From ab683f000c653727fde3a0af2275d939d82c6524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 04:00:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] =?UTF-8?q?=EB=B3=B4=EC=95=88:=20=EB=A1=9C=EA=B7=B8=20?= =?UTF-8?q?=ED=8F=AC=EC=A7=95=20=EC=B7=A8=EC=95=BD=EC=A0=90=20=EC=88=98?= =?UTF-8?q?=EC=A0=95=20=EB=B0=8F=20=EB=A1=9C=EA=B9=85=20=EB=AA=A8=EB=B2=94?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=EC=82=AC=EB=A1=80=20=EC=A0=81=EC=9A=A9?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- .jules/sentinel.md | 5 +++++ services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py | 2 +- .../src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md index 34122c2b4..f82a12949 100644 --- a/.jules/sentinel.md +++ b/.jules/sentinel.md @@ -28,3 +28,8 @@ **Vulnerability:** The Rust backend (`apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/main.rs`) did not enforce a maximum URL length limit when processing YouTube URLs via `import_youtube_url`. While the frontend enforced `MAX_YOUTUBE_URL_LENGTH = 2000` via the input element, this could be bypassed by an attacker sending requests directly to the Tauri backend API, potentially causing a Denial of Service (DoS) due to unbounded URL parsing and regex matching. **Learning:** Input validation must occur at the entry point of untrusted data on the backend, even if it is also validated on the frontend. Relying solely on frontend validation for constraints like string length can expose the backend to resource exhaustion vulnerabilities. **Prevention:** Always enforce constraints like maximum length, format validation, and sanitization at the earliest possible point on the backend, typically at the API boundary, regardless of frontend safeguards. + +## 2026-09-14 - Python Log Forging via f-strings +**Vulnerability:** External user inputs were directly injected into Python logger methods using f-strings (e.g., `logger.info(f"Failed to analyze {path}")`), allowing attackers to potentially forge log entries by supplying inputs containing newline characters (Log Injection/CWE-117). +**Learning:** Relying on standard f-strings for logging bypasses the Python logging framework's ability to handle potentially malicious string representation automatically, and PEP-282 explicitly recommends deferred string interpolation for both performance and security reasons. +**Prevention:** Always use deferred string interpolation (parameterized formatting like `logger.info("msg %s", repr(var))`) when logging untrusted inputs, explicitly wrapping them in `repr()` to escape control characters. diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py index 6838ee711..2652f27cf 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ def main() -> int: try: temporal_analyzer = TemporalAnalyzer() features = temporal_analyzer.analyze(audio_path) - logging.info(f"Extracted BPM: {features['bpm']}") + logging.info("Extracted BPM: %s", features['bpm']) except Exception: logging.warning( "Temporal analysis failed for %s; continuing with safe fallback.", diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py index 7fe5ae6f7..6b226eeab 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ def analyze(self, audio_path: str | Path) -> TemporalFeatures: if not path.exists() or not path.is_file(): raise FileNotFoundError(f"Audio file not found: {path_str}") - logger.info(f"Loading and decoding audio: {path_str}") + logger.info("Loading and decoding audio: %s", repr(path_str)) try: with path.open("rb") as fileobj: @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ def analyze(self, audio_path: str | Path) -> TemporalFeatures: bpm_val = float(tempo[0]) if isinstance(tempo, np.ndarray) else float(tempo) - logger.info(f"Analysis complete: {bpm_val:.1f} BPM, {len(beat_times)} beats detected.") + logger.info("Analysis complete: %.1f BPM, %d beats detected.", bpm_val, len(beat_times)) return { "bpm": bpm_val, @@ -140,5 +140,5 @@ def analyze(self, audio_path: str | Path) -> TemporalFeatures: } except Exception as e: - logger.error(f"Failed to analyze audio {path_str}: {e}") + logger.error("Failed to analyze audio %s: %s", repr(path_str), repr(str(e))) raise ValueError(f"Temporal analysis failed: {e}") from e From 2c848fe0f0c71fb96e1d3b9ea84f310bfe95cd58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 12:19:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] =?UTF-8?q?=EB=B3=B4=EC=95=88:=20=EB=A1=9C=EA=B7=B8=20?= =?UTF-8?q?=ED=8F=AC=EC=A7=95=20=EC=B7=A8=EC=95=BD=EC=A0=90=20=EC=88=98?= =?UTF-8?q?=EC=A0=95=20=EB=B0=8F=20=EB=A1=9C=EA=B9=85=20=EB=AA=A8=EB=B2=94?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=EC=82=AC=EB=A1=80=20=EC=A0=81=EC=9A=A9?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py | 2 +- services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py index 2652f27cf..91ad3fa77 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ def main() -> int: try: temporal_analyzer = TemporalAnalyzer() features = temporal_analyzer.analyze(audio_path) - logging.info("Extracted BPM: %s", features['bpm']) + logging.info("Extracted BPM: %s", features["bpm"]) except Exception: logging.warning( "Temporal analysis failed for %s; continuing with safe fallback.", diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py b/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py index 1d8224c5a..6a0853944 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py @@ -1275,9 +1275,7 @@ def test_workflow_concurrency_cancels_only_superseded_pr_heads() -> None: workflow = (workflows_dir / workflow_name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") assert "concurrency:" in workflow, workflow_name assert "cancel-in-progress: false" in workflow, workflow_name - assert "contents: read" in workflow or "permissions: read-all" in workflow, ( - workflow_name - ) + assert "contents: read" in workflow or "permissions: read-all" in workflow, workflow_name assert "pull_request:" not in (workflows_dir / "release.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8") From d1c98aab7c72f52ced2192f49df4d5796ecf8442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 03:07:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] =?UTF-8?q?=EB=B3=B4=EC=95=88:=20=EB=A1=9C=EA=B7=B8=20?= =?UTF-8?q?=ED=8F=AC=EC=A7=95=20=EC=B7=A8=EC=95=BD=EC=A0=90=20=EC=88=98?= =?UTF-8?q?=EC=A0=95=20=EB=B0=8F=20=EB=A1=9C=EA=B9=85=20=EB=AA=A8=EB=B2=94?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=EC=82=AC=EB=A1=80=20=EC=A0=81=EC=9A=A9?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From 2993b307b44999c6548d0fbb916ef2535230a6ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:45:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Trigger CI retry From 1ba2cc278c96b346d12644f1e03c28a7f3a2b919 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 02:26:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Trigger CI retry 2 From 7abe16aec32d8cd7a0c2707c0fd3b9ffa64a0376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 15:06:31 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] repair(privacy): remove weaker duplicate log-forging writer This generated lane mixes a valid TemporalAnalyzer CR/LF finding with a harmless numeric-BPM logging style change and a foreign #1176 formatter delta. Its repr(path) mitigation still discloses the local-audio path and logs repr(str(exception)), which is weaker than the canonical #1055 path-free, exception-type-only privacy contract preserved by #1211. Restore all net changes to protected develop as an ordinary descendant. Keep the valid finding in the canonical preservation/owner path instead of maintaining another temporal source writer. No force update, destructive rebase, self-approval, gate weakening, or security-completion claim. --- .jules/sentinel.md | 5 ----- services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py | 2 +- .../src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py | 6 +++--- services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md index f82a12949..34122c2b4 100644 --- a/.jules/sentinel.md +++ b/.jules/sentinel.md @@ -28,8 +28,3 @@ **Vulnerability:** The Rust backend (`apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/main.rs`) did not enforce a maximum URL length limit when processing YouTube URLs via `import_youtube_url`. While the frontend enforced `MAX_YOUTUBE_URL_LENGTH = 2000` via the input element, this could be bypassed by an attacker sending requests directly to the Tauri backend API, potentially causing a Denial of Service (DoS) due to unbounded URL parsing and regex matching. **Learning:** Input validation must occur at the entry point of untrusted data on the backend, even if it is also validated on the frontend. Relying solely on frontend validation for constraints like string length can expose the backend to resource exhaustion vulnerabilities. **Prevention:** Always enforce constraints like maximum length, format validation, and sanitization at the earliest possible point on the backend, typically at the API boundary, regardless of frontend safeguards. - -## 2026-09-14 - Python Log Forging via f-strings -**Vulnerability:** External user inputs were directly injected into Python logger methods using f-strings (e.g., `logger.info(f"Failed to analyze {path}")`), allowing attackers to potentially forge log entries by supplying inputs containing newline characters (Log Injection/CWE-117). -**Learning:** Relying on standard f-strings for logging bypasses the Python logging framework's ability to handle potentially malicious string representation automatically, and PEP-282 explicitly recommends deferred string interpolation for both performance and security reasons. -**Prevention:** Always use deferred string interpolation (parameterized formatting like `logger.info("msg %s", repr(var))`) when logging untrusted inputs, explicitly wrapping them in `repr()` to escape control characters. diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py index 91ad3fa77..6838ee711 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/cli.py @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ def main() -> int: try: temporal_analyzer = TemporalAnalyzer() features = temporal_analyzer.analyze(audio_path) - logging.info("Extracted BPM: %s", features["bpm"]) + logging.info(f"Extracted BPM: {features['bpm']}") except Exception: logging.warning( "Temporal analysis failed for %s; continuing with safe fallback.", diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py index 6b226eeab..7fe5ae6f7 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/temporal/analyzer.py @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ def analyze(self, audio_path: str | Path) -> TemporalFeatures: if not path.exists() or not path.is_file(): raise FileNotFoundError(f"Audio file not found: {path_str}") - logger.info("Loading and decoding audio: %s", repr(path_str)) + logger.info(f"Loading and decoding audio: {path_str}") try: with path.open("rb") as fileobj: @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ def analyze(self, audio_path: str | Path) -> TemporalFeatures: bpm_val = float(tempo[0]) if isinstance(tempo, np.ndarray) else float(tempo) - logger.info("Analysis complete: %.1f BPM, %d beats detected.", bpm_val, len(beat_times)) + logger.info(f"Analysis complete: {bpm_val:.1f} BPM, {len(beat_times)} beats detected.") return { "bpm": bpm_val, @@ -140,5 +140,5 @@ def analyze(self, audio_path: str | Path) -> TemporalFeatures: } except Exception as e: - logger.error("Failed to analyze audio %s: %s", repr(path_str), repr(str(e))) + logger.error(f"Failed to analyze audio {path_str}: {e}") raise ValueError(f"Temporal analysis failed: {e}") from e diff --git a/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py b/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py index 6a0853944..1d8224c5a 100644 --- a/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py +++ b/services/analysis-engine/tests/test_supply_chain_policy.py @@ -1275,7 +1275,9 @@ def test_workflow_concurrency_cancels_only_superseded_pr_heads() -> None: workflow = (workflows_dir / workflow_name).read_text(encoding="utf-8") assert "concurrency:" in workflow, workflow_name assert "cancel-in-progress: false" in workflow, workflow_name - assert "contents: read" in workflow or "permissions: read-all" in workflow, workflow_name + assert "contents: read" in workflow or "permissions: read-all" in workflow, ( + workflow_name + ) assert "pull_request:" not in (workflows_dir / "release.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")