748`。隔离普通 release EXE/bridge SHA-256 `18B78102632B745DA34228BA026B2F26EA50D1D565892227589312F351D45AA1` / `4FB3723071D1A317F4AEFE4D69ED8FC2116804969E7ACC80E01A54A406CDA5D0`,research 为 `DFF198BA093F782705BC2618983BDC6343204F748086F352C7D4FF169639CE29` / `3F0718021771AE2AC22D69073F36D23198CB9DD58EDC72CA816069A67FB2F9D9`;两种离线 release 构建通过。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(含普通/research),日志 `target-harness/feat004-poll-budget-all.log` SHA-256 `CEBAF3E85D65045BA77171A57CA75F439AC5234602FA01F2AC76FA31075906AE`;`init.ps1 -Mode docs` 通过。 + +GitNexus 隔离索引对动态 JS 常量 `D8_POLL_JS` 返回 UNKNOWN,`poll_listener_json` 上游 LOW;已结合源码核对动态 JS、Rust 分派和结果消费者,不将缺失图边视为零影响。Windows 既有 wrapper 测试因拼接脚本超过 `node -e` 命令行上限报 206,现改为 stdin 输入;原失败日志 `target-harness/feat004-poll-budget-green-final.log` 保留,修复前对照 `target-harness/feat004-poll-budget-red.log`、`target-harness/feat004-poll-oversize-red.log` 与修复后 `target-harness/feat004-poll-budget-target-final.log` 保留。本轮未接入 QQ、未发送;修复版真实现场、真实迟到回调及原生线程/drain 仍未验,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 媒体 Promise 保守修复版语音正常路径现场(源码 `7b8b732`):用户重启并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送约 0.9 秒三音语音;新 QQ 根 PID `38060`、创建 `2026-11-16T10:53:51.6672356Z`,固定模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后只提交一次;发送与紧接着的 OneBot `get_msg` 均 retcode 0,持久消息 ID 与语音标识匹配。用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条、内容和数量符合预期;独立审计确认唯一请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID、目标和语音大小/MD5 与预登记样本一致。 + +该 `get_msg` 为 OneBot 持久账本回读,不等同 QQ 原生语音下载或 `get_record`。合成停止探针 pass,manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;QQ 同代次当次响应且保留 bridge,不得重接、热卸载或重发。本轮仅验证语音正常路径,未制造真实非零 Promise、cookie 冲突或迟到回调,不证明业务拒绝语义、未知结果后迟到纠正或原生线程/drain;feat-004 in-progress。 + +ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-media-result-voice-field-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/独立审计/审计摘要/SILK SHA-256 依次为 `80E27C54B344EE63B2E900290A01B4D88B94A9152AEB0F89EA4D3333974FCA86` / `A7AF9D574E56A30F3AF70F5AC60D348BDC63792DFCE22ED1D3311C8278BCDBC3` / `3B33518CBAE54A7CBF6EDB8E8B96E926924ACBC96A8C14AFF76E8C001DE52350` / `A7E388D3FDDFC420B57225E8DF6827B052E6F4D4B2B21D61540D3EF2CC3A8B20` / `B507162DD626706FFDC5A91DF290F18A7FC9485A6199F0189809C3133FD8DA2A`。样本本地解码 45 帧、0.9 秒,不将本地解码作为对端播放证据。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 媒体 Promise 保守修复版图片正常路径现场(源码 `7b8b732`):用户重启并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送 PNG;新 QQ 根 PID `48480`、创建 `2026-11-16T10:42:55.6925710Z`,固定模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后只提交一次;发送与紧接着的 OneBot `get_msg` 均 retcode 0,持久消息 ID 与图片标识匹配。用户分别确认对端只收到一张且图案、标记相符;独立审计确认唯一请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID、目标及图片大小/MD5/尺寸与预登记样本一致。 + +该 `get_msg` 为 OneBot 持久账本回读,不等同 QQ 原生图片下载或 `get_image`。合成停止探针 pass,manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;QQ 同代次当次响应且保留 bridge,不得重接、热卸载或重发。本轮仅验证图片正常路径,未制造真实非零 Promise、cookie 冲突或迟到回调,不证明语音正常路径或原生线程/drain;feat-004 in-progress。 + +ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-media-result-image-field-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/独立审计/审计摘要/PNG SHA-256 依次为 `80E27C54B344EE63B2E900290A01B4D88B94A9152AEB0F89EA4D3333974FCA86` / `FAFC0092C25DC7BFED2E381CCEC4DC9FBBB8701214569E28306653902815843E` / `CE2B8F5AB0B481CC62E165CF03BCC3A3294C44372D4F01566395DCC5D3771CB7` / `18A0AB6C26A93CC35DF4CEEDD27A2FCE287583A188226DC0473EA7A3BF1AAC35` / `5328C6A706AE08A7DAAF3DC12D872A1DB2E9D95D10E1DE073E7FDD7FE26DAF2C`。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 图片与语音非零 Promise 保守结果(起点 `bccef3e`):使用实际生成的媒体发送脚本与生产 listener 的离线对照发现,非零整数 Promise 在 add 通知前到达时被标记为 `rejected`;Rust `complete_sends` 将该项转为 `SendOutcome::Failure`,而该 Promise 值尚无可信业务拒绝语义。图片和语音回归均在修复前失败;日志 `target-harness/feat004-media-result-red.log` SHA-256 `DDC52D2B848AE5F4883CCC8B1A1A853A9F11796B0C29FF994DE066ED600D278A`。这只证明合成输入下原实现的结果层级,不声称真实 QQ 曾返回该码或消息已送达。 + +现将非零安全整数 Promise 统一保守映射为 `unknown`,原因字段记录有界安全整数 `send_result_ambiguous=`;回执在 Promise 前后两种顺序均保持同一结果,非安全整数、畸形结果、异常或 Promise 拒绝使用媒体固定 unknown 标签,拒绝值中的私有字符串不外泄。零值正常路径仍须匹配通知和精确回读才能成功。该修复不赋予业务拒绝码语义,也不保证 Promise 不确定后迟到通知可修正:现有 `pending.failed` 会阻止后续相关匹配。图片、语音各覆盖前后顺序、非安全整数、异常字符串、畸形值和成功正例,修复后日志 `target-harness/feat004-media-result-green-final.log` SHA-256 `84CD0BCDD95DE55169EA2F595615D7F111E72C9D811DFC96D91398DB4F595859`。 + +Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,普通/research 新增媒体结果回归各 2/2,日志 `target-harness/feat004-media-result-all.log`。GitNexus 当前隔离索引对 `build_image_send_js` / `build_voice_send_js` 上游 LOW、直接调用 `qq_entry`;动态 JS 文件和 `complete_sends` 为 UNKNOWN,源码补证 `include_str!`、`lib.rs` 的结果分派及 `resident.rs` 的 Failure/Unknown 区别,不能把缺失图边当作零影响。隔离普通 release EXE/bridge SHA-256 `73C5C54FD547BA679B05DBC71A9C8C1B006D5D38401A44A126549385A482156A` / `102BB98451D527397D613A1F18BFDD97DF637438826D3F5310FF9FEBEB09A1D0`,research 为 `3E5D33A4AF8A9784C52C0E94EC5DC87CCFD538C53AC2240948D0ED7EBA4F37AF` / `1DD5F1E36F855B263CA110B175463E726C64C4A10A34D93019452495CA9775F6`。本轮未接入 QQ、未发送,修复版现场正常路径和非零 Promise 的真实行为均未验证;不重发旧样本,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 修复版单次语音发送与连续回读(源码 `de251e3`):用户重启并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送约 0.9 秒低—高—低三音语音;新 QQ 根 PID `42396`、创建 `2026-11-16T08:15:50.5580602Z`,固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后只提交一次;发送与紧接着的 OneBot `get_msg` 均 retcode 0,持久消息 ID 与语音标识匹配。用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条、内容和数量符合预期;独立审计确认唯一请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID、目标和语音大小/MD5 与预登记样本一致。 + +该 `get_msg` 是 OneBot 持久账本回读,不等同 QQ 原生下载或 `get_record`。合成停止探针 pass,manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;QQ 同代次当次响应且保留 bridge,不得重接、热卸载或重发。此单次样本未制造真实 cookie 冲突,不证明此前 10053 的精确根因、真实迟到回调或原生线程/drain;历史失败保留,feat-004 in-progress。 + +ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-http-fixed-voice-send-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/独立审计/审计摘要/SILK SHA-256 依次为 `C3BD41AC74B28E2BDC22D814BE0B5F5B9E77F2DE8D92BDD0B1E587BBAACDAB91` / `0DD60E8F189C486BC4F365E4E1B0AAA7D6997D8ADE1BA80886FC6B1BEF0108B9` / `5DF76B82AAD04BFFEB12FC1321915C467530B5E791CFEA168FBDF130DA479059` / `A7E388D3FDDFC420B57225E8DF6827B052E6F4D4B2B21D61540D3EF2CC3A8B20` / `8D184EAC62B375A82ADA6B100AB2DDFD29E6296A10130BD7F3DB61A1B3CEDBF2`。样本本地解码 45 帧、0.9 秒,不将本地解码作为对端播放证据。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 修复版单次图片发送与连续回读(源码 `de251e3`):用户重启并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送 PNG;新 QQ 根 PID `4544`、创建 `2026-11-16T08:06:28.1804081Z`,固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后只提交一次;发送与紧接着的 OneBot `get_msg` 均 retcode 0,持久消息 ID 与图片标识匹配。用户确认对端收到且仅收到一张、内容相符。独立审计确认唯一请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID、目标和图片大小/MD5/尺寸与预登记样本一致。 + +该 `get_msg` 是 OneBot 持久账本回读,不等同 QQ 原生下载或 `get_image`。合成停止探针 pass,manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;QQ 同代次当次响应且保留 bridge,不得重接、热卸载或重发。此单次图片样本未制造真实 cookie 冲突,不证明此前 10053 的精确根因、语音发送后连续回读、真实迟到回调或原生线程/drain;历史失败保留,feat-004 in-progress。 + +ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-http-fixed-image-send-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/独立审计/审计摘要/PNG SHA-256 依次为 `C3BD41AC74B28E2BDC22D814BE0B5F5B9E77F2DE8D92BDD0B1E587BBAACDAB91` / `F3E698DB1EBE201DB9B121453052BFC6FF6B2DBE2B975DCF850221F87728CFB8` / `8A256F3DAE6CC35D351FABF646BADE28DA4FD0B0927E6ECDA76A4D001120CCB6` / `18A0AB6C26A93CC35DF4CEEDD27A2FCE287583A188226DC0473EA7A3BF1AAC35` / `3AECDD16099DB2BFE3FDD8BF88D83A88AAC291F719D05F7C902769E248533F75`。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 10053 修复版真实单次发送与连续回读(源码 `de251e3`):用户重启、登录并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送文本;新 QQ 根 PID `55192`、创建 `2026-11-16T07:57:23.0031408Z`,固定模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验通过后只提交一次,发送接口与紧接着的 `get_msg` 均 retcode 0、持久消息 ID 和正文匹配;用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条、内容相符。独立审计确认单请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID 和消息账本一致。 + +runner 的 `trace_pass=false` 原样保留:detail 使用单引号,旧解析误按 JSON;独立白名单复核观察两批同一 JS 代次/序号的 registered、submit_enter、submit_return、matched_add、matched_update、promise_accepted、readback_matched、settled,仅在该单请求与账本条件下解释,不证明 QQ native callback OS 线程或全局完整性。合成停止探针 pass、manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;QQ 当次同代响应并保留 bridge,不得重接、热卸载或重发。此单次样本验证修复版指定文本发送后的连续回读,不证明原两次 10053 的精确根因、媒体发送后表现或真实 cookie 复用;原失败仍保留,feat-004 in-progress。 + +ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-http-fixed-send-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/技术审计/技术摘要/完整审计/摘要 SHA-256 依次为 `7A4DA088289A32A74DCC5BA7BA4DDBF10266061F96FE12BCD530234CEC5DE648` / `BF9CB5473266D54D678BC642964D2C4D9C9FD64A66D7B7D99CDAF6A4F8BA812F` / `8735B94CABCBF990EA48DB68C5517C5F076DD91C89BC91BFD5F2418E035E19D9` / `E2A8822C9BAE5D3A4E514958D90787D9FC170AF20D81B91159E8C13FF7A7AE62` / `A9146D27ED397CC29D03A422ACA7B19C6F43CEA5E8D55D012D4A6C388805DB0A` / `6891484115A14E2B7D2A831D82C038B03F7CA1129F4EBD9115124CA3962B3F35`。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 10053 修复版零发送现场(源码 `de251e3`):用户重启并登录后指定 QQ 根 PID `47980`、创建 `2026-11-16T07:54:58.0186913Z`,固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 准入通过。research 版单次接入,listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验通过;两个 `get_status` 请求分别在客户端连接后延迟 250 ms 发请求头、发送部分请求体后延迟 250 ms 发剩余数据,均 HTTP 200 / retcode 0。延迟由客户端计时并自报,未独立观测服务端 accept 时序。 + +将此前图片消息账本复制到隔离运行目录并核对 SHA-256 一致,对原持久消息 ID 执行一次 OneBot `get_msg`,HTTP 200 / retcode 0、原身份和图片指纹匹配;该查询读取复制的持久账本,不是 QQ 原生查询。独立审计确认本轮零发送、请求 journal 为空、两个状态探针及单次消息查询、manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;QQ 同代次响应且保留 bridge,不得重接或热卸载。只覆盖指定零发送场景,不证明发送后连续回读或既往 10053 根因;旧失败保留,feat-004 in-progress。 + +ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-http-fixed-nosend-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/审计/审计摘要/探针结果 SHA-256 依次为 `C3BD41AC74B28E2BDC22D814BE0B5F5B9E77F2DE8D92BDD0B1E587BBAACDAB91` / `5B80D3E498833A3451AD4705D6782A5E5BB04399AEECD7E87DBB7C28578AC7E5` / `48688567FCC9FC91526E31DC6EF61725144E3D352DE885666FF51E2A821E2795` / `7CB8BEBB6917EAAAE434BE661F7565BD0C6F49852D414BBD9780DEF6827F1EB2` / `D72DEE6EE4D3AB67CB4B90C1887ADA14BDF7D4FCF368DE9502EC6796696CA2C3`。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 现场连续 HTTP 请求的 10053 离线诊断与修复(起点 `fe2f5ac`):两次现场失败均在 Python 发送 `get_msg` 请求时的 `sendall` 报 WinError 10053。使用当前 Windows、同一 Python 客户端和正式 OneBot HTTP 解析/并行服务、纯模拟后端进行无 QQ 对照,修复前 90 对连续请求中 86 对通过、4 对报告 10053;修复后另 90 对全部通过。另以同一 `serve_one`、自建 accept 对照控制客户端连接后延迟 200 ms 才发请求头:继承监听器非阻塞模式的 12/12 报 10053、服务端均未读到完整头;显式切换阻塞模式的 12/12 返回 HTTP 200。模拟后端没有 QQ,计数仅覆盖指定本机实验;这些结果支持一个与现场栈相符的原因,但没有现场内核/包级证据,不能证明历史两次失败均由此造成。 + +`serve_one` 现在在读取前将已接收连接切回阻塞模式;转换失败即停止处理,后续仍使用原来的有界读取期限和写入超时。GitNexus 上游影响 HIGH,直接涉及并行及串行 HTTP 入口和测试夹具,动态边界另经源码核对;回归在 Windows 修复前并行/串行延迟请求头均失败且报 10053,修复后并行及串行的延迟请求头、分段请求体均通过,已有 HTTP 消息回读测试通过;Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,普通/research 延迟回归各 2/2,日志 `target-harness/feat004-http-10053-all.log`。真实 QQ 未接入、未发送,修复版尚无现场验收;原发送后的两次失败和后续只读回查仍按原样保留,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +本机 ignored `target-harness/feat004-http-10053-lab/` 保存模拟源码、客户端和结果。基线/修复后 90 对结果 SHA-256 `CC0B75C25E02653E494610B00873762E4BC2C9FE2ECF248A41B5595D61F3BB7A` / `B52102961F8D249192E679649E9E40DDD3F18387560ED8E7E9AA43DBC074A304`;延迟对照结果 `41F30DE434E11F723199559FC120B819A3D26F3E04ADE25C9B78E54947395460`;回归修复前/后日志 `9683CDDB6A1DBF0C2651CB5EFFFF4917825FE83E3E60404E6F183123E5E7E049` / `A878B1EF6AE5C3DC59D8C4556A7DC3B5B51B028724B10109DAEF26D5BB5077EC`。隔离普通 release EXE/bridge SHA-256 `F896D6BDC694B7C7A6F19C9ECA8F26B73CF6200F575A883254FC776D813D32CE` / `2382E07BD9BB18077B082824CEB906A273B55392F30BF83CBACC3F681BC176C0`,research 为 `3DCF3B06A178547718A9EAE7958492FEC320F562C8D0413E95C815E86287451C` / `7C594963A0745A85B058D9E7D78FB004422F5BA562B3E49D7FD467444A6542B2`。 + +2026-11-16 图片数量补充确认:用户后续明确确认上一条测试图片仅收到一张,且与原预期相符;此前“未明确核实数量”的当时记录保留,不改写原答复或审计。补充确认保存在 ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-image-cookie-field-20261116/user-count-confirmation-20261116.json`,SHA-256 `FA49D931A60DA8BD6EDBAA5C0114C5B51EA90C791CAE0CCDAA0E4002FBF31DBA`。此确认不改变首次 `get_msg` 的 10053 失败或 cookie/线程/drain 验收范围。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 图片 cookie 防护版现场:用户重启并授权向登记好友 B 发送一张测试 PNG;QQ 根 PID `34236`、创建 `2026-11-16T05:29:53.3238212Z`,固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后只提交一次,发送 retcode 0 且返回持久消息 ID;用户确认图片可见且内容相符,答复未明确核实数量。独立审计确认唯一请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID 与持久消息身份一致,图片大小、MD5 和尺寸匹配预登记样本。 + +发送后首次现场 `get_msg` 因 WinError 10053 连接中断,未获回读;runner 原始 `phase=send_reserved`、失败栈保留,根因未知且不重发。manager/owner 均退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 关闭,同代 QQ 当次响应且保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载;合成停止探针不证明真实迟到回调或线程/drain。本机 ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-image-cookie-field-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/审计/审计摘要/失败栈 SHA-256 依次为 `41A23E986945ED75D1E84CDE6D937C9D85D2CBEBACFE7422F49C5B1846228058` / `EC0765409D9E1F3DB9DD030ED0FB6CAC4C366C85351857EA78FFC0E5C722C5D4` / `530D6B29DCE8C4D6FAFBE430C9E59F9451CEAE850A133B4DA4D68AC5B38C6546` / `5862A31525A27C6AD772055557B9935A41387DEC38015B49254F130E7AE4ACA0` / `19FC841F558E4F111A4A4B55428AF53FA1C72F7694DE7D331BFA07178932B6B9`;PNG SHA-256 `88AB8BB6F8112832E091D9811803862BD3B1B76C1BB0784299473547274E6B48`。 + +用户随后重启并指定新测试 QQ 根 PID `6184`、创建 `2026-11-16T05:33:04.5883110Z`,固定模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 和账号登录准入通过。将原消息账本复制到独立运行目录并核对 SHA-256 一致,只对原持久消息 ID 执行一次 OneBot `get_msg`:HTTP 200 / retcode 0,私聊图片标识、发送账号及原 ID 匹配,原账本的目标、图片大小、MD5 和尺寸与样本相符。查询读取复制的持久账本,不是 QQ 原生查询,不能解释第一次 10053;原失败继续保留。 + +只读轮零发送、请求 journal 为空;独立审计确认仅一次查询、账本副本一致、manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 关闭。QQ 同代次当次响应且保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载。ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-image-cookie-readback-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/审计/审计摘要 SHA-256 为 `41A23E986945ED75D1E84CDE6D937C9D85D2CBEBACFE7422F49C5B1846228058` / `96D9CC4F64474AB5B57D29CBAEFF5CEA433C7940B34256AB0EAE0B38CA49894A` / `B39361CE01B38825909388970CBB264498737AE093B7E3CACF787C4D70FBED56` / `5B5104E81461055A1DF037728CAB12DA4B4CAF2134CDF45F80F0DBDCF5481856`。本轮未制造真实 cookie 冲突;真实迟到回调、原生线程和全局 drain 未证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 语音 cookie 防护版原消息只读回查(源码 `981b7dd`):上一轮单次发送成功但现场 `get_msg` 报 10053;用户正常重启并指定新测试 QQ 根 PID `42452`、创建 `2026-11-16T05:21:25.1083438Z`。固定模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 与登记账号登录准入通过。将上一轮消息账本复制到独立运行目录并核对 SHA-256 一致,针对原持久消息 ID 执行一次 OneBot `get_msg`,HTTP 200 / retcode 0,返回私聊语音标识与发送账号、原消息 ID 一致;账本的目标和语音大小、MD5 与原样本一致。此查询读取已复制的持久账本,不是向 QQ 原生服务查询,不能据此解释第一次 10053 根因。第一次失败及栈完整保留。 + +本轮无发送、请求 journal 为空;独立审计确认 runner 不含发送动作、原账本与副本一致、仅预留一次查询,以及 manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭。QQ 同代次响应并保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载。ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-voice-cookie-readback-20261116/` 的 preflight/runner/审计/审计摘要 SHA-256 为 `41A23E986945ED75D1E84CDE6D937C9D85D2CBEBACFE7422F49C5B1846228058` / `4446DF4C00E608D697B051BD67B768CEBF6752D38844E75EFD6F7F7A465CABFE` / `F7768DC96821714F84B16406AF87EBD45E0E78311C42FDAAAD30900774F91DD7` / `8EF2F07FE1300956C8238D30F26B589EF94B86083D441E89EBA3AAF2FE3E32E7`。此样本未验证真实 cookie 复用、迟到回调或原生线程/drain,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 语音 cookie 防护版单次私聊现场(源码 `981b7dd`):用户重启、登录并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送 0.9 秒高—低—高三音语音;新 QQ 根 PID `33768`、创建 `2026-11-16T05:15:14.4004368Z`,固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research 版单次接入,listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验通过后只提交一次;发送接口 retcode 0 且返回持久消息 ID。用户确认一条语音可播放、提示音相符。独立审计确认唯一请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、回调 native ID 与持久消息身份一致,语音大小及 MD5 与预登记样本相符。 + +后续现场 `get_msg` 的连接被 Windows 中止并报 `WinError 10053`,没有生成回读响应;runner 原始 `phase=send_reserved` 和失败栈原样保留,不能把发送成功、账本或对端可见当作 HTTP 回读成功。根因未知;不得重发,后续只能按合同准备新进程及原消息只读回查。manager/owner 退出码均 0,HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;同代 QQ 响应且 bridge 保留,不得重接或热卸载。合成停止探针通过,不证明真实迟到回调、QQ native callback 线程或全局 drain。样本不制造真实 cookie 冲突,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +本机 ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-voice-cookie-field-20261116/` 保留预检、独立审计和原始现场材料;preflight/runner/审计/审计摘要/失败栈 SHA-256 依次为 `41A23E986945ED75D1E84CDE6D937C9D85D2CBEBACFE7422F49C5B1846228058` / `19DCCF15DAE3A26AB28A536F324BB8755078D673A732524B53F326BDB03E9E19` / `2CC6135FF5B7DA53D354ED85C6126D035CEA7225617BEEB104F86A213FC265A2` / `C393D74F14F65E055F1B11D073EA7BA995345D7B133B779CA7AE5C38991FCD4A` / `25EF272CA5095A8B2600CF4DC81ABF5F1607B8BA0C92A61050063A0EECDF5347`。本地生成 SILK 样本 SHA-256 `09824209A92C9BE9D6C3045EEEBCE838CF610A0337DFC30B244A8E3C701AD0D7`,45 包、0.9 秒,本机解码 45 帧通过;不将本地解码推作对端播放证据。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 语音已退役 cookie 防护(起点 `b537355`):以生产生成脚本与 listener 在 Node 中先完成第一条语音,再对相同 cookie、目标和语音指纹的后续请求重放旧 add/update 与回读,修复前第二条错误使用旧消息 ID 完成;负例日志 `target-harness/feat004-voice-retired-red.log` SHA-256 `2C484A0F23C7BDABDB9D5D2B1C9BC6AF55BDD39DC8C2B8D060844B336B8FB737`。这是合成复现,不证明实际 QQ 复用 cookie。 + +语音脚本现于文件准备和原生发送前保留当前 JS 环境中本 guard 认领的 cookie,最多 65,536 条、每条最多 256 字符,重复、无效、guard 不可用或历史耗尽均拒绝;已认领值即使后续准备失败仍保留,容量耗尽须更换 JS 环境。文本、图片和语音分别维护历史;其他环境、旧版本或外部来源不受本 guard 保护,非恶意同进程脚本隔离。离线测试覆盖完成后的旧通知重放、资源对象重建、容量/长度上限和不可用、可变或 accessor guard,原有语音发送正反路径保留。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,普通/research 各有 wrapper_send 15/15 和新语音 cookie 测试 2/2,日志 `target-harness/feat004-voice-retired-all.log`。GitNexus 对脚本文件与测试入口返回 UNKNOWN,源码补证 `build_voice_send_js` 以 `include_str!` 接入并由 `qq_entry` 分派,动态 JS 未完整建图。隔离普通 release 的 EXE/bridge SHA-256 为 `5F0F35592FF43DF8B29AEEC1B2D4B31A73A983B66DCA2BDCF65AA75898DC0CA2` / `0884F5AA558F5B3439B2D37A5112A31D0767F0084D8D78CEE34D3F237E67EB4A`,research 为 `17399474B78409E680BFA4184A8FEE8CCE8101BC4293509E93DD62A8B744B4EC` / `36A5C889EBE2FCAE56A81CF48941D35B811D0E5915BF3E216D462584EFDCD13C`。本轮未接入 QQ、未发送;新代码现场正常路径、真实 cookie 冲突、原生线程和全局 drain 均未验证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 图片已退役 cookie 防护(起点 `65196b8`):生产生成的图片发送脚本和 listener 在 Node 中先完成第一条图片,再对同 cookie、目标、图片指纹的第二条请求重放旧 add/update 与回读;修复前第二条错误以旧消息 ID 完成,负例日志 `target-harness/feat004-image-retired-red.log` SHA-256 `51ABAE381A36F89C06608791E46D19611636943DF515739741FFB2AC9C3BC598`。这是合成复现,不证明 QQ 实际复用 cookie。 + +图片脚本现在在文件准备与原生 `sendMsg` 前,为当前 JS 环境中本 guard 认领的图片 cookie 保存最多 65,536 条历史,每条最多 256 字符;重复、畸形、guard 不可用及历史耗尽均拒绝,不淘汰历史。认领后即便准备失败仍保留;达到上限需新的 JS 环境才能继续。普通文本与图片各有独立历史,此保护不覆盖旧版本、其他环境或来源及语音的历史,也不构成同进程恶意脚本隔离。离线测试覆盖完成后的旧通知重放、同一 JS 环境中资源对象重建、容量与长度上限、可变/accessor guard 和原有图片正常路径。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,普通/research 图片 wrapper 各 3/3;日志 `target-harness/feat004-image-retired-all.log`。图工具对脚本文件和测试入口返回 UNKNOWN;源码补证 `qq_v8::build_image_send_js` 以 `include_str!` 接入,`qq_entry` 分派图片路径,动态 JS 边界未由图覆盖。隔离普通 release 的 EXE/bridge SHA-256 为 `7B20160E27A9C3DCA5342BE6F403ABE6DDCBC399823C1A4CBAE9C24466059799` / `6AF9710EC897B56D398832EE46D0F494ED215B61B6CD637182CE5636C9E67BBD`,research 为 `0CFCB7C96FAD85EB3C1E8877113F050790BB586E88E015DB0C54C163E3779C56` / `8FB626210F652768169E1AFC53E585CA5A300220E8B1840C036AAF6A00536EF2`。本轮未接入 QQ、未发送;现场正常路径、真实冲突、迟到回调及 QQ 原生线程/drain 仍未验,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 已退役 cookie 防护版单次私聊现场(源码 `997e92b`):用户重启并授权向登记好友 B 单次发送;最新根 PID `22232`、创建 `2026-11-16T01:01:30.8646312Z`,固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 准入通过。research 版单次接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后仅提交一次,发送与 `get_msg` retcode 0、持久身份与正文匹配。独立技术审计核对单请求账本 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID 和回读,用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条、内容相符,独立完整审计通过。 + +旧 runner 的 `trace_pass=false` 原样保留:detail 使用单引号,runner 错按 JSON 解析;独立白名单复核观察两批同一 JS 代次/序号的 registered、submit_enter、submit_return、matched_add、matched_update、promise_accepted、readback_matched、settled,仅在本轮单请求与账本条件下解释,不证明 QQ native callback OS 线程或全局完整性。合成停止探针 pass,manager/owner 退出码 0,HTTP/SSE 端口关闭,同代次 QQ 响应并保留 bridge;不得重接、热卸载或重发该样本。 + +本机 ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-retired-cookie-send-20261116/` 的运行器、技术审计及摘要 SHA-256 `886929405B8B113ECEEC46E8C2DBF8063102733EECA3BE3311E792E431AAB839` / `6C28DD454D067227397BD0B9DFA8679C6D1D93434F5C0FDEA26153894118B354` / `E2A8822C9BAE5D3A4E514958D90787D9FC170AF20D81B91159E8C13FF7A7AE62`。完整审计脚本和摘要 SHA-256 `06A4301D308DF02A3E3FC8EEB2CC1349EB38A56FDAB1F34E7510AD9FEBC216C0` / `6891484115A14E2B7D2A831D82C038B03F7CA1129F4EBD9115124CA3962B3F35`。此样本只验证正常发送路径,不制造真实 cookie 冲突或迟到重放;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 已退役文本 cookie 防护版零发送现场(源码 `997e92b`):用户重启并登录后指定最新测试 QQ 根 PID `26916`、创建时间 `2026-11-16T00:59:12.8212617Z`,固定模块 hash、PE/backend 审计和唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research 版单次接入后 listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验通过;本轮零发送且请求账本为空。合成停止探针 pass,manager/owner 均退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;进程结束时响应并保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载。独立审计复核准入、产物 pin、无发送代码、账本和停止。 + +本机 ignored `E:/stella/Caligo/local-evidence/feat004-retired-cookie-nosend-20261116/` 的 preflight、runner、审计脚本及摘要 SHA-256 分别为 `E8B9A2F92EA2576061B8B83A43E308891100B3F3E69B7B41868CD4AEDDD6EF52` / `09EF681AF55E25ACB2C0FADA5138E78F61325A0DD4092B5CE66CCE949508745E` / `03D767E6DD09EE084B47FDA57AFFFD328182E29BC34DCADB40C3DD82558E31ED` / `674F599658AC472EB6D53F76C1643DC904B4368E702C1517EE8FF02AA1B9C584`。零发送未执行文本 cookie guard,不证明实际 cookie 复用或真实迟到、callback 线程和全局 drain;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 文本已退役 cookie 离线防护(起点 `a32f59d`):使用真实生成脚本及生产 listener,在 Node VM 中先完成第一条请求,再对同 cookie、目标和正文的第二条请求重放旧 add/update 和读回;修复前第二条错误地以旧 native ID 完成(`target-harness/feat004-retired-cookie-repro.log`)。这是合成复现,不证明 QQ 实际复用 cookie。此前只防在途冲突,未覆盖移除后的重用。 + +文本路径现于 `sendMsg` 前在当前 JS 环境中保留本 guard 已认领的 cookie,监听器停止/重启和超时项清理不清空;重复或无效值拒绝。历史最多 65,536 个、每个值最多 256 字符;容量耗尽时拒绝新提交,需要新 JS 环境,不能通过淘汰记录继续。guard 的全局属性必须是不可写、不可配置的数据函数,否则拒绝,避免意外可变占位绕过。已认领值即使后续提交失败仍保留。仅覆盖本 guard 在该环境中认领的文本,不涵盖其他环境、旧版本、外部 QQ 消息或媒体的历史;不是恶意同进程脚本的安全边界。 + +回归覆盖完成后重放、超时清除、监听器重启、容量/长度上限及不可用/可变/accessor guard,正例仍覆盖不同 cookie 的同文发送。修复前另有可变 guard 绕过的负例(`target-harness/feat004-guard-descriptor-red.log`);Node 命令长度限制和首次缺 Cargo 缓存的失败日志保留,采用 stdin 并补齐锁定依赖后复验。Windows MSVC 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,普通/research wrapper 各 15/15(日志 `target-harness/feat004-retired-cookie-all-final.log`);隔离普通和 research release 构建通过。GitNexus `build_send_js` 上游 LOW,动态 JS 不在图中完整建模。隔离普通 release 的 EXE/bridge SHA-256 为 `16D6CF305C19A0A1EC27F890EA3796D52D49956955F037FC71C75A0506E1CDE6` / `544F41C42E1A16DC5727B853B35EEB1D9BEA86093CF81DDFF5C0A61996C19064`,research 为 `6FC378F1B4B38A85594F41B13FE7E7DFE1EE5ED7DB345CDE438300E7DB2965C8` / `A13006D42DAC61930A9C6AFE570B52D38714889C75CF9E9DB93BF7FF84644D50`。本轮未接入 QQ 或发送,新代码没有现场验收;先前 `a8b1da4` 的现场样本不自动外推到本次修改,真实 cookie 复用、原生线程和最终 drain 仍未证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 文本 cookie 修复版正常路径现场(源码 `a8b1da4`):用户授权向登记好友 B 单次发送新标记;指定 QQ 根 PID `5384`、创建 `2026-11-15T14:03:47.7393043Z`,此前本代次未加载 bridge,当次固定模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 只读准入通过。research EXE/bridge 使用下方隔离构建;listener_armed、Active 和登记账号登录核验后只发送一次,现场 HTTP 发送与 `get_msg` 均 retcode 0、持久身份与正文匹配;用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条。 + +独立审计确认单请求 journal 顺序 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、native ID 和消息账本一致;白名单解析器观察两批同一 JS 代次/序号的 registered、submit_enter、submit_return、matched_add、matched_update、promise_accepted、readback_matched、settled,报告 scope unverified / completeness unknown,仅在本轮单请求及账本证据下解释。原 runner 保留 `trace_pass=false`:旧检查仍将已替换双引号的 detail 当 JSON;独立审计与解析器只读复核通过,不覆盖原结果。合成停止探针通过,manager/owner 退出码均 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭,QQ 同代次响应并保留 bridge;不得重接、热卸载或重发该样本。 + +本机 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-cookie-regression-20261116/` 的现场运行器/独立审计/审计摘要 SHA-256 分别为 `0730D7471656DD748C8BD427E9C661AF036D2779834A380B97CB3BA056DEDC5C` / `C36447EE5AB83550BB4D5BEA6052D70C25981C13C9EFEBC99501F6E51790B3E8` / `6891484115A14E2B7D2A831D82C038B03F7CA1129F4EBD9115124CA3962B3F35`。该样本验证修复版正常单次私聊及回读,不制造或证明真实 cookie 冲突;合成冲突、在途移除后迟到复用、QQ 原生 callback 线程和最终 drain 仍分别受限,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 文本在途 cookie 冲突修复(起点 `03d3272`):正式 wrapper 的文本路径此前未像语音/图片路径那样拒绝在途 cookie 重复。使用实际生成的发送脚本和生产 listener 在 Node VM 中构造两个同 cookie、同目标、同正文请求,单条合成 add/update 与精确回读使两条请求都以同一 native ID 标为 `done`;修复前回归如预期失败,日志 `target-harness/feat004-cookie-collision-before.log` SHA-256 `DAD26F6D47E58EEDA3D032D3B1143F806F2B4A9F39618E72832FE6CDACE9D7EA`。这是合成风险复现,尚未证明固定 QQ 实际生成重复 cookie。 + +文本脚本现在与媒体路径一致,在调用 `sendMsg` 前拒绝与 `R.sends` 在途项重复的 cookie,返回已有 `invalid_cookie`,不修改第一请求。回归验证首个请求仍经精确回读成功、第二个不发送;还覆盖在途图片/语音占用相同 cookie,以及不同 cookie 的同文请求可同时提交。修复后定向测试普通/research 各 9/9,Windows 进程内串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过(全仓测试在最后新增正向测试前运行,新增测试随后在两构建单独通过)。GitNexus 针对 `build_send_js` 的上游结果 LOW,直接调用 `send_text`、上游包括 `QqOwnerAdapter::native_op`;嵌入 JS 和动态分派仍需源码核对。只对仍在 `R.sends` 的冲突生效;项移除后的迟到回调、cookie 重用、QQ 原生 callback 线程和最终 drain 仍未证。未接入 QQ 或发送,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +隔离 research release 构建通过,产物位于 `target-harness/feat004-cookie-research-20261116/x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/release/`,EXE/bridge SHA-256 分别为 `D1D458801C19463781D7E7ED97925BB6500312B966EB0AFA86E13E8DEA07D33E` / `6F15548CD0F1D37DE6C3A333881EE3FDEE4E4378E84E2E14385EFE3AECDD497D`;该构建当时尚未现场加载,后续正常路径现场见本次最新记录;未证寿命不卸载。 + +隔离普通 release 同样构建通过,EXE/bridge SHA-256 分别为 `3F4991F79A1A3AAB5237F14577512D96E0C80E335C144E81A2722B3FC9285B57` / `D2DFB0E5D6BC77670A00436AD13D31F90FC38D635C10A473E7F833611F61D07F`,亦未现场加载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 私有 ETW 查询结构对照(起点 `32ed378`):同一自建进程中 A 停止后以同名同 GUID 创建 B,共 20 次;每次 A 连续两次查询、B 当前句柄查询与 A 过期值查询 B 的 `EVENT_TRACE_PROPERTIES`、嵌套 `WNODE_HEADER` 具名成员及返回名称共 25 项均相同,A/B 句柄数值均复用;只以当次创建的当前句柄停止。脚本保存字段差异而非原始指针;这仅说明指定私有会话样本中的这些字段无法区分代次,不比较结构填充或 ETW 全部状态,不证明系统 logger、跨进程或 query→stop 原子性。未接入 QQ、未启用 PMC/LBR。 + +本机 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-etw-query-fields-20261116/` 的实验脚本/结果和逐项审计脚本/摘要 SHA-256 分别为 `5504B6F138624AA07D8130DBF28C77323EA6953B325BF7D541A5004ED56DC7D3` / `1A63E1BEED665AEB5228E6C0EB56835CF0053FD7670BB439C2AF0A0EEE8E0B71` / `FEA0A9F10EF1C8D6FD37449B24A7219530FEB045654C19244ADCE6F779D38EA4` / `2074B999E01F7E521F59B4D0E0019F1BEE4AA45E8ECD3D25392863F500C724A1`。审计核对 20 个样本、25 项范围和启动/停止码,对篡改差异的负例拒绝;结果依赖实验源码与自报摘要,没有独立 kernel trace。结束时 WPR 未记录、logman 当次为空;系统会话所有权、崩溃恢复及 LBR 仍未证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 私有 ETW query 输出对照(起点 `fdc3b63`):同一自建进程中 A 停止后创建 B,分两组各 12 次;两组均复用句柄数值。B 使用不同名称/GUID 时,以旧句柄和 A 的查询输入调用 `ControlTraceW(QUERY)`,返回名称和 GUID 12/12 是 B,能识别本组替换;B 使用同名同 GUID 时,旧句柄返回的这两个字段 12/12 与 A 一致,不能据此证明代次不变。两组均只 stop 当次成功创建的当前句柄,没有用旧值 stop;这些是本机 in-process private 会话自报样本,未比较所有返回字段、不证明 query→stop 原子性或系统 logger/跨进程行为,不接入 QQ、不启用 PMC/LBR。 + +本机 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-etw-query-identity-20261115/` 的实验脚本/结果、逐项审计脚本/摘要 SHA-256 分别为 `4005AF551404956ADFEA2F1EE1F180E986486B9F64B58A634FD51285A00FDFF1` / `6B9A6034244774A5B867C909992BC65B6C18D717409B01F4D11ABB3A19E1847E` / `B6FF85C1CE4DA08BFE69C6881BCBE96849BAA6D588AB93B57EC3D64B95A7D374` / `664FA7207DA6EE38E035A31FDD0576380F47F0740EE8F0CB66AE660E22053262`。审计逐项核对 24 个样本和停止码,测试字节篡改、错误生命周期负例;审计依赖实验源码及自报结果,无独立 kernel trace。WPR 结束时未记录、logman 当次为空;具名系统会话权限、原子代次/所有权与控制器崩溃恢复仍未证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 私有 ETW 过期句柄 ABA 对照(起点 `8e61343`):同一自建进程对无 provider/无文件的 in-process private ETW 会话 A 停止后创建 B,分三组各 12 次:B 与 A 相同名称及 GUID、同名不同 GUID、不同名称及不同 GUID。三组中 B 均 12/12 取得与 A 相同的句柄数值;以 A 过期值及 A 查询参数只读 query,B 存在时均 12/12 返回 0。不同名称/GUID 组另观测到 A 停止后、B 创建前旧值 query 12/12 返回 4201,而 B 创建后 12/12 返回 0。每个真实 stop 仅针对当次成功创建的当前句柄,未以旧值 stop;另有 12 次同名不同 GUID 的间隙对照保留本机。该观察证明本次私有会话句柄数值会复用,不能凭旧句柄 query 成功确认原代次;不证明系统 logger、跨进程或其他版本的同一行为,不涉及 QQ、PMC/LBR 或文件采样。 + +脚本和结果在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-etw-aba-20261115/`。同名同 GUID 脚本/结果 SHA-256 `38ADA04CF6A43AC5FF574F3B1DA25F7D62794EED10F6B9194518242B59CBC462` / `060D850A5A87C4692786CF7521B419A264653D687BC2745DC63312D711BDC330`;同名不同 GUID 脚本 `D34805ACF9101327A9E0F9EB653A5482093DCB2F39969F9E2C951B248DD48A90`,其结果恰与前组摘要一致;不同名称及 GUID 脚本/结果 `ECD0DFE94C975A55F58F3B4619AC34FDE0C5688799405FE501707941E0DF9518` / `7313ADC4B15B5904BC017C489E7575A5BC54EE6A0108FAE1315D770DBEF4D96D`。逐项只读审计脚本/摘要为 `37F6B21574A2B7D94BAF00B50D97AF7A42205A322C87B1E7C847BDD57345FB23` / `4B2C5F6324EC42DB1F6AF30B0D0EF850B2745C956FD60ED66AAEF73603D5D0D4`,审计依赖脚本和自报结果,无独立 kernel trace。结束时 WPR 未记录、logman 当次返回空列表;控制器崩溃、具名 system logger 实际恢复与原子所有权仍未证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 私有 ETW 与子进程退出对照(起点 `36929f9`):自建控制进程持有无 provider、无文件、无 PMC/LBR 的真实 in-process private ETW 会话,分别运行独立子进程正常退出、返回 17 和超时后终止三种样本。每个样本的 `StartTraceW`、子进程启动前和结束后按句柄 query、最终按取得句柄 stop 均返回 0;超时子进程实际终止且退出非零。控制器/源码和三个结果在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-etw-watchdog-20261115/`,脚本/normal/failure/timeout SHA-256 `6CB5613497A7C312E2E40872006A5B8545FA0A2C7B79F3ABF99B4D53C770BDEA` / `AA0DA5B46E1D6F92EAB5ADEDC22E4C780A8DF36E07D5A3ADF6EE01C4DA523E3F` / `7DE481C18B97803CD2A01E54C015EF3BD0DE7DDFCDE8BB6A4AA2B385917750C8` / `1F604AFAC3739CDCB415A014E637B3FC0D9BD0067CFAAED3DDC52357E32F1C7B`。结束时 WPR 报未记录、logman 当次返回空列表。仅验证控制进程存活时的指定私有会话;不证明控制器崩溃、系统 logger 或 PMC/LBR 清理,不接入 QQ、不发送。 + +后续系统会话恢复不得只凭名称、GUID、PID 或过期句柄停止;仍需可核验代次、受保护证据及无法判定时的人工处置。[ControlTraceW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/evntrace/nf-evntrace-controltracew) 说明 stop 返回 `ERROR_MORE_DATA` 时停止可能已发生,不得根据非零码盲目重试。具名 system logger 成功路径仍受访问权限和[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)约束;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 空具名 system logger 尝试(起点 `95f934c`):当前 token 未提升;自建脚本以固定描述性名称、非默认 GUID、system logger 与有界 buffering 调用 `StartTraceW`,`EnableFlags=0`,不配置 provider、文件、PMC、LBR 或 QQ。Windows 返回 `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`(5),未取得句柄,也没有调用 query 或 stop;这不是系统会话成功、冲突或清理证据。四个模拟后端测试覆盖拒绝/同名冲突时绝不停止、成功返回句柄后的查询和停止、成功但零句柄不停止,均通过。结束后 `wpr -status` 未记录、`logman query -ets` 返回空列表,仅代表当次查询。微软 [StartTraceW 文档](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/evntrace/nf-evntrace-starttracew)列出访问拒绝和权限条件;权限提升本身不满足隐私、实际所有权、全局 PMC 冲突或异常清理合同。 + +本机 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-etw-system-20261115/` 的脚本/模拟测试/结果 SHA-256 分别为 `9E892FB1828EF644B477CC56746405D9FA02D2FF6F820F012AD0FBEE28A4EFAE` / `40A8FE4AF9BCFE9A07AEB320D4889C02668FC3BC0D84B754E1D819994DA5A90A` / `0C4A383453F198D2DDF37FA9E6E03C12DE9C7D5176443D1D8149459E8F5B74FE`;脚本复用上一轮独立 ABI 声明。下一步先为异常终止与会话所有权准备可审计的恢复方案,再在具备权限、隔离和其余门条件下验证无事件系统会话;当前不启用采样或重试。本轮不接入 QQ、不发送,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 进程内 ETW 所有权对照(起点 `6c76d9c`):在自建 Python 进程中,仅用 `StartTraceW` 创建无 provider、无文件、无系统标志的 in-process private buffering 会话,`ControlTraceW` 用成功返回的句柄查询/停止,三项返回码均 0。另起同类自建隔离实验:第一个会话启动 0,同名第二次返回 183;另一个独立私有会话启动 0,两个查询均 0,停止第一个 0 后第二个查询仍为 0,最后按其自身句柄停止 0。没有启用事件 provider、system logger、PMC/LBR 或访问 QQ;不证明跨进程、系统级所有权、崩溃清理、采样或线程关联。结束后 `wpr -status` 报未记录,`logman query -ets` 返回空列表,只代表这两项当次查询结果。参照微软 [StartTraceW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/evntrace/nf-evntrace-starttracew) 的描述性稳定名称建议;已存在不能仅凭同名接管或停止。 + +本机 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-etw-private-20261115/` 的单会话脚本/摘要、隔离脚本/摘要 SHA-256 分别为 `39E8FA1A720BF82B48721140D52B04CD33B081173454EBF9C711666887EBDCB1` / `38072EE0F7D07A52FF90FD3BC743E749C24422CE4CCA61543230B9FDD7825ADD` / `B777E0F29F45594D8A59D5266797912EDD435775B164A2BB07E6BF72A915492E` / `9689880B4459162B2FF524053A8E33279C13CC8CEED11D3B5DFDE749B31479B8`。隔离实验只停止成功返回并记录的句柄。下一步须独立验证具名系统会话、全局 PMC 冲突、异常终止清理和数据范围,不能把私有会话通过当成 LBR 准入;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 LBR 会话生命周期离线模型(起点 `f00dd1a`):新增 [纯状态模型](scripts/lbr-session-model.mjs)与[测试](scripts/lbr-session-model.test.mjs),模拟预检不满足拒绝启动、启动身份不明不停止、只对成功回执中的同身份模拟句柄发停止、停止失败及控制器丢失保留 unknown、超时后即使停止成功仍为 unknown。7 项 Node 测试通过;将两处身份检查从副本中移除的变异有两项负例按预期失败。测试已加入 Windows CI。模型无 ETW 或系统后端,不能证明真实所有权、会话冲突、崩溃清理、采样完整性或线程归属;未启动 ETW、不接入 QQ、不发送。变异日志在 ignored `target-harness/lbr-model-mutation/mutation.log`;详见[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md),feat-004 仍 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 LBR 对照继续准备(起点 `b5282de`):核对本机 `xperf -help start/stop`:`-Pids` 只说明用于 heap tracing,默认 stop/隐含 `-d` 可触及 kernel logger;[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)新增系统级数据、会话所有权/崩溃清理、时钟和采样丢失前置条件,具名系统会话与全局 PMC 冲突尚未验证。未启动 ETW,不接入 QQ、不发送。 + +自建双线程对照扩展输出 PID、FILETIME 创建时间、QPC 频率及各线程起止区间;独立控制脚本在子进程存活时从 Windows 进程 API 复核创建时间,再校验完整输出,故意使用错误代次被拒绝。严格解析器 4 项测试覆盖代次、重复 TID、零计数、无重叠、坏时间、额外行和冲突地址;PE 独立机器码校验两处 `call rax` 仍通过。脚本及摘要在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-lbr-control-20261115/`,源码/EXE/控制器/解析器/摘要 SHA-256 `D9FF41E4AA4C5FA87C4CD741E001CDADB82F41CEC30F211AF2FDBEA02263C441` / `43BD0921824D9B1EA238B8A8F4EA8BC39690C5FBF590364F3A499E3CDA70E012` / `4F685C0F01853449CF19E043E78441CD43878D74A9E86799D8787CAB81032972` / `3787C82A833D2D4EB21C880F2E79784DBC556B97414C38CC8F7E3EECACA12304` / `6A73E714F5784C78A10672AD9993B25FFE01C2FC2591B2932E62C7C71BC02E46`。这些是自建进程真值,未验证 ETW 时间转换、采样线程归属或 LBR 可用性;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 回调观测候选的离线对照(起点 `0430563`):Windows 自带 WPR 与 xperf,本机只读 `wpr -profiles`、`wpr -status` 和 `xperf -pmcsources` 显示 SPGO_LBR profile、WPR 当前未记录及 TotalIssues/BranchInstructions 等计数器来源;当前进程不是提升的管理员。微软文档描述的 [LBR](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/sample-profile-guided-optimization?view=msvc-170) 是无代码插桩的有界分支采样,xperf 采集示例需要提升权限;CPU 型号和计数器列表不证明本机 LBR 可用。采样不能保证命中、不能仅凭时间证明对象或请求身份;历史调用点补丁与 slot7 仍被否决。未启动 ETW,未接入 QQ、未发送。 + +为后续仅在自建进程验证采集与 TID 归属,构建双线程自有 Rust 对照程序:两条间接调用各指向同一回调,分别记录调用线程和计数;固定二进制离线反汇编验证两个 `call rax` 位于不同 RVA,目标入口独立,错误指令类型负例失败。初版两个完全相同的调用函数被编译器合并到同一地址,原脚本/二进制/日志保留;增加不同的 `black_box` 标识并断言地址不同后复验通过。该结果只验证自报真值与机器指令形状,不证明 ETW 可用、采样线程归属正确、QQ 运行时接收者或请求身份。`rustc --edition 2021 -O`、2 秒运行和 `verify-surrogate-code.py` 命令及产物在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-lbr-lab-20261115/`;源码/二进制/校验脚本/摘要 SHA-256 为 `1E52907450FE1B11BBB5EB5DE7B2A1506269D71A6C22539C87B90859C1B70E93` / `283B2F679C2B2A1C808E7AF1783B3C46F5D639A8CA114B1609EA9BD8A2DED089` / `D16C2E32A6A2D657F62F9DBFC1A5210D266D784B3F135EA96531F26952AFEBE2` / `45A4A7AAB7FC07B09BFCC36028EE86972853521B656156E879C0364F673CB6A9`;负例日志 `5EAF2F4298A7AF2004863698D406AA4FDA50C151DE3C59BA6023FE1FAD4A9852`。下一步先审查系统级采样范围、隐私/会话清理与丢失语义,再在满足权限及隔离条件的自建 workload 上验证采集,不以候选替代现场准入。feat-004 仍 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 只读现场描述项核验(起点 `99a9b3d`):用户重启测试 QQ 后,新根 PID `5384`、创建 `2026-11-15T14:03:47.7393043Z`;固定 manifest、已加载模块 hash、PE/backend 审计、唯一 Environment 通过,窗口响应且未映射 Caligo bridge;未接入或核验登录账号。对 hash `0D8B94448F4DAFE7337B88D6A568B004224C37FCBE2BD1142C1AF7624FBD534C` 的已加载 wrapper,用 `QUERY|VM_READ` 只读 64 字节描述项和 8 字节名称,验证第 34 项的重定位名称与 thunk 指针、其余字段及 `sendMsg` 名称;错误 thunk 偏移的负例按预期失败。此为指定代次的映像数据观察,不证明类注册、运行时 receiver、真实调用、callback 线程或寿命。未加载 bridge、未发送,原生线程采集方案尚未满足[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md),feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +本机材料在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-dynamic-preflight-20261115/`;只读脚本、正例报告、负例日志 SHA-256 分别为 `509AD425B89FBD8A4B1F94E2E9D4AC8839B375800E9D0E17D223C8245A3DBF56`、`BA61E6968D4B3F04384296FEB5ADC1B789BD0EBD72D75DC58022090E9F899D34`、`FEF6D87D018D5AEF8D44A4D003FA88F2EBE3528D5EB36C733EA864731E4EAB10`。首次预检在 PowerShell 7 因版本门于任何进程操作前拒绝,改 Windows PowerShell 5 通过;首次只读脚本因 `UIntPtr` 转换错误未完成读取,原日志保留,修正后正反例复验。结束时同代次 QQ 响应、bridge 未映射;后续仍须当次重新核验代次、准入与观测方案,不得将此结果当作回调执行或全局 drain。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 固定映像发送回调静态续核(起点 `519b7ac`):对 QQ 9.9.36-53644 `wrapper.node` SHA-256 `0D8B94448F4DAFE7337B88D6A568B004224C37FCBE2BD1142C1AF7624FBD534C`,按指令边界、RTTI、表项和 Windows x64 栈布局核对:带 `NodeIKernelMsgService::sendMsg` 断言字符串的函数 `0xFE181E`,经 `0xDAE487 → 0xDB8B3F` 构造指向 `NodeIOperateCallback` 候选对象及控制块的引用对,并将副本作为第六参数交给接收者虚槽 `+0x118`。`KernelMsgService` primary RTTI 候选该槽为 `0x329680`;**仅当**运行时接收者确为该候选、分支满足时,该实现将第六参数引用对复制到 `sendMsg` lambda 捕获 `+0x20/+0x28`。选定 lambda `0x3964BA` 调用捕获对象虚槽 `+8`;`NodeIOperateCallback` RTTI 候选该槽为 `0x22A0878`,后者进入已核对的分派函数 `0xC3F6CF`。这将原先彼此孤立的候选收窄为有条件的静态数据流,**不证明**现场 receiver 动态类型、类注册成功、该路径曾执行或实际 callback OS 线程。 + +进一步核对同 hash 的类定义表:以 `0x41DDCF0` 为起点的 299 个 64-byte 条目中,第 34 项(从 0 计)将 `sendMsg` 与 thunk `0xFE181E` 配对;初始化函数将该表交给复制形状 helper,并把目标缓冲、299 项和 `NodeIKernelMsgService` 传至导入的 `napi_define_class`。这是条件静态类定义路径;复制、类注册是否成功以及现场 JS 对象实际选择均未观测。独立校验脚本/报告 SHA-256 `4DEB5BA156B3FD31D36376CB0728FFB0D3ECC24F71B02B78B0DFF91F23C65DA5` / `17CF4F98C22ED351CA24F5A8F4DA147DC69E97AAA761E98140AE5C91CBBB9B4B`;将 descriptor callback 改错的负例按预期失败,日志 SHA-256 `56514C9250E0209109ED2214A9B784E6B641F5B098C063DD3BBABFE9C8FE87C9`。这补充先前链路脚本中“未独立核对属性表”的历史限制,但不证明运行时行为。 + +独立断言脚本与 JSON 摘要 SHA-256 `26D849F8E1B200A7870A4CBC8EC46953C09AC3D8A74C3A7F0E7654062D9D14AE` / `10BD806C576523EA86A2A31F395CDDE77D0C5FD28653EF2E78F81502C6D1B7D0`;故意把候选虚槽目标改错的负例按预期失败,日志 SHA-256 `E195F85586BD9FCC813F2451DB8182D0E1FBF4CD841CE2AAE230A2B2B7BB9973`。首次脚本另有一条错误的辅助算式断言,失败保留 `verify-sendmsg-callback-chain-before.log`;已删除该错误断言,保留并验证八次 push、栈分配、帧基址和独立正确的 entry-stack 算式。脚本/报告均在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/`;不对其它 hash 外推。本轮未接入 QQ、未发送;最终 owner、成功 wait、全局 drain 和历史 G3 合同仍开放,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级轨迹单次群聊现场(工作树 `089c613`,bridge 构建源 `491221e`):用户正常重启测试 QQ 并明确授权向既定测试群 C 单次发送新标记;新根 PID `39500`、创建 `2026-11-15T13:31:30.1245341Z`,固定 9.9.36-53644 manifest、已加载模块 hash、PE/backend 审计与唯一 Environment(0 读失败)通过。listener 和登记账号登录核验后只发送一次;HTTP 发送和 `get_msg` 均 retcode 0,正文、发送账号、群会话及持久 ID 对应;用户确认群内收到且仅收到一条、内容相符。 + +独立审计确认唯一请求 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、账本 native 身份和 HTTP 回读一致。使用 `089c613` 的白名单解析器(SHA-256 `8E864ABC375834285035230E6409555ED65FC76494A604DA3A7877347B58D091`)读取两批原始阶段日志,观察到同一 JS 代次 1 / 临时序号 1 的 registered、submit_enter、submit_return、matched_add、matched_update、promise_accepted、readback_matched、settled,两批均未标 incomplete;输出仍保留 scope unverified / completeness unknown,结合本轮单请求与账本限定解释,不能泛化并发。阶段日志 TID 与 listener owner/轮询线程一致,不能认作 QQ native callback OS 线程。 + +合成停止探针 pass;manager/owner 均退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭,QQ 同代次响应且保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载、不重发。独立审计脚本/摘要 SHA-256 `8F3A5F8A37A4DEBF87B56563A4DBE4E50848CC33284F3475FFD1634D99FCD573` / `569FE08AACDA5E041007427D11B4DCEFFA9D02EE8AD69C66F782B22274216F70`,原始材料仅在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-scoped-trace-group-20261115/`。运行器保留 `field_pass=false` 与用户确认待外部核对的原始摘要,后续确认与独立审计独立保存。该样本证明固定版本的指定群单次发送/回读和阶段观察,不证明真实迟到、native callback 线程、最终 owner/drain 或长期运行;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 阶段日志离线解析(起点 `e5bd754`):新增 `scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.mjs`,只读解析 `append_stage` 双引号替换后的受限格式;严格验证字段、白名单、代次/序号范围、批次数和输入大小。无记录、明确 incomplete、畸形或超限返回 unknown,错误不输出原始日志;成功仅输出临时数字和固定阶段,始终标 `scope: unverified` 与 `completeness: unknown`。它不证明跨进程/环境关联、真实 callback 线程或报告未丢失。对 `feat004-scoped-trace-send-20261115/entry.private.jsonl` 只读复核得到两批、代次 1/序号 1 及已记录的八个阶段;原现场 runner 的误判与独立审计均保留。 + +Node 测试新增 3 项;空数据、损坏/多余/重复字段、伪造阶段、零序号、明确 incomplete、条数/字节超限及敏感值不回显均覆盖;scope 标记回归先失败后通过。三组 Node tooling 合并 19 PASS / 2 SKIP,文档检查通过;缺失文件 CLI 返回 exit 2 和不含路径的 unknown。本轮仅离线处理,不接入 QQ、不发送或修改既有现场日志;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级诊断单次私聊现场(起点 `491221e`):用户明确授权向登记好友 B 单次发送新标记并重启 QQ;新根 PID `50664`、创建 `2026-11-15T13:06:13.9041195Z`,固定 9.9.36-53644 manifest、模块 hash、PE/backend 审计及唯一 Environment(0 读失败)通过。使用 research EXE/bridge hash `048455F7F6FC68C7682FA8A380778E751419EF83B6685384C11F13FC8F89B83C` / `FD6EB1507200BFEA589263BCB13950E02EB5267DEA50EDECFF8D9A403B8771B7`,listener 与登记账号登录核验后单次发送。HTTP 发送和 `get_msg` 均 retcode 0,正文、账号、会话与持久 ID 匹配;用户确认 B 收到且仅收到一条、内容相符。 + +独立审计核对同一请求 `Queued → DispatchIntent → NativeStarted → ConfirmedSuccess`、账本 native 身份和回读;两次轮询阶段均为同一 JS 代次 1 / 临时序号 1、`incomplete=false`,顺序为 registered、submit_enter、submit_return、matched_add、matched_update、promise_accepted、readback_matched、settled。现场只有一个授权发送请求,序号与该请求的关联由该单请求采样条件和独立账本证据共同限定,不能泛化为多请求已现场验证。阶段日志 TID 匹配 listener owner/轮询线程,不等于 QQ native callback OS 线程。合成停止探针 pass;manager/owner 退出码 0、HTTP/SSE 端口关闭,QQ 响应且保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载;不重发该消息。 + +采集脚本的 `trace_pass=false` 原样保留:阶段日志的 detail 将双引号转为单引号,脚本误按 JSON 解析失败;独立审计在限定白名单格式下解析原始两批记录并通过,不能覆盖原脚本误判。独立审计脚本/摘要 SHA-256 `1665DF7ACF4DC27AB74FE8D1F3026DCB7CE5DC99FEB239CBA14A60A38D0EC8FD` / `6891484115A14E2B7D2A831D82C038B03F7CA1129F4EBD9115124CA3962B3F35`,本机材料为 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-scoped-trace-send-20261115/`。此样本验证固定构建、单次私聊请求级阶段采集和对端可见,不验证真实迟到回调、QQ callback OS 线程、最终 owner/drain 或长期运行;feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级诊断构建零发送现场(起点 `491221e`):用户正常重启测试 QQ 并指定最新进程,新根 PID `47144`、创建 `2026-11-15T13:00:41.6886053Z`;固定 9.9.36-53644 manifest、已加载模块 hash、PE/backend 审计及唯一 Environment(0 读失败)通过。隔离 research EXE/bridge hash 分别为 `048455F7F6FC68C7682FA8A380778E751419EF83B6685384C11F13FC8F89B83C` / `FD6EB1507200BFEA589263BCB13950E02EB5267DEA50EDECFF8D9A403B8771B7`。单次正式接入、listener_armed、Active 和登记账号 verify-login 通过;停止中主动调用的合成 listener 防护探针记录 `pass`,本轮没有工具发送,空请求账本。 + +manager/owner 退出码均 0,HTTP/SSE 端口关闭;同代次 QQ 响应并保留该 bridge 映射,不重接、不热卸载。独立审计核对准入、构建 pin、空账本、零发送、阶段与停止,脚本/摘要 SHA-256 `13EFB583112144A0ECA476A3911603080989D16CCFF00364EB03D988B37C9F9F` / `E42849DBCFB537899A3A12848A87FCCC0FFE1C50C8309364192F063475034C96`,私有材料存 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-scoped-trace-no-send-attempt2-20261115/`。合成调用不等于真实迟到回调,本轮没有发送,因此请求级轨迹的现场采集、QQ callback OS 线程与最终 owner/drain 均未验证。feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +前一次只读准入通过,但运行器子进程 PowerShell 模块路径错误,`Get-FileHash` 不可用而在接入保留标记和 `qq-entry` 前退出;manager 退出码 0,零发送、无接入。原失败保留 `local-evidence/feat004-scoped-trace-no-send-20261115/`;后续新目录固定系统 PowerShell 5 模块路径、重新核验同一未接入进程后完成上述唯一接入。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级诊断离线实现(HEAD `3a2ab95`):research 轨迹为每个文本请求分配同一 JS 环境中本监听器代次的有界临时序号,跨 poll 保留关联;容量超过 32、序号耗尽或代次计数无法持久化时标记不完整。sanitizer 只输出受限数字及固定阶段,不输出账号、正文、cookie、原始 request ID 或 native ID;日志缺失、32 次报告预算耗尽和无独立请求映射仍为 unknown。普通模式不启用诊断。不会从序号推导真实请求、QQ native callback 线程或全局 drain。详见[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)。 + +旧实现的并发/跨 poll 回归先失败,修复后通过;代次属性 setter 抛错曾保留未登记代次号,独立回归先失败后修复,现为 generation 0 / incomplete,且发送继续。新增测试覆盖并发交错、跨 poll、容量溢出及复位、旧代次迟到、序号耗尽、代次写入异常、白名单脱敏与异常字段。最终审查还修复未启用轨迹的空批次误报 incomplete 并消耗日志预算的问题,停用与真实溢出两类负例通过。Windows 新测试第一次因 Node 命令行长度超过限制未启动(`feat004-scoped-trace-tests.log`),改为 stdin 后通过。修复后 Windows 串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,research 定向 wrapper 6/6 与 sanitizer 白名单测试通过;隔离 research release EXE SHA-256 `048455F7F6FC68C7682FA8A380778E751419EF83B6685384C11F13FC8F89B83C`,bridge `FD6EB1507200BFEA589263BCB13950E02EB5267DEA50EDECFF8D9A403B8771B7`,未加载现场。完整日志分别为 ignored `target-harness/feat004-scoped-trace-all-verified.log`、`feat004-scoped-trace-tests-fixed.log`、`feat004-scoped-trace-release-verified.log`;两次失败记录保留 `feat004-trace-scoped-before.log` 与 `feat004-trace-generation-before.log`。索引工具方面,WSL 隔离索引的多次增量更新触发 16 GiB 数据库上限,失败保留 `target-harness/feat004-trace-final-index.log`;旧 Windows 磁盘索引刷新在长时间运行后终止,文件保留、完整性未知,不能继续使用,须重新构建。本次独立 WSL 索引在源码与状态更新后核验 HEAD、runner 和 content current;all-scope 图检查为 HIGH(7 个已跟踪文件、16 符号、6 流程),未跟踪观测合同已另行源码审阅;图的动态 JS 和流程截断仍有限,不能替代现场安全证据。本轮无 QQ 接入或发送,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 并发诊断关联离线核查(HEAD `3a2ab95`):源码确认 `textSendTrace` 是监听器级共享的最多 32 项固定标签,poll 后清空且 sanitizer 不输出请求关联。临时独立 Rust LAB 调用当前 `build_send_js` 生成两个请求,在 Node VM 将两个 Promise 按相反顺序完成;两次均产生完全相同的两个 `promise_accepted` 标签及相同阶段数组,而两个 `sendResults` 各自 accepted。另以 11 个未完成请求产生 33 个阶段,poll 只返回 32 项,其中 submit_return 仅 10 项,轨迹没有截断标记;复现脚本 `target-harness/feat004-trace-cap-lab.cjs` SHA-256 `9628E4BCD7470749AE1DBA0C971B0FD45D07358E6E90ED8B51C039DBD8456F84`。故该轨迹不能证明并发时单个请求的回调顺序,缺失标签不证明事件未发生,也不能推断账本混淆或 QQ 现场线程;此前指定单次现场样本仍以其原始采集条件和独立证据为准。 + +重跑 `cargo run --manifest-path target-harness/feat004-trace-lab/Cargo.toml --offline --target-dir target-harness/feat004-trace-build --quiet` 后执行 `node target-harness/feat004-trace-lab.cjs`;脚本 SHA-256 `6C507A5808B94FD5A9C837FD0A9C0937EF48E1CF15A5E5D53253C03B98CB9FA3`,生成脚本 JSON `DFFFD156E594062E769EF4BADEE820CA0A7FC60FEE725B5E7A45E3CE6B85046A`,Rust 驱动 `50DBD4E86E1E5D4306697B6E79DBBC516C4673F0D8ABF670924BE3A0CE48B040`;材料在 ignored `target-harness/`。已更新[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)的跨请求和 overflow 边界及后续关联设计约束。本轮未更改实现、接入 QQ 或发送,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 停止合成探针补充离线核查(HEAD `3a2ab95`):从当前 `qq_v8.rs` 提取实际 START/STOP 脚本,在独立 Node VM 中核对无 listener、普通模式局部关闭覆盖同名全局变量、research pass、状态被更改时 fail、回调抛错时 error 且不泄露异常、移除异常仍返回失败并拒绝重启,共 6/6 通过。另在内存副本仅移除 `onRecvMsg` 的 stopped 守卫,原检查按预期失败(`stop_probe=fail`),未改源码;它只证明该指定变异被检查检测到。脚本 SHA-256 `20CB6EB3B764D61386D410981E6DD771F728EA2DB9B088CD6712B0EF7BF95A69`,变异脚本 `4DF524857551413724ACEE141D8AEFE83DD46985E476A15A08B755032E98DBDE`,失败日志 `F1B9AF89D766DCD6E460A8104B5879922B51F16297016C4E064A87C41BAAD5F9`,均在 ignored `target-harness/feat004-stop-probe-*`。 + +上轮最终 all-scope GitNexus 首次 partial,重跑完整结果 CRITICAL、519 个关联流程;关联包含文档标题,分析器也提示跨语言/流程截断,不能作为完整调用图。针对现有 probe 测试符号的本轮 impact 错误落在整个文件,报 CRITICAL;按准确 UID 重试为 UNKNOWN,结合源码确认该函数是独立 Node VM 测试、图将文件错误映射为调用者后,已将无 listener、普通构建局部关闭覆盖同名全局变量以及合成回调异常脱敏断言纳入现有测试;research 定向 5/5 通过,未修改原生实现。现有 probe 与测试仍未提交,真实迟到回调、callback OS 线程及最终 owner/drain 无新现场证据;本轮未接入或发送,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 离线续验(HEAD `3a2ab95`):GitNexus 原索引属于 WSL,项目 runner 此前误选 Windows CLI;改用原索引记录的 Linux Node 和 GitNexus 1.6.12 后,`analyze --index-only --pdg` 成功,MCP context 与 `status --json` 均指向本工作树和同一 HEAD、schema-4 runner current、无 incomplete reasons、content current。分析器另提示跨语言字段、调用候选与流程截断,图不覆盖所有动态关联。all-scope detect 报 HIGH、5 个已跟踪文件/8 符号/6 流程;未跟踪的观测合同不在该差异结果内,已人工审阅。`stop_listener` 上游为 `QqOwnerAdapter::native_op`;保留原有未提交合成探针,其只在 research 模式主动调用三个停止态 listener,不改变移除成功/失败判定,不能证明真实迟到回调、QQ callback 线程或全局 drain。 + +Windows research 定向 wrapper_send / wrapper_image_send / wrapper_image_contract / wrapper_query_contract 共 17/17,进程内串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 两套构建通过;隔离 research release 构建通过,EXE SHA-256 `EBA8E237A3D282761A25C0F227CE77E8385F9B06F4B6037BFEDBF5AB5F9CB`,bridge `4C5A385A9BF6B6F985027BCD29081B2D3D1CE9605E43B078A18E81A810ED8D56`。构建未加载现场;完整日志在 ignored `target-harness/feat004-observation-all-20261115.log` 和 `feat004-stop-probe-release-20261115.log`。本轮无 QQ 接入或发送;feat-004 仍 in-progress,真实线程、最终 owner/drain 与历史 G3 合同仍待证。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 离线续查(HEAD `3a2ab95`):PR 工作树原有未提交的停止合成探针及其测试保留原样;Windows `cargo test -p caligo-bridge --test wrapper_send --locked --offline --target-dir target-harness -- --test-threads=1` 5/5 通过,仅为合成合同。探针在停止函数内部直接调用 listener,不能证明 QQ 实际迟到回调或 native callback 线程。已建立[后续观测判定合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md),区分 JS 线程、native 入口、真实迟到与最终 owner/drain 的证据及 unknown;Windows GitNexus `status --json` 对该 WSL 路径 worktree 报 `not-git-repository`;显式 Git 路径后索引报 `foreign`,尚未取得可用图,未编辑原生代码或执行图检查。本轮未接入 QQ 或发送,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 停止隔离版现场(起点 `04ae7f8`):用户正常重启并指定最新 QQ 主进程;新根 PID 41684,创建 `2026-11-15T11:37:59.8919600Z`。固定 9.9.36-53644 五项 manifest、加载角色模块 hash、PE/backend 审计及唯一 Environment(0 读失败)通过。包含消息停止隔离修复的普通 release EXE / bridge SHA-256 为 `34BD52C5AD0AE3BE547D921085F9E5251CF301A40AD1289DB37CC7B3FFDC49D4` / `DBE259FC215E1A2141312D50474245844DE5B06AC03CBAB0B2FA83C57716A30F`。单次正式接入后 `listener_armed`、连接 Active 与管理端 verify-login HTTP 200 通过;该接口仅在桥接账号在线且与登记账号一致时返回成功。本轮 runner 零发送,journal 为空;未主动制造停止后的迟到消息或媒体回调。 + +管理器与 owner 停止退出码均 0;两个本轮 HTTP/SSE 端口不再可连接,QQ 同代次响应且保留一个 bridge 映射,不重接或热卸载。`listener_armed` 所记 owner 轮询线程与 callback OS 线程是不同证据;正常关闭不证明 QQ 登记项必定移除、已复制快照已执行、修复路径现场命中或全局 drain。本机 audit 对准入、构建 pin、零发送、空 journal、两项停止码和 listener owner TID 交叉检查通过,脚本/结果 SHA-256 `778BA313332DBFA92404A2C994CBBEA4553E3D1A96DB2719A58980099968BA63` / `3420D256413B6A8538A80AF82E085B9D1E4B945A959C5A204749CFBFE3CB0216`。进程创建时间与选择依据、准入、构建 pin、manager/owner 原始日志和零发送 runner 在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-stop-field-20261115/`;首次只读枚举的 WMI 查询因 shell 引号失败,改用脚本后成功,失败时未接入。此样本只验证新构建的接入、登录和正常停止,不提升 feat-004 完成状态,正式 callback 线程与最终 owner/drain 仍待证;不追测业务拒绝。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 监听器快照与停止隔离续核(起点 `496cc4a`):[PR #12 Windows CI](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo/actions/runs/43700611883/job/132770698657) 通过。对固定 9.9.36-53644 `wrapper.node` SHA-256 `0D8B94448F4DAFE7337B88D6A568B004224C37FCBE2BD1142C1AF7624FBD534C` 的 RTTI 及指令断言显示:候选 `KernelNotifyAdapter` 的 `+0x398` 登记结构在移除时按键搜索,命中后摘除节点并对节点 `+0x28` 的引用对执行 release;该对象两个已选虚槽使用同一偏移建立快照,复制引用对并增加其控制字段,遍历快照后释放。若先建立快照再移除登记项,移除自身不撤销已复制引用;这是条件静态路径,不证明现场对象类型、事件名、发生过该交错、最终 owner 或全局 drain。验证脚本/报告 SHA-256 `9A0E8E82E6C5B52C12D6C1AB1832520862762EEB4687C6718C13504BF4B90BA9` / `8AE4A41A73F91855DB301DFD1F8CC31C2CFEDA24B98E4262455A6D7263ABDF2A`,保存在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/`。 + +新增 wrapper 回归发现停止后的旧监听器即使不能影响新代次,仍可向旧接收队列写入及更改拒绝计数;修复为在三个消息回调入口检查 `R.stopped`,覆盖移除调用内同步回调、正常停止后的迟到通知及移除异常隔离。媒体完成回调保留独立迟到清理路径:初次尝试阻断该回调导致 `wrapper_image_contract` 临时目录清理回归失败,已保留该路径并复验图片/语音查询合同;原失败日志分别为 `target-harness/feat004-stopped-listener-before.log` 和 `feat004-stopped-listener-focused.log`。四组定向 `wrapper_send`、`wrapper_image_send`、`wrapper_image_contract`、`wrapper_query_contract` 共 16 项、Windows 进程内串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 和隔离普通 release 构建通过。all-scope GitNexus 检查首次 partial 保留,顺序重跑完整结果 CRITICAL(共享 wrapper;图有跨语言限制),结果在本机 `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/gitnexus-stopped-listener-final.json`;新实现尚未现场加载,不证明 QQ 内全局 callback 已停止或可卸载。`D8_START_JS` GitNexus impact 为 UNKNOWN,人工覆盖文本、图片、语音和下载回调源码及测试;未知图边不视为无影响。本轮未新接入或发送,不追测业务拒绝;正式 callback OS 线程和最终 owner/drain 仍待证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 回调线程与释放续核(起点 `2bc0eaa`):[PR #12 Windows CI](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo/actions/runs/43699597776/job/132767605201) 通过。固定 9.9.36-53644 的 `wrapper.node` SHA-256 `0D8B94448F4DAFE7337B88D6A568B004224C37FCBE2BD1142C1AF7624FBD534C` 的静态断言与 QQNT.dll import 映射显示:所选 `NodeIOperateCallback` 表项 `0x22A0878` 经 `0xC3F6CF`,将保存的 owner token 与 `uv_thread_self` 比较;相同则调用适配器槽,否则入队并调 `uv_async_send`。初始化路径取得 `napi_get_uv_event_loop` 并把 `0xC3F573` 传给 `uv_async_init`;消费函数换出链表后检查 `node::IsEnvironmentStopping`,停止分支跳过 invocation 并进入 payload/节点清理。以上只证明固定映像中的条件路径,不证明初始化/入队成功、实际执行线程、全部队列排空或宿主静默;`sendMsg` 捕获对象的现场动态类型仍未绑定,不能将所选 Promise 回调路径外推到 G3 或全部事件。 + +同一映像的 `removeKernelMsgListener` N-API thunk `0xFDBA14` 调用对象虚槽 `+0x18`;RTTI 候选 `KernelMsgService` 相应槽为 `0x3251D8`,仅会话有效等条件满足时调用 `0x3EEADC`,后者将标识交给 `0x7FB8E` 注册表 helper。接收对象的现场 RTTI、键命中、实际注销和此前回调排空未证;N-API thunk 的返回路径不提供删除计数,故 API 返回不证明全局 drain。Caligo 停止源码将 in-flight 标记 unknown,移除异常隔离;其 owner pump 自身 `uv_close` callback 标记 closed,未释放 handle 存储,不能据此声称 QQ 内部队列或 bridge 可热卸载。 + +只读进程清单于 `2026-11-15T09:42:29Z` 显示先前 PID 53716、42124 均已不存在,因此其各自进程代次与映射随进程退出结束;原因及退出前 callback 状态未知。PID 44580 创建 FILETIME 与先前现场一致,仍有 1 个 bridge 映射,保留、不重接或热卸载。固定映像验证脚本/报告 SHA-256 `A473AE6ADC4EA4C1703C578708A310B242904DD481481B4A0490752E4F3FE6CB` / `428365514CD844BC1F4D538AC838AB41FB7D0AFFA385AB1B245839AEAFD76C97`;只读清单脚本/报告 SHA-256 `7AF471B535C6D9F159529AB184E18FE47928BDAE1B6D544A1E55E160AB208F8A` / `713C9C3DFFB088ADD0AE6961D6E59D62BEBCCF701CE10059954037C614B74533`,均在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/`。历史 G3 的一次实际 callback OS TID 29124、drain TID 12244 和线程起始地址已记于 [R2 execution](docs/execution/2026-10-11-n4-response-recovery.md#2026-11-08-r2-callback-tid-start-routine--read-only-follow-up),不等于正式 wrapper 的 callback TID。Windows 串行定向 `resident_lifecycle` 22/22、`wrapper_send` 4/4 通过,仅属离线合同;日志 `target-harness/feat004-thread-lifetime-targeted.log`。仍需正式链路动态线程、最终 owner 与 drain 证据;feat-004 继续 in-progress。本轮没有新接入、消息或 QQ 进程写入;不再追测业务拒绝。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 发送准入决策:用户要求以正常账号连接为发送准入,对可正常投递的群聊/私聊发起发送,不再检测业务拒绝,也不再核验明确拒绝语义。指定 [Caligo_research](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo_research/tree/69c66bc6d0104dc26f3576f4acd60e403ffbafbc) 最后一次核查固定提交 `69c66bc6d0104dc26f3576f4acd60e403ffbafbc` 的发送结果、callback/Promise 与记录关联材料:所选 [Phase1471](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo_research/blob/69c66bc6d0104dc26f3576f4acd60e403ffbafbc/docs/research/2026-10-23-qqnt-msg-send-callback-result-provenance-phase1471.md) 和 [Phase3819](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo_research/blob/69c66bc6d0104dc26f3576f4acd60e403ffbafbc/docs/research/2026-11-03-qqnt-sendmsg-event-record-correlation-crosswalk-phase3819.md) 仅针对 9.9.33-52230 固定 hash,均未建立业务码语义或送达关联;未发现可移用于现行 9.9.36 的明确业务拒绝证据。明确拒绝语义因此记录为已知缺口,不再追测,不将旧码 120 解释为拒绝。 + +当前正式文本链路的 `AccountActor::submit_send` 要求 Active 和同会话身份,监听器另要求可用 QQ 会话;`build_send_js` 进行路由与发送,没有禁言或对端拒收预查询。Active 表示 core/bridge 连接,不单独证明当前账号登录;现有登录身份查询可独立核对,但未证明它在每次发送前自动运行。因此无须移除拒绝预查询,用户提出的账号连接检查不能仅凭 Active 宣称完全实现。账号连接允许提交不是单次送达证明:有对应强身份和回读才确认成功,不明整数或其他未确认结果仍为 unknown,保留诊断且不自动重发。目标格式、身份映射、容量、版本和生命周期边界继续按现有合同处理。本次只改变验收范围及记录,不删除已确认失败的账本兼容;feature 的相关完成条件已按用户决定修订。callback OS 线程、最终释放和历史 G3 consumer 合同不随拒绝语义豁免,feat-004 暂保持 in-progress;本轮未接入 QQ、未发送。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 结果码顺序复核(起点 `d757ac5`):[PR #12 的 Windows CI](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo/actions/runs/43697545380/job/132761311783) 已通过。用户指定的参考研究仓库固定提交 `7cf025fe1e7f9c609e02a8643c6e6398eeec0d64` 的 [sendMsg 封装](https://github.com/Eternal-Wanderer-Vegetable/Napcat-Snowluma-research/blob/7cf025fe1e7f9c609e02a8643c6e6398eeec0d64/packages/snowcat-core/apis/msg.ts) 检查 `result === 0` 并另等成功状态更新;它不能证明任意非零码或 120 的业务语义。旧 9.9.33 静态回调材料绑定不同 hash,不移用为现行 ABI 结论。 + +本轮对 9.9.36-53644 的固定 `wrapper.node` SHA-256 `0D8B94448F4DAFE7337B88D6A568B004224C37FCBE2BD1142C1AF7624FBD534C` 离线核对:`sendMsg` 的 RTTI 类型表项指向 `0x3964BA`,该片段读取一个输入 DWORD 并通过捕获对象的虚槽 `+8` 转交;另一 RTTI 类型 `NodeIOperateCallback` 的 `+8` 表项指向 `0x22A0878`,将 EDX 写入回调状态 `+0x18`;既有该 hash 的独立静态记录将 resolver `0x22A0AB0` 的 `+0x18` 字段与 `result` 对应。静态表项不证明 sendMsg 捕获对象运行时类型、这两段与现场 120 是同一路径、实际 callback 线程或 drain。验证脚本/报告 SHA-256 `ECFD31D064E0DD9024A8BAD390023D9022855D8DF1B2CA6EBACAE73763FEE4C1` / `C7B274236C2379829BEC400D610E88B87148178168A2974ACE95A9963FA8F111`,保存在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/`。 + +发现非零 Promise 在 add 尚未出现时会立即判为 rejected,而其他顺序下同一类结果保守 unknown;没有证据能保证稍后的 add 不出现或证明所有非零码都是明确拒绝。针对该顺序的回归先失败,修复后统一为 unknown 并保留安全整数 `send_result_ambiguous=`,不改变已确认拒绝的独立持久化合同。Windows 定向 `wrapper_send` 4/4 与进程内串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,原失败日志 `target-harness/feat004-promise-first-before.log`。all-scope 结构化变更图为 CRITICAL;部分流程错误归因于文档标题,图不等于实际影响面,全量结果存本机 `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/gitnexus-promise-first-all.json`。本轮未接入 QQ、未发送;旧样本保持 unknown、不重发,feat-004 仍 in-progress。GitNexus 以本工作树 `d757ac5` 刷新,`build_send_js` 上游 LOW,含 `send_text` 与 `QqOwnerAdapter::native_op`;JS 内部动态关联仍须源码核对。 + +2026-11-15 收尾检查:Windows 进程内串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all`、最终普通与 research release 构建、文档检查及 `git diff --check` 通过。GitNexus all-scope 结构化结果为 9 文件、13 个符号、522 条流程、CRITICAL;共享 V8 图映射含不匹配的文件级结果,已补源码审阅,不能把图映射视为现场安全证明。全量报告存于 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/gitnexus-final-all.json`。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 业务拒绝续验:发现 `ConfirmedFailure` 原因仅存内存,重启后为空;回归先失败,现将原因作为可选字段与请求状态同条持久化,旧记录缺字段仍可恢复且不改写。Windows 串行 `recovery_contract` 12/12、`init.ps1 -Mode all` 和隔离 research release 通过,原失败日志在 `target-harness/feat004-rejection-recovery-before.log`。新增字段兼容旧记录,不推断旧失败原因。 + +用户确认登记群可作禁言负例。新根 7040 完成准入和登录后,首次禁言状态 HTTP 查询因 WinError 10053 中断,未取得结果、零发送,正常停止且 bridge 保留。再换新根 39012,curl 查询成功且账号与登记群匹配,但个人禁言时间为 `2026-09-01T13:06:03Z`,早于本次时间,故前置门拒绝、零发送;manager/owner 均退出码 0。用户随后明确给出另一禁言测试群,与旧登记群不同;已作为当次独立范围仅登记本机,待新进程和个人禁言核对。原始私有材料在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-group-reject-20261115/` 和 `feat004-group-reject-curl-20261115/`;不得把这两轮当作业务拒绝样本,不复用或热卸载旧进程。 + +新根 42124 在用户指定的另一测试群通过精确模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment、登录及当前账号个人禁言查询。单次新标记 HTTP 200 / OneBot 1501 unknown,阶段为 registered→submit_enter→submit_return→matched_add→promise_unknown;journal 是同一请求的 Queued→DispatchIntent→NativeStarted→DeliveryUnknown,审计仅有 `text_submit_unknown`。用户确认群内未见;交付仍为 unknown,不是已证业务拒绝,原样本不重发。manager/owner 均退出码 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge。材料在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-designated-muted-group-20261115/`。 + +后续源码核对发现 add 已到而 Promise 返回非零整数时,旧代码保守 unknown 却丢弃整数;合成回归先失败,修复为继续 unknown 并把安全整数写入审计,包括精确回读先于 Promise 的交错;拒绝的 Promise 不写异常原文。`wrapper_send` 4/4 与 `recovery_contract` 13/13 通过,后者验证 unknown 的码在重启后仍可审计且不重派。本次 42124 的实际 Promise 返回类型/码没有被采集,不能从阶段推定,也不能回填。用户另行授权的一条不同新标记的执行结果见下段。 + +新根 44580 通过精确模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment、登录及同一账号有效个人禁言检查。另行授权的一次不同标记返回 HTTP 200 / OneBot 1501 unknown,用户确认群内未见;阶段为 registered→submit_enter→submit_return→matched_add→promise_unknown,同请求 journal 为 Queued→DispatchIntent→NativeStarted→DeliveryUnknown,审计保留 `send_result_ambiguous=120`。停止后的 journal 副本用实际 `AccountActor::open` 恢复,unknown 和整数 120 保留、不在待重派队列。此整数的来源是本次 wrapper Promise,不能仅凭禁言相关性或另一合成 fixture 将 120 解释为业务拒绝;两个样本均不重发。manager/owner 退出码 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge。原始材料和隔离恢复工具在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-muted-new-code-20261115/`,定向和 Windows 进程内串行 `init.ps1 -Mode all`、隔离 research release 通过。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 续验:正式 `caligo_qq_daemon_client_start` 使用 `QqOwnerAdapter`/V8 wrapper;历史 `native_resident`/G3 consumer 是 research 门控的另一入口,不把两者的 ABI、回调线程或寿命证据互换。新增正式 wrapper 合成测试覆盖发送前登记、`sendMsg` 内 inline add/update、重复回调仅一次精确回读与终结、停止后的旧监听器/旧 Promise 不影响新代次。固定 QQNT.dll `75B19E58A123B0513E99DF4DF3EBC6524478535BA44651024D6A20821F5086E5` 离线导出核对 17/17;具名导出存在不证明签名或释放合同。GitNexus 在 `e21aaf9` 的增量索引对共享 V8 文件返回 CRITICAL 文件级结果,`D8_STOP_JS` 符号 UNKNOWN;源码补查 owner pump、媒体和测试引用,不以空图当无影响。 + +固定 9.9.36-53644 的新根 53716 通过模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 和登录核验。research 诊断版单次主动私聊和同轮 HTTP `get_msg` 成功,用户确认对端一条;单请求 journal 顺序为 Queued→DispatchIntent→NativeStarted→ConfirmedSuccess,稳定 ID 与持久记录一致。无敏感值的有界阶段依次为 registered→submit_enter→submit_return→matched_add→matched_update→promise_accepted→readback_matched→settled;两次阶段报告由监听器注册的同一 owner 轮询 TID 写出,不能将轮询 TID 认作 QQ callback OS TID。manager/owner 退出码 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge,不重发或热卸载。诊断版 EXE/bridge SHA-256 `45F99D7A959E0CDC5651140680E9921370BDAA0590E9CA717D6E5ABDDDA84E73` / `BB194C443C75C5953E2D87381264CC56C7BD231B92F187E30307B874EDC04BBF`;精确 profile、原始数据、脱敏阶段、校验脚本及导出审计在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-send-trace-20261115/`。该指定样本不证明业务拒绝、未知结果的现场行为或全局 callback drain。 + +续审停止路径发现 `removeKernelMsgListener` 抛异常时曾返回 `STOPPED` 并误报移除:合成回归先失败,修复为保留 stopped 对象、返回固定错误供 resident quarantine;保留对象的再次启动亦明确拒绝,回归先失败后修复。基线复现脚本第一次从 Windows Git 读取 WSL 创建的 worktree 失败,改由 Linux Git/Node 执行后成功复现,日志留在上述本机目录。该停止修复未加载到本次 QQ,正常返回也不证明 QQ 内部已全局 drain。最终全仓首次复验的 `native_adapter_contract` 为 6 PASS / 1 FAIL,inline 用例的全局 native_ops 计数为 2 而非 1,其恰一次 outcome 断言已通过;核实 WSL 环境设置未传入 Windows,实际未串行。测试共享累计计数且以绝对值 1 断言,失败日志中另一个发送测试先执行,故测试顺序可解释该计数。Windows 进程内指定串行后该用例单独通过;原日志留在 `target-harness/feat004-complete-all.log`。最终串行全仓、独立普通 release、定向测试和文档检查结果见本轮交接;`feat-004` 保持 in-progress,真实业务拒绝、QQ callback OS 线程与 native 最终释放仍缺证据。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 进行中:基于 PR #12 的 `54b6a5a`,正式文本发送预登记后若 `sendMsg` 抛异常、Promise 拒绝或结果格式不明,改为保留 unknown;整数拒绝码保留,受理仍不等于稳定 ID 成功。Windows 定向 `wrapper_send` 3/3(含异常、拒绝码、受理、超时/停止/替换后的迟到结果),`recovery_contract` 10/10,`init.ps1 -Mode all` 与隔离普通 release 构建通过。首次 PowerShell 内部重定向把 Cargo stderr 当错误,外部重定向复验通过,原日志保留本机。GitNexus 索引绑定本工作树 `54b6a5a`,`build_send_js` 上游 LOW(`send_text`、`native_op`);嵌入 JS 与跨语言调用需结合源码审查。 + +同日 resident 回调路径补充:回归先复现 unknown 后迟到拒绝被再次输出,修复后该路径只允许有界窗口内非空稳定 ID 更正,空 ID、重复 unknown 和迟到拒绝不再终结。`complete_sends` 图上游为 UNKNOWN;源码确认 owner 泵调用,比较 `drain_send_responses` 的强身份限定后修复。最终 Windows `init.ps1 -Mode all` 和新的隔离普通 release 构建通过;上述复现失败保留。新构建未用于前一发送样本。 + +同日固定 QQ 9.9.36-53644 新根 7204 经精确模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 只读准入,首次预检因创建时间低位精度不一致拒绝、未接入,使用进程 API 完整时间复核通过。正式修复版单次主动私聊返回 OneBot retcode 0 和持久 ID;随后的 `get_msg` 客户端连接 WinError 10053,无 HTTP 响应。停止后账本同 ID 的两次修订均匹配账号、目标、native ID 与标记;用户确认对端收到一条;停止后使用账本副本在隔离 manager 经本地 HTTP 回放 get_msg 通过,不能替代现场 HTTP 或解释 10053。manager/owner 停止码 0,QQ 响应且 bridge 保留;不重发。原始材料仅在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-acceptance-20261115/`。本次现场构建不包含随后 resident 迟到结果修复。现场回程各阶段、拒绝码与 ABI/线程/寿命尚未闭合;`feat-004` 保持 in-progress。 + +随后新根 42768 通过固定模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 及登录核验,使用包含两处修复的新普通构建,以停止账本副本对原发送执行一次现场 HTTP `get_msg`,返回 200 / retcode 0,持久 ID、私聊、发送者与正文匹配;本轮零发送。manager/owner 退出码 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge。本样本为跨代次只读证据,不能解释旧 10053,也不能替代回调时序、拒绝码及 native ABI/寿命门。原始材料在 ignored `local-evidence/feat004-readback-20261115/`。 + +2026-11-15 feat-003 验收启动:基于 main `db188c45` 的跟踪 PR 分支,在隔离 worktree 核对 N1/T04/T05。新增 [wrapper 接收测试](crates/caligo-core/tests/wrapper_message_chain.rs),验证同私聊同文不同 native ID 均保留、未知会话类型拒绝且不影响随后群消息。Windows x64 锁定依赖离线测试:`qq_wire_golden` 6/6、`qq_text_codec` 4/4、`runtime_contract` 11/11、原 wrapper 链路及新增用例各通过;`init.ps1 -Mode default` 与正式 release EXE/bridge 构建通过。首次用 PowerShell 5 内部重定向运行 default 时将 Cargo stderr 误判为错误,改进程外重定向后通过,原日志保留本机。上述是 LAB,不替代真实记录字段与同文不同 native ID 的现场证据;feat-003 仍 in-progress。现场须指定新鲜 A 进程、逐项准入后才能接入,见 [handoff](session-handoff.md)。 + +同日现场两轮:指定 A 的两次新进程分别通过固定模块、PE/backend 与唯一 Environment 只读准入,各以正式 release 单次接入并报告 `listener_armed`。两次管理端登录核验均 HTTP 409;首轮未保存正文,第二轮等待 Active 后返回“桥接尚未就绪”,具体来源未确定。两轮均未采集或发送消息;manager 与 owner 退出码均为 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge。私有记录分别在 ignored `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-20261115/` 和 `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt2-20261115/`。先离线定位 NotReady,再按当次准入合同决定下一步;不在旧进程重接。 + +GitNexus 首次变更检查报告 CRITICAL、511 条受影响流程;CLI 仅显示前 10 条,结果截断。后续重建索引并通过 MCP 保存全量结构化结果:4 文件、6 个符号、122 条流程、CRITICAL,未报告 partial/truncated;结果保留于本机 `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-20261115/gitnexus-mcp-final.json`。图中跨语言推断仍有覆盖限制,不能把结果视为现场安全证明。`init.ps1 -Mode docs` 与 `git diff --check` 通过。 + +2026-11-15 后续离线定位:`NotReady` 可由多个不同层级返回,第二轮没有足够日志确定其来源。`query_login` 上游 impact 为 HIGH;在 [qq_entry](crates/caligo-bridge/src/qq_entry.rs) 添加仅 `research` 构建启用的固定白名单诊断,未知/恶意字段归为固定 other 标签,不输出原始报告、身份或昵称,不修改查询结果与清理分支。隐私定向测试通过;标签扩展前 Windows `init.ps1 -Mode all` 通过,扩展后隐私测试与研究 release 重建通过。诊断版 EXE SHA-256 `875D02AF33739BDD618A395CE2AABEE970142A724185D8BB842F61C784E8DF79`,bridge `E539112CEBA9E96B9013288C74366BD1BC8F27CEE6D4EA747B2D9424C9A3F7CF`;基于 main 加本次研究诊断源码构建。诊断可能不覆盖 resident 预检或 broker 层的失败;缺标签时仍为 unknown。新现场仍需用户重启指定 A 和当次准入。 + +2026-11-15 第三轮只读诊断:用户指定的新 QQ 进程通过精确模块、PE/backend 和唯一 Environment 准入,研究诊断版单次接入、监听就绪且连接 Active。一次登录核验仍 HTTP 409,固定标签为 `status_current_account_mismatch`,监听器为 `listener_remove_returned`;即本轮实际登录账号不等于本机登记 A,不能推断前两轮的具体原因。本机四份既有 A 登记互相一致;用户确认本轮接入端为原登记 B,对端为原登记 A,仍使用原登记测试群。未采集或发送消息。manager 与 owner 退出码均为 0,QQ 响应、bridge 保留;私有证据在 ignored `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt3-20261115/`。不得放宽身份校验、在旧代次重接或自动重试。 + +2026-11-15 第四轮角色调整:用户指定的新接入端通过准入,研究诊断版单次接入、监听及当前账号核验通过,SSE 已就绪。用户确认发送三条同文样本;入站采集未收到匹配事件。只读账本核对发现三条不同消息身份(私聊两条、登记群一条)的 sender 均是本轮接入端,私聊有追加修订,不能判对端入站通过。人工发起管理器关闭,owner 停止码 0、QQ 响应且保留 bridge;HTTP/SSE 不再监听,未发现该轮 manager 进程,但采集脚本未及时取得 manager 退出码。原样本不重发,私有证据在 ignored `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt4-20261115/`。下一轮先由用户确认本轮对端,再重启指定新鲜接入端、重新准入并使用新标记。 + +2026-11-15 第五轮:新接入端通过准入、登录核验及 SSE 就绪;至少一条对端私聊事件经采集器的会话/发送者/ID 校验,但首次现场 HTTP `get_msg` 请求以 WinError 10053 中断,未保存该 SSE 原文,也无 HTTP 响应。用户确认三条从对端发送;关闭后账本仅有两条匹配的私聊消息,发送者、对端、账号、平台时间和正文可核对,OneBot ID 与 native 身份各不相同,群样本未入账,不能推断其是否在停止前到达。对账本副本用同源码的 research 构建只读调用生产 `get_msg` handler,两条均通过;这不是现场 HTTP 通过。manager/owner 退出码 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge。首次回读工具构建复用被映射 DLL 的目录而遇 LNK1104;改独立目录构建、只读回放成功,原失败保留,未卸载 DLL。原始现场和回放材料在 ignored `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt5-20261115/`。不重发旧样本;现场 HTTP、登记群同文及完整 T04/T05 仍待验,feat-003 不提升。 + +回放工具准备时直接 `rustc` 链接两次报 E0463;独立 Cargo 项目首轮因嵌套工作区配置失败,补 `[workspace]` 后仍因复用已映射 DLL 目录遇上述 LNK1104,最终使用独立 target 通过。另在隔离 manager 中载入账本副本,两条消息经正常本地 HTTP `get_msg` 均返回 0 且字段匹配,无 QQ 接入或发送,manager 退出码 0。针对 HTTP 的 `onebot_http_lab` 锁定依赖离线测试 1/1 通过;这些回放不能解释或排除本次现场 10053,也不能当作现场 HTTP 通过。该类客户端写入中断在 2026-11-14 语音下载记录中也出现过,原因未证。 + +2026-11-15 第六轮只读复验:新接入端通过精确模块、PE/backend、唯一 Environment 准入及当前登录核验;隔离 manager 载入第五轮账本副本,正式桥接就绪后使用 curl 对两条原私聊各执行一次 HTTP `get_msg`,两次均 HTTP 200 / retcode 0,持久 ID、私聊类型、对端发送者与正文匹配。两条原消息不重发,本轮零发送;manager/owner 退出码 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge。此为跨代次、研究诊断版的只读 HTTP 证据,不能解释第五轮 10053 或补齐群样本;feat-003 保持 in-progress。私有材料在 ignored `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt6-20261115/`。 + +2026-11-15 第七轮登记群:固定 QQ 9.9.36-53644 精确模块和研究诊断版通过当次准入、登录核验及 SSE 就绪。对端在登记群单次各发送两条同文样本,两条 SSE、现场 HTTP `get_msg`(各 HTTP 200 / retcode 0)与持久消息核对通过,OneBot ID 和 native ID 各不相同。关闭后只读复核 journal 副本,两条原始 wrapper、journal、消息账本、SSE 与 HTTP 的对应身份、正文及平台秒时间一致;第五轮两条私聊的原始 wrapper、journal 与消息账本也一致,HTTP 则为第六轮跨代次只读证据。第四轮三条自发私聊/群记录的原始 wrapper、journal 和账本最新修订核对通过;首次将早期自发事件与最新账本修订时间直接比较失败,修正为按同身份最新修订核对,保留原失败。manager/owner 退出码均为 0,QQ 响应并保留 bridge;本轮工具零发送。原始材料分别在 ignored `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt4-20261115/`、`feat003-acceptance-attempt5-20261115/`、`feat003-acceptance-attempt7-20261115/`。 + +feat-003 三项完成门按以上固定构建及样本收口:私聊/群 wire golden 6/6;私聊、群与自发消息记录级字段已有对应证据;私聊/群同文不同 native ID 均保留,未知会话类型拒绝及后续消息不串会话由 wrapper LAB 覆盖。状态提升为 done;这是跨代次、部分使用 research 诊断的指定样本验收,不代表其他 QQ 构建、全部通知类型、完整 OneBot 互通、重连或长期运行通过,第五轮 10053 根因仍 unknown。 + +收口检查:Windows `init.ps1 -Mode docs` 通过(15 份维护文档、408 条本地链接、37 条历史入口、10 个 feature),`git diff --check` 通过。GitNexus 对 3 个状态文件的完整结构化变更检查返回 LOW、3 个符号、0 流程,未报告 partial/truncated;索引的跨语言/流程覆盖有限,0 不证明无影响,已逐文件审阅状态及完成条件。结构化结果保存在本机 `local-evidence/feat003-acceptance-attempt7-20261115/gitnexus-changes.private.json`。 + 2026-11-15 准备 v0.3.0:workspace 版本与 lock 同步,README 指向包含管理入口和正式桥的发布包;现场能力与 feature 状态不变。本机 Windows `init.ps1 -Mode default` 与锁定依赖的普通 release 构建通过;打包首次因 Windows Git 无法解析 WSL 工作树路径失败,显式指定工作树 Git 路径后通过。CI 和发布资产以 GitHub Release 为准;未运行现场验收。 2026-11-15 README 按 main 更新:区分 v0.2.0 发布包与后续源码的管理入口及正式桥,补充 QQ 接入前提和文档导航;未改变产品能力状态。Windows PowerShell `init.ps1 -Mode docs` 通过(15 个维护文档、403 个本地链接、37 条历史条目、10 个 feature);未运行 Rust 测试或现场验收。交接见 [session-handoff](session-handoff.md)。 diff --git a/scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.mjs b/scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88cf87f --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/** Read-only parser for bounded, sanitized text_send_trace stage logs. + * Output is observational only: missing reports and native callback threads remain unknown. + */ +import fs from 'node:fs'; +import { resolve } from 'node:path'; +import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; + +const MAX_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024; +const MAX_BATCHES = 32; +const MAX_EVENTS = 32; +const MAX_ID = 2_147_483_647; +const STAGES = new Set(['registered','submit_enter','submit_return','promise_accepted', + 'promise_rejected','promise_unknown','matched_add','matched_update', + 'readback_matched','readback_mismatch','settled']); +const unknown = reason => ({status:'unknown', reason, completeness:'unknown'}); +const positiveId = value => Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value > 0 && value <= MAX_ID; + +/** Parse only the exact whitelisted schema emitted by the current Rust sanitizer. */ +export function analyzeTraceLog(input) { + if (typeof input !== 'string' || Buffer.byteLength(input,'utf8') > MAX_BYTES) return unknown('input_limit'); + const groups = new Map(); + let batches = 0; + for (const raw of input.replace(/^\uFEFF/, '').split(/\r?\n/)) { + if (!raw.trim()) continue; + let row; + try { row = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { return unknown('invalid_log'); } + if (!row || typeof row !== 'object' || Array.isArray(row)) return unknown('invalid_log'); + if (row.stage !== 'text_send_trace') continue; + if (++batches > MAX_BATCHES || row.ok !== true || typeof row.detail !== 'string' || + row.detail.length > 8192 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_'{}\[\]:,]*$/.test(row.detail)) return unknown('invalid_trace'); + let detail; + const normalized = row.detail.replaceAll("'", '"'); + try { detail = JSON.parse(normalized); } catch { return unknown('invalid_trace'); } + if (!detail || typeof detail !== 'object' || Array.isArray(detail) || + !Number.isSafeInteger(detail.generation) || detail.generation < 0 || detail.generation > MAX_ID || + typeof detail.incomplete !== 'boolean' || !Array.isArray(detail.events) || detail.events.length > MAX_EVENTS) + return unknown('invalid_trace'); + const cleanEvents = []; + for (const event of detail.events) { + if (!event || typeof event !== 'object' || Array.isArray(event) || !positiveId(event.seq) || !STAGES.has(event.stage)) + return unknown('invalid_trace'); + cleanEvents.push({seq:event.seq,stage:event.stage}); + } + // append_stage replaces JSON quotes; canonical reconstruction rejects extra or duplicate keys. + if (JSON.stringify({events:cleanEvents,generation:detail.generation,incomplete:detail.incomplete}) !== normalized) + return unknown('invalid_trace'); + if (detail.incomplete || detail.generation === 0) return unknown('incomplete_trace'); + for (const event of cleanEvents) { + const key = `${detail.generation}:${event.seq}`; + if (!groups.has(key)) groups.set(key,{generation:detail.generation,seq:event.seq,stages:[]}); + groups.get(key).stages.push(event.stage); + } + } + if (!batches || !groups.size) return unknown('no_trace_records'); + return {status:'observed',batches,completeness:'unknown',scope:'unverified',groups:[...groups.values()]}; +} + +function main(args) { + if (args.length !== 1) return unknown('usage'); + let fd; + try { + fd = fs.openSync(args[0], 'r'); + if (!fs.fstatSync(fd).isFile()) return unknown('input_unavailable'); + const buffer = Buffer.alloc(MAX_BYTES + 1); + let size = 0, count; + while (size < buffer.length && (count = fs.readSync(fd,buffer,size,buffer.length-size,null)) > 0) size += count; + if (size > MAX_BYTES) return unknown('input_limit'); + return analyzeTraceLog(buffer.subarray(0,size).toString('utf8')); + } catch { return unknown('input_unavailable'); } + finally { if (fd !== undefined) { try { fs.closeSync(fd); } catch {} } } +} + +if (process.argv[1] && pathToFileURL(resolve(process.argv[1])).href === import.meta.url) { + const result = main(process.argv.slice(2)); + process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result) + '\n'); + if (result.status !== 'observed') process.exitCode = 2; +} diff --git a/scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.test.mjs b/scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.test.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aad6994 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.test.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +import test from 'node:test'; +import assert from 'node:assert/strict'; +import { analyzeTraceLog } from './analyze-text-send-trace.mjs'; + +const detail = (generation, incomplete, events) => JSON.stringify({events,generation,incomplete}).replaceAll('"', "'"); +const line = (stage, value, ok=true) => JSON.stringify({stage,ok,detail:value}); + +test('correlates fixed labels across batches without exposing other log content', () => { + const log=[line('listener_armed','secret-account'), + line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,[{seq:1,stage:'registered'},{seq:2,stage:'registered'}])), + line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,[{seq:2,stage:'promise_accepted'},{seq:1,stage:'promise_unknown'}]))].join('\n'); + const result=analyzeTraceLog(log); + assert.deepEqual(result,{status:'observed',batches:2,completeness:'unknown',scope:'unverified',groups:[ + {generation:1,seq:1,stages:['registered','promise_unknown']}, + {generation:1,seq:2,stages:['registered','promise_accepted']}]}); + assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(result).includes('secret-account')); +}); + +test('treats missing, incomplete, malformed or noncanonical data as unknown', () => { + assert.equal(analyzeTraceLog(line('other','secret')).status,'unknown'); + for (const bad of [line('text_send_trace',detail(1,true,[])),line('text_send_trace',"{'events':[],'generation':1,'incomplete':false,'secret':'x'}"), + line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,[{seq:1,stage:'secret'}])),line('text_send_trace',"{'events':[],'generation':1,'generation':2,'incomplete':false}"),line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,[{seq:0,stage:'registered'}])), + line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,[{seq:1,stage:'registered'}]),false),'not-json']) { + const result=analyzeTraceLog(bad);assert.equal(result.status,'unknown');assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(result).includes('secret')); + } +}); + +test('rejects over-budget logs and events', () => { + assert.equal(analyzeTraceLog('x'.repeat(4*1024*1024+1)).status,'unknown'); + const events=Array.from({length:33},()=>({seq:1,stage:'registered'})); + assert.equal(analyzeTraceLog(line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,events))).status,'unknown'); + const rows=Array.from({length:33},()=>line('text_send_trace',detail(1,false,[]))).join('\n'); + assert.equal(analyzeTraceLog(rows).status,'unknown'); +}); diff --git a/scripts/lbr-session-model.mjs b/scripts/lbr-session-model.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b780040 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/lbr-session-model.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/** Offline state model. It has no ETW backend and must not control real sessions. */ +const REQUIRED = ['isolated','privateOutput','bounded','noConflict','clockDefined']; +const VALID_ID = /^[a-f0-9]{32}$/; + +export class LabSessionModel { + #state = 'new'; + #handle = null; + #identity; + #outcome = 'unknown'; + #cleanup = 'not_needed'; + + constructor(identity) { + if (typeof identity !== 'string' || !VALID_ID.test(identity)) throw new TypeError('invalid lab identity'); + this.#identity = identity; + } + snapshot() { + return Object.freeze({state:this.#state, outcome:this.#outcome, cleanup:this.#cleanup}); + } + preflight(facts) { + if (this.#state !== 'new') throw new Error('invalid transition'); + if (!facts || REQUIRED.some(key => facts[key] !== true)) { + this.#state = 'refused'; + return null; + } + this.#state = 'ready'; + return null; + } + begin() { + if (this.#state !== 'ready') throw new Error('invalid transition'); + this.#state = 'starting'; + return Object.freeze({action:'start_lab_session', identity:this.#identity}); + } + started(result) { + if (this.#state !== 'starting') throw new Error('invalid transition'); + if (!result || result.kind !== 'started' || result.identity !== this.#identity || + typeof result.handle !== 'string' || !VALID_ID.test(result.handle)) { + // A failed or ambiguous start may have created a session without returning ownership. + this.#state = 'ownership_unknown'; + this.#cleanup = 'unknown'; + return null; + } + this.#handle = result.handle; + this.#state = 'running'; + this.#cleanup = 'pending'; + return null; + } + finish(reason) { + if (this.#state !== 'running' || !['complete','failure','timeout'].includes(reason)) throw new Error('invalid transition'); + this.#outcome = reason === 'complete' ? 'awaiting_cleanup' : 'unknown'; + this.#state = 'stopping'; + return Object.freeze({action:'stop_owned_lab_session', identity:this.#identity, handle:this.#handle}); + } + stopped(result) { + if (this.#state !== 'stopping') throw new Error('invalid transition'); + if (!result || result.kind !== 'stopped' || result.identity !== this.#identity || result.handle !== this.#handle) { + this.#state = 'cleanup_unknown'; + this.#cleanup = 'unknown'; + this.#outcome = 'unknown'; + return null; + } + this.#handle = null; + this.#state = 'closed'; + this.#cleanup = 'confirmed_by_backend'; + if (this.#outcome === 'awaiting_cleanup') this.#outcome = 'workload_completed'; + return null; + } + controllerLost() { + if (!['starting','running','stopping'].includes(this.#state)) throw new Error('invalid transition'); + this.#handle = null; + this.#state = 'ownership_unknown'; + this.#cleanup = 'unknown'; + this.#outcome = 'unknown'; + } +} diff --git a/scripts/lbr-session-model.test.mjs b/scripts/lbr-session-model.test.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aa1190 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/lbr-session-model.test.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +import test from 'node:test'; +import assert from 'node:assert/strict'; +import { LabSessionModel } from './lbr-session-model.mjs'; + +const id='1'.repeat(32), handle='2'.repeat(32), other='3'.repeat(32); +const ready={isolated:true,privateOutput:true,bounded:true,noConflict:true,clockDefined:true}; +const opened=() => { const m=new LabSessionModel(id); m.preflight(ready); m.begin(); m.started({kind:'started',identity:id,handle}); return m; }; + +test('successful lifecycle stops only the acknowledged owned handle', () => { + const m=opened(); assert.deepEqual(m.finish('complete'),{action:'stop_owned_lab_session',identity:id,handle}); + m.stopped({kind:'stopped',identity:id,handle}); + assert.deepEqual(m.snapshot(),{state:'closed',outcome:'workload_completed',cleanup:'confirmed_by_backend'}); + assert.throws(()=>m.finish('complete')); +}); +test('each unknown preflight fact refuses before start', () => { + for (const key of Object.keys(ready)) for (const value of [false,undefined,1]) { + const m=new LabSessionModel(id); m.preflight({...ready,[key]:value}); + assert.equal(m.snapshot().state,'refused'); assert.throws(()=>m.begin()); + } +}); +test('collision, ambiguous start and unowned or malformed acknowledgements cannot stop', () => { + for (const result of [null,{kind:'collision'},{kind:'started',identity:other,handle},{kind:'started',identity:id,handle:'bad'}]) { + const m=new LabSessionModel(id); m.preflight(ready); m.begin(); m.started(result); + assert.deepEqual(m.snapshot(),{state:'ownership_unknown',outcome:'unknown',cleanup:'unknown'}); + assert.throws(()=>m.finish('failure')); + } +}); +test('timeout and workload failure remain unknown even after confirmed stop', () => { + for (const reason of ['timeout','failure']) { + const m=opened(); m.finish(reason); m.stopped({kind:'stopped',identity:id,handle}); + assert.deepEqual(m.snapshot(),{state:'closed',outcome:'unknown',cleanup:'confirmed_by_backend'}); + } +}); +test('bad or failed stop acknowledgement does not claim cleanup or retry', () => { + for (const result of [null,{kind:'stopped',identity:other,handle},{kind:'stopped',identity:id,handle:other},{kind:'failed',identity:id,handle}]) { + const m=opened(); m.finish('complete'); m.stopped(result); + assert.deepEqual(m.snapshot(),{state:'cleanup_unknown',outcome:'unknown',cleanup:'unknown'}); + assert.throws(()=>m.stopped({kind:'stopped',identity:id,handle})); + } +}); +test('controller loss never guesses ownership or produces a stop', () => { + for (const phase of ['starting','running','stopping']) { + const m=new LabSessionModel(id); m.preflight(ready); m.begin(); + if (phase!=='starting') m.started({kind:'started',identity:id,handle}); + if (phase==='stopping') m.finish('complete'); + assert.equal(m.controllerLost(),undefined); + assert.deepEqual(m.snapshot(),{state:'ownership_unknown',outcome:'unknown',cleanup:'unknown'}); + assert.throws(()=>m.finish('failure')); + } +}); +test('out of order transitions and invalid identities fail', () => { + assert.throws(()=>new LabSessionModel('NT Kernel Logger')); + const m=new LabSessionModel(id); assert.throws(()=>m.started({kind:'started',identity:id,handle})); + assert.throws(()=>m.finish('complete')); assert.equal(m.snapshot().state,'new'); +}); diff --git a/scripts/poll-result-ack-model.mjs b/scripts/poll-result-ack-model.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b271d94 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/poll-result-ack-model.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +// Offline state model only: this module is not wired to the QQ bridge. +// The caller must supply a unique listener generation and acknowledge only after +// independently accepting the complete batch. This is not a journal ACK. +export class PollResultAckModel { + #generation; #entries = new Map(); #flight = null; #revision = 0; #batch = 0; + #capacity; #maxBatch; #maxBytes; #limit; + constructor({generation, capacity = 128, maxBatch = 32, maxBytes = 2048, sequenceLimit = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER}) { + if (typeof generation !== 'string' || !generation || Buffer.byteLength(generation) > 128 || + ![capacity, maxBatch, maxBytes, sequenceLimit].every(n => Number.isSafeInteger(n) && n > 0)) + throw new TypeError('invalid model limits or generation'); + this.#generation = generation; this.#capacity = capacity; this.#maxBatch = maxBatch; + this.#maxBytes = maxBytes; this.#limit = sequenceLimit; + } + put(key, value) { + if (typeof key !== 'string' || !key || Buffer.byteLength(key) > 128 || + !value || !['pending', 'accepted', 'unknown', 'done', 'rejected'].includes(value.status)) + return false; + if (!this.#entries.has(key) && this.#entries.size >= this.#capacity) return false; + if (this.#revision >= this.#limit) return false; + let json; + try { json = JSON.stringify(value); } catch { return false; } + if (typeof json !== 'string' || Buffer.byteLength(json) > this.#maxBytes) return false; + this.#entries.set(key, {revision: ++this.#revision, value: JSON.parse(json)}); + return true; + } + poll() { + if (this.#flight) return structuredClone(this.#flight.public); + if (this.#batch >= this.#limit) return null; + const entries = [...this.#entries].filter(([, e]) => !['pending', 'accepted'].includes(e.value.status)).slice(0, this.#maxBatch); + if (!entries.length) return null; + const token = {generation: this.#generation, batch: ++this.#batch}; + const publicBatch = {token, results: entries.map(([key, e]) => ({key, value: structuredClone(e.value)}))}; + this.#flight = {public: publicBatch, revisions: entries.map(([key, e]) => [key, e.revision])}; + return structuredClone(publicBatch); + } + acknowledge(token) { + if (!this.#flight || !token || token.generation !== this.#generation || + token.batch !== this.#flight.public.token.batch) return false; + for (const [key, revision] of this.#flight.revisions) { + if (this.#entries.get(key)?.revision === revision) this.#entries.delete(key); + } + this.#flight = null; + return true; + } + inspect(key) { const e = this.#entries.get(key); return e ? structuredClone(e.value) : undefined; } + get size() { return this.#entries.size; } +} diff --git a/scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs b/scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dff453b --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/poll-result-ack-model.test.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +import test from 'node:test'; +import assert from 'node:assert/strict'; +import { PollResultAckModel } from './poll-result-ack-model.mjs'; +const model = (options = {}) => new PollResultAckModel({generation:'listener-1', ...options}); + +test('unacknowledged batch repeats; acceptance then acknowledgement advances', () => { + const m=model({maxBatch:1}); m.put('a',{status:'done',msgId:'11'});m.put('b',{status:'unknown'}); + const first=m.poll(); first.results[0].value.msgId='mutated'; + assert.equal(m.poll().results[0].value.msgId,'11'); + assert.equal(m.size,2);assert.ok(m.acknowledge(first.token));assert.equal(m.size,1); + assert.equal(m.poll().results[0].key,'b');assert.equal(m.acknowledge(first.token),false); +}); + +test('outdated acknowledgement does not delete a newer revision', () => { + const m=model();m.put('a',{status:'unknown',reason:'timeout'});m.put('b',{status:'done',msgId:'12'}); + const batch=m.poll();m.put('a',{status:'done',msgId:'11'});assert.ok(m.acknowledge(batch.token)); + assert.deepEqual(m.inspect('a'),{status:'done',msgId:'11'});assert.equal(m.inspect('b'),undefined); + assert.equal(m.poll().results[0].value.msgId,'11'); +}); + +test('wrong generation, forged token and duplicate acknowledgement do not clear results', () => { + const a=model(),b=model({generation:'listener-2'});a.put('k',{status:'done'});b.put('k',{status:'unknown'}); + const x=a.poll(),y=b.poll();assert.equal(b.acknowledge(x.token),false); + assert.equal(b.acknowledge({generation:y.token.generation,batch:y.token.batch+1}),false); + assert.equal(b.size,1);assert.ok(b.acknowledge(y.token));assert.equal(b.acknowledge(y.token),false); +}); + +test('capacity, oversized input and invalid input fail closed without eviction', () => { + const m=model({capacity:2,maxBytes:80});assert.ok(m.put('a',{status:'unknown'}));assert.ok(m.put('b',{status:'pending'})); + assert.equal(m.put('c',{status:'done'}),false);assert.equal(m.put('a',{status:'done',msgId:'x'.repeat(200)}),false); + assert.equal(m.put('a',{status:'other'}),false);assert.equal(m.size,2);assert.equal(m.inspect('a').status,'unknown'); + assert.ok(m.put('b',{status:'done',msgId:'12'}));assert.equal(m.size,2); +}); + +test('nonterminal states are never acknowledged as terminal results', () => { + const m=model();m.put('a',{status:'accepted'});m.put('b',{status:'pending'});assert.equal(m.poll(),null); + m.put('a',{status:'done',msgId:'12'});const batch=m.poll();assert.deepEqual(batch.results.map(x=>x.key),['a']); + assert.ok(m.acknowledge(batch.token));assert.equal(m.inspect('b').status,'pending'); +}); + +test('revision and batch exhaustion reject new work and never wrap', () => { + const m=model({sequenceLimit:2});assert.ok(m.put('a',{status:'done'}));let x=m.poll();assert.ok(m.acknowledge(x.token)); + assert.ok(m.put('b',{status:'done'}));x=m.poll();assert.ok(m.acknowledge(x.token)); + assert.equal(m.put('c',{status:'done'}),false);assert.equal(m.size,0); +}); diff --git a/session-handoff.md b/session-handoff.md index 78606a3..6cf63e3 100644 --- a/session-handoff.md +++ b/session-handoff.md @@ -1,5 +1,139 @@ # Session handoff +2026-11-17 feat-004 单 worker lease:同 resident 并发 worker 拒绝,正常退出在会话/接收端关闭后释放,unwind panic 则隔离该代次;自建并发和真实管道回归见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。不证明不同 resident、abort、原生回调/宿主退出;无自动重启或通道替换。当前测试 QQ 根 `38060` 当次仍映射 bridge,现场须重启登录并重新准入;unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 满额背压恢复:正式 owner/research pump 在派发前重试后缀;满额暂停并在 ACK 释放空间后恢复 FIFO,通道拒收/序号耗尽仍硬停。假宿主与受控真实管道对照见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。长时间暂停下的队列、自动重启/并发排他、跨宿主恢复、stop/drain 与 QQ 现场仍未证;unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 resident 通知保留:正式 owner/research pump 在交接前保留有界副本,序号跨同一 resident 的 worker 重建保持;假宿主和真实命名管道重建/去重回归见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。满额/拒收会锁存停派且尾项需后续恢复,无自动 worker 重启或并发排他,宿主退出、stop/drain 与 QQ 现场仍未证;unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。上轮到期接口调用遗漏已在 progress 勘误:research native pump 确有调用。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 worker 结果序号 ACK:业务协议 revision 4 在结果与 ACK 加必填序号,worker 在自身生存期保留递增身份并按序号匹配,旧 unknown ACK 不释放后续强身份槽;合成和命名管道证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。跨 worker/宿主身份、正文保留、停止恢复与 QQ 现场尚未闭合;两端须匹配 revision,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 unknown 窗口容量:resident 到期接口现在仅在 unknown 已确认时释放槽;未确认时到期保留,确认后释放,假宿主正反测试见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。源码未发现该到期接口的正式调用;worker 退出丢失、同类终态版本、持久恢复和现场均未闭合。后续继续有界副本与版本化 ACK;unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 worker ACK 防护:结果 ACK 现在匹配请求、终态类型和当前连接已发送项后才移除及释放槽位;定向红绿对照见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。同类终态版本、worker 退出丢失、持久恢复和现场仍未闭合;继续版本化 ACK 与 resident 保留设计。现场须新鲜进程准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 worker 退出缺口:假宿主离线复现通道成功后接收前丢失,以及 worker outbox 持有期间丢失;未修改生产协议。下一步设计 resident 有界持有与版本化 durable ACK,覆盖中间态/迟到结果、重放与退出;详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。现场仍须新鲜进程准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 owner 通知交接:通道发送明确失败时恢复未交出项,锁存断开并停止后续 dispatch/查询 drain/JS 快照确认;假宿主回归和真实命名管道 ACK 丢失对照见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。成功进入通道但 worker 退出前未持久化、首次发现断开之前的派发及关闭恢复仍未覆盖;继续处理 durable ACK 与退出边界。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 结果表压力抽样:未匹配观察按既有频率产生 `poll_result_pressure` 本机报告,仅含有界数量和满额/退避状态,异常为 unknown;合成只读、隐私及边界验证见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。该样本不是持续健康度或未匹配精确计数,报告须留本机;仍需可审计处置、持久化、额外 V8 调用的现场兼容和退出恢复验证。未知不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 未匹配结果退避:同一未匹配对象按单调时钟 250 ms 到 2 秒递增重试,新键/新对象和接收事件不受阻;时钟不可用立即重试,保留结果,合成证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。退避不清理未知或消除 128 条容量阻塞;仍需可审计处置、daemon 持久化及真实 QQ/退出恢复验证。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 快照逐项确认:resident 返回本次确实处理或等价空身份已处理的键,owner 仅确认这些键;未匹配、过期和终结态重复结果保留,伪造/换键重放拒绝,合成证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。未匹配结果可能反复轮询并最终占满 128 条而阻止新发送;需研究有界退避及可审计处置,不能丢弃或重发。daemon 持久化、接收事件、真实 QQ 和退出恢复仍未验证;现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-17 feat-004 发送结果快照确认已接正式 owner:JS 保留终态至指定随机代次/序号快照被确认,owner 确认失败先重试;对象已替换时不清理新值。JS/decoder/resident 离线串联与负例见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。确认不是 daemon 持久 ACK;未知请求的忽略策略、接收队列 V8 返回失败、宿主退出/恢复、同对象原地变更及实际 QQ 未验证。继续按合同验证持久接收、真实线程及 drain;现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 batch 清空前准入:生产轮询对最终 JSON 大小和 decoder 基础字段校验失败时保留相关状态;故障注入和修复后重取见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。超时扫描仍先执行,JS 校验不是 Rust/daemon ACK,单条事件、V8 结果丢失、唯一代次与确认重试仍需处理;继续完成版本化确认。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询 session 前置核验:正式 owner 使用一次捕获的 session 生成绑定轮询和 decoder;空绑定跳过,JS sid 不匹配时变更前拒绝,合成复现与匹配对照见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。sid 名称不是唯一 listener 代次,V8 返回失败、其他解码错误、确认重试和 daemon 持久化仍未解决;继续完成版本化确认协议。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 resident 重复空身份结果:`IdentityPending` 收到重复空 native ID 不再重复通知,后续强身份成功和终态去重通过离线回归,详情见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。这不提供结果版本确认、失败后重确认或持久化保证;下一步继续生产确认协议,JS 拒收后丢终态缺陷仍未修复。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 结果容量防护:文本/图片/语音在 `sendResults` 达 128 条时于 `sendMsg` 前拒绝并保留旧结果,受控回归与边界见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。这只为未来确认提供背压,并未修复批次拒收后结果丢失;下一步处理唯一代次、结果修订及 owner 重复接收/确认失败后可安全再确认,再完成生产接线回归。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询确认离线状态模型:单在途批次、代次/修订匹配、重取及有界负例通过,修订检查变异可被测试检出;详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。模型不接 QQ/生产路径、不分配唯一代次也不是持久化确认;已知拒收后丢终态缺陷仍在。下一步核定生产代次、预算背压与接收/确认顺序,再对实际 JS 和 Rust owner 做失败、更新和恢复回归。现场须新鲜进程重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询确认边界:生产 JS + decoder 的离线故障注入复现首批因 session 不匹配被拒后终态已从 JS 清除;这是合成对照,不证明真实发生,详情和复验入口见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。下一步设计并测试按监听器代次和结果修订保护的接收确认,覆盖失败、重复、在途更新、内存上限和 daemon 持久化边界;此前不声称已修复或端到端确认。任何新现场须新鲜进程和重新准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 轮询超限离线修复:合成测试发现未放入 512 KiB 批次的终态曾被清除,现保留至下批,单条无法放入空批次的终态保守 unknown;回归及边界见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。序列化不是下游确认,修复版现场和真实迟到/线程/drain 未验证。后续继续按现有观测合同推进;任何新现场须新鲜 QQ 进程及重新准入,旧 unknown 不重发,未证寿命不卸载。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 媒体 Promise 修复版语音现场:用户授权一次语音,QQ `38060` 准入登录后单次发送、OneBot `get_msg`、账本指纹及对端一条确认通过,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。回读基于持久账本,非 QQ 原生下载;manager/owner 停止、端口关闭、QQ 响应且 bridge 保留,不重接、不卸载、不重发。本轮未制造真实非零 Promise,真实非零语义、未知结果后的迟到匹配及原生线程/drain 仍未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 媒体 Promise 修复版图片现场:用户授权一次图片,QQ `48480` 准入登录后单次发送、OneBot `get_msg`、账本指纹及对端仅一张确认通过,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。回读基于持久账本,非 QQ 原生下载;manager/owner 停止、端口关闭、QQ 响应且 bridge 保留,不重接、不卸载、不重发。此轮未制造非零 Promise,语音正常路径、真实 cookie/迟到和线程/drain 尚未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 媒体非零 Promise 离线修复:图片/语音原先在非零 Promise 先于通知时会输出 rejected 并进入 Failure;现统一 unknown,安全整数保留诊断码,两种顺序和异常/成功对照见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。`pending.failed` 仍阻止不确定结果后的迟到匹配,不能宣称迟到纠正已闭合;真实非零语义及新构建现场未验证。后续现场须新进程、固定 hash 准入和单次发送授权,不重发旧样本;feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 修复版语音现场:用户授权一次语音,QQ `42396` 准入登录后单次发送、紧随其后的 OneBot `get_msg`、账本指纹及对端一条确认通过,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。回读基于持久账本,非 QQ 原生下载;manager/owner 停止、端口关闭、QQ 响应且 bridge 保留,不重接、不卸载、不重发。旧 10053 根因及真实 cookie/线程/drain 仍未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 修复版图片现场:用户授权一次图片,QQ `4544` 准入登录后单次发送、紧随其后的 OneBot `get_msg`、账本指纹与对端仅一张确认通过,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。回读基于持久账本,非 QQ 原生下载;manager/owner 停止、端口关闭、QQ 响应且 bridge 保留,不重接、不卸载、不重发。旧 10053 根因、语音连续回读及 cookie/线程/drain 仍未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 修复版单次现场:用户授权一次文本,QQ `55192` 准入登录后单次发送、紧接着的 `get_msg`、账本及对端一条确认通过;独立审计及旧 runner 轨迹误解析保留见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。manager/owner 停止、端口关闭、QQ 响应且 bridge 保留,不重接、不卸载、不重发。该样本不证明既往 10053 根因、媒体连续发送回读或真实 cookie/线程/drain,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 修复版零发送现场:新鲜 QQ `47980` 准入、登录后,延迟请求头与分段请求体的状态请求各一次通过,原图片复制账本 `get_msg` 通过;客户端自报延迟,服务端 accept 时序未独立观测。零发送及正常停止经独立审计,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。QQ 同代次响应且 bridge 保留,不重接、不热卸载;既往 10053 根因、发送后连续回读及 cookie/线程/drain 尚未证明。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 HTTP 10053 离线修复:Windows 下监听器非阻塞模式导致已接收连接在请求未到齐时立即失败;受控延迟对照及正式入口回归先失败后通过,`serve_one` 现先将连接改为阻塞并沿用读取期限。现场两次 10053 没有独立内核证据,不能断言同一根因;新构建尚未 QQ 现场验证。结果、HIGH 影响面与产物见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。后续现场先指定新鲜进程、按合同准入;不重发旧消息,真实 cookie/线程/drain 仍未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 图片数量补充确认:用户明确确认仅收到一张,内容与原预期一致;补充证据和原记录保留见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。发送后两例 `get_msg` 10053 根因仍待调查,不重发样本。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 图片 cookie 防护版现场:用户授权的单次图片发送 retcode 0、单请求账本和图片指纹匹配;用户确认图片可见且内容相符,未明确核实数量。首次 get_msg 因 10053 中断,原因未知、失败保留;新鲜 QQ `6184` 上对原消息复制账本的一次 OneBot 只读回查通过,非 QQ 原生查询。两轮均正常停止,最新 QQ 响应并保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载或重发;证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。真实 cookie 复用、迟到与线程/drain 未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 语音原消息只读回查:新鲜 QQ `42452` 准入、登录后,对原发送消息的复制账本执行一次 OneBot `get_msg`,返回匹配语音标识及原消息身份;零发送、独立审计和正常停止通过。首次 `get_msg` 的 10053 失败保留、根因未知;此回查读取复制账本而非 QQ 原生查询。证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。QQ 同代响应且 bridge 保留,不重接或热卸载;真实 cookie 冲突、迟到回调及原生线程/drain 未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 语音 cookie 防护版单次现场:用户授权的一条语音发送 retcode 0、持久账本和用户播放确认通过;现场 `get_msg` 连接 WinError 10053,未获回读,根因未知,不重发。独立审计与失败证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。manager/owner 正常停止、端口关闭;QQ `33768` 响应且保留 bridge,不得重接或热卸载。下一步可准备新鲜进程上只读查询原消息,不能把旧失败覆盖为成功;真实冲突、线程/drain 仍未证,feat-004 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 语音已退役 cookie 离线防护:合成复现同 cookie、目标及语音指纹的旧通知误确认,现为本 JS 环境内语音 cookie 维护有界历史,耗尽拒绝;回归与范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。真实 QQ 复用和新代码现场未验证;后续现场须指定新鲜进程、重新准入,真实发送另需明确授权,不重发旧样本。其他来源及原生线程/drain 未证,feat-004 仍 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 图片已退役 cookie 离线防护:合成旧通知在同 cookie、目标与图片指纹下误确认第二条图片,现限制同一 JS 环境内本图片 guard 已认领的 cookie,不驱逐历史且容量耗尽拒绝;边界和测试见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。真实 QQ 复用及新代码现场未验证;后续现场须指定新鲜进程、重新准入,真实发送另需明确授权,不重发旧样本。语音历史、其他来源及线程/drain 不受本次覆盖,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 已退役 cookie 防护版单次私聊:用户授权一次,新鲜测试 QQ `22232` 准入、登录、发送/持久回读及单请求账本技术审计通过;用户确认对端收到且仅收到一条、内容相符,独立完整审计通过。manager/owner 正常停止、端口关闭,同代 QQ 响应并保留 bridge;不得重接、热卸载或重发。轨迹解析原失败、独立复核及范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state);真实 cookie 复用、迟到和原生线程/drain 未证,feat-004 保持 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 已退役 cookie 防护版零发送现场:固定构建新进程 `26916` 准入、单次接入、登记账号登录核验及正常停止通过,空账本与合成停止探针经独立审计;详细证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。该进程已加载 bridge,不得重接或热卸载;零发送未执行文本 guard,不能证明真实复用与原生 callback 线程/drain。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 文本已退役 cookie 防护:生产 listener 的合成重放先复现旧通知误确认后续同 cookie 请求,现对当前 JS 环境内本 guard 已认领的文本 cookie 保留有界历史,超限拒绝;测试、限制和证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。后续可在用户指定的新鲜 QQ 代次按固定 hash 与现场合同准备正常路径验证;单次发送需新的明确范围授权,不重发旧样本。此修复未验证实际 QQ cookie 复用、其他来源 cookie、媒体历史或原生线程/drain,feat-004 仍 in-progress。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 cookie 修复版正常路径现场:用户授权单次私聊并确认对端收到一条;指定根 `5384` 当次准入、登录核验、发送/现场回读、单请求账本和独立阶段审计通过。manager/owner 停止码 0、端口关闭,QQ 响应并保留 bridge;旧 runner 的 trace 误解析保留,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。该样本没有制造真实 cookie 冲突,迟到/移除后复用及线程/drain 未证;不得重接此进程、热卸载或重发本样本。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 文本 cookie 冲突:合成生产 listener 复现同 cookie、目标和正文的两条在途文本由单个 native ID 双重确认;现于原生 `sendMsg` 前拒绝在途重复 cookie,与媒体路径一致。首条成功、第二条拒绝、媒体占用与不同 cookie 同文正例、普通/research 回归及隔离 research release hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。当时修复尚未现场加载,后续正常路径样本见上条;该检查不覆盖移出在途表后的迟到与复用,真实 callback OS 线程/最终 drain 仍 unknown。后续现场需指定新鲜 QQ 代次重新准入,发送另有明确范围和授权,不重发旧样本。 + +2026-11-16 feat-004 私有 ETW 全成员对照:20 次同名同 GUID A→B 替换中,句柄复用,查询结构具名成员与名称共 25 项在 A、B 和过期值查询中一致;仅使用当前句柄停止。脚本、审计和范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。这些字段快照不足以证明私有会话代次,不能外推系统 logger;继续按[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)解决系统级所有权、崩溃恢复和权限,不能凭匹配快照 stop。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 私有 ETW query 输出:A 停止后 B 名称/GUID 均不同,旧句柄查询输出两字段为 B(12/12);B 复用名称/GUID 时输出与 A 两字段相同(12/12),仍不能区分代次;均未用旧句柄停止。脚本、审计负例和范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。不证明其他字段、query→stop 原子性、系统 logger 或跨进程恢复;继续研究独立可核验的系统会话代次与冲突控制,权限和现场准入不变。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 私有 ETW 句柄 ABA:A 停止后 B 即便使用不同名称/GUID,12/12 复用 A 句柄数值;A 旧值在 B 创建前 query 12/12 返回 4201、B 创建后 12/12 返回 0。另两组同名对照同样复用;只对本轮当前句柄 stop,未对旧值 stop。细节、hash 和范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。这是本机 in-process private 会话证据,不外推 system logger;后续恢复不能凭过期句柄及 query 成功确认代次,需独立解决系统级所有权与原子性,权限、隐私和现场准入仍未闭合。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 私有 ETW 子进程退出对照:控制进程存活时,正常、非零退出和超时终止的自建子进程启动前及结束后,私有 ETW 会话按持有句柄 query/stop 均通过;详情及 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。未验证控制器崩溃、具名系统会话或跨进程恢复;下一步仍须建立可核验代次与无法判定时的恢复合同,stop 的 `ERROR_MORE_DATA` 不得盲目重试,系统权限和现场准入保持约束。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 空 system logger 尝试:当前未提升 token 的无 provider/无文件/无 PMC/LBR `StartTraceW` 返回访问拒绝 5;未取得句柄、未 query/stop。四项模拟测试验证拒绝及身份边界,脚本 hash 和范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。系统会话成功和清理仍未验证;先完成异常终止恢复与独立所有权方案,再在具备权限和隔离条件时重新准入,不凭同名停止、不开 QQ 采样。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 ETW 进程内对照:当前 token 下自建、无 provider 的 private in-process 会话启动/按句柄查询停止通过;同名碰撞 183,两个独立私有会话中停止一个不影响另一个,两个均正常停止。脚本、结果 hash 和范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。该结果不证明 system logger、PMC、LBR 或崩溃清理;下一步先在明确权限和隔离条件下验证具名系统会话及冲突清理,不在系统或 QQ 上采用未经验证的采样方案;不凭同名停止其他会话。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 LBR 会话离线模型:新增纯状态模型及 7 项测试、身份检查变异负例和 Windows CI 接线,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。无 ETW 后端或系统调用,不能认作真实会话控制;下一步验证独立具名 system logger 的真实所有权、冲突与崩溃清理方案并审查权限/隐私后,才考虑仅对自建 workload 采样。不要停止默认 kernel logger,不对 QQ 使用未验证方案;本轮未启动 ETW、未接入 QQ、未发送。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 LBR 对照准备:自建进程扩展 PID/创建时间、线程和 QPC 真值;独立 Windows API 核验代次及解析器正反测试通过。系统级隐私、独立会话所有权、全局 PMC 冲突、异常清理和时钟/丢失门已写入[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md),细节和本机产物 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。尚无可安全启动的采集控制器,未启动 ETW;下一步先实现/离线验证会话与冲突控制,再在权限和隔离条件满足时对自建进程采集;不要使用默认内核 logger 清理,不对 QQ 使用未验证方案。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 观测候选离线对照:WPR/xperf 和 PMU 来源可见,但 LBR 采集未启动,本会话未提升;自建双线程同回调 workload 已确认两条独立间接调用和线程真值,首版调用点合并与正反验证均保留,详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。下一步先审查系统级采样隐私、会话所有权/清理、丢失和 TID 归属,再在满足权限及隔离条件的自建进程开展 LBR 校验;无法关联请求则保持 unknown,不对 QQ 使用未验证方案。未接入 QQ、未发送;PID `5384` 当次仍响应且 bridge 未映射,后续重新核验代次和准入,不重发旧样本。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 只读现场:用户重启后 PID `5384` 通过固定模块、backend、唯一 Environment 准入;只读进程内存核对 `sendMsg` 描述项的指针和名称,错误目标负例拒绝。未加载 bridge、未发送,结束时 QQ 响应;详细 hash、首次工具错误及证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。描述项不证明类注册或实际回调;继续先建立符合[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)的原生入口、对象关联及线程采集和离线负例,后续现场重核 PID/创建时间、模块、backend、唯一 Environment 和账号;旧授权单次样本不重发,未证寿命不热卸载。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 固定 hash 静态续核:sendMsg 命名 thunk → NodeIOperateCallback 引用对 → 虚槽 +0x118 → 候选 KernelMsgService → lambda 捕获 → callback 虚槽 +8 → 分派器,已在限定接收者类型及分支条件下逐指令/RTTI/栈布局核对;正反断言、首次算式错误和 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。同 hash 的 `sendMsg` 属性表与 `napi_define_class` 初始化路径亦有条件静态核对;不证明实际接收者、类注册成功、现场执行、callback 线程或最终 owner/drain。后续先验证运行时接收者与可安全观测的线程合同;新现场须新鲜代次准入,不重发、不热卸载。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级轨迹群聊现场:用户授权后新根 `39500` 准入,登记群单次文本的 HTTP 发送/get_msg、持久账本和用户确认一条均通过;新解析器观察两批同一代次/序号,scope 与完整性仍为 unknown。manager/owner 正常停止、端口关闭,QQ 响应且保留 bridge;不重接、不热卸载或重发。证据、固定构建和解析器 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。真实迟到、QQ native callback OS 线程和最终 owner/drain 仍待独立证据;新现场须新进程重新准入。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 阶段日志解析:`node scripts/analyze-text-send-trace.mjs <本机日志>` 只读解析固定白名单格式,异常、溢出或缺记录返回 unknown,成功也标范围未核验和完整性未知;新增测试纳入 Windows CI。已对上轮原始日志只读复核,测试与证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。下一步继续独立研究实际 QQ callback OS 线程、最终 owner 和 drain;现场必须新代次准入,不重发旧消息、不热卸载。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级轨迹单次现场:用户授权后新根 `50664` 准入并单次向登记 B 发送,HTTP 发送/get_msg、持久账本和用户确认一条均通过;两批轨迹同一代次/序号且完整。原 runner 因日志单引号误解析标 `trace_pass=false`,独立审计解析原日志通过,原结果保留。manager/owner 正常停止、端口关闭,QQ 响应且保留 bridge,不重接、不热卸载或重发。详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。下一步先改进离线日志解析与报告,并继续独立研究实际 QQ callback OS 线程及最终 owner/drain;新现场须新鲜代次准入。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 新诊断构建零发送现场:新 QQ 根 `47144` 准入、监听、登记账号登录核验和合成停止探针通过;manager/owner 退出码 0、端口关闭、空账本、QQ 响应且保留 bridge。该进程不重接、不热卸载;真实迟到、请求级轨迹现场、callback OS 线程和最终 drain 均未验证。首次 PowerShell 模块路径失败发生在接入前,保留后另目录复验;证据与 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。后续测试使用新鲜进程重新准入,需发送时另明确单次目标和授权,不重发 unknown。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 请求级诊断离线实现:research 阶段记录现携带 JS 环境内代次和临时请求序号,并标记批次溢出或无法分配;已补并发、跨 poll、旧代次、耗尽、异常与隐私负例。完整证据与日志见 [progress](progress.md#current-state),边界见[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)。旧 Windows 磁盘索引刷新中断、完整性未知;独立 WSL 增量索引曾触及 16 GiB 上限,后续须使用新建的干净索引并核验。现场未加载,缺日志仍 unknown;实际 QQ callback 线程和最终 owner/drain 仍需独立证据。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 并发轨迹核查:实际生成的两个发送脚本在 Node VM 中以相反顺序完成 Promise,得到相同的 listener 级标签数组;11 请求样本另显示 32 项上限会无标记丢失阶段。现有标签不能用于并发请求的逐请求顺序或缺失事件证明。复现入口、hash 及边界见 [progress](progress.md#current-state),后续请求级诊断约束见[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)。下一步先针对有界、代次隔离的诊断关联设计完成影响分析、隐私和并发负例,再实现与离线验收;实际 callback OS 线程及 QQ drain 仍需独立证据。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 合成探针补查:独立 VM 6/6;内存移除 onRecvMsg stopped 守卫的变异按预期失败,脚本/日志 hash 和范围见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。测试符号 GitNexus 精确 UID 为 UNKNOWN,经源码核对隔离的 Node VM 测试后已纳入三个负例,research 定向 5/5。下一步补证测试符号映射,并在[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)下准备真实事件与线程观测;不能把合成结果升级为现场证据。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 离线续验:已通过 WSL 原分析器恢复当前 GitNexus 索引;普通/research 全仓、research 定向 17 项与隔离 research release 通过。原有未提交探针保留,限于合成停止态调用,不是实际 QQ callback 证据。详细图限制、构建 hash 与日志见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。下一步在现有[观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md)下设计可关联的实际事件和线程观测;新现场须新代次准入,unknown 不重发,未证寿命不热卸载。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 离线续查:原有未提交停止合成探针未改动,wrapper_send Windows 定向 5/5;新增[线程与停止观测合同](docs/acceptance/2026-11-15-feat-004-observation.md),将合成、真实迟到、JS 与 native 线程和最终 drain 分开判定。下一步先解决 Windows 与 WSL worktree 的 Git/索引路径不一致(GitNexus 状态分别报 not-git-repository 与 foreign),保留现有索引和未提交代码;再审查原有探针并完成可关联的安全观测实现及正反测试;现场须新代次、重新准入,未获证不得热卸载,unknown 不重发。详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 停止隔离版现场:新根 41684 准入、正式构建单次接入、监听和登记账号登录核验通过;零发送,manager/owner 停止码 0、端口关闭、QQ 响应且保留 bridge。未触发或观察停止后迟到回调,未证明 QQ 内注销/全局 drain;该进程不重接、不热卸载。证据和 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。后续先设计可验证的线程及在途回调观测合同,需新现场时重走新鲜代次准入;不追测业务拒绝。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 快照与停止隔离:固定 9.9.36 静态路径显示 listener 登记节点移除后,先前拷贝的引用快照仍可能持有对象;消息 listener 入口现拒绝 stopped 后的迟到通知,媒体完成回调保留临时文件清理。定向回归及失败历史、固定 hash 与证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。新实现未现场加载;继续按新鲜代次和准入合同设计正式 callback 线程/最终 owner/drain 证据,不重发、热卸载或追测业务拒绝。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 回调与释放:9.9.36 固定映像已静态验证 Promise callback 的同线程/异线程分派与停止分支,以及消息 listener remove 的条件路径;只读清单显示先前两进程已退出,PID 44580 同代次仍持有 bridge。详情及可复验 hash 见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。静态机制不证明正式链路实际 callback TID、listener 注销、最终 owner 或全局 drain;须先设计可验证的动态观测和安全寿命合同,新现场才使用新鲜代次重新准入。不要热卸载、重发旧样本或重启业务拒绝核验。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 范围决策:参考 Caligo_research 后未找到现行构建的明确业务拒绝语义,按用户要求记录已知缺口,不再核验拒绝信息;账号正常连接后可提交群聊/私聊,单次未确认结果仍是 unknown、不自动重发。正式文本路径没有拒绝预查询;Active 是 core/bridge 状态,不能单独证明账号登录,登录身份查询与发送准入的接线仍需核对。本轮无代码或现场动作。其余 callback OS 线程、最终释放和历史 G3 consumer 合同仍开放;详情与证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 离线续验:Promise 非零码先于 add 不能证明明确失败,现保守 unknown 并保留整数;定向回归先失败后通过。参考研究和固定 hash 的有界静态回调核对及未证边界见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。本轮无 QQ 接入和发送;既有禁言样本不重发、未证寿命不卸载。后续仍需真实明确拒绝语义、callback 线程、最终释放与 G3 合同证据;新现场须新代次重新准入。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 续验:用户指定的禁言测试群经新根 42124、44580 各次独立准入及个人禁言只读核对后,各发送一次不同标记;用户均确认未见,两个请求均为 DeliveryUnknown,不重发。第二次 wrapper Promise 的整数 120 已保留在审计,停止后以实际 AccountActor 打开账本副本核实重启保留且不重派;不能推断其为明确业务拒绝。两个 manager/owner 均正常停止,QQ 响应并保留 bridge;不复用或热卸载。ConfirmedFailure 原因持久化、新旧账本兼容、异常停止隔离与 wrapper 交错均有离线回归;Windows 串行 all 与隔离 research release 通过。详见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。feat-004 仍 in-progress:真实明确拒绝语义、QQ callback OS 线程、最终 owner/stop/drain 及历史 G3 consumer 合同未闭合。继续前先建立可验证的安全研究合同;任何新现场使用新鲜代次重新准入,原样本不重发。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 续验:固定 9.9.36-53644 新根 53716 的单次私聊及 HTTP 回读通过,用户确认对端一条;有界阶段显示登记、submit、匹配回调、受理、精确回读与终结的本次顺序,不能证明 QQ callback OS 线程。manager/owner 已停止,QQ 响应并保留 bridge;不复用或热卸载。wrapper 停止异常与停止态重启拒绝已补回归及修复,新修复尚未现场加载。命令、构建 hash、证据与未闭合门见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。真实业务拒绝、callback 线程和最终释放未闭合,状态保持 in-progress;下一步先建立可安全复现的拒绝与寿命研究合同,任何新接入须新鲜代次重新准入,不重发既有样本。 + +2026-11-15 feat-004 进行中:独立工作树 `Caligo-feat-004` 基于 PR #12 `54b6a5a`;正式文本提交异常保守 unknown 的修复、定向及全仓结果和单次现场证据见 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。现场已停止,7204 与 42768 均不复用或热卸载;原发送成功、对端确认一条,新代次现场 HTTP 只读回查通过,原 10053 根因未知。后续补全正式链路回调、拒绝与寿命完成门;任何新接入需用户指定新鲜代次并重走准入,不热卸载。feature 仍 in-progress。 + +2026-11-15 feat-003 验收完成:固定 9.9.36-53644 的私聊、登记群和自发文本指定样本及离线未知类型合同满足三项完成门,跨代次范围、10053 未知及自发修订核对保留在 [progress](progress.md#current-state)。第七轮 manager/owner 正常停止,QQ 响应且保留 bridge。后续按用户任务选择清单中的下一个工作块;不自动推进 feat-004,不放宽身份准入、不重发旧样本,未证寿命不卸载。 + 2026-11-15 v0.3.0 发布准备:版本与 README 同步;发布结果见 [Release](https://github.com/Enoa-devteam/Caligo/releases/tag/v0.3.0) 和 [progress](progress.md)。现场及 feature 状态不因发布改变。 2026-11-15 README 更新:基于 main `e99ea37c` 区分 v0.2.0 与当前源码入口,明确固定 QQ 构建和桥接准入;详见 [progress](progress.md)。本次不推进现场或 feature 状态。下次按用户任务及当前进度选择工作块。