From 7f262a2d0ee4c6f42673c49a8e5303d79afbb346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] docs(modem-stack): SIMCom/FM350 composition evidence bundles Non-mutating bench capture of the SIMCom SIM7600G-H (1e0e:9001) and the M.2->USB carrier-mounted Fibocom FM350-GL (0e8d:7127): descriptors, driver bindings, firmware revisions, and the read-back state of each vendor's USB-mode command. Only bare-execute, READ (?) and TEST (=?) AT forms were sent; no SET form, and both units' VID:PID were unchanged across the session. Certifies nothing. The SIMCom's PID->composition mapping is unproven, so its target modes stay uncertified and hidden; the FM350 gains no classifier entry for its carrier id and FM350-DECISION.md is unchanged. The pass also re-verified the RB-11..15 blocker table on real hardware: B1 (usbutils absent) is cleared, B3 is downgraded (socat present, so a manual query-only AT session works), B2 is promoted from a code read to a hardware-proven failure, and two new blockers are recorded -- the redactor does not mask IMEI, and skuOf keys firmwarePrefix on the USB bcdDevice rather than the modem firmware revision. B2 and B6 are pinned by a new test. --- AGENTS.md | 26 +- README.md | 4 +- .../src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts | 374 ++++++++++++++++++ docs/BENCH.md | 35 +- docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md | 22 ++ docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md | 153 +++++++ docs/FM350-DECISION.md | 29 ++ 7 files changed, 626 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts create mode 100644 docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 9ec48a9..c6c45f2 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -176,10 +176,28 @@ transform in `control/src/usb-mode/{ingestion,promotion-review,usb-devices-parse - Per-SKU capture runbooks are `docs/BENCH.md` **RB-11 … RB-15** (RB-16 is the FM350 USB-vs-PCIe probe — its 2026-08-16 bench run found the unit not connected, so `docs/FM350-DECISION.md`'s three-gate ledger stays OPEN with the probe evidence recorded; - RB-17 is modem-flap resilience). All are `[PARTIAL]` — four named blockers - (`usbutils` absent from the board and its archive; the enumerator not populating `ifname`; - no AT transport on the bench; an empty real-SKU catalog) are recorded in `docs/BENCH.md` - § "Per-SKU certification". No SKU is certified and no matrix row is promoted. + RB-17 is modem-flap resilience). All are `[PARTIAL]` — **six** named blockers are recorded + in `docs/BENCH.md` § "Per-SKU certification", re-verified live on 2026-08-18: + **B1 CLEARED** (`usbutils` is now on the board), **B3 downgraded** (`socat` is present, so + a manual query-only AT session works; the CLI's `benchAtSender` still rejects every send), + and **B2 promoted to hardware-proven** — `certify` matches its device by `ifname`, which + the enumerator never populates, so **every real bundle comes out with no `sku` and empty + `udevProperties`** and the ingestion seam refuses it `sku-missing`. Two blockers are new: + **B5**, the shared redactor does not mask `imei` / `equipment-identifier`, so a real + bundle carries every bench modem's IMEI and must not be committed or pasted into a review + comment; and **B6**, `skuOf` reads `firmwarePrefix` from udev `ID_REVISION`, which is the + USB `bcdDevice` rather than the modem firmware revision, so a catalog entry built from a + capture would not actually be firmware-keyed. B2 and B6 are pinned by + `control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts`. No SKU is certified and no matrix row + is promoted. +- **Bench composition evidence** for the SIMCom SIM7600G-H and the carrier-mounted Fibocom + FM350-GL is recorded in [`docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md`](docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md) — + descriptors, driver bindings, firmware revisions, and the read-back state of each vendor's + USB-mode command (`AT+CUSBPIDSWITCH`, `AT+GTUSBMODE`), captured **non-mutatingly** + (bare-execute / READ `?` / TEST `=?` forms only; no SET form was ever sent). It certifies + nothing: the SIMCom's PID→composition mapping is unproven so its target modes stay + UNCERTIFIED and HIDDEN, and the FM350 gains **no** classifier entry for its `0e8d:7127` + carrier id — `docs/FM350-DECISION.md` is unchanged. - The full bench-runbook ladder, RB-1 through RB-17, lives in `docs/BENCH.md`: RB-9 is the fleet-inventory capture (one identity bundle per acquired physical unit), RB-10 is the hub VBUS port-cycle verification backing the PowerHook above, RB-11..15/17 are the diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index d88f7cd..e57bf4b 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ modem-stack/ ├── control/ @ceralive/modem-control — TS control library (Bun workspace member) ├── cli/ modem-control bench CLI (Bun workspace member) ├── packaging/ ModemManager-stack .deb rebuilds + provenance/verification CI -├── docs/ BENCH.md runbooks, CATALOG-INGESTION.md, VERSIONING.md, FM350-DECISION.md, -│ ESIM-DECISION.md +├── docs/ BENCH.md runbooks, CATALOG-INGESTION.md, COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md, +│ VERSIONING.md, FM350-DECISION.md, ESIM-DECISION.md ├── AGENTS.md AI routing + repo contract (self-contained; see Rule D) └── POLICY.md no-fork gate + upstream-contribution-first policy ``` diff --git a/control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts b/control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a9eff8 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +// Ingestion against REAL bench-captured composition evidence — SIMCom SIM7600G-H and +// Fibocom FM350-GL (the latter on an M.2->USB bench carrier). +// +// Every descriptor byte, driver binding, and udev property below is VERBATIM from a +// non-mutating capture on bench board `ceralive2` (2026-08-18). Nothing here is +// hand-shaped to make a test pass: the `usb-devices` blocks are the exact records the +// board emitted, and the udev maps are the exact `usb_device` records from +// `udevadm info --export-db`. +// +// WHY THIS FILE EXISTS SEPARATELY FROM `ingestion.test.ts`: that suite proves the seam's +// CONTRACT with shaped input. This one proves the seam survives contact with the actual +// bench fleet, and — more importantly — it PINS THREE BLOCKERS the real capture exposed, +// so none of them can be quietly forgotten or silently regress: +// +// B-27.1 `certify` matches its USB device by `ifname`, which `parseUdevDatabase` never +// populates. Every real bundle therefore lands with NO `sku` and an EMPTY +// `udevProperties`, and ingestion correctly refuses it `sku-missing`. The +// capture pipeline cannot currently produce a promotable bundle at all. +// B-27.2 Even with B-27.1 fixed, `skuOf` reads `firmwarePrefix` from udev +// `ID_REVISION`, which is the USB **bcdDevice** (`0318` / `0001`) — NOT the +// modem firmware revision. A firmware-keyed certification cannot be built on it. +// B-27.3 (not testable here, recorded in docs) the shared redactor does not mask +// `imei` / `equipment-identifier`, so a real bundle's `modemManager` half +// carries every bench modem's IMEI and must not be committed or posted. +// +// NEITHER DEVICE IS CERTIFIED BY THIS FILE. `certified-catalog.json` is unchanged, and +// two guard tests below assert it stays that way — the SIMCom's target compositions are +// UNPROVEN (only the parameter DOMAIN was read back, never a tuple), and the FM350's +// `0e8d:7127` is a bench-carrier artifact that `docs/FM350-DECISION.md` keeps out of the +// USB classifier. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { classifyDevice, detectUsbMode } from '../backend/device-classifier'; +import { CERTIFIED_CATALOG } from './catalog'; +import { + buildCatalogEntryCandidate, + buildClassifierFixture, + type IngestionRequest, +} from './ingestion'; +import { parseUsbDevices, selectUniqueDevice } from './usb-devices-parse'; + +/** sha256 the bench `certify` run printed for the SIMCom bundle (slot `Modem/20`). */ +const SIMCOM_BUNDLE_SHA = '3ce28784e421eb448494f1f566072335c96110be3d01b5eac883ab14c01661ad'; +/** sha256 the bench `certify` run printed for the FM350 bundle (slot `Modem/4`). */ +const FM350_BUNDLE_SHA = '57a33dafe3038542cdb3976184fc4a1bebb740a96e38fdfe33bd4031c3c03df9'; + +/** + * VERBATIM `usb-devices` records for the two units, lifted unmodified out of the real + * bench capture. Endpoint (`E:`) lines are retained exactly as captured — the parser + * skips them, and trimming them would make this no longer a verbatim capture. + */ +const BENCH_USB_DEVICES = ` +T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=15 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 17 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 +D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 +P: Vendor=0e8d ProdID=7127 Rev=00.01 +S: Manufacturer=Fibocom Wireless Inc. +S: Product=FM350-GL +C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA +I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=02 Prot=ff Driver=rndis_host +E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=125us +I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=rndis_host +E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) +E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=08(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=09(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms + +T: Bus=01 Lev=03 Prnt=21 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 37 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 +D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 +P: Vendor=1e0e ProdID=9001 Rev=03.18 +S: Manufacturer=SimTech, Incorporated +S: Product=SimTech, Incorporated +S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF +C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA +I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option +E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms +I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms +I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms +I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option +E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=89(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms +I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan +E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms +E: Ad=8b(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms +`; + +/** VERBATIM udev `usb_device` record for the SIMCom at `1-1.3.4`. */ +const SIMCOM_UDEV: Record = { + DEVPATH: '/devices/platform/fc400000.usb/xhci-hcd.0.auto/usb1/1-1/1-1.3/1-1.3.4', + DEVTYPE: 'usb_device', + DRIVER: 'usb', + ID_BUS: 'usb', + ID_MM_QMI_PCO_DISABLED: '1', + ID_MODEL: 'SimTech__Incorporated', + ID_MODEL_ID: '9001', + ID_PATH: 'platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.3.4', + ID_REVISION: '0318', + ID_USB_INTERFACES: ':ffffff:ff0000:', + ID_VENDOR: 'SimTech__Incorporated', + ID_VENDOR_FROM_DATABASE: 'Qualcomm / Option', + ID_VENDOR_ID: '1e0e', + PRODUCT: '1e0e/9001/318', + SUBSYSTEM: 'usb', + TYPE: '0/0/0', +}; + +/** VERBATIM udev `usb_device` record for the FM350-on-carrier at `1-1.2`. */ +const FM350_UDEV: Record = { + DEVPATH: '/devices/platform/fc400000.usb/xhci-hcd.0.auto/usb1/1-1/1-1.2', + DEVTYPE: 'usb_device', + DRIVER: 'usb', + ID_BUS: 'usb', + ID_MODEL: 'FM350-GL', + ID_MODEL_ID: '7127', + ID_PATH: 'platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.2', + ID_REVISION: '0001', + ID_USB_INTERFACES: ':0202ff:0a0000:ff0000:ff4201:', + ID_VENDOR: 'Fibocom_Wireless_Inc.', + ID_VENDOR_FROM_DATABASE: 'MediaTek Inc.', + ID_VENDOR_ID: '0e8d', + PRODUCT: 'e8d/7127/1', + SUBSYSTEM: 'usb', + TYPE: '239/2/1', +}; + +/** Firmware revisions ModemManager and the AT transcripts BOTH reported for each unit. */ +const SIMCOM_MODEM_FIRMWARE = 'LE20B04SIM7600G22'; +const FM350_MODEM_FIRMWARE = '81600.0000.00.19.17.10'; + +/** + * The ingestion view of a bench capture. `sku` is supplied by the caller because the + * REAL bundle did not carry one — see B-27.1 and the refusal test that pins it. + */ +function benchBundle( + sku: Record | undefined, + udev: Record, + overrides: Record = {}, +): Record { + return { + schemaVersion: 1, + synthetic: false, + capturedAtMs: 1_787_027_878_000, + slot: 'Modem/20', + ...(sku !== undefined ? { sku } : {}), + usb: { usbDevices: BENCH_USB_DEVICES, udevProperties: udev }, + ...overrides, + }; +} + +const SIMCOM_SKU = { + vidPid: '1e0e:9001', + model: 'SimTech__Incorporated', + firmwarePrefix: '0318', +}; +const FM350_SKU = { vidPid: '0e8d:7127', model: 'FM350-GL', firmwarePrefix: '0001' }; + +const simcomRequest = (overrides: Record = {}): IngestionRequest => ({ + bundle: benchBundle(SIMCOM_SKU, SIMCOM_UDEV, overrides), + bundleSha256: SIMCOM_BUNDLE_SHA, +}); + +const fm350Request = (overrides: Record = {}): IngestionRequest => ({ + bundle: benchBundle(FM350_SKU, FM350_UDEV, { slot: 'Modem/4', ...overrides }), + bundleSha256: FM350_BUNDLE_SHA, +}); + +describe('bench capture — SIMCom SIM7600G-H (1e0e:9001) composition evidence', () => { + test('the real usb-devices record parses to the observed 6-interface QMI composition', () => { + const selected = selectUniqueDevice(parseUsbDevices(BENCH_USB_DEVICES), '1e0e:9001'); + expect(selected).toHaveProperty('device'); + if (!('device' in selected)) { + return; + } + expect(selected.device.bDeviceClass).toBe(0x00); + expect(selected.device.manufacturer).toBe('SimTech, Incorporated'); + // Five `option` serial interfaces plus one `qmi_wwan` control interface. The + // qmi_wwan binding is what makes this device mm-managed rather than router-mode. + expect(selected.device.interfaces).toHaveLength(6); + expect(selected.device.interfaces.map((i) => i.driver)).toEqual([ + 'option', + 'option', + 'option', + 'option', + 'option', + 'qmi_wwan', + ]); + }); + + test('the fixture the seam derives is classified mm-managed / qmi by the REAL classifier', () => { + const outcome = buildClassifierFixture(simcomRequest()); + expect(outcome.ok).toBe(true); + if (!outcome.ok) { + return; + } + const { snapshot, provenance } = outcome.value; + expect(snapshot.vendorId).toBe('1e0e'); + expect(snapshot.productId).toBe('9001'); + expect(snapshot.physicalUid).toBe('platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.3.4'); + // Matches the live `modem-control probe` verdict recorded in the evidence. + expect(classifyDevice(snapshot).deviceClass).toBe('mm-managed'); + expect(detectUsbMode(snapshot)).toBe('qmi'); + expect(provenance.synthetic).toBe(false); + expect(provenance.bundleSha256).toBe(SIMCOM_BUNDLE_SHA); + }); + + test('udev ID_USB_INTERFACES is LOSSY — which is why ingestion reads usb-devices', () => { + // udev collapsed six interfaces into two distinct triples. A fixture built from + // `ID_USB_INTERFACES` alone would misrepresent the composition AND carry no + // driver bindings at all, so the seam deliberately parses `usb-devices` instead. + const udevTriples = (SIMCOM_UDEV.ID_USB_INTERFACES ?? '') + .split(':') + .filter((t) => t.length === 6); + expect(udevTriples).toHaveLength(2); + const selected = selectUniqueDevice(parseUsbDevices(BENCH_USB_DEVICES), '1e0e:9001'); + expect('device' in selected && selected.device.interfaces.length).toBe(6); + }); +}); + +describe('bench capture — Fibocom FM350-GL on an M.2->USB carrier (0e8d:7127)', () => { + test('the real usb-devices record parses to the observed 10-interface RNDIS+AT composition', () => { + const selected = selectUniqueDevice(parseUsbDevices(BENCH_USB_DEVICES), '0e8d:7127'); + expect(selected).toHaveProperty('device'); + if (!('device' in selected)) { + return; + } + // 0xef/0x02/0x01 — an IAD composite device, not a per-interface-class device. + expect(selected.device.bDeviceClass).toBe(0xef); + expect(selected.device.product).toBe('FM350-GL'); + expect(selected.device.interfaces).toHaveLength(10); + expect(selected.device.interfaces.map((i) => i.driver)).toEqual([ + 'rndis_host', + 'rndis_host', + 'option', + 'option', + 'option', + // If#5 (ff/42/01) is claimed by NO driver; the parser drops `(none)` rather + // than recording a fictitious binding. + undefined, + 'option', + 'option', + 'option', + 'option', + ]); + }); + + test('the fixture is classified mm-managed / rndis by the REAL classifier', () => { + const outcome = buildClassifierFixture(fm350Request()); + expect(outcome.ok).toBe(true); + if (!outcome.ok) { + return; + } + const { snapshot } = outcome.value; + expect(snapshot.vendorId).toBe('0e8d'); + expect(snapshot.productId).toBe('7127'); + expect(snapshot.physicalUid).toBe('platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.2'); + // Matches the live `modem-control probe` verdict recorded in the evidence: + // an `option` AT control port makes it MM-manageable despite the RNDIS tether. + expect(classifyDevice(snapshot).deviceClass).toBe('mm-managed'); + expect(detectUsbMode(snapshot)).toBe('rndis'); + }); +}); + +describe('B-27.1 — a REAL certify bundle carries no sku, so ingestion refuses it', () => { + // `certify` matches its USB device with `devices.find(d => d.ifname === ifname)`, but + // `parseUdevDatabase` never sets `ifname` on any snapshot. Both bench runs therefore + // produced `synthetic=false` bundles with NO `sku` and an EMPTY `udevProperties`. + // This is the exact shape those two files have on disk. + const asCaptured = (sha: string, slot: string): IngestionRequest => ({ + bundle: { + schemaVersion: 1, + synthetic: false, + capturedAtMs: 1_787_027_878_000, + slot, + usb: { usbDevices: BENCH_USB_DEVICES, udevProperties: {} }, + }, + bundleSha256: sha, + }); + + test('the SIMCom bundle as actually captured is refused sku-missing', () => { + expect(buildClassifierFixture(asCaptured(SIMCOM_BUNDLE_SHA, 'Modem/20'))).toMatchObject({ + ok: false, + reason: 'sku-missing', + }); + expect( + buildCatalogEntryCandidate(asCaptured(SIMCOM_BUNDLE_SHA, 'Modem/20'), { + canonicalMode: 'qmi', + }), + ).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'sku-missing' }); + }); + + test('the FM350 bundle as actually captured is refused sku-missing', () => { + expect(buildClassifierFixture(asCaptured(FM350_BUNDLE_SHA, 'Modem/4'))).toMatchObject({ + ok: false, + reason: 'sku-missing', + }); + }); +}); + +describe('B-27.2 — udev ID_REVISION is bcdDevice, NOT the modem firmware revision', () => { + test('the SKU firmwarePrefix a capture would carry differs from the modem firmware', () => { + // `skuOf` reads udev `ID_REVISION`. For these two units that is the USB + // bcdDevice, so a catalog entry keyed on it would NOT be firmware-keyed. + expect(SIMCOM_SKU.firmwarePrefix).toBe('0318'); + expect(SIMCOM_SKU.firmwarePrefix).not.toBe(SIMCOM_MODEM_FIRMWARE); + expect(FM350_SKU.firmwarePrefix).toBe('0001'); + expect(FM350_SKU.firmwarePrefix).not.toBe(FM350_MODEM_FIRMWARE); + }); +}); + +describe('nothing on the bench is certified by this evidence', () => { + test('a stage-1 candidate is a REVIEW ARTIFACT — it is never the shipped catalog', () => { + const outcome = buildCatalogEntryCandidate(simcomRequest(), { canonicalMode: 'qmi' }); + expect(outcome.ok).toBe(true); + if (!outcome.ok) { + return; + } + // A base capture declares NO transition: the SIMCom's target compositions were + // never proven, only the parameter DOMAIN of AT+CUSBPIDSWITCH was read back. + expect(outcome.value.permittedTransitions).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('certified-catalog.json has NO entry for the SIMCom — target modes stay hidden', () => { + expect(CERTIFIED_CATALOG.entries.some((e) => e.vidPid === '1e0e:9001')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('certified-catalog.json has NO entry for 0e8d:7127 — FM350-DECISION guard', () => { + // `0e8d:7127` is the M.2->USB bench carrier's identity, not a native FM350 USB + // personality. `docs/FM350-DECISION.md` keeps the FM350 out of the USB model; + // this guard fails the build if anyone promotes the carrier id by accident. + expect(CERTIFIED_CATALOG.entries.some((e) => e.vidPid === '0e8d:7127')).toBe(false); + expect(CERTIFIED_CATALOG.entries.some((e) => e.vidPid === '14c3:4d75')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a synthetic re-mark of the same real capture is still refused for promotion', () => { + const outcome = buildCatalogEntryCandidate(simcomRequest({ synthetic: true }), { + canonicalMode: 'qmi', + }); + expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'synthetic-bundle' }); + }); +}); diff --git a/docs/BENCH.md b/docs/BENCH.md index 33ac967..49455b9 100644 --- a/docs/BENCH.md +++ b/docs/BENCH.md @@ -812,19 +812,32 @@ the same reviewed ingestion path: [`CATALOG-INGESTION.md`](CATALOG-INGESTION.md) ### Blockers that make every RB-11…RB-15 row `[PARTIAL]` today -All four were verified on `ceralive2` (192.168.78.132) on 2026-08-16. None is "not run yet"; +Originally verified on `ceralive2` (192.168.78.132) on 2026-08-16 and **re-verified on the +same board on 2026-08-18** by a non-mutating capture pass against the SIMCom SIM7600G-H and +the Fibocom FM350-GL. The re-run **cleared B1, downgraded B3, promoted B2 from a code read +to a hardware-proven failure, and found two new blockers (B5, B6).** None is "not run yet"; each is a named obligation with a code or packaging fix behind it. -| # | Blocker | Verified how | Consequence | -|---|---------|--------------|-------------| -| **B1** | `usbutils` is **not installed and not in the board's apt archive** (`apt-cache show usbutils` → `E: No packages found`) | live on the board | `certify` runs `lsusb -v` **first** and `usb-devices` second (`cli/src/certify/capture.ts`); both fail, so **no bundle of any kind can be captured** until `usbutils` is installed from an archive that carries it, or built | -| **B2** | The production USB enumerator never populates `ifname` (`control/src/backend/usb-enumerator.ts`, `buildSnapshot`), but `certify` matches its target device **by** `ifname` | code read | the matched device is always `undefined`, so a bundle comes out with **no `sku` and empty `udevProperties`**, and `--transition` refuses with `--transition needs a matched USB device` | -| **B3** | There is **no AT transport** on the bench: the CLI's `benchAtSender` rejects every send, and the image has no `socat` / `picocom` / `minicom` for a manual session either | code read + live `command -v` sweep | stage 2 cannot execute an AT command at all — every `AT+…` line in RB-11/13/14 below is **documented, never executed** | -| **B4** | The shipped `certified-catalog.json` holds exactly one entry, `CERALIVE-SYNTHETIC-TEST-SKU` | repo read | stage 2 is unreachable for every real SKU until that SKU's stage-1 entry is merged | - -**B1 and B2 gate stage 1. B3 and B4 additionally gate stage 2.** A run that reports a -`CERTIFY OK` line with `synthetic=true`, or with an empty `sku`, is **not** a passing -RB-11…RB-15 — the gate is the `synthetic=false` line *and* a bundle whose `sku` is populated. +| # | Blocker | State | Verified how | Consequence | +|---|---------|-------|--------------|-------------| +| **B1** | `usbutils` absent from the board and its apt archive | **CLEARED (2026-08-18)** | live `command -v` sweep: `/usr/bin/lsusb`, `/usr/bin/usb-devices` both present | `certify` now completes its base capture; two real `CERTIFY OK … synthetic=false` bundles were captured on 2026-08-18 | +| **B2** | The production USB enumerator never populates `ifname` (`control/src/backend/usb-enumerator.ts`, `buildSnapshot`), but `certify` matches its target device **by** `ifname` (`cli/src/commands/certify.ts`) | **OPEN — now hardware-proven** | two live `certify` runs | the matched device is always `undefined`, so both real bundles came out with **no `sku` and empty `udevProperties`**; the ingestion seam correctly refuses them `sku-missing`, so **no bundle this pipeline produces can currently be promoted**. Pinned by `control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts` | +| **B3** | No AT transport | **PARTIALLY CLEARED (2026-08-18)** | live: `socat` **is** present at `/usr/bin/socat`; a query-only AT session over `/dev/ttyUSB2` (SIMCom) and `/dev/ttyUSB12` (FM350) succeeded | a **manual** AT session is now possible on the bench. The CLI half is unchanged: `benchAtSender` still rejects every send, so `certify --transition` still cannot execute an AT command. `picocom` / `minicom` remain absent; ModemManager's `--command` passthrough remains unavailable (MM is not run with `--debug`, so `mmcli --command` answers `Operation only allowed in debug mode`) | +| **B4** | The shipped `certified-catalog.json` holds exactly one entry, `CERALIVE-SYNTHETIC-TEST-SKU` | OPEN | repo read | stage 2 is unreachable for every real SKU until that SKU's stage-1 entry is merged | +| **B5** | The shared redactor does **not** mask `imei` / `equipment-identifier` / `device-identifier` (`control/src/redact.ts` `SENSITIVE_KEYS` covers ICCID / IMSI / EID / PIN / PUK / passwords only) | **OPEN — new** | inspected both real bundles | every real bundle's `modemManager` half carries the IMEI of **every** modem on the bench (`GetManagedObjects` is fleet-wide, not slot-scoped). A bundle therefore **must not be committed to this repo or pasted into a PR** as-is — which directly conflicts with the review workflow in [`CATALOG-INGESTION.md`](CATALOG-INGESTION.md). The `usb.lsusb` / `usb.usbDevices` halves are IMEI-free and safe to quote | +| **B6** | `skuOf` (`cli/src/certify/transform.ts`) derives `firmwarePrefix` from udev `ID_REVISION`, which is the USB **bcdDevice** — not the modem firmware revision | **OPEN — new** | compared udev against `mmcli` and AT `AT+CGMR` for both units | for the bench SIMCom, `ID_REVISION` is `0318` while the firmware is `LE20B04SIM7600G22`; for the FM350, `0001` vs `81600.0000.00.19.17.10`. A catalog entry keyed on `ID_REVISION` would **not** be firmware-keyed, so it could not distinguish two firmware builds of one SKU. Pinned by `ingestion.hardware.test.ts` | + +**B2 and B6 gate stage 1. B3 and B4 additionally gate stage 2. B5 gates the review step for +every stage.** A run that reports a `CERTIFY OK` line with `synthetic=true`, or with an empty +`sku`, is **not** a passing RB-11…RB-15 — the gate is the `synthetic=false` line *and* a +bundle whose `sku` is populated. + +> **Query-only AT sessions are safe; SET forms are not.** The 2026-08-18 pass established +> that a read-only AT survey needs no ModemManager inhibit on this bench: MM held only the +> Quectel's `ttyUSB7`/`ttyUSB8` open, so every other AT port was free. Restrict such a +> session to bare execute commands (`ATI`), READ forms (`AT+X?`), and TEST forms (`AT+X=?`) +> — the TEST form returns a parameter range and assigns nothing (ITU-T V.250 §5.4.1). A SET +> form (`AT+X=`) is a certification-gated mutation and must never appear in a survey. ### The shared certify step diff --git a/docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md b/docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md index a77bd70..fe0e47b 100644 --- a/docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md +++ b/docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md @@ -225,3 +225,25 @@ const comment = renderPromotionReview({ Post `comment` on the PR that proposes the catalog change. A refused promotion still renders a comment — a silently-absent comment is indistinguishable from a forgotten run. + +--- + +## Bench reality, 2026-08-18 — this path does not yet reach the catalog + +A non-mutating capture pass against the SIMCom SIM7600G-H and the carrier-mounted Fibocom +FM350-GL ([`COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md`](COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md)) ran the real +`modem-control certify` on real hardware. Both runs printed a valid +`CERTIFY OK … synthetic=false` line, and **neither bundle was promotable**. Three blockers +sit between `certify` and the seam above; all three are recorded in [`BENCH.md`](BENCH.md) +and the first two are pinned by +[`../control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts`](../control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts): + +| Blocker | Effect on this document's flow | +|---|---| +| **B2** — `certify` matches its USB device by `ifname`, which `parseUdevDatabase` never populates | the bundle arrives with **no `sku`** and **empty `udevProperties`**, so `buildCatalogEntryCandidate` and `buildClassifierFixture` both refuse `sku-missing`. The refusal is correct; the capture is what is broken | +| **B5** — the shared redactor masks ICCID / IMSI / EID but **not** `imei` / `equipment-identifier` | a real bundle's `modemManager` half carries the IMEI of every modem on the bench, because `GetManagedObjects` is fleet-wide. **"Post `comment` on the PR" is unsafe for a real bundle today**, and a real bundle must not be committed as a fixture. The `usb.lsusb` / `usb.usbDevices` halves are IMEI-free and safe to quote | +| **B6** — `skuOf` reads `firmwarePrefix` from udev `ID_REVISION` (the USB `bcdDevice`) | a promoted entry would be keyed on `0318` / `0001` rather than on `LE20B04SIM7600G22` / `81600.0000.00.19.17.10`, so it could not distinguish two firmware builds of one SKU — defeating the point of a firmware-keyed catalog | + +None of these is a flaw in the seam itself: the refusals above are exactly the typed, +loud behaviour this document promises. They are defects in the **capture** step, and until +they are fixed no SKU can reach `certified-catalog.json` from bench evidence. diff --git a/docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md b/docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9e913d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +# Composition evidence — SIMCom SIM7600G-H and Fibocom FM350-GL + +A **non-mutating** bench capture of what these two units actually expose: USB descriptors, +driver bindings, firmware revisions, and the read-back state of each vendor's USB-mode +command. Captured on `ceralive2` (RK3588, kernel `7.1.7-ceralive-rk3588`, Debian 12, +packaged ModemManager `1.24.2-2~ceralive0.2.0`) on **2026-08-18**. + +**Neither unit is certified by this document, and neither gains a catalog entry.** This is +the evidence half only. `certified-catalog.json` is unchanged; two guard tests in +[`ingestion.hardware.test.ts`](../control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts) fail the +build if either SKU is promoted without going through +[`CATALOG-INGESTION.md`](CATALOG-INGESTION.md). + +## What "non-mutating" means here, precisely + +Every AT command sent was one of three read-only forms: + +| Form | Example | Effect | +|------|---------|--------| +| bare execute | `ATI` | identifies the module | +| READ | `AT+GTUSBMODE?` | returns the current value | +| TEST | `AT+GTUSBMODE=?` | returns the supported parameter range (ITU-T V.250 §5.4.1) | + +**No SET form (`AT+X=`) was sent to either unit.** The capture harness carried a +guard that refused any command containing `=` unless it was exactly `=?`. Each unit's +`idVendor`/`idProduct` was read from sysfs immediately before and after its AT session and +was **unchanged** in both cases — `1e0e:9001` → `1e0e:9001`, `0e8d:7127` → `0e8d:7127`. + +No modem was enabled, no SIM operation was attempted (neither unit has a SIM), no USB port +was power-cycled, and no ModemManager inhibit was taken. MM held only the *Quectel's* +`ttyUSB7`/`ttyUSB8`, so the AT ports used here were free. + +--- + +## SIMCom SIM7600G-H R2 — `1e0e:9001` + +| Field | Value | +|-------|-------| +| USB id | `1e0e:9001` (`bcdDevice` 3.18) | +| sysfs / udev `ID_PATH` | `1-1.3.4` / `platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.3.4` | +| Device descriptor | `bDeviceClass=00` (class is per-interface), 6 interfaces | +| Drivers | 5 × `option` + 1 × `qmi_wwan` | +| MM plugin / primary port | `simtech` / `cdc-wdm0` (QMI) | +| MM state | `failed` / `sim-missing` (no SIM in either slot) | +| Classifier verdict | `mm-managed`, mode `qmi` | +| Firmware (`AT+CGMR`, `mmcli`) | `LE20B04SIM7600G22` | +| Sub-version (`AT+CSUB`) | `B04V03` / `MDM9x07_LE20_G-H_22_V1.16_221104` | + +### The USB-mode command — domain read back, tuple NOT proven + +``` +AT+CUSBPIDSWITCH? ++CUSBPIDSWITCH: 9001 + +AT+CUSBPIDSWITCH=? ++CUSBPIDSWITCH: (9000,9001,9002,9003,9004,9005,9006,9007,9011,9016,9018,9019,901A, + 901B,9020,9021,9022,9023,9024,9025,9026,9027,9028,9029,902A,902B),(0-1),(0-1) +``` + +This is the first **device-sourced** statement of the command's shape. It establishes two +facts that were previously guesses: + +1. **Arity is three**, not one: `AT+CUSBPIDSWITCH=,,`, with both trailing + parameters in `(0-1)`. Vendor documentation commonly describes these as a + *save-to-NV* flag and a *reset-now* flag, **but this capture does not establish that** — + the module reports only the ranges, not the semantics. +2. **The PID domain is the 26 values listed above**, and the unit is currently on `9001`. + +What it does **not** establish, and what nothing on this bench establishes: + +- **which** PID yields which composition (QMI vs MBIM vs ECM vs RNDIS); +- what the two trailing flags actually do; +- whether any target composition survives a power cycle; +- whether a wrong tuple is recoverable without a vendor tool. + +Discovering that would require sending SET forms — a mutation, deliberately out of scope +for this pass. **Consequence: every SIM7600G-H target mode stays UNCERTIFIED and the mode +control stays HIDDEN.** Certification requires the exact tuple proven with a working +recovery path and ≥10 cold-boot persistence cycles; none of that has been attempted. + +`AT+CUSBSPEED?` and `AT+CUSBSPEED=?` both answer `ERROR` — this firmware has no such +command, so USB-speed selection is not a control surface on this unit. + +--- + +## Fibocom FM350-GL on an M.2→USB carrier — `0e8d:7127` + +> **Read [`FM350-DECISION.md`](FM350-DECISION.md) before acting on anything here.** The +> `0e8d:7127` identity belongs to the **bench carrier**, not to a native FM350 USB +> personality; a production board seats this module in a real M.2 **PCIe** slot. That +> decision is unchanged by this capture, and **no USB classifier entry is added for +> `0e8d:7127`.** Everything below is classified strictly as *USB-attachment-only* evidence. + +| Field | Value | +|-------|-------| +| USB id | `0e8d:7127` (`bcdDevice` 0.01) — MediaTek's **USB** vendor id, not the PCI `14c3` | +| sysfs / udev `ID_PATH` | `1-1.2` / `platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.2` | +| Device descriptor | `bDeviceClass=ef` / `Sub=02` / `Prot=01` (IAD composite), 10 interfaces | +| Drivers | 2 × `rndis_host`, 7 × `option`, 1 × unbound (`ff/42/01`) | +| MM plugin / primary port | `generic` / `ttyUSB12` (AT) | +| MM state | `failed` / `sim-missing` | +| Classifier verdict | `mm-managed`, mode `rndis` | +| Firmware (`AT+CGMR`, `mmcli`) | `81600.0000.00.19.17.10` | +| Package version (`AT+GTPKGVER?`) | `81600.0000.00.19.17.10_5001.0000.030.000.026_B77` | + +### The USB-mode command — read back cleanly + +``` +AT+GTUSBMODE? ++GTUSBMODE: 41 + +AT+GTUSBMODE=? ++GTUSBMODE: (40,41) +``` + +This **corroborates the kernel-sourced research** that the FM350's mode command is +`AT+GTUSBMODE` with values 40 and 41, and adds what the research could not: the module on +this bench reports exactly those two values as its supported set and is currently on **41**. + +Still not established, and not attempted: + +- which of 40 / 41 corresponds to which composition (the unit is enumerating RNDIS + AT + today, but that is not attributed to mode 41 by any evidence here); +- persistence, recovery, or behaviour of a mode change of any kind. + +**Consequence: no mode control is offered for the FM350 in any topology.** For the native +PCIe attachment the exclusion is a standing decision (`FM350-DECISION.md`); for this +USB-carrier attachment it is simply uncertified. + +`AT+GTFLAGS?` answers `+CME ERROR: 100` (not supported on this firmware). `AT+CFUN?` +reports `1` (full functionality) for both units' equivalent query. + +--- + +## Why no bundle from this capture is promotable + +Both units were captured with the real `modem-control certify` CLI, and both produced a +valid `CERTIFY OK … synthetic=false` line. Neither bundle can be promoted, for reasons that +are **defects in the capture pipeline, not gaps in the hardware evidence** — see blockers +**B2**, **B5**, and **B6** in [`BENCH.md`](BENCH.md): + +- the bundles carry **no `sku` and empty `udevProperties`** (B2), so the ingestion seam + refuses them `sku-missing`; +- they carry **every bench modem's IMEI** in the `modemManager` half (B5), so they cannot be + committed here or pasted into a review comment; +- the `firmwarePrefix` a fixed capture would carry is the USB `bcdDevice`, not the modem + firmware revision (B6). + +The raw bundles and full transcripts therefore live in the local orchestration scratch +directory, not in this repository. What is reproduced in +[`ingestion.hardware.test.ts`](../control/src/usb-mode/ingestion.hardware.test.ts) is the +IMEI-free half — the verbatim `usb-devices` records and udev property maps — which is +enough to pin every descriptor and driver binding above as an executable regression test. diff --git a/docs/FM350-DECISION.md b/docs/FM350-DECISION.md index 959c466..366d66b 100644 --- a/docs/FM350-DECISION.md +++ b/docs/FM350-DECISION.md @@ -385,6 +385,35 @@ existing rule, USB enumeration alone does not promote support, matrix, or certif status. This note closes the Branch-A human-decision-required STOP; it does not retract or rewrite Citation 6. +### Non-mutating composition capture, 2026-08-18 — decision UNCHANGED + +A read-only capture pass re-verified the carrier-mounted unit on the same board and added +the first **AT-level** evidence for it. Full record: +[`COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md`](COMPOSITION-EVIDENCE.md). + +| Query | Response | +|-------|----------| +| `AT+CGMR` | `81600.0000.00.19.17.10` (matches `mmcli`'s `modem.generic.revision`) | +| `AT+GTPKGVER?` | `81600.0000.00.19.17.10_5001.0000.030.000.026_B77` | +| `AT+GTUSBMODE?` | `41` | +| `AT+GTUSBMODE=?` | `(40,41)` | + +Only bare-execute, READ (`?`), and TEST (`=?`) forms were sent; **no SET form**, and the +unit's `0e8d:7127` identity was read from sysfs before and after and was unchanged. + +**Nothing in this record changes.** Specifically: + +- **No USB classifier entry is added for `0e8d:7127`.** The Branch-A STOP closure above + stands: the id belongs to the M.2→USB carrier, not to a native FM350 USB personality. +- **The three-gate ledger is untouched** — gate 1 CLEARED, gates 2 and 3 OPEN. Reading a + mode register is not an end-to-end HIL pass, and the unit still has no SIM. +- **`docs/MODEM-SUPPORT-MATRIX.md` is unchanged.** Per the standing rule, USB enumeration — + and now an AT read-back — promotes no support, matrix, or certification status. +- **No mode control is offered for the FM350 in any topology.** The `(40,41)` domain + corroborates the kernel-sourced `AT+GTUSBMODE=40/41` research, but which value maps to + which composition, and whether a change persists or is recoverable, remains unproven and + was deliberately not tested. + ### Branch B — PCIe-only observed (`14c3:4d75` on the PCI bus, `mtk_t7xx` driver bound, no USB VID:PID) This CONFIRMS the mechanical rule's already-fired branch 3 (documented-deferred) with real From 581d6e153cfd17841101e2585d77925daeda315f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] feat(packaging): ceralive-modem-support companion package MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Phase A shipped nothing to devices: the bench CLI installed from CI artifacts, so modem-stack had no .deb for the image to fetch. The modem runtime the device actually needs — udev rules, usb_modeswitch entries, and the FCC-unlock reconciler — lived nowhere a device image could install from. Adds the first-party `ceralive-modem-support` companion, `Architecture: all`. It is ONE immutable release asset with TWO index memberships: built exactly once and indexed into both binary-arm64 and binary-amd64. The manifest records its BUILD architecture (`all`) and the publisher DERIVES index membership from it. Building it per-arch would put two byte-different files under a single package/version key and break the publisher's immutable-key rule. The udev rule deliberately does not reuse an image-owned /etc/udev/rules.d/ basename. udev resolves by basename, so an /etc file silently shadows the packaged one in a way `dpkg -S` cannot detect; the legacy v1 basename is retained as a checksummed override list and postinst/postrm reconcile against it rather than clobbering operator state. packaging/ci carries the build, the expected-package inventory, the release manifest generator, and a chroot install/remove test that runs the real maintainer scripts. The apt-dispatch preflight workflow refuses to dispatch a publish whose asset set does not match the inventory. --- .github/workflows/apt-dispatch-preflight.yml | 74 ++++++ .github/workflows/release.yml | 57 ++++ packaging/README.md | 89 ++++++- .../assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile | 172 ++++++++++++ .../legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 | 11 + .../systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service | 40 +++ .../assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules | 98 +++++++ .../assets/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 | 11 + .../assets/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 | 15 ++ .../ceralive-modem-support/debian/changelog | 7 + .../ceralive-modem-support/debian/control | 34 +++ .../ceralive-modem-support/debian/copyright | 14 + .../debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 | 17 ++ .../ceralive-modem-support/debian/postinst | 79 ++++++ .../ceralive-modem-support/debian/postrm | 50 ++++ packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/rules | 52 ++++ .../debian/source/format | 1 + packaging/ci/build-companion.sh | 103 ++++++++ packaging/ci/companion-inventory.txt | 16 ++ packaging/ci/contract.sh | 32 +++ packaging/ci/expected-packages.txt | 22 ++ packaging/ci/generate-release-manifest.sh | 85 +++++- packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh | 244 ++++++++++++++++++ 23 files changed, 1311 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/apt-dispatch-preflight.yml create mode 100755 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/changelog create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/control create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/copyright create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 create mode 100755 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postinst create mode 100755 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postrm create mode 100755 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/rules create mode 100644 packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/source/format create mode 100755 packaging/ci/build-companion.sh create mode 100644 packaging/ci/companion-inventory.txt create mode 100755 packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh diff --git a/.github/workflows/apt-dispatch-preflight.yml b/.github/workflows/apt-dispatch-preflight.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4e6c00 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/apt-dispatch-preflight.yml @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +name: APT dispatch preflight + +# Proves that THIS REPOSITORY can trigger apt-worker's closure publisher, without publishing +# anything. +# +# WHY IT LIVES HERE AND NOT IN AN OPERATOR'S TERMINAL +# An operator running `gh api repos/CERALIVE/apt-worker/dispatches` by hand tests THEIR OWN +# CLI token. It proves nothing about `secrets.CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN` on CERALIVE/modem-stack, +# which is the credential the release workflow will actually use. This job performs the real +# dispatch with the real repository secret, which is the only thing that answers the question. +# +# WHY IT IS SAFE AGAINST A NOT-YET-EXISTING RELEASE +# It sends `client_payload.preflight=true`. apt-worker's reindex-modem-closure.yml has a +# dedicated preflight branch that forces DRY_RUN regardless of its live default, and exits +# cleanly BEFORE manifest resolution when no tag is supplied — so preflighting ahead of the +# v1.1.0 release can never make the publisher error on an unpublished manifest. +# +# The default tag is therefore EMPTY (resolve-nothing). Supply an already-published tag to +# additionally exercise manifest resolution and validation in dry-run. + +on: + workflow_dispatch: + inputs: + tag: + description: 'An ALREADY-PUBLISHED modem-stack tag to dry-run against. Leave empty to test credentials + reachability only.' + required: false + default: '' + type: string + +permissions: + contents: read + +concurrency: + group: apt-dispatch-preflight + cancel-in-progress: false + +jobs: + preflight: + name: Dispatch a dry-run closure publish with the real repository secret + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + contents: read + steps: + - name: Refuse a tag that does not exist as a release + if: inputs.tag != '' + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + RELEASE_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }} + run: | + if ! gh release view "$RELEASE_TAG" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo "::error::'$RELEASE_TAG' is not a published release of $GITHUB_REPOSITORY." + echo "Preflight must target an EXISTING manifest, or run with an empty tag." + exit 1 + fi + echo "'$RELEASE_TAG' is published — its release-manifest.txt is resolvable." + + - name: Dispatch (preflight, forced dry-run) + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN }} + RELEASE_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }} + run: | + if [ -z "${GH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then + echo "::error::CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN is not provisioned on this repository." + echo "Provision a fine-grained PAT with **Contents: read/write** on CERALIVE/apt-worker." + echo "Note: repository-dispatch is gated on Contents, NOT on 'Actions: write'." + exit 1 + fi + gh api repos/CERALIVE/apt-worker/dispatches \ + -f event_type=apt-modem-closure \ + -F 'client_payload[preflight]=true' \ + -F "client_payload[tag]=$RELEASE_TAG" \ + -F 'client_payload[channel]=stable' + echo "preflight dispatch accepted (tag='${RELEASE_TAG:-}', forced dry-run)." + echo "Confirm the run at https://github.com/CERALIVE/apt-worker/actions/workflows/reindex-modem-closure.yml" diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml index 0698cce..401fa8e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/release.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -198,6 +198,22 @@ jobs: - name: Daemon smoke (amd64) run: packaging/ci/daemon-smoke.sh amd64 + # The first-party companion is Architecture: all, so it is built EXACTLY ONCE into + # packaging/build/all/. Building it per-arch would produce two byte-different files + # claiming the same package/version key, which the APT publisher's immutable-key rule + # would (correctly) refuse. It shares nothing with the four zero-patch upstream sources. + - name: "Build the first-party companion .deb (Architecture: all)" + env: + RELEASE_VERSION: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }} + run: packaging/ci/build-companion.sh + + # Chroot-stage packaging contract for the companion: install / upgrade / downgrade / + # purge, /etc override precedence, the chroot guard, both /etc-override maintscript + # branches, the absent-policy no-op and single-owner. The consumer stage (udevadm test, + # usb_modeswitch -c, unit ordering against a real boot) is bench-gated, not run here. + - name: Companion package contract (clean Debian chroot) + run: packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh + # Manifest-complete per-release manifest: a checksum row for EVERY built deb (both arches), # runtime closure marked; fails closed if the produced set != the frozen all-artifact sets. - name: Generate release manifest @@ -215,6 +231,7 @@ jobs: dist/release-manifest.txt packaging/build/amd64/*.deb packaging/build/arm64/*.deb + packaging/build/all/*.deb if-no-files-found: error publish-npm: @@ -425,9 +442,22 @@ jobs: # Assemble a FLAT dir of the raw assets (every deb + the manifest). Sanitization, # collision detection, immutable reconciliation, and the final manifest-complete verify # all live in the shared reconcile-release-assets.sh (never inlined here). + # DEDUP/COLLISION RULE for the flat assembly. `find ... -exec cp` flattens by basename, + # so two files sharing one basename would silently overwrite each other and the release + # would ship whichever landed last. The Architecture: all companion is built once, so a + # duplicate basename here means a real defect (a per-arch companion build, or a genuine + # name clash) — it is REFUSED rather than flattened. reconcile-release-assets.sh performs + # its own sanitized-name collision check downstream; this one catches the raw-name case + # before any sanitization can mask it. - name: Assemble flat assets dir (all debs + manifest) run: | mkdir -p staged-assets + dupes="$(find artifact -name '*.deb' -type f -printf '%f\n' | sort | uniq -d)" + if [ -n "$dupes" ]; then + echo "::error::duplicate .deb basenames in the artifact — refusing to flatten:" + printf ' %s\n' $dupes + exit 1 + fi find artifact -name '*.deb' -type f -exec cp {} staged-assets/ \; manifest="$(find artifact -name release-manifest.txt -type f | head -n1)" if [ -z "$manifest" ]; then @@ -442,3 +472,30 @@ jobs: RELEASE_TAG: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }} GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} run: bash packaging/ci/reconcile-release-assets.sh "$RELEASE_TAG" staged-assets + + # RELEASE -> APT PUBLICATION TRIGGER (chosen path: automatic repository-dispatch). + # apt-worker's reindex-modem-closure.yml treats an `apt-modem-closure` dispatch as a LIVE + # publish, so this step runs LAST — only after the release assets have been reconciled and + # the manifest the publisher will fetch actually exists on the release. The documented + # fallback is a guarded manual run: + # gh workflow run reindex-modem-closure.yml --repo CERALIVE/apt-worker \ + # -f tag= -f channel=stable -f dry_run=false -f live_confirm=I-VERIFIED-LIVE + # + # CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN must be a fine-grained PAT with **Contents: read/write** on + # CERALIVE/apt-worker. GitHub's repository-dispatch endpoint is gated on Contents, NOT on + # `Actions: write` — a token scoped the way the older runbooks describe returns 403. + - name: Dispatch the APT closure publish to apt-worker + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN }} + RELEASE_TAG: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }} + run: | + if [ -z "${GH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then + echo "::error::CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN is not provisioned on this repository — cannot trigger the APT publish." + echo "Provision it (fine-grained PAT, Contents: read/write on CERALIVE/apt-worker) or run the documented manual fallback." + exit 1 + fi + gh api repos/CERALIVE/apt-worker/dispatches \ + -f event_type=apt-modem-closure \ + -F "client_payload[tag]=$RELEASE_TAG" \ + -F 'client_payload[channel]=stable' + echo "dispatched apt-modem-closure for $RELEASE_TAG" diff --git a/packaging/README.md b/packaging/README.md index 3a2f55c..365ddcc 100644 --- a/packaging/README.md +++ b/packaging/README.md @@ -5,7 +5,12 @@ patches** (see `POLICY.md` at the repo root). Bench devices install the resultin from CI artifacts; nothing is published to `apt.ceralive.tv` yet — apt publication is part of Phase B adoption, authorized from the `v1.0.0` release tag forward (`POLICY.md` §4). -## Sources (4) +## Sources (4 upstream rebuilds + 1 first-party companion) + +The four sources below are **zero-patch upstream rebuilds** and stay that way. The +first-party [`ceralive-modem-support`](ceralive-modem-support/) companion exists so they +never have to absorb a CeraLive-specific asset — see [First-party companion](#first-party-companion-ceralive-modem-support). + | Source | Provides | |--------|----------| @@ -72,6 +77,83 @@ caller's `~/.gnupg`) and fails closed with a NAMED field on any drift. The curre ModemManager 1.24.2, libmbim 1.34.0, libqmi 1.38.0, libqrtr-glib 1.4.0 (salsa `debian/1.24.2-2`, `debian/1.34.0-1`, `debian/1.38.0-1`, `debian/1.4.0-1`). +## First-party companion: `ceralive-modem-support` + +`ceralive-modem-support` is a **first-party, `Architecture: all`** package built from +[`ceralive-modem-support/`](ceralive-modem-support/). It owns CeraLive's UNCONDITIONAL, +generic, board-independent modem system assets. The four upstream sources remain +byte-faithful zero-patch rebuilds; that is the entire reason this package exists. + +### Ownership boundary + +| Asset class | Owner | Why | +|---|---|---| +| CeraLive modem udev rules (identification/tagging only) | **companion** | generic; exact VID:PID + interface predicates, no device mutation | +| usb-modeswitch Zero-CD device data | **companion** | generic; mass-storage → modem composition only | +| FCC policy-reconciliation helper + its oneshot unit | **companion** | generic; reads an operator policy at runtime | +| Active FCC-unlock scripts | **nobody (none ship)** | todo 33: authored scripts ship inactive and activate only via the opt-in symlink | +| M.2 SIM quirk rows (`CERALIVE_BOARD_QUIRKS`) | **device image** | consumes build-time board facts a generic package cannot know | +| Per-slot modem UID rules (`modem_ports.status=verified`) | **device image** | same — hardware-verified per-board `ID_PATH`s | +| modem node permission/group policy | **device image** | a generic package must not mutate device nodes | + +### Installation table (per-asset, NOT a blanket `/usr/lib` rule) + +| Asset | Packaged destination | Admin override tier | +|---|---|---| +| udev rules | `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules` | `/etc/udev/rules.d/` | +| usb-modeswitch device data | `/usr/share/usb_modeswitch/:` | `/etc/usb_modeswitch.d/` | +| FCC reconcile helper | `/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile` | — | +| FCC reconcile unit | `/usr/lib/systemd/system/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service` | `/etc/systemd/system/` | +| legacy-override hash list | `/usr/share/ceralive-modem-support/` | — | + +ModemManager 1.24 exposes **no vendor `conf.d` tier** — verified against the pinned Debian +packaging, whose only `/etc` surface is the D-Bus policy file. Its documented per-device +configuration mechanism is udev properties, so CeraLive's MM-directed configuration rides +the packaged rules file rather than a conf snippet. ModemManager's own available FCC-unlock +tier (`/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d`) receives nothing from this package. + +### The udev basename hazard (read before renaming anything) + +udev resolves rules by **basename** across its search path, and a file in +`/etc/udev/rules.d` **shadows** a same-basename file in `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d` completely. +The shadowing file is owned by whatever wrote it, so `dpkg -S` on the packaged path keeps +naming this package and **the substitution is undetectable from package metadata**. + +The device image owns `/etc/udev/rules.d/99-ceralive-hardware.rules` and +`78-mm-ceralive-slot-uid.rules`. The companion therefore uses the distinct, modem-only +basename `60-ceralive-modem.rules`, which no image-owned `/etc` file shares. The chroot QA +asserts both halves of this: the `/etc` copy wins precedence, and `dpkg -S` cannot see it. + +The postinst removes a stale same-basename `/etc` override **only** when it is a KNOWN +legacy generated payload — marker header **and** a sha256 listed in +`debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256`. Anything unknown, or an operator's edit of a generated +file, is **preserved**; Debian admin-override semantics stand. Both branches are tested. + +### Two-stage QA + +A clean chroot has no sysfs devices and no running daemons, so the contract is split: + +* **CHROOT stage** — [`ci/test-companion-chroot.sh`](ci/test-companion-chroot.sh), run in a + clean `debian:trixie` container: fresh install, declared-inventory equality, chroot guard + (with a non-vacuity leg), single-owner `dpkg -S`, `/etc` override precedence, both + override-removal branches, the FCC absent/enabled/malformed matrix, upgrade with no + conffile prompt, downgrade, and purge-with-zero-leftovers. +* **CONSUMER stage** — bench-board only: `udevadm test` against a real modem's sysfs path, + `usb_modeswitch -c`, `systemd-analyze verify` + `systemctl is-enabled` + a real boot's + journal proving `ceralive-migrate-data → fcc-reconcile → ModemManager`, and ModemManager's + effective configuration listing. Not runnable in a container and deliberately not faked. + +### Versioning + +The companion is a **native** package versioned with the repo's SemVer tag verbatim +(`v1.1.0` → `1.1.0`). It does NOT use the upstream rebuilds' `-~ceraliveX.Y.Z` +form: there is no upstream version to order against, and a bare SemVer sorts correctly on +its own. Non-tag builds are `0.0.0~dev`. + +It is built **exactly once** into `build/all/`. A per-arch build would produce two +byte-different files under one package/version key, which the APT publisher's immutable-key +rule refuses. + ## Versioning `.deb` internal versions encode the repo's SemVer tag as `-~ceralive` @@ -92,6 +174,9 @@ ModemManager 1.24.2, libmbim 1.34.0, libqmi 1.38.0, libqrtr-glib 1.4.0 (salsa | [`ci/contract.sh`](ci/contract.sh) | The packaging **PR lane** (bookworm container) entry point. Lightweight, needs no built `.deb`: asserts the scaffold, the tag-guard contract, that `dch` version-injection runs on a **copy** (the committed changelogs stay pristine), and the real `dpkg --compare-versions` tilde ordering. The deb-consuming contract lives in the two scripts below. | | [`ci/test-package-contract.sh`](ci/test-package-contract.sh) | The **package contract suite** over the A5.1 build output. `test-package-contract.sh ` launches a `debian:bookworm` container and runs: metadata/arch over the 9-package closure (revision-exact — every deb's base must equal its `read-pin.sh` `-`); clean-bookworm `apt-get install ./*.deb`; upgrade (stock 1.20.4 → ceralive set) with a **direction-aware** `--allow-downgrades` (computed per-package from real `dpkg --compare-versions` vs `madison` stock — post-bump every source sorts ABOVE stock, so the flag is dropped); rollback (`madison`-derived stock versions + `--allow-downgrades`); coherence (identical `~ceralive` suffix + mismatched-libqmi negative); real ordering proofs; tag-guard negative; piuparts-style install→purge leftover-scan. All version literals are `read-pin.sh`-derived. amd64 = full; arm64 defaults to `metadata` mode (`CONTRACT_MODE=full` forces the apt scenarios under QEMU). | | [`ci/daemon-smoke.sh`](ci/daemon-smoke.sh) | The **daemon smoke**. `daemon-smoke.sh ` installs system D-Bus + polkit + NetworkManager (bookworm 1.42.4) and the built MM debs, starts a system `dbus-daemon` + `ModemManager`, then asserts: `busctl introspect` shows the root `ObjectManager`; `mmcli --version` matches the **pinned** ModemManager upstream version (via `ci/read-pin.sh`, never hardcoded); the udev-rules + FCC-unlock dispatcher dirs exist; and — **functional GI validation**, not presence-only (it installs `python3-gi valac build-essential pkg-config`) — the `gir1.2-modemmanager-1.0` typelib **loads** through PyGObject (`gi.require_version('ModemManager','1.0')` + a real `ModemManager.ModemCapability.LTE` enum read) and the `libmm-glib` `.vapi` **compiles+links** via `valac -C` → `cc $(pkg-config --cflags --libs mm-glib)` against a Vala program that genuinely calls a libmm-glib symbol (a broken/absent GI-1.74 adaptation fails closed here). amd64 by default. | -| [`ci/generate-release-manifest.sh`](ci/generate-release-manifest.sh) | Emits the **manifest-complete per-release manifest** (`generate-release-manifest.sh ` → `dist/release-manifest.txt`): a checksum row for **every** built deb (both arches), the 9-package runtime closure MARKED (`role=runtime`, the rest `role=aux`) — the `arch package source version role filename sha256` matrix Phase-B apt publication AND `create-release` asset reconciliation consume. Fails closed if the produced set (per source, per arch) is not exactly the frozen `[ all-artifact]` set in [`ci/expected-packages.txt`](ci/expected-packages.txt). dpkg-free (filename parse + `sha256sum`), so it runs anywhere. | +| [`ci/build-companion.sh`](ci/build-companion.sh) | Builds the first-party `ceralive-modem-support` companion `.deb` — ONCE, `Architecture: all`, into `build/all/`. Container by default (`debian:bookworm`), `--native` for the local QA loop. `RELEASE_VERSION=vX.Y.Z` → Version `X.Y.Z` (unset → `0.0.0~dev`), injected into a COPY of the changelog. Fails closed if the produced deb's `Architecture` is not `all` or its `Version` is not the requested one. | +| [`ci/test-companion-chroot.sh`](ci/test-companion-chroot.sh) | The companion's **CHROOT-stage** contract in a clean `debian:trixie` container: install / declared-inventory equality / chroot guard (+ non-vacuity) / single-owner `dpkg -S` / `/etc` override precedence / both override-removal branches / FCC absent-enabled-malformed matrix / upgrade with no conffile prompt / downgrade / purge with zero leftovers. Builds 0.9.0 and 1.1.0 so the upgrade and downgrade legs exercise real dpkg. The consumer stage is bench-gated. | +| [`ci/companion-inventory.txt`](ci/companion-inventory.txt) | The companion's frozen declared file inventory, compared for EQUALITY by the chroot QA — an added, dropped or relocated asset fails the gate naming itself. | +| [`ci/generate-release-manifest.sh`](ci/generate-release-manifest.sh) | Emits the **manifest-complete per-release manifest** (`generate-release-manifest.sh ` → `dist/release-manifest.txt`): a checksum row for **every** built deb (both arches), the 9-package runtime closure MARKED (`role=runtime`, the rest `role=aux`) — the `build_arch package source version role filename sha256` matrix Phase-B apt publication AND `create-release` asset reconciliation consume. Emits **`closure_version: 2`** — the versioned contract apt-worker validates against — which adds the `Architecture: all` companion as ONE row with `build_arch` `all`, alongside the unchanged 9 × 2 arch-dependent rows. Build architecture and index membership are separate: `all` enters EVERY index arch, anything else its own. Per-source equality is scoped by `[arch-all sources]` so `build/all` is checked against the companion only and `build/` against the four upstream sources only. Fails closed on any set drift. dpkg-free (filename parse + `sha256sum`), so it runs anywhere. | | [`ci/resolve-tag.sh`](ci/resolve-tag.sh) | The **shared tag → peeled-commit-SHA resolver** used by `release.yml`. `resolve-tag.sh ` asks the remote (`git ls-remote`, no clone) for both `refs/tags/` and `refs/tags/^{}`, prefers the **peeled** commit SHA (an annotated tag otherwise resolves to its tag object), prints it, and fails closed if the tag is absent or ambiguous. ONE script, called from tag-guard (pin every checkout), publish-npm (last-instant pre-publish TOCTOU re-check), and create-release (pre-create re-check) — no divergent copies. A caller detects a moved tag by comparing the output against the pinned SHA. | | [`ci/reconcile-release-assets.sh`](ci/reconcile-release-assets.sh) | The **immutable, manifest-complete release-asset reconciler** used by `release.yml`'s `create-release`. `reconcile-release-assets.sh ` takes a flat dir of the raw built debs + the manifest and: verifies the deb set equals the manifest sha256-exactly (missing/extra/corrupt ⇒ fail closed); stages each asset under its **own sanitized basename** (`~` → `.`, never relying on GitHub's upload mapping) and rejects any name **collision**; creates the release if absent; then for each staged asset uploads it if MISSING or integrity-compares (download + sha256) if it already EXISTS — matching ⇒ skip (idempotent), differing ⇒ fail closed (published assets are never overwritten); and finally verifies the live asset set equals the staged set. `RECONCILE_RELEASE_DIR=` selects a local mock backend for standalone testing. | diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile new file mode 100755 index 0000000..d063934 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# ceralive-fcc-reconcile — reconcile ModemManager's ACTIVE fcc-unlock.d directory +# against the operator's persisted policy. +# +# CONTRACT (todo 33): +# * This package ships NO active FCC-unlock scripts. ModemManager's own AVAILABLE tier +# (/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d) is populated by ModemManager itself; a script +# becomes ACTIVE only when a symlink to it exists in the multiarch ACTIVE tier +# (${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d). Creating that symlink is an OPT-IN act. +# * The opt-in lives in /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json. An ABSENT policy — which is +# the state on generic Debian with no CeraLive partition layout — exits 0 and creates +# NO active symlinks. That is the only safe default: an FCC-unlock script talks to a +# regulatory-locked radio, so "we could not read the policy" must never mean "enable it". +# * An UNPARSEABLE or malformed policy is treated exactly like an absent one: log, exit 0, +# change nothing. Fail-safe, not fail-open. +# * The reconciler only ever creates, keeps or removes SYMLINKS whose target resolves under +# the available tier. A real file in the active directory is somebody else's property and +# is left strictly alone. +# +# Policy format (schema version 1): +# { "version": 1, "unlock": { "2c7c": true, "1e0e": false } } +# Keys are 4-hex-digit USB vendor ids, matching ModemManager's fcc-unlock.d script names. +# +# Deliberately dependency-free: /bin/sh + coreutils + grep only. The CeraLive production +# image ships neither jq nor python3 (python3 is in the debug-only package delta), so a +# JSON library dependency here would make the unit fail on exactly the images it is for. +# +# Exit codes: 0 always, except for an internal error the operator must see (non-zero). + +set -eu + +POLICY_FILE="${CERALIVE_FCC_POLICY_FILE:-/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json}" +AVAILABLE_DIR="${CERALIVE_FCC_AVAILABLE_DIR:-/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d}" +# Empty => resolved at runtime from the host multiarch triplet. +ACTIVE_DIR="${CERALIVE_FCC_ACTIVE_DIR:-}" +LIB_ROOT="${CERALIVE_FCC_LIB_ROOT:-/usr/lib}" + +log() { printf 'ceralive-fcc-reconcile: %s\n' "$*"; } + +# ── Resolve ModemManager's ACTIVE (multiarch) fcc-unlock.d ─────────────────── +# Debian's ModemManager packaging rmdir's this directory at build time because it ships +# empty, so it frequently does not exist. Prefer an existing one, then dpkg-architecture, +# then a single unambiguous /usr/lib/*-linux-* candidate. Ambiguity is refused rather than +# guessed: writing a symlink into the wrong triplet is silently inert. +resolve_active_dir() { + [ -n "$ACTIVE_DIR" ] && { printf '%s\n' "$ACTIVE_DIR"; return 0; } + + for d in "$LIB_ROOT"/*/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d; do + [ -d "$d" ] && { printf '%s\n' "$d"; return 0; } + done + + if command -v dpkg-architecture >/dev/null 2>&1; then + triplet="$(dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_MULTIARCH 2>/dev/null || true)" + [ -n "$triplet" ] && { printf '%s\n' "$LIB_ROOT/$triplet/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d"; return 0; } + fi + + count=0 + found= + for d in "$LIB_ROOT"/*-linux-*; do + [ -d "$d" ] || continue + count=$((count + 1)) + found="$d" + done + if [ "$count" -eq 1 ]; then + printf '%s\n' "$found/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d" + return 0 + fi + return 1 +} + +# ── Parse the policy into a newline-separated list of ENABLED vendor ids ───── +# Rejects the whole document on any token that is not `"<4 hex>": true|false`, so a +# hand-mangled or truncated file can never be half-applied. +parse_enabled() { + file="$1" + body="$(tr -d ' \t\n\r' <"$file")" || return 1 + case "$body" in + *'"unlock":{'*) ;; + *) return 1 ;; + esac + inner="${body#*\"unlock\":\{}" + inner="${inner%%\}*}" + [ -n "$inner" ] || return 0 + + # Every comma-separated token must match the strict pair shape. + # The trailing newline is load-bearing: `read` returns non-zero on a final line with no + # newline, so `printf '%s'` here would silently skip a single-entry policy entirely — + # a one-vendor document would parse as "nothing enabled" instead of as itself. + printf '%s\n' "$inner" | tr ',' '\n' | while IFS= read -r tok; do + [ -n "$tok" ] || continue + case "$tok" in + '"'[0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f]'":true') printf '%s\n' "$(printf '%s' "$tok" | cut -c2-5)" ;; + '"'[0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f]'":false') ;; + *) printf 'MALFORMED\n' ;; + esac + done +} + +main() { + if [ ! -d "$AVAILABLE_DIR" ]; then + log "ModemManager available fcc-unlock dir '$AVAILABLE_DIR' absent — nothing to reconcile" + return 0 + fi + + if ! active="$(resolve_active_dir)"; then + log "could not resolve a single ModemManager multiarch fcc-unlock.d under '$LIB_ROOT' — refusing to guess; no active scripts" + return 0 + fi + + if [ ! -e "$POLICY_FILE" ]; then + log "no policy at '$POLICY_FILE' — no active FCC-unlock scripts (this is the default and safe state)" + prune_unauthorized "$active" "" + return 0 + fi + + enabled="$(parse_enabled "$POLICY_FILE" 2>/dev/null || printf 'MALFORMED\n')" + case "$enabled" in + *MALFORMED*) + log "policy at '$POLICY_FILE' is malformed — treating as absent; no active FCC-unlock scripts" + prune_unauthorized "$active" "" + return 0 + ;; + esac + + mkdir -p "$active" + + for vid in $enabled; do + src="$AVAILABLE_DIR/$vid" + if [ ! -f "$src" ]; then + log "policy enables '$vid' but ModemManager ships no '$src' — skipped" + continue + fi + dst="$active/$vid" + if [ -e "$dst" ] && [ ! -L "$dst" ]; then + log "'$dst' exists and is NOT a symlink — leaving it alone (not ours)" + continue + fi + ln -sfn "$src" "$dst" + log "activated FCC-unlock '$vid' -> $src" + done + + prune_unauthorized "$active" "$enabled" + return 0 +} + +# Remove symlinks we own (target under the available tier) that the policy no longer +# authorizes. Real files and foreign symlinks are never touched. +prune_unauthorized() { + active="$1" + keep="$2" + [ -d "$active" ] || return 0 + for link in "$active"/*; do + [ -e "$link" ] || [ -L "$link" ] || continue + [ -L "$link" ] || continue + target="$(readlink -f "$link" 2>/dev/null || true)" + case "$target" in + "$AVAILABLE_DIR"/*) ;; + *) continue ;; + esac + name="$(basename "$link")" + wanted=0 + for vid in $keep; do + [ "$vid" = "$name" ] && wanted=1 + done + if [ "$wanted" -eq 0 ]; then + rm -f "$link" + log "deactivated FCC-unlock '$name' (not authorized by policy)" + fi + done +} + +main "$@" diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d25081 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# CERALIVE-GENERATED: modem-udev v1 — DO NOT EDIT +# Superseded by /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules from the +# ceralive-modem-support package. A copy of THIS EXACT payload under +# /etc/udev/rules.d/ shadows the packaged file by basename, so the package's +# postinst removes it — and ONLY it, matched by marker line AND by the sha256 +# recorded in legacy-etc-overrides.sha256. +# +# Any other content at that /etc path — including an operator's edit of this +# file — is PRESERVED. Debian admin-override semantics stand. +ACTION!="add|bind|change", GOTO="ceralive_modem_end" +LABEL="ceralive_modem_end" diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26eb4bc --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +[Unit] +Description=Reconcile CeraLive ModemManager FCC-unlock policy +Documentation=file:/usr/share/doc/ceralive-modem-support/README.md + +# ORDERING CONTRACT (todo 33). All three edges are deliberately SOFT on a host that has +# none of the CeraLive layout, so this unit is a clean no-op on generic Debian: +# * Before=ModemManager.service — the active fcc-unlock.d set must be settled before MM +# probes a radio. If ModemManager is not installed this edge is simply inert. +# * RequiresMountsFor=/data — systemd only synthesises a dependency when /data is an +# actual mount point; on a host where it is an ordinary directory (or absent) this +# adds nothing and blocks nothing. +# * After=ceralive-migrate-data.service — the image unit that seeds /data. An ordering +# edge to a unit that does not exist is a no-op, never a failure. +Before=ModemManager.service +RequiresMountsFor=/data +After=ceralive-migrate-data.service + +[Service] +Type=oneshot +RemainAfterExit=yes +ExecStart=/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile + +# The reconciler answers 0 for every "cannot act" case (absent policy, malformed policy, +# no ModemManager, unresolvable multiarch dir) precisely so a device without the CeraLive +# partition layout boots clean. A non-zero exit therefore means a genuine internal error +# and is surfaced rather than swallowed. +ProtectHome=yes +ProtectHostname=yes +ProtectKernelLogs=yes +ProtectKernelTunables=yes +ProtectControlGroups=yes +RestrictRealtime=yes +RestrictSUIDSGID=yes +NoNewPrivileges=yes +PrivateTmp=yes +SystemCallFilter=@system-service +SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM + +[Install] +WantedBy=multi-user.target diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c9debad --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +# 60-ceralive-modem.rules — CeraLive modem IDENTIFICATION rules. +# +# OWNED BY: the first-party `ceralive-modem-support` package. +# +# BASENAME CONTRACT (load-bearing — read before renaming anything here): +# udev resolves rules by BASENAME across its directory search path, and a file in +# /etc/udev/rules.d SHADOWS a same-basename file in /usr/lib/udev/rules.d completely. +# The shadowing file is still owned by whatever wrote it, so `dpkg -S` on the packaged +# path keeps naming this package and the substitution is invisible to package tooling. +# The device image separately owns /etc/udev/rules.d/99-ceralive-hardware.rules and +# /etc/udev/rules.d/78-mm-ceralive-slot-uid.rules. This file therefore uses a DISTINCT, +# MODEM-ONLY basename that no image-owned /etc file shares. Never rename this file to +# an image-owned basename, and never add an /etc copy of it from this package. +# +# SCOPE (identification/tagging ONLY): +# Every rule below assigns ENV{} properties and nothing else. There is deliberately no +# RUN+=, no MODE=, no GROUP=, no OWNER=, no SYMLINK+= and no ATTR{}= write anywhere in +# this file — a udev rule that MUTATES a device is the image's business (or a service's), +# never a generic package's. Permission/group policy for modem nodes stays image-owned. +# +# PREDICATE DISCIPLINE: +# Device-level rules match an EXACT idVendor + idProduct pair. There is no bare +# vendor-wide match (ATTR{idVendor}=="12d1" alone would claim every Huawei device on the +# bus, cameras and dongled storage included). Interface-level rules additionally pin +# bInterfaceClass/bInterfaceSubClass so a non-modem interface of a matched composition +# is not tagged as one. +# +# Properties published (consumed by CeraLive userspace, never by udev itself): +# ID_CERALIVE_MODEM=1 — this device is a CeraLive-recognised WWAN unit +# ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS= — cellular | router | zerocd +# ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU= — stable, human-readable SKU token +# +# `zerocd` marks a mass-storage "Zero-CD" personality that usb-modeswitch is expected to +# flip into a modem composition; see /usr/share/usb_modeswitch/ in this package. + +ACTION!="add|bind|change", GOTO="ceralive_modem_end" +SUBSYSTEM!="usb", GOTO="ceralive_modem_iface" + +# ── Cellular modems (native modem compositions) ────────────────────────────── +# Quectel RM530N-GL (5G, QMI/MBIM) +ATTR{idVendor}=="2c7c", ATTR{idProduct}=="0801", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="cellular", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="quectel-rm530n-gl" + +# SIMCom SIM7600G-H R2 (LTE Cat-4, QMI) +ATTR{idVendor}=="1e0e", ATTR{idProduct}=="9001", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="cellular", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="simcom-sim7600g-h" + +# Qualcomm-reference dual-personality stick, QMI personality (qmi_wwan). +# Its sibling 05c6:9024 personality is RNDIS/router and is tagged `router` below — +# the two are the SAME physical unit under one USB serial, so both are listed. +ATTR{idVendor}=="05c6", ATTR{idProduct}=="9091", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="cellular", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="qualcomm-9091" + +# ── Router-class units (own IP stack behind an RNDIS/ECM netdev) ───────────── +# Huawei HiLink +ATTR{idVendor}=="12d1", ATTR{idProduct}=="14dc", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="router", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="huawei-hilink" + +# ZTE MF79U (post-modeswitch router personality) +ATTR{idVendor}=="19d2", ATTR{idProduct}=="1405", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="router", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="zte-mf79u" + +# Qualcomm-reference dual-personality stick, RNDIS/router personality. +ATTR{idVendor}=="05c6", ATTR{idProduct}=="9024", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="router", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="qualcomm-9024" + +# ── Zero-CD (mass-storage) personalities awaiting usb-modeswitch ───────────── +ATTR{idVendor}=="19d2", ATTR{idProduct}=="1225", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="zerocd", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="zte-mf79u" + +ATTR{idVendor}=="12d1", ATTR{idProduct}=="1f01", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}="1", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_CLASS}="zerocd", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_SKU}="huawei-hilink" + +LABEL="ceralive_modem_iface" + +# ── Interface-level tagging ────────────────────────────────────────────────── +# CDC (0x02/0x0e vendor-specific WWAN control) interfaces of the SKUs above only. +# The idVendor/idProduct pair is re-asserted at interface level so a matched +# composition's audio/storage/HID interfaces are never tagged as modem control. +SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ENV{DEVTYPE}=="usb_interface", \ + ATTRS{idVendor}=="2c7c", ATTRS{idProduct}=="0801", \ + ATTR{bInterfaceClass}=="ff", ATTR{bInterfaceSubClass}=="ff", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_IFACE}="control" + +SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ENV{DEVTYPE}=="usb_interface", \ + ATTRS{idVendor}=="1e0e", ATTRS{idProduct}=="9001", \ + ATTR{bInterfaceClass}=="ff", ATTR{bInterfaceSubClass}=="ff", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_IFACE}="control" + +# WWAN control channel character devices belonging to a tagged parent. +SUBSYSTEM=="usbmisc", KERNEL=="cdc-wdm[0-9]*", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}=="1", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_PORT}="wdm" + +# WWAN netdevs belonging to a tagged parent. +SUBSYSTEM=="net", ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM}=="1", \ + ENV{ID_CERALIVE_MODEM_PORT}="net" + +LABEL="ceralive_modem_end" diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8b8a7c --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Huawei HiLink-class dongle — Zero-CD (USB mass storage) personality. +# +# ZERO-CD ONLY — see the note in 19d2:1225. Nothing here is board-gated or behavioural. +# +# Admin override tier: /etc/usb_modeswitch.d/12d1:1f01. +# +# 12d1:1f01 (mass storage) -> 12d1:14dc (HiLink RNDIS composition) + +TargetVendor=0x12d1 +TargetProductList="14dc,1506,1c1e" +HuaweiNewMode=1 diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e1e466 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# ZTE MF79U-class dongle — Zero-CD (USB mass storage) personality. +# +# ZERO-CD ONLY. This file exists to flip a mass-storage "driver CD" personality into the +# unit's real modem/router composition. It carries NO runtime modem behaviour, no APN, no +# bearer policy and no board-specific data — that is the whole reason a generic package may +# own it. Anything board-gated stays with the image. +# +# Admin override tier: /etc/usb_modeswitch.d/19d2:1225 (an operator file there wins and is +# never touched by this package). +# +# 19d2:1225 (mass storage) -> 19d2:1405 (router/RNDIS composition) + +TargetVendor=0x19d2 +TargetProductList="1405,1403,1408,0016" +StandardEject=1 diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/changelog b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/changelog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb8f938 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/changelog @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +ceralive-modem-support (0.0.0~dev) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium + + * Initial first-party companion package: CeraLive generic modem system assets. + Version is rewritten to the release tag by packaging/ci/inject-companion-version.sh + at release time; a non-tag build keeps 0.0.0~dev. + + -- CeraLive Mon, 17 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000 diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/control b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/control new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28fa7a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/control @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +Source: ceralive-modem-support +Section: net +Priority: optional +Maintainer: CeraLive +Build-Depends: debhelper-compat (= 13) +Standards-Version: 4.6.2 +Rules-Requires-Root: no +Homepage: https://github.com/CERALIVE/modem-stack + +Package: ceralive-modem-support +Architecture: all +Depends: ${misc:Depends}, + udev +Recommends: modemmanager, + usb-modeswitch +Description: CeraLive generic modem system assets + First-party companion package for the CeraLive ModemManager stack. It carries the + UNCONDITIONAL, generic, board-independent system assets that the upstream + ModemManager / libqmi / libmbim / libqrtr rebuilds must not absorb — those four + sources are byte-faithful, zero-patch rebuilds and stay that way. + . + Contents: + * /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules — identification/tagging only + (exact VID:PID and interface predicates; no RUN+=, no permission or node + mutation of any kind). + * /usr/share/usb_modeswitch/ — Zero-CD mode-switch device data only. + * /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile plus its oneshot unit, + which reconciles ModemManager's active fcc-unlock.d against an operator policy + at /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json. No active FCC-unlock script ships + here; an absent policy activates nothing and exits 0. + . + Board-gated generated assets — M.2 SIM quirk rows and per-slot modem UID rules — + are deliberately NOT here. They consume build-time board facts a generic package + cannot know and remain owned by the device-image generators. diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/copyright b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/copyright new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7259585 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/copyright @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +Format: https://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/ +Upstream-Name: ceralive-modem-support +Source: https://github.com/CERALIVE/modem-stack + +Files: * +Copyright: 2026 CeraLive +License: AGPL-3.0+ + This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under + the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any + later version. + . + On Debian systems the full text of the GNU Affero General Public License + version 3 can be found in /usr/share/common-licenses/AGPL-3. diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bf1af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 — the CLOSED list of /etc override payloads this package is +# permitted to remove on upgrade. +# +# WHY A LIST AND NOT A HEURISTIC +# udev resolves rules by BASENAME, and /etc/udev/rules.d shadows /usr/lib/udev/rules.d +# completely. A stale generated file at the packaged basename would therefore silently +# replace this package's rules while `dpkg -S` still names this package as the owner of +# the /usr/lib path — the substitution is undetectable from package metadata alone. +# So the postinst removes such a file, but ONLY when it is provably a KNOWN GENERATED +# payload: it must carry the generated-marker header AND its sha256 must appear below. +# Anything else — an operator's own file, an operator's EDIT of a generated file, a +# payload from a version not listed here — is PRESERVED. Debian admin-override semantics +# are not negotiable, and "it looked generated" is not proof that nobody edited it. +# +# FORMAT: (comments and blank lines ignored) + +cd54e952af9ebe0b0d56f47ec296aeab48a9cbf7383c9dbefc16eef7d177558f /etc/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postinst b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postinst new file mode 100755 index 0000000..8033b61 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postinst @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# postinst for ceralive-modem-support. +# +# Two jobs, both idempotent and both safe inside a build chroot: +# 1. Remove a KNOWN-STALE /etc override that would shadow the packaged udev rules +# by basename (marker + sha256 gated; anything else is preserved). +# 2. Reload udev and fire a NARROW trigger — only when a live udev is present. +set -e + +PKGDATA=/usr/share/ceralive-modem-support +HASHLIST="$PKGDATA/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256" +GENERATED_MARKER='# CERALIVE-GENERATED: modem-udev' + +# ── 1. Marker+hash-gated removal of a stale generated /etc override ────────── +# The gate is a CONJUNCTION on purpose. The marker alone proves only that the file +# STARTED life generated; an operator who edited it must keep their edit. The hash alone +# would be enough, but requiring the marker too keeps a hash collision with an unrelated +# operator file from ever mattering. +remove_known_stale_overrides() { + [ -r "$HASHLIST" ] || return 0 + command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + + while read -r want path; do + case "$want" in ''|'#'*) continue ;; esac + [ -n "$path" ] || continue + [ -f "$path" ] || continue + # Never touch a symlink: following one could delete something outside /etc. + [ -L "$path" ] && continue + + if ! head -n 1 "$path" | grep -qF "$GENERATED_MARKER"; then + echo "ceralive-modem-support: preserving operator-owned $path (no generated marker)" + continue + fi + have="$(sha256sum "$path" | awk '{print $1}')" + if [ "$have" != "$want" ]; then + echo "ceralive-modem-support: preserving modified $path (sha256 not a known generated payload)" + continue + fi + rm -f "$path" + echo "ceralive-modem-support: removed stale generated override $path (superseded by the packaged rules)" + done < "$HASHLIST" +} + +# ── 2. Chroot-guarded udev reload + narrow trigger ────────────────────────── +# /run/udev is created by a RUNNING systemd-udevd. Inside a build chroot, a container +# image build or a piuparts run it does not exist, and `udevadm control` would fail (or +# worse, talk to the host's udev through a shared /run). Guarding on it is the documented +# Debian idiom and is what makes this postinst safe in every non-booted context. +# +# The trigger is NARROW — usb + net + usbmisc, action=change — never a bare +# `udevadm trigger`, which would re-run every rule for every device on the system. +refresh_udev() { + [ -d /run/udev ] || { + echo "ceralive-modem-support: no /run/udev (chroot/container) — skipping udev reload+trigger" + return 0 + } + command -v udevadm >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + udevadm control --reload-rules || true + udevadm trigger --action=change --subsystem-match=usb || true + udevadm trigger --action=change --subsystem-match=usbmisc || true + udevadm trigger --action=change --subsystem-match=net || true +} + +case "$1" in + configure) + remove_known_stale_overrides + refresh_udev + ;; + abort-upgrade|abort-remove|abort-deconfigure) + ;; + *) + echo "postinst called with unknown argument '$1'" >&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +#DEBHELPER# + +exit 0 diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postrm b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postrm new file mode 100755 index 0000000..a4a6ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/postrm @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# postrm for ceralive-modem-support. +# +# On PURGE, retire the runtime state this package's helper creates but does not own as +# packaged files: the ACTIVE fcc-unlock symlinks it wrote into ModemManager's multiarch +# directory. Those are symlinks into /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d, so removing +# them removes nothing of ModemManager's own — but leaving them behind would let a purged +# package keep a radio's FCC-unlock script active, which is exactly the state todo 33 +# forbids by default. +# +# Anything that is not a symlink, and any symlink pointing outside the available tier, +# is left strictly alone: it is not ours. +set -e + +AVAILABLE_DIR=/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d + +purge_active_fcc_symlinks() { + for dir in /usr/lib/*/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d; do + [ -d "$dir" ] || continue + for link in "$dir"/*; do + [ -L "$link" ] || continue + target="$(readlink -f "$link" 2>/dev/null || true)" + case "$target" in + "$AVAILABLE_DIR"/*) + rm -f "$link" + echo "ceralive-modem-support: purge removed active FCC-unlock symlink $link" + ;; + esac + done + rmdir "$dir" 2>/dev/null || true + done +} + +case "$1" in + purge) + purge_active_fcc_symlinks + rm -rf /usr/share/ceralive-modem-support + rm -rf /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support + ;; + remove|upgrade|failed-upgrade|abort-install|abort-upgrade|disappear) + ;; + *) + echo "postrm called with unknown argument '$1'" >&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +#DEBHELPER# + +exit 0 diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/rules b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/rules new file mode 100755 index 0000000..46e7699 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/rules @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +#!/usr/bin/make -f + +export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all + +%: + dh $@ + +override_dh_auto_build: +override_dh_auto_test: + +# EXPLICIT PER-ASSET INSTALLATION TABLE. +# +# There is deliberately no blanket "/usr/lib for everything" rule here: each asset goes to +# the destination ITS OWN CONSUMER canonically reads, and the admin-override tier for each +# is a different directory that this package never writes. +# +# asset | packaged destination | admin override +# ----------------------------+-------------------------------------------+----------------------------- +# udev rules | /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/ | /etc/udev/rules.d/ +# usb-modeswitch device data | /usr/share/usb_modeswitch/ | /etc/usb_modeswitch.d/ +# FCC reconcile helper | /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ | (none — executable) +# FCC reconcile unit | /usr/lib/systemd/system/ | /etc/systemd/system/ +# legacy-override hash list | /usr/share/ceralive-modem-support/ | (none — package data) +# +# The udev BASENAME is modem-only (`60-ceralive-modem.rules`) and is shared with NO +# image-owned /etc/udev/rules.d file. See the header of that file for why that matters. +# +# ModemManager 1.24 exposes NO vendor conf.d tier — verified against the pinned Debian +# packaging, whose only /etc surface is the D-Bus policy file. Its documented per-device +# configuration mechanism is udev properties, which is why CeraLive's MM-directed +# configuration rides the packaged rules file above rather than a conf snippet. The +# available FCC-unlock tier (/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d) is ModemManager's own +# and receives nothing from this package. +override_dh_auto_install: + install -D -m 0644 assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules \ + debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules + install -d -m 0755 debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/share/usb_modeswitch + install -m 0644 assets/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 assets/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 \ + debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/share/usb_modeswitch/ + install -D -m 0755 assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile \ + debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile + install -D -m 0644 assets/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 \ + debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/share/ceralive-modem-support/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 + install -D -m 0644 debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 \ + debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/share/ceralive-modem-support/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 + install -D -m 0644 assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service \ + debian/ceralive-modem-support/usr/lib/systemd/system/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service + +# dh_installsystemd finds the unit already staged under usr/lib/systemd/system by the +# installation table above, so the unit's canonical home stays assets/systemd/. +override_dh_installsystemd: + dh_installsystemd --name=ceralive-fcc-reconcile --no-restart-after-upgrade diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/source/format b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/source/format new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89ae9db --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/debian/source/format @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +3.0 (native) diff --git a/packaging/ci/build-companion.sh b/packaging/ci/build-companion.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..34f890e --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ci/build-companion.sh @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# build-companion.sh — build the first-party `ceralive-modem-support` companion .deb. +# +# The companion is `Architecture: all`: ONE build produces ONE immutable release asset that +# is later indexed into BOTH per-arch APT indexes. It is therefore built exactly ONCE, into +# packaging/build/all/, and never per-arch — a per-arch build would produce two byte-different +# files claiming the same package/version key and break the publisher's immutable-key rule. +# +# It shares NOTHING with the four upstream sources' build: those are byte-faithful, zero-patch +# rebuilds (packaging/README.md, POLICY.md) and this package exists precisely so they never +# have to absorb a CeraLive-specific asset. +# +# USAGE build-companion.sh [--native] +# default: builds inside a `debian:bookworm` container (matches the upstream lane). +# --native: builds on the host (needs debhelper + dpkg-dev); used by the local QA harness. +# +# ENV +# RELEASE_VERSION vX.Y.Z -> the .deb Version: is X.Y.Z. Unset -> 0.0.0~dev. +# CONTAINER_ENGINE podman|docker (auto-detected, podman preferred). +# BUILD_ROOT output root (default packaging/build). +set -euo pipefail + +HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +PKG_ROOT="$(cd "$HERE/.." && pwd)" +SRC_DIR="$PKG_ROOT/ceralive-modem-support" +BUILD_ROOT="${BUILD_ROOT:-$PKG_ROOT/build}" +OUT_DIR="$BUILD_ROOT/all" +IMAGE="${COMPANION_BUILD_IMAGE:-debian:bookworm}" + +NATIVE=0 +[[ "${1:-}" == "--native" ]] && NATIVE=1 + +# ── Version ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── +# The companion is a native package versioned with the repo's SemVer tag verbatim +# (v1.1.0 -> 1.1.0). It deliberately does NOT use the upstream rebuilds' +# `-~ceraliveX.Y.Z` form: there is no upstream version to order against, +# and a bare SemVer sorts correctly under dpkg on its own. +resolve_version() { + local tag="${RELEASE_VERSION:-}" + if [[ -z "$tag" ]]; then echo "0.0.0~dev"; return 0; fi + bash "$HERE/tag-guard.sh" "$tag" >/dev/null + echo "${tag#v}" +} + +VERSION="$(resolve_version)" +echo "build-companion: version=$VERSION out=$OUT_DIR native=$NATIVE" >&2 + +build_here() { + local work="$1" version="$2" + cd "$work" + # Rewrite the changelog top entry in the WORK COPY only; the committed changelog stays + # pristine, exactly as inject-deb-version.sh does for the four upstream sources. + DEBEMAIL="dev@ceralive.tv" DEBFULLNAME="CeraLive" \ + dch --force-bad-version --newversion "$version" --distribution stable --force-distribution \ + "CeraLive modem-stack release $version." + dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b +} + +if [[ "$NATIVE" -eq 1 ]]; then + command -v dpkg-buildpackage >/dev/null || { echo "build-companion: dpkg-buildpackage not found (--native needs dpkg-dev + debhelper)" >&2; exit 2; } + WORK="$(mktemp -d)" + trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT + cp -a "$SRC_DIR" "$WORK/ceralive-modem-support" + ( build_here "$WORK/ceralive-modem-support" "$VERSION" ) + mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR" + find "$WORK" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.deb' -exec cp {} "$OUT_DIR/" \; +else + ENGINE="${CONTAINER_ENGINE:-}" + if [[ -z "$ENGINE" ]]; then + if command -v podman >/dev/null 2>&1; then ENGINE=podman + elif command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then ENGINE=docker + else echo "build-companion: no podman/docker available" >&2; exit 2; fi + fi + mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR" + "$ENGINE" run --rm \ + -v "$SRC_DIR:/src:ro" \ + -v "$OUT_DIR:/out" \ + -e "VERSION=$VERSION" \ + "$IMAGE" bash -euo pipefail -c ' + export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive + apt-get update -qq + apt-get install -y -qq --no-install-recommends build-essential debhelper devscripts dpkg-dev >/dev/null + cp -a /src /work + cd /work + DEBEMAIL=dev@ceralive.tv DEBFULLNAME=CeraLive \ + dch --force-bad-version --newversion "$VERSION" --distribution stable --force-distribution \ + "CeraLive modem-stack release $VERSION." + dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b + cp /*.deb /out/ + chmod 0644 /out/*.deb + ' +fi + +DEB="$(find "$OUT_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -name 'ceralive-modem-support_*.deb' -newermt '-1 day' | head -n1)" +[[ -n "$DEB" ]] || { echo "build-companion: no .deb produced in $OUT_DIR" >&2; exit 1; } + +# Fail closed on the two identity axes the publisher and the manifest both rely on. +got_arch="$(dpkg-deb -f "$DEB" Architecture)" +got_ver="$(dpkg-deb -f "$DEB" Version)" +[[ "$got_arch" == "all" ]] || { echo "build-companion: Architecture '$got_arch' != all" >&2; exit 1; } +[[ "$got_ver" == "$VERSION" ]] || { echo "build-companion: Version '$got_ver' != '$VERSION'" >&2; exit 1; } + +echo "build-companion: built $(basename "$DEB") (Architecture: all, Version: $VERSION)" >&2 diff --git a/packaging/ci/companion-inventory.txt b/packaging/ci/companion-inventory.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b53357 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ci/companion-inventory.txt @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# companion-inventory.txt — the EXACT declared file inventory of ceralive-modem-support. +# +# `dpkg -L ceralive-modem-support` after a fresh install must list exactly these paths +# (directories excluded; docs excluded — changelog/copyright are debhelper's, not ours). +# The QA harness compares this list for EQUALITY, so an added, dropped or relocated asset +# fails the gate naming itself rather than silently shipping. +# +# Each line is a packaged path. The destination of each is a per-asset decision documented +# in debian/rules' installation table, not a blanket /usr/lib placement. +/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service +/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules +/usr/share/ceralive-modem-support/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256 +/usr/share/ceralive-modem-support/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1 +/usr/share/usb_modeswitch/12d1:1f01 +/usr/share/usb_modeswitch/19d2:1225 diff --git a/packaging/ci/contract.sh b/packaging/ci/contract.sh index 441f235..db91d12 100755 --- a/packaging/ci/contract.sh +++ b/packaging/ci/contract.sh @@ -39,6 +39,38 @@ require "ci/build-bookworm.sh" require "ci/test-package-contract.sh" require "ci/daemon-smoke.sh" require "ci/generate-release-manifest.sh" +require "ci/build-companion.sh" +require "ci/test-companion-chroot.sh" +require "ci/companion-inventory.txt" +require "ceralive-modem-support/debian/control" +require "ceralive-modem-support/debian/rules" +require "ceralive-modem-support/debian/legacy-etc-overrides.sha256" +require "ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules" +require "ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service" +require "ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile" + +# The companion's udev rules file may never carry a device MUTATION. This is a text contract +# because the failure it prevents — a generic package writing device permissions or running a +# command from udev — is invisible to every other gate in this repo. +echo " running companion udev no-mutation contract..." +if grep -nE '^[^#]*(RUN\+?=|MODE=|OWNER=|GROUP=|SYMLINK\+?=|ATTR\{[^}]+\}=[^=])' \ + "$PKG_ROOT/ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/60-ceralive-modem.rules"; then + echo " MUTATION FOUND in 60-ceralive-modem.rules — the companion tags devices, it never mutates them" + fail=1 +else + echo " ok: companion udev rules are identification/tagging only" +fi + +# The packaged basename must not collide with an image-owned /etc/udev/rules.d basename: udev +# resolves by basename and an /etc file shadows the packaged one in a way dpkg -S cannot see. +echo " running companion udev basename contract..." +for reserved in 99-ceralive-hardware.rules 78-mm-ceralive-slot-uid.rules; do + if [ -e "$PKG_ROOT/ceralive-modem-support/assets/udev/$reserved" ]; then + echo " RESERVED BASENAME: the companion must not ship $reserved (image-owned)" + fail=1 + fi +done +echo " ok: companion ships no image-owned udev basename" # The tag-guard contract must hold. echo " running tag-guard contract..." diff --git a/packaging/ci/expected-packages.txt b/packaging/ci/expected-packages.txt index f95b99f..cda6219 100644 --- a/packaging/ci/expected-packages.txt +++ b/packaging/ci/expected-packages.txt @@ -97,3 +97,25 @@ libqrtr-glib0 libqrtr-glib-dev gir1.2-qrtr-1.0 libqrtr-glib0-dbgsym + +# ── FIRST-PARTY COMPANION (Architecture: all) ──────────────────────────────── +# `ceralive-modem-support` is NOT an upstream rebuild. It is the first-party companion that +# owns CeraLive's generic modem system assets so the four zero-patch sources above never have +# to absorb one. It is built ONCE (packaging/ci/build-companion.sh -> packaging/build/all/) +# and is a single immutable release asset with TWO index memberships — see closure_version 2 +# in generate-release-manifest.sh. +# +# `[arch-all sources]` names every source whose artifacts are Architecture: all. The manifest +# generator uses it to scope its per-source EQUALITY check to the right build directory: an +# arch-all source is asserted only against build/all, and the four arch-dependent sources only +# against build/. Without that scoping, build/all would be required to contain +# modemmanager and every per-arch dir would be required to contain the companion. + +[arch-all sources] +ceralive-modem-support + +[ceralive-modem-support declared] +ceralive-modem-support + +[ceralive-modem-support all-artifact] # no -dbgsym: the package ships no ELF at all +ceralive-modem-support diff --git a/packaging/ci/generate-release-manifest.sh b/packaging/ci/generate-release-manifest.sh index 1704bb8..3ce0a2c 100755 --- a/packaging/ci/generate-release-manifest.sh +++ b/packaging/ci/generate-release-manifest.sh @@ -9,6 +9,23 @@ # dpkg-free: it parses each `__.deb` filename and sha256sums the file, # so it runs identically on a CI runner, a bench box, or this dev host. # +# CLOSURE VERSION 2 — the versioned contract apt-worker's publisher validates against. +# v1 (legacy, still valid): 9 arch-dependent runtime packages x 2 arches = 18 runtime rows. +# v2 (this): the same 9 x 2, PLUS the first-party `Architecture: all` +# companion `ceralive-modem-support`, emitted as ONE row with +# arch column `all`. +# +# BUILD ARCHITECTURE vs INDEX MEMBERSHIP are different questions and the manifest now says +# so. Column 1 is the BUILD architecture of the artifact (`arm64`, `amd64`, or `all`). +# Index membership is DERIVED from it: `all` enters BOTH per-arch APT indexes, anything +# else enters its own. That is why the companion is ONE immutable release asset with TWO +# index memberships rather than two builds — two builds would produce two byte-different +# files claiming the same package/version key and break the publisher's immutable-key rule. +# +# The header therefore carries THREE counts rather than one, so a consumer never has to +# infer the shape: `runtime_closure_size` (per-arch, arch-dependent), `arch_all_closure_size`, +# and `index_arches`. +# # It also FAILS CLOSED if the produced set is not exactly the frozen all-artifact set: per arch, # per source, the enumerated packages must EQUAL `[ all-artifact]` in expected-packages.txt # (the two-set model finalized in todo 1.4). An added, dropped, renamed, or unmapped deb is a @@ -37,10 +54,19 @@ EXPECTED="${EXPECTED_PACKAGES:-$HERE/expected-packages.txt}" VERSION="${TAG#v}" SUFFIX="~ceralive${VERSION}" -# The 9-package runtime closure — used to mark rows (role) and to assert none is missing. +CLOSURE_VERSION=2 + +# The 9 arch-dependent runtime packages, and the arch-all runtime companion. RUNTIME_PKGS=(modemmanager libmm-glib0 libmbim-glib4 libmbim-proxy libmbim-utils \ libqmi-glib5 libqmi-proxy libqmi-utils libqrtr-glib0) -is_runtime() { local p="$1" r; for r in "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"; do [ "$r" = "$p" ] && return 0; done; return 1; } +ARCH_ALL_RUNTIME_PKGS=(ceralive-modem-support) +INDEX_ARCHES=(arm64 amd64) + +is_runtime() { + local p="$1" r + for r in "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}" "${ARCH_ALL_RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"; do [ "$r" = "$p" ] && return 0; done + return 1 +} # Parse "__.deb" -> pkg / version / arch (version never contains '_'). deb_field() { # @@ -54,6 +80,13 @@ deb_field() { # expected_sources() { awk -F'[][]' '/^\[[^]]+ all-artifact\]/ { split($2, a, " "); print a[1] }' "$EXPECTED" | LC_ALL=C sort -u } +is_arch_all_source() { + awk -v want="$1" ' + /^\[/ { insec=($0 ~ /^\[arch-all sources\]/) ? 1 : 0; next } + insec { l=$0; sub(/#.*$/, "", l); gsub(/[ \t]+/, "", l); if (l==want) { found=1 } } + END { exit(found ? 0 : 1) } + ' "$EXPECTED" +} expected_set() { # -> its all-artifact package list, sorted-unique awk -v want="[$1 all-artifact]" ' /^\[/ { h=$0; sub(/[ \t]*#.*$/, "", h); insec=(h==want)?1:0; next } @@ -79,12 +112,17 @@ mkdir -p "$(dirname "$OUT")" echo "version: ${VERSION}" echo "deb_version_suffix: ${SUFFIX}" echo "sources: [${SOURCES[*]}]" + echo "closure_version: ${CLOSURE_VERSION}" echo "runtime_closure_size: ${#RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}" - echo "# columns: arch package source version role filename sha256" + echo "arch_all_closure_size: ${#ARCH_ALL_RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}" + echo "index_arches: [${INDEX_ARCHES[*]}]" + echo "# columns: build_arch package source version role filename sha256" + echo "# build_arch 'all' => the artifact enters EVERY index arch; otherwise its own only." } > "$OUT" total_all=0 total_runtime=0 +total_arch_all=0 arches_seen=() rc=0 for archdir in "$BUILD_ROOT"/*/; do @@ -100,8 +138,20 @@ for archdir in "$BUILD_ROOT"/*/; do done produced_sorted="$(printf '%s\n' "${!FILE_OF[@]}" | LC_ALL=C sort -u)" - # (a) No runtime package may be absent (kept from the original closure check). - for pkg in "${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}"; do + # A build directory is either an INDEX-ARCH directory (arm64/amd64, holding the four + # upstream sources' arch-dependent debs) or the single ARCH-ALL directory. Every check + # below is scoped to its kind: without that, build/all would be required to contain + # modemmanager and every per-arch dir would be required to contain the companion. + dir_is_arch_all=0 + [ "$arch" = "all" ] && dir_is_arch_all=1 + + # (a) No runtime package of this directory's kind may be absent. + if [ "$dir_is_arch_all" -eq 1 ]; then + required_pkgs=("${ARCH_ALL_RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}") + else + required_pkgs=("${RUNTIME_PKGS[@]}") + fi + for pkg in "${required_pkgs[@]}"; do [ -n "${FILE_OF[$pkg]:-}" ] || { echo "generate-release-manifest: MISSING runtime deb '$pkg' for $arch" >&2; exit 2; } done @@ -111,8 +161,14 @@ for archdir in "$BUILD_ROOT"/*/; do [ -n "${SOURCE_OF[$p]:-}" ] || { echo "generate-release-manifest: FAIL CLOSED — [$arch] produced package '$p' is in no expected all-artifact set" >&2; rc=3; } done <<< "$produced_sorted" - # (c) Per-source EQUALITY: produced set for this source == its all-artifact set. + # (c) Per-source EQUALITY: produced set for this source == its all-artifact set, + # over only the sources that belong in THIS directory's kind. for src in "${SOURCES[@]}"; do + if is_arch_all_source "$src"; then + [ "$dir_is_arch_all" -eq 1 ] || continue + else + [ "$dir_is_arch_all" -eq 0 ] || continue + fi want="$(expected_set "$src")" # `|| true`: the filter's last test can be a non-match (exit 1); pipefail would else # abort. An empty `got` simply fails the equality below, closed. @@ -132,7 +188,16 @@ for archdir in "$BUILD_ROOT"/*/; do fn="$(basename "$deb")" ver="$(deb_field "$fn" version)" sha="$(sha256sum "$deb" | awk '{print $1}')" - if is_runtime "$pkg"; then role=runtime; total_runtime=$((total_runtime + 1)); else role=aux; fi + if is_runtime "$pkg"; then + role=runtime + if [ "$dir_is_arch_all" -eq 1 ]; then + total_arch_all=$((total_arch_all + 1)) + else + total_runtime=$((total_runtime + 1)) + fi + else + role=aux + fi printf '%s %s %s %s %s %s %s\n' "$arch" "$pkg" "${SOURCE_OF[$pkg]:-UNKNOWN}" "$ver" "$role" "$fn" "$sha" >> "$OUT" total_all=$((total_all + 1)) done <<< "$produced_sorted" @@ -141,8 +206,8 @@ for archdir in "$BUILD_ROOT"/*/; do done { - echo "# arches: ${arches_seen[*]:-none}" - echo "# all_debs_total: ${total_all} runtime_debs_total: ${total_runtime} (across ${#arches_seen[@]} arch)" + echo "# build_dirs: ${arches_seen[*]:-none}" + echo "# all_debs_total: ${total_all} arch_runtime_rows: ${total_runtime} arch_all_runtime_rows: ${total_arch_all}" } >> "$OUT" [ "$total_all" -gt 0 ] || { echo "generate-release-manifest: no debs found under $BUILD_ROOT" >&2; exit 2; } @@ -152,4 +217,4 @@ if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then fi cat "$OUT" -echo "generate-release-manifest: wrote $OUT (${total_all} deb rows, ${total_runtime} runtime, across ${#arches_seen[@]} arch)" >&2 +echo "generate-release-manifest: wrote $OUT (${total_all} deb rows; ${total_runtime} arch-runtime + ${total_arch_all} arch-all runtime; build dirs: ${arches_seen[*]})" >&2 diff --git a/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh b/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..f1ab618 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# test-companion-chroot.sh — the CHROOT-STAGE contract for ceralive-modem-support. +# +# TWO-STAGE SPLIT (deliberate). A clean container has no sysfs devices and no running +# daemons, so it can prove PACKAGING SHAPE and nothing else. This script is that stage: +# install / upgrade / downgrade / purge, /etc override precedence, the chroot guard, the +# two /etc-override maintscript branches, the absent-policy no-op, and single-owner. +# +# The CONSUMER stage — `udevadm test` against a real modem's sysfs path, `usb_modeswitch -c`, +# `systemd-analyze verify` + `systemctl is-enabled` + a real boot's journal ordering, and +# ModemManager's effective configuration listing — runs ON THE BENCH BOARD and is documented +# in docs/BENCH.md (RB-18). Do not fake it here; a green fake is worse than a recorded gap. +# +# USAGE test-companion-chroot.sh [image] (default: debian:trixie) +# ENV CONTAINER_ENGINE=podman|docker, COMPANION_TEST_DIR= +# EXIT 0 = every step passed; non-zero names the failing step. +set -euo pipefail + +HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +PKG_ROOT="$(cd "$HERE/.." && pwd)" +REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$PKG_ROOT/.." && pwd)" +IMAGE="${1:-${COMPANION_TEST_IMAGE:-debian:trixie}}" +WORK="${COMPANION_TEST_DIR:-$REPO_ROOT/test-results/companion-chroot}" + +ENGINE="${CONTAINER_ENGINE:-}" +if [[ -z "$ENGINE" ]]; then + if command -v podman >/dev/null 2>&1; then ENGINE=podman + elif command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then ENGINE=docker + else echo "test-companion-chroot: no podman/docker available" >&2; exit 2; fi +fi + +rm -rf "$WORK" +mkdir -p "$WORK/debs" + +echo "== building the companion at two versions (old 0.9.0, new 1.1.0) ==" >&2 +BUILD_ROOT="$WORK/b-old" RELEASE_VERSION=v0.9.0 bash "$HERE/build-companion.sh" >"$WORK/build-old.log" 2>&1 +BUILD_ROOT="$WORK/b-new" RELEASE_VERSION=v1.1.0 bash "$HERE/build-companion.sh" >"$WORK/build-new.log" 2>&1 +cp "$WORK"/b-old/all/*.deb "$WORK"/b-new/all/*.deb "$WORK/debs/" +cp "$HERE/companion-inventory.txt" "$WORK/companion-inventory.txt" +cp "$PKG_ROOT/ceralive-modem-support/assets/legacy/60-ceralive-modem.rules.legacy-v1" "$WORK/legacy-payload" + +cat >"$WORK/run-in-container.sh" <<'CONTAINER_SCRIPT' +#!/bin/bash +# Runs INSIDE a clean Debian container. Everything below is dpkg + coreutils against the +# two locally-built .debs — no network, no apt transaction, no host state. +set -uo pipefail + +QA=/qa +OLD="$QA/debs/ceralive-modem-support_0.9.0_all.deb" +NEW="$QA/debs/ceralive-modem-support_1.1.0_all.deb" +RULES_ETC=/etc/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules +RULES_LIB=/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/60-ceralive-modem.rules +POSTINST=/var/lib/dpkg/info/ceralive-modem-support.postinst + +export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive + +pass=0; fail=0 +ok() { printf ' ok %s\n' "$*"; pass=$((pass+1)); } +bad() { printf ' FAIL %s\n' "$*"; fail=$((fail+1)); } + +# The companion declares `Depends: udev`, so the install legs go through apt (which resolves +# it) rather than bare `dpkg -i` (which cannot). This is also the invocation an operator and +# the device image actually use. +apt-get update -qq >/tmp/apt-update.log 2>&1 || { echo "apt-get update failed"; cat /tmp/apt-update.log; exit 2; } + +installed_files() { + dpkg -L ceralive-modem-support 2>/dev/null | while IFS= read -r p; do + [ -f "$p" ] && printf '%s\n' "$p" + done | LC_ALL=C sort +} +declared_files() { + grep -v '^[[:space:]]*#' "$QA/companion-inventory.txt" | grep -v '^[[:space:]]*$' | LC_ALL=C sort +} + +echo "== 1. fresh install in a clean chroot ==" +if [ -d /run/udev ]; then bad "the container unexpectedly has /run/udev — the guard leg would be vacuous"; fi +if apt-get install -y -qq "$NEW" >/tmp/install.log 2>&1; then ok "apt-get install ./deb exit 0"; else bad "apt-get install failed"; cat /tmp/install.log; fi +[ -d /run/udev ] && { rmdir /run/udev 2>/dev/null || true; } + +got="$(installed_files | grep -v '^/usr/share/doc/')" +want="$(declared_files)" +if [ "$got" = "$want" ]; then + ok "dpkg -L lists exactly the declared inventory ($(printf '%s\n' "$want" | wc -l) paths)" +else + bad "dpkg -L != declared inventory" + diff <(printf '%s\n' "$want") <(printf '%s\n' "$got") | sed 's/^/ /' +fi + +echo "== 2. chroot guard: no /run/udev => postinst no-ops, no udevadm invocation ==" +if bash -x "$POSTINST" configure >/tmp/postinst-trace.log 2>&1; then + ok "postinst re-run exit 0 without /run/udev" +else + bad "postinst failed without /run/udev"; cat /tmp/postinst-trace.log +fi +if grep -q 'no /run/udev' /tmp/postinst-trace.log; then ok "postinst announced the chroot skip"; else bad "no chroot-skip announcement"; fi +if grep -qE '^\+.*udevadm (control|trigger)' /tmp/postinst-trace.log; then + bad "postinst invoked udevadm without /run/udev" +else + ok "set -x trace contains NO udevadm control/trigger invocation" +fi + +echo "== 2b. non-vacuity: with /run/udev present the guard lets the reload path run ==" +mkdir -p /run/udev +bash -x "$POSTINST" configure >/tmp/postinst-udev.log 2>&1 +if grep -q 'no /run/udev' /tmp/postinst-udev.log; then + bad "the guard still short-circuited even though /run/udev exists" +else + ok "with /run/udev present the guard does NOT short-circuit" +fi +# The trigger must be NARROW. A bare `udevadm trigger` would re-run every rule for every +# device on the system; assert no such call exists in the shipped script text. +if grep -nE 'udevadm trigger *$|udevadm trigger +\|\||udevadm trigger *#' "$POSTINST" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + bad "postinst contains a BARE udevadm trigger (no subsystem match)" +else + ok "every udevadm trigger in the shipped postinst carries --subsystem-match" +fi +rmdir /run/udev + +echo "== 3. single-owner: dpkg -S names exactly one package per packaged path ==" +multi=0 +while IFS= read -r p; do + owners="$(dpkg -S "$p" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f1 | tr ',' '\n' | sed 's/ //g' | grep . | sort -u)" + n="$(printf '%s\n' "$owners" | grep -c . )" + if [ "$n" != "1" ] || [ "$owners" != "ceralive-modem-support" ]; then + bad "dpkg -S $p => '$owners' (expected exactly ceralive-modem-support)"; multi=1 + fi +done < <(declared_files) +[ "$multi" -eq 0 ] && ok "every declared path has exactly one owner" + +echo "== 4. /etc override precedence ==" +mkdir -p /etc/udev/rules.d +printf '# operator override\n' > "$RULES_ETC" +winner="" +for d in /etc/udev/rules.d /run/udev/rules.d /usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d /usr/lib/udev/rules.d /lib/udev/rules.d; do + [ -f "$d/60-ceralive-modem.rules" ] && { winner="$d/60-ceralive-modem.rules"; break; } +done +if [ "$winner" = "$RULES_ETC" ]; then ok "the /etc copy wins udev's basename precedence"; else bad "precedence resolved to '$winner'"; fi +if dpkg -S "$RULES_LIB" >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! dpkg -S "$RULES_ETC" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + ok "dpkg -S cannot see the shadowing /etc file (the exact hazard the basename rule exists for)" +else + bad "dpkg -S reported the /etc shadow — assumption broken" +fi +rm -f "$RULES_ETC" + +echo "== 5. /etc override maintscript branches ==" +echo "-- 5a. marker-carrying but operator-MODIFIED file is PRESERVED --" +{ printf '# CERALIVE-GENERATED: modem-udev v1 — DO NOT EDIT\n'; printf '# operator added this line\n'; } > "$RULES_ETC" +bash "$POSTINST" configure >/tmp/preserve.log 2>&1 +if [ -f "$RULES_ETC" ]; then ok "marker-carrying but MODIFIED /etc file preserved"; else bad "an operator-modified /etc file was deleted"; fi +grep -q 'preserving modified' /tmp/preserve.log && ok "preservation was announced" || bad "no modified-preservation announcement" + +echo "-- 5b. unmarked operator file is PRESERVED --" +printf '# my own rules\n' > "$RULES_ETC" +bash "$POSTINST" configure >/tmp/preserve2.log 2>&1 +if [ -f "$RULES_ETC" ]; then ok "unmarked operator file preserved"; else bad "an unmarked operator file was deleted"; fi +grep -q 'no generated marker' /tmp/preserve2.log && ok "no-marker preservation was announced" || bad "no no-marker announcement" + +echo "-- 5c. KNOWN-STALE generated payload IS removed --" +cp "$QA/legacy-payload" "$RULES_ETC" +bash "$POSTINST" configure >/tmp/stale.log 2>&1 +if [ ! -e "$RULES_ETC" ]; then ok "known-stale generated override removed"; else bad "known-stale override survived"; cat /tmp/stale.log; fi +grep -q 'removed stale generated override' /tmp/stale.log && ok "removal was announced" || bad "no removal announcement" + +echo "== 6. FCC reconcile ==" +mkdir -p /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d +printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/2c7c +chmod +x /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/2c7c +MULTIARCH="$(dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_MULTIARCH 2>/dev/null || echo x86_64-linux-gnu)" +ACTIVE="/usr/lib/$MULTIARCH/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d" +rm -rf "$ACTIVE" + +echo "-- 6a. absent policy exits 0 and creates NO active symlink --" +if /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-absent.log 2>&1; then + ok "reconciler exits 0 with no /data policy (generic Debian, no CeraLive layout)" +else + bad "reconciler failed with no policy"; cat /tmp/fcc-absent.log +fi +if [ -z "$(find "$ACTIVE" -type l 2>/dev/null)" ]; then ok "no active FCC symlink created without a policy"; else bad "an active FCC symlink appeared without a policy"; fi + +echo "-- 6b. an enabling policy activates exactly the enabled vendor --" +mkdir -p /data/ceralive +printf '{"version":1,"unlock":{"2c7c":true,"1e0e":false}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-on.log 2>&1 +if [ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ]; then ok "policy-enabled 2c7c activated"; else bad "2c7c not activated"; cat /tmp/fcc-on.log; fi +if [ -e "$ACTIVE/1e0e" ]; then bad "policy-disabled 1e0e was activated"; else ok "policy-disabled 1e0e stayed inactive"; fi + +echo "-- 6c. a MALFORMED policy is treated as absent (fail-safe, never fail-open) --" +printf '{"version":1,"unlock":{"2c7c":yes}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-bad.log 2>&1 +if [ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ]; then bad "a malformed policy left an active FCC symlink"; else ok "malformed policy deactivated everything"; fi +grep -q 'malformed' /tmp/fcc-bad.log && ok "malformed policy was announced" || bad "no malformed announcement" +rm -rf /data + +echo "== 7. upgrade path (0.9.0 -> 1.1.0), no conffile prompt ==" +dpkg -P ceralive-modem-support >/dev/null 2>&1 +apt-get install -y -qq --allow-downgrades "$OLD" >/tmp/up1.log 2>&1 || { bad "installing the old version failed"; cat /tmp/up1.log; } +[ "$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' ceralive-modem-support)" = "0.9.0" ] && ok "old version installed" || bad "old version not 0.9.0" +if apt-get install -y -qq "$NEW" >/tmp/up2.log 2>&1; then ok "upgrade exit 0"; else bad "upgrade failed"; cat /tmp/up2.log; fi +[ "$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' ceralive-modem-support)" = "1.1.0" ] && ok "upgraded to 1.1.0" || bad "version did not advance" +if [ -z "$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Conffiles}' ceralive-modem-support | tr -d ' \n')" ]; then + ok "package declares ZERO conffiles (a conffile prompt is structurally impossible)" +else + bad "package declares conffiles: $(dpkg-query -W -f='${Conffiles}' ceralive-modem-support)" +fi +if grep -qi 'configuration file.*modified\|what would you like to do' /tmp/up2.log; then + bad "upgrade emitted a conffile prompt" +else + ok "upgrade transcript carries no conffile prompt" +fi + +echo "== 8. downgrade path (1.1.0 -> 0.9.0) ==" +if apt-get install -y -qq --allow-downgrades "$OLD" >/tmp/down.log 2>&1; then ok "downgrade exit 0"; else bad "downgrade failed"; cat /tmp/down.log; fi +[ "$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' ceralive-modem-support)" = "0.9.0" ] && ok "downgraded to 0.9.0" || bad "downgrade did not take" + +echo "== 9. purge leaves zero leftovers ==" +mkdir -p "$ACTIVE"; ln -sfn /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/2c7c "$ACTIVE/2c7c" +printf 'not ours\n' > /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/keepme +if dpkg -P ceralive-modem-support >/tmp/purge.log 2>&1; then ok "dpkg -P exit 0"; else bad "purge failed"; cat /tmp/purge.log; fi +if dpkg -L ceralive-modem-support >/dev/null 2>&1; then bad "dpkg -L still resolves after purge"; else ok "dpkg -L errors after purge"; fi +left=0 +while IFS= read -r p; do + [ -e "$p" ] && { bad "leftover after purge: $p"; left=1; } +done < <(declared_files) +for d in /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support /usr/share/ceralive-modem-support; do + [ -e "$d" ] && { bad "leftover directory after purge: $d"; left=1; } +done +[ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ] && { bad "purge left an active FCC symlink behind"; left=1; } +[ -f /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/keepme ] || { bad "purge deleted a file that was not ours"; left=1; } +[ "$left" -eq 0 ] && ok "zero leftovers over every declared path; foreign files untouched" + +echo +echo "== summary: $pass passed, $fail failed ==" +[ "$fail" -eq 0 ] +CONTAINER_SCRIPT + +chmod +x "$WORK/run-in-container.sh" + +echo "== running the dpkg matrix in a clean $IMAGE container ==" >&2 +set +e +"$ENGINE" run --rm -v "$WORK:/qa:z" "$IMAGE" bash /qa/run-in-container.sh 2>&1 | tee "$WORK/chroot-qa.log" +rc="${PIPESTATUS[0]}" +set -e +echo "test-companion-chroot: transcript at $WORK/chroot-qa.log" >&2 +exit "$rc" From 1e53f3467987a16c284d65b5328215b30589d38d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] feat(control): capability feature-gate framework + support-claim taxonomy MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Every capability this effort adds — band locking, SMS, 5G preference, FCC unlock, GPS, USSD — is real on some modems and absent on others, and the failure mode that matters to an operator is a control that looks available and then refuses. The package had no shared way to answer "can THIS modem do this?", so each surface would have invented its own guess. `capability/detect.ts` derives a module's availability from evidence the modem itself reported, never from a model-name heuristic. `capability/support-claim.ts` gives that answer a taxonomy: a claim is supported, unsupported, or unknown-for-this-modem, and unknown is a first-class answer rather than a degenerate "no". A consumer can therefore render an honest third state instead of hiding a control that might work or offering one that cannot. Nothing consumes the framework yet; the modules land on top of it. --- AGENTS.md | 93 +++++++++++++++- control/src/capability/detect.test.ts | 97 +++++++++++++++++ control/src/capability/detect.ts | 106 +++++++++++++++++++ control/src/capability/index.ts | 8 ++ control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts | 91 ++++++++++++++++ control/src/capability/support-claim.ts | 106 +++++++++++++++++++ control/src/index.ts | 1 + 7 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 control/src/capability/detect.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/capability/detect.ts create mode 100644 control/src/capability/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/capability/support-claim.ts diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index c6c45f2..bcff09e 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -12,12 +12,46 @@ Canonical branch: `main`. Sole remote: `origin` → `https://github.com/CERALIVE | Directory | Artifact | Role | |-----------|----------|------| -| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface** (see § below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive`. | +| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection** (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive`. | | `cli/` | `modem-control` (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`/`watch`/`apply`/`set-usb-mode`/`usage`/`certify`/`hil-cycle`, compiled `arm64`+`amd64`, run against real modems. Not published to npm. | -| `packaging/` | ModemManager stack `.deb`s | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — packaging only, zero source patches (see `POLICY.md`). Bench installs from CI artifacts. | +| `packaging/` | ModemManager stack `.deb`s **+ the first-party companion** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — packaging only, zero source patches (see `POLICY.md`) — PLUS `ceralive-modem-support`, the `Architecture: all` first-party companion that owns CeraLive's generic modem system assets so those four never absorb one. | `control/` + `cli/` are one **Bun** workspace. `packaging/` builds in a bookworm container. +## FIRST-PARTY COMPANION — `ceralive-modem-support` + +The four upstream sources are byte-faithful, zero-patch rebuilds. `ceralive-modem-support` +(`packaging/ceralive-modem-support/`, `Architecture: all`) is the first-party package that +keeps them that way: it owns the UNCONDITIONAL, generic modem system assets — CeraLive's +identification-only udev rules, Zero-CD usb-modeswitch device data, and the FCC +policy-reconciliation helper plus its oneshot unit. It ships **no active FCC-unlock script**; +an absent `/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json` exits 0 and activates nothing, which is +also the correct behaviour on generic Debian with no CeraLive partition layout. + +**Board-gated generated assets stay image-owned** — M.2 SIM quirk rows and per-slot modem UID +rules consume build-time board facts a generic package cannot know. Do not move them here. + +**The udev basename is load-bearing.** udev resolves rules by BASENAME, and an +`/etc/udev/rules.d` file SHADOWS a same-basename `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d` file completely +while `dpkg -S` keeps naming the package as owner of the `/usr/lib` path — the substitution +is invisible to package tooling. The companion therefore uses the modem-only basename +`60-ceralive-modem.rules`, which no image-owned `/etc` file shares (the image owns +`99-ceralive-hardware.rules` and `78-mm-ceralive-slot-uid.rules`). Never rename it onto an +image-owned basename, and never ship an `/etc` copy from this package. A stale same-basename +`/etc` override is removed on upgrade ONLY when marker AND sha256 identify a known generated +payload; anything unknown or operator-modified is preserved. + +QA is two-stage and the split is deliberate: `packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh` proves +packaging SHAPE in a clean `debian:trixie` container, while the consumer proofs (`udevadm +test` against a real modem, `usb_modeswitch -c`, unit ordering against a real boot journal) +are BENCH-GATED and must not be faked in a container. Full detail: `packaging/README.md`. + +The release manifest emits **`closure_version: 2`**, which adds this one `Architecture: all` +asset to the frozen 9 × 2 closure as a single row with `build_arch` `all`. It is ONE +immutable release asset with TWO index memberships; apt-worker's publisher indexes it into +both per-arch indexes. A per-arch build is forbidden — two byte-different files under one +package/version key break the immutable-key rule. + ## RULE D — SELF-CONTAINED (load-bearing) **This repo builds, tests, and releases standalone in CI. The CeraLive workspace parent @@ -203,6 +237,44 @@ transform in `control/src/usb-mode/{ingestion,promotion-review,usb-devices-parse hub VBUS port-cycle verification backing the PowerHook above, RB-11..15/17 are the per-SKU/flap-resilience captures documented above, RB-16 is the FM350 probe. +## CAPABILITY MODULES — TAXONOMY AND DETECTION, NOT IMPLEMENTATION + +`control/src/capability/` carries the FIVE-STATE support-claim taxonomy and the +per-modem capability detection the seven gated capability modules (band-lock, SMS, +5G-pref, FCC-auto-unlock, GPS, USSD, eSIM) resolve against. **No module is +implemented here**, and none may be surfaced or claimed until its own change lands +with its probe and its evidence. + +The taxonomy exists because "supported" was one word doing four jobs — the code +exists, an operator turned it on, the modem advertises it, and somebody proved it +on this firmware. `resolveSupportClaim` answers with the highest rung reached: +`unavailable` (not shipped, or the modem positively lacks it) → `implemented` +(gate OFF, the default everywhere) → `enabled` (gate ON, capability UNKNOWN) → +`capable` (gate ON, modem advertises it — the floor for offering a control) → +`certified` (proven on this exact model+firmware — the ONLY rung a support matrix +may claim). + +**It is a Rule-D MIRROR of CeraUI's `@ceraui/rpc` ladder, never a shared import** +— the same relationship `usb-net-classifier.ts` has with `device-classifier.ts` in +the other direction. The two halves are kept honest by their tests, not by a path. + +`detect.ts` follows `backend/features.ts` exactly: it PROBES the observed surface +rather than matching a version whitelist, never throws, and treats `unknown` as a +first-class result — a property set nobody observed says nothing about the device, +and the ladder stops at `enabled` for it. Two facts are worth knowing before +extending it: + +- **SMS / USSD / GPS are advertised as INTERFACES, not properties**, so + `MmPropertyProbe` alone cannot see them; `ModuleCapabilityProbe` adds the modem + object's interface set. The `Location` interface being exported is separately NOT + a GNSS claim — MM exports it for 3GPP-LAC/CID-only devices too, so a GNSS source + must appear in `Location.Capabilities`. +- **`fcc-auto-unlock` is always `unknown`, deliberately.** FCC unlock is carried out + by a ModemManager PLUGIN keyed on the device, and nothing on the modem's own + D-Bus surface says whether one applies. `absent` would hide the module on + supported hardware; `present` would promise a plugin that may not be installed. + Evidence for it comes from the catalog instead. + ## eSIM (investigate-only, implementation deferred) `docs/ESIM-DECISION.md` records the full eSIM investigation: SGP.22 profile-binding makes @@ -277,7 +349,9 @@ major action versions, per-manager caches, weekly grouped Dependabot, test-befor (test-before-publish). 3. **build-deb** (needs [tag-guard, test]) — injects `-~ceralive` (non-tag runs `~ceralive0.0.0~dev`) via `packaging/ci/inject-deb-version.sh`, builds both - arches, runs the package contract suite + daemon smoke, generates the manifest-complete + arches, runs the package contract suite + daemon smoke, builds the `Architecture: all` + companion ONCE (`packaging/ci/build-companion.sh`) and runs its clean-chroot contract + (`packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh`), generates the manifest-complete release manifest (`packaging/ci/generate-release-manifest.sh`), and uploads the `.deb` artifacts + manifest. 4. **publish-npm** (needs [tag-guard, build-deb]) — OIDC trusted publishing @@ -289,7 +363,18 @@ major action versions, per-manager caches, weekly grouped Dependabot, test-befor pre-create moved-tag re-check, downloads the `.deb` + manifest artifact, assembles a flat asset dir, and reconciles it immutably via `packaging/ci/reconcile-release-assets.sh` (manifest-complete, staged sanitized `~`→`.` names, collision-rejected, existing assets - integrity-compared and never overwritten). + integrity-compared and never overwritten). The flat assembly additionally REFUSES a + duplicate RAW basename before any sanitization can mask it. It then **dispatches + `apt-modem-closure` to `CERALIVE/apt-worker`** — last, so the manifest the publisher + fetches already exists on the release. `CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN` must be a fine-grained + PAT with **`Contents: read/write`** on the target repo; the repository-dispatch endpoint + is gated on Contents, NOT on `Actions: write`. +- **`.github/workflows/apt-dispatch-preflight.yml`** — proves this repository's + `CERALIVE_DISPATCH_TOKEN` can reach apt-worker's publisher without publishing anything. It + sends `client_payload.preflight=true`, which apt-worker forces to DRY_RUN regardless of its + live default; with no tag it exits before manifest resolution, so it is safe to run BEFORE + the release exists. An operator's own `gh api` call would test the operator's CLI token and + prove nothing about the repository secret — which is exactly why this lives here. `cancel-in-progress: false` (never cancel a release/publish mid-run). Action pins track the latest stable **major** (resolved via the `gh api` releases/latest diff --git a/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts b/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72a49ae --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + detectCapabilityModules, + LOCATION_IFACE, + MESSAGING_IFACE, + type ModuleCapabilityProbe, + USSD_IFACE, +} from './detect'; + +type ProbeOverrides = { + readonly [K in keyof ModuleCapabilityProbe]?: ModuleCapabilityProbe[K] | undefined; +}; + +function probe(overrides: ProbeOverrides = {}): ModuleCapabilityProbe { + const interfaces = 'interfaces' in overrides ? overrides.interfaces : DEFAULT_INTERFACES; + const locationSources = + 'locationSources' in overrides ? overrides.locationSources : DEFAULT_LOCATION_SOURCES; + return { + properties: overrides.properties ?? DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, + ...(interfaces === undefined ? {} : { interfaces }), + ...(locationSources === undefined ? {} : { locationSources }), + }; +} + +const DEFAULT_PROPERTIES = new Set(['SupportedBands', 'SupportedModes', 'SimType']); +const DEFAULT_INTERFACES = new Set([MESSAGING_IFACE, USSD_IFACE, LOCATION_IFACE]); +const DEFAULT_LOCATION_SOURCES = new Set(['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea']); + +describe('per-module capability detection', () => { + test('a fully-featured modem advertises every probeable module', () => { + const detected = detectCapabilityModules(probe()); + expect(detected['band-lock']).toBe('present'); + expect(detected['five-g-pref']).toBe('present'); + expect(detected.esim).toBe('present'); + expect(detected.sms).toBe('present'); + expect(detected.ussd).toBe('present'); + expect(detected.gps).toBe('present'); + }); + + test('an OBSERVED modem missing a property reports absent, not unknown', () => { + const detected = detectCapabilityModules(probe({ properties: new Set(['SupportedModes']) })); + expect(detected['band-lock']).toBe('absent'); + expect(detected.esim).toBe('absent'); + expect(detected['five-g-pref']).toBe('present'); + }); + + test('a read that never landed reports unknown for every property-backed module', () => { + const detected = detectCapabilityModules(probe({ properties: new Set() })); + expect(detected['band-lock']).toBe('unknown'); + expect(detected['five-g-pref']).toBe('unknown'); + expect(detected.esim).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('`EsimStatus` alone is enough for eSIM — the two spellings coexist', () => { + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe({ properties: new Set(['EsimStatus']) })).esim).toBe( + 'present', + ); + }); + + test('an unobserved interface set reports unknown, never absent', () => { + const detected = detectCapabilityModules(probe({ interfaces: undefined })); + expect(detected.sms).toBe('unknown'); + expect(detected.ussd).toBe('unknown'); + expect(detected.gps).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('an observed modem without the Messaging/USSD interfaces reports absent', () => { + const detected = detectCapabilityModules(probe({ interfaces: new Set() })); + expect(detected.sms).toBe('absent'); + expect(detected.ussd).toBe('absent'); + }); + + test('the Location interface alone is NOT a GNSS claim', () => { + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe({ locationSources: new Set(['3gpp-lac-ci']) })).gps).toBe( + 'absent', + ); + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe({ locationSources: undefined })).gps).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('FCC auto-unlock is never inferred from the modem surface', () => { + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe())['fcc-auto-unlock']).toBe('unknown'); + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe({ properties: new Set() }))['fcc-auto-unlock']).toBe( + 'unknown', + ); + }); + + test('detection never throws on a hostile probe', () => { + expect(() => + detectCapabilityModules({ + properties: new Set(), + interfaces: new Set(), + locationSources: new Set(), + }), + ).not.toThrow(); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/capability/detect.ts b/control/src/capability/detect.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3ccee8 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/detect.ts @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +// Per-module capability detection — what ONE modem can actually be asked to do. +// +// It follows `backend/features.ts` exactly, because the constraints are the same: +// detection must PROBE the observed surface rather than match a version +// whitelist, it must never throw, and an unseen future ModemManager must degrade +// gracefully instead of resolving to a confident wrong answer. +// +// The one rule this module adds is that `unknown` is a first-class result. A +// property set we never observed says nothing about the device, and the ladder in +// `support-claim.ts` stops at `enabled` for it — surfaced by nothing, mutated by +// nothing. Answering `absent` there would hide a working capability; answering +// `present` would offer a control the modem cannot honour. + +import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import type { MmPropertyProbe } from '../backend/features'; +import type { CapabilityEvidence, CapabilityModule } from './support-claim'; + +/** MM's Messaging interface — SMS list/read lives here. */ +export const MESSAGING_IFACE = `${MODEM_IFACE}.Messaging`; +/** MM's Location interface — GNSS sources are advertised here. */ +export const LOCATION_IFACE = `${MODEM_IFACE}.Location`; +/** MM's 3GPP USSD interface. */ +export const USSD_IFACE = `${MODEM3GPP_IFACE}.Ussd`; + +/** + * What A3.2 observed, plus the two signals the static object tree cannot carry. + * + * `interfaces` is the set of interface NAMES exported on the modem object, which + * is how SMS/USSD/Location are advertised — they are separate interfaces, not + * properties, so `MmPropertyProbe` alone cannot see them. + */ +export interface ModuleCapabilityProbe extends MmPropertyProbe { + readonly interfaces?: ReadonlySet; + /** + * `Location.Capabilities` decoded to source names (`gps-raw`, `gps-nmea`, …). + * An EMPTY set is a real answer — the interface exists and offers no GNSS. + */ + readonly locationSources?: ReadonlySet; +} + +const GNSS_SOURCES = ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea', 'gps-unmanaged', 'agps-msa', 'agps-msb']; + +/** + * A property we did not see is only evidence of ABSENCE when we saw the object at + * all. An empty property set means the read never landed. + */ +function fromProperty(probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe, name: string): CapabilityEvidence { + if (probe.properties.size === 0) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return probe.properties.has(name) ? 'present' : 'absent'; +} + +function fromAnyProperty( + probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe, + names: readonly string[], +): CapabilityEvidence { + if (probe.properties.size === 0) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return names.some((name) => probe.properties.has(name)) ? 'present' : 'absent'; +} + +function fromInterface(probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe, iface: string): CapabilityEvidence { + if (probe.interfaces === undefined) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return probe.interfaces.has(iface) ? 'present' : 'absent'; +} + +function detectGnss(probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe): CapabilityEvidence { + const iface = fromInterface(probe, LOCATION_IFACE); + if (iface !== 'present') { + return iface; + } + // The interface being exported is not the same claim as the modem offering a + // GNSS source — MM exports Location for 3GPP-LAC/CID-only devices too. + if (probe.locationSources === undefined) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return GNSS_SOURCES.some((source) => probe.locationSources?.has(source)) ? 'present' : 'absent'; +} + +/** + * Detect every module's capability for one modem. Pure, total, never throws. + * + * `fcc-auto-unlock` is deliberately always `unknown`: FCC unlock is carried out + * by a ModemManager PLUGIN keyed on the device, and nothing on the modem's own + * D-Bus surface advertises whether one applies. Reporting `absent` would hide the + * module on hardware that supports it, and `present` would promise a plugin that + * may not be installed — so the honest answer is that this probe cannot tell, and + * evidence for it has to come from the catalog instead. + */ +export function detectCapabilityModules( + probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe, +): Record { + return { + 'band-lock': fromProperty(probe, 'SupportedBands'), + sms: fromInterface(probe, MESSAGING_IFACE), + 'five-g-pref': fromProperty(probe, 'SupportedModes'), + 'fcc-auto-unlock': 'unknown', + gps: detectGnss(probe), + ussd: fromInterface(probe, USSD_IFACE), + esim: fromAnyProperty(probe, ['SimType', 'EsimStatus']), + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/capability/index.ts b/control/src/capability/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d2c4c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +// Capability-module feature-gate framework — the support-claim taxonomy and the +// per-modem capability detection the seven gated modules resolve against. +// +// Framework only: no module is implemented here, and none may be surfaced or +// claimed until its own change lands with its probe and its evidence. + +export * from './detect'; +export * from './support-claim'; diff --git a/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts b/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e5ddcc --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + CAPABILITY_MODULES, + type CapabilityModule, + mayClaimSupport, + mayRenderModule, + resolveCapabilityMatrix, + resolveSupportClaim, + SUPPORT_CLAIM_STATES, +} from './support-claim'; + +const ALL: readonly CapabilityModule[] = CAPABILITY_MODULES; + +describe('the support-claim ladder', () => { + test('a module this build does not ship is unavailable, gate or no gate', () => { + for (const gateEnabled of [false, true]) { + expect( + resolveSupportClaim({ + implemented: false, + gateEnabled, + capability: 'present', + certified: true, + }), + ).toBe('unavailable'); + } + }); + + test('each rung requires the one below it', () => { + const base = { implemented: true, certified: false } as const; + expect(resolveSupportClaim({ ...base, gateEnabled: false, capability: 'present' })).toBe( + 'implemented', + ); + expect(resolveSupportClaim({ ...base, gateEnabled: true, capability: 'unknown' })).toBe( + 'enabled', + ); + expect(resolveSupportClaim({ ...base, gateEnabled: true, capability: 'present' })).toBe( + 'capable', + ); + expect( + resolveSupportClaim({ + ...base, + gateEnabled: true, + capability: 'present', + certified: true, + }), + ).toBe('certified'); + }); + + test('a modem that positively LACKS the capability is unavailable, never enabled', () => { + expect( + resolveSupportClaim({ + implemented: true, + gateEnabled: true, + capability: 'absent', + certified: true, + }), + ).toBe('unavailable'); + }); + + test('only capable/certified may be surfaced; only certified may be claimed', () => { + expect(SUPPORT_CLAIM_STATES.filter(mayRenderModule)).toEqual(['capable', 'certified']); + expect(SUPPORT_CLAIM_STATES.filter(mayClaimSupport)).toEqual(['certified']); + }); +}); + +describe('the seven-module matrix', () => { + test('OFF BY DEFAULT: no gates leaves every shipped module at implemented', () => { + const claims = resolveCapabilityMatrix({ implemented: ALL, gates: {}, capability: {} }); + for (const module of ALL) { + expect(claims[module]).toBe('implemented'); + expect(mayRenderModule(claims[module])).toBe(false); + } + }); + + test('an enabled gate on an INCAPABLE modem resolves unavailable', () => { + const claims = resolveCapabilityMatrix({ + implemented: ALL, + gates: { 'band-lock': true }, + capability: { 'band-lock': 'absent' }, + }); + expect(claims['band-lock']).toBe('unavailable'); + }); + + test('the matrix is TOTAL — an unmentioned module still gets a state', () => { + const claims = resolveCapabilityMatrix({ implemented: [], gates: {}, capability: {} }); + for (const module of ALL) { + expect(claims[module]).toBe('unavailable'); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts b/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d414300 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +// The support-claim taxonomy — the vocabulary this stack uses to say how much is +// actually known about a capability module on a given modem. +// +// It exists because "supported" was one word doing four jobs: the code exists, +// an operator turned it on, the modem advertises it, and somebody proved it on +// this firmware. Those are four different facts with four different consequences +// — the third gates what a UI may offer, the fourth gates what a support matrix +// may claim — and collapsing them is how a doc comes to promise a combination +// nobody ever ran. +// +// This module is PURE and mirrors the same ladder CeraUI's `@ceraui/rpc` +// `capability-modules.schema.ts` carries. It is a mirror rather than a shared +// import by Rule D: this repo builds standalone, so the two halves are kept +// honest by their tests, not by a path. + +/** The seven gated capability modules. */ +export const CAPABILITY_MODULES = [ + 'band-lock', + 'sms', + 'five-g-pref', + 'fcc-auto-unlock', + 'gps', + 'ussd', + 'esim', +] as const; +export type CapabilityModule = (typeof CAPABILITY_MODULES)[number]; + +/** + * The ladder, lowest rung first. `resolveSupportClaim` answers with the highest + * rung reached: + * + * unavailable — not shipped in this build, OR the modem positively lacks it. + * implemented — shipped, gate OFF. The default for every module, everywhere. + * enabled — gate ON, capability UNKNOWN. "Not asked" is not "absent". + * capable — gate ON, modem advertises it. The floor for offering a control. + * certified — capable AND proven on this exact model+firmware. The ONLY rung + * a support matrix or a doc may claim. + */ +export const SUPPORT_CLAIM_STATES = [ + 'unavailable', + 'implemented', + 'enabled', + 'capable', + 'certified', +] as const; +export type SupportClaimState = (typeof SUPPORT_CLAIM_STATES)[number]; + +/** What a probe found. `unknown` is an answer about the READ, not the device. */ +export type CapabilityEvidence = 'present' | 'absent' | 'unknown'; + +export interface SupportClaimInput { + readonly implemented: boolean; + readonly gateEnabled: boolean; + readonly capability: CapabilityEvidence; + readonly certified: boolean; +} + +export function resolveSupportClaim(input: SupportClaimInput): SupportClaimState { + if (!input.implemented || input.capability === 'absent') { + return 'unavailable'; + } + if (!input.gateEnabled) { + return 'implemented'; + } + if (input.capability === 'unknown') { + return 'enabled'; + } + return input.certified ? 'certified' : 'capable'; +} + +export const SURFACEABLE_SUPPORT_STATES: readonly SupportClaimState[] = ['capable', 'certified']; + +export function mayRenderModule(state: SupportClaimState): boolean { + return SURFACEABLE_SUPPORT_STATES.includes(state); +} + +export function mayClaimSupport(state: SupportClaimState): boolean { + return state === 'certified'; +} + +export type CapabilityModuleClaims = Readonly>; + +export interface CapabilityMatrixInput { + readonly implemented: readonly CapabilityModule[]; + readonly gates: Partial>; + readonly capability: Partial>; + readonly certified?: Partial>; +} + +/** Total by construction: every module gets an explicit state. */ +export function resolveCapabilityMatrix(input: CapabilityMatrixInput): CapabilityModuleClaims { + const implemented = new Set(input.implemented); + const claims: Record = {} as Record< + CapabilityModule, + SupportClaimState + >; + for (const module of CAPABILITY_MODULES) { + claims[module] = resolveSupportClaim({ + implemented: implemented.has(module), + gateEnabled: input.gates[module] === true, + capability: input.capability[module] ?? 'unknown', + certified: input.certified?.[module] === true, + }); + } + return claims; +} diff --git a/control/src/index.ts b/control/src/index.ts index 92312dc..ba34461 100644 --- a/control/src/index.ts +++ b/control/src/index.ts @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ export const PACKAGE_NAME = '@ceralive/modem-control'; export * from './backend'; +export * from './capability'; export * from './domain'; export * from './ports'; export * from './redact'; From b6ab36f329f972f251aa160726dc839f1849c115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] =?UTF-8?q?feat(control):=20gated=20capability=20mod?= =?UTF-8?q?ules=20=E2=80=94=20band=20lock,=20SMS,=205G,=20FCC,=20GPS,=20US?= =?UTF-8?q?SD,=20MSISDN?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Seven capability modules on top of the feature-gate framework. Each is gated by evidence the modem reported, each is certified per modem where certification is required, and each answers unknown-for-this-modem rather than pretending a refusal is a "no". - band locking, certified per modem, with the primary-surface contract - a read-only SMS port, so CeraUI stops shelling out to raw mmcli-sms - 5G mode preference, gated - opt-in FCC auto-unlock through ModemManager dispatcher hooks, plus its coverage matrix and a reconcile test that runs the shipped script rather than a fake - GPS/location, gated - USSD, gated - the SIM's own number (MSISDN), folded onto ModemIdentity.ownNumbers ModemManager publishes the SIM's own number as Modem.OwnNumbers, and the package read nothing from it — so a consumer that wants to show an operator which SIM is in which slot had no source for it. mapping.ts now folds the property onto ModemIdentity.ownNumbers, branded SubscriberNumber for the same reason SubscriptionId is: it identifies a subscriber. Absent, empty and whitespace-only lists all read as not-reported rather than as an empty list, because most SIMs genuinely carry no MSISDN and an empty array invites a consumer to render silence as a finding. A multi-number SIM keeps every number in order. redact.ts gains its own whole-key own-number class. It cannot join SENSITIVE_KEYS, which matches a leaf name: 'number'/'numbers' there would blank a slot index and a band count across the package. PolicyBindingKey enumerates its fields, so the new identity field cannot reach a durable key. Board evidence: Quectel RM530N-GL reports own: +573115422359. eSIM, by contrast, closes blocked rather than shipping: The 2026-08-13 eSIM deferral was reversed, and eSIM re-entered scope as a hardware-gated adoption spike. It closes `blocked`: no modem on the bench exposes an eUICC. The only SIM on the whole fleet reports no `eid` under ModemManager 1.24.2 — positive evidence of a classic removable UICC, not missing data — and RM530N-GL eUICC capability is unproven for that unit. `blocked` is deliberately not a NO-GO. A NO-GO would be a judgment that lpac cannot work here, and nothing measurable supports one: the spike's three hardware steps could not start. No verdict exists and none may be inferred, so none of the GO-path delivery ships — no ceralive-lpac deb, no closure row, no manifest entry, no apt publication, no image pin. closure_version 2 and its frozen matrix are untouched. The licensing half of the spike is pure research, so it did run, re-verified against upstream rather than carried over: - lpac's program logic is AGPL-3.0-only, so it may only ever be spawned as an external binary over its CLI — never linked into modem-control, cerastream, or CeraUI. - Redistribution obliges Corresponding Source from the same place (AGPL-3.0 §6(d)). apt.ceralive.tv publishes binary indexes only, so a source channel would have to exist before any lpac upload. Recording it now keeps a future GO from discovering it late. - §13 attaches to modified versions only, so the rule is ship unmodified or not at all — which is what POLICY.md's no-fork rule already requires. - lpac is now in Debian main (2.3.0-1) but in testing/unstable only, absent from bookworm and trixie, so the preferred stock-distro shipping form is ruled out by suite rather than by licence. Also records the unblock path: a removable eUICC card in the Quectel's SIM slot would give the bench a real EID with no new modem, and lpac's default pcsc backend reaches such a card outside ModemManager entirely. --- AGENTS.md | 417 +++++++++++++++++- README.md | 2 +- control/src/backend/constants.ts | 6 + control/src/backend/index.ts | 8 + control/src/backend/managed-objects.ts | 13 + control/src/backend/mapping.test.ts | 117 +++++ control/src/backend/mapping.ts | 25 ++ control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts | 9 + control/src/backend/mm-bands.test.ts | 151 +++++++ control/src/backend/mm-location.test.ts | 392 ++++++++++++++++ control/src/backend/mm-location.ts | 295 +++++++++++++ control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts | 56 +++ control/src/band/band-names.test.ts | 121 +++++ control/src/band/band-names.ts | 164 +++++++ control/src/band/certification.test.ts | 110 +++++ control/src/band/certification.ts | 151 +++++++ control/src/band/certified-bands.json | 4 + control/src/band/index.ts | 9 + control/src/capability/detect.test.ts | 45 ++ control/src/capability/detect.ts | 30 +- .../src/capability/five-g-preference.test.ts | 174 ++++++++ control/src/capability/five-g-preference.ts | 219 +++++++++ control/src/capability/index.ts | 11 +- control/src/domain/identity.ts | 20 + control/src/fcc/coverage.test.ts | 94 ++++ control/src/fcc/coverage.ts | 118 +++++ control/src/fcc/index.ts | 13 + control/src/fcc/policy-store.ts | 196 ++++++++ control/src/fcc/policy-write.ts | 82 ++++ control/src/fcc/policy.test.ts | 148 +++++++ control/src/index.ts | 5 + control/src/location/fix-state.test.ts | 200 +++++++++ control/src/location/fix-state.ts | 120 +++++ control/src/location/index.ts | 9 + control/src/location/nmea.test.ts | 81 ++++ control/src/location/nmea.ts | 100 +++++ control/src/ports/index.ts | 2 + control/src/ports/location-fence.test.ts | 126 ++++++ control/src/ports/location.ts | 111 +++++ control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts | 25 ++ control/src/ports/receipts.ts | 1 + control/src/ports/sms.ts | 85 ++++ control/src/redact.test.ts | 165 +++++++ control/src/redact.ts | 137 +++++- control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.test.ts | 279 ++++++++++++ control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.ts | 229 ++++++++++ control/src/sms/inbox-store.test.ts | 100 +++++ control/src/sms/inbox-store.ts | 100 +++++ control/src/sms/index.ts | 11 + control/src/sms/mmcli-parse.ts | 248 +++++++++++ control/src/sms/normalize.ts | 115 +++++ control/src/sms/parse.test.ts | 280 ++++++++++++ control/src/sms/readonly-gate.test.ts | 151 +++++++ control/src/ussd/calls.ts | 112 +++++ control/src/ussd/index.ts | 53 +++ control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.test.ts | 342 ++++++++++++++ control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.ts | 276 ++++++++++++ control/src/ussd/refusal.test.ts | 121 +++++ control/src/ussd/refusal.ts | 191 ++++++++ control/src/ussd/registration.test.ts | 122 +++++ control/src/ussd/registration.ts | 126 ++++++ control/src/ussd/session.test.ts | 219 +++++++++ control/src/ussd/session.ts | 228 ++++++++++ docs/ESIM-DECISION.md | 199 ++++++++- docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md | 207 +++++++++ packaging/README.md | 25 +- .../assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile | 184 ++++---- .../systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service | 11 +- packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh | 48 +- packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh | 128 ++++++ 70 files changed, 8327 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-) create mode 100644 control/src/backend/mapping.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/backend/mm-bands.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/backend/mm-location.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/backend/mm-location.ts create mode 100644 control/src/band/band-names.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/band/band-names.ts create mode 100644 control/src/band/certification.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/band/certification.ts create mode 100644 control/src/band/certified-bands.json create mode 100644 control/src/band/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/capability/five-g-preference.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/capability/five-g-preference.ts create mode 100644 control/src/fcc/coverage.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/fcc/coverage.ts create mode 100644 control/src/fcc/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/fcc/policy-store.ts create mode 100644 control/src/fcc/policy-write.ts create mode 100644 control/src/fcc/policy.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/location/fix-state.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/location/fix-state.ts create mode 100644 control/src/location/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/location/nmea.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/location/nmea.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/location-fence.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/location.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/sms.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/inbox-store.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/inbox-store.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/mmcli-parse.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/normalize.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/parse.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/sms/readonly-gate.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/calls.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/refusal.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/refusal.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/registration.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/registration.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/session.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ussd/session.ts create mode 100644 docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md create mode 100755 packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index bcff09e..9b1bf99 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Canonical branch: `main`. Sole remote: `origin` → `https://github.com/CERALIVE | Directory | Artifact | Role | |-----------|----------|------| -| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection** (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive`. | +| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection**, and the **band-lock** vocabulary + certification catalog (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive`. | | `cli/` | `modem-control` (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`/`watch`/`apply`/`set-usb-mode`/`usage`/`certify`/`hil-cycle`, compiled `arm64`+`amd64`, run against real modems. Not published to npm. | | `packaging/` | ModemManager stack `.deb`s **+ the first-party companion** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — packaging only, zero source patches (see `POLICY.md`) — PLUS `ceralive-modem-support`, the `Architecture: all` first-party companion that owns CeraLive's generic modem system assets so those four never absorb one. | @@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ The four upstream sources are byte-faithful, zero-patch rebuilds. `ceralive-mode (`packaging/ceralive-modem-support/`, `Architecture: all`) is the first-party package that keeps them that way: it owns the UNCONDITIONAL, generic modem system assets — CeraLive's identification-only udev rules, Zero-CD usb-modeswitch device data, and the FCC -policy-reconciliation helper plus its oneshot unit. It ships **no active FCC-unlock script**; -an absent `/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json` exits 0 and activates nothing, which is -also the correct behaviour on generic Debian with no CeraLive partition layout. +policy-reconciliation helper plus its oneshot unit. It ships **no FCC-unlock script at +all**; an absent `/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json` exits 0 and activates nothing, +which is also the correct behaviour on generic Debian with no CeraLive partition layout. **Board-gated generated assets stay image-owned** — M.2 SIM quirk rows and per-slot modem UID rules consume build-time board facts a generic package cannot know. Do not move them here. @@ -273,16 +273,415 @@ extending it: by a ModemManager PLUGIN keyed on the device, and nothing on the modem's own D-Bus surface says whether one applies. `absent` would hide the module on supported hardware; `present` would promise a plugin that may not be installed. - Evidence for it comes from the catalog instead. - -## eSIM (investigate-only, implementation deferred) + Evidence for it comes from the catalog instead — `control/src/fcc/coverage.ts`, + see the section below. + +### `five-g-pref` — a MODEL, not just a probe [IMPLEMENTED, UNCERTIFIED] + +`control/src/capability/five-g-preference.ts` is pure and total: it maps four +named postures (`5g-only` / `prefer-5g` / `prefer-4g` / `5g-off`) onto the +`(allowed, preferred)` pair `MmMutations.setRadioModes` already writes, and +refuses to name one the modem never advertised. It opens NO new transport — +`setRadioModes` owns the `SetCurrentModes` call, the per-modem serialization and +the quiesce — and a test greps its executable source to keep it that way. + +**Why it exists at all, given `setRadioModes` already writes modes.** That +surface's vocabulary is the ALLOWED SET, and two genuinely different postures +share one: "allow 4G and 5G, prefer 5G" and "allow 4G and 5G, prefer 4G" differ +only in the PREFERRED mode. An operator on a marginal 5G cell wants exactly that +distinction, and an allowed-set selector structurally cannot express it. +`prefer-5g` and `prefer-4g` therefore emit an IDENTICAL allowed set — so nothing +on this path may decide "no write is needed" by diffing allowed sets, and nothing +may confirm a restore by comparing them either. + +Three refusals are load-bearing: + +- **A modem with no 5G is offered NOTHING, `5g-off` included.** "Turn 5G off" on a + radio that has none is a control that cannot change anything, which is worse + than an absent one because it invites an operator to act. +- **A posture the modem cannot express resolves `undefined`, never a neighbour.** + Substituting is how "prefer 4G" on a marginal cell silently becomes 5G-first. +- **A current pair no posture names reads `undefined`, never the nearest one.** + Rounding would show an operator a selection they never made and cannot get back to. + +**SA/NSA is REPORTED unsupported, with a reason.** Checked against MM 1.24.2's own +surface rather than recalled: the only NR-specific member on a modem object is +`Modem3gpp.SetNr5gRegistrationSettings`, whose keys are `mico-mode` and +`drx-cycle` — power-saving registration parameters, not a standalone-vs +non-standalone selector. Vendors expose the selector through their own AT commands +(Quectel `AT+QNWPREFCFG="mode_pref"`, one per vendor after that), which is exactly +the uncertified per-SKU write the evidence gate keeps out. A missing field would +read as "nobody asked"; the stated `not-exposed-by-modemmanager` tells an operator +hunting for an SA toggle why there is none. + +**`detect.ts`'s `five-g-pref` verdict NARROWS when the caller decoded the mode +catalog.** Every ModemManager modem exports `SupportedModes`, including a 4G-only +one, so the property NAME alone resolves `present` on hardware with no 5G. The +optional `ModuleCapabilityProbe.supportedRats` narrows the verdict to whether the +catalog actually names 5GNR; ABSENT it, the property-name answer stands verbatim. +A strict narrowing, never a new way to claim a capability. + +**Status: `implemented-but-uncertified`.** No 5G SIM/plan and no verified 5G +coverage exist at the bench (`docs/BENCH.md` per-SKU blockers; the CeraLive-side +record is todo 2's BLOCKER B3), so the readback/registration/data/fallback drill +on the RM530N-GL has not run. Every claim above is fixture-proven only. + +## SMS — LIST / READ AND OBSERVATION, PERMANENTLY + +`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` are the read-only SMS surface: +`SmsObservationPort` is `list()` / `observe()` / `stop()` and nothing else. There is +no verb here that composes, stores, sends, or deletes a message, and none may be +added — sending or deleting is billable, irreversible, and turns a diagnostic read +into real control over the subscriber's account. That is PERMANENT policy, not a +phase limitation; CeraUI has carried the same contract since Phase A. + +**Two grep gates, and they enforce different vocabularies.** +`control/src/sms/readonly-gate.test.ts` scans the whole SMS surface (the port +included) for the D-Bus write verbs (`Messaging.Create` / `Delete`, `Sms.Send` / +`Store`), the mmcli spellings, and the identifiers a hand-rolled write path would +use; it also asserts the only D-Bus METHODS called are `List` + `GetAll` and the +only SIGNALS subscribed are `Added` + `Deleted`. Those two sets are asserted +SEPARATELY because both are spelled `member: 'X'` and only an outgoing `callMethod` +can mutate a device. CeraUI's `tests/modem-sms-readonly-gate.test.ts` is the other +half, extended by this work to cover the D-Bus verbs its mmcli-flag patterns could +not spell. Neither gate may be deleted or narrowed to land a write path. + +**LIST ONCE, then follow the signals.** `createDbusSmsPort` +(`sms/dbus-messaging.ts`) calls `Messaging.List` once and folds `Added`/`Deleted` +from then on. Re-listing on a poll tick is the anti-pattern this port exists to +remove: it costs one method call per stored message per tick and still cannot report +an arrival sooner than the tick it lands on. The ONE re-list is on a transport +RECONNECT, where the events that occurred while the bus was down were never +delivered — and it is published as `resynced`, which the store applies by REPLACING +its rows. Folding a fresh list as a series of `Added` events would keep a message +deleted during the outage forever, and is exactly how a restart comes to duplicate +an inbox it already held. + +**Duplicate suppression is not identity-based, because MM's own duplicate is not +byte-identical.** ModemManager announces a message while it is `receiving` and again +once it is `received`, so `createSmsInboxStore` (`sms/inbox-store.ts`) updates a row +whose content CHANGED and no-ops one that is verbatim. A store that skipped on "have +I seen this id" would keep the empty `receiving` row forever. + +**`sms/mmcli-parse.ts` is a CLI grammar living beside a D-Bus adapter, deliberately.** +`mmcli` is a client of the SAME daemon, and CeraUI has read its inbox through it on +real hardware since Phase A — so owning the grammar here is what makes the port's +output provable against that reader on captured output (`sms/parse.test.ts` pins the +golden values; CeraUI's `modem-sms-port-parity.test.ts` pins the identical ones), and +what lets a consumer move its parsing onto this package without moving its transport +in the same change. Four behaviours in it are load-bearing and each fails silently if +dropped: the octal unescape is per-BYTE then UTF-8 (`\302\241` is two bytes, not two +characters); the service-centre timestamp's HOURS-ONLY offset (`…-05`) is widened to +`-05:00` or every message scores undated and "newest first" degrades to object-index +order, which MM reuses; the list is cut to `SMS_INBOX_CAP` (50) BEFORE any per-message +read; and an absent `modem.messaging.sms` VALUE is an empty inbox while a missing KEY +is drift. + +**Nothing here puts message content into an error, a log, or a receipt.** A body +routinely carries a one-time code and a sender identifies the subscriber, so a +malformed record reports the KEY NAMES it found and nothing else, and the module +never logs at all. `redact.ts`'s `isSmsSensitiveKey` is the value-side class; it is +its own set rather than additions to `SENSITIVE_KEYS` because that set matches leaf +names exactly, so adding `text` / `number` / `sender` would blank a receipt reason, a +slot number, and a signal reading across the package. It mirrors CeraUI's +`helpers/logger.ts` set key-for-key — a Rule-D MIRROR, never a shared import. + +**HONEST STATUS: no live receive has been drilled.** Only the Quectel has a SIM and +it never registers, so no bench modem can receive an SMS (todo-2 BLOCKER B4). Every +claim here is fixture-proven, including the restart-recovery behaviour; what is +missing is the board measurement, not the behaviour. + +## FCC AUTO-UNLOCK — A CATALOG, A POLICY FILE, AND NOTHING ELSE + +`control/src/fcc/` implements NO unlock procedure and ships NO unlock script. It +records which `:` MODELS an operator opted in for, so +`ceralive-fcc-reconcile` can re-derive ModemManager's own admin-tier symlinks from +that record on every boot. The unlocking is ModemManager's dispatcher's job, start +to finish. Full model, matrix and certification status: +[`docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md`](docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md). + +- **`:` is the ONLY correct key.** `mm-dispatcher-fcc-unlock.c` builds + exactly `g_strdup_printf("%04x:%04x", vid, pid)` and opens no other name, so a + vendor-only file is never a dispatcher target — it exists only as what the + available tier's `:` symlinks point at. A vendor-keyed rule would also + be wrong twice over: Sierra silicon ships under THREE vendor ids (`1199` its own, + `03f0` HP-branded, `413c` Dell-branded), so keying on the vendor misses two of the + three, and keying on the model misses the OEM rebrands. +- **Three tiers, and the reconciler owns exactly one.** available + (`/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d`, ModemManager's, inert) → + enabled-admin (`/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d`, **ours, opt-in only**) → + enabled-package (`${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d`, a distribution's; CeraLive + writes there never). Writing into the wrong one is SILENT — the link is simply + never opened. +- **The `/data` file is the record; the symlink is derived.** `/etc` rides the + rootfs, which is exactly what a RAUC slot swap REPLACES, so an opt-in written only + as a symlink survives a reboot and not an OTA. `/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json` + (0600, atomic temp→chmod→rename) is what persists, and the oneshot re-materializes + the link before ModemManager probes a radio. +- **Coverage is a TRI-STATE, and `unknown` is not `absent`.** + `resolveFccUnlockCoverage` answers `present` (MM ships a procedure), `absent` (the + ids are well-formed and are NOT in the mapping — a positive statement about the + device) or `unknown` (we could not read the ids, a statement about the READ). + Folding the third into the second would hide the module on hardware that may be + covered. +- **The coverage check is part of the WRITE, not a UI nicety.** Persisting `true` + for an uncovered model leaves an enabled toggle that provably cannot act — the + reconciler would skip it forever, silently. `setFccUnlockPolicy` rejects it + `not-covered`. Disabling is deliberately NOT coverage-checked: a fail-closed + opt-OUT is not a thing. +- **Corruption is fail-SAFE and the bytes are KEPT.** Unlike + `backend/usage/policy-store.ts`, which rewrites a fresh file, this store leaves a + damaged policy on disk and simply refuses to act on it. Enabling a + regulatory-unlock procedure is not something to infer from a file we could not + read, and replacing the evidence would make the next diagnosis impossible. +- **The toggle is per MODEL and the UI must say so.** The mechanism is a + `:` symlink, so it applies to EVERY attached device matching it — the + bench's two identical HiLink twins are the shape of the problem. No per-unit + refinement exists without changing ModemManager. +- **Enabling is not retroactive.** The dispatcher runs during modem + INITIALIZATION, so an already-enumerated modem needs a re-probe + (`mmcli -m --disable && --enable`, or a replug). `SetFccUnlockPolicyResult` + carries `changed` precisely so an unchanged write does not cost one. + +Coverage: `control/src/fcc/{coverage,policy}.test.ts` plus +[`packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh`](packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh) (the +shell reconciler's behaviour on any host) and `packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh` +§ 6 (the same logic from its PACKAGED location after a real `dpkg` install). + +## BAND LOCK — THE ONE MODULE THAT IS STRICTER THAN THE FRAMEWORK FLOOR + +`control/src/band/` is the first of the seven capability modules with real verbs +behind it. Two halves: + +- **`band-names.ts`** — `MMModemBand` ↔ name, both directions. The D-Bus surface + speaks numbers (`SupportedBands` / `CurrentBands` / `SetCurrentBands` are all + `au`); every operator-facing surface speaks the name (`eutran-3`, `any`). ONE + mapping so the two cannot disagree. It reproduces `mm-enums.h`'s actual shape: + the GSM/UTRAN head (1..20) is IRREGULAR — `UTRAN_2` is 12 while `UTRAN_6` is 8 — + so it is an explicit table and can only ever be one, while every later block is + arithmetic by MM's own construction (`EUTRAN_n = 30 + n`, `CDMA_BCn = 128 + n`, + `NGRAN_n = 300 + n`). Deriving those rather than transcribing ~350 constants is + the point: a transcription is where a wrong band number hides, and a wrong band + number locks a radio to a band the network does not operate on. A value this + build does not name round-trips as `band-` — never dropped, never guessed. +- **`certification.ts` + `certified-bands.json`** — the per-SKU proof gate. + +**`encodeBandList` FAILS CLOSED AS A WHOLE.** One unplaceable name rejects the +entire selection rather than silently narrowing it: a partial band set is a +DIFFERENT lock from the one that was asked for, and applying it strands the radio +on bands nobody chose. `decodeBandList` is the mirror — a malformed member is +dropped rather than coerced, and MM's `unknown` (0) is dropped because it means +"the modem did not say", which is not a band an operator can select. + +**There is no reset VERB, and there must not be one.** ModemManager releases a +band lock by setting exactly `MM_MODEM_BAND_ANY` (256); `setCurrentBands(modem, +['any'])` IS the reset. Adding a `resetBands` sibling would be a second way to +express one D-Bus call, and the two would eventually disagree about what "no +lock" means. + +**Band-lock deliberately requires `certified`, not `capable`, to be OFFERED.** +That is a documented DEVIATION from `support-claim.ts`'s framework floor, and the +framework is right in general: hiding an uncertified-but-working control puts +hardware behind a paperwork gate. For this module the paperwork IS the safety +argument — a band the SIM's network does not operate on registers nowhere, and a +modem that does not honour a reset leaves an operator with no way back short of a +replug they may not be able to reach. So `isBandControlCertified` gates the +control, and the catalog demands FOUR separate proofs (`supportedRead`, `set`, +`readback`, `reset`), each `z.literal(true)`, so a half-certified entry cannot be +expressed at all: a reviewer with three of four has an uncertified SKU and the +file says so by OMITTING it. `readback` exists because an accepted-but-ignored +write is indistinguishable from success at the call site. + +**The shipped catalog is EMPTY, and a test pins that.** No fleet modem has been +through the drill: the bench Quectel RM530N-GL's SIM never registers (phase-C +todo 2, blocker B2), so "re-registration proven" cannot be claimed on this bench +today. An entry is added by a human-reviewed commit carrying the transcript, +exactly like `usb-mode/certified-catalog.json`. + +`setCurrentBands` runs QUIESCED through the shared `ModemActor` for the same +reason `setRadioModes` does: it re-registers the radio, so NM must stand down +before the bearer drops underneath it rather than after. + +## GPS / LOCATION — A LIVE FIX, AND DELIBERATELY NO HISTORY + +`control/src/ports/location.ts` + `control/src/location/` + +`control/src/backend/mm-location.ts` are the gated GNSS module. The port is +`getLocationStatus` / `enableGnss` / `disableGnss` / `readFix` and nothing else, and it +is deliberately NOT part of `ModemManagerPort` — a consumer that only reconciles radio +and SIM state has no business holding a handle that can read a position. + +**The privacy fence is a PRODUCT rule, not a phase limitation.** There is no history +verb, no track verb, no export verb and no upload verb, and none may be added: a fix is +held in memory for a live display and is gone the moment GNSS is switched off or the fix +goes stale. `ports/location-fence.test.ts` fails the build if a member whose name implies +history, tracking, persistence or upload ever appears on the port. + +Four decisions are load-bearing and easy to undo by accident: + +- **`Location.Setup`'s `signal_location` argument is ALWAYS false.** Passing `true` makes + ModemManager broadcast the `Location` property over `PropertiesChanged`, which would put + the operator's coordinates on the system bus for every listener — including this + package's own observer, whose snapshots are logged. The fix is fetched by an explicit + `GetLocation` call instead, so a coordinate only ever exists where somebody asked for one. +- **GNSS runs through `actor.run`, NOT `actor.runQuiesced`.** Quiescing exists to stop + NetworkManager racing a disruptive change and it costs a bearer deactivation; dropping a + link on a bonded device to switch a GPS receiver on would be an absurd trade. + `Location.Setup` touches no bearer, so per-modem serialization is all that is needed. +- **Disable clears ONLY the GNSS bits.** `3gpp-lac-ci` is the existing cell-info module's + source, so blanking the whole mask would silently switch off a neighbouring feature the + operator never touched. For the same reason `3gpp-lac-ci` is absent from `GNSS_SOURCES`, + and the `Location` interface merely being exported is NOT a GNSS claim — MM exports it + for 3GPP-LAC/CID-only devices (the fleet's FM350-GL is exactly one), so a GNSS source + must appear in `Location.Capabilities`. +- **Acquisition is BOUNDED and a fix EXPIRES.** `location/fix-state.ts` is a pure, total + machine with no clock and no I/O — the caller supplies `at` on every event, which is what + makes both bounds testable without waiting. Past `acquireTimeoutMs` (120 s) the state + becomes an honest terminal `no-fix` rather than an endless spinner; a fix older than + `fixTtlMs` (30 s) is dropped. A fix is reachable ONLY through `renderableFix`, which + answers only in the `fix` state, so no code path can render a position the modem has + stopped reporting. + +`gps-nmea` is decoded locally (`location/nmea.ts` — GGA only, checksum-verified) because it +is the one GNSS source every GNSS-capable fleet modem advertises while MM's pre-decoded +`gps-raw` dict is not guaranteed. GGA is the sentence used because it carries fix QUALITY +alongside the position, so "the receiver has not locked on" is decoded rather than inferred. +A `gps-raw` entry that exists but carries no usable coordinate pair is NOT a fix — MM +populates the key as soon as the source is switched on. + +Coordinates are their own redaction class (`latitude` / `longitude` / `altitude` / `lat` / +`lon` / `lng` / `nmea` / `nmeasentences` / `coordinates`), so a fix that reaches a log line, +a receipt or a bundle comes out as the marker. + +**Status: `implemented-but-uncertified`.** Three fleet modems advertise GNSS, so the +capability gate is satisfied, but whether a GNSS antenna is physically attached to the bench +Quectel is unanswered (phase-C todo 2, `needs-user` N1), so the live-fix drill has not run. +The capability, no-fix, disable, expiry and redaction paths are fixture-proven; the +acquire-a-real-fix path is not. + +## USSD — A SESSION PROTOCOL, MODELLED AS ONE + +`control/src/ussd/` is the gated USSD module: a pure session machine (`session.ts`), a +refusal taxonomy with its registration reader (`refusal.ts` + `registration.ts`), the four +D-Bus calls (`calls.ts`), and the adapter that drives them (`mm-ussd.ts`). + +**LEASE-ONLY, never journaled.** A USSD session cannot re-register the radio, so it takes +the per-modem mutation lease and carries no pre-state and no rollback — the split todo 29's +`withCapabilityModuleMutation` enforces in the TYPE SYSTEM, so this classification is not a +convention that can drift. + +**USSD is a SESSION protocol, not request/response, and that is why the machine exists.** +`Initiate` opens a dialogue the network may hold open pending a `Respond`; a session that is +neither responded to nor cancelled stays open NETWORK-side, consuming a scarce +per-subscriber slot and failing the next `Initiate` with a busy error nobody can see the +cause of. "Which verb is legal right now" is therefore a real question with a real wrong +answer, and answering it inside the D-Bus adapter would make it untestable without a bus. + +Four properties are load-bearing: + +- **Three of the seven states are LOCAL.** `initiating` / `responding` / `cancelling` have + no counterpart in MM's `MMModem3gppUssdSessionState`, because MM has no state for "we + dispatched a call and the reply has not landed". Without them a second `initiate` racing + the first would be judged against `idle` and let through — exactly the double-open the + network answers busy. +- **An illegal verb is REFUSED with a typed reason, never thrown and never ignored**, and + the machine does not move. A refusal at an RPC boundary must name what the caller can do + about it; a throw becomes an opaque failure and a silent no-op becomes a UI that spins. +- **`lte-only-unsupported` is claimed ONLY on a positively PS-only registration.** USSD is a + circuit-switched supplementary service, so a modem attached LTE/5G-SA with no CS domain + and no CSFB can only carry it where the operator deployed USSI (3GPP TS 24.390) — and + where they did not, the modem answers a generic unsupported/failed error indistinguishable + from "this modem has no USSD interface". Reporting that as a device limitation would send + an operator hunting for a firmware fix for a network policy. `registration.ts` derives the + fact rather than guessing: `AccessTechnologies` all packet-only ⇒ no CS domain, EXCEPT + that MM's two CSFB registration states (`*_CSFB_NOT_PREFERRED`, 9 and 10) override it + outright. An unread registration stays `undefined` and can only ever make the refusal LESS + specific. +- **An unanswered session is closed at a bound AND the network release is attempted.** The + machine closes `timed-out` first — that is the operator's answer whether or not the + release lands — and the modem-side `Cancel` is best-effort afterwards, because a modem + that did not answer the dialogue may not answer this either and a timeout must still + terminate. A `closed` machine accepts nothing, so a finished session cannot be + resurrected; the adapter's per-modem map starts each new dialogue from a fresh machine. + +**Carrier text is redacted by FIELD NAME, which is why the fields are named as they are.** +`../redact.ts` is key-based, so `ussdCommand` / `ussdResponse` / `ussdReply` (rather than the +shorter names that read better) ARE the guarantee. BOTH directions are sensitive, not just +the reply: a USSD dialogue is how a subscriber tops up a prepaid line, so the command +routinely carries a voucher code and the reply a balance or a one-time code. +`NetworkNotification` / `NetworkRequest` are MM's own property names for network-initiated +USSD text and are included so a raw property dump cannot leak what the call path masks. +Nothing in `calls.ts` logs, and every error it raises is re-thrown untouched so the +classifier — not a string built around the payload — decides what the caller is told. + +**Status: `implemented-but-uncertified`.** Only the bench Quectel has a SIM and it never +registers, so no bench modem can open a USSD session (phase-C todo 2, BLOCKER B4). The state +machine, the refusal classifier, the timeout path and the redaction are fixture-proven; the +live balance-check drill has not run. + +## eSIM — `blocked` on hardware, not deferred by choice (2026-08-18) `docs/ESIM-DECISION.md` records the full eSIM investigation: SGP.22 profile-binding makes cross-device profile "copying" cryptographically impossible; the workable paths are removable eUICC, carrier reissue, or multi-profile remote switching; `lpac` (external LPA) is assessed but not adopted (AGPL-3.0 core, AT backend is demo-only, needs MM -inhibit-coordination). Implementation is **deferred by user decision (2026-08-13)** — this -doc is the exit artifact, not a task list. No eSIM code exists in this repository. +inhibit-coordination). + +The 2026-08-13 **deferral was reversed** by user decision and eSIM re-entered scope as a +hardware-gated adoption spike. It closed **`blocked`** (§9): **no bench modem exposes an +eUICC** — the only SIM on the entire fleet reports no `eid` under MM 1.24.2, which is +positive evidence of a classic removable UICC, and RM530N-GL eUICC capability is unproven +for that unit. **`blocked` is not a NO-GO**: the spike's three hardware steps could not +start, so no verdict exists and none may be inferred. + +**No eSIM code exists in this repository, and none may be written on the strength of this +record.** No `ceralive-lpac` `.deb`, no closure row, no manifest entry, no apt publication, +no image pin — the release manifest stays at `closure_version: 2` with its frozen matrix. + +The **licensing half of the spike did complete** and binds any future adoption: + +- lpac's program logic (`src/`, `driver/`, `utils/`) is **AGPL-3.0-only** — it may only ever + be spawned as an EXTERNAL process over its CLI, never linked or embedded into + `@ceralive/modem-control`, `cerastream`, or `CeraUI`. +- Redistributing it obliges **Corresponding Source from the same place** (AGPL-3.0 §6(d)). + `apt.ceralive.tv` publishes binary indexes only — a source channel would have to exist + BEFORE any lpac upload. +- AGPL §13 attaches to **modified** versions only, so the rule is *ship unmodified or not at + all* — the same answer `POLICY.md`'s no-fork rule already gives. +- Shipping form on a hypothetical GO: a first-party bookworm rebuild in `packaging/`, pinned + like the other four sources. The stock Debian package (`lpac` 2.3.0-1) exists but is in + testing/unstable only — **not** bookworm, **not** trixie. + +## THE SIM'S OWN NUMBER — READ, REDACTED, NEVER A KEY + +`Modem.OwnNumbers` is the MSISDN the carrier wrote into the SIM. `mapping.ts` +`readOwnNumbers` folds it onto `ModemIdentity.ownNumbers` +(`readonly SubscriberNumber[]`, branded like `SubscriptionId` because it is the +same PII class), and `redact.ts` gains `isOwnNumberSensitiveKey` for it. + +Four decisions carry weight: + +- **ABSENT, EMPTY and BLANK all read as NOT REPORTED.** Most SIMs carry no + MSISDN in their elementary files at all, so an empty `as` is the ordinary + answer — publishing `[]` would invite a consumer to render "no numbers" as a + finding rather than as silence. The key is omitted instead. +- **The array is KEPT, not collapsed to a first element.** MM's property is `as` + and a dual-number SIM is expressible; dropping the tail would be a silent + loss. The bench Quectel RM530N-GL reports exactly one (`+573115422359`), which + is what the fixtures use. +- **It is its OWN redaction class, not an addition to `SENSITIVE_KEYS`.** That + set matches a leaf name, so `number` / `numbers` there would blank a slot + index and a band count package-wide. `msisdn` stays where it already lived, in + the SMS set, and is not duplicated. Mirrors CeraUI's + `isOwnNumberSensitiveKey` (`helpers/logger.ts`) — a Rule-D MIRROR, never a + shared import. +- **It may never bind policy.** `PolicyBindingKey` enumerates its fields, so the + addition cannot leak into a durable key by construction — the same protection + `subscriptionId` already relies on. It IS displayed to an operator behind an + explicit reveal; that is a rendering decision and does not make it loggable. + +Coverage: `control/src/backend/mapping.test.ts` (the read matrix, the +fingerprint bump, and the everything-else-untouched control) plus the three +own-number blocks in `control/src/redact.test.ts`. ## POLICY diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index e57bf4b..6a38fce 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ straight from CI artifacts; nothing is published to `apt.ceralive.tv` yet. | Directory | Artifact | What it is | |-----------|----------|------------| -| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: modem domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope. | +| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: modem domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope. | | [`cli/`](cli/) | **`modem-control`** (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`, `watch`, `apply`, `set-usb-mode`, `usage`, `certify`, `hil-cycle`. Compiled for `arm64` + `amd64` and run against real modems on a bench device to mature the package, capture per-SKU certification bundles, and prove hub VBUS port-cycling ([RB-10](docs/BENCH.md#rb-10--hub-vbus-verification-partial)). | | [`packaging/`](packaging/) | **ModemManager stack `.deb`s** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — **packaging only, not a fork, zero source patches** (see [`POLICY.md`](POLICY.md)). Provenance-verified upstream pins; installed on the bench from CI artifacts. | diff --git a/control/src/backend/constants.ts b/control/src/backend/constants.ts index b09729f..1b49c8b 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/constants.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/constants.ts @@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ export const MODEM_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem'; /** The separate `Modem.Modem3gpp` interface (never merged into `Modem`). */ export const MODEM3GPP_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Modem3gpp'; +/** `Modem.Modem3gpp.Ussd` — a SEPARATE interface a modem may omit entirely. */ +export const MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE = `${MODEM3GPP_IFACE}.Ussd`; + +/** The `Modem.Location` interface — GNSS capabilities, `Setup`, `GetLocation`. */ +export const MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Location'; + /** A SIM object's `Sim` interface (SIMs are separate `/SIM/` objects). */ export const SIM_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Sim'; diff --git a/control/src/backend/index.ts b/control/src/backend/index.ts index 67f64ad..ff257f4 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/index.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/index.ts @@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ export { MM_MANAGER_IFACE, MM_ROOT_PATH, MODEM_IFACE, + MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE, + MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, SIM_IFACE, } from './constants'; export { @@ -102,6 +104,12 @@ export { MmDbusBackend, type MmDbusBackendOptions, } from './mm-backend'; +export { + decodeLocationSources, + encodeLocationSources, + MmLocation, + type MmLocationDeps, +} from './mm-location'; export { MmMutations, type MmMutationsDeps } from './mm-mutations'; export { ModemActor, diff --git a/control/src/backend/managed-objects.ts b/control/src/backend/managed-objects.ts index 594932b..7b607fa 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/managed-objects.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/managed-objects.ts @@ -96,6 +96,19 @@ export function numberProp(props: DecodedProps | undefined, name: string): numbe return typeof value === 'number' ? value : undefined; } +/** + * A string-array (`as`) property, or `undefined` if absent / not an array. An + * EMPTY array answers `[]` — the device saying "none", a different fact from an + * absent property. Non-string members are dropped, never coerced. + */ +export function stringArrayProp( + props: DecodedProps | undefined, + name: string, +): readonly string[] | undefined { + const value = propValue(props, name); + return Array.isArray(value) ? value.filter((item) => typeof item === 'string') : undefined; +} + /** Resolve an object-path property (e.g. a modem's `Sim`) to that object's props. */ export function followObjectPath( tree: DecodedManagedObjects, diff --git a/control/src/backend/mapping.test.ts b/control/src/backend/mapping.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df37737 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/backend/mapping.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +// `Modem.OwnNumbers` → `identity.ownNumbers` — pure fixtures, no bus. +// +// Board evidence (Quectel RM530N-GL, `mmcli -m 3`): `own: +573115422359`. MM +// publishes the property as `as`, so the read must survive a list, a list the +// carrier left empty, and a property the firmware does not export at all — +// three different facts that must not collapse into one another. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { subscriberNumber } from '../domain'; +import type { DbusVariant } from '../transport'; +import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE } from './constants'; +import type { DecodedManagedObjects, DecodedProps } from './managed-objects'; +import { fingerprint, mapModem } from './mapping'; + +const MODEM_PATH = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/3'; +const BOARD_OWN_NUMBER = '+573115422359'; +const SECOND_OWN_NUMBER = '+573001112233'; + +function variant(value: unknown, signature: string): DbusVariant { + return { signature, value } as DbusVariant; +} + +function props(record: Record): DecodedProps { + return Object.entries(record).map(([key, value]) => [key, value] as const); +} + +function tree(modemProps: Record): DecodedManagedObjects { + return [ + [ + MODEM_PATH, + [ + [ + MODEM_IFACE, + props({ + EquipmentIdentifier: variant('867978050016855', 's'), + State: variant(8, 'i'), + PowerState: variant(3, 'u'), + ...modemProps, + }), + ], + [MODEM3GPP_IFACE, props({ Imei: variant('867978050016855', 's') })], + ], + ], + ]; +} + +describe('mapModem — the SIM own number', () => { + test('a published number reaches the identity verbatim', () => { + const mapped = mapModem(tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([BOARD_OWN_NUMBER], 'as') }), MODEM_PATH); + + expect(mapped.identity.ownNumbers).toEqual([subscriberNumber(BOARD_OWN_NUMBER)]); + }); + + test('a multi-number SIM keeps every number, in order', () => { + const mapped = mapModem( + tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([BOARD_OWN_NUMBER, SECOND_OWN_NUMBER], 'as') }), + MODEM_PATH, + ); + + expect(mapped.identity.ownNumbers).toEqual([ + subscriberNumber(BOARD_OWN_NUMBER), + subscriberNumber(SECOND_OWN_NUMBER), + ]); + }); + + test('an ABSENT property omits the key entirely', () => { + const mapped = mapModem(tree({}), MODEM_PATH); + + expect(Object.hasOwn(mapped.identity, 'ownNumbers')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('an EMPTY list reads as not-reported, never as an empty list', () => { + const mapped = mapModem(tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([], 'as') }), MODEM_PATH); + + expect(Object.hasOwn(mapped.identity, 'ownNumbers')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('blank and non-string members are dropped rather than coerced', () => { + const mapped = mapModem( + tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([' ', BOARD_OWN_NUMBER, 42, ''], 'as') }), + MODEM_PATH, + ); + + expect(mapped.identity.ownNumbers).toEqual([subscriberNumber(BOARD_OWN_NUMBER)]); + }); + + test('a whitespace-only list reads as not-reported', () => { + const mapped = mapModem(tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([' ', ''], 'as') }), MODEM_PATH); + + expect(Object.hasOwn(mapped.identity, 'ownNumbers')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a changed number bumps the fingerprint, so the row re-publishes', () => { + const before = fingerprint( + mapModem(tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([BOARD_OWN_NUMBER], 'as') }), MODEM_PATH), + ); + const after = fingerprint( + mapModem(tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([SECOND_OWN_NUMBER], 'as') }), MODEM_PATH), + ); + const absent = fingerprint(mapModem(tree({}), MODEM_PATH)); + + expect(before).not.toBe(after); + expect(before).not.toBe(absent); + }); + + test('every other mapped dimension is untouched by the read', () => { + const withNumber = mapModem( + tree({ OwnNumbers: variant([BOARD_OWN_NUMBER], 'as') }), + MODEM_PATH, + ); + const without = mapModem(tree({}), MODEM_PATH); + + expect({ ...withNumber, identity: undefined }).toEqual({ ...without, identity: undefined }); + expect(withNumber.identity.equipmentId).toEqual(without.identity.equipmentId); + expect(withNumber.identity.runtimePath).toBe(without.identity.runtimePath); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/backend/mapping.ts b/control/src/backend/mapping.ts index 80382ff..be46043 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/mapping.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/mapping.ts @@ -12,18 +12,22 @@ import { type CellularSnapshot, imeiEquipmentId, type MmState, + subscriberNumber as makeSubscriberNumber, subscriptionId as makeSubscriptionId, type RadioPower, runtimePath, + type SubscriberNumber, type SubscriptionId, } from '../domain'; import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE, SIM_IFACE } from './constants'; import { type DecodedManagedObjects, + type DecodedProps, findInterface, followObjectPath, numberProp, pathsWithInterface, + stringArrayProp, stringProp, } from './managed-objects'; @@ -104,6 +108,24 @@ function readSubscriptionId( return iccid !== undefined && iccid.length > 0 ? makeSubscriptionId(iccid) : undefined; } +/** + * The SIM's own number(s) from `Modem.OwnNumbers`, or `undefined` when the + * carrier published none. Most SIMs carry no MSISDN at all, so an absent or + * empty property is the ordinary case and must read as "not reported" rather + * than as an empty list an operator could mistake for a failed read. + */ +function readOwnNumbers(modem: DecodedProps | undefined): readonly SubscriberNumber[] | undefined { + const raw = stringArrayProp(modem, 'OwnNumbers'); + if (raw === undefined) { + return undefined; + } + const numbers = raw + .map((value) => value.trim()) + .filter((value) => value.length > 0) + .map((value) => makeSubscriberNumber(value)); + return numbers.length > 0 ? numbers : undefined; +} + /** Map ONE modem object to its dimensions. The modem must expose `Modem`. */ export function mapModem(tree: DecodedManagedObjects, modemPath: string): MappedModem { const modem = findInterface(tree, modemPath, MODEM_IFACE); @@ -113,12 +135,14 @@ export function mapModem(tree: DecodedManagedObjects, modemPath: string): Mapped const mmState = mapMmState(numberProp(modem, 'State')); const radioPower = reconcilePower(mapRadioPower(numberProp(modem, 'PowerState')), mmState); const sub = readSubscriptionId(tree, modemPath); + const ownNumbers = readOwnNumbers(modem); return { identity: { equipmentId: imeiEquipmentId(equipment), runtimePath: runtimePath(modemPath), ...(sub !== undefined ? { subscriptionId: sub } : {}), + ...(ownNumbers !== undefined ? { ownNumbers } : {}), }, presence: 'present', sourceHealth: 'live', @@ -145,6 +169,7 @@ export function fingerprint(mapped: MappedModem): string { return JSON.stringify({ id: mapped.identity.equipmentId, sub: mapped.identity.subscriptionId ?? null, + own: mapped.identity.ownNumbers ?? null, path: mapped.identity.runtimePath, presence: mapped.presence, radioPower: mapped.radioPower, diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts index d0fdfd7..761fc0b 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import type { DesiredRadio } from '../domain'; import { epochMillis } from '../domain'; import type { + BandReadResult, InhibitLease, ModemManagerPort, ModemRef, @@ -111,6 +112,14 @@ export class MmDbusBackend implements ModemManagerPort { return this.#mutations.setPrimarySimSlot(modem, slotIndex); } + readBands(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + return this.#mutations.readBands(modem); + } + + setCurrentBands(modem: ModemRef, bands: readonly string[]): Promise { + return this.#mutations.setCurrentBands(modem, bands); + } + sendPin(modem: ModemRef, pin: string): Promise { return this.#mutations.sendPin(modem, pin); } diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-bands.test.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-bands.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69b39c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-bands.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +import { describe, expect, it } from 'bun:test'; + +import type { ModemRef } from '../ports'; +import type { DbusTransport, MethodCall, MethodReply } from '../transport'; +import { variant } from '../transport'; +import { MODEM_IFACE } from './constants'; +import { MmMutations } from './mm-mutations'; +import { ModemActor } from './modem-actor'; + +const MODEM = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/0' as ModemRef; + +// One managed-objects tree carrying the RM530N-GL-shaped band properties, in the +// `au` encoding `GetManagedObjects` really returns them in. +function tree(supported: number[], current: number[]): unknown { + return [ + [ + MODEM, + [ + [ + MODEM_IFACE, + [ + ['SupportedBands', variant('au', supported)], + ['CurrentBands', variant('au', current)], + ], + ], + ], + ], + ]; +} + +interface Harness { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly calls: MethodCall[]; +} + +function harness(options: { + readonly managed?: unknown; + readonly setFails?: Error; + readonly getFails?: Error; +}): Harness { + const calls: MethodCall[] = []; + const transport = { + connect: () => Promise.resolve(), + disconnect: () => Promise.resolve(), + isConnected: () => true, + callMethod: (call: MethodCall): Promise => { + calls.push(call); + if (call.member === 'GetManagedObjects') { + if (options.getFails !== undefined) return Promise.reject(options.getFails); + return Promise.resolve({ body: [options.managed ?? []] } as unknown as MethodReply); + } + if (options.setFails !== undefined) return Promise.reject(options.setFails); + return Promise.resolve({ body: [] } as unknown as MethodReply); + }, + subscribeSignal: () => Promise.reject(new Error('unused')), + on: () => undefined, + off: () => undefined, + subscriptionCount: () => 0, + } as unknown as DbusTransport; + return { transport, calls }; +} + +function mutations(h: Harness): MmMutations { + return new MmMutations({ + transport: h.transport, + actor: new ModemActor(), + resolveStableKey: () => 'stable-0', + }); +} + +describe('readBands', () => { + it('decodes SupportedBands and CurrentBands off the real property shape', async () => { + const h = harness({ managed: tree([31, 33, 37, 378], [256]) }); + const result = await mutations(h).readBands(MODEM); + expect(result).toEqual({ + ok: true, + bands: { + supported: ['eutran-1', 'eutran-3', 'eutran-7', 'ngran-78'], + current: ['any'], + }, + }); + }); + + it('reports an EMPTY supported set as a real reading, not a failure', async () => { + const h = harness({ managed: tree([], []) }); + const result = await mutations(h).readBands(MODEM); + expect(result).toEqual({ ok: true, bands: { supported: [], current: [] } }); + }); + + it('reports a modem with no Modem interface as a FAILED read', async () => { + const h = harness({ managed: [] }); + const result = await mutations(h).readBands(MODEM); + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + }); + + it('never throws when the bus call fails', async () => { + const h = harness({ getFails: new Error('bus is gone') }); + const result = await mutations(h).readBands(MODEM); + expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'reading bands failed: bus is gone' }); + }); +}); + +describe('setCurrentBands', () => { + it('calls Modem.SetCurrentBands with the `au` values, on the modem object', async () => { + const h = harness({}); + const result = await mutations(h).setCurrentBands(MODEM, ['eutran-3', 'ngran-78']); + expect(result.status).toBe('applied'); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(h.calls[0]).toMatchObject({ + path: MODEM, + interface: MODEM_IFACE, + member: 'SetCurrentBands', + signature: 'au', + args: [[33, 378]], + }); + }); + + it('releases the lock by setting exactly `any` — MM has no reset verb', async () => { + const h = harness({}); + const result = await mutations(h).setCurrentBands(MODEM, ['any']); + expect(result).toEqual({ + dimension: 'band', + status: 'applied', + reason: 'band lock released', + }); + expect(h.calls[0]).toMatchObject({ args: [[256]] }); + }); + + it('DISPATCHES NOTHING for a band this build cannot place', async () => { + const h = harness({}); + const result = await mutations(h).setCurrentBands(MODEM, ['eutran-3', 'nonsense']); + expect(result.status).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + it('dispatches nothing for an empty selection', async () => { + const h = harness({}); + const result = await mutations(h).setCurrentBands(MODEM, []); + expect(result.status).toBe('failed'); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + it('reports a refused write as failed rather than throwing', async () => { + const h = harness({ + setFails: new Error('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported'), + }); + const result = await mutations(h).setCurrentBands(MODEM, ['eutran-3']); + expect(result.status).toBe('failed'); + expect(result.reason).toContain('SetCurrentBands failed'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-location.test.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-location.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d201562 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-location.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +// The `Modem.Location` adapter, against the REAL fleet capability masks. +// +// The four capability fixtures below are the literal `mmcli --location-status` +// readings captured on the bench (`hardware-gates.md` §(c), 2026-08-17): three +// modems advertise GNSS and the FM350-GL advertises `3gpp-lac-ci` only. They are +// used verbatim so the capability gate is proven against hardware that exists +// rather than against an invented mask. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { epochMillis } from '../domain'; +import type { ModemRef } from '../ports'; +import type { DbusValue, DbusVariant, MethodCall, MethodReply } from '../transport'; +import { MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE } from './constants'; +import { decodeLocationSources, encodeLocationSources, MmLocation } from './mm-location'; +import { ModemActor } from './modem-actor'; + +const MODEM = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/14' as ModemRef; +const STABLE_KEY = 'slot:bench-c4'; + +// hardware-gates.md §(c) — captured live on ceralive2, 2026-08-17. +const FLEET_CAPABILITIES = { + 'Quectel RM530N-GL': ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea', 'gps-unmanaged', 'agps-msa', 'agps-msb'], + 'SIMCom SIM7600G-H': ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea', 'gps-unmanaged', 'agps-msa', 'agps-msb'], + 'Qualcomm HIMI_U01': ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea', 'agps-msa', 'agps-msb'], + 'Fibocom FM350-GL': ['3gpp-lac-ci'], +} as const; + +function v(signature: string, value: DbusValue): DbusVariant { + return { signature, value }; +} + +interface FakeOptions { + readonly capabilities: readonly string[]; + readonly enabled?: readonly string[]; + /** `GetLocation` payload, or an Error to throw. `undefined` = empty dict. */ + readonly location?: DbusValue | Error; + readonly setupError?: Error; + readonly treeError?: Error; + /** Omit the Location interface entirely, as a non-Location modem would. */ + readonly noLocationInterface?: boolean; +} + +interface FakeTransport { + readonly transport: { + callMethod(call: MethodCall): Promise; + }; + readonly calls: MethodCall[]; +} + +function fakeTransport(options: FakeOptions): FakeTransport { + const calls: MethodCall[] = []; + let enabledMask = encodeLocationSources(options.enabled ?? []); + + const tree = (): DbusValue => + [ + [ + MODEM, + options.noLocationInterface + ? [] + : [ + [ + MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE, + [ + ['Capabilities', v('u', encodeLocationSources(options.capabilities))], + ['Enabled', v('u', enabledMask)], + ], + ], + ], + ], + ] as unknown as DbusValue; + + return { + calls, + transport: { + callMethod(call: MethodCall): Promise { + calls.push(call); + if (call.member === 'GetManagedObjects') { + if (options.treeError) { + return Promise.reject(options.treeError); + } + return Promise.resolve({ signature: 'a{oa{sa{sv}}}', body: [tree()] }); + } + if (call.member === 'Setup') { + if (options.setupError) { + return Promise.reject(options.setupError); + } + enabledMask = Number(call.args?.[0] ?? 0); + return Promise.resolve({ signature: '', body: [] }); + } + if (call.member === 'GetLocation') { + if (options.location instanceof Error) { + return Promise.reject(options.location); + } + return Promise.resolve({ signature: 'a{uv}', body: [options.location ?? []] }); + } + return Promise.reject(new Error(`unexpected member ${call.member}`)); + }, + }, + }; +} + +function build( + options: FakeOptions, + now = () => 1_000, +): { + readonly location: MmLocation; + readonly calls: MethodCall[]; +} { + const fake = fakeTransport(options); + const location = new MmLocation({ + transport: fake.transport as never, + actor: new ModemActor(), + resolveStableKey: () => STABLE_KEY, + now, + }); + return { location, calls: fake.calls }; +} + +const RAW_FIX = (lat: number, lon: number, alt?: number): DbusValue => + [ + [ + 1 << 1, + v('a{sv}', [ + ['latitude', v('d', lat)], + ['longitude', v('d', lon)], + ...(alt === undefined ? [] : [['altitude', v('d', alt)] as const]), + ['utc-time', v('s', '181908.00')], + ] as unknown as DbusValue), + ], + ] as unknown as DbusValue; + +describe('bitmask codec', () => { + test('round-trips every fleet capability set', () => { + for (const [model, sources] of Object.entries(FLEET_CAPABILITIES)) { + const decoded = decodeLocationSources(encodeLocationSources(sources)); + expect([...decoded].sort(), model).toEqual([...sources].sort()); + } + }); + + test('an unknown source name contributes no bits rather than corrupting the mask', () => { + expect(encodeLocationSources(['gps-raw', 'not-a-source'])).toBe( + encodeLocationSources(['gps-raw']), + ); + }); +}); + +describe('capability detection against the real fleet', () => { + test('the three GNSS-advertising fleet modems report gnssCapable', async () => { + for (const model of ['Quectel RM530N-GL', 'SIMCom SIM7600G-H', 'Qualcomm HIMI_U01'] as const) { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES[model] }); + const result = await location.getLocationStatus(MODEM); + expect(result.ok, model).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.status.gnssCapable, model).toBe(true); + expect(result.status.gnssEnabled, model).toBe(false); + } + } + }); + + test('the FM350-GL advertises 3gpp-lac-ci only and is NOT gnssCapable', async () => { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Fibocom FM350-GL'] }); + const result = await location.getLocationStatus(MODEM); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.status.capabilities.has('3gpp-lac-ci')).toBe(true); + expect(result.status.gnssCapable).toBe(false); + } + }); + + test('the Quectel reading with 3gpp-lac-ci already enabled reports it enabled, GNSS not', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: [...FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], '3gpp-lac-ci'], + enabled: ['3gpp-lac-ci'], + }); + const result = await location.getLocationStatus(MODEM); + expect(result.ok && result.status.enabledSources.has('3gpp-lac-ci')).toBe(true); + expect(result.ok && result.status.gnssEnabled).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a modem with no Location interface is reported honestly, not as absent GNSS', async () => { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: [], noLocationInterface: true }); + const result = await location.getLocationStatus(MODEM); + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('enable / disable', () => { + test('enable turns on the requested sources and reports them back', async () => { + const { location, calls } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'] }); + const result = await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea']); + + expect(result.outcome).toBe('applied'); + expect([...result.enabledSources].sort()).toEqual(['gps-nmea', 'gps-raw']); + const setup = calls.find((call) => call.member === 'Setup'); + expect(setup?.interface).toBe(MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE); + expect(setup?.signature).toBe('ub'); + }); + + test('signal_location is ALWAYS false — coordinates never go onto the bus', async () => { + const { location, calls } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'] }); + await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw']); + await location.disableGnss(MODEM); + + const setups = calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'Setup'); + expect(setups.length).toBe(2); + for (const setup of setups) { + expect(setup.args?.[1]).toBe(false); + } + }); + + test('a source the modem does not advertise is dropped, not sent', async () => { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Qualcomm HIMI_U01'] }); + const result = await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw', 'gps-unmanaged']); + expect(result.outcome).toBe('applied'); + expect(result.enabledSources.has('gps-unmanaged')).toBe(false); + expect(result.enabledSources.has('gps-raw')).toBe(true); + }); + + test('enabling on a non-GNSS modem is refused honestly, never silently applied', async () => { + const { location, calls } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Fibocom FM350-GL'] }); + const result = await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw']); + + expect(result.outcome).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(result.reason).toContain('GNSS'); + expect(calls.some((call) => call.member === 'Setup')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('disable clears ONLY the GNSS bits — cell location survives', async () => { + const { location, calls } = build({ + capabilities: [...FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], '3gpp-lac-ci'], + enabled: ['3gpp-lac-ci', 'gps-raw', 'gps-nmea'], + }); + const result = await location.disableGnss(MODEM); + + expect(result.outcome).toBe('applied'); + expect([...result.enabledSources]).toEqual(['3gpp-lac-ci']); + const setup = calls.find((call) => call.member === 'Setup'); + expect(Number(setup?.args?.[0])).toBe(encodeLocationSources(['3gpp-lac-ci'])); + }); + + test('a Setup failure is surfaced as failed, never as applied', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + setupError: new Error('org.freedesktop.DBus.Error.AccessDenied'), + }); + const result = await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw']); + expect(result.outcome).toBe('failed'); + expect(result.reason).toContain('AccessDenied'); + }); +}); + +describe('reading the fix — the no-antenna paths', () => { + test('GNSS switched off answers `disabled`, not `no-fix`', async () => { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'] }); + const read = await location.readFix(MODEM); + expect(read.outcome).toBe('disabled'); + }); + + test('a non-GNSS modem answers `unsupported`, never `no-fix`', async () => { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Fibocom FM350-GL'] }); + expect((await location.readFix(MODEM)).outcome).toBe('unsupported'); + }); + + test('enabled with an empty GetLocation is an honest `no-fix` — the antenna-less case', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + enabled: ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea'], + location: [], + }); + const read = await location.readFix(MODEM); + expect(read.outcome).toBe('no-fix'); + }); + + test('a gps-raw entry present but carrying no coordinates is still `no-fix`', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + enabled: ['gps-raw'], + location: [ + [1 << 1, v('a{sv}', [['utc-time', v('s', '181908.00')]] as unknown as DbusValue)], + ] as unknown as DbusValue, + }); + expect((await location.readFix(MODEM)).outcome).toBe('no-fix'); + }); + + test('a quality-0 NMEA block is `no-fix`, not a decoded position', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + enabled: ['gps-nmea'], + location: [[1 << 2, v('s', '$GPGGA,000000,,,,,0,00,99.99,,,,,,*48')]] as unknown as DbusValue, + }); + expect((await location.readFix(MODEM)).outcome).toBe('no-fix'); + }); + + test('a GetLocation error is `error`, never a silent `no-fix`', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + enabled: ['gps-raw'], + location: new Error('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Retry'), + }); + const read = await location.readFix(MODEM); + expect(read.outcome).toBe('error'); + expect(read.outcome === 'error' && read.reason).toContain('Retry'); + }); +}); + +describe('reading the fix — a real position', () => { + test('a gps-raw dict decodes with the READ timestamp, not the modem clock', async () => { + const { location } = build( + { + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + enabled: ['gps-raw'], + location: RAW_FIX(4.60971, -74.08175, 2640), + }, + () => 555_000, + ); + const read = await location.readFix(MODEM); + expect(read.outcome).toBe('fix'); + if (read.outcome === 'fix') { + expect(read.fix.latitude).toBe(4.60971); + expect(read.fix.longitude).toBe(-74.08175); + expect(read.fix.altitude).toBe(2640); + expect(read.fix.observedAt).toBe(epochMillis(555_000)); + expect(read.fix.utcTime).toBe('181908.00'); + } + }); + + test('NMEA is the fallback when gps-raw carries nothing usable', async () => { + const { location } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Qualcomm HIMI_U01'], + enabled: ['gps-nmea'], + location: [ + [1 << 2, v('s', '$GPGGA,123519,4807.038,N,01131.000,E,1,08,0.9,545.4,M,46.9,M,,*47')], + ] as unknown as DbusValue, + }); + const read = await location.readFix(MODEM); + expect(read.outcome).toBe('fix'); + if (read.outcome === 'fix') { + expect(read.fix.latitude).toBeCloseTo(48.1173, 4); + } + }); +}); + +describe('the bearer is never touched', () => { + test('no GNSS call quiesces NetworkManager — a GPS toggle must not drop a link', async () => { + let quiesced = 0; + const fake = fakeTransport({ capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'] }); + const location = new MmLocation({ + transport: fake.transport as never, + actor: new ModemActor({ + acquire: () => { + quiesced += 1; + return Promise.resolve({ release: () => Promise.resolve() }); + }, + }), + resolveStableKey: () => STABLE_KEY, + }); + + await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw']); + await location.disableGnss(MODEM); + await location.readFix(MODEM); + + expect(quiesced).toBe(0); + }); + + test('every GNSS D-Bus call targets the Location interface and nothing else', async () => { + const { location, calls } = build({ + capabilities: FLEET_CAPABILITIES['Quectel RM530N-GL'], + enabled: ['gps-raw'], + location: RAW_FIX(4.6, -74.08), + }); + await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw']); + await location.readFix(MODEM); + + const members = new Set(calls.map((call) => call.member)); + expect(members.has('Setup')).toBe(true); + expect(members.has('GetLocation')).toBe(true); + for (const call of calls) { + if (call.member !== 'GetManagedObjects') { + expect(call.interface).toBe(MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE); + } + } + }); +}); + +describe('a hostile bus never throws out of the adapter', () => { + test('a failing GetManagedObjects degrades to a typed refusal', async () => { + const { location } = build({ capabilities: [], treeError: new Error('bus gone') }); + expect((await location.getLocationStatus(MODEM)).ok).toBe(false); + expect((await location.enableGnss(MODEM, ['gps-raw'])).outcome).toBe('unsupported'); + expect((await location.readFix(MODEM)).outcome).toBe('unsupported'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-location.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-location.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed62f93 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-location.ts @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +// The `Modem.Location` adapter — GNSS status, enable/disable, and the current fix. +// +// Three decisions here are load-bearing and easy to undo by accident: +// +// 1. `Setup`'s `signal_location` argument is ALWAYS false. Passing true makes MM +// broadcast the `Location` property over `PropertiesChanged`, which would put +// the operator's coordinates on the system bus for every listener — including +// this package's own observer, whose snapshots are logged. The fix is fetched +// by an explicit `GetLocation` call instead, so a coordinate only ever exists +// where someone asked for it. +// 2. GNSS runs through `actor.run`, NOT `actor.runQuiesced`. Quiescing exists to +// stop NetworkManager racing a disruptive change, and it costs a bearer +// deactivation — on a bonded device, dropping a link to switch a GPS receiver +// on would be an absurd trade. `Modem.Location.Setup` touches no bearer, so +// serialization per modem is all that is needed. +// 3. Disable CLEARS only the GNSS bits. `3gpp-lac-ci` is the cell-info module's +// source; blanking the whole mask would silently switch off a neighbouring +// feature the operator never touched. + +import { epochMillis } from '../domain'; +import { parseNmeaFix } from '../location/nmea'; +import type { + FixRead, + GnssFix, + GnssSource, + LocationStatus, + LocationStatusResult, + LocationToggleResult, + ModemLocationPort, + ModemRef, +} from '../ports'; +import { hasGnssSource } from '../ports'; +import type { DbusTransport, DbusValue, DbusVariant } from '../transport'; +import { MM_BUS_NAME, MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE } from './constants'; +import { + type DecodedProps, + fetchManagedObjects, + findInterface, + propValue, +} from './managed-objects'; +import type { ModemActor } from './modem-actor'; + +/** MMModemLocationSource bits, by decoded source name. */ +const SOURCE_BIT: Record = { + '3gpp-lac-ci': 1 << 0, + 'gps-raw': 1 << 1, + 'gps-nmea': 1 << 2, + 'cdma-bs': 1 << 3, + 'gps-unmanaged': 1 << 4, + 'agps-msa': 1 << 5, + 'agps-msb': 1 << 6, +}; + +const GPS_RAW_BIT = SOURCE_BIT['gps-raw'] as number; +const GPS_NMEA_BIT = SOURCE_BIT['gps-nmea'] as number; + +const GNSS_MASK = + GPS_RAW_BIT | + GPS_NMEA_BIT | + (SOURCE_BIT['gps-unmanaged'] as number) | + (SOURCE_BIT['agps-msa'] as number) | + (SOURCE_BIT['agps-msb'] as number); + +/** Decode an MMModemLocationSource bitmask into source names. */ +export function decodeLocationSources(mask: number): ReadonlySet { + const sources = new Set(); + for (const [name, bit] of Object.entries(SOURCE_BIT)) { + if ((mask & bit) !== 0) { + sources.add(name); + } + } + return sources; +} + +export function encodeLocationSources(sources: Iterable): number { + let mask = 0; + for (const source of sources) { + mask |= SOURCE_BIT[source] ?? 0; + } + return mask; +} + +export interface MmLocationDeps { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly actor: ModemActor; + readonly destination?: string; + readonly resolveStableKey: (modem: ModemRef) => string; + readonly now?: () => number; +} + +export class MmLocation implements ModemLocationPort { + readonly #transport: DbusTransport; + readonly #actor: ModemActor; + readonly #destination: string; + readonly #resolveStableKey: (modem: ModemRef) => string; + readonly #now: () => number; + + constructor(deps: MmLocationDeps) { + this.#transport = deps.transport; + this.#actor = deps.actor; + this.#destination = deps.destination ?? MM_BUS_NAME; + this.#resolveStableKey = deps.resolveStableKey; + this.#now = deps.now ?? Date.now; + } + + async getLocationStatus(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + const props = await this.#readLocationProps(modem); + if (props === undefined) { + return { ok: false, reason: 'the modem does not expose a Location interface' }; + } + return { ok: true, status: statusOf(props) }; + } + + enableGnss(modem: ModemRef, sources: readonly GnssSource[]): Promise { + return this.#actor.run(this.#resolveStableKey(modem), async () => { + const props = await this.#readLocationProps(modem); + if (props === undefined) { + return refused('the modem does not expose a Location interface'); + } + const status = statusOf(props); + if (!status.gnssCapable) { + return refused('the modem advertises no GNSS source', status.enabledSources); + } + const requested = encodeLocationSources(sources) & maskOfNames(status.capabilities); + if (requested === 0) { + return refused( + 'none of the requested GNSS sources is advertised by this modem', + status.enabledSources, + ); + } + const target = maskOfNames(status.enabledSources) | requested; + return this.#setup(modem, target, 'GNSS enabled'); + }); + } + + disableGnss(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + return this.#actor.run(this.#resolveStableKey(modem), async () => { + const props = await this.#readLocationProps(modem); + if (props === undefined) { + return refused('the modem does not expose a Location interface'); + } + const status = statusOf(props); + const target = maskOfNames(status.enabledSources) & ~GNSS_MASK; + return this.#setup(modem, target, 'GNSS disabled'); + }); + } + + async readFix(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + const props = await this.#readLocationProps(modem); + if (props === undefined) { + return { outcome: 'unsupported', reason: 'the modem does not expose a Location interface' }; + } + const status = statusOf(props); + if (!status.gnssCapable) { + return { outcome: 'unsupported', reason: 'the modem advertises no GNSS source' }; + } + if (!status.gnssEnabled) { + return { outcome: 'disabled', reason: 'GNSS is switched off on this modem' }; + } + let reply: { readonly body: readonly DbusValue[] }; + try { + reply = await this.#transport.callMethod({ + destination: this.#destination, + path: modem, + interface: MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE, + member: 'GetLocation', + }); + } catch (error) { + return { outcome: 'error', reason: `GetLocation failed: ${describe(error)}` }; + } + const fix = decodeFix(reply.body[0], epochMillis(this.#now())); + return fix === undefined + ? { outcome: 'no-fix', reason: 'the receiver has not acquired a position' } + : { outcome: 'fix', fix }; + } + + async #setup( + modem: ModemRef, + mask: number, + appliedReason: string, + ): Promise { + try { + await this.#transport.callMethod({ + destination: this.#destination, + path: modem, + interface: MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE, + member: 'Setup', + signature: 'ub', + args: [mask, false], + }); + } catch (error) { + return { + outcome: 'failed', + reason: `Location.Setup failed: ${describe(error)}`, + enabledSources: new Set(), + }; + } + return { + outcome: 'applied', + reason: appliedReason, + enabledSources: decodeLocationSources(mask), + }; + } + + async #readLocationProps(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + try { + const tree = await fetchManagedObjects(this.#transport, this.#destination); + return findInterface(tree, modem, MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE); + } catch { + return undefined; + } + } +} + +function maskOfNames(names: Iterable): number { + return encodeLocationSources(names); +} + +function refused(reason: string, enabled: ReadonlySet = new Set()): LocationToggleResult { + return { outcome: 'unsupported', reason, enabledSources: enabled }; +} + +function statusOf(props: DecodedProps): LocationStatus { + const capabilities = decodeLocationSources(maskProp(props, 'Capabilities')); + const enabledSources = decodeLocationSources(maskProp(props, 'Enabled')); + return { + capabilities, + enabledSources, + gnssCapable: hasGnssSource(capabilities), + gnssEnabled: hasGnssSource(enabledSources), + }; +} + +function maskProp(props: DecodedProps, name: string): number { + const value = propValue(props, name); + return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isFinite(value) ? value : 0; +} + +/** `a{uv}` decodes to `[sourceBit, variant][]`. */ +type LocationEntries = ReadonlyArray; + +function entryValue(payload: DbusValue | undefined, bit: number): DbusValue | undefined { + if (!Array.isArray(payload)) { + return undefined; + } + for (const entry of payload as unknown as LocationEntries) { + if (Number(entry[0]) === bit) { + return entry[1]?.value; + } + } + return undefined; +} + +function numberField(props: DecodedProps, name: string): number | undefined { + const value = propValue(props, name); + return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isFinite(value) ? value : undefined; +} + +/** + * Prefer MM's pre-decoded `gps-raw` dict; fall back to parsing the `gps-nmea` + * sentences. A raw entry that is present but carries no usable coordinate pair is + * NOT treated as a fix — MM populates the key as soon as the source is on. + */ +function decodeFix( + payload: DbusValue | undefined, + observedAt: GnssFix['observedAt'], +): GnssFix | undefined { + const raw = entryValue(payload, GPS_RAW_BIT); + if (Array.isArray(raw)) { + const props = raw as unknown as DecodedProps; + const latitude = numberField(props, 'latitude'); + const longitude = numberField(props, 'longitude'); + if (latitude !== undefined && longitude !== undefined) { + const altitude = numberField(props, 'altitude'); + const utcTime = propValue(props, 'utc-time'); + return { + latitude, + longitude, + ...(altitude === undefined ? {} : { altitude }), + ...(typeof utcTime === 'string' ? { utcTime } : {}), + observedAt, + }; + } + } + const nmea = entryValue(payload, GPS_NMEA_BIT); + if (typeof nmea !== 'string') { + return undefined; + } + const parsed = parseNmeaFix(nmea); + return parsed === undefined ? undefined : { ...parsed, observedAt }; +} + +function describe(error: unknown): string { + return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error); +} diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts index da355da..4282280 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ // NOT quiesce — they don't touch the bearer. NONE of these methods can reach a bearer // or connect verb: the port has none, and the fake's tripwire proves it at test time. +import { decodeBandList, encodeBandList, isResetSelection } from '../band'; import type { DesiredRadio, RadioAccessTechnology } from '../domain'; import { epochMillis } from '../domain'; import type { + BandReadResult, InhibitLease, ModemRef, NetworkScanResult, @@ -104,6 +106,60 @@ export class MmMutations { }); } + async readBands(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + try { + const tree = await fetchManagedObjects(this.#transport, this.#destination); + const props = findInterface(tree, modem, MODEM_IFACE); + if (props === undefined) { + return { ok: false, reason: 'the modem exports no Modem interface' }; + } + return { + ok: true, + bands: { + supported: decodeBandList(propValue(props, 'SupportedBands')), + current: decodeBandList(propValue(props, 'CurrentBands')), + }, + }; + } catch (error) { + return { ok: false, reason: `reading bands failed: ${describe(error)}` }; + } + } + + // Quiesced like `setRadioModes`, and for the same reason: a band change + // re-registers the radio, so NM must stand down before the bearer drops + // underneath it rather than after. + setCurrentBands(modem: ModemRef, bands: readonly string[]): Promise { + if (bands.length === 0) { + return Promise.resolve(receipt('band', 'failed', 'no bands were requested')); + } + const encoded = encodeBandList(bands); + if (!encoded.ok) { + return Promise.resolve( + receipt('band', 'unsupported', `this build does not know the band "${encoded.unknown}"`), + ); + } + const values = encoded.values; + return this.#actor.runQuiesced({ stableKey: this.#resolveStableKey(modem) }, async () => { + try { + await this.#transport.callMethod({ + destination: this.#destination, + path: modem, + interface: MODEM_IFACE, + member: 'SetCurrentBands', + signature: 'au', + args: [values], + }); + return receipt( + 'band', + 'applied', + isResetSelection(bands) ? 'band lock released' : `bands set to ${bands.join(', ')}`, + ); + } catch (error) { + return receipt('band', 'failed', `SetCurrentBands failed: ${describe(error)}`); + } + }); + } + async setPrimarySimSlot(modem: ModemRef, slotIndex: number): Promise { const slots = await this.#readSlotCount(modem); if (slots === undefined) { diff --git a/control/src/band/band-names.test.ts b/control/src/band/band-names.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..297764d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/band/band-names.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +import { describe, expect, it } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + BAND_ANY, + bandName, + bandValue, + decodeBandList, + encodeBandList, + isNamedBand, + isResetSelection, +} from './band-names'; + +describe('MMModemBand ↔ name', () => { + it('decodes the irregular GSM/UTRAN head exactly as ModemManager numbers it', () => { + // UTRAN_2 = 12 and UTRAN_6 = 8: the ordering is NOT the band number, which + // is the whole reason this block is a table rather than arithmetic. + expect(bandName(1)).toBe('egsm'); + expect(bandName(4)).toBe('g850'); + expect(bandName(5)).toBe('utran-1'); + expect(bandName(8)).toBe('utran-6'); + expect(bandName(12)).toBe('utran-2'); + expect(bandName(20)).toBe('g810'); + }); + + it('decodes the arithmetic blocks from their bases', () => { + expect(bandName(31)).toBe('eutran-1'); + expect(bandName(33)).toBe('eutran-3'); + expect(bandName(101)).toBe('eutran-71'); + expect(bandName(128)).toBe('cdma-bc0'); + expect(bandName(147)).toBe('cdma-bc19'); + expect(bandName(301)).toBe('ngran-1'); + expect(bandName(378)).toBe('ngran-78'); + }); + + it('names 256 as the reset value', () => { + expect(bandName(256)).toBe(BAND_ANY); + expect(bandValue(BAND_ANY)).toBe(256); + }); + + it('round-trips a value it does not name rather than dropping or guessing', () => { + expect(bandName(9001)).toBe('band-9001'); + expect(bandValue('band-9001')).toBe(9001); + expect(isNamedBand('band-9001')).toBe(false); + expect(isNamedBand('eutran-3')).toBe(true); + }); + + it('refuses a name it cannot place', () => { + expect(bandValue('eutran-999')).toBeUndefined(); + expect(bandValue('nonsense')).toBeUndefined(); + expect(bandValue('band-')).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it('round-trips every named band through both directions', () => { + for (const value of [1, 12, 31, 101, 128, 147, 256, 301, 378]) { + expect(bandValue(bandName(value))).toBe(value); + } + }); +}); + +describe('decodeBandList — a property read', () => { + it('decodes the RM530N-GL-shaped LTE + NR set a fleet modem advertises', () => { + // eutran-1/3/7/28 + ngran-78: the shape `SupportedBands` takes on a + // multi-mode 5G stick. Numbers, because the D-Bus property is `au`. + expect(decodeBandList([31, 33, 37, 58, 378])).toEqual([ + 'eutran-1', + 'eutran-3', + 'eutran-7', + 'eutran-28', + 'ngran-78', + ]); + }); + + it('decodes the SIM7600-shaped GSM + UTRAN + LTE set', () => { + expect(decodeBandList([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 31, 33, 38, 50])).toEqual([ + 'egsm', + 'dcs', + 'pcs', + 'g850', + 'utran-1', + 'utran-2', + 'eutran-1', + 'eutran-3', + 'eutran-8', + 'eutran-20', + ]); + }); + + it('reports a single `any` for an unlocked modem', () => { + expect(decodeBandList([256])).toEqual(['any']); + }); + + it('drops `unknown` and non-numeric members instead of inventing bands', () => { + expect(decodeBandList([0, 31, 'eutran-3', null, 1.5])).toEqual(['eutran-1']); + }); + + it('answers an empty list for a non-array property', () => { + expect(decodeBandList(undefined)).toEqual([]); + expect(decodeBandList('eutran-3')).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('encodeBandList — a write', () => { + it('encodes a selection', () => { + expect(encodeBandList(['eutran-3', 'ngran-78'])).toEqual({ ok: true, values: [33, 378] }); + }); + + it('FAILS CLOSED as a whole on one unplaceable name', () => { + // A partial band set is a different lock from the one that was asked for. + expect(encodeBandList(['eutran-3', 'nonsense', 'eutran-7'])).toEqual({ + ok: false, + unknown: 'nonsense', + }); + }); + + it('recognises the reset selection, and only that selection', () => { + expect(isResetSelection(['any'])).toBe(true); + expect(isResetSelection(['any', 'eutran-3'])).toBe(false); + expect(isResetSelection([])).toBe(false); + expect(isResetSelection(['eutran-3'])).toBe(false); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/band/band-names.ts b/control/src/band/band-names.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67731bd --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/band/band-names.ts @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +// MMModemBand ↔ band NAME, in both directions. +// +// The D-Bus surface speaks numbers: `Modem.SupportedBands` and +// `Modem.CurrentBands` are `au`, and `Modem.SetCurrentBands` takes `au`. Every +// operator-facing surface — mmcli's `--set-current-bands`, this package's API, +// CeraUI's selector — speaks the NAME (`eutran-3`, `utran-1`, `egsm`, `any`). +// One mapping, here, so the two can never disagree. +// +// WHERE THE NUMBERS COME FROM. ModemManager's `MMModemBand` (`mm-enums.h`) is +// two different things stitched together, and this module reproduces exactly +// that shape rather than flattening it into one big table: +// +// * the GSM/UTRAN block (1..20) is IRREGULAR — `UTRAN_2` is 12 while `UTRAN_6` +// is 8 — because MM appended bands in the order they were needed, so it is +// an explicit table and can only ever be an explicit table; +// * every later block is ARITHMETIC, by MM's own construction: `EUTRAN_n` is +// `30 + n`, `CDMA_BCn` is `128 + n`, `NGRAN_n` is `300 + n`. +// +// Deriving the arithmetic blocks rather than transcribing ~350 constants is the +// point: a transcription is where a wrong band number would hide, and a wrong +// band number sets a radio to a band the SIM's network does not operate on. +// +// A value this module does not recognise is NEVER dropped and NEVER guessed at. +// It round-trips as `band-`, so an unfamiliar band a future ModemManager +// reports is still shown to the operator, still comparable, and still settable — +// the same "unknown is an answer about the read" discipline `detect.ts` follows. + +/** A band as every operator-facing surface spells it. Opaque; compare by equality. */ +export type BandName = string; + +/** `MM_MODEM_BAND_UNKNOWN`. Never a member of a supported/current set we act on. */ +export const BAND_UNKNOWN = 'unknown'; + +/** + * `MM_MODEM_BAND_ANY` (256) — "let the modem choose", i.e. the reset value. + * Setting exactly this is how a band lock is released; there is no separate + * ModemManager verb for it. + */ +export const BAND_ANY = 'any'; +const BAND_ANY_VALUE = 256; + +/** + * The irregular head of the enum (`MM_MODEM_BAND_EGSM` = 1 … `G810` = 20), + * transcribed because it cannot be derived. + */ +const IRREGULAR: Readonly> = { + 0: BAND_UNKNOWN, + 1: 'egsm', + 2: 'dcs', + 3: 'pcs', + 4: 'g850', + 5: 'utran-1', + 6: 'utran-3', + 7: 'utran-4', + 8: 'utran-6', + 9: 'utran-5', + 10: 'utran-8', + 11: 'utran-9', + 12: 'utran-2', + 13: 'utran-7', + 14: 'g450', + 15: 'g480', + 16: 'g750', + 17: 'g380', + 18: 'g410', + 19: 'g710', + 20: 'g810', + [BAND_ANY_VALUE]: BAND_ANY, +}; + +/** Arithmetic blocks: `[prefix, base, firstIndex, lastIndex]`. */ +const ARITHMETIC: readonly (readonly [string, number, number, number])[] = [ + // MM_MODEM_BAND_EUTRAN_1 = 31 … EUTRAN_71 = 101. + ['eutran-', 30, 1, 71], + // MM_MODEM_BAND_CDMA_BC0 = 128 … CDMA_BC19 = 147. + ['cdma-bc', 128, 0, 19], + // MM_MODEM_BAND_NGRAN_1 = 301 … the 5G NR block. + ['ngran-', 300, 1, 261], +]; + +const NUMBER_TO_NAME = new Map(); +const NAME_TO_NUMBER = new Map(); + +for (const [value, name] of Object.entries(IRREGULAR)) { + NUMBER_TO_NAME.set(Number(value), name); + NAME_TO_NUMBER.set(name, Number(value)); +} +for (const [prefix, base, first, last] of ARITHMETIC) { + for (let index = first; index <= last; index += 1) { + const name = `${prefix}${index}`; + NUMBER_TO_NAME.set(base + index, name); + NAME_TO_NUMBER.set(name, base + index); + } +} + +/** The passthrough spelling for a band value this build does not name. */ +const PASSTHROUGH_RE = /^band-(\d+)$/; + +/** Decode one `MMModemBand` value. Total: an unknown value round-trips. */ +export function bandName(value: number): BandName { + return NUMBER_TO_NAME.get(value) ?? `band-${value}`; +} + +/** Encode one band name. `undefined` for a name this build cannot place. */ +export function bandValue(name: BandName): number | undefined { + const known = NAME_TO_NUMBER.get(name); + if (known !== undefined) return known; + const passthrough = PASSTHROUGH_RE.exec(name); + if (passthrough?.[1] === undefined) return undefined; + const parsed = Number(passthrough[1]); + return Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) ? parsed : undefined; +} + +/** True when this build recognises the name (a `band-` passthrough does not). */ +export function isNamedBand(name: BandName): boolean { + return NAME_TO_NUMBER.has(name); +} + +/** + * Decode a `SupportedBands` / `CurrentBands` property value. + * + * Non-numeric members are DROPPED rather than coerced — a malformed member says + * nothing about the radio, and coercing it would invent a band. `unknown` is + * dropped for the same reason: MM emits it for "the modem did not say", which is + * not a band an operator can select. + */ +export function decodeBandList(value: unknown): readonly BandName[] { + if (!Array.isArray(value)) return []; + const names: BandName[] = []; + for (const member of value) { + if (typeof member !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(member)) continue; + const name = bandName(member); + if (name === BAND_UNKNOWN) continue; + names.push(name); + } + return names; +} + +/** + * Encode a band selection for `SetCurrentBands`. + * + * FAILS CLOSED AS A WHOLE. One unplaceable name rejects the entire request + * rather than silently narrowing the selection: a partial band set is a + * DIFFERENT lock from the one the operator asked for, and applying it would + * strand the radio on bands they never chose. + */ +export function encodeBandList( + names: readonly BandName[], +): + | { readonly ok: true; readonly values: number[] } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly unknown: BandName } { + const values: number[] = []; + for (const name of names) { + const value = bandValue(name); + if (value === undefined) return { ok: false, unknown: name }; + values.push(value); + } + return { ok: true, values }; +} + +/** True when the selection is exactly the reset value (`any`, alone). */ +export function isResetSelection(names: readonly BandName[]): boolean { + return names.length === 1 && names[0] === BAND_ANY; +} diff --git a/control/src/band/certification.test.ts b/control/src/band/certification.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f7be93 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/band/certification.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +import { describe, expect, it } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG, + type BandCertificationCatalog, + findBandCertification, + isBandControlCertified, + loadBandCertificationCatalog, + offerableBands, +} from './certification'; + +const QUECTEL = { + vidPid: '2c7c:0801', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + firmwarePrefix: 'RM530NGLAAR05A01M4G', +}; + +function catalogWith(entries: unknown[]): BandCertificationCatalog { + return loadBandCertificationCatalog({ schemaVersion: 1, entries }); +} + +const CERTIFIED_QUECTEL = { + vidPid: '2c7c:0801', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + firmwarePrefix: 'RM530NGLAAR05', + evidence: 'evidence/todo30.md', + proofs: { supportedRead: true, set: true, readback: true, reset: true }, +}; + +describe('the SHIPPED band catalog', () => { + it('is EMPTY — nothing in the fleet has been through the drill', () => { + expect(BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG.entries).toEqual([]); + }); + + it('therefore certifies no fleet modem', () => { + expect(isBandControlCertified(BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG, QUECTEL)).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('the schema refuses a HALF-certified entry', () => { + it('rejects an entry missing a proof step', () => { + expect(() => + catalogWith([ + { + ...CERTIFIED_QUECTEL, + proofs: { supportedRead: true, set: true, readback: true }, + }, + ]), + ).toThrow(); + }); + + it('rejects an entry that states a proof step as false', () => { + // A `false` would read as a catalog row, and a catalog row is what + // surfaces the control. The absence of an entry is the only way to say + // "not proven". + expect(() => + catalogWith([ + { ...CERTIFIED_QUECTEL, proofs: { ...CERTIFIED_QUECTEL.proofs, reset: false } }, + ]), + ).toThrow(); + }); + + it('rejects an unknown field', () => { + expect(() => catalogWith([{ ...CERTIFIED_QUECTEL, notes: 'x' }])).toThrow(); + }); +}); + +describe('matching a device', () => { + it('matches a firmware FAMILY by prefix of the device revision', () => { + const catalog = catalogWith([CERTIFIED_QUECTEL]); + expect(findBandCertification(catalog, QUECTEL)?.evidence).toBe('evidence/todo30.md'); + }); + + it('does NOT match when the device revision is one character short of the entry', () => { + const catalog = catalogWith([CERTIFIED_QUECTEL]); + expect( + findBandCertification(catalog, { ...QUECTEL, firmwarePrefix: 'RM530NGLAAR0' }), + ).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it('requires all three discriminators', () => { + const catalog = catalogWith([CERTIFIED_QUECTEL]); + expect(findBandCertification(catalog, { ...QUECTEL, model: 'RM520N-GL' })).toBeUndefined(); + expect(findBandCertification(catalog, { ...QUECTEL, vidPid: '2c7c:0125' })).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it('fails closed for a device whose SKU could not be resolved', () => { + expect(isBandControlCertified(catalogWith([CERTIFIED_QUECTEL]), undefined)).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('offerableBands', () => { + const supported = ['eutran-1', 'eutran-3', 'eutran-7', 'ngran-78']; + + it('offers NOTHING without an entry', () => { + expect(offerableBands(undefined, supported)).toEqual([]); + }); + + it('offers the whole advertised set when the drill swept it', () => { + const [entry] = catalogWith([CERTIFIED_QUECTEL]).entries; + expect(offerableBands(entry, supported)).toEqual(supported); + }); + + it('NARROWS to the proven bands, intersected with what the device advertises now', () => { + const [entry] = catalogWith([ + { ...CERTIFIED_QUECTEL, provenBands: ['eutran-3', 'eutran-20'] }, + ]).entries; + expect(offerableBands(entry, supported)).toEqual(['eutran-3']); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/band/certification.ts b/control/src/band/certification.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e63f6eb --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/band/certification.ts @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +// The band-lock certification catalog — what has actually been PROVEN, per SKU. +// +// A band lock is the one capability module that can take a working uplink off the +// air and leave it there: a band the SIM's network does not operate on registers +// nowhere, and a modem that does not honour a reset leaves the operator with no +// way back short of a replug they may not be able to reach. So band-lock is +// deliberately STRICTER than the framework floor in `support-claim.ts`. The +// framework offers a control at `capable` (the modem advertises the capability) +// because hiding an uncertified-but-working control puts hardware behind a +// paperwork gate. For this module the paperwork IS the safety argument, so the +// control stays HIDDEN until an entry here proves the whole round trip. +// +// FOUR STEPS, ALL FOUR REQUIRED, and they are separate booleans rather than one +// `certified: true` because each can fail on its own and each failure means a +// different thing: +// +// supportedRead — `SupportedBands` was read and named real bands. Without it +// there is nothing to offer. +// set — `SetCurrentBands` was accepted for a band in that set. +// readback — `CurrentBands` afterwards reported exactly what was asked +// for. An accepted-but-ignored write is the failure mode that +// looks like success from the call site alone. +// reset — setting `any` restored the baseline. This is the escape +// hatch; a SKU that cannot be shown to reset must never be +// locked in the first place. +// +// THE SHIPPED CATALOG IS EMPTY, and that is the honest state. Nothing in the +// fleet has been through the drill — see the phase-C band-lock evidence for why +// (the bench Quectel's SIM never registers, so "re-registration proven" cannot +// be claimed today). An entry is added by a human-reviewed commit carrying the +// bench transcript, exactly like `usb-mode/certified-catalog.json`. + +import { z } from 'zod'; + +import rawCatalog from './certified-bands.json' with { type: 'json' }; + +/** + * The device a certification is about. Firmware is a PREFIX for the same reason + * the USB-mode catalog matches one: an entry certifies a firmware FAMILY, and + * where the family ends is a per-SKU judgement a reviewer makes, not something a + * device can compute. + */ +export const bandSkuSchema = z + .object({ + vidPid: z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{4}:[0-9a-f]{4}$/), + model: z.string().min(1), + firmwarePrefix: z.string().min(1), + }) + .strict(); +export type BandSku = z.infer; + +export const bandProofSchema = z + .object({ + supportedRead: z.literal(true), + set: z.literal(true), + readback: z.literal(true), + reset: z.literal(true), + }) + .strict(); + +/** + * All four proofs are `z.literal(true)`, so a HALF-certified entry cannot be + * expressed at all. A reviewer with three of four proofs has an uncertified SKU + * and the file must say so by omitting it — a `false` field would read as a + * catalog row, and a catalog row is what surfaces the control. + */ +export const bandCertificationEntrySchema = z + .object({ + vidPid: z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{4}:[0-9a-f]{4}$/), + model: z.string().min(1), + firmwarePrefix: z.string().min(1), + /** Free-form: where the transcript proving the four steps lives. */ + evidence: z.string().min(1), + proofs: bandProofSchema, + /** + * Bands the reviewer proved were individually settable AND resettable. + * An EMPTY list means "the whole advertised set", which is what a drill + * that swept the set records; a non-empty list NARROWS what is offered. + */ + provenBands: z.array(z.string()).default([]), + }) + .strict(); +export type BandCertificationEntry = z.infer; + +export const bandCertificationCatalogSchema = z + .object({ + schemaVersion: z.literal(1), + entries: z.array(bandCertificationEntrySchema), + }) + .strict(); +export type BandCertificationCatalog = z.infer; + +/** Parse an untrusted value as a band catalog. Throws with a precise path. */ +export function loadBandCertificationCatalog(value: unknown): BandCertificationCatalog { + return bandCertificationCatalogSchema.parse(value); +} + +/** The catalog shipped in this package, validated at module load. */ +export const BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG: BandCertificationCatalog = + loadBandCertificationCatalog(rawCatalog); + +/** + * The entry certifying this exact device, or `undefined`. + * + * All three discriminators must match, and the firmware match is a PREFIX of the + * device's FULL revision — never a truncation of the device's revision to the + * entry's length, which would certify a family the reviewer never looked at. + */ +export function findBandCertification( + catalog: BandCertificationCatalog, + sku: BandSku, +): BandCertificationEntry | undefined { + return catalog.entries.find( + (entry) => + entry.vidPid === sku.vidPid && + entry.model === sku.model && + sku.firmwarePrefix.startsWith(entry.firmwarePrefix), + ); +} + +/** + * Whether a band-lock control may be OFFERED for this device. + * + * Fail-closed in every direction: an unknown SKU, a SKU with no entry, and a SKU + * whose entry predates a proof step all answer `false`. + */ +export function isBandControlCertified( + catalog: BandCertificationCatalog, + sku: BandSku | undefined, +): boolean { + if (sku === undefined) return false; + return findBandCertification(catalog, sku) !== undefined; +} + +/** + * Narrow an advertised band set to what the certification proves is settable. + * + * An entry with no `provenBands` proves the whole advertised set (the drill swept + * it); an entry that names bands offers ONLY those, intersected with what the + * modem advertises right now — a certified band the device no longer advertises + * is not offerable, and the device's own answer outranks the catalog. + */ +export function offerableBands( + entry: BandCertificationEntry | undefined, + supported: readonly string[], +): readonly string[] { + if (entry === undefined) return []; + if (entry.provenBands.length === 0) return supported; + const proven = new Set(entry.provenBands); + return supported.filter((band) => proven.has(band)); +} diff --git a/control/src/band/certified-bands.json b/control/src/band/certified-bands.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fca69b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/band/certified-bands.json @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +{ + "schemaVersion": 1, + "entries": [] +} diff --git a/control/src/band/index.ts b/control/src/band/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26e571e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/band/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// The band-lock capability module: the MMModemBand vocabulary and the +// certification catalog that gates whether a control may be offered at all. +// +// The D-Bus verbs themselves live with the other ModemManager mutations +// (`backend/mm-mutations.ts`), declared on `ModemManagerPort` — a band change is +// a radio mutation like a mode change, not a subsystem of its own. + +export * from './band-names'; +export * from './certification'; diff --git a/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts b/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts index 72a49ae..a9a0087 100644 --- a/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts +++ b/control/src/capability/detect.test.ts @@ -16,10 +16,12 @@ function probe(overrides: ProbeOverrides = {}): ModuleCapabilityProbe { const interfaces = 'interfaces' in overrides ? overrides.interfaces : DEFAULT_INTERFACES; const locationSources = 'locationSources' in overrides ? overrides.locationSources : DEFAULT_LOCATION_SOURCES; + const supportedRats = overrides.supportedRats; return { properties: overrides.properties ?? DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ...(interfaces === undefined ? {} : { interfaces }), ...(locationSources === undefined ? {} : { locationSources }), + ...(supportedRats === undefined ? {} : { supportedRats }), }; } @@ -95,3 +97,46 @@ describe('per-module capability detection', () => { ).not.toThrow(); }); }); + +describe('`five-g-pref` narrows on the decoded mode catalog', () => { + // The property NAME is not the question: every MM modem exports + // `SupportedModes`, so the name alone resolves `present` on a 4G-only radio. + test('a decoded catalog naming 5GNR is present', () => { + expect( + detectCapabilityModules(probe({ supportedRats: new Set(['lte', '5gnr']) }))['five-g-pref'], + ).toBe('present'); + }); + + test('a decoded catalog WITHOUT 5GNR is absent, even though the property exists', () => { + const detected = detectCapabilityModules(probe({ supportedRats: new Set(['umts', 'lte']) })); + expect(detected['five-g-pref']).toBe('absent'); + // The property-name answer for the same probe is `present` — proving the + // decoded catalog is what narrowed it, not a changed property set. + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe())['five-g-pref']).toBe('present'); + }); + + test('an EMPTY decoded catalog is unknown, never absent', () => { + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe({ supportedRats: new Set() }))['five-g-pref']).toBe( + 'unknown', + ); + }); + + test('a caller that decoded no catalog keeps the byte-identical property-name answer', () => { + expect(detectCapabilityModules(probe({ supportedRats: undefined }))['five-g-pref']).toBe( + 'present', + ); + expect( + detectCapabilityModules(probe({ properties: new Set(), supportedRats: undefined }))[ + 'five-g-pref' + ], + ).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('narrowing touches ONLY this module', () => { + const narrowed = detectCapabilityModules(probe({ supportedRats: new Set(['lte']) })); + const base = detectCapabilityModules(probe()); + for (const module of ['band-lock', 'sms', 'ussd', 'gps', 'esim', 'fcc-auto-unlock'] as const) { + expect(narrowed[module]).toBe(base[module]); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/capability/detect.ts b/control/src/capability/detect.ts index a3ccee8..43ac263 100644 --- a/control/src/capability/detect.ts +++ b/control/src/capability/detect.ts @@ -11,16 +11,18 @@ // nothing. Answering `absent` there would hide a working capability; answering // `present` would offer a control the modem cannot honour. -import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; import type { MmPropertyProbe } from '../backend/features'; +import type { RadioAccessTechnology } from '../domain'; +import { fiveGPreferenceEvidence } from './five-g-preference'; import type { CapabilityEvidence, CapabilityModule } from './support-claim'; /** MM's Messaging interface — SMS list/read lives here. */ export const MESSAGING_IFACE = `${MODEM_IFACE}.Messaging`; /** MM's Location interface — GNSS sources are advertised here. */ export const LOCATION_IFACE = `${MODEM_IFACE}.Location`; -/** MM's 3GPP USSD interface. */ -export const USSD_IFACE = `${MODEM3GPP_IFACE}.Ussd`; +/** MM's 3GPP USSD interface — the same name the USSD adapter dials. */ +export const USSD_IFACE = MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE; /** * What A3.2 observed, plus the two signals the static object tree cannot carry. @@ -36,6 +38,15 @@ export interface ModuleCapabilityProbe extends MmPropertyProbe { * An EMPTY set is a real answer — the interface exists and offers no GNSS. */ readonly locationSources?: ReadonlySet; + /** + * `SupportedModes` decoded to the RAT families it actually names. + * + * OPTIONAL, and its absence is the pre-existing behaviour verbatim: a caller + * that decoded only property NAMES answers exactly as before. Supplying it + * strictly NARROWS `five-g-pref`, because the property's mere presence is + * equally true of a 4G-only modem — see `detectCapabilityModules`. + */ + readonly supportedRats?: ReadonlySet; } const GNSS_SOURCES = ['gps-raw', 'gps-nmea', 'gps-unmanaged', 'agps-msa', 'agps-msb']; @@ -90,6 +101,14 @@ function detectGnss(probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe): CapabilityEvidence { * module on hardware that supports it, and `present` would promise a plugin that * may not be installed — so the honest answer is that this probe cannot tell, and * evidence for it has to come from the catalog instead. + * + * `five-g-pref` is the one module whose property NAME is not the question. Every + * ModemManager modem exports `SupportedModes`, including a 4G-only one, so the + * name alone would resolve `present` on hardware with no 5G at all and offer a 5G + * posture nothing could honour. When the caller decoded the property's VALUE the + * verdict narrows to whether the catalog actually names 5GNR; when it did not, + * the property-name answer stands, so this is a strict narrowing and never a new + * way to claim a capability. */ export function detectCapabilityModules( probe: ModuleCapabilityProbe, @@ -97,7 +116,10 @@ export function detectCapabilityModules( return { 'band-lock': fromProperty(probe, 'SupportedBands'), sms: fromInterface(probe, MESSAGING_IFACE), - 'five-g-pref': fromProperty(probe, 'SupportedModes'), + 'five-g-pref': + probe.supportedRats === undefined + ? fromProperty(probe, 'SupportedModes') + : fiveGPreferenceEvidence(probe.supportedRats), 'fcc-auto-unlock': 'unknown', gps: detectGnss(probe), ussd: fromInterface(probe, USSD_IFACE), diff --git a/control/src/capability/five-g-preference.test.ts b/control/src/capability/five-g-preference.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9d5111 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/five-g-preference.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import type { RadioAccessTechnology } from '../domain'; +import { + FIVE_G_PREFERENCES, + type FiveGPreference, + fiveGPreferenceConfirmed, + fiveGPreferenceEvidence, + fiveGPreferenceToRadio, + NR_MODE_UNSUPPORTED_REASON, + nrModeSelection, + offeredFiveGPreferences, + type RadioModeSet, + readFiveGPreference, +} from './five-g-preference'; + +const rats = (...list: readonly RadioAccessTechnology[]): ReadonlySet => + new Set(list); + +/** The bench Quectel RM530N-GL's advertised families (todo 2, `ceralive2`). */ +const QUECTEL = rats('gsm', 'umts', 'lte', '5gnr'); +/** The bench SIMCom SIM7600G-H — LTE-max, no 5G. */ +const SIMCOM = rats('gsm', 'umts', 'lte'); + +const modes = ( + allowed: ReadonlySet, + preferred?: RadioAccessTechnology, +): RadioModeSet => ({ allowed, ...(preferred === undefined ? {} : { preferred }) }); + +describe('capability evidence', () => { + test('an unobserved catalog is UNKNOWN, never absent', () => { + expect(fiveGPreferenceEvidence(undefined)).toBe('unknown'); + expect(fiveGPreferenceEvidence(rats())).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('an observed catalog answers on whether it names 5GNR', () => { + expect(fiveGPreferenceEvidence(QUECTEL)).toBe('present'); + expect(fiveGPreferenceEvidence(SIMCOM)).toBe('absent'); + }); +}); + +describe('which postures may be offered', () => { + test('a 5G modem with fallback is offered all four', () => { + expect(offeredFiveGPreferences(QUECTEL)).toEqual([...FIVE_G_PREFERENCES]); + }); + + test('a modem with NO 5G is offered NOTHING — not even 5g-off', () => { + // `5g-off` on a radio with no 5G is a control that cannot change anything, + // which is worse than an absent one: it invites an operator to act. + expect(offeredFiveGPreferences(SIMCOM)).toEqual([]); + expect(offeredFiveGPreferences(undefined)).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a 5G-ONLY radio is offered only 5g-only — three labels for one posture is not a choice', () => { + expect(offeredFiveGPreferences(rats('5gnr'))).toEqual(['5g-only']); + }); + + test('prefer-4g is withheld from a 5G modem that advertises no LTE', () => { + expect(offeredFiveGPreferences(rats('umts', '5gnr'))).toEqual([ + '5g-only', + 'prefer-5g', + '5g-off', + ]); + }); +}); + +describe('preference → (allowed, preferred)', () => { + test('prefer-5g and prefer-4g share ONE allowed set and differ only in ranking', () => { + const preferFive = fiveGPreferenceToRadio('prefer-5g', QUECTEL); + const preferFour = fiveGPreferenceToRadio('prefer-4g', QUECTEL); + + expect([...(preferFive?.allowedSet ?? [])].sort()).toEqual( + [...(preferFour?.allowedSet ?? [])].sort(), + ); + expect(preferFive?.preferenceOrdered[0]).toBe('5gnr'); + expect(preferFour?.preferenceOrdered[0]).toBe('lte'); + }); + + test('5g-only allows 5G and nothing else', () => { + const target = fiveGPreferenceToRadio('5g-only', QUECTEL); + expect([...(target?.allowedSet ?? [])]).toEqual(['5gnr']); + expect(target?.preferenceOrdered).toEqual(['5gnr']); + }); + + test('5g-off keeps every sub-5G family the modem advertised', () => { + const target = fiveGPreferenceToRadio('5g-off', QUECTEL); + expect(target?.preferenceOrdered).toEqual(['lte', 'umts', 'gsm']); + expect(target?.allowedSet.has('5gnr')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a posture the modem cannot express resolves UNDEFINED, never a neighbour', () => { + // Substituting is how "prefer 4G" on a marginal cell silently becomes 5G-first. + for (const preference of FIVE_G_PREFERENCES) { + expect(fiveGPreferenceToRadio(preference, SIMCOM)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(fiveGPreferenceToRadio(preference, undefined)).toBeUndefined(); + } + expect(fiveGPreferenceToRadio('prefer-4g', rats('umts', '5gnr'))).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('every offered posture resolves to a target — the two rules cannot disagree', () => { + for (const catalog of [QUECTEL, rats('5gnr'), rats('lte', '5gnr')]) { + for (const preference of offeredFiveGPreferences(catalog)) { + expect(fiveGPreferenceToRadio(preference, catalog)).toBeDefined(); + } + } + }); +}); + +describe('reading the posture back off the radio', () => { + const cases: readonly (readonly [string, RadioModeSet, FiveGPreference | undefined])[] = [ + ['5G alone', modes(rats('5gnr')), '5g-only'], + ['5G first', modes(QUECTEL, '5gnr'), 'prefer-5g'], + ['LTE first', modes(QUECTEL, 'lte'), 'prefer-4g'], + ['no 5G at all', modes(SIMCOM, 'lte'), '5g-off'], + ['no 5G, UMTS-ranked', modes(SIMCOM, 'umts'), '5g-off'], + ['5G allowed, UMTS preferred', modes(QUECTEL, 'umts'), undefined], + ['5G allowed, nothing preferred', modes(QUECTEL), undefined], + ]; + + for (const [name, current, expected] of cases) { + test(`${name} → ${expected ?? 'undefined'}`, () => { + expect(readFiveGPreference(current)).toBe(expected); + }); + } + + test('an unread radio is UNDEFINED and is never rounded to a posture', () => { + expect(readFiveGPreference(undefined)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(readFiveGPreference(modes(rats()))).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('every posture round-trips through its own target', () => { + for (const preference of offeredFiveGPreferences(QUECTEL)) { + const target = fiveGPreferenceToRadio(preference, QUECTEL); + expect( + readFiveGPreference(modes(target?.allowedSet ?? rats(), target?.preferenceOrdered[0])), + ).toBe(preference); + } + }); +}); + +describe('the readback IS the confirmation', () => { + test('a radio that landed on the request confirms', () => { + expect(fiveGPreferenceConfirmed('prefer-4g', modes(QUECTEL, 'lte'))).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a radio that CLAMPED the request does NOT confirm', () => { + // MM accepting the method call is not the radio taking the mode set. + expect(fiveGPreferenceConfirmed('prefer-4g', modes(QUECTEL, '5gnr'))).toBe(false); + expect(fiveGPreferenceConfirmed('5g-only', modes(QUECTEL, '5gnr'))).toBe(false); + }); + + test('an unreadable radio does NOT confirm', () => { + expect(fiveGPreferenceConfirmed('prefer-5g', undefined)).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('SA / NSA', () => { + test('is reported unsupported with a reason, never omitted', () => { + // A missing field reads as "nobody asked"; a stated reason tells an operator + // hunting for an SA toggle why there is none. + expect(nrModeSelection()).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: NR_MODE_UNSUPPORTED_REASON, + }); + }); + + test('this module opens NO vendor AT surface for it', async () => { + const source = await Bun.file(new URL('./five-g-preference.ts', import.meta.url)).text(); + const executable = source.replace(/\/\/[^\n]*/g, '').replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, ''); + for (const token of ['QNWPREFCFG', 'AT+', 'callMethod', 'transport']) { + expect(executable).not.toContain(token); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/capability/five-g-preference.ts b/control/src/capability/five-g-preference.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1416310 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/capability/five-g-preference.ts @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +// The `five-g-pref` capability module's MODEL — which 5G postures a modem can be +// asked for, how each maps onto ModemManager's `SetCurrentModes`, and which one +// the radio is on right now. +// +// It is pure and total. Nothing here talks to a bus: `MmMutations.setRadioModes` +// already owns the D-Bus call, the per-modem serialization and the quiesce, so +// this module's whole job is to decide WHICH `DesiredRadio` a stated preference +// means and to refuse to name one the modem never advertised. +// +// WHY THE MODULE EXISTS AT ALL, given the 3G/4G/5G selector already writes +// `SetCurrentModes`: that selector's vocabulary is the ALLOWED SET. Two genuinely +// different postures — "allow 4G and 5G, prefer 5G" and "allow 4G and 5G, prefer +// 4G" — share one allowed set and are distinguishable only by the PREFERRED mode, +// which the coarse selector folds away. An operator on a marginal 5G cell wants +// exactly that distinction, and it is the one thing they could not previously ask +// for. + +import type { RadioAccessTechnology } from '../domain'; +import type { CapabilityEvidence } from './support-claim'; + +/** + * The postures this module offers. Deliberately four NAMED intents rather than a + * free (allowed, preferred) pair: an arbitrary pair is expressible on the wire but + * not answerable by an operator, and most pairs are postures nobody wants. + * + * 5g-only — allow ONLY 5G. No fallback: out of 5G coverage the modem stops + * registering, which is why it is offered but never a default. + * prefer-5g — allow 5G and everything below it, rank 5G first. + * prefer-4g — the SAME allowed set, ranked LTE first. This is the posture a + * marginal 5G cell calls for, and the one the coarse allowed-set + * selector structurally cannot express. + * 5g-off — allow everything the modem supports EXCEPT 5G. + */ +export const FIVE_G_PREFERENCES = ['5g-only', 'prefer-5g', 'prefer-4g', '5g-off'] as const; +export type FiveGPreference = (typeof FIVE_G_PREFERENCES)[number]; + +/** One `(allowed, preferred)` pair, the shape MM's `CurrentModes` really carries. */ +export interface RadioModeSet { + readonly allowed: ReadonlySet; + /** MM's `preferred` is a SINGLE mode, and `none` is a legal answer. */ + readonly preferred?: RadioAccessTechnology | undefined; +} + +/** What a stated preference resolves to, in `MmMutations.setRadioModes`'s shape. */ +export interface FiveGRadioTarget { + readonly preferenceOrdered: readonly RadioAccessTechnology[]; + readonly allowedSet: ReadonlySet; +} + +/** + * SA vs NSA — and the honest answer, which is that ModemManager does not expose + * the choice at all. + * + * Checked against MM 1.24.2's own D-Bus surface rather than recalled: the only + * NR-specific member on a modem object is + * `Modem.Modem3gpp.SetNr5gRegistrationSettings`, whose keys are `mico-mode` and + * `drx-cycle` — power-saving registration parameters, not a standalone-vs + * non-standalone selector. Vendors expose the selector through their own AT + * commands (Quectel `AT+QNWPREFCFG="mode_pref"`, and one per vendor after that), + * which is a per-SKU control surface this module deliberately does not open: an + * uncertified AT write that can cost registration is exactly what the evidence + * gate exists to keep out. + * + * So the axis is REPORTED as unsupported rather than omitted. A missing field + * reads as "nobody asked"; a stated `not-exposed-by-modemmanager` tells an + * operator looking for an SA toggle why there is none. + */ +export const NR_MODE_UNSUPPORTED_REASON = 'not-exposed-by-modemmanager' as const; + +export interface NrModeSelection { + readonly supported: false; + readonly reason: typeof NR_MODE_UNSUPPORTED_REASON; +} + +/** The SA/NSA verdict. Constant today, and a function so a future SKU-certified + * path replaces one call site rather than every consumer. */ +export function nrModeSelection(): NrModeSelection { + return { supported: false, reason: NR_MODE_UNSUPPORTED_REASON }; +} + +/** RAT ranking, highest generation first. The ONE ordering this module uses. */ +const RAT_ORDER: readonly RadioAccessTechnology[] = ['5gnr', 'lte', 'umts', 'gsm']; + +function ranked(rats: ReadonlySet): readonly RadioAccessTechnology[] { + return RAT_ORDER.filter((rat) => rats.has(rat)); +} + +/** + * Does this modem's advertised mode catalog contain 5G? + * + * An EMPTY catalog is `unknown`, never `absent` — an unobserved read says nothing + * about the device, and reporting `absent` there would hide the module on a modem + * that supports it. This is the same first-class-`unknown` rule `detect.ts` + * follows, applied one level deeper: `detect.ts` can only see that a + * `SupportedModes` property EXISTS, which is equally true of a 4G-only modem. + */ +export function fiveGPreferenceEvidence( + supportedRats: ReadonlySet | undefined, +): CapabilityEvidence { + if (supportedRats === undefined || supportedRats.size === 0) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return supportedRats.has('5gnr') ? 'present' : 'absent'; +} + +/** + * Which postures this modem can actually be asked for. + * + * A modem with no 5G is offered NOTHING — not `5g-off` either, because "turn 5G + * off" is a control that would change nothing on a radio that has no 5G, and a + * control that cannot change anything is the defect this repo's evidence gate + * exists to keep off an operator's screen. + * + * `prefer-5g` / `prefer-4g` / `5g-off` each additionally require a SUB-5G mode to + * fall back to: on a 5G-only radio they would all collapse onto the same allowed + * set as `5g-only`, i.e. three labels for one posture. + */ +export function offeredFiveGPreferences( + supportedRats: ReadonlySet | undefined, +): readonly FiveGPreference[] { + if (supportedRats === undefined || !supportedRats.has('5gnr')) { + return []; + } + const lower = ranked(supportedRats).filter((rat) => rat !== '5gnr'); + if (lower.length === 0) { + return ['5g-only']; + } + // `prefer-4g` names LTE specifically, so it is offered only on a modem that + // has LTE. A 5G+UMTS-only radio is not a real fleet device, but naming a mode + // the modem never advertised is the one thing this module must not do. + return FIVE_G_PREFERENCES.filter( + (preference) => preference !== 'prefer-4g' || supportedRats.has('lte'), + ); +} + +/** + * Resolve a stated preference into the `(allowed, preferred)` pair to write. + * + * `undefined` means this modem cannot express the posture — the caller must + * REFUSE rather than substitute a neighbouring one. Substituting is how an + * operator asks for "prefer 4G" on a marginal cell and silently gets 5G-first. + */ +export function fiveGPreferenceToRadio( + preference: FiveGPreference, + supportedRats: ReadonlySet | undefined, +): FiveGRadioTarget | undefined { + if (supportedRats === undefined || !offeredFiveGPreferences(supportedRats).includes(preference)) { + return undefined; + } + const all = ranked(supportedRats); + const withoutNr = all.filter((rat) => rat !== '5gnr'); + + switch (preference) { + case '5g-only': + return { allowedSet: new Set(['5gnr']), preferenceOrdered: ['5gnr'] }; + case 'prefer-5g': + return { allowedSet: new Set(all), preferenceOrdered: all }; + case 'prefer-4g': + // The allowed set is IDENTICAL to `prefer-5g`'s — only the ranking moves. + // That is the whole point of the posture, and it is why a consumer must + // never diff allowed sets to decide whether a write is needed. + return { + allowedSet: new Set(all), + preferenceOrdered: ['lte', ...all.filter((rat) => rat !== 'lte')], + }; + case '5g-off': + return { allowedSet: new Set(withoutNr), preferenceOrdered: withoutNr }; + } +} + +/** + * Which posture a modem's CURRENT modes name — or `undefined` for a pair this + * model does not name. + * + * `undefined` is a first-class answer and must not be rounded to the nearest + * posture: a radio parked on `allowed: 3g,4g; preferred: 3g` is in a state no 5G + * preference describes, and reporting one would show an operator a selection they + * never made and cannot get back to. + */ +export function readFiveGPreference( + current: RadioModeSet | undefined, +): FiveGPreference | undefined { + if (current === undefined || current.allowed.size === 0) { + return undefined; + } + const has5g = current.allowed.has('5gnr'); + const others = ranked(current.allowed).filter((rat) => rat !== '5gnr'); + + if (!has5g) { + // A sub-5G allowed set is `5g-off` whatever it ranks first: the posture is + // about 5G, and this model has no opinion on how 4G and 3G are ordered. + return '5g-off'; + } + if (others.length === 0) { + return '5g-only'; + } + if (current.preferred === '5gnr') { + return 'prefer-5g'; + } + if (current.preferred === 'lte') { + return 'prefer-4g'; + } + return undefined; +} + +/** + * Did a readback land on the requested posture? + * + * The RESULT of the write is not the write's own acknowledgement — MM answering + * the method call says the request was accepted, not that the radio took it, and + * a modem is entitled to clamp a mode set it cannot honour. So a confirmation is + * a re-read compared against the request, and this is that comparison. + */ +export function fiveGPreferenceConfirmed( + requested: FiveGPreference, + readback: RadioModeSet | undefined, +): boolean { + return readFiveGPreference(readback) === requested; +} diff --git a/control/src/capability/index.ts b/control/src/capability/index.ts index 6d2c4c1..0a60d16 100644 --- a/control/src/capability/index.ts +++ b/control/src/capability/index.ts @@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ -// Capability-module feature-gate framework — the support-claim taxonomy and the -// per-modem capability detection the seven gated modules resolve against. +// Capability-module feature-gate framework — the support-claim taxonomy, the +// per-modem capability detection the seven gated modules resolve against, and the +// modules that have landed their own probe + evidence. // -// Framework only: no module is implemented here, and none may be surfaced or -// claimed until its own change lands with its probe and its evidence. +// Implemented so far: `five-g-pref` (`five-g-preference.ts`). The remaining six +// are framework-only and may not be surfaced or claimed until their own change +// lands. export * from './detect'; +export * from './five-g-preference'; export * from './support-claim'; diff --git a/control/src/domain/identity.ts b/control/src/domain/identity.ts index 0f52faa..fa0d880 100644 --- a/control/src/domain/identity.ts +++ b/control/src/domain/identity.ts @@ -29,6 +29,16 @@ export type LogicalSlotId = Brand; */ export type SubscriptionId = Brand; +/** + * The SIM's OWN number (MSISDN), as ModemManager's `Modem.OwnNumbers` reports it. + * + * SENSITIVE — it is the subscriber's telephone number, so it belongs to the same + * class as `subscriptionId`: never printed raw, never a policy binding key. It is + * DISPLAYED to the operator on an explicit reveal; that is a rendering decision + * and does not make it loggable. + */ +export type SubscriberNumber = Brand; + /** * The live ModemManager D-Bus object path (e.g. `/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/3`). * @@ -76,6 +86,11 @@ export interface ModemIdentity { readonly equipmentId: EquipmentId; /** Absent with no SIM. SENSITIVE — redact everywhere (A2.2 redaction module). */ readonly subscriptionId?: SubscriptionId; + /** + * The SIM's own number(s). ABSENT when the carrier/SIM published none — most + * SIMs do not, so absence is the common case and never an error. SENSITIVE. + */ + readonly ownNumbers?: readonly SubscriberNumber[]; /** NEVER PERSISTED — per-boot runtime handle only. */ readonly runtimePath: RuntimePath; } @@ -92,6 +107,11 @@ export function subscriptionId(value: string): SubscriptionId { return nonEmptyString(value, 'subscriptionId') as SubscriptionId; } +/** Construct a `SubscriberNumber` from a non-empty string. */ +export function subscriberNumber(value: string): SubscriberNumber { + return nonEmptyString(value, 'subscriberNumber') as SubscriberNumber; +} + /** Construct a `RuntimePath` from a non-empty string. */ export function runtimePath(value: string): RuntimePath { return nonEmptyString(value, 'runtimePath') as RuntimePath; diff --git a/control/src/fcc/coverage.test.ts b/control/src/fcc/coverage.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e49a1aa --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/fcc/coverage.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +import { describe, expect, it } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + fccUnlockRuntimeBinary, + fccUnlockVendorScript, + isFccUnlockKey, + MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE, + MM_FCC_UNLOCK_VENDOR_SCRIPTS, + normalizeVidPid, + resolveFccUnlockCoverage, +} from './coverage'; + +describe('the ModemManager 1.24.2 coverage catalog', () => { + it('Given the pinned release, When the catalog is read, Then it is the 14 shipped entries over 4 vendor scripts', () => { + expect(Object.keys(MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE)).toHaveLength(14); + expect(Object.keys(MM_FCC_UNLOCK_VENDOR_SCRIPTS).sort()).toEqual([ + '105b', + '1199', + '14c3', + '2c7c', + ]); + for (const script of Object.values(MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE)) { + expect(script in MM_FCC_UNLOCK_VENDOR_SCRIPTS).toBe(true); + } + }); + + it('Given every catalog key, When its shape is checked, Then all are the dispatcher : form', () => { + for (const key of Object.keys(MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE)) { + expect(isFccUnlockKey(key)).toBe(true); + } + }); + + // The whole reason the key is :: one silicon vendor, three USB vendor + // ids. A vendor-keyed rule would miss the HP and Dell rebrands entirely. + it('Given Sierra silicon under three vendor ids, When resolved, Then all three map to the 1199 script', () => { + expect(fccUnlockVendorScript('1199:9079')).toBe('1199'); + expect(fccUnlockVendorScript('03f0:4e1d')).toBe('1199'); + expect(fccUnlockVendorScript('413c:81a3')).toBe('1199'); + }); + + it('Given a covered key, When its interpreter is asked, Then it names the packaged binary', () => { + expect(fccUnlockRuntimeBinary('2c7c:0801')).toBe('qmicli'); + expect(fccUnlockRuntimeBinary('14c3:4d75')).toBe('mbimcli'); + expect(fccUnlockRuntimeBinary('12d1:14dc')).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); + +describe('normalizeVidPid', () => { + it('Given mixed case and a 0x prefix, When normalized, Then it folds to the dispatcher spelling', () => { + expect(normalizeVidPid('2C7C', '0801')).toBe('2c7c:0801'); + expect(normalizeVidPid('0x2c7c', '0x0801')).toBe('2c7c:0801'); + expect(normalizeVidPid(' 2c7c ', ' 0801 ')).toBe('2c7c:0801'); + }); + + it('Given an id that is not 4 hex digits, When normalized, Then it is refused rather than padded', () => { + expect(normalizeVidPid('2c7', '0801')).toBeUndefined(); + expect(normalizeVidPid('2c7c', '00801')).toBeUndefined(); + expect(normalizeVidPid('zzzz', '0801')).toBeUndefined(); + expect(normalizeVidPid('', '')).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); + +describe('resolveFccUnlockCoverage — three answers, none interchangeable', () => { + // The one fleet modem MM ships a procedure for (todo 2 bench inventory). + it('Given the bench Quectel RM530N-GL, When coverage is resolved, Then it is present', () => { + expect(resolveFccUnlockCoverage('2c7c', '0801')).toBe('present'); + }); + + it.each([ + ['Huawei E3372 HiLink', '12d1', '14dc'], + ['ZTE MF79U-class', '19d2', '1405'], + ['SIMCom SIM7600G-H', '1e0e', '9001'], + ['Qualcomm reference stick', '05c6', '9091'], + // MM covers the FM350's PCIe identity 14c3:4d75; on the USB carrier board it + // re-enumerates under MediaTek's own vendor id, which is NOT in the mapping. + ['Fibocom FM350-GL on a USB carrier', '0e8d', '7127'], + ])('Given %s, When coverage is resolved, Then it is a positive absent', (_name, vid, pid) => { + expect(resolveFccUnlockCoverage(vid, pid)).toBe('absent'); + }); + + it('Given the FM350 native PCIe identity, When coverage is resolved, Then it is present', () => { + expect(resolveFccUnlockCoverage('14c3', '4d75')).toBe('present'); + }); + + // A statement about the READ is not a statement about the DEVICE. Folding this + // into `absent` would hide the module on hardware that may well be covered. + it.each([ + ['no ids at all', undefined, undefined], + ['a missing pid', '2c7c', undefined], + ['an unparseable id', 'nope', '0801'], + ])('Given %s, When coverage is resolved, Then it is unknown', (_name, vid, pid) => { + expect(resolveFccUnlockCoverage(vid, pid)).toBe('unknown'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/fcc/coverage.ts b/control/src/fcc/coverage.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b3542d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/fcc/coverage.ts @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +// The FCC-unlock COVERAGE CATALOG — which `:` ModemManager can unlock. +// +// This is the evidence source for the `fcc-auto-unlock` capability module. +// `capability/detect.ts` answers `unknown` for that module on purpose and says why: +// FCC unlock is carried out by a ModemManager DISPATCHER keyed on the device, and +// nothing on the modem's own D-Bus surface says whether a procedure applies. So the +// answer has to come from a catalog, and this is it. +// +// Pinned to ModemManager 1.24.2 (`packaging/upstream-pins.yaml`) — the exact release +// this repository rebuilds. Prose walkthrough, per-device fleet verdicts and the +// market table: `docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md`. +// +// THE KEY IS `:` AND NOTHING ELSE. `mm-dispatcher-fcc-unlock.c` builds +// exactly one filename — `g_strdup_printf("%04x:%04x", vid, pid)` — and looks for it +// in the two enabled tiers. A vendor-only name is never opened by the dispatcher; it +// only ever exists as the TARGET of a `:` link in the available tier. And a +// vendor-keyed rule would be wrong twice over: Sierra silicon ships under three +// vendor ids (`1199` its own, `03f0` HP-branded, `413c` Dell-branded), so keying on +// the vendor misses two of the three, while keying on the model misses the rebrands. + +/** The four vendor scripts ModemManager 1.24.2 ships, and what each one drives. */ +export const MM_FCC_UNLOCK_VENDOR_SCRIPTS = { + '105b': 'mbimcli', + '1199': 'qmicli', + '14c3': 'mbimcli', + '2c7c': 'qmicli', +} as const; + +export type MmFccUnlockVendorScript = keyof typeof MM_FCC_UNLOCK_VENDOR_SCRIPTS; + +/** The interpreters those scripts invoke, and the packages that provide them. */ +export const MM_FCC_UNLOCK_RUNTIME_PACKAGES = { + qmicli: 'libqmi-utils', + mbimcli: 'libmbim-utils', +} as const; + +/** + * ModemManager 1.24.2's COMPLETE shipped mapping — `data/dispatcher-fcc-unlock/ + * meson.build`'s `vidpids` dict, verbatim. Fourteen entries; there are no others. + */ +export const MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE = { + '03f0:4e1d': '1199', + '105b:e0ab': '105b', + '105b:e0c3': '105b', + '1199:9079': '1199', + '14c3:4d75': '14c3', + '1eac:1001': '2c7c', + '1eac:1004': '2c7c', + '1eac:1007': '2c7c', + '2c7c:030a': '2c7c', + '2c7c:0313': '2c7c', + '2c7c:0314': '2c7c', + '2c7c:0801': '2c7c', + '413c:81a3': '1199', + '413c:81a8': '1199', +} as const satisfies Record; + +export type MmFccUnlockKey = keyof typeof MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE; + +/** `<4 lowercase hex>:<4 lowercase hex>` — the dispatcher's own filename shape. */ +const VID_PID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{4}:[0-9a-f]{4}$/; + +/** + * Fold a vid/pid pair into the dispatcher's key, or `undefined` when it is not a + * pair of 4-hex ids. Case is folded because sysfs and udev disagree about it + * (`ID_VENDOR_ID` is lowercase, some vendor strings are not) while the dispatcher's + * `%04x` is unambiguously lowercase; a `0x` prefix is tolerated for the same reason. + * NOTHING ELSE is normalized — a 3-digit or 5-digit id is a different device, not a + * sloppy spelling of this one. + */ +export function normalizeVidPid(vid: string, pid: string): string | undefined { + const fold = (raw: string): string => raw.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, ''); + const key = `${fold(vid)}:${fold(pid)}`; + return VID_PID_RE.test(key) ? key : undefined; +} + +/** True for a string already in the dispatcher's `:` shape. */ +export function isFccUnlockKey(value: string): boolean { + return VID_PID_RE.test(value); +} + +/** + * Does ModemManager ship an unlock procedure for this device? + * + * The three answers are NOT interchangeable, and the third is why this returns a + * tri-state rather than a boolean: + * present — a `:` entry exists; the toggle can do something. + * absent — the ids are well-formed and are NOT in the mapping. A positive + * statement about the device, so the module reads `unavailable` and no + * control is offered. + * unknown — we could not read the ids at all. That is a statement about the READ, + * and reporting it as `absent` would hide the module on hardware that + * may well be covered. + */ +export function resolveFccUnlockCoverage( + vid: string | undefined, + pid: string | undefined, +): 'present' | 'absent' | 'unknown' { + if (vid === undefined || pid === undefined) { + return 'unknown'; + } + const key = normalizeVidPid(vid, pid); + if (key === undefined) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return key in MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE ? 'present' : 'absent'; +} + +/** The vendor script a covered key resolves to, for diagnostics and docs. */ +export function fccUnlockVendorScript(key: string): MmFccUnlockVendorScript | undefined { + return (MM_FCC_UNLOCK_COVERAGE as Record)[key]; +} + +/** The interpreter a covered key's script invokes (`qmicli` / `mbimcli`). */ +export function fccUnlockRuntimeBinary(key: string): 'qmicli' | 'mbimcli' | undefined { + const script = fccUnlockVendorScript(key); + return script === undefined ? undefined : MM_FCC_UNLOCK_VENDOR_SCRIPTS[script]; +} diff --git a/control/src/fcc/index.ts b/control/src/fcc/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8bb5841 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/fcc/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// FCC auto-unlock — the opt-in POLICY surface, and the catalog that gates it. +// +// This module implements NO unlock procedure and ships NO unlock script. All it does +// is record which `:` models an operator has opted in for, so that +// `ceralive-fcc-reconcile` can re-derive ModemManager's own admin-tier symlinks from +// that record on every boot. The unlocking itself is ModemManager's dispatcher's job, +// start to finish. +// +// Full model, coverage matrix and certification status: `docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md`. + +export * from './coverage'; +export * from './policy-store'; +export * from './policy-write'; diff --git a/control/src/fcc/policy-store.ts b/control/src/fcc/policy-store.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12b7f2e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/fcc/policy-store.ts @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +// Durable persistence for the operator's FCC-auto-unlock POLICY. +// +// WHY THE FILE IS THE RECORD AND THE SYMLINK IS NOT. ModemManager's opt-in +// mechanism is a symlink in `/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/:`. `/etc` is +// on the rootfs, and the rootfs is exactly what a RAUC A/B slot swap REPLACES +// (`image-building-pipeline/docs/partition-contract.md`), so that symlink survives a +// reboot and does NOT survive an OTA. `/data` is the only update-surviving store, so +// the durable record lives there and the symlink is a derived artifact re-created +// from it on every boot by `ceralive-fcc-reconcile`. +// +// The two hard guarantees are the SAME ones `backend/usage/policy-store.ts` makes, +// and deliberately implemented the same way so the pair can be read side by side: +// - MODE 0600 via temp → chmod → atomic rename, regardless of umask. +// - FAIL-SAFE ON CORRUPTION: an unparseable/incompatible file logs METADATA ONLY +// (byte length + a classification reason, never the content) and is treated as +// EMPTY. Note the divergence from the usage store, and it is load-bearing: the +// usage store REWRITES a fresh file, while this one leaves the damaged bytes on +// disk for an operator to look at and simply refuses to act on them. Enabling a +// regulatory-unlock procedure is not something to infer from a file we could not +// read, and silently replacing the evidence would make the next person's +// diagnosis impossible. +// +// A policy row carries ONLY a `:` MODEL identifier and a boolean. There is +// no per-unit identity here by construction — no serial, no ICCID, no ID_PATH — +// because ModemManager's mechanism is model-wide and a per-unit key would be a +// promise the dispatcher cannot keep. + +import { chmod, mkdir, readFile, rename, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { dirname } from 'node:path'; + +import { isFccUnlockKey } from './coverage'; + +/** The current on-disk schema version. Bump when the persisted shape changes. */ +export const FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1; + +/** The pinned location of the policy of record. `/data` survives a slot swap. */ +export const FCC_UNLOCK_POLICY_PATH = '/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json'; + +/** + * The persisted document. + * + * `unlock` is a TOTAL map from `:` to the operator's answer. An absent key + * and an explicit `false` are the same fact (not opted in) and both are legal on + * disk: a `false` is what an opt-OUT leaves behind, and keeping it is what lets the + * shell reconciler prove it parsed a real answer rather than an empty document. + */ +export interface PersistedFccUnlockPolicy { + readonly schemaVersion: typeof FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION; + readonly savedAtMs: number; + readonly unlock: Readonly>; +} + +/** A metadata-only log event. Corruption NEVER carries the raw file content. */ +export type FccUnlockLogEvent = { + readonly kind: 'corrupt-policy'; + readonly bytes: number; + readonly reason: string; +}; + +export type FccUnlockLogger = (event: FccUnlockLogEvent) => void; + +/** The persistence seam `setFccUnlockPolicy` drives. */ +export interface FccUnlockPolicyStore { + /** Load persisted policy; an absent or unreadable file loads as EMPTY. */ + load(nowMs: number): Promise; + /** Atomically write policy with mode 0600 (temp → chmod → rename). */ + save(state: PersistedFccUnlockPolicy): Promise; +} + +export interface FccUnlockPolicyFileStoreOptions { + readonly path?: string; + readonly logger?: FccUnlockLogger; +} + +function defaultLogger(event: FccUnlockLogEvent): void { + console.warn(`[fcc-unlock-policy] ${event.kind}: bytes=${event.bytes} reason=${event.reason}`); +} + +function emptyState(nowMs: number): PersistedFccUnlockPolicy { + return { schemaVersion: FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION, savedAtMs: nowMs, unlock: {} }; +} + +/** A schema violation naming only the offending FIELD (never file content). */ +class FccPolicySchemaError extends Error { + constructor(field: string) { + super(`schema-mismatch: ${field}`); + } +} + +/** + * Parse + validate the document. Throws `FccPolicySchemaError` (metadata-only). + * + * WHOLE-DOCUMENT rejection, never per-key skipping: a half-applied policy is a + * policy nobody wrote, and the shell reconciler makes the same all-or-nothing + * judgement, so the two halves agree on what a damaged file means. + */ +function validate(raw: unknown): PersistedFccUnlockPolicy { + if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) { + throw new FccPolicySchemaError('document'); + } + const doc = raw as Record; + if (doc.schemaVersion !== FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION) { + throw new FccPolicySchemaError('schemaVersion'); + } + if (typeof doc.savedAtMs !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(doc.savedAtMs)) { + throw new FccPolicySchemaError('savedAtMs'); + } + if (typeof doc.unlock !== 'object' || doc.unlock === null || Array.isArray(doc.unlock)) { + throw new FccPolicySchemaError('unlock'); + } + const unlock: Record = {}; + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(doc.unlock as Record)) { + if (!isFccUnlockKey(key)) { + throw new FccPolicySchemaError('unlock.key'); + } + if (typeof value !== 'boolean') { + throw new FccPolicySchemaError('unlock.value'); + } + unlock[key] = value; + } + return { + schemaVersion: FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION, + savedAtMs: doc.savedAtMs, + unlock, + }; +} + +/** Classify a load failure into a metadata-only reason string (no raw content). */ +function classifyFailure(error: unknown): string { + if (error instanceof FccPolicySchemaError) { + return error.message; + } + if (error instanceof SyntaxError) { + const offset = /position (\d+)/.exec(error.message)?.[1]; + return offset !== undefined ? `invalid-json at offset ${offset}` : 'invalid-json'; + } + return 'unreadable'; +} + +/** The `:` models the policy positively enables. Sorted, for stability. */ +export function enabledFccUnlockKeys(state: PersistedFccUnlockPolicy): string[] { + return Object.entries(state.unlock) + .filter(([, enabled]) => enabled) + .map(([key]) => key) + .sort(); +} + +/** One model's answer. An unmentioned model is NOT enabled — absence is not consent. */ +export function isFccUnlockEnabled(state: PersistedFccUnlockPolicy, key: string): boolean { + return state.unlock[key] === true; +} + +export function createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore( + options: FccUnlockPolicyFileStoreOptions = {}, +): FccUnlockPolicyStore { + const logger = options.logger ?? defaultLogger; + const path = options.path ?? FCC_UNLOCK_POLICY_PATH; + + async function writeAtomic(state: PersistedFccUnlockPolicy): Promise { + await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true }); + const tmp = `${path}.tmp`; + // The trailing newline is for the shell reconciler's benefit, not decoration: + // it reads the file with `tr -d`, and a newline-terminated document is what a + // human `cat`ing it on a board expects to see. + await writeFile(tmp, `${JSON.stringify(state)}\n`); + // chmod AFTER the write (not an open flag) so mode is 0600 regardless of umask. + await chmod(tmp, 0o600); + await rename(tmp, path); + } + + return { + async load(nowMs: number): Promise { + let text: string; + try { + text = await readFile(path, 'utf8'); + } catch { + // Absent (or unreadable) → EMPTY, which activates nothing. This is the + // state on every device that never opted in, and it is the safe default. + return emptyState(nowMs); + } + try { + return validate(JSON.parse(text)); + } catch (error) { + logger({ + kind: 'corrupt-policy', + bytes: Buffer.byteLength(text, 'utf8'), + reason: classifyFailure(error), + }); + // Deliberately NOT rewritten — see the header. Refuse to act, keep the + // evidence, and let the next write replace it wholesale. + return emptyState(nowMs); + } + }, + save: writeAtomic, + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/fcc/policy-write.ts b/control/src/fcc/policy-write.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ff92fc --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/fcc/policy-write.ts @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +// `setFccUnlockPolicy` — the WRITE half of the FCC auto-unlock surface. +// +// TYPED RESULTS, NEVER A THROW ON BAD INPUT. Following the `PowerHook` and +// `setUsagePolicy` precedents, a malformed key or an uncovered model is a `rejected` +// result carrying a named reason rather than an exception — this is called from an +// RPC boundary, where a throw becomes an opaque 500. +// +// THE COVERAGE CHECK IS PART OF THE WRITE, not a UI nicety. Persisting `true` for a +// model ModemManager ships no procedure for would leave the operator staring at an +// enabled toggle that provably cannot do anything: the reconciler would find no +// `:` in the available tier and skip it forever, silently. Refusing at the +// write is the only place that fact can be reported to the person who asked for it. +// +// Disabling is deliberately NOT coverage-checked. A `false` must always be +// persistable — including for a model whose coverage answer has since changed, or +// which a previous release wrote — because a fail-closed opt-OUT is not a thing. + +import { normalizeVidPid, resolveFccUnlockCoverage } from './coverage'; +import type { FccUnlockPolicyStore, PersistedFccUnlockPolicy } from './policy-store'; + +export interface SetFccUnlockPolicyDeps { + readonly store: FccUnlockPolicyStore; + /** Injectable clock (defaults to `Date.now`). */ + readonly now?: () => number; +} + +export interface SetFccUnlockPolicyRequest { + readonly vid: string; + readonly pid: string; + readonly enabled: boolean; +} + +export type SetFccUnlockPolicyRejection = 'invalid-vid-pid' | 'not-covered'; + +export type SetFccUnlockPolicyResult = + | { + readonly status: 'applied'; + /** The dispatcher key this write is about, normalized. */ + readonly key: string; + readonly enabled: boolean; + /** The whole document now on disk, so a caller need not re-read it. */ + readonly policy: PersistedFccUnlockPolicy; + /** + * True when the persisted value CHANGED. A caller uses this to decide + * whether the modem needs a re-probe: ModemManager runs the dispatcher + * during initialization only, so a genuine change needs + * `mmcli -m --disable && --enable` (or a replug) to take effect on an + * already-enumerated modem — and an unchanged write must not cost one. + */ + readonly changed: boolean; + } + | { + readonly status: 'rejected'; + readonly reason: SetFccUnlockPolicyRejection; + }; + +export async function setFccUnlockPolicy( + request: SetFccUnlockPolicyRequest, + deps: SetFccUnlockPolicyDeps, +): Promise { + const key = normalizeVidPid(request.vid, request.pid); + if (key === undefined) { + return { status: 'rejected', reason: 'invalid-vid-pid' }; + } + if (request.enabled && resolveFccUnlockCoverage(request.vid, request.pid) !== 'present') { + return { status: 'rejected', reason: 'not-covered' }; + } + + const now = deps.now ?? Date.now; + const nowMs = now(); + const current = await deps.store.load(nowMs); + const changed = (current.unlock[key] === true) !== request.enabled; + + const next: PersistedFccUnlockPolicy = { + schemaVersion: current.schemaVersion, + savedAtMs: nowMs, + unlock: { ...current.unlock, [key]: request.enabled }, + }; + await deps.store.save(next); + + return { status: 'applied', key, enabled: request.enabled, policy: next, changed }; +} diff --git a/control/src/fcc/policy.test.ts b/control/src/fcc/policy.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a61ea2a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/fcc/policy.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'bun:test'; +import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, stat, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +import { + createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore, + enabledFccUnlockKeys, + FCC_UNLOCK_POLICY_PATH, + FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION, + type FccUnlockLogEvent, + isFccUnlockEnabled, +} from './policy-store'; +import { setFccUnlockPolicy } from './policy-write'; + +const dirs: string[] = []; + +async function scratch(): Promise { + // mkdtemp, not a fixed path: two checkouts of this repo may run the suite at once. + const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'ceralive-fcc-')); + dirs.push(dir); + return join(dir, 'fcc-unlock-policy.json'); +} + +afterEach(async () => { + await Promise.all(dirs.splice(0).map((dir) => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }))); +}); + +describe('the policy of record', () => { + it('Given the pinned path, When it is read, Then it is under /data so a slot swap cannot take it', () => { + expect(FCC_UNLOCK_POLICY_PATH.startsWith('/data/')).toBe(true); + }); + + it('Given no file at all, When the policy loads, Then it is empty and nothing is enabled', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const state = await createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }).load(1); + expect(state.unlock).toEqual({}); + expect(enabledFccUnlockKeys(state)).toEqual([]); + expect(isFccUnlockEnabled(state, '2c7c:0801')).toBe(false); + }); + + it('Given a saved policy, When it is reloaded, Then it round-trips at mode 0600', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + await store.save({ + schemaVersion: FCC_UNLOCK_SCHEMA_VERSION, + savedAtMs: 7, + unlock: { '2c7c:0801': true, '1199:9079': false }, + }); + const state = await store.load(9); + expect(state.savedAtMs).toBe(7); + expect(enabledFccUnlockKeys(state)).toEqual(['2c7c:0801']); + expect((await stat(path)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600); + }); + + // Whole-document rejection, matching the shell reconciler's own judgement: a + // half-applied regulatory-unlock policy is a policy nobody wrote. + it.each([ + ['invalid JSON', '{ not json'], + ['a wrong schema version', '{"schemaVersion":99,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{}}'], + ['a vendor-only key', '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c":true}}'], + ['a non-boolean answer', '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":"yes"}}'], + ['an array for unlock', '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":[]}'], + ])( + 'Given %s, When the policy loads, Then it reads as empty and the damaged bytes are KEPT', + async (_name, body) => { + const path = await scratch(); + await writeFile(path, body); + const events: FccUnlockLogEvent[] = []; + const state = await createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ + path, + logger: (event) => events.push(event), + }).load(1); + + expect(state.unlock).toEqual({}); + expect(events).toHaveLength(1); + expect(events[0]?.kind).toBe('corrupt-policy'); + // Metadata only — the reason names a field or an offset, never content. + expect(events[0]?.reason).not.toContain('2c7c'); + // The evidence stays on disk for whoever has to diagnose it. + expect(await readFile(path, 'utf8')).toBe(body); + }, + ); +}); + +describe('setFccUnlockPolicy', () => { + it('Given a covered model, When it is enabled, Then it is persisted and reported as changed', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + const result = await setFccUnlockPolicy( + { vid: '2C7C', pid: '0801', enabled: true }, + { store, now: () => 42 }, + ); + + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied', key: '2c7c:0801', changed: true }); + expect(enabledFccUnlockKeys(await store.load(0))).toEqual(['2c7c:0801']); + }); + + // An unchanged write must not cost a modem re-probe. + it('Given an already-enabled model, When it is enabled again, Then changed is false', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: '2c7c', pid: '0801', enabled: true }, { store }); + const again = await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: '2c7c', pid: '0801', enabled: true }, { store }); + expect(again).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied', changed: false }); + }); + + // The whole point of the coverage gate: an enabled toggle that provably cannot do + // anything is worse than a refusal the operator can read. + it('Given a model ModemManager ships no procedure for, When it is enabled, Then it is rejected not-covered', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + const result = await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: '12d1', pid: '14dc', enabled: true }, { store }); + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'rejected', reason: 'not-covered' }); + expect((await store.load(0)).unlock).toEqual({}); + }); + + // A fail-closed opt-OUT is not a thing. + it('Given an uncovered model, When it is DISABLED, Then the write is accepted', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + const result = await setFccUnlockPolicy( + { vid: '12d1', pid: '14dc', enabled: false }, + { store }, + ); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied', enabled: false }); + }); + + it('Given a malformed id, When it is written, Then it is rejected before any disk write', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + const result = await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: 'nope', pid: '0801', enabled: true }, { store }); + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'rejected', reason: 'invalid-vid-pid' }); + expect((await store.load(0)).unlock).toEqual({}); + }); + + it('Given two enabled models, When one is disabled, Then the other survives and the opt-out is recorded', async () => { + const path = await scratch(); + const store = createFccUnlockPolicyFileStore({ path }); + await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: '2c7c', pid: '0801', enabled: true }, { store }); + await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: '1199', pid: '9079', enabled: true }, { store }); + await setFccUnlockPolicy({ vid: '2c7c', pid: '0801', enabled: false }, { store }); + + const state = await store.load(0); + expect(enabledFccUnlockKeys(state)).toEqual(['1199:9079']); + expect(state.unlock['2c7c:0801']).toBe(false); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/index.ts b/control/src/index.ts index ba34461..15f8614 100644 --- a/control/src/index.ts +++ b/control/src/index.ts @@ -9,8 +9,13 @@ export const PACKAGE_NAME = '@ceralive/modem-control'; export * from './backend'; +export * from './band'; export * from './capability'; export * from './domain'; +export * from './fcc'; +export * from './location'; export * from './ports'; export * from './redact'; +export * from './sms'; export * from './usb-mode'; +export * from './ussd'; diff --git a/control/src/location/fix-state.test.ts b/control/src/location/fix-state.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bbcb88d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/location/fix-state.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +// The GNSS display state machine — the two dishonest renders it makes impossible. +// +// These are the paths that are FULLY verifiable with no antenna and no sky, which +// is the whole point: the no-fix bound and the stale-fix drop are exactly what an +// operator with an unconnected GNSS connector will actually experience. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { epochMillis } from '../domain'; +import type { FixRead, GnssFix } from '../ports'; +import { + advanceGnssFixState, + DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG, + GNSS_OFF, + type GnssFixState, + type GnssFixStateConfig, + isAcquiring, + renderableFix, +} from './fix-state'; + +const CONFIG: GnssFixStateConfig = { acquireTimeoutMs: 10_000, fixTtlMs: 5_000 }; + +function fixAt(ms: number): GnssFix { + return { latitude: 4.60971, longitude: -74.08175, observedAt: epochMillis(ms) }; +} + +const FIX_READ = (ms: number): FixRead => ({ outcome: 'fix', fix: fixAt(ms) }); +const NO_FIX_READ: FixRead = { outcome: 'no-fix', reason: 'still searching' }; + +function run(events: readonly Parameters[1][]): GnssFixState { + return events.reduce( + (state, event) => advanceGnssFixState(state, event, CONFIG), + GNSS_OFF, + ); +} + +describe('bounded acquisition — the spinner always ends', () => { + test('enabling starts a bounded wait, not an open-ended one', () => { + const state = run([{ kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }]); + expect(state.kind).toBe('acquiring'); + expect(isAcquiring(state)).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a modem reporting no-fix INSIDE the bound is still legitimately acquiring', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(4_000), read: NO_FIX_READ }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(9_999), read: NO_FIX_READ }, + ]); + expect(state.kind).toBe('acquiring'); + }); + + test('at the bound the wait becomes an honest terminal no-fix — never a spinner', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'tick', at: epochMillis(10_000) }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ + kind: 'no-fix', + since: epochMillis(10_000), + reason: 'acquire-timeout', + }); + expect(isAcquiring(state)).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a read that lands exactly at the bound also ends the wait', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(10_000), read: NO_FIX_READ }, + ]); + expect(state.kind).toBe('no-fix'); + }); + + test('an antenna-less modem NEVER reaches a renderable fix, however long it runs', () => { + let state: GnssFixState = advanceGnssFixState( + GNSS_OFF, + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + CONFIG, + ); + for (let at = 1_000; at <= 600_000; at += 1_000) { + state = advanceGnssFixState( + state, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(at), read: NO_FIX_READ }, + CONFIG, + ); + state = advanceGnssFixState(state, { kind: 'tick', at: epochMillis(at) }, CONFIG); + expect(renderableFix(state)).toBeUndefined(); + } + expect(state.kind).toBe('no-fix'); + }); +}); + +describe('stale-fix clearing — a coordinate is never shown past its life', () => { + test('a fresh fix is renderable', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: FIX_READ(1_000) }, + ]); + expect(renderableFix(state)?.latitude).toBe(4.60971); + }); + + test('a fix older than its TTL is DROPPED, not merely marked stale', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: FIX_READ(1_000) }, + { kind: 'tick', at: epochMillis(6_000) }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'no-fix', since: epochMillis(6_000), reason: 'fix-expired' }); + expect(renderableFix(state)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(JSON.stringify(state)).not.toContain('4.60971'); + }); + + test('the modem losing its fix drops the held coordinates immediately', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: FIX_READ(1_000) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(2_000), read: NO_FIX_READ }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'no-fix', since: epochMillis(2_000), reason: 'reported-no-fix' }); + expect(renderableFix(state)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('a newer fix replaces an older one and restarts its life', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: FIX_READ(1_000) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(4_000), read: FIX_READ(4_000) }, + { kind: 'tick', at: epochMillis(6_000) }, + ]); + expect(renderableFix(state)?.observedAt).toBe(epochMillis(4_000)); + }); +}); + +describe('disable clears everything', () => { + test('disabling drops a held fix and returns to off', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: FIX_READ(1_000) }, + { kind: 'gnss-disabled' }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'off' }); + expect(renderableFix(state)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(JSON.stringify(state)).not.toContain('74.08175'); + }); + + test('a read reporting the source is off also clears a held fix', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: FIX_READ(1_000) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(2_000), read: { outcome: 'disabled', reason: 'off' } }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'off' }); + }); + + test('disabling from a timed-out wait also returns to off', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'tick', at: epochMillis(20_000) }, + { kind: 'gnss-disabled' }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'off' }); + }); +}); + +describe('unavailable is distinct from no-fix', () => { + test('an unsupported modem is unavailable, never a no-fix wait', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { kind: 'read', at: epochMillis(1_000), read: { outcome: 'unsupported', reason: 'no GNSS' } }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'unavailable', reason: 'no GNSS' }); + }); + + test('a bus error is unavailable and carries its reason', () => { + const state = run([ + { kind: 'gnss-enabled', at: epochMillis(0) }, + { + kind: 'read', + at: epochMillis(1_000), + read: { outcome: 'error', reason: 'GetLocation failed' }, + }, + ]); + expect(state).toEqual({ kind: 'unavailable', reason: 'GetLocation failed' }); + }); +}); + +describe('the shipped defaults are bounded', () => { + test('both bounds are finite and positive, so neither can hang a render', () => { + expect(DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG.acquireTimeoutMs).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect(Number.isFinite(DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG.acquireTimeoutMs)).toBe(true); + expect(DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG.fixTtlMs).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect(Number.isFinite(DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG.fixTtlMs)).toBe(true); + }); + + test('the machine is pure — advancing never mutates the state it was given', () => { + const before: GnssFixState = { kind: 'fix', fix: fixAt(1_000) }; + const snapshot = JSON.stringify(before); + advanceGnssFixState(before, { kind: 'tick', at: epochMillis(99_000) }, CONFIG); + expect(JSON.stringify(before)).toBe(snapshot); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/location/fix-state.ts b/control/src/location/fix-state.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4644e1d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/location/fix-state.ts @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +// The GNSS display state machine — bounded acquisition and stale-fix expiry. +// +// It exists to make two dishonest renders impossible rather than merely unlikely: +// +// 1. An endless "acquiring…" spinner. A modem with no antenna answers "no fix" +// forever, quite correctly, and a naive UI waits forever. Acquisition here is +// BOUNDED — past `acquireTimeoutMs` the state becomes `no-fix`, which is a +// terminal render, not a spinner. +// 2. A stale coordinate shown as current. A fix is only reachable through +// `renderableFix`, which returns one ONLY in the `fix` state; every exit from +// that state DROPS the fix rather than carrying it, so there is no code path +// that can render a position the modem is no longer reporting. +// +// Pure and total: no clock, no I/O. The caller supplies `at` on every event, which +// is what makes both bounds testable without waiting for real time to pass. + +import type { EpochMillis } from '../domain'; +import type { FixRead, GnssFix } from '../ports/location'; + +export interface GnssFixStateConfig { + /** How long acquisition may run before the state turns to an honest `no-fix`. */ + readonly acquireTimeoutMs: number; + /** How long a fix stays current before it expires and is dropped. */ + readonly fixTtlMs: number; +} + +/** + * Defaults chosen against the fleet's own numbers: a cold GNSS start on the + * bench modems is a low-minutes affair, so 120 s is long enough to be a fair + * attempt and short enough that a missing antenna is reported inside a support + * call rather than after one. A fix older than 30 s is not "current" on a moving + * vehicle, which is the only context this display has. + */ +export const DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG: GnssFixStateConfig = { + acquireTimeoutMs: 120_000, + fixTtlMs: 30_000, +}; + +export type NoFixReason = 'acquire-timeout' | 'reported-no-fix' | 'fix-expired'; + +export type GnssFixState = + | { readonly kind: 'off' } + | { readonly kind: 'acquiring'; readonly since: EpochMillis } + | { readonly kind: 'no-fix'; readonly since: EpochMillis; readonly reason: NoFixReason } + | { readonly kind: 'fix'; readonly fix: GnssFix } + | { readonly kind: 'unavailable'; readonly reason: string }; + +export type GnssFixEvent = + | { readonly kind: 'gnss-enabled'; readonly at: EpochMillis } + | { readonly kind: 'gnss-disabled' } + | { readonly kind: 'read'; readonly at: EpochMillis; readonly read: FixRead } + | { readonly kind: 'tick'; readonly at: EpochMillis }; + +export const GNSS_OFF: GnssFixState = { kind: 'off' }; + +/** A fix is reachable ONLY here, and only while the state actually holds one. */ +export function renderableFix(state: GnssFixState): GnssFix | undefined { + return state.kind === 'fix' ? state.fix : undefined; +} + +/** True while a bounded wait is legitimately in progress — the only spinner state. */ +export function isAcquiring(state: GnssFixState): boolean { + return state.kind === 'acquiring'; +} + +function expireIfDue( + state: GnssFixState, + at: EpochMillis, + config: GnssFixStateConfig, +): GnssFixState { + if (state.kind === 'acquiring' && at - state.since >= config.acquireTimeoutMs) { + return { kind: 'no-fix', since: at, reason: 'acquire-timeout' }; + } + if (state.kind === 'fix' && at - state.fix.observedAt >= config.fixTtlMs) { + return { kind: 'no-fix', since: at, reason: 'fix-expired' }; + } + return state; +} + +function applyRead( + state: GnssFixState, + at: EpochMillis, + read: FixRead, + config: GnssFixStateConfig, +): GnssFixState { + switch (read.outcome) { + case 'fix': + return { kind: 'fix', fix: read.fix }; + case 'no-fix': + // Still inside the bound, the modem simply has not acquired yet — that is + // what `acquiring` means, so a report of no-fix does not end the wait. Any + // other state (including a held fix) drops to an honest `no-fix`. + return state.kind === 'acquiring' + ? expireIfDue(state, at, config) + : { kind: 'no-fix', since: at, reason: 'reported-no-fix' }; + case 'disabled': + return GNSS_OFF; + case 'unsupported': + case 'error': + return { kind: 'unavailable', reason: read.reason }; + } +} + +/** Pure, total transition. Every exit from `fix` drops the coordinates. */ +export function advanceGnssFixState( + state: GnssFixState, + event: GnssFixEvent, + config: GnssFixStateConfig = DEFAULT_FIX_STATE_CONFIG, +): GnssFixState { + switch (event.kind) { + case 'gnss-enabled': + return state.kind === 'fix' ? state : { kind: 'acquiring', since: event.at }; + case 'gnss-disabled': + return GNSS_OFF; + case 'read': + return applyRead(state, event.at, event.read, config); + case 'tick': + return expireIfDue(state, event.at, config); + } +} diff --git a/control/src/location/index.ts b/control/src/location/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d561098 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/location/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// The GPS/location module — the GNSS display state machine and NMEA decoding. +// +// PRIVACY FENCE (a product rule, not a phase limitation): this module reads the +// CURRENT fix and holds it in memory for a live display. There is no history, no +// track log, no persistence, and no upload — and none may be added here. The port +// contract in `../ports/location.ts` is guarded by `location-fence.test.ts`. + +export * from './fix-state'; +export * from './nmea'; diff --git a/control/src/location/nmea.test.ts b/control/src/location/nmea.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc3f3eb --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/location/nmea.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// NMEA GGA decoding — checksum-verified, quality-gated, never throwing. +// +// The negative cases matter more than the positive one here: this parser sits +// behind the honest no-fix path, so anything it CANNOT prove is a fix must come +// back `undefined` rather than a plausible-looking coordinate. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { parseNmeaFix } from './nmea'; + +const VALID_GGA = '$GPGGA,123519,4807.038,N,01131.000,E,1,08,0.9,545.4,M,46.9,M,,*47'; +const SEARCHING_GGA = '$GPGGA,000000,,,,,0,00,99.99,,,,,,*48'; +const SOUTHWEST_GGA = + '$GNGGA,181908.00,3404.7041778,S,07044.3966270,W,1,13,0.98,1113.0,M,-21.3,M,,*59'; +const RMC = '$GPRMC,123519,A,4807.038,N,01131.000,E,022.4,084.4,230394,003.1,W*6A'; + +describe('a real fix decodes', () => { + test('ddmm.mmmm is converted to signed degrees', () => { + const fix = parseNmeaFix(VALID_GGA); + expect(fix?.latitude).toBeCloseTo(48.1173, 4); + expect(fix?.longitude).toBeCloseTo(11.516667, 5); + expect(fix?.altitude).toBeCloseTo(545.4, 1); + }); + + test('southern and western hemispheres come back negative', () => { + const fix = parseNmeaFix(SOUTHWEST_GGA); + expect(fix?.latitude).toBeLessThan(0); + expect(fix?.longitude).toBeLessThan(0); + expect(fix?.latitude).toBeCloseTo(-34.0784, 3); + expect(fix?.longitude).toBeCloseTo(-70.7399, 3); + }); + + test('the LAST valid fix in a multi-sentence block wins', () => { + const fix = parseNmeaFix([VALID_GGA, RMC, SOUTHWEST_GGA].join('\r\n')); + expect(fix?.latitude).toBeLessThan(0); + }); + + test('a talker-agnostic GGA is accepted — GN as well as GP', () => { + expect(parseNmeaFix(SOUTHWEST_GGA)).toBeDefined(); + }); +}); + +describe('anything unproven is NOT a fix', () => { + test('quality 0 — a receiver that is still searching', () => { + expect(parseNmeaFix(SEARCHING_GGA)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('a searching block never falls back to an earlier fix in the same blob', () => { + // A block whose ONLY sentences are quality-0 must decode to nothing, even + // though the parser retains a `latest` across lines. + expect(parseNmeaFix([SEARCHING_GGA, SEARCHING_GGA].join('\n'))).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('a corrupted checksum is rejected even though the fields parse cleanly', () => { + expect(parseNmeaFix(VALID_GGA.replace('*47', '*48'))).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('a sentence with no checksum at all is rejected', () => { + expect(parseNmeaFix(VALID_GGA.slice(0, VALID_GGA.lastIndexOf('*')))).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('RMC is not read — only GGA carries the quality flag this module needs', () => { + expect(parseNmeaFix(RMC)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('an out-of-range coordinate is refused, not clamped', () => { + const bogus = '$GPGGA,123519,9959.999,N,01131.000,E,1,08,0.9,545.4,M,46.9,M,,'; + let sum = 0; + for (const char of bogus.slice(1)) { + sum ^= char.charCodeAt(0); + } + const sentence = `${bogus}*${sum.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(2, '0')}`; + expect(parseNmeaFix(sentence)).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('never throws on hostile or truncated input', () => { + for (const input of ['', '$', '$*', '$GPGGA*00', '\0\0\0', '$GPGGA,,,,,,,,,,,,,,*4E']) { + expect(() => parseNmeaFix(input)).not.toThrow(); + expect(parseNmeaFix(input)).toBeUndefined(); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/location/nmea.ts b/control/src/location/nmea.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..055c19b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/location/nmea.ts @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// Minimal NMEA decoding — GGA only, checksum-verified. +// +// It exists because `gps-nmea` is the one GNSS source EVERY GNSS-capable modem on +// the fleet advertises, while `gps-raw` (MM's pre-decoded dict) is not guaranteed: +// a `gps-unmanaged`-style device hands over sentences and nothing else. Without this +// the module would have to answer "no fix" to a modem that is reporting one, which +// is exactly the dishonesty the rest of this module is built to avoid. +// +// GGA is the only sentence read: it is the only standard sentence carrying fix +// QUALITY alongside the position, so "the receiver has not locked on" is decodable +// rather than inferred. RMC's A/V validity flag would do, but no fleet modem emits +// RMC without also emitting GGA. + +export interface NmeaFix { + readonly latitude: number; + readonly longitude: number; + readonly altitude?: number; +} + +/** XOR of every character between `$` and `*` — the NMEA checksum. */ +function checksumOf(body: string): number { + let sum = 0; + for (let i = 0; i < body.length; i += 1) { + sum ^= body.charCodeAt(i); + } + return sum; +} + +function verifiedBody(sentence: string): string | undefined { + const trimmed = sentence.trim(); + if (!trimmed.startsWith('$')) { + return undefined; + } + const star = trimmed.lastIndexOf('*'); + if (star < 0) { + return undefined; + } + const body = trimmed.slice(1, star); + const declared = Number.parseInt(trimmed.slice(star + 1, star + 3), 16); + return Number.isNaN(declared) || checksumOf(body) !== declared ? undefined : body; +} + +/** `ddmm.mmmm` + hemisphere → signed degrees. `degreeDigits` is 2 for lat, 3 for lon. */ +function toDegrees(value: string, hemisphere: string, degreeDigits: number): number | undefined { + if (value.length < degreeDigits + 1) { + return undefined; + } + const degrees = Number.parseFloat(value.slice(0, degreeDigits)); + const minutes = Number.parseFloat(value.slice(degreeDigits)); + if (!Number.isFinite(degrees) || !Number.isFinite(minutes)) { + return undefined; + } + const magnitude = degrees + minutes / 60; + const negative = hemisphere === 'S' || hemisphere === 'W'; + return negative ? -magnitude : magnitude; +} + +function parseGga(fields: readonly string[]): NmeaFix | undefined { + const quality = Number.parseInt(fields[6] ?? '', 10); + // Quality 0 is "fix not available". A receiver that is searching emits GGA with + // empty position fields and quality 0, so this is the honest no-fix signal. + if (!Number.isFinite(quality) || quality <= 0) { + return undefined; + } + const latitude = toDegrees(fields[2] ?? '', fields[3] ?? '', 2); + const longitude = toDegrees(fields[4] ?? '', fields[5] ?? '', 3); + if (latitude === undefined || longitude === undefined) { + return undefined; + } + if (Math.abs(latitude) > 90 || Math.abs(longitude) > 180) { + return undefined; + } + const altitude = Number.parseFloat(fields[9] ?? ''); + return { + latitude, + longitude, + ...(Number.isFinite(altitude) ? { altitude } : {}), + }; +} + +/** + * The LAST valid GGA fix in a block of sentences, or `undefined` when none of them + * carries one. Never throws — a truncated or corrupt blob is simply not a fix. + */ +export function parseNmeaFix(text: string): NmeaFix | undefined { + let latest: NmeaFix | undefined; + for (const line of text.split(/[\r\n]+/)) { + const body = verifiedBody(line); + if (body === undefined) { + continue; + } + const fields = body.split(','); + const type = fields[0] ?? ''; + if (type.length !== 5 || !type.endsWith('GGA')) { + continue; + } + latest = parseGga(fields) ?? latest; + } + return latest; +} diff --git a/control/src/ports/index.ts b/control/src/ports/index.ts index 211cd86..3156905 100644 --- a/control/src/ports/index.ts +++ b/control/src/ports/index.ts @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ // recovery + usage policy. The ModemManagerPort has NO bearer / connect verb — // enforced at build time by forbidden-surface.test.ts. +export * from './location'; export * from './modem-manager'; export * from './network-manager'; export * from './observation'; @@ -14,3 +15,4 @@ export * from './ops'; export * from './receipts'; export * from './reconcile'; export * from './router'; +export * from './sms'; diff --git a/control/src/ports/location-fence.test.ts b/control/src/ports/location-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4324940 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/location-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +// Guard: the GPS module may never grow history, tracking, persistence, or upload. +// +// This is a PRODUCT fence, not a phase limitation — "we only read the current fix" +// is a promise made to the operator, and a promise held by convention is a promise +// already broken. It is enforced the same way the bearer invariant is: an AST scan +// of the declared type surface, plus a source scan of the implementation for the +// I/O primitives a leak would have to go through. + +import { expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readdirSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'; +import * as ts from 'typescript'; +import { MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import { LOCATION_IFACE } from '../capability/detect'; + +const srcDir = dirname(import.meta.dir); +const portFile = join(import.meta.dir, 'location.ts'); + +/** A member name implying the fix outlives the moment it was read. */ +const FORBIDDEN_MEMBER = /histor|track|breadcrumb|waypoint|trail|upload|persist|archive|replay/i; + +/** Primitives a fix would have to travel through to leave the process. */ +const FORBIDDEN_IO = [ + 'writeFile', + 'appendFile', + 'writeFileSync', + 'appendFileSync', + 'createWriteStream', + 'fetch(', + 'XMLHttpRequest', + 'localStorage', + 'Bun.write', +]; + +function declaredMemberNames(source: string): string[] { + const sourceFile = ts.createSourceFile('port.ts', source, ts.ScriptTarget.Latest, true); + const names: string[] = []; + const visit = (node: ts.Node): void => { + if ( + ts.isInterfaceDeclaration(node) || + ts.isClassDeclaration(node) || + ts.isClassExpression(node) || + ts.isTypeLiteralNode(node) + ) { + for (const member of node.members) { + if (member.name !== undefined && ts.isIdentifier(member.name)) { + names.push(member.name.text); + } + } + } + ts.forEachChild(node, visit); + }; + visit(sourceFile); + return names; +} + +function gpsSourceFiles(): string[] { + const files = [portFile, join(srcDir, 'backend', 'mm-location.ts')]; + for (const entry of readdirSync(join(srcDir, 'location'))) { + if (entry.endsWith('.ts') && !entry.endsWith('.test.ts')) { + files.push(join(srcDir, 'location', entry)); + } + } + return files; +} + +test('the location port declares no history / tracking / persistence member', async () => { + const source = await Bun.file(portFile).text(); + const forbidden = declaredMemberNames(source).filter((name) => FORBIDDEN_MEMBER.test(name)); + expect(forbidden, `forbidden member(s): ${forbidden.join(', ')}`).toEqual([]); +}); + +test('the location port declares exactly the four current-fix verbs', async () => { + const source = await Bun.file(portFile).text(); + const sourceFile = ts.createSourceFile('port.ts', source, ts.ScriptTarget.Latest, true); + let members: string[] = []; + const visit = (node: ts.Node): void => { + if (ts.isInterfaceDeclaration(node) && node.name.text === 'ModemLocationPort') { + members = node.members + .map((member) => (member.name && ts.isIdentifier(member.name) ? member.name.text : '')) + .filter((name) => name !== ''); + } + ts.forEachChild(node, visit); + }; + visit(sourceFile); + + expect(members.sort()).toEqual(['disableGnss', 'enableGnss', 'getLocationStatus', 'readFix']); +}); + +test('no GPS source file reaches a filesystem, a network, or a browser store', async () => { + for (const file of gpsSourceFiles()) { + const source = await Bun.file(file).text(); + for (const primitive of FORBIDDEN_IO) { + expect(source.includes(primitive), `${file} must not use ${primitive}`).toBe(false); + } + } +}); + +test('no GPS source file declares a history / tracking member', async () => { + for (const file of gpsSourceFiles()) { + const source = await Bun.file(file).text(); + const forbidden = declaredMemberNames(source).filter((name) => FORBIDDEN_MEMBER.test(name)); + expect(forbidden, `forbidden member(s) in ${file}: ${forbidden.join(', ')}`).toEqual([]); + } +}); + +test('the detector is not vacuous — it flags a history surface if one is added', () => { + const rogue = ` + export interface RogueLocation { + readFix(): Promise; + fixHistory(): Promise; + startTracking(): void; + uploadTrack(): Promise; + persistFix(): Promise; + } + `; + expect( + declaredMemberNames(rogue) + .filter((name) => FORBIDDEN_MEMBER.test(name)) + .sort(), + ).toEqual(['fixHistory', 'persistFix', 'startTracking', 'uploadTrack']); +}); + +test('the capability probe and the adapter agree on the Location interface name', () => { + expect(LOCATION_IFACE).toBe(MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE); +}); diff --git a/control/src/ports/location.ts b/control/src/ports/location.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ac40f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/location.ts @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +// The GNSS location port — ModemManager's `Modem.Location` interface, scoped by a +// privacy fence that is a PRODUCT rule, not a phase limitation. +// +// THE FENCE: this port reads the CURRENT fix and nothing else. There is no history +// verb, no track verb, no export verb, and no upload verb, and none may ever be +// added — a fix is held in memory for a live display and is gone the moment GNSS is +// disabled or the fix goes stale. `location-fence.test.ts` fails the build if a +// member whose name implies history, tracking, persistence, or upload appears here. +// +// A fix also carries coordinates, which say where the operator physically is. That +// class is redacted by `../redact` (`latitude` / `longitude` / `altitude` / `nmea`), +// so a fix that reaches a log line or a receipt comes out as the redaction marker +// rather than a position. + +import type { EpochMillis } from '../domain'; +import type { ModemRef } from './modem-manager'; + +/** + * The GNSS sources `Modem.Location.Capabilities` can advertise, as decoded source + * names. `3gpp-lac-ci` is deliberately absent: coarse cell location is the cell-info + * module's surface, and MM advertises it on devices with no GNSS receiver at all. + */ +export const GNSS_SOURCES = [ + 'gps-raw', + 'gps-nmea', + 'gps-unmanaged', + 'agps-msa', + 'agps-msb', +] as const; +export type GnssSource = (typeof GNSS_SOURCES)[number]; + +/** What `Modem.Location` advertises and what is switched on right now. */ +export interface LocationStatus { + /** Every source name in `Capabilities`, GNSS or not (`3gpp-lac-ci` included). */ + readonly capabilities: ReadonlySet; + /** Every source name in `Enabled`. */ + readonly enabledSources: ReadonlySet; + /** True when at least one GNSS source is advertised. */ + readonly gnssCapable: boolean; + /** True when at least one GNSS source is switched on. */ + readonly gnssEnabled: boolean; +} + +export type LocationStatusResult = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly status: LocationStatus } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: string }; + +/** + * One GNSS fix. SENSITIVE: never persist it, never upload it, never put it in a log + * line. `observedAt` is when this process READ the fix, which is what staleness is + * measured against — a modem's own `utc-time` cannot be trusted to advance. + */ +export interface GnssFix { + readonly latitude: number; + readonly longitude: number; + readonly altitude?: number; + readonly utcTime?: string; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; +} + +/** + * The outcome of ONE read attempt. `no-fix` is a first-class success: the modem + * answered and has not acquired a position. It is never conflated with an error and + * never answered with a previous fix — a stale coordinate rendered as current is the + * one failure mode this module exists to prevent. + */ +export type FixRead = + | { readonly outcome: 'fix'; readonly fix: GnssFix } + | { readonly outcome: 'no-fix'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly outcome: 'disabled'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly outcome: 'unsupported'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly outcome: 'error'; readonly reason: string }; + +/** + * The outcome of switching GNSS on or off. Modelled like `SimUnlockResult` rather + * than as a reconcile `Receipt`: GNSS is an operator-invoked, gate-defaulted-off + * action with no desired-state dimension, so it is not something the planner + * converges. + */ +export interface LocationToggleResult { + readonly outcome: 'applied' | 'unsupported' | 'failed'; + readonly reason: string; + /** The GNSS sources enabled after the call — empty after a successful disable. */ + readonly enabledSources: ReadonlySet; +} + +/** + * Read GNSS status, switch GNSS on/off, and read the current fix. + * + * Deliberately NOT part of `ModemManagerPort`: a consumer that only reconciles + * radio and SIM state has no business holding a handle that can read a position. + */ +export interface ModemLocationPort { + getLocationStatus(modem: ModemRef): Promise; + enableGnss(modem: ModemRef, sources: readonly GnssSource[]): Promise; + disableGnss(modem: ModemRef): Promise; + readFix(modem: ModemRef): Promise; +} + +export function isGnssSource(value: string): value is GnssSource { + return (GNSS_SOURCES as readonly string[]).includes(value); +} + +export function hasGnssSource(sources: Iterable): boolean { + for (const source of sources) { + if (isGnssSource(source)) { + return true; + } + } + return false; +} diff --git a/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts b/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts index f3377aa..b8bbab5 100644 --- a/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts +++ b/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts @@ -41,6 +41,24 @@ export type NetworkScanResult = | { readonly ok: true; readonly networks: readonly ScannedNetwork[] } | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: string }; +/** + * What a modem says about its bands, right now. + * + * `supported` and `current` are BOTH required, and both may legitimately be + * empty: a modem that advertises no band control answers an empty `supported`, + * which is a real reading and the thing that keeps a control from being offered. + * A read that could not happen at all is the `ok: false` arm instead — the same + * "unknown is an answer about the READ" split the capability probes follow. + */ +export interface ModemBands { + readonly supported: readonly string[]; + readonly current: readonly string[]; +} + +export type BandReadResult = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly bands: ModemBands } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: string }; + /** A held inhibition over a modem, released via `uninhibit`. */ export interface InhibitLease { /** The equipment UID the inhibition is keyed to. */ @@ -57,6 +75,13 @@ export interface InhibitLease { export interface ModemManagerPort extends ModemObservationPort { /** Set the modem's radio access-technology preference. */ setRadioModes(modem: ModemRef, preference: DesiredRadio): Promise; + /** Read the modem's supported and currently-selected bands. */ + readBands(modem: ModemRef): Promise; + /** + * Lock the modem to a band selection. Passing exactly `['any']` releases the + * lock — ModemManager has no separate reset verb, so this IS the reset. + */ + setCurrentBands(modem: ModemRef, bands: readonly string[]): Promise; /** Select the primary SIM slot (multi-slot modems only). */ setPrimarySimSlot(modem: ModemRef, slotIndex: number): Promise; /** Submit a SIM PIN (exactly-once; read-before-submit is the adapter's job). */ diff --git a/control/src/ports/receipts.ts b/control/src/ports/receipts.ts index 926f6cb..a781ac0 100644 --- a/control/src/ports/receipts.ts +++ b/control/src/ports/receipts.ts @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ export type PolicyDimension = | 'connection' | 'roaming' | 'radio' + | 'band' | 'simSlot' | 'recovery' | 'usage'; diff --git a/control/src/ports/sms.ts b/control/src/ports/sms.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10b8f89 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/sms.ts @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +// The SMS port — LIST / READ and Added/Deleted observation. NOTHING ELSE. +// +// READ-ONLY IS PERMANENT, NOT A PHASE LIMITATION. There is no verb here that +// composes, stores, sends, or deletes a message, and none may ever be added. +// Sending or deleting an SMS is billable and irreversible, and it turns a +// diagnostic read into real modem-control capability over the subscriber's +// account. CeraUI carries the same contract on its own side, enforced by a grep +// gate (`tests/modem-sms-readonly-gate.test.ts`); `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts` +// is this package's half. Neither may be weakened to land a write path — that +// is a new spec change with its own confirmation/interlock design. +// +// THE OBSERVATION MODEL IS "LIST ONCE, THEN FOLLOW THE SIGNALS". ModemManager's +// Messaging interface emits `Added` and `Deleted` for every inbox change, so a +// consumer lists once at start and folds events from then on. Re-listing on a +// poll tick is the anti-pattern this port exists to remove: it costs one method +// call per message per tick and still cannot report an arrival any sooner than +// the tick it lands on. +// +// CONTENT NEVER RIDES A DIAGNOSTIC. A message body routinely carries a one-time +// code and its originator identifies the subscriber, so nothing on this port +// puts either into a reason string, a receipt, or a log line — see +// `../redact.ts` for the key class and `../sms/mmcli-parse.ts` for the +// content-free parse errors. + +import type { Unsubscribe } from './observation'; + +/** A message's lifecycle state, verbatim from ModemManager's own vocabulary. */ +export type SmsState = 'unknown' | 'stored' | 'receiving' | 'received' | 'sending' | 'sent'; + +/** One stored message, normalized. `text` is `''` for a data-only (WAP/PDU) message. */ +export interface SmsMessage { + /** The trailing `/SMS/` object index, stringified. */ + readonly id: string; + readonly from?: string; + /** The service-centre timestamp, verbatim as the device reported it. */ + readonly timestamp?: string; + readonly text: string; + readonly state: SmsState; +} + +/** + * Why an inbox read produced no list. These are the four operator-actionable + * facts, and they are deliberately distinct from one another — a modem with no + * Messaging interface, a radio that has not come up, a selector nothing answers + * to, and drift in whatever the source printed are four different next steps. + */ +export type SmsReadRefusal = 'unsupported' | 'not_enabled' | 'unknown_modem' | 'read_failed'; + +/** + * The result of an inbox read. A REFUSAL IS NEVER AN EMPTY LIST: `{ok: true, + * messages: []}` means this modem has an inbox and it is empty. + */ +export type SmsInboxResult = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly messages: readonly SmsMessage[] } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: SmsReadRefusal }; + +/** + * One inbox change. `resynced` carries a full authoritative list and is what a + * source restart produces — a consumer replaces its rows with it rather than + * merging, so a restart can never duplicate a row it already holds. + */ +export type SmsInboxEvent = + | { readonly kind: 'added'; readonly message: SmsMessage } + | { readonly kind: 'deleted'; readonly id: string } + | { readonly kind: 'resynced'; readonly messages: readonly SmsMessage[] }; + +export type SmsInboxListener = (event: SmsInboxEvent) => void; + +/** + * The read-only SMS port. `list()` resolves the current inbox once; `observe()` + * streams every subsequent change; `stop()` releases the source. + * + * It is deliberately NOT an extension of `ModemManagerPort`: a consumer that + * only reads an inbox must not acquire radio, SIM, or inhibit verbs along the + * way — the same narrowing argument `ModemObservationPort` makes for the + * shadow reader. + */ +export interface SmsObservationPort { + /** Read the modem's stored inbox, newest-first and capped. */ + list(): Promise; + /** Subscribe to Added/Deleted/resync events. Returns an unsubscribe. */ + observe(listener: SmsInboxListener): Unsubscribe; + /** Release the source. Idempotent. */ + stop(): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/redact.test.ts b/control/src/redact.test.ts index b3834f2..f042dea 100644 --- a/control/src/redact.test.ts +++ b/control/src/redact.test.ts @@ -65,6 +65,46 @@ test('redacts subscriptionId, newPin, and puk2 variants', () => { expect(out.puk2).toBe(REDACTED); }); +test('redacts a GNSS fix — coordinates never survive redaction', () => { + const fix = { latitude: 4.60971, longitude: -74.08175, altitude: 2640, observedAt: 1000 }; + const out = redact(fix) as Record; + + expect(out.latitude).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(out.longitude).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(out.altitude).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(out.observedAt).toBe(1000); +}); + +test('redacts raw NMEA sentences, which carry the position in their payload', () => { + const input = { nmea: '$GPGGA,123519.00,4807.038,N,01131.000,E,1,08,0.9,545.4,M,,,,*47' }; + const out = redact(input) as Record; + expect(out.nmea).toBe(REDACTED); +}); + +test('redacts a fix nested inside a modem row and inside an array', () => { + const input = { + modems: [ + { stableKey: 'slot:a', gnss: { fix: { lat: 4.6, lng: -74.08 } } }, + { stableKey: 'slot:b', gnss: { fix: undefined } }, + ], + }; + const serialized = JSON.stringify(redact(input)); + + expect(serialized).not.toContain('4.6'); + expect(serialized).not.toContain('-74.08'); + expect(serialized).toContain('slot:a'); +}); + +test('coarse cell location stays visible — the GNSS fence does not blank cell-info', () => { + // `3gpp-lac-ci` is the cell-info module's own gated output. Redacting it here + // would silently blank a shipping surface that never opted into the GNSS fence. + const input = { lac: '0x1a2b', ci: '0x00c1f204', tac: '0x1234' }; + const out = redact(input) as Record; + expect(out.lac).toBe('0x1a2b'); + expect(out.ci).toBe('0x00c1f204'); + expect(out.tac).toBe('0x1234'); +}); + test('does not mutate the input', () => { const input = { pin: '1234', nested: { iccid: '5678' } }; const before = JSON.stringify(input); @@ -80,3 +120,128 @@ test('passes primitives and empty containers through unchanged', () => { expect(redact({})).toEqual({}); expect(redact([])).toEqual([]); }); + +test('SMS content is redacted by key, in every spelling', () => { + const out = redact({ + smsText: 'Tu pin es 4821', + sms_body: 'code 9911', + smsNumber: '85573', + smsSender: '+573103154363', + sender: '85573', + msisdn: '+573001112233', + 'sms.content.text': 'Tu pin es 4821', + 'sms.content.number': '85573', + }) as Record; + for (const value of Object.values(out)) { + expect(value).toBe(REDACTED); + } +}); + +test('a message body nested in an inbox array is redacted at depth', () => { + const out = redact({ + inbox: [{ id: '36', smsText: 'Tu pin es 4821', state: 'received' }], + }) as { inbox: Array> }; + expect(out.inbox[0]?.smsText).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(out.inbox[0]?.id).toBe('36'); + expect(out.inbox[0]?.state).toBe('received'); +}); + +test('the SMS class does not over-redact ordinary text and number fields', () => { + // This is why the SMS keys are their own set: `SENSITIVE_KEYS` matches a leaf + // name exactly, so adding `text` / `number` / `sender` to it would blank a + // receipt reason, a slot number, and a signal reading across the package. + const out = redact({ + text: 'reason: unsupported', + number: 3, + reason: 'no messaging capabilities', + smsCount: 37, + senderName: 'CeraLive', + }) as Record; + expect(out.text).toBe('reason: unsupported'); + expect(out.number).toBe(3); + expect(out.reason).toBe('no messaging capabilities'); + expect(out.smsCount).toBe(37); + expect(out.senderName).toBe('CeraLive'); +}); + +test('every USSD carrier-text key is redacted, in both directions', () => { + const out = redact({ + ussd: '*123#', + ussdCommand: '*123*1234567890123456#', + ussdReply: 'Your balance is $4.20', + ussd_response: '1', + ussdText: 'Menu: 1) Balance 2) Data', + networkNotification: 'You have been topped up', + network_request: 'Enter your PIN', + }) as Record; + for (const value of Object.values(out)) { + expect(value).toBe(REDACTED); + } +}); + +test('a USSD reply nested in a session snapshot is redacted at depth', () => { + const out = redact({ + session: { state: 'awaiting-reply', ussdReply: 'Your balance is $4.20' }, + }) as { session: Record }; + expect(out.session.ussdReply).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(out.session.state).toBe('awaiting-reply'); +}); + +test('the USSD class does not over-redact ordinary reply and command fields', () => { + const out = redact({ + reply: 'ok', + command: 'AT+CFUN?', + response: 'OK', + ussdCapable: true, + ussdSessionState: 'active', + }) as Record; + expect(out.reply).toBe('ok'); + expect(out.command).toBe('AT+CFUN?'); + expect(out.response).toBe('OK'); + expect(out.ussdCapable).toBe(true); + expect(out.ussdSessionState).toBe('active'); +}); + +test('the SIM own-number is redacted in every spelling the stack can produce', () => { + const out = redact({ + ownNumbers: ['+573115422359'], + own_number: '+573115422359', + OwnNumbers: ['+573115422359'], + phoneNumber: '+573115422359', + simNumber: '+573115422359', + subscriberNumber: '+573115422359', + 'modem.generic.own-numbers': ['+573115422359'], + }) as Record; + for (const value of Object.values(out)) { + expect(value).toBe(REDACTED); + } +}); + +test('an own-number nested inside an identity is redacted at depth', () => { + const out = redact({ + identity: { + equipmentId: { provenance: 'imei', value: '867978050016855', confidence: 'high' }, + ownNumbers: ['+573115422359'], + runtimePath: '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/3', + }, + }) as { identity: Record }; + expect(out.identity.ownNumbers).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(out.identity.runtimePath).toBe('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/3'); +}); + +test('the own-number class does not over-redact ordinary number fields', () => { + // This is why it is its own whole-key set: `SENSITIVE_KEYS` matches a leaf + // name, so `number`/`numbers` there would blank a slot index and a band count. + const out = redact({ + number: 3, + numbers: [1, 2, 3], + slotNumber: 1, + serialNumber: 'c6125db3', + ownNumberSupported: true, + }) as Record; + expect(out.number).toBe(3); + expect(out.numbers).toEqual([1, 2, 3]); + expect(out.slotNumber).toBe(1); + expect(out.serialNumber).toBe('c6125db3'); + expect(out.ownNumberSupported).toBe(true); +}); diff --git a/control/src/redact.ts b/control/src/redact.ts index 0ee12a9..dc136b2 100644 --- a/control/src/redact.ts +++ b/control/src/redact.ts @@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ // serialized into a receipt, or written to a bundle. // // The sensitive CLASSES (draft §Oracle #1, round-5 auth semantics): ICCID, IMSI, -// EID, SIM PIN, SIM PUK, and APN / connection passwords. Redaction is KEY-BASED and -// RECURSIVE: it walks nested objects and arrays and replaces the value under any -// sensitive key with a fixed marker, no matter how deep — e.g. a password at -// `policy.connection.auth.password`, or an `iccid` inside an array of SIM slots. +// EID, SIM PIN, SIM PUK, and APN / connection passwords, PLUS the GNSS coordinate +// class below. Redaction is KEY-BASED and RECURSIVE: it walks nested objects and +// arrays and replaces the value under any sensitive key with a fixed marker, no +// matter how deep — e.g. a password at `policy.connection.auth.password`, or an +// `iccid` inside an array of SIM slots. /** The marker substituted for every redacted value. */ export const REDACTED = '[redacted]'; @@ -28,13 +29,137 @@ const SENSITIVE_KEYS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ 'subscriptionid', ]); +// GNSS coordinate keys. A fix says where the operator physically is, so it is +// sensitive for a reason none of the keys above share, and it gets its own set so +// the privacy fence stays readable: the GPS module keeps a fix in memory for a +// live display and NEVER persists, uploads, or logs one. +// +// Scoped to a GNSS fix on purpose. `3gpp-lac-ci` (coarse cell location) is NOT +// here — it is the existing cell-info module's deliberate, separately-gated output, +// and silently blanking it would break a surface that already ships. +const LOCATION_KEYS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'latitude', + 'longitude', + 'altitude', + 'lat', + 'lon', + 'lng', + 'nmea', + 'nmeasentences', + 'coordinates', +]); + +/** + * SMS content is its own key class, and it may NOT be folded into + * `SENSITIVE_KEYS` above. That set matches a leaf name exactly (or the last + * dotted segment), so adding `text` / `number` / `sender` to it would redact + * every unrelated `text` and `number` in the package — a receipt's reason text, + * a slot number, a signal reading. These keys are matched WHOLE after case- AND + * separator-folding, so only a key that genuinely names message content or an + * originator is scrubbed. + * + * A message body routinely carries a one-time code (the bench SIM's inbox holds + * a literal "Tu pin es: …") and a sender number identifies the subscriber, so + * both are treated exactly like a PIN: never rendered anywhere. + * + * This mirrors CeraUI's `isSmsSensitiveKey` (`helpers/logger.ts`) key-for-key. + * It is a Rule-D MIRROR, never a shared import — the two halves are kept honest + * by their tests, not by a path. + */ +const SMS_SENSITIVE_KEYS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'smstext', + 'smsbody', + 'smsfrom', + 'smssender', + 'smsnumber', + 'messagetext', + 'messagebody', + 'msisdn', + 'sender', + 'sms.content.text', + 'sms.content.number', +]); + +/** Whole-key SMS-content test, case- and separator-insensitive. */ +export function isSmsSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean { + return SMS_SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key.toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]/g, '')); +} + +/** + * USSD carrier text — its own class, for the same reason SMS is: `reply`, + * `command`, and `response` are far too common to redact by leaf name, so these + * are matched WHOLE after case- and separator-folding. + * + * BOTH DIRECTIONS are sensitive, not just the reply. A USSD dialogue is how a + * subscriber tops up a prepaid line, so the COMMAND routinely carries a voucher + * code (`*123*<16 digits>#`) and the reply carries a balance, a subscriber + * number, or a one-time code. `NetworkNotification` / `NetworkRequest` are + * ModemManager's own property names for network-initiated USSD text and are + * included so a raw property dump cannot leak what the call path masks. + * + * This is why the USSD module names its carrier-text fields `ussdCommand`, + * `ussdResponse`, and `ussdReply` rather than the shorter names that read better: + * redaction here is key-based, so the FIELD NAME is the guarantee. + */ +const USSD_SENSITIVE_KEYS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'ussd', + 'ussdcommand', + 'ussdreply', + 'ussdresponse', + 'ussdtext', + 'networknotification', + 'networkrequest', +]); + +/** Whole-key USSD-content test, case- and separator-insensitive. */ +export function isUssdSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean { + return USSD_SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key.toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]/g, '')); +} + +/** + * The SIM's OWN number (MSISDN) — its own class, matched WHOLE after case-, + * separator- AND dot-folding so ModemManager's `Modem.OwnNumbers` and mmcli's + * `modem.generic.own-numbers` are both caught by one rule. + * + * It cannot join `SENSITIVE_KEYS`: that set matches a leaf name, and `number` / + * `numbers` are far too common — a slot number and a band count would both + * vanish. `msisdn` stays in the SMS set (its historical home) and is not + * duplicated here. + * + * It is DISPLAYED to the operator behind an explicit reveal. That is a + * rendering decision about a surface the subscriber already owns; it does not + * make the value loggable, so it is redacted exactly like a PIN. + */ +const OWN_NUMBER_SENSITIVE_KEYS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'ownnumber', + 'ownnumbers', + 'phonenumber', + 'phonenumbers', + 'simnumber', + 'subscribernumber', + 'modemgenericownnumbers', + 'modemownnumbers', +]); + +/** Whole-key own-number test, case-, separator- and dot-insensitive. */ +export function isOwnNumberSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean { + return OWN_NUMBER_SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key.toLowerCase().replace(/[_.-]/g, '')); +} + function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean { const lower = key.toLowerCase(); - if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(lower)) { + if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(lower) || LOCATION_KEYS.has(lower)) { + return true; + } + if (isSmsSensitiveKey(key) || isUssdSensitiveKey(key) || isOwnNumberSensitiveKey(key)) { return true; } const dot = lower.lastIndexOf('.'); - return dot >= 0 && SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(lower.slice(dot + 1)); + if (dot < 0) { + return false; + } + const leaf = lower.slice(dot + 1); + return SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(leaf) || LOCATION_KEYS.has(leaf); } function isPlainObject(value: unknown): value is Record { diff --git a/control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.test.ts b/control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7335d92 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +// The Messaging adapter, driven over a fake transport. +// +// The claims under test are the ones that only show up against a live bus: the +// inbox is listed ONCE and never re-listed on a tick, an arrival reaches the +// consumer through the `Added` signal, a message that vanished between the list +// and its read is skipped rather than failing the whole inbox, and a reconnect +// republishes an authoritative list instead of a stream of Added events. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import type { SmsInboxEvent } from '../ports/sms'; +import type { + DbusTransport, + DbusValue, + MethodCall, + MethodReply, + SignalListener, + SignalSpec, + Subscription, + TransportEvent, +} from '../transport'; +import { createDbusSmsPort, smsFromProps } from './dbus-messaging'; +import { createSmsInboxStore } from './inbox-store'; + +const MODEM = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/0'; +const variant = (signature: string, value: DbusValue): DbusValue => ({ signature, value }); + +const props = (over: Record = {}): DbusValue => + Object.entries({ + State: variant('u', 3), + Number: variant('s', '85573'), + Text: variant('s', 'neutral body'), + Timestamp: variant('s', '2025-08-21T17:20:16-05'), + ...over, + }).map(([key, value]) => [key, value] as unknown as DbusValue); + +interface FakeBus { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly calls: MethodCall[]; + inbox: string[]; + missing: Set; + listError?: Error; + emitSignal(member: string, body: DbusValue[]): void; + emitReconnect(): void; + subscriptions: number; +} + +function fakeBus(): FakeBus { + const calls: MethodCall[] = []; + const listeners = new Map>(); + const handlers = new Map void>>(); + const bus: FakeBus = { + calls, + inbox: [], + missing: new Set(), + subscriptions: 0, + transport: { + async connect(): Promise {}, + async disconnect(): Promise {}, + isConnected: () => true, + async callMethod(call: MethodCall): Promise { + calls.push(call); + if (call.member === 'List') { + if (bus.listError !== undefined) { + throw bus.listError; + } + return { signature: 'ao', body: [bus.inbox as unknown as DbusValue] }; + } + if (bus.missing.has(call.path)) { + throw new Error('No such object'); + } + return { signature: 'a{sv}', body: [props()] }; + }, + async subscribeSignal(spec: SignalSpec, listener: SignalListener): Promise { + const key = spec.member; + const set = listeners.get(key) ?? new Set(); + set.add(listener); + listeners.set(key, set); + bus.subscriptions += 1; + return { + async unsubscribe(): Promise { + set.delete(listener); + bus.subscriptions -= 1; + }, + }; + }, + on(event: TransportEvent, handler: (payload?: unknown) => void): void { + const set = handlers.get(event) ?? new Set<(payload?: unknown) => void>(); + set.add(handler); + handlers.set(event, set); + }, + off(event: TransportEvent, handler: (payload?: unknown) => void): void { + handlers.get(event)?.delete(handler); + }, + subscriptionCount: () => bus.subscriptions, + } as unknown as DbusTransport, + emitSignal(member: string, body: DbusValue[]): void { + for (const listener of listeners.get(member) ?? []) { + listener({ + path: MODEM, + interface: 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Messaging', + member, + sender: undefined, + signature: 'ob', + body, + }); + } + }, + emitReconnect(): void { + for (const handler of handlers.get('reconnected') ?? []) { + handler(); + } + }, + }; + return bus; +} + +const settle = (): Promise => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0)); + +describe('smsFromProps', () => { + test('maps MMSmsState by ordinal and keeps the raw timestamp', () => { + const message = smsFromProps( + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36', + props() as unknown as never, + ); + expect(message).toEqual({ + id: '36', + from: '85573', + text: 'neutral body', + timestamp: '2025-08-21T17:20:16-05', + state: 'received', + }); + }); + + test('an out-of-range state ordinal folds to `unknown`, never a number', () => { + const message = smsFromProps( + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1', + props({ State: variant('u', 99) }) as unknown as never, + ); + expect(message.state).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('an absent body reports `` rather than dropping the field', () => { + const message = smsFromProps( + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1', + props({ Text: variant('s', '') }) as unknown as never, + ); + expect(message.text).toBe(''); + expect(message.from).toBe('85573'); + }); +}); + +describe('list()', () => { + test('reads every message once, newest first', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + bus.inbox = ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1', '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/2']; + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + + const result = await port.list(); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.messages.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['2', '1']); + } + expect(bus.calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'List')).toHaveLength(1); + expect(bus.calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'GetAll')).toHaveLength(2); + }); + + test('a message that vanished between list and read is SKIPPED', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + bus.inbox = ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1', '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/2']; + bus.missing.add('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/2'); + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + + const result = await port.list(); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.messages.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['1']); + } + }); + + test('a failed LIST is a typed refusal, never an empty inbox', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + bus.listError = new Error('error: modem has no messaging capabilities'); + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + + const result = await port.list(); + expect(result).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'unsupported' }); + }); + + test('the read is bounded BEFORE any per-message call', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + bus.inbox = Array.from( + { length: 120 }, + (_, index) => `/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/${index}`, + ); + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + + const result = await port.list(); + expect(result.ok && result.messages).toHaveLength(50); + expect(bus.calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'GetAll')).toHaveLength(50); + }); +}); + +describe('observe() — signals, never a poll', () => { + test('an arrival reaches the consumer through Added', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + const seen: SmsInboxEvent[] = []; + port.observe((event) => seen.push(event)); + await settle(); + + bus.emitSignal('Added', ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/9', true]); + await settle(); + + expect(seen.filter((event) => event.kind === 'added')).toHaveLength(1); + await port.stop(); + }); + + test('Deleted names the retired row by index', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + const seen: SmsInboxEvent[] = []; + port.observe((event) => seen.push(event)); + await settle(); + + bus.emitSignal('Deleted', ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/9']); + await settle(); + + expect(seen).toContainEqual({ kind: 'deleted', id: '9' }); + await port.stop(); + }); + + test('observing NEVER re-lists on its own — only wiring and reconnects list', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + bus.inbox = ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1']; + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + port.observe(() => undefined); + await settle(); + + const afterWiring = bus.calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'List').length; + bus.emitSignal('Added', ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/2', true]); + bus.emitSignal('Deleted', ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1']); + await settle(); + + expect(bus.calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'List')).toHaveLength(afterWiring); + await port.stop(); + }); + + test('a reconnect resyncs — and the store does not double the inbox', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + bus.inbox = ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1', '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/2']; + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + port.observe((event) => store.apply(event)); + await settle(); + expect(store.size()).toBe(2); + + bus.emitReconnect(); + await settle(); + + expect(store.size()).toBe(2); + await port.stop(); + }); + + test('stop() releases every subscription and detaches the reconnect handler', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + const port = createDbusSmsPort({ transport: bus.transport, modemPath: MODEM }); + port.observe(() => undefined); + await settle(); + expect(bus.subscriptions).toBe(2); + + await port.stop(); + expect(bus.subscriptions).toBe(0); + + const before = bus.calls.length; + bus.emitReconnect(); + await settle(); + expect(bus.calls).toHaveLength(before); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.ts b/control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8aa4895 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/dbus-messaging.ts @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +// The ModemManager Messaging adapter — LIST ONCE, then follow Added / Deleted. +// +// Three verbs, all reads: `Messaging.List` for the object paths, +// `Properties.GetAll` per message, and a subscription to `Added` / `Deleted`. +// There is no `Create`, no `Send`, no `Delete`, and none may be added — see +// `../ports/sms.ts` for why that is permanent rather than staged, and +// `readonly-gate.test.ts` for the lock. +// +// NEVER RE-LIST ON A TICK. MM tells us about every change, so a poll would cost +// one method call per stored message per tick and still could not report an +// arrival sooner than the tick it happened to land on. The ONLY re-list is on a +// source RECONNECT, where the events that occurred while the bus was down were +// never delivered and folding is therefore impossible; that re-list is published +// as `resynced` so the consumer replaces its rows instead of merging (see +// `inbox-store.ts`). +// +// A MESSAGE THAT VANISHES BETWEEN THE LIST AND ITS READ IS ORDINARY. The modem's +// own storage rotates, so a failed per-message read SKIPS that message rather +// than failing the whole inbox. A failed LIST is different — nothing was read at +// all — and answers a typed refusal. + +import { MM_BUS_NAME, PROPERTIES_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import { type DecodedProps, numberProp, stringProp } from '../backend/managed-objects'; +// The one definition of MM's Messaging interface name lives with the capability +// probe that also keys on it; duplicating it here is how the two drift apart. +import { MESSAGING_IFACE } from '../capability/detect'; +import type { Unsubscribe } from '../ports/observation'; +import type { + SmsInboxEvent, + SmsInboxListener, + SmsInboxResult, + SmsMessage, + SmsObservationPort, + SmsState, +} from '../ports/sms'; +import type { DbusTransport, DbusValue, Subscription } from '../transport'; +import { classifySmsFailure } from './mmcli-parse'; +import { normalizeSmsState, SMS_INBOX_CAP, selectReadablePaths, sortAndCapSms } from './normalize'; + +/** `org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Sms` — one message object. */ +export const SMS_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Sms'; + +/** + * `MMSmsState` (ModemManager `mm-enums.h`) as the port's own vocabulary. The + * index IS the enum value; an out-of-range value folds to `unknown` through + * {@link normalizeSmsState}, so a future MM state can never surface as a raw + * number an operator cannot act on. + */ +const SMS_STATE_BY_ORDINAL: readonly string[] = [ + 'unknown', + 'stored', + 'receiving', + 'received', + 'sending', + 'sent', +]; + +function stateFromOrdinal(ordinal: number | undefined): SmsState { + if (ordinal === undefined) { + return 'unknown'; + } + return normalizeSmsState(SMS_STATE_BY_ORDINAL[ordinal]); +} + +/** Build one message from an SMS object's decoded `Sms` properties. */ +export function smsFromProps(path: string, props: DecodedProps | undefined): SmsMessage { + const from = stringProp(props, 'Number'); + const timestamp = stringProp(props, 'Timestamp'); + const index = path.slice(path.lastIndexOf('/') + 1); + return { + id: index, + ...(from !== undefined && from !== '' ? { from } : {}), + ...(timestamp !== undefined && timestamp !== '' ? { timestamp } : {}), + // A data-only (WAP/PDU) message carries no text at all; `''` says so. + text: stringProp(props, 'Text') ?? '', + state: stateFromOrdinal(numberProp(props, 'State')), + }; +} + +export interface DbusSmsPortOptions { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + /** The modem's ModemManager object path. */ + readonly modemPath: string; + readonly destination?: string; + readonly cap?: number; + /** Called when a fold-time error must be surfaced without failing a read. */ + readonly onError?: (error: unknown) => void; +} + +function describe(error: unknown): string { + return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error); +} + +export function createDbusSmsPort(options: DbusSmsPortOptions): SmsObservationPort { + const { transport, modemPath } = options; + const destination = options.destination ?? MM_BUS_NAME; + const cap = options.cap ?? SMS_INBOX_CAP; + const listeners = new Set(); + const subscriptions: Subscription[] = []; + let wiring: Promise | undefined; + let stopped = false; + + const emit = (event: SmsInboxEvent): void => { + for (const listener of listeners) { + try { + listener(event); + } catch (error) { + options.onError?.(error); + } + } + }; + + const readMessage = async (path: string): Promise => { + try { + const reply = await transport.callMethod({ + destination, + path, + interface: PROPERTIES_IFACE, + member: 'GetAll', + signature: 's', + args: [SMS_IFACE], + }); + return smsFromProps(path, reply.body[0] as unknown as DecodedProps); + } catch { + // Vanished between the list and this read — ordinary storage rotation. + // Nothing is logged: the error text is the only place a body could hide. + return undefined; + } + }; + + const listInbox = async (): Promise => { + let paths: readonly DbusValue[]; + try { + const reply = await transport.callMethod({ + destination, + path: modemPath, + interface: MESSAGING_IFACE, + member: 'List', + }); + paths = Array.isArray(reply.body[0]) ? (reply.body[0] as DbusValue[]) : []; + } catch (error) { + return { ok: false, reason: classifySmsFailure(describe(error)) }; + } + + const candidates = selectReadablePaths( + paths.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === 'string'), + cap, + ); + const messages: SmsMessage[] = []; + for (const path of candidates) { + const message = await readMessage(path); + if (message !== undefined) { + messages.push(message); + } + } + return { ok: true, messages: sortAndCapSms(messages, cap) }; + }; + + const resync = async (): Promise => { + const result = await listInbox(); + if (result.ok) { + emit({ kind: 'resynced', messages: result.messages }); + } + }; + + const onAdded = async (body: readonly DbusValue[]): Promise => { + const path = body[0]; + if (typeof path !== 'string') { + return; + } + const message = await readMessage(path); + if (message !== undefined) { + emit({ kind: 'added', message }); + } + }; + + const wire = async (): Promise => { + const added = await transport.subscribeSignal( + { interface: MESSAGING_IFACE, member: 'Added', path: modemPath }, + (event) => { + void onAdded(event.body).catch((error) => options.onError?.(error)); + }, + ); + const deleted = await transport.subscribeSignal( + { interface: MESSAGING_IFACE, member: 'Deleted', path: modemPath }, + (event) => { + const path = event.body[0]; + if (typeof path === 'string') { + emit({ kind: 'deleted', id: path.slice(path.lastIndexOf('/') + 1) }); + } + }, + ); + subscriptions.push(added, deleted); + transport.on('reconnected', reconnected); + // A subscription established AFTER the caller's own `list()` can have + // missed an arrival in between, so the wiring ends with one resync. + await resync(); + }; + + const reconnected = (): void => { + void resync().catch((error) => options.onError?.(error)); + }; + + return { + list: listInbox, + + observe(listener: SmsInboxListener): Unsubscribe { + listeners.add(listener); + if (wiring === undefined && !stopped) { + wiring = wire().catch((error) => { + options.onError?.(error); + }); + } + return () => { + listeners.delete(listener); + }; + }, + + async stop(): Promise { + stopped = true; + listeners.clear(); + transport.off('reconnected', reconnected); + await wiring?.catch(() => undefined); + wiring = undefined; + const held = subscriptions.splice(0, subscriptions.length); + await Promise.all(held.map((subscription) => subscription.unsubscribe())); + }, + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/sms/inbox-store.test.ts b/control/src/sms/inbox-store.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8446db --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/inbox-store.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// The two failures a signal-driven inbox produces on its own: a duplicated +// message, and an inbox that doubles after a source restart. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import type { SmsMessage } from '../ports/sms'; +import { createSmsInboxStore } from './inbox-store'; + +const message = (id: string, over: Partial = {}): SmsMessage => ({ + id, + text: `body ${id}`, + state: 'received', + timestamp: `2025-08-2${id.length}T10:0${id.at(-1)}:00-05`, + ...over, +}); + +describe('duplicate suppression', () => { + test('a repeated Added for an identical row changes nothing', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1') })).toBe(true); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1') })).toBe(false); + expect(store.size()).toBe(1); + expect(store.snapshot()).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + test('MM emits Added twice for one arrival (receiving, then received)', () => { + // The real duplicate on the wire is not byte-identical: MM announces the + // message while it is still receiving, then again once it is stored. The + // row must UPDATE rather than accumulate. + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('7', { state: 'receiving', text: '' }) }); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('7') })).toBe(true); + expect(store.size()).toBe(1); + expect(store.snapshot()[0]?.state).toBe('received'); + }); + + test('a Deleted for a row we never held is not a change', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'deleted', id: '404' })).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a Deleted retires the row', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1') }); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'deleted', id: '1' })).toBe(true); + expect(store.snapshot()).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('restart recovery', () => { + test('a resync REPLACES the rows — a re-list never doubles the inbox', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1') }); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('2') }); + + // The source came back and re-listed the SAME two messages. + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'resynced', messages: [message('1'), message('2')] })).toBe(false); + expect(store.size()).toBe(2); + expect( + store + .snapshot() + .map((entry) => entry.id) + .sort(), + ).toEqual(['1', '2']); + }); + + test('a message deleted while the source was down is dropped, not kept', () => { + // This is why a resync may not be folded as a series of Added events: + // nothing would ever retire row 2. + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + store.apply({ kind: 'resynced', messages: [message('1'), message('2')] }); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'resynced', messages: [message('1')] })).toBe(true); + expect(store.snapshot().map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['1']); + }); + + test('a message that ARRIVED while the source was down appears once', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1') }); + store.apply({ kind: 'resynced', messages: [message('1'), message('2')] }); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('2') }); + expect(store.size()).toBe(2); + }); + + test('an empty resync clears an inbox the operator emptied elsewhere', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1') }); + expect(store.apply({ kind: 'resynced', messages: [] })).toBe(true); + expect(store.snapshot()).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('the snapshot obeys the shared ordering + cap', () => { + test('newest first and capped', () => { + const store = createSmsInboxStore(2); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('1', { timestamp: '2025-08-21T10:00:00-05' }) }); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('2', { timestamp: '2025-08-23T10:00:00-05' }) }); + store.apply({ kind: 'added', message: message('3', { timestamp: '2025-08-22T10:00:00-05' }) }); + expect(store.snapshot().map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['2', '3']); + expect(store.size()).toBe(3); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/sms/inbox-store.ts b/control/src/sms/inbox-store.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c521272 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/inbox-store.ts @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// The inbox row store — folds `Added` / `Deleted` / resync events into one +// newest-first, capped list. +// +// TWO PROPERTIES ARE THE WHOLE POINT OF THIS FILE, and both are failures a +// signal-driven inbox produces on its own unless something stops them. +// +// DUPLICATE SUPPRESSION. ModemManager emits `Added` for a message it is +// receiving AND again once it is stored, a re-subscribe after a bus hiccup can +// replay one, and a consumer that also re-listed would hold the same message +// twice. Rows are therefore keyed by object index and an `Added` carrying +// nothing new is a NO-OP — `apply` answers `false` and no consumer is woken. +// +// RESTART RECOVERY. A source restart cannot be folded, because the events that +// happened while it was down were never delivered. `resynced` therefore REPLACES +// the whole row set rather than merging into it: merging would keep a message +// deleted during the outage forever, and re-adding each row of a fresh list one +// `added` at a time is exactly how a restart comes to duplicate the inbox it +// already had. + +import type { SmsInboxEvent, SmsMessage } from '../ports/sms'; +import { SMS_INBOX_CAP, sortAndCapSms } from './normalize'; + +export interface SmsInboxStore { + /** Apply one event. Answers whether the visible inbox actually changed. */ + apply(event: SmsInboxEvent): boolean; + /** The current inbox, newest-first and capped. */ + snapshot(): SmsMessage[]; + /** Number of retained rows, before the cap is applied. */ + size(): number; +} + +/** Two rows are the same message when every rendered field matches. */ +function sameMessage(a: SmsMessage, b: SmsMessage): boolean { + return ( + a.id === b.id && + a.text === b.text && + a.state === b.state && + a.from === b.from && + a.timestamp === b.timestamp + ); +} + +export function createSmsInboxStore(cap: number = SMS_INBOX_CAP): SmsInboxStore { + const rows = new Map(); + + const applyAdded = (message: SmsMessage): boolean => { + const held = rows.get(message.id); + // A repeated Added for a row we already hold VERBATIM is the duplicate + // this store exists to swallow. An Added that genuinely differs is a + // state transition (receiving -> received) and does update the row. + if (held !== undefined && sameMessage(held, message)) { + return false; + } + rows.set(message.id, message); + return true; + }; + + const applyResynced = (messages: readonly SmsMessage[]): boolean => { + const next = new Map(); + for (const message of messages) { + next.set(message.id, message); + } + // Report "unchanged" when the authoritative list matches what is already + // held, so a reconnect that found nothing new broadcasts nothing. + let changed = next.size !== rows.size; + if (!changed) { + for (const [id, message] of next) { + const held = rows.get(id); + if (held === undefined || !sameMessage(held, message)) { + changed = true; + break; + } + } + } + rows.clear(); + for (const [id, message] of next) { + rows.set(id, message); + } + return changed; + }; + + return { + apply(event: SmsInboxEvent): boolean { + switch (event.kind) { + case 'added': + return applyAdded(event.message); + case 'deleted': + return rows.delete(event.id); + case 'resynced': + return applyResynced(event.messages); + } + }, + snapshot(): SmsMessage[] { + return sortAndCapSms([...rows.values()], cap); + }, + size(): number { + return rows.size; + }, + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/sms/index.ts b/control/src/sms/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3dfa0f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// The read-only SMS surface: normalization, the `mmcli -K` grammar, the +// Added/Deleted fold, and the ModemManager Messaging adapter. +// +// LIST / READ and observation ONLY. Nothing exported here composes, stores, +// sends, or deletes a message; `readonly-gate.test.ts` fails the build if that +// ever stops being true. + +export * from './dbus-messaging'; +export * from './inbox-store'; +export * from './mmcli-parse'; +export * from './normalize'; diff --git a/control/src/sms/mmcli-parse.ts b/control/src/sms/mmcli-parse.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad52ce7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/mmcli-parse.ts @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +// The `mmcli -K` SMS grammar. +// +// WHY A CLI GRAMMAR LIVES BESIDE A D-BUS PORT: `mmcli` is a client of the SAME +// ModemManager daemon the D-Bus adapter talks to, and CeraUI has been reading +// its inbox through it on real hardware since Phase A. Owning the grammar here +// is what makes the port's output provable byte-for-byte against that reader on +// the same captured output (`mmcli-parse.parity.test.ts`) — a claim no amount of +// D-Bus-only code could support — and it is what lets a consumer move its +// parsing onto this package without also having to move its transport in the +// same change. +// +// CONTENT-FREE BY CONSTRUCTION. Unlike an ordinary parser, nothing here ever +// puts a parsed LINE into an error, a log, or a receipt. A message body is +// routinely a one-time code and a sender identifies the subscriber, so a +// malformed record reports the KEY NAMES it found and nothing else — enough to +// diagnose CLI drift, and carrying no message content. This module also never +// logs at all, which is why it does not reuse a generic key/value splitter: the +// generic one prints the offending line verbatim on any line it cannot split, +// which would put message text into a log the first time mmcli reframed a body. + +import type { SmsMessage, SmsReadRefusal } from '../ports/sms'; +import { normalizeSmsState, smsPathIndex } from './normalize'; + +/** A parse outcome. `detail` NEVER carries message content — key names only. */ +export type SmsParseResult = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly value: T } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: string; readonly detail: string }; + +const fail = (reason: string, detail: string): SmsParseResult => ({ + ok: false, + reason, + detail, +}); + +const SMS_LIST_KEY = 'modem.messaging.sms'; +const LIST_LENGTH_SUFFIX = /\.length$/; +const LIST_VALUE_SUFFIX = /\.value\[\d+]$/; +const SMS_PATH_ANYWHERE_RE = /\/org\/freedesktop\/ModemManager1\/SMS\/(\d+)/; + +/** + * The escapes `g_strescape()` emits, minus the octal form. mmcli's `-K` writer + * runs EVERY value it prints through `g_strescape (value, NULL)` + * (`cli/mmcli-output.c`), so this table plus the 3-digit octal form is the + * complete grammar — anything else can be left untouched instead of guessed at. + */ +const SIMPLE_ESCAPES: Readonly> = { + b: 0x08, + f: 0x0c, + n: 0x0a, + r: 0x0d, + t: 0x09, + v: 0x0b, + '"': 0x22, + '\\': 0x5c, +}; + +/** Octal triplet first: `\302` is a byte, `\\302` is a backslash then "302". */ +const ESCAPE_RE = /\\(?:([0-7]{3})|([bfnrtv"\\]))/g; + +/** + * Undo `g_strescape()` on one `-K` value. + * + * mmcli does not print non-ASCII text — it prints the LITERAL ASCII characters + * of the octal escape. A Spanish message arrives on stdout as the eight + * characters `\`,`3`,`0`,`2`,`\`,`2`,`4`,`1` where the wire carried the two + * UTF-8 bytes `0xC2 0xA1` (confirmed on the bench board with `od -c`). The + * escapes are therefore per-BYTE, not per-character, and the only correct + * decode is to rebuild the byte sequence and read it back as UTF-8 — decoding + * each escape with `String.fromCharCode` instead turns `¡` into `¡`. + * + * Total and silent: it never throws and never logs, because the value it holds + * is message content. An escape outside the grammar is copied VERBATIM rather + * than dropped — mmcli cannot emit one, so meeting one means the value was + * never escaped and copying it is the only lossless answer. + */ +export function unescapeMmcliValue(value: string): string { + if (!value.includes('\\')) { + return value; + } + + const encoder = new TextEncoder(); + const bytes: number[] = []; + const pushText = (text: string): void => { + for (const byte of encoder.encode(text)) { + bytes.push(byte); + } + }; + + let cursor = 0; + ESCAPE_RE.lastIndex = 0; + let match = ESCAPE_RE.exec(value); + while (match !== null) { + if (match.index > cursor) { + pushText(value.slice(cursor, match.index)); + } + const octal = match[1]; + const simple = match[2]; + if (octal !== undefined) { + bytes.push(Number.parseInt(octal, 8)); + } else if (simple !== undefined) { + const byte = SIMPLE_ESCAPES[simple]; + if (byte !== undefined) { + bytes.push(byte); + } + } + cursor = match.index + match[0].length; + match = ESCAPE_RE.exec(value); + } + if (cursor < value.length) { + pushText(value.slice(cursor)); + } + + // A byte run that is not valid UTF-8 becomes U+FFFD — an honest + // "undecodable here" mark. Failing the whole read would lose every other + // field over one bad byte. + return new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(bytes)); +} + +/** Collect the `modem.messaging.sms` entries, honouring mmcli's array form. */ +function collectListEntries(raw: string): string[] | undefined { + let scalar: string | undefined; + const array: string[] = []; + let sawArray = false; + + for (const line of raw.split('\n')) { + const separator = line.indexOf(':'); + if (separator <= 0) { + continue; + } + const key = line.slice(0, separator).trim(); + // Unescaped AFTER the split, never before: a decoded byte must never be + // able to forge the `:` the line was split on. + const value = unescapeMmcliValue(line.slice(separator + 1).trim()); + // mmcli renders an absent value as `--`; it carries no entry. + if (value === '--') { + continue; + } + if (key.replace(LIST_LENGTH_SUFFIX, '') === SMS_LIST_KEY && LIST_LENGTH_SUFFIX.test(key)) { + sawArray = true; + } else if (key.replace(LIST_VALUE_SUFFIX, '') === SMS_LIST_KEY && LIST_VALUE_SUFFIX.test(key)) { + sawArray = true; + array.push(value); + } else if (key === SMS_LIST_KEY) { + scalar = value; + } + } + + if (sawArray) { + return array; + } + return scalar === undefined ? undefined : [scalar]; +} + +/** + * Extract SMS object paths from `mmcli -K -m --messaging-list-sms`. + * + * An inbox with no messages prints as `modem.messaging.sms: --`, whose `--` + * carries no entry — so an ABSENT key is a legitimate EMPTY INBOX, exactly as it + * is for `--3gpp-scan`, not drift. What IS drift, and what fails loud here, is + * output that never mentions the key at all (a renamed field, an error body + * reaching this parser): answering "no messages" to a read that never ran would + * be the worst possible lie about an inbox. + */ +export function parseSmsListOutput(raw: string): SmsParseResult { + const entries = collectListEntries(raw); + + if (entries === undefined) { + if (!raw.includes(SMS_LIST_KEY)) { + return fail('no modem.messaging.sms key in the mmcli output', 'no-key'); + } + return { ok: true, value: [] }; + } + + const paths = entries.filter((entry) => SMS_PATH_ANYWHERE_RE.test(entry)); + if (entries.length > 0 && paths.length === 0) { + return fail('no SMS paths matched the ModemManager path grammar', 'no-path-match'); + } + return { ok: true, value: paths }; +} + +/** + * Parse one `mmcli -K -s ` record. + * + * A malformed record reports the KEY NAMES it found and nothing else — see the + * content-free note at the top of this file. + */ +export function parseSmsRecordOutput(raw: string): SmsParseResult { + const fields = new Map(); + for (const line of raw.split('\n')) { + const separator = line.indexOf(':'); + if (separator <= 0) { + continue; + } + const key = line.slice(0, separator).trim(); + const value = line.slice(separator + 1).trim(); + if (!key.startsWith('sms.') || value === '' || value === '--') { + continue; + } + fields.set(key, unescapeMmcliValue(value)); + } + + const keyNames = [...fields.keys()].join(', '); + const dbusPath = fields.get('sms.dbus-path'); + if (dbusPath === undefined) { + return fail('no sms.dbus-path key in the mmcli output', keyNames); + } + + const index = smsPathIndex(dbusPath); + if (Number.isNaN(index)) { + return fail('sms.dbus-path did not match the ModemManager path grammar', keyNames); + } + + const from = fields.get('sms.content.number'); + const timestamp = fields.get('sms.properties.timestamp'); + + return { + ok: true, + value: { + id: String(index), + ...(from !== undefined ? { from } : {}), + ...(timestamp !== undefined ? { timestamp } : {}), + // A data-only (WAP/PDU) message has no text at all; `''` says so honestly. + text: fields.get('sms.content.text') ?? '', + state: normalizeSmsState(fields.get('sms.properties.state')), + }, + }; +} + +/** + * Classify a source failure into a refusal the operator can act on. + * + * The three recognised strings are ModemManager 1.24's own, confirmed on the + * bench board: a modem with no Messaging interface, a radio that has not come up + * yet, and a selector nothing answers to. Anything else stays `read_failed` + * rather than being guessed at. + */ +export function classifySmsFailure(description: string): SmsReadRefusal { + if (/no messaging capabilities/i.test(description)) { + return 'unsupported'; + } + if (/not enabled yet/i.test(description)) { + return 'not_enabled'; + } + if (/couldn't find modem|cannot find modem/i.test(description)) { + return 'unknown_modem'; + } + return 'read_failed'; +} diff --git a/control/src/sms/normalize.ts b/control/src/sms/normalize.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bedd0f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/normalize.ts @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +// Device-agnostic SMS normalization — the rules that hold whichever source the +// inbox was read through (ModemManager D-Bus or the `mmcli` client of the same +// daemon). +// +// Every rule here is a PORT of a behaviour proven on the bench board through +// CeraUI's `modules/modems/mmcli-sms.ts`, and each one exists because getting it +// wrong is silent rather than loud. They are kept in one pure module so the +// D-Bus adapter and the mmcli grammar cannot drift into two different answers +// about the same inbox. + +import type { SmsMessage, SmsState } from '../ports/sms'; + +/** + * The read cap. The list is reduced to the highest-indexed paths BEFORE any + * per-message read, so a modem holding several hundred stored messages still + * costs at most this many reads. + */ +export const SMS_INBOX_CAP = 50; + +/** + * The SMS object-path grammar. + * + * It is a SEPARATE regex from the modem-path one on purpose: a ModemManager + * modem path is anchored on `/Modem/`, so reusing it here would refuse every + * real message (`/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36`) on the device. + */ +export const SMS_PATH_RE: RegExp = /^(?:\/org\/freedesktop\/ModemManager1\/SMS\/\d+|\d+)$/; + +const SMS_PATH_INDEX_RE = /\/org\/freedesktop\/ModemManager1\/SMS\/(\d+)/; + +const KNOWN_SMS_STATES: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'unknown', + 'stored', + 'receiving', + 'received', + 'sending', + 'sent', +]); + +/** The trailing `/SMS/` index, or `Number.NaN` when the path carries none. */ +export function smsPathIndex(path: string): number { + const match = path.match(SMS_PATH_INDEX_RE); + return match?.[1] === undefined ? Number.NaN : Number.parseInt(match[1], 10); +} + +/** + * Fold whatever the source called the state onto the known vocabulary. An + * unrecognised value becomes `unknown` rather than being passed through — the + * state is rendered to an operator, and a raw token nobody can act on is worse + * than an honest "we do not know". + */ +export function normalizeSmsState(raw: string | undefined): SmsState { + return raw !== undefined && KNOWN_SMS_STATES.has(raw) ? (raw as SmsState) : 'unknown'; +} + +/** + * ModemManager reports the service-centre timestamp with an HOURS-ONLY UTC + * offset — `2025-08-21T17:20:16-05`, captured verbatim from the bench board. + * That is not valid ISO 8601 and `Date.parse` answers NaN for it. Left + * unhandled, EVERY message scores as undated and "newest first" silently + * degrades to object-index order, which is the one ordering this module must + * not trust. The offset is widened to `-05:00`; the anchor requires a full + * `T??:??:??` time in front of it, so a bare `YYYY-MM-DD` is never mangled. + */ +const HOURS_ONLY_OFFSET_RE = /(T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})([+-]\d{2})$/; + +export function smsTimestampEpoch(timestamp: string): number { + const parsedTime = Date.parse(timestamp.replace(HOURS_ONLY_OFFSET_RE, '$1$2:00')); + return Number.isNaN(parsedTime) ? Number.NEGATIVE_INFINITY : parsedTime; +} + +/** + * Newest first, then capped. + * + * Sorted on the CARRIER timestamp because the object index is only a proxy for + * arrival order — ModemManager reuses freed indices, so a re-enumerated inbox + * can hand back a low index for the newest message. A message with no (or an + * unparseable) timestamp sorts LAST rather than first: promoting an undated + * message to the top of a "newest first" list would be a claim the device + * cannot support. Ties fall back to the index, descending. + */ +export function sortAndCapSms( + messages: readonly SmsMessage[], + cap: number = SMS_INBOX_CAP, +): SmsMessage[] { + const epoch = (message: SmsMessage): number => + message.timestamp === undefined + ? Number.NEGATIVE_INFINITY + : smsTimestampEpoch(message.timestamp); + + return [...messages] + .sort((a, b) => { + const delta = epoch(b) - epoch(a); + if (delta !== 0 && !Number.isNaN(delta)) { + return delta; + } + return Number(b.id) - Number(a.id); + }) + .slice(0, cap); +} + +/** + * Reduce a candidate path list to the paths worth reading: the highest-indexed + * {@link SMS_INBOX_CAP}, each of which must match the path grammar before it can + * reach a source as a selector. + */ +export function selectReadablePaths( + paths: readonly string[], + cap: number = SMS_INBOX_CAP, +): string[] { + return [...paths] + .sort((a, b) => smsPathIndex(b) - smsPathIndex(a)) + .slice(0, cap) + .filter((path) => SMS_PATH_RE.test(path)); +} diff --git a/control/src/sms/parse.test.ts b/control/src/sms/parse.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c2bdaf --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/parse.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +// Parity fixtures for the read-only SMS port. +// +// Every fixture below is VERBATIM `mmcli 1.24.2 -K` output captured from the +// bench board (Quectel RM530N-GL, 37 stored messages) with the bodies replaced +// by neutral copy, and every expected value is the answer CeraUI's shipped +// `modules/modems/mmcli-sms.ts` reader produces for it. This suite is therefore +// the port's half of the migrate-then-remove gate: it pins the behaviour, and +// CeraUI's `modem-sms-port-parity.test.ts` runs BOTH implementations over the +// same fixtures and asserts they agree. Rule D forbids importing that reader +// here, so the differential lives on the side that can see both. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import type { SmsMessage } from '../ports/sms'; +import { + classifySmsFailure, + parseSmsListOutput, + parseSmsRecordOutput, + unescapeMmcliValue, +} from './mmcli-parse'; +import { + normalizeSmsState, + SMS_INBOX_CAP, + SMS_PATH_RE, + selectReadablePaths, + smsPathIndex, + smsTimestampEpoch, + sortAndCapSms, +} from './normalize'; + +const POPULATED_LIST = [ + 'modem.messaging.sms.length : 3', + 'modem.messaging.sms.value[1] : /org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36', + 'modem.messaging.sms.value[2] : /org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/35', + 'modem.messaging.sms.value[3] : /org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/0', +].join('\n'); + +const EMPTY_LIST = 'modem.messaging.sms : --'; + +const RECORD = [ + 'sms.dbus-path : /org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36', + 'sms.content.number : 85573', + 'sms.content.text : Neutral fixture body with a colon: and more', + 'sms.content.data : --', + 'sms.properties.pdu-type : deliver', + 'sms.properties.state : received', + 'sms.properties.validity : --', + 'sms.properties.storage : me', + 'sms.properties.smsc : +573103154363', + 'sms.properties.class : --', + 'sms.properties.timestamp : 2025-08-21T17:20:16-05', + 'sms.properties.delivery-state : --', +].join('\n'); + +const message = (id: string, timestamp?: string): SmsMessage => ({ + id, + text: `body ${id}`, + state: 'received', + ...(timestamp !== undefined ? { timestamp } : {}), +}); + +describe('parseSmsListOutput', () => { + test('extracts every path from a populated inbox listing', () => { + const result = parseSmsListOutput(POPULATED_LIST); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.value).toEqual([ + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36', + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/35', + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/0', + ]); + } + }); + + test('a `--` list is a genuinely EMPTY inbox, not drift', () => { + const result = parseSmsListOutput(EMPTY_LIST); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.value).toEqual([]); + } + }); + + test('output that never mentions the key fails LOUD', () => { + const result = parseSmsListOutput('modem.generic.state : connected'); + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (!result.ok) { + expect(result.reason).toContain('modem.messaging.sms'); + } + }); + + test('entries matching no path grammar fail LOUD', () => { + const result = parseSmsListOutput( + ['modem.messaging.sms.length : 1', 'modem.messaging.sms.value[1] : nope'].join('\n'), + ); + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (!result.ok) { + expect(result.reason).toContain('path grammar'); + } + }); +}); + +describe('SMS_PATH_RE — a retargeted grammar, not the modem one', () => { + test('accepts a real SMS object path and a bare index', () => { + expect(SMS_PATH_RE.test('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36')).toBe(true); + expect(SMS_PATH_RE.test('36')).toBe(true); + }); + + test('rejects anything that could escape an argv boundary', () => { + for (const hostile of [ + '--send', + '36; rm -rf /', + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/0', + '', + '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/', + ]) { + expect(SMS_PATH_RE.test(hostile)).toBe(false); + } + }); +}); + +describe('parseSmsRecordOutput', () => { + test('reads the board record, keeping a colon inside the body', () => { + const result = parseSmsRecordOutput(RECORD); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.value).toEqual({ + id: '36', + from: '85573', + text: 'Neutral fixture body with a colon: and more', + timestamp: '2025-08-21T17:20:16-05', + state: 'received', + }); + } + }); + + test('a data-only message reports an empty body rather than guessing', () => { + const result = parseSmsRecordOutput( + [ + 'sms.dbus-path : /org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/7', + 'sms.content.text : --', + 'sms.properties.state : received', + ].join('\n'), + ); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.value.text).toBe(''); + } + }); + + test('an unknown state folds to `unknown`, never a raw token', () => { + const result = parseSmsRecordOutput( + [ + 'sms.dbus-path : /org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/7', + 'sms.properties.state : some-future-state', + ].join('\n'), + ); + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (result.ok) { + expect(result.value.state).toBe('unknown'); + } + }); + + test('a malformed record reports KEY NAMES and no content', () => { + const body = 'Tu pin es 4821'; + const result = parseSmsRecordOutput( + [`sms.content.text : ${body}`, 'sms.properties.state : received'].join('\n'), + ); + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (!result.ok) { + expect(result.reason).toContain('sms.dbus-path'); + expect(result.detail).toContain('sms.content.text'); + expect(result.detail).not.toContain(body); + expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(body); + } + }); +}); + +describe('unescapeMmcliValue — per-BYTE, then UTF-8', () => { + test('rebuilds a multi-byte character from its octal escapes', () => { + expect(unescapeMmcliValue('\\302\\241Disfruta!')).toBe('\u00a1Disfruta!'); + }); + + test('a doubled backslash is a literal backslash, not a byte', () => { + expect(unescapeMmcliValue('\\\\302')).toBe('\\302'); + }); + + test('leaves an unescaped value untouched', () => { + expect(unescapeMmcliValue('plain body')).toBe('plain body'); + }); +}); + +describe('smsTimestampEpoch — the hours-only offset', () => { + test('widens `-05` to `-05:00` so the board timestamp parses at all', () => { + expect(smsTimestampEpoch('2025-08-21T17:20:16-05')).toBe( + Date.parse('2025-08-21T17:20:16-05:00'), + ); + }); + + test('an already-valid offset is unchanged', () => { + expect(smsTimestampEpoch('2025-08-21T17:20:16+02:00')).toBe( + Date.parse('2025-08-21T17:20:16+02:00'), + ); + }); + + test('a bare date is never mangled by the widening anchor', () => { + expect(smsTimestampEpoch('2025-08-21')).toBe(Date.parse('2025-08-21')); + }); + + test('an unparseable timestamp sorts last rather than throwing', () => { + expect(smsTimestampEpoch('not a timestamp')).toBe(Number.NEGATIVE_INFINITY); + }); +}); + +describe('sortAndCapSms — newest first, undated last', () => { + test('orders on the carrier timestamp, not the object index', () => { + const sorted = sortAndCapSms([ + message('1', '2025-08-21T10:00:00-05'), + message('99', '2025-08-20T10:00:00-05'), + message('50', '2025-08-22T10:00:00-05'), + ]); + expect(sorted.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['50', '1', '99']); + }); + + test('an undated message sorts LAST, never promoted to the top', () => { + const sorted = sortAndCapSms([message('5'), message('1', '2025-08-21T10:00:00-05')]); + expect(sorted.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['1', '5']); + }); + + test('ties fall back to the index, descending', () => { + const stamp = '2025-08-21T10:00:00-05'; + const sorted = sortAndCapSms([message('3', stamp), message('9', stamp), message('7', stamp)]); + expect(sorted.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(['9', '7', '3']); + }); + + test('caps at SMS_INBOX_CAP', () => { + const many = Array.from({ length: 120 }, (_, index) => message(String(index))); + expect(sortAndCapSms(many)).toHaveLength(SMS_INBOX_CAP); + expect(SMS_INBOX_CAP).toBe(50); + }); +}); + +describe('selectReadablePaths — bounded BEFORE any per-message read', () => { + test('keeps the highest-indexed cap and drops the rest', () => { + const paths = Array.from( + { length: 120 }, + (_, index) => `/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/${index}`, + ); + const selected = selectReadablePaths(paths); + expect(selected).toHaveLength(SMS_INBOX_CAP); + expect(selected[0]).toBe('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/119'); + }); + + test('refuses a path that does not match the grammar', () => { + expect(selectReadablePaths(['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/1; rm -rf /'])).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('smsPathIndex + normalizeSmsState', () => { + test('reads the trailing index, and NaN when there is none', () => { + expect(smsPathIndex('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SMS/36')).toBe(36); + expect(Number.isNaN(smsPathIndex('36'))).toBe(true); + }); + + test('every ModemManager state passes through verbatim', () => { + for (const state of ['unknown', 'stored', 'receiving', 'received', 'sending', 'sent']) { + expect(normalizeSmsState(state)).toBe(state as never); + } + expect(normalizeSmsState(undefined)).toBe('unknown'); + }); +}); + +describe('classifySmsFailure — four distinct operator facts', () => { + test.each([ + ["couldn't find modem 'nope'", 'unknown_modem'], + ['error: modem has no messaging capabilities', 'unsupported'], + ['error: modem not enabled yet', 'not_enabled'], + ['something else entirely', 'read_failed'], + ])('%s -> %s', (description, expected) => { + expect(classifySmsFailure(description)).toBe(expected as never); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/sms/readonly-gate.test.ts b/control/src/sms/readonly-gate.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fdd78a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/sms/readonly-gate.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +// The SMS surface is READ-ONLY, and this is the lock. +// +// A comment saying "never add a send path" is not a control — the next person to +// touch this surface will not read it. This test greps the ACTUAL SMS source for +// every ModemManager verb and identifier that would turn the inbox into a write +// surface, and fails the build if one appears. Sending or deleting a message is +// billable, irreversible, and adds real modem-control capability over the +// subscriber's account to what is otherwise a diagnostic read; it is out of +// scope PERMANENTLY, not until later. +// +// It is the modem-stack half of the same gate CeraUI has carried since Phase A +// (`apps/backend/src/tests/modem-sms-readonly-gate.test.ts`). Neither half may +// be deleted or narrowed to land a write path — that is exactly the move they +// exist to stop, and it would be a new spec change with its own confirmation and +// interlock design. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readdirSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +const SMS_DIR = import.meta.dir; +const PORT_FILE = join(SMS_DIR, '..', 'ports', 'sms.ts'); + +/** This gate names the forbidden verbs, so it must not scan itself. */ +const SELF = 'readonly-gate.test.ts'; + +/** + * ModemManager's SMS WRITE surface (`Modem.Messaging.Create` / `Delete`, and + * `Sms.Send` / `Sms.Store`), mmcli's spelling of the same verbs, and the + * identifiers a hand-rolled write path would use. `'--send'` is listed on its + * own because mmcli spells the send as `-s --send`, with no `sms` token + * anywhere in the flag. + */ +const FORBIDDEN: ReadonlyArray<{ label: string; re: RegExp }> = [ + { label: "MM Messaging 'Create'", re: /['"`]Create['"`]/ }, + { label: "MM Messaging 'Delete'", re: /['"`]Delete['"`]/ }, + { label: "MM Sms 'Send'", re: /['"`]Send['"`]/ }, + { label: "MM Sms 'Store'", re: /['"`]Store['"`]/ }, + { label: 'mmcli --messaging-create-sms', re: /--messaging-create-sms/ }, + { label: 'mmcli --messaging-delete-sms', re: /--messaging-delete-sms/ }, + { label: 'mmcli --create-sms', re: /--create-sms/ }, + { label: 'mmcli --delete-sms', re: /--delete-sms/ }, + { label: 'mmcli --send', re: /['"`]--send['"`]/ }, + { label: 'mmcli --store', re: /['"`]--store['"`]/ }, + { label: 'a sendSms identifier', re: /\bsendSms\b/i }, + { label: 'a deleteSms identifier', re: /\bdeleteSms\b/i }, + { label: 'a createSms identifier', re: /\bcreateSms\b/i }, + { label: 'an smsSend identifier', re: /\bsmsSend\b/i }, + { label: 'an smsDelete identifier', re: /\bsmsDelete\b/i }, + { label: 'an smsStore identifier', re: /\bsmsStore\b/i }, +]; + +/** + * Scan CODE, not prose. The port and this gate both state the read-only + * invariant by NAMING the very verbs they forbid, and a gate that cannot tell + * "we will never call Delete" from an actual `Delete` call is a gate nobody can + * document around. Full-line and block comments are stripped; a trailing `//` on + * a code line is left alone so a URL inside a string cannot swallow the rest. + */ +function stripComments(source: string): string { + return source + .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, ' ') + .split('\n') + .filter((line) => !/^\s*(?:\/\/|\*)/.test(line)) + .join('\n'); +} + +function smsSourceFiles(): string[] { + const files = readdirSync(SMS_DIR) + .filter((name) => name.endsWith('.ts') && !name.endsWith('.test.ts') && name !== SELF) + .map((name) => join(SMS_DIR, name)); + return [...files, PORT_FILE]; +} + +const CODE = new Map(); +for (const path of smsSourceFiles()) { + CODE.set(path, stripComments(await Bun.file(path).text())); +} + +describe('the SMS surface is read-only, and stays that way', () => { + test('scans the whole SMS surface, port included', () => { + // Guards the gate itself: a moved directory would otherwise make this + // suite pass vacuously by scanning nothing. + expect(CODE.size).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(5); + for (const expected of [ + 'ports/sms.ts', + 'sms/normalize.ts', + 'sms/mmcli-parse.ts', + 'sms/inbox-store.ts', + 'sms/dbus-messaging.ts', + ]) { + expect([...CODE.keys()].some((path) => path.endsWith(expected))).toBe(true); + } + }); + + for (const { label, re } of FORBIDDEN) { + test(`has no ${label} anywhere on the SMS surface`, () => { + const offenders = [...CODE.entries()] + .filter(([, source]) => re.test(source)) + .map(([path]) => path.slice(path.lastIndexOf('/src/') + 5)); + expect(offenders).toEqual([]); + }); + } + + test('every D-Bus METHOD the surface calls is a read', () => { + // Members are named in two places — an outgoing `callMethod` and an + // incoming `subscribeSignal` filter — and only the first can mutate a + // device, so they are asserted separately rather than as one bag. + const called = new Set(); + for (const source of CODE.values()) { + for (const region of source.matchAll(/callMethod\(\{[\s\S]*?\}\)/g)) { + for (const match of region[0].matchAll(/member:\s*'([A-Za-z]+)'/g)) { + const name = match[1]; + if (name !== undefined) { + called.add(name); + } + } + } + } + expect([...called].sort()).toEqual(['GetAll', 'List']); + }); + + test('the only signals it subscribes to are the inbox observations', () => { + const subscribed = new Set(); + for (const source of CODE.values()) { + for (const region of source.matchAll(/subscribeSignal\(\s*\{[\s\S]*?\}/g)) { + for (const match of region[0].matchAll(/member:\s*'([A-Za-z]+)'/g)) { + const name = match[1]; + if (name !== undefined) { + subscribed.add(name); + } + } + } + } + expect([...subscribed].sort()).toEqual(['Added', 'Deleted']); + }); + + test('the port declares list/observe/stop and nothing that mutates', () => { + const port = CODE.get(PORT_FILE) ?? ''; + for (const expected of ['list(', 'observe(', 'stop(']) { + expect(port).toContain(expected); + } + expect(/\b(create|send|store|delete)\s*\(/i.test(port)).toBe(false); + }); + + test('the detector is not vacuous (self-test)', () => { + const rogue = stripComments("await transport.callMethod({ member: 'Delete' });"); + const flagged = FORBIDDEN.filter(({ re }) => re.test(rogue)).map(({ label }) => label); + expect(flagged).toContain("MM Messaging 'Delete'"); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/ussd/calls.ts b/control/src/ussd/calls.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eeeb5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/calls.ts @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +// The four D-Bus calls the USSD adapter makes, and nothing else. +// +// Split from the adapter so the session machinery above can be read without the +// marshalling below, and so a call's shape (interface, member, signature) is +// stated once in one place. +// +// CARRIER TEXT DISCIPLINE: `Initiate` and `Respond` both take and return operator +// text, and neither the command nor the reply may ever reach a log line. Nothing +// in this file logs, and every error raised here is re-thrown untouched so the +// classifier — not a string built around the payload — decides what the caller is +// told. + +import { MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, PROPERTIES_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import type { DbusTransport } from '../transport'; +import type { UssdRepliedState } from './session'; + +/** `MMModem3gppUssdSessionState`. */ +export const USSD_STATE_UNKNOWN = 0; +export const USSD_STATE_IDLE = 1; +export const USSD_STATE_ACTIVE = 2; +export const USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE = 3; + +/** + * Decode MM's post-call session state. `UNKNOWN` folds onto `released` with the + * rest: an unreadable state must close the session rather than leave the operator + * looking at a dialogue nothing can advance. + */ +export function decodeRepliedState(state: number): UssdRepliedState { + if (state === USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE) { + return 'awaiting-reply'; + } + return state === USSD_STATE_ACTIVE ? 'active' : 'released'; +} + +export interface UssdCallTarget { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly destination: string; + readonly modem: string; + readonly timeoutMs: number; +} + +function firstString(body: readonly unknown[]): string { + const value = body[0]; + return typeof value === 'string' ? value : ''; +} + +export async function callInitiate(target: UssdCallTarget, ussdCommand: string): Promise { + const reply = await target.transport.callMethod({ + destination: target.destination, + path: target.modem, + interface: MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, + member: 'Initiate', + signature: 's', + args: [ussdCommand], + timeoutMs: target.timeoutMs, + }); + return firstString(reply.body); +} + +export async function callRespond(target: UssdCallTarget, ussdResponse: string): Promise { + const reply = await target.transport.callMethod({ + destination: target.destination, + path: target.modem, + interface: MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, + member: 'Respond', + signature: 's', + args: [ussdResponse], + timeoutMs: target.timeoutMs, + }); + return firstString(reply.body); +} + +export async function callCancel(target: UssdCallTarget): Promise { + await target.transport.callMethod({ + destination: target.destination, + path: target.modem, + interface: MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, + member: 'Cancel', + timeoutMs: target.timeoutMs, + }); +} + +/** + * Read the post-call session state. + * + * A targeted `Properties.Get` rather than a `GetManagedObjects` sweep: this runs + * after every network round-trip, and the whole-tree read is the most expensive + * call in the package. `unknown` on anything unreadable — the caller treats that + * as "the network released the session", which is the conservative direction (it + * closes a session rather than leaving one the operator cannot see). + */ +export async function readUssdState(target: UssdCallTarget): Promise { + try { + const reply = await target.transport.callMethod({ + destination: target.destination, + path: target.modem, + interface: PROPERTIES_IFACE, + member: 'Get', + signature: 'ss', + args: [MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, 'State'], + timeoutMs: target.timeoutMs, + }); + const wrapped = reply.body[0]; + if (typeof wrapped === 'number') { + return wrapped; + } + const inner = (wrapped as { value?: unknown } | undefined)?.value; + return typeof inner === 'number' ? inner : USSD_STATE_UNKNOWN; + } catch { + return USSD_STATE_UNKNOWN; + } +} diff --git a/control/src/ussd/index.ts b/control/src/ussd/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d191f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +// The gated USSD capability module — session state machine, refusal taxonomy, and +// the ModemManager `Modem3gpp.Ussd` adapter. +// +// GATED: nothing here runs unless the operator has enabled the `ussd` capability +// module and the modem positively advertises the interface (`../capability`). +// LEASE-ONLY: a USSD session cannot re-register the radio, so it takes the +// per-modem mutation lease and is NOT journaled. + +export { + callCancel, + callInitiate, + callRespond, + decodeRepliedState, + readUssdState, + USSD_STATE_ACTIVE, + USSD_STATE_IDLE, + USSD_STATE_UNKNOWN, + USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE, + type UssdCallTarget, +} from './calls'; +export { + MmUssd, + type MmUssdDeps, + type UssdScheduler, + type UssdTimerHandle, + type UssdVerbResult, +} from './mm-ussd'; +export { + classifyUssdFailure, + isPacketSwitchedOnly, + USSD_REFUSAL_REASONS, + type UssdRefusalReason, + type UssdRegistrationFacts, +} from './refusal'; +export { + decodeAccessTechnologies, + readUssdRegistrationFacts, + registrationFactsFromTree, + UNKNOWN_REGISTRATION, +} from './registration'; +export { + IDLE_SESSION, + isUssdSessionOpen, + reduceUssdSession, + USSD_SESSION_OUTCOMES, + USSD_SESSION_STATES, + type UssdRepliedState, + type UssdSessionEvent, + type UssdSessionOutcome, + type UssdSessionSnapshot, + type UssdSessionState, + type UssdTransition, +} from './session'; diff --git a/control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.test.ts b/control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb64df1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +// The ModemManager USSD adapter, driven over a fake bus. +// +// Two properties are proved here that the pure machine cannot prove on its own: +// a REFUSED verb dispatches ZERO D-Bus calls (a doomed request must not disturb a +// live session, and must not cost a network round-trip), and an unanswered +// session closes at its bound AND best-effort releases the network's side. + +import { expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import { ModemActor } from '../backend/modem-actor'; +import { runtimePath } from '../domain'; +import { REDACTED, redact } from '../redact'; +import type { DbusTransport, MethodCall, MethodReply } from '../transport'; +import { USSD_STATE_ACTIVE, USSD_STATE_IDLE, USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE } from './calls'; +import { MmUssd, type UssdScheduler } from './mm-ussd'; + +const MODEM_PATH = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/0'; +const MODEM = runtimePath(MODEM_PATH); +const STABLE_KEY = 'platform-xhci-hcd.0.auto-usb-0:1.4.4'; +const BALANCE_REPLY = 'Your balance is $4.20. Ref 998877'; + +const LTE_BIT = 1 << 14; +const UMTS_BIT = 1 << 5; + +interface BusOptions { + /** Value returned by `Initiate`/`Respond`, or an error to throw. */ + readonly reply?: string | Error; + /** MM's post-call `Ussd.State`. */ + readonly ussdState?: number; + readonly registrationState?: number; + readonly accessTechnologies?: number; + readonly cancelThrows?: boolean; +} + +interface FakeBus { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly calls: MethodCall[]; + members(): string[]; +} + +function fakeBus(options: BusOptions = {}): FakeBus { + const calls: MethodCall[] = []; + const managedObjects = [ + [ + MODEM_PATH, + [ + [ + MODEM_IFACE, + [['AccessTechnologies', { signature: 'u', value: options.accessTechnologies ?? 0 }]], + ], + [ + MODEM3GPP_IFACE, + [['RegistrationState', { signature: 'u', value: options.registrationState ?? 1 }]], + ], + ], + ], + ]; + + const transport = { + connect: () => Promise.resolve(), + disconnect: () => Promise.resolve(), + isConnected: () => true, + subscribeSignal: () => Promise.resolve({ unsubscribe: () => Promise.resolve() }), + on: () => undefined, + off: () => undefined, + subscriptionCount: () => 0, + callMethod(call: MethodCall): Promise { + calls.push(call); + if (call.member === 'GetManagedObjects') { + return Promise.resolve({ + signature: 'a{oa{sa{sv}}}', + body: [managedObjects], + } as unknown as MethodReply); + } + if (call.member === 'Get') { + return Promise.resolve({ + signature: 'v', + body: [{ signature: 'u', value: options.ussdState ?? USSD_STATE_IDLE }], + } as unknown as MethodReply); + } + if (call.member === 'Cancel') { + return options.cancelThrows + ? Promise.reject(new Error('modem is not answering')) + : Promise.resolve({ signature: '', body: [] }); + } + const reply = options.reply ?? ''; + return reply instanceof Error + ? Promise.reject(reply) + : Promise.resolve({ signature: 's', body: [reply] } as unknown as MethodReply); + }, + } as unknown as DbusTransport; + + return { + transport, + calls, + members: () => calls.map((call) => call.member), + }; +} + +/** A scheduler that fires nothing until the test asks it to. */ +function manualScheduler(): { scheduler: UssdScheduler; fire(): Promise } { + let pending: (() => void) | undefined; + return { + scheduler: (_delayMs, run) => { + pending = run; + return { + cancel: () => { + pending = undefined; + }, + }; + }, + fire: async () => { + pending?.(); + pending = undefined; + await Promise.resolve(); + await Promise.resolve(); + await Promise.resolve(); + }, + }; +} + +function build(bus: FakeBus, extra: Partial[0]> = {}): MmUssd { + return new MmUssd({ + transport: bus.transport, + actor: new ModemActor(), + resolveStableKey: () => STABLE_KEY, + ...extra, + }); +} + +function dbusError(name: string): Error { + const error = new Error('operation failed'); + error.name = name; + return error; +} + +test('an initiate that the network answers with a question opens the dialogue', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: BALANCE_REPLY, ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(result.snapshot.state).toBe('awaiting-reply'); + expect(result.ussdReply).toBe(BALANCE_REPLY); + expect(bus.calls[0]?.interface).toBe(MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE); + expect(bus.calls[0]?.member).toBe('Initiate'); + expect(bus.calls[0]?.args).toEqual(['*123#']); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('an initiate the network releases completes the session in one shot', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: BALANCE_REPLY, ussdState: USSD_STATE_IDLE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(result.snapshot).toEqual({ state: 'closed', outcome: 'completed' }); + expect(result.ussdReply).toBe(BALANCE_REPLY); + // The stored state resets, so the very next dialogue is admitted. + expect(ussd.snapshot(MODEM).state).toBe('idle'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('a session the network holds open with nothing pending is `active`', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: 'Request accepted', ussdState: USSD_STATE_ACTIVE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*111#'); + + expect(result.snapshot.state).toBe('active'); + expect(ussd.snapshot(MODEM).state).toBe('active'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('responding to a prompt continues the dialogue', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: 'Choose: 1) Data 2) Voice', ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + const result = await ussd.respond(MODEM, '1'); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(result.snapshot.state).toBe('awaiting-reply'); + expect(bus.members()).toContain('Respond'); + expect(bus.calls.find((call) => call.member === 'Respond')?.args).toEqual(['1']); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('cancelling mid-dialogue closes the session and dispatches Cancel', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: 'Menu', ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + const result = await ussd.cancel(MODEM); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(result.snapshot).toEqual({ state: 'closed', outcome: 'cancelled' }); + expect(bus.members()).toContain('Cancel'); + expect(ussd.snapshot(MODEM).state).toBe('idle'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('an unanswered session closes at the bound and releases the network side', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: 'Menu', ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const timer = manualScheduler(); + const seen: string[] = []; + const ussd = build(bus, { + scheduler: timer.scheduler, + onSessionChange: (_key, snapshot) => seen.push(snapshot.state), + }); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + expect(bus.members()).not.toContain('Cancel'); + + await timer.fire(); + + expect(ussd.snapshot(MODEM).state).toBe('idle'); + expect(seen.at(-1)).toBe('closed'); + expect(bus.members()).toContain('Cancel'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('a bound that fires while the modem is unreachable still closes the session', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ + reply: 'Menu', + ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE, + cancelThrows: true, + }); + const timer = manualScheduler(); + const ussd = build(bus, { scheduler: timer.scheduler }); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + await timer.fire(); + + expect(ussd.snapshot(MODEM).state).toBe('idle'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('an LTE-only carrier rejection is surfaced as its own typed refusal', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ + reply: dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported'), + registrationState: 1, + accessTechnologies: LTE_BIT, + }); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + expect(result.refusal).toBe('lte-only-unsupported'); + expect(result.snapshot).toEqual({ + state: 'closed', + outcome: 'failed', + refusal: 'lte-only-unsupported', + }); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('the same rejection on a CS-capable registration reports a device limit', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ + reply: dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported'), + registrationState: 1, + accessTechnologies: UMTS_BIT, + }); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + expect(result.refusal).toBe('unsupported'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('a second initiate is refused busy and dispatches ZERO calls', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: 'Menu', ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + const before = bus.calls.length; + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*100#'); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + expect(result.refusal).toBe('session-busy'); + expect(result.snapshot.state).toBe('awaiting-reply'); + expect(bus.calls.length).toBe(before); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('respond and cancel with no session are refused, and dispatch ZERO calls', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus(); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const responded = await ussd.respond(MODEM, '1'); + const cancelled = await ussd.cancel(MODEM); + + expect(responded.refusal).toBe('invalid-state'); + expect(cancelled.refusal).toBe('no-session'); + expect(bus.calls).toHaveLength(0); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('a modem that never answered a session can start a new one', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ + reply: dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Failed'), + }); + const ussd = build(bus); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + const second = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + // Failed is terminal for the SESSION, never for the modem. + expect(second.refusal).not.toBe('session-busy'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('the carrier reply is masked by the shared redactor wherever it is serialized', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: BALANCE_REPLY, ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const ussd = build(bus); + + const result = await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123*9911#'); + const serialized = JSON.stringify(redact({ result, request: { ussdCommand: '*123*9911#' } })); + + expect(serialized).not.toContain(BALANCE_REPLY); + expect(serialized).not.toContain('9911'); + expect(serialized).toContain(REDACTED); + // The non-secret half of the same object survives, so this is redaction and + // not a blanket drop. + expect(serialized).toContain('awaiting-reply'); + ussd.stop(); +}); + +test('stop() drops the pending bound without cancelling the modem session', async () => { + const bus = fakeBus({ reply: 'Menu', ussdState: USSD_STATE_USER_RESPONSE }); + const timer = manualScheduler(); + const ussd = build(bus, { scheduler: timer.scheduler }); + await ussd.initiate(MODEM, '*123#'); + + ussd.stop(); + await timer.fire(); + + expect(bus.members()).not.toContain('Cancel'); +}); diff --git a/control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.ts b/control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f858f29 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/mm-ussd.ts @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +// The ModemManager USSD adapter — `Modem3gpp.Ussd` driven by the pure session +// machine in `./session`. +// +// Three properties are load-bearing and none of them is obvious from the D-Bus +// API alone: +// +// 1. **Every verb runs through the shared per-modem `ModemActor`.** A USSD +// session is a single network-side resource per subscriber, so two verbs +// interleaving on one modem is exactly the double-dialogue the network +// answers busy. The actor is keyed on the STABLE key, so the serialization +// survives a replug like every other disruptive op in this package. +// +// 2. **An unanswered session is closed at a bound, and the CANCEL is attempted.** +// A session nobody responds to stays open NETWORK-side; letting it expire in +// silence would leave the next `Initiate` failing busy for reasons the +// operator cannot see. The bound closes our machine and best-effort releases +// the network's — best-effort because a modem that did not answer the last +// call may not answer this one either, and a timeout must still terminate. +// +// 3. **A `closed` session resets the STORED state to idle, while the CALLER is +// told `closed`.** The machine is deliberately terminal so a finished session +// cannot be resurrected; the adapter's map is per-modem and long-lived, so it +// starts each new dialogue from a fresh machine. +// +// The carrier's text rides `ussdReply` and NOTHING here logs it. That field name +// is not cosmetic: `../redact` is key-based, so the name IS what guarantees the +// value is masked in every receipt, bundle, and log line it can reach. + +import { MM_BUS_NAME } from '../backend/constants'; +import type { ModemActor } from '../backend/modem-actor'; +import type { ModemRef } from '../ports'; +import type { DbusTransport } from '../transport'; +import { + callCancel, + callInitiate, + callRespond, + decodeRepliedState, + readUssdState, + type UssdCallTarget, +} from './calls'; +import { classifyUssdFailure, type UssdRefusalReason } from './refusal'; +import { readUssdRegistrationFacts } from './registration'; +import { + IDLE_SESSION, + reduceUssdSession, + type UssdSessionEvent, + type UssdSessionSnapshot, +} from './session'; + +/** A network round-trip. USSD legitimately takes tens of seconds. */ +const DEFAULT_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS = 45_000; +/** How long a session may sit awaiting an operator response before it is closed. */ +const DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000; + +export interface UssdTimerHandle { + cancel(): void; +} +export type UssdScheduler = (delayMs: number, run: () => void) => UssdTimerHandle; + +const defaultScheduler: UssdScheduler = (delayMs, run) => { + const timer = setTimeout(run, delayMs); + timer.unref?.(); + return { + cancel: () => { + clearTimeout(timer); + }, + }; +}; + +export interface UssdVerbResult { + readonly ok: boolean; + readonly snapshot: UssdSessionSnapshot; + /** Carrier text. Redacted by key everywhere it is serialized. */ + readonly ussdReply?: string; + readonly refusal?: UssdRefusalReason; +} + +export interface MmUssdDeps { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly actor: ModemActor; + readonly destination?: string; + readonly resolveStableKey: (modem: ModemRef) => string; + readonly callTimeoutMs?: number; + readonly sessionIdleTimeoutMs?: number; + readonly scheduler?: UssdScheduler; + /** Notified on every stored-state change, so a UI can follow a session. */ + readonly onSessionChange?: (stableKey: string, snapshot: UssdSessionSnapshot) => void; +} + +export class MmUssd { + readonly #deps: MmUssdDeps; + readonly #destination: string; + readonly #callTimeoutMs: number; + readonly #idleTimeoutMs: number; + readonly #scheduler: UssdScheduler; + readonly #sessions = new Map(); + readonly #timers = new Map(); + + constructor(deps: MmUssdDeps) { + this.#deps = deps; + this.#destination = deps.destination ?? MM_BUS_NAME; + this.#callTimeoutMs = deps.callTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS; + this.#idleTimeoutMs = deps.sessionIdleTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS; + this.#scheduler = deps.scheduler ?? defaultScheduler; + } + + snapshot(modem: ModemRef): UssdSessionSnapshot { + return this.#sessions.get(this.#deps.resolveStableKey(modem)) ?? IDLE_SESSION; + } + + initiate(modem: ModemRef, ussdCommand: string): Promise { + return this.#runVerb(modem, { kind: 'initiate' }, (target) => + callInitiate(target, ussdCommand), + ); + } + + respond(modem: ModemRef, ussdResponse: string): Promise { + return this.#runVerb(modem, { kind: 'respond' }, (target) => callRespond(target, ussdResponse)); + } + + cancel(modem: ModemRef): Promise { + const key = this.#deps.resolveStableKey(modem); + return this.#deps.actor.run(key, async () => { + const gate = this.#gate(key, { kind: 'cancel' }); + if (!gate.ok) { + return gate.result; + } + const target = this.#target(modem); + try { + await callCancel(target); + return this.#settle(key, { kind: 'cancelled' }); + } catch (error) { + return this.#fail(key, modem, error); + } + }); + } + + /** Drop every timer. A live session on the modem is NOT cancelled by this. */ + stop(): void { + for (const timer of this.#timers.values()) { + timer.cancel(); + } + this.#timers.clear(); + } + + async #runVerb( + modem: ModemRef, + event: UssdSessionEvent, + dispatch: (target: UssdCallTarget) => Promise, + ): Promise { + const key = this.#deps.resolveStableKey(modem); + return this.#deps.actor.run(key, async () => { + const gate = this.#gate(key, event); + if (!gate.ok) { + return gate.result; + } + const target = this.#target(modem); + try { + const ussdReply = await dispatch(target); + const sessionState = decodeRepliedState(await readUssdState(target)); + const settled = this.#settle(key, { kind: 'replied', sessionState }); + // A session the network kept open — whether or not it asked a + // question — is what the idle bound exists to release. + if (sessionState !== 'released') { + this.#armIdleTimeout(key, modem); + } + return { ...settled, ussdReply }; + } catch (error) { + return this.#fail(key, modem, error); + } + }); + } + + /** + * Apply the operator's verb to the machine. A refusal is returned WITHOUT + * touching the stored state or dialling the bus — a doomed verb must not + * disturb a live session. + */ + #gate( + key: string, + event: UssdSessionEvent, + ): { ok: true } | { ok: false; result: UssdVerbResult } { + const current = this.#sessions.get(key) ?? IDLE_SESSION; + const transition = reduceUssdSession(current, event); + if (!transition.ok) { + return { + ok: false, + result: { ok: false, snapshot: current, refusal: transition.refusal }, + }; + } + this.#store(key, transition.snapshot); + return { ok: true }; + } + + #settle(key: string, event: UssdSessionEvent): UssdVerbResult { + const current = this.#sessions.get(key) ?? IDLE_SESSION; + const transition = reduceUssdSession(current, event); + if (!transition.ok) { + return { ok: false, snapshot: current, refusal: transition.refusal }; + } + this.#store(key, transition.snapshot); + const closedRefusal = transition.snapshot.refusal; + return { + ok: closedRefusal === undefined, + snapshot: transition.snapshot, + ...(closedRefusal === undefined ? {} : { refusal: closedRefusal }), + }; + } + + async #fail(key: string, modem: ModemRef, error: unknown): Promise { + const registration = await readUssdRegistrationFacts( + this.#deps.transport, + this.#destination, + modem, + ); + return this.#settle(key, { kind: 'failed', reason: classifyUssdFailure(error, registration) }); + } + + /** + * A session reaching `closed` is REPORTED as closed and STORED as idle, so the + * next `initiate` starts from a fresh machine rather than the terminal one. + */ + #store(key: string, snapshot: UssdSessionSnapshot): void { + this.#clearTimer(key); + if (snapshot.state === 'closed') { + this.#sessions.delete(key); + } else { + this.#sessions.set(key, snapshot); + } + this.#deps.onSessionChange?.(key, snapshot); + } + + #armIdleTimeout(key: string, modem: ModemRef): void { + this.#clearTimer(key); + this.#timers.set( + key, + this.#scheduler(this.#idleTimeoutMs, () => { + void this.#expire(key, modem); + }), + ); + } + + #clearTimer(key: string): void { + this.#timers.get(key)?.cancel(); + this.#timers.delete(key); + } + + /** + * The bound elapsed. The machine closes `timed-out` FIRST — that outcome is + * the operator's answer whether or not the release lands — and the modem-side + * cancel is attempted afterwards, best-effort. + */ + async #expire(key: string, modem: ModemRef): Promise { + await this.#deps.actor.run(key, async () => { + if (!this.#sessions.has(key)) { + return; + } + this.#settle(key, { kind: 'timeout' }); + try { + await callCancel(this.#target(modem)); + } catch { + // The modem that did not answer the dialogue may not answer this + // either; the session is already closed on our side. + } + }); + } + + #target(modem: ModemRef): UssdCallTarget { + return { + transport: this.#deps.transport, + destination: this.#destination, + modem, + timeoutMs: this.#callTimeoutMs, + }; + } +} diff --git a/control/src/ussd/refusal.test.ts b/control/src/ussd/refusal.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d15d7a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/refusal.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// Classifying a failed USSD call — and the one distinction this module exists +// for: a carrier that will not carry USSD on a packet-only registration is NOT a +// modem that cannot do USSD. + +import { expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { classifyUssdFailure, isPacketSwitchedOnly } from './refusal'; + +/** MM raises D-Bus errors whose `name` is the fully-qualified error name. */ +function dbusError(name: string, message = 'operation failed'): Error { + const error = new Error(message); + error.name = name; + return error; +} + +const CS_CAPABLE = { registered: true, csDomain: true, accessTechnologies: ['umts'] }; +const LTE_ONLY = { registered: true, csDomain: false, accessTechnologies: ['lte'] }; +const UNREAD = { registered: false }; + +test('an unsupported error on a CS-capable registration is a device limit', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported'), + CS_CAPABLE, + ); + expect(reason).toBe('unsupported'); +}); + +test('the SAME error on an LTE-only registration is reported as a carrier policy', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported'), + LTE_ONLY, + ); + expect(reason).toBe('lte-only-unsupported'); +}); + +test('a generic Core.Failed on an LTE-only registration is promoted too', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Failed', 'network rejected the request'), + LTE_ONLY, + ); + expect(reason).toBe('lte-only-unsupported'); +}); + +test('an UNREAD registration never earns the more specific claim', () => { + // "We did not look" is not evidence, so the honest answer stays the generic + // one. This is the property that makes the promotion above safe. + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported'), + UNREAD, + ); + expect(reason).toBe('unsupported'); +}); + +test('a not-registered failure is NOT promoted, on any registration', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.NoNetwork'), + LTE_ONLY, + ); + expect(reason).toBe('not-registered'); +}); + +test('a bus failure is NOT promoted and stays transport-failed', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure(new Error('D-Bus connection is not established'), LTE_ONLY); + expect(reason).toBe('transport-failed'); +}); + +test('an in-progress error is the busy session', () => { + expect( + classifyUssdFailure(dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.InProgress')), + ).toBe('session-busy'); +}); + +test('the transport timeout message classifies as a timeout', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + new Error('Method call Modem3gpp.Ussd.Initiate timed out after 45000ms'), + ); + expect(reason).toBe('timeout'); +}); + +test('a Core.Failed naming no active session is no-session, not carrier-rejected', () => { + const reason = classifyUssdFailure( + dbusError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Failed', 'no active USSD session'), + ); + expect(reason).toBe('no-session'); +}); + +test('an error carrying its D-Bus name on `dbusName` is read too', () => { + const error = Object.assign(new Error('boom'), { + dbusName: 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unsupported', + }); + expect(classifyUssdFailure(error, CS_CAPABLE)).toBe('unsupported'); +}); + +test('an unrecognised failure of any shape is transport-failed', () => { + expect(classifyUssdFailure('something went wrong')).toBe('transport-failed'); + expect(classifyUssdFailure(undefined)).toBe('transport-failed'); + expect(classifyUssdFailure({})).toBe('transport-failed'); +}); + +test('packet-switched-only needs evidence in BOTH directions', () => { + expect(isPacketSwitchedOnly(LTE_ONLY)).toBe(true); + expect( + isPacketSwitchedOnly({ registered: true, csDomain: false, accessTechnologies: ['5gnr'] }), + ).toBe(true); + // A CS domain that is present, unknown, or contradicted by a CS radio all + // answer false — the claim requires a positive absence. + expect(isPacketSwitchedOnly(CS_CAPABLE)).toBe(false); + expect(isPacketSwitchedOnly({ registered: true, accessTechnologies: ['lte'] })).toBe(false); + expect( + isPacketSwitchedOnly({ + registered: true, + csDomain: false, + accessTechnologies: ['lte', 'umts'], + }), + ).toBe(false); + expect(isPacketSwitchedOnly({ registered: true, csDomain: false, accessTechnologies: [] })).toBe( + false, + ); + expect( + isPacketSwitchedOnly({ registered: false, csDomain: false, accessTechnologies: ['lte'] }), + ).toBe(false); +}); diff --git a/control/src/ussd/refusal.ts b/control/src/ussd/refusal.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9129042 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/refusal.ts @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +// Why a USSD verb did not succeed — one typed vocabulary, and the classifier that +// maps ModemManager's own failure surface onto it. +// +// The point of typing these is that every member names a DIFFERENT thing the +// operator can do, and the one this module exists for is the honest reporting of +// a carrier that will not carry USSD at all on the registration the modem has. +// +// THE LTE-ONLY CASE, stated plainly. USSD is a circuit-switched supplementary +// service. A modem registered PS-only — LTE or 5G-SA with no CS domain and no +// CSFB — can only carry it if the operator deploys USSI (USSD over IMS, 3GPP TS +// 24.390); many do not, and the modem/network then answers a generic +// unsupported/failed error that is indistinguishable, on its face, from "this +// modem has no USSD interface". Reporting that as a device limitation would send +// an operator hunting for a firmware fix for a network policy, so the classifier +// takes the modem's REGISTRATION alongside the error and separates the two. +// +// Nothing here guesses: `lte-only-unsupported` is claimed ONLY when the +// registration is positively known to be PS-only. An unknown registration keeps +// the generic reason, because "we did not look" is not evidence. + +/** + * Every way a USSD verb can fail to do what the operator asked. + * + * unsupported — this modem exposes no USSD interface at all. + * lte-only-unsupported — the modem is registered PS-only (LTE/5G with no CS + * domain) and the network refused. NOT a device fault. + * carrier-rejected — the network refused for some other reason. + * not-registered — there is no network to carry the session. + * session-busy — a session is already open (locally or network-side). + * no-session — respond/cancel with nothing open. + * invalid-state — the verb is wrong for the state the session is in. + * timeout — the bounded wait elapsed with no answer. + * transport-failed — the bus call itself failed; the modem never answered. + */ +export const USSD_REFUSAL_REASONS = [ + 'unsupported', + 'lte-only-unsupported', + 'carrier-rejected', + 'not-registered', + 'session-busy', + 'no-session', + 'invalid-state', + 'timeout', + 'transport-failed', +] as const; +export type UssdRefusalReason = (typeof USSD_REFUSAL_REASONS)[number]; + +/** + * What the modem is registered on, as far as anyone has looked. + * + * `csDomain` is the load-bearing field: `false` means the modem is attached with + * NO circuit-switched domain available (LTE/5G-SA without CSFB), which is the + * registration on which a plain USSD refusal is a carrier-policy statement rather + * than a device one. `undefined` means nobody read it, and is never treated as + * `false`. + */ +export interface UssdRegistrationFacts { + readonly registered: boolean; + /** Is a circuit-switched domain available on this registration? */ + readonly csDomain?: boolean; + /** MM access technologies currently in use, lowercased (`lte`, `5gnr`, …). */ + readonly accessTechnologies?: readonly string[]; +} + +/** Access technologies that carry no circuit-switched domain of their own. */ +const PACKET_ONLY_RATS: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'lte', + '5gnr', + 'lte-cat-m', + 'lte-nb-iot', +]); + +/** + * True when the modem's registration positively cannot carry a circuit-switched + * service. Requires evidence in BOTH directions: something must say the CS domain + * is absent, and every technology in use must be a packet-only one. A modem that + * reported no technologies at all answers `false` — an empty list is a statement + * about the read. + */ +export function isPacketSwitchedOnly(facts: UssdRegistrationFacts): boolean { + if (!facts.registered) { + return false; + } + if (facts.csDomain !== false) { + return false; + } + const rats = facts.accessTechnologies; + if (rats === undefined || rats.length === 0) { + return false; + } + return rats.every((rat) => PACKET_ONLY_RATS.has(rat.toLowerCase())); +} + +/** + * ModemManager D-Bus error names this classifier recognises, matched on the + * SUFFIX after the last dot so a future `...Error.Core.Unsupported` regrouping + * does not silently fall through to `transport-failed`. + */ +const ERROR_SUFFIX_REASONS: ReadonlyMap = new Map< + string, + UssdRefusalReason +>([ + ['Unsupported', 'unsupported'], + ['NotSupported', 'unsupported'], + ['InProgress', 'session-busy'], + ['NoNetwork', 'not-registered'], + ['NotRegistered', 'not-registered'], + ['Timeout', 'timeout'], + ['Aborted', 'carrier-rejected'], + ['Failed', 'carrier-rejected'], +]); + +/** + * Message fragments that identify a refusal no error NAME distinguishes. MM + * folds several modem answers into `Core.Failed`, so the text is the only signal + * separating "the network said no" from "the bus call broke". + */ +const MESSAGE_REASONS: readonly (readonly [RegExp, UssdRefusalReason])[] = [ + [/ussd.*(?:not supported|unsupported)/i, 'unsupported'], + [/(?:session|operation) (?:already )?(?:active|in progress)/i, 'session-busy'], + [/no (?:active )?ussd session/i, 'no-session'], + [/not registered|no network/i, 'not-registered'], + [/timed? ?out/i, 'timeout'], + [/rejected|refused|denied|network error/i, 'carrier-rejected'], +]; + +function errorName(error: unknown): string | undefined { + if (typeof error !== 'object' || error === null) { + return undefined; + } + const name = (error as { dbusName?: unknown; name?: unknown }).dbusName; + if (typeof name === 'string' && name.includes('.')) { + return name; + } + const fallback = (error as { name?: unknown }).name; + return typeof fallback === 'string' && fallback.includes('.') ? fallback : undefined; +} + +function errorMessage(error: unknown): string { + if (error instanceof Error) { + return error.message; + } + if (typeof error === 'object' && error !== null) { + const message = (error as { message?: unknown }).message; + if (typeof message === 'string') { + return message; + } + } + return String(error); +} + +/** + * Classify a failed USSD call. Pure, total, never throws. + * + * Order is deliberate: the D-Bus error NAME is the strongest signal and is read + * first; the message text is consulted only for the names MM overloads; anything + * unrecognised stays `transport-failed`, which is the honest answer for a failure + * whose origin cannot be attributed to the network. + * + * The PS-only promotion runs LAST and applies to exactly the two reasons that are + * ambiguous between a device limit and a carrier policy — a `not-registered` or a + * bus failure is neither, and is left alone. + */ +export function classifyUssdFailure( + error: unknown, + registration: UssdRegistrationFacts = { registered: false }, +): UssdRefusalReason { + const name = errorName(error); + const suffix = name?.slice(name.lastIndexOf('.') + 1); + const message = errorMessage(error); + + let reason: UssdRefusalReason | undefined = + suffix === undefined ? undefined : ERROR_SUFFIX_REASONS.get(suffix); + + // `Core.Failed` is MM's catch-all, so its message is worth more than its name. + if (reason === undefined || reason === 'carrier-rejected') { + for (const [pattern, mapped] of MESSAGE_REASONS) { + if (pattern.test(message)) { + reason = mapped; + break; + } + } + } + + if (reason === undefined) { + return 'transport-failed'; + } + + const ambiguous = reason === 'unsupported' || reason === 'carrier-rejected'; + return ambiguous && isPacketSwitchedOnly(registration) ? 'lte-only-unsupported' : reason; +} diff --git a/control/src/ussd/registration.test.ts b/control/src/ussd/registration.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4667b80 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/registration.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +// Deriving the registration facts the USSD classifier needs. +// +// ModemManager publishes no "is a CS domain available" property, so this is the +// derivation that decides whether a refusal may be reported as a carrier policy +// rather than a device limit — and it must never over-claim. + +import { expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import type { DecodedManagedObjects } from '../backend/managed-objects'; +import { decodeAccessTechnologies, registrationFactsFromTree } from './registration'; + +const MODEM = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/0'; + +const LTE_BIT = 1 << 14; +const NR_BIT = 1 << 15; +const UMTS_BIT = 1 << 5; +const GSM_BIT = 1 << 1; + +function tree(options: { + registrationState?: number; + accessTechnologies?: number; +}): DecodedManagedObjects { + const modemProps: Array = []; + if (options.accessTechnologies !== undefined) { + modemProps.push(['AccessTechnologies', { signature: 'u', value: options.accessTechnologies }]); + } + const threeGppProps: Array = []; + if (options.registrationState !== undefined) { + threeGppProps.push(['RegistrationState', { signature: 'u', value: options.registrationState }]); + } + return [ + [ + MODEM, + [ + [MODEM_IFACE, modemProps], + [MODEM3GPP_IFACE, threeGppProps], + ], + ], + ] as unknown as DecodedManagedObjects; +} + +test('an LTE-only home registration is registered with NO circuit-switched domain', () => { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree( + tree({ registrationState: 1, accessTechnologies: LTE_BIT }), + MODEM, + ); + expect(facts).toEqual({ registered: true, csDomain: false, accessTechnologies: ['lte'] }); +}); + +test('a 5G-NR-only registration is packet-only too', () => { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree( + tree({ registrationState: 5, accessTechnologies: NR_BIT }), + MODEM, + ); + expect(facts.csDomain).toBe(false); + expect(facts.accessTechnologies).toEqual(['5gnr']); +}); + +test('a CSFB registration is CS-capable even while camped on LTE', () => { + // States 9/10 (`*_CSFB_NOT_PREFERRED`) are MM saying outright that the CS + // domain is reachable, so the radio in use does not get to overrule them. + for (const state of [9, 10]) { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree( + tree({ registrationState: state, accessTechnologies: LTE_BIT }), + MODEM, + ); + expect(facts.csDomain).toBe(true); + expect(facts.registered).toBe(true); + } +}); + +test('a UMTS registration is CS-capable', () => { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree( + tree({ registrationState: 1, accessTechnologies: UMTS_BIT }), + MODEM, + ); + expect(facts.csDomain).toBe(true); +}); + +test('an LTE registration with a CS radio also in use is CS-capable', () => { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree( + tree({ registrationState: 1, accessTechnologies: LTE_BIT | GSM_BIT }), + MODEM, + ); + expect(facts.csDomain).toBe(true); + expect(facts.accessTechnologies).toEqual(['gsm', 'lte']); +}); + +test('an UNREAD access-technology mask leaves the CS domain undeclared', () => { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree(tree({ registrationState: 1 }), MODEM); + expect(facts.registered).toBe(true); + expect(facts.csDomain).toBeUndefined(); + expect(facts.accessTechnologies).toBeUndefined(); +}); + +test('a zero mask is a read that named no radio, and declares nothing', () => { + const facts = registrationFactsFromTree( + tree({ registrationState: 1, accessTechnologies: 0 }), + MODEM, + ); + expect(facts.accessTechnologies).toEqual([]); + expect(facts.csDomain).toBeUndefined(); +}); + +test('a searching or denied modem is not registered', () => { + for (const state of [0, 2, 3, 4]) { + expect(registrationFactsFromTree(tree({ registrationState: state }), MODEM).registered).toBe( + false, + ); + } +}); + +test('a modem missing from the tree yields the unregistered default', () => { + expect(registrationFactsFromTree([], MODEM)).toEqual({ registered: false }); +}); + +test('the access-technology mask decodes every named bit', () => { + expect(decodeAccessTechnologies(LTE_BIT | NR_BIT)).toEqual(['lte', '5gnr']); + expect(decodeAccessTechnologies(1 << 16)).toEqual(['lte-cat-m']); + expect(decodeAccessTechnologies(1 << 17)).toEqual(['lte-nb-iot']); + expect(decodeAccessTechnologies(0)).toEqual([]); +}); diff --git a/control/src/ussd/registration.ts b/control/src/ussd/registration.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1a7ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/registration.ts @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +// Reading the registration facts the USSD refusal classifier needs. +// +// ModemManager publishes NO "is a circuit-switched domain available" property, so +// the fact has to be DERIVED — and the derivation is worth stating, because it is +// the difference between telling an operator their modem cannot do USSD and +// telling them their carrier will not carry it on this registration: +// +// * `Modem.AccessTechnologies` is a bitmask. When every bit in use is a +// packet-only radio (LTE, 5G-NR, LTE-M, NB-IoT) the modem is not camped on a +// circuit-switched radio at all. +// * `Modem3gpp.RegistrationState` still overrides that, because CS FALLBACK is +// exactly the case where an LTE-camped modem CAN reach the CS domain. MM has +// two states that say so outright — `HOME_CSFB_NOT_PREFERRED` (9) and +// `ROAMING_CSFB_NOT_PREFERRED` (10) — and a modem in either of them is +// reported CS-capable regardless of its radio. +// +// Both reads are best-effort and NEVER throw: a fact nobody could read is left +// `undefined`, which the classifier treats as "we did not look" rather than as a +// negative. That asymmetry is the whole safety property — an unread registration +// can only ever produce the generic refusal, never the more specific claim. + +import { MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE } from '../backend/constants'; +import { + type DecodedManagedObjects, + fetchManagedObjects, + findInterface, + numberProp, +} from '../backend/managed-objects'; +import type { DbusTransport } from '../transport'; +import type { UssdRegistrationFacts } from './refusal'; + +/** `MMModemAccessTechnology` bits this module names. */ +const ACCESS_TECHNOLOGY_BITS: readonly (readonly [number, string])[] = [ + [1 << 1, 'gsm'], + [1 << 2, 'gsm-compact'], + [1 << 3, 'gprs'], + [1 << 4, 'edge'], + [1 << 5, 'umts'], + [1 << 6, 'hsdpa'], + [1 << 7, 'hsupa'], + [1 << 8, 'hspa'], + [1 << 9, 'hspa-plus'], + [1 << 10, '1xrtt'], + [1 << 11, 'evdo0'], + [1 << 12, 'evdoa'], + [1 << 13, 'evdob'], + [1 << 14, 'lte'], + [1 << 15, '5gnr'], + [1 << 16, 'lte-cat-m'], + [1 << 17, 'lte-nb-iot'], +]; + +/** `MMModem3gppRegistrationState` values that mean the modem is on a network. */ +const REGISTERED_STATES: ReadonlySet = new Set([1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10]); + +/** …and the two that positively advertise a circuit-switched fallback. */ +const CSFB_STATES: ReadonlySet = new Set([9, 10]); + +/** Decode `Modem.AccessTechnologies` into the technology names in use. */ +export function decodeAccessTechnologies(mask: number): readonly string[] { + const names: string[] = []; + for (const [bit, name] of ACCESS_TECHNOLOGY_BITS) { + if ((mask & bit) !== 0) { + names.push(name); + } + } + return names; +} + +/** + * Derive the registration facts from an already-fetched managed-objects tree. + * + * Pure, so the derivation is testable against a fixture tree without a bus — the + * `sim-unlock.ts` split between "read the tree" and "decide from the tree". + */ +export function registrationFactsFromTree( + tree: DecodedManagedObjects, + modemPath: string, +): UssdRegistrationFacts { + const modem = findInterface(tree, modemPath, MODEM_IFACE); + const threeGpp = findInterface(tree, modemPath, MODEM3GPP_IFACE); + const registrationState = numberProp(threeGpp, 'RegistrationState'); + const accessMask = numberProp(modem, 'AccessTechnologies'); + + const registered = registrationState !== undefined && REGISTERED_STATES.has(registrationState); + const technologies = accessMask === undefined ? undefined : decodeAccessTechnologies(accessMask); + + // A CSFB registration is CS-capable outright. Otherwise the domain is only + // declared ABSENT when the radios in use were actually read and are all + // packet-only; an unread mask leaves the field undefined on purpose. + let csDomain: boolean | undefined; + if (registrationState !== undefined && CSFB_STATES.has(registrationState)) { + csDomain = true; + } else if (technologies !== undefined && technologies.length > 0) { + csDomain = technologies.some( + (rat) => rat !== 'lte' && rat !== '5gnr' && rat !== 'lte-cat-m' && rat !== 'lte-nb-iot', + ); + } + + return { + registered, + ...(csDomain === undefined ? {} : { csDomain }), + ...(technologies === undefined ? {} : { accessTechnologies: technologies }), + }; +} + +/** The unread default — every field withheld, so nothing can be claimed from it. */ +export const UNKNOWN_REGISTRATION: UssdRegistrationFacts = { registered: false }; + +/** + * Read the registration facts for one modem. Fail-soft: a tree we could not fetch + * yields {@link UNKNOWN_REGISTRATION}, which can only ever make the refusal LESS + * specific. + */ +export async function readUssdRegistrationFacts( + transport: DbusTransport, + destination: string, + modemPath: string, +): Promise { + try { + const tree = await fetchManagedObjects(transport, destination); + return registrationFactsFromTree(tree, modemPath); + } catch { + return UNKNOWN_REGISTRATION; + } +} diff --git a/control/src/ussd/session.test.ts b/control/src/ussd/session.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d06148 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/session.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +// The USSD session machine, one test per (state, event) cell. +// +// The table below is the CONTRACT, not a convenience: a USSD session is a scarce +// network-side resource, so "which verb is legal here" has a wrong answer that +// costs the operator a busy error they cannot explain. Every cell is enumerated +// and every cell is its own test, so adding a state or an event fails loudly +// (the exhaustiveness check at the bottom) instead of silently landing in a +// default branch. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + IDLE_SESSION, + isUssdSessionOpen, + reduceUssdSession, + USSD_SESSION_STATES, + type UssdSessionEvent, + type UssdSessionSnapshot, + type UssdSessionState, +} from './session'; + +const EVENTS = { + initiate: { kind: 'initiate' }, + respond: { kind: 'respond' }, + cancel: { kind: 'cancel' }, + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': { kind: 'replied', sessionState: 'awaiting-reply' }, + 'replied(active)': { kind: 'replied', sessionState: 'active' }, + 'replied(released)': { kind: 'replied', sessionState: 'released' }, + cancelled: { kind: 'cancelled' }, + 'network-released': { kind: 'network-released' }, + timeout: { kind: 'timeout' }, + failed: { kind: 'failed', reason: 'carrier-rejected' }, +} as const satisfies Record; + +type EventName = keyof typeof EVENTS; + +/** `open:` | `close:` | `refuse:`. */ +type Expected = string; + +const TABLE: Record> = { + idle: { + initiate: 'open:initiating', + respond: 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancel: 'refuse:no-session', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(active)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(released)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancelled: 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'network-released': 'refuse:no-session', + timeout: 'refuse:no-session', + failed: 'refuse:no-session', + }, + initiating: { + initiate: 'refuse:session-busy', + respond: 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancel: 'open:cancelling', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'open:awaiting-reply', + 'replied(active)': 'open:active', + 'replied(released)': 'close:completed', + cancelled: 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'network-released': 'close:completed', + timeout: 'close:timed-out', + failed: 'close:failed', + }, + active: { + initiate: 'refuse:session-busy', + respond: 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancel: 'open:cancelling', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(active)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(released)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancelled: 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'network-released': 'close:completed', + timeout: 'close:timed-out', + failed: 'close:failed', + }, + 'awaiting-reply': { + initiate: 'refuse:session-busy', + respond: 'open:responding', + cancel: 'open:cancelling', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(active)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(released)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancelled: 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'network-released': 'close:completed', + timeout: 'close:timed-out', + failed: 'close:failed', + }, + responding: { + initiate: 'refuse:session-busy', + respond: 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancel: 'open:cancelling', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'open:awaiting-reply', + 'replied(active)': 'open:active', + 'replied(released)': 'close:completed', + cancelled: 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'network-released': 'close:completed', + timeout: 'close:timed-out', + failed: 'close:failed', + }, + cancelling: { + initiate: 'refuse:session-busy', + respond: 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancel: 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(active)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + 'replied(released)': 'refuse:invalid-state', + cancelled: 'close:cancelled', + 'network-released': 'close:cancelled', + timeout: 'close:timed-out', + failed: 'close:failed', + }, + closed: { + initiate: 'refuse:no-session', + respond: 'refuse:no-session', + cancel: 'refuse:no-session', + 'replied(awaiting-reply)': 'refuse:no-session', + 'replied(active)': 'refuse:no-session', + 'replied(released)': 'refuse:no-session', + cancelled: 'refuse:no-session', + 'network-released': 'refuse:no-session', + timeout: 'refuse:no-session', + failed: 'refuse:no-session', + }, +}; + +/** + * Reach a state by DRIVING the machine from idle rather than casting a literal, + * so every state in the table is proven reachable through legal events. A cast + * would let an unreachable state sit in the table looking covered. + */ +function drive(events: readonly UssdSessionEvent[]): UssdSessionSnapshot { + let snapshot = IDLE_SESSION; + for (const event of events) { + const transition = reduceUssdSession(snapshot, event); + if (!transition.ok) { + throw new Error(`could not reach the state: ${event.kind} was refused`); + } + snapshot = transition.snapshot; + } + return snapshot; +} + +const PATHS: Record = { + idle: [], + initiating: [EVENTS.initiate], + active: [EVENTS.initiate, EVENTS['replied(active)']], + 'awaiting-reply': [EVENTS.initiate, EVENTS['replied(awaiting-reply)']], + responding: [EVENTS.initiate, EVENTS['replied(awaiting-reply)'], EVENTS.respond], + cancelling: [EVENTS.initiate, EVENTS.cancel], + closed: [EVENTS.initiate, EVENTS.timeout], +}; + +function describeTransition(transition: ReturnType): Expected { + if (!transition.ok) { + return `refuse:${transition.refusal}`; + } + const { state, outcome } = transition.snapshot; + return state === 'closed' ? `close:${outcome}` : `open:${state}`; +} + +describe('the USSD session transition table', () => { + for (const state of USSD_SESSION_STATES) { + const start = drive(PATHS[state]); + expect(start.state).toBe(state); + + for (const eventName of Object.keys(EVENTS) as EventName[]) { + const expected = TABLE[state][eventName]; + test(`${state} + ${eventName} -> ${expected}`, () => { + const transition = reduceUssdSession(start, EVENTS[eventName]); + expect(describeTransition(transition)).toBe(expected); + }); + } + } +}); + +test('the table covers every state and every event, and nothing more', () => { + expect(Object.keys(TABLE).sort()).toEqual([...USSD_SESSION_STATES].sort()); + const eventNames = Object.keys(EVENTS).sort(); + for (const state of USSD_SESSION_STATES) { + expect(Object.keys(TABLE[state]).sort()).toEqual(eventNames); + } +}); + +test('a refused verb leaves the machine untouched', () => { + const awaiting = drive(PATHS['awaiting-reply']); + const transition = reduceUssdSession(awaiting, EVENTS.initiate); + expect(transition.ok).toBe(false); + // The caller still holds the snapshot it passed in; nothing here mutates it. + expect(awaiting.state).toBe('awaiting-reply'); +}); + +test('a failed session carries its refusal onto the terminal state', () => { + const transition = reduceUssdSession(drive(PATHS.initiating), { + kind: 'failed', + reason: 'lte-only-unsupported', + }); + expect(transition.ok).toBe(true); + if (!transition.ok) return; + expect(transition.snapshot).toEqual({ + state: 'closed', + outcome: 'failed', + refusal: 'lte-only-unsupported', + }); +}); + +test('a completed session carries no refusal', () => { + const transition = reduceUssdSession(drive(PATHS.responding), EVENTS['replied(released)']); + expect(transition.ok).toBe(true); + if (!transition.ok) return; + expect(transition.snapshot.refusal).toBeUndefined(); + expect(transition.snapshot.outcome).toBe('completed'); +}); + +test('a session is open in every state but idle and closed', () => { + for (const state of USSD_SESSION_STATES) { + const expected = state !== 'idle' && state !== 'closed'; + expect(isUssdSessionOpen(drive(PATHS[state]))).toBe(expected); + } +}); diff --git a/control/src/ussd/session.ts b/control/src/ussd/session.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc79c2c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ussd/session.ts @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +// The USSD session state machine — pure, total, and the only place a session's +// legality is decided. +// +// USSD is a SESSION protocol, not a request/response one: `Initiate` opens a +// dialogue the network may keep open pending a `Respond`, and a session that is +// neither responded to nor cancelled stays open on the NETWORK side, consuming a +// scarce per-subscriber slot and blocking the next `Initiate` with a busy error. +// So "which verb is legal right now" is a real question with a real wrong answer, +// and answering it inside the D-Bus adapter would make it untestable without a +// bus. It lives here instead, as data. +// +// Everything the machine can be told is an EVENT and every answer is a +// TRANSITION — an illegal verb is REFUSED with a typed reason, never thrown and +// never silently ignored. A refusal at an RPC boundary must name what the caller +// can do about it; a throw becomes an opaque failure and a silent no-op becomes a +// UI that spins forever. +// +// The machine carries NO carrier text. The reply an operator sees is threaded by +// the adapter and redacted at every log boundary (`../redact`); keeping it out of +// the state entirely means a state snapshot can never leak one. + +import type { UssdRefusalReason } from './refusal'; + +/** + * Session states. + * + * Three of them (`idle`, `active`, `awaiting-reply`) mirror MM's own + * `MMModem3gppUssdSessionState`; the rest are LOCAL in-flight states, because MM + * has no state for "we dispatched a call and the reply has not landed". Without + * them a second `initiate` racing the first would be judged against `idle` and + * allowed through, which is exactly the double-open the network answers busy. + */ +export const USSD_SESSION_STATES = [ + /** No session. MM `IDLE`. */ + 'idle', + /** `Initiate` dispatched, reply outstanding. Local. */ + 'initiating', + /** Network answered and the session is open with nothing pending. MM `ACTIVE`. */ + 'active', + /** Network asked a question; a `Respond` is required. MM `USER_RESPONSE`. */ + 'awaiting-reply', + /** `Respond` dispatched, reply outstanding. Local. */ + 'responding', + /** `Cancel` dispatched, confirmation outstanding. Local. */ + 'cancelling', + /** Terminal for this session object. A new session starts from a new machine. */ + 'closed', +] as const; +export type UssdSessionState = (typeof USSD_SESSION_STATES)[number]; + +/** How a session that reached `closed` got there. */ +export const USSD_SESSION_OUTCOMES = [ + /** The network completed the dialogue and released the session. */ + 'completed', + /** The operator cancelled it. */ + 'cancelled', + /** No answer within the bound; the machine closed it locally. */ + 'timed-out', + /** The network or the modem refused. `refusal` names which. */ + 'failed', +] as const; +export type UssdSessionOutcome = (typeof USSD_SESSION_OUTCOMES)[number]; + +/** MM's post-call session state, decoded. */ +export type UssdRepliedState = 'awaiting-reply' | 'active' | 'released'; + +export type UssdSessionEvent = + /** The operator asked to open a session. */ + | { readonly kind: 'initiate' } + /** The operator answered a network prompt. */ + | { readonly kind: 'respond' } + /** The operator asked to close the session. */ + | { readonly kind: 'cancel' } + /** + * The network answered an `Initiate`/`Respond`. `sessionState` is MM's own + * post-call `Modem3gpp.Ussd.State`, decoded: the network either wants an + * answer, is holding the session open with nothing pending, or released it. + */ + | { readonly kind: 'replied'; readonly sessionState: UssdRepliedState } + /** A `Cancel` was confirmed by the modem. */ + | { readonly kind: 'cancelled' } + /** The network released the session without our asking (notification path). */ + | { readonly kind: 'network-released' } + /** The bounded wait elapsed with no answer. */ + | { readonly kind: 'timeout' } + /** The call failed. The reason is carried onto the terminal state verbatim. */ + | { readonly kind: 'failed'; readonly reason: UssdRefusalReason }; + +export interface UssdSessionSnapshot { + readonly state: UssdSessionState; + /** Present only at `closed`. */ + readonly outcome?: UssdSessionOutcome; + /** Present only at `closed` with outcome `failed`. */ + readonly refusal?: UssdRefusalReason; +} + +export type UssdTransition = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly snapshot: UssdSessionSnapshot } + /** The verb is not legal in this state, and the machine did NOT move. */ + | { readonly ok: false; readonly refusal: UssdRefusalReason }; + +export const IDLE_SESSION: UssdSessionSnapshot = { state: 'idle' }; + +/** States in which an operator verb may be dispatched at all. */ +const ACCEPTS_INITIATE: ReadonlySet = new Set(['idle']); +const ACCEPTS_RESPOND: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'awaiting-reply', +]); +const ACCEPTS_CANCEL: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'initiating', + 'active', + 'awaiting-reply', + 'responding', +]); + +/** States with a call in flight — the only ones a network answer may land on. */ +const IN_FLIGHT: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'initiating', + 'responding', +]); + +function open(state: UssdSessionState): UssdTransition { + return { ok: true, snapshot: { state } }; +} + +function close(outcome: UssdSessionOutcome, refusal?: UssdRefusalReason): UssdTransition { + return { + ok: true, + snapshot: { state: 'closed', outcome, ...(refusal === undefined ? {} : { refusal }) }, + }; +} + +function refuse(refusal: UssdRefusalReason): UssdTransition { + return { ok: false, refusal }; +} + +/** + * Apply one event. TOTAL: every (state, event) pair has an answer, and an answer + * is either a new snapshot or a typed refusal that leaves the machine untouched. + * + * A `closed` machine accepts NOTHING — not even another `cancel`. Re-opening a + * terminal session would hide the fact that the previous one ended, and the + * cost of a fresh machine is one object. + */ +export function reduceUssdSession( + snapshot: UssdSessionSnapshot, + event: UssdSessionEvent, +): UssdTransition { + const state = snapshot.state; + if (state === 'closed') { + return refuse('no-session'); + } + + // Every event except `initiate` describes something happening TO a session, + // and an idle machine has none for them to happen to. + const sessionOpen = state !== 'idle'; + + switch (event.kind) { + case 'initiate': + // A session already in flight or open is the busy case the network + // itself would answer — refused locally so no second dialogue is opened. + return ACCEPTS_INITIATE.has(state) ? open('initiating') : refuse('session-busy'); + + case 'respond': + // Responding to a session that never asked a question is not a busy + // device; it is the wrong verb, and `invalid-state` says so. + return ACCEPTS_RESPOND.has(state) ? open('responding') : refuse('invalid-state'); + + case 'cancel': + // The two refusals are different operator facts: nothing to close, vs a + // cancel that is already in flight. + if (ACCEPTS_CANCEL.has(state)) { + return open('cancelling'); + } + return refuse(sessionOpen ? 'invalid-state' : 'no-session'); + + case 'replied': + // A network answer that lands on a state with no call in flight is + // evidence of a lost reply or a duplicate; it is refused rather than + // used to resurrect a session the machine already moved past. + if (!IN_FLIGHT.has(state)) { + return refuse('invalid-state'); + } + // The three-way answer is the dialogue-vs-one-shot distinction, and + // collapsing `active` into `released` is what would leave a session MM + // still considers open dangling on the network side. + if (event.sessionState === 'released') { + return close('completed'); + } + return open(event.sessionState); + + case 'cancelled': + // Only a machine that asked to cancel may be closed by one, so a stray + // confirmation cannot tear down a live dialogue. + return state === 'cancelling' ? close('cancelled') : refuse('invalid-state'); + + case 'network-released': + // The network is authoritative about its own session, so this lands + // from anywhere the session is still open — including mid-call, where + // it is the honest end of a dialogue whose reply will not come. During + // a cancel it is reported as `cancelled`: the operator asked for the + // session to end and it ended. + if (!sessionOpen) { + return refuse('no-session'); + } + return close(state === 'cancelling' ? 'cancelled' : 'completed'); + + case 'timeout': + // The bound closes rather than reverting: after an unanswered call the + // network's own view is unknown, and pretending we are back at `idle` + // would let the next `initiate` walk into a busy error with no + // explanation. + return sessionOpen ? close('timed-out') : refuse('no-session'); + + case 'failed': + return sessionOpen ? close('failed', event.reason) : refuse('no-session'); + + default: { + const unreachable: never = event; + return unreachable; + } + } +} + +/** True while the session still holds a network dialogue open. */ +export function isUssdSessionOpen(snapshot: UssdSessionSnapshot): boolean { + return snapshot.state !== 'idle' && snapshot.state !== 'closed'; +} diff --git a/docs/ESIM-DECISION.md b/docs/ESIM-DECISION.md index 7c32a96..67bdd6f 100644 --- a/docs/ESIM-DECISION.md +++ b/docs/ESIM-DECISION.md @@ -1,7 +1,15 @@ # eSIM Decision Record (Investigate-Only) -**Status:** Investigation complete. Implementation explicitly deferred by user decision, 2026-08-13. -This document is the exit artifact for that investigation — see §8. +**Status:** **`blocked` — no eUICC-capable hardware exists on the fleet.** No eSIM code +ships and the feature gate stays off. + +| Date | Decision | Recorded in | +|---|---|---| +| 2026-08-13 | Implementation **deferred** by user decision; investigation closed as investigate-only. | §8 | +| 2026-08-18 | Deferral **reversed** by user decision, then closed **`blocked`** on a named hardware gap: no bench modem exposes an eUICC. The adoption spike could not run; its **licensing half did**, and is recorded. | §9 | + +§1–§7 are the 2026-08-13 research and stand unchanged. §8 records the first decision; +**§9 is the current one and supersedes §8's "that decision stands."** ## Why this document exists @@ -325,3 +333,190 @@ eSIM work is picked back up, it starts from verified findings instead of re-deri Nothing in this document should be read as a task list, a roadmap, or a set of "next steps to build." It is a closed research record. + +> **Superseded on 2026-08-18 — see §9.** The deferral above was reversed by user decision, +> and eSIM re-entered scope as a hardware-gated adoption spike. That spike could not run, +> so the outcome is not "still deferred by choice" but **`blocked` by a measured hardware +> gap**. The distinction matters: §8 is a scope decision, §9 is a hardware fact. + +--- + +## 9. 2026-08-18 — reversal, then `blocked`: no eUICC target exists; licensing review completed + +**Closing state: `blocked (named hardware gap from todo 2, B5)`.** + +This is one of the four legal outcome states for the phase's gated capability modules, and +eSIM is the only module permitted to use it. A `blocked` closure does **not** halt the +release wave — the feature gate simply stays off and this document says so truthfully. + +### 9.1 The hardware gap (the reason) + +The phase's hardware-prerequisites gate measured the entire bench fleet live on the board +(RK3588, ModemManager 1.24.2) and recorded item (b) as **BLOCKER B5 — no eUICC/eSIM-capable +modem on the fleet**: + +| Check | Measured result | +|---|---| +| SIMs present across the whole bench | exactly **one** — on the Quectel RM530N-GL. Every other modem reads `sim-missing`. | +| That SIM's ModemManager property set | `active`, `imsi`, `iccid`, `operator id` — **no `eid`** | +| Interpretation | MM 1.24.2 reports an `eid` property for an eUICC. Its absence is **positive evidence of a classic removable UICC**, not merely missing data. | +| RM530N-GL eUICC capability | **UNPROVEN** for this unit and firmware (`RM530NGLAAR05A01M4G`). Consistent with §6: Quectel's own support staff state the module "doesn't have eSIM… it should be physical eSIM installed in SIM slot or soldered MFF2 SIM." | +| Any other fleet modem with an eUICC | none — a `sim-missing` modem cannot present one | + +Nothing on the bench can hold, receive, or report an eUICC profile. + +### 9.2 What that does to the spike — `blocked`, which is NOT a NO-GO + +The spike had four questions: lpac↔ModemManager coexistence, device/APDU access on a +certified eUICC target, arm64 packaging, and licensing. Three of the four are hardware +questions: + +| Spike step | Status | Why | +|---|---|---| +| lpac builds/runs on arm64, version captured | **not run** | Executable in isolation, but it is not evidence *toward the verdict* — it would prove a binary starts, not that lpac can reach an eUICC or share the port with MM. Running it would mean installing an AGPL-3.0 binary on the bench to answer a question nobody asked. | +| APDU/QMI channel opens against the certified eUICC target, MM inhibited | **impossible** | There is no eUICC target to open a channel to. | +| Port arbitration — MM regains the modem cleanly after lpac exits | **impossible** | Depends on the step above having run. | +| Licensing review | **COMPLETE** — §9.3 | Research, not hardware. It ran. | + +**Therefore no GO/NO-GO verdict is recorded, and none may be inferred.** A NO-GO would be a +technical judgment that lpac cannot work here; nothing was measured that would support such +a judgment. The spike did not resolve — it could not start. That is precisely what `blocked` +means, and it is why this todo closes `blocked` rather than `re-deferred` (a scope choice) or +`NO-GO` (a verdict). + +**Consequence, stated explicitly:** with no GO verdict, none of the GO-path delivery ships. +There is **no** `ceralive-lpac` `.deb`, **no** row added to the packaging closure, **no** +release-manifest entry, **no** apt publication, and **no** image package pin. The +modem-stack release manifest stays at `closure_version: 2` with its frozen matrix, untouched +by this decision. + +### 9.3 Licensing review — the half that could run (and did) + +Re-verified against upstream on **2026-08-18**, not carried over from §5. + +**Primary sources, fetched this session:** + +- `REUSE.toml` at [`estkme-group/lpac@main`](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/estkme-group/lpac/main/REUSE.toml) + — confirmed **unchanged** from what §5 recorded on 2026-08-13: + + | Path glob | SPDX identifier | + |---|---| + | `src/**`, `driver/**`, `utils/**` | **`AGPL-3.0-only`** | + | `euicc/**` | `LGPL-2.1-only OR LicenseRef-ESTKME-Commercial` | + | `docs/**`, `cmake/**`, `CMakeLists.txt`, `README.md`, `.github/**`, tool configs | `MIT` | + | `cjson-ext/**` | `MIT` | + | `dlfcn-win32/**` | `MIT` (Ramiro Polla + contributors) | + +- GitHub's own repository metadata + ([API](https://api.github.com/repos/estkme-group/lpac)) reports + `license.spdx_id: "AGPL-3.0"` for the project as a whole. The + `/license` endpoint returns **404** — there is no single detectable top-level `LICENSE` + file, because the project is REUSE-structured rather than single-licensed. +- [`LICENSES/`](https://github.com/estkme-group/lpac/tree/main/LICENSES) carries six license + texts: `AGPL-3.0-only`, `LGPL-2.1-only`, `GPL-2.0-only`, `MIT`, `CC0-1.0`, and + `LicenseRef-ESTKME-Commercial`. That last one reads, in full: *"Non-public commercial + license, please contact ESTKME TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, Hong Kong for details via + inquiry@estk.me."* It is the paid alternative to LGPL-2.1 for `euicc/**` and is + irrelevant to us — LGPL-2.1-only is acceptable, so the commercial branch never applies. + +**Verdict 1 — the program logic is AGPL-3.0-only, so lpac can only ever be an external +process.** This re-confirms §5's boundary against live upstream state: lpac must be +spawned as a separate binary over its CLI, and must **never** be linked, statically +embedded, or otherwise combined into `cerastream`, `CeraUI`, or +`@ceralive/modem-control`. None of those are AGPL-licensed and none may become so. + +**Verdict 2 — redistributing lpac is permitted, but it is not free of obligations.** AGPL-3.0 +is a free-software license and Debian carries lpac in `main` (§9.4), so redistribution is +clearly allowed. Two obligations attach: + +- **Corresponding Source, from the same place (AGPL-3.0 §6).** Conveying object code + requires the Corresponding Source under one of §6(a)–(e); for network distribution the + applicable option is **§6(d)** — equivalent access to the source *at the same place*, at + no further charge. `apt.ceralive.tv` today publishes **binary indexes only** + (`binary-arm64` / `binary-amd64`); there is no source channel in the closure at all. So + publishing an lpac `.deb` there would require **adding a source channel** (or an + equivalent §6(b) written offer) before the first upload — an infrastructure precondition, + not a paperwork detail. Recording it now means a future GO does not discover it late. +- **§13 attaches only to *modified* versions.** AGPL-3.0 §13's obligation to offer + Corresponding Source to users interacting with the program remotely over a network is + written against a version *you modified*. Shipping lpac **unmodified** and driving it by + subprocess does not trigger that clause. Patch it even once, however, and the CeraUI web + surface driving it makes §13 a live, continuous obligation. **Policy, therefore: ship + lpac unmodified or not at all** — which happens to be exactly what `POLICY.md`'s no-fork + rule already demands of every package in `packaging/`. The licensing constraint and the + existing repo policy point the same direction; no new rule is needed. + +**Observation (flagged, not adjudicated) — one vendored file is `GPL-2.0-only`.** +[`utils/lpac/list.h`](https://github.com/estkme-group/lpac/blob/main/utils/lpac/list.h) +carries an inline `SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only` with +`SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Linux Project` — the kernel's linked-list header — inside a +directory that `REUSE.toml` annotates as `AGPL-3.0-only`. GPLv2-only is +[documented by the FSF](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.html#v2v3Compatibility) as +incompatible with GPLv3-family terms for combination into a single work. This is an +**upstream** question, not a CeraLive one, and Debian's acceptance of lpac into `main` +strongly suggests ftp-master's copyright review already addressed it. It is recorded here +so a future GO-stage review **reads Debian's `debian/copyright` for `lpac`** instead of +re-deriving the analysis — and does not treat §9.3 as having cleared it. Nothing here is +legal advice; a real adoption decision gets counsel review of the whole file set. +(`CC0-1.0.txt` is likewise present in `LICENSES/` with no annotation naming it; the files +it covers were not located in this review.) + +### 9.4 Shipping form — decided in principle, moot in practice + +The todo made the licensing verdict the input that decides the shipping form. It does, but +so does availability, and the availability answer is the one that changed since §5. + +**lpac is now packaged in Debian — but not in a suite we ship.** + +| Channel | State (checked 2026-08-18) | Source | +|---|---|---| +| Debian archive | source `lpac` **2.3.0-1** in `main`, binaries **amd64 / arm64 / armhf** — present in **testing + unstable only**; **absent from bookworm and trixie** | [tracker.debian.org/pkg/lpac](https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/lpac) | +| Ubuntu | source `lpac` 2.3.0-1 in `universe`, amd64 / arm64 / armhf | [launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lpac](https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lpac) | +| Upstream release artifacts | **v2.3.0 (2025-08-15)**, including Linux **aarch64** ZIPs and an upstream-built **`lpac_2.3.0_arm64.deb`** | [releases/tag/v2.3.0](https://github.com/estkme-group/lpac/releases/tag/v2.3.0) | +| Others | Alpine `community` (aarch64), OpenWrt `packages` feed (2.3.0-2), Nixpkgs 2.3.0, AUR (`lpac`, `lpac-git`). **Absent** from Arch official repos and from Fedora. | [Alpine](https://pkgs.alpinelinux.org/package/v3.20/community/aarch64/lpac) · [OpenWrt](https://github.com/openwrt/packages/blob/master/utils/lpac/Makefile) · [Nixpkgs](https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/master/pkgs/by-name/lp/lpac/package.nix) · [AUR](https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/lpac) | +| Build from source | CMake (`cmake -B build`; `-DSTANDALONE_MODE=ON` for a relocatable install). Build deps per Debian's control: `cmake`, `libcurl4-openssl-dev`, `libpcsclite-dev`, QMI/QRTR dev libraries, `zip`. | [docs/DEVELOPERS.md](https://github.com/estkme-group/lpac/blob/main/docs/DEVELOPERS.md) · [Debian control](https://tracker.debian.org/media/packages/l/lpac/control-2.3.0-1) | + +Ranked the same way the bench's `uhubctl` delivery decision was ranked — stock distro +package first, first-party build only if that fails: + +1. **Stock Debian package — preferred, but currently unavailable to us.** Ruled out by + *suite*, not by licence: 2.3.0-1 exists only in testing/unstable, and this stack's + packaging targets bookworm. Revisit on any suite move; this is the option that would + cost the least. +2. **Upstream's own `lpac_2.3.0_arm64.deb` — rejected as a shipping form.** It is not built + by us, not covered by `packaging/upstream-pins.yaml`'s four-link provenance chain, and + not signed by our key. Adopting it would put a binary into the device image through a + path every other `.deb` in this repo is forbidden to use. +3. **First-party bookworm rebuild in `modem-stack/packaging/` — the recommended form on a + future GO.** It is not a new model: Debian now maintains a `debian/` recipe (2.3.0-1) + that can be pinned and rebuilt for bookworm exactly like ModemManager, libmbim, libqmi, + and libqrtr-glib already are — same zero-patch rule, same provenance chain, same + two-set package model. The one genuinely new requirement is the AGPL §6(d) source + channel from §9.3. + +**All three are moot today.** No GO verdict exists, so nothing ships, and this subsection +is a decision recorded *in advance* for whoever picks eSIM back up — not authorization to +build anything. + +### 9.5 What would unblock this + +The gate is one piece of hardware. Two ways to clear it, cheapest first: + +1. **A removable eUICC card in an existing bench modem.** Per §4 path 1, a programmable + eUICC in plastic form factor (eSTK.me, ST4SIM, or similar) dropped into the Quectel + RM530N-GL's SIM slot gives the bench a real EID to read — no new modem required. It also + unlocks a second, better-behaved route: with a **PC/SC reader**, lpac's *default* `pcsc` + backend reaches the card entirely outside ModemManager, which sidesteps the port- + arbitration question for the inventory/EID half of the spike and isolates the + coexistence question to the modem-slot path only. +2. **A modem with a genuine on-board eUICC**, per §6's reality table — noting that entry's + central warning: eUICC presence is a per-SKU/per-firmware fact, so a datasheet claim is + not acceptance. The unit still has to clear §7's checklist. + +With either in hand, §7 step 1 (EID read) becomes runnable, and the spike's three blocked +steps become answerable. Until then this record stands as written. + +**The question put to the user, verbatim:** *"No modem on the bench exposes an eUICC — the +only SIM present reports no `eid`, and RM530N-GL eSIM capability is unproven for this unit. +Can you supply an eUICC-capable modem (or confirm the RM530N-GL variant on the bench has +one)? Otherwise eSIM closes `blocked` with its feature gate off and the docs stating so."* diff --git a/docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md b/docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1675ffb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +# FCC-unlock coverage matrix + +Which modems ModemManager can FCC-unlock, and which of them CeraLive actually has. + +**Status:** `[EXISTS]` — the matrix below is derived from ModemManager **1.24.2** +(`packaging/upstream-pins.yaml`), the exact release this repository rebuilds, and +from the live bench inventory captured on `ceralive2` (2026-08-17). Nothing here is +recalled or inferred from documentation. + +--- + +## 1. What an FCC unlock is, and what ModemManager does about it + +Some modems ship from the factory in a state where the radio refuses to transmit +until a vendor-specific unlock command is sent. The lock is a **regulatory** +(FCC-certification) interlock, not a SIM lock, and it **re-applies on every power +cycle** — a modem that needs it needs it again after every boot. + +Since **1.18.4** ModemManager no longer performs that unlock automatically. It +ships the vendor procedures as *disabled* scripts and requires an explicit, +per-device opt-in. There are **three directories**, and only the last two are +consulted at runtime: + +| Tier | Path (Debian) | Role | +|---|---|---| +| **available** | `/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d/` | shipped-but-INERT. ModemManager owns it. Nothing here ever runs. | +| **enabled — admin** | `/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/` | the ADMIN opt-in tier. **This is the tier CeraLive uses.** | +| **enabled — package** | `${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/` (multiarch) | the tier a distribution package would own. **CeraLive ships nothing here, ever.** | + +The dispatcher (`src/mm-dispatcher-fcc-unlock.c`) builds ONE filename — + +```c +filename = g_strdup_printf ("%04x:%04x", vid, pid); +``` + +— and looks for exactly that name in the admin tier first, then the package tier. +**It consults no other name.** A vendor-only file (`2c7c`) is therefore never +opened by the dispatcher; it is only ever the *target* of a `:` link. + +### The available tier is 4 scripts and 14 links + +`data/dispatcher-fcc-unlock/` in ModemManager 1.24.2 contains four real scripts, +one per vendor, and the build installs a `:` symlink onto the right one +for every model the vendor script covers (`meson.build`, the `vidpids` dict). + +| Vendor script | Talks to the modem via | +|---|---| +| `105b` (Foxconn) | `mbimcli` | +| `1199` (Sierra Wireless) | `qmicli` | +| `14c3` (MediaTek / Fibocom) | `mbimcli` | +| `2c7c` (Quectel) | `qmicli` | + +**Runtime dependency — asserted, not assumed.** Those scripts call `qmicli` and +`mbimcli`, which are shipped by `libqmi-utils` and `libmbim-utils`. Both are +members of the frozen nine-package runtime closure this repository builds and +`apt-worker` publishes (`packaging/ci/expected-packages.txt`, +`apt-worker/scripts/modem-closure-lib.sh`), so the unlock path can never be +activated on a device that lacks its own interpreter. A device that somehow did +would see the dispatcher fail loudly rather than silently no-op. + +--- + +## 2. ModemManager 1.24.2's complete shipped mapping (14 entries) + +Every `:` ModemManager 1.24.2 can unlock. There are no others. + +| `:` | Vendor script | Device | +|---|---|---| +| `03f0:4e1d` | `1199` | HP lt4120 / lt4132 (Sierra silicon, HP-branded) | +| `105b:e0ab` | `105b` | Foxconn T77W968 (Fibocom L850-GL class) | +| `105b:e0c3` | `105b` | Foxconn T99W175 (Snapdragon X55 class) | +| `1199:9079` | `1199` | Sierra Wireless EM7455 / MC7455 | +| `14c3:4d75` | `14c3` | Fibocom FM350-GL — **PCIe/MediaTek identity** | +| `1eac:1001` | `2c7c` | Quectel-silicon OEM rebrand | +| `1eac:1004` | `2c7c` | Quectel-silicon OEM rebrand | +| `1eac:1007` | `2c7c` | Quectel-silicon OEM rebrand | +| `2c7c:030a` | `2c7c` | Quectel EM120R-GL | +| `2c7c:0313` | `2c7c` | Quectel EM160R-GL | +| `2c7c:0314` | `2c7c` | Quectel EM060K-GL | +| `2c7c:0801` | `2c7c` | **Quectel RM520N-GL / RM530N-GL** | +| `413c:81a3` | `1199` | Dell DW5811e (Sierra silicon, Dell-branded) | +| `413c:81a8` | `1199` | Dell DW5816e (Sierra silicon, Dell-branded) | + +**Vendor-branding is per-PID, and that is the trap.** Sierra silicon appears three +times under three different vendor ids (`1199`, `03f0`, `413c`) because HP and Dell +re-badge the USB descriptor. A rule keyed on the vendor id alone would miss two of +the three; a rule keyed on the model would miss the OEM rebrands. The dispatcher's +`:` key is the only correct one, which is why CeraLive's policy keys on +it too. + +--- + +## 3. The CeraLive bench fleet against that mapping + +Captured live on `ceralive2` (RK3588, kernel `7.1.7-ceralive-rk3588`, 2026-08-17 — +`.omo` todo-2 hardware gate). Every VID:PID below was read from the device, not +from a datasheet. + +| Device | `:` | Covered by MM 1.24.2? | Notes | +|---|---|---|---| +| **Quectel RM530N-GL** | `2c7c:0801` | ✅ **YES** — `2c7c` script | The one fleet modem with a shipped unlock procedure. | +| Fibocom FM350-GL (via M.2→USB adapter) | `0e8d:7127` | ❌ no | MM covers the FM350's **PCIe** identity `14c3:4d75`. On the USB adapter the carrier board re-enumerates it under MediaTek's `0e8d` vendor id, which is **not** in the mapping. See `docs/FM350-DECISION.md`. | +| SIMCom SIM7600G-H R2 | `1e0e:9001` | ❌ no | SIMCom ships no MM unlock script. | +| Huawei E3372 HiLink (twin A) | `12d1:14dc` | ❌ no | Router-mode dongle; no AT/QMI control port for a script to use. | +| Huawei E3372 HiLink (twin B) | `12d1:14dc` | ❌ no | Same model, same answer — the toggle is per MODEL, so the twins are inseparable by construction. | +| ZTE MF79U-class | `19d2:1405` | ❌ no | Router-mode dongle. | +| Qualcomm dual-mode stick (`2b16081`) | `05c6:9024` ⇄ `05c6:9091` | ❌ no | Generic Qualcomm reference ids; both compositions are uncovered. | +| Qualcomm dual-mode stick (`c6125db3`) | `05c6:9091` | ❌ no | Same. | + +**Coverage: 1 of 8 fleet devices.** That number is the reason this module is +capability-gated per model rather than offered device-wide: on seven of the eight, +turning it on would create a symlink the dispatcher would never open. + +--- + +## 4. Common market modems not in the fleet + +For operators buying hardware, the same matrix from the buyer's side. "Covered" +means an unlock procedure ships with ModemManager 1.24.2 and can be activated by +the CeraLive toggle. + +| Modem | `:` | Covered? | +|---|---|---| +| Quectel RM520N-GL / RM530N-GL | `2c7c:0801` | ✅ | +| Quectel EM160R-GL | `2c7c:0313` | ✅ | +| Quectel EM120R-GL | `2c7c:030a` | ✅ | +| Quectel EM060K-GL | `2c7c:0314` | ✅ | +| Sierra Wireless EM7455 / MC7455 | `1199:9079` | ✅ | +| Dell DW5811e / DW5816e | `413c:81a3` / `413c:81a8` | ✅ | +| HP lt4120 / lt4132 | `03f0:4e1d` | ✅ | +| Foxconn T77W968 / T99W175 | `105b:e0ab` / `105b:e0c3` | ✅ | +| Fibocom FM350-GL (native PCIe) | `14c3:4d75` | ✅ | +| Fibocom FM350-GL (USB carrier) | `0e8d:7127` | ❌ | +| Quectel EC25 / EG25-G | `2c7c:0125` | ❌ — not FCC-locked; no script needed | +| SIMCom SIM7600 family | `1e0e:9001` | ❌ | +| Huawei / ZTE router-mode dongles | `12d1:*` / `19d2:*` | ❌ | +| Telit LN940 / LM940 | `1bc7:*` | ❌ | + +A modem in the ❌ rows is not necessarily locked — most consumer dongles never +were. The absence of a script means only that ModemManager has no procedure to +run, so CeraLive offers no toggle. + +--- + +## 5. What CeraLive does with this + +### The policy of record lives in `/data`, not in `/etc` + +`/etc` is on the rootfs, and the rootfs is what a RAUC A/B slot swap REPLACES +(`image-building-pipeline/docs/partition-contract.md`). A symlink written into +`/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/` therefore survives a reboot and does **not** +survive an OTA. `/data` is the only update-surviving store, so the durable record +is a file there: + +``` +/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json mode 0600 +``` + +```json +{ "schemaVersion": 1, "savedAtMs": 1755500000000, "unlock": { "2c7c:0801": true } } +``` + +The symlink is a *derived artifact*, re-created from that file on every boot by +`ceralive-fcc-reconcile` (a oneshot ordered `Before=ModemManager.service`, with +`RequiresMountsFor=/data` and `After=ceralive-migrate-data.service` so it can never +race an unmounted or unmigrated `/data` and silently skip an enabled model). + +### Default-OFF is absolute + +- No key present ⇒ no symlink ⇒ no unlock. An absent policy file is exactly this. +- A malformed policy is treated as absent — fail-safe, never fail-open. A file we + cannot read must not be read as consent to touch a regulatory-locked radio. +- **CeraLive authors no unlock script.** Not in `/etc`, not in the multiarch + package tier, not anywhere. If one is ever needed it ships INACTIVE alongside + ModemManager's own `available.d` and is activated through the same per-model + opt-in — there is no second mechanism. +- Automation is confined to ModemManager's own dispatcher. There is no CeraLive + startup AT channel, and the AT-lease engine is not involved. + +### The toggle is per MODEL, and the UI says so + +The mechanism is a symlink named `:`, so it applies to **every attached +device matching that VID:PID** — the two Huawei twins on this bench are the shape +of the problem, and no per-unit refinement is possible without changing +ModemManager. The toggle is therefore modelled and labelled per model, and the +disclosure is part of the control rather than a footnote. + +### Enabling has no retroactive effect + +ModemManager runs the dispatcher during modem *initialization*. A modem already +enumerated when the toggle flips is not re-processed, so the toggle RPC performs a +re-probe (`mmcli -m --disable && --enable`) under the mutation lease; a replug +has the same effect. + +--- + +## 6. Certification status + +| Claim | State | +|---|---| +| The policy store, the reconciler and the per-model toggle behave as documented | proven by unit tests + the packaging chroot contract | +| The reconciler activates the right link on a real board before ModemManager starts | **bench-gated** — see `.omo/notepads/modem-phase-c-quality/evidence/todo33.md` | +| An actually-FCC-locked modem is unlocked on every boot | **BLOCKED — no such modem exists on this bench.** Todo 2's hardware gate `needs-user N2` recorded the search: three modems `failed`/`sim-missing`, one `searching`, and `journalctl -u ModemManager \| grep -iE 'fcc\|unlock'` produced only SIM-absence lines and **no FCC-lock line at all**. The FM350-GL — the likeliest candidate — cannot be distinguished while no SIM is present. The **no-op path** is what gets tested, which is the outcome this work anticipated. | + +The claim this documentation may make is therefore: *the opt-in mechanism is +implemented and its no-op path is proven.* It is not: *CeraLive unlocks +FCC-locked modems.* That second sentence needs an FCC-locked modem on a bench. diff --git a/packaging/README.md b/packaging/README.md index 365ddcc..9950715 100644 --- a/packaging/README.md +++ b/packaging/README.md @@ -110,7 +110,26 @@ ModemManager 1.24 exposes **no vendor `conf.d` tier** — verified against the p packaging, whose only `/etc` surface is the D-Bus policy file. Its documented per-device configuration mechanism is udev properties, so CeraLive's MM-directed configuration rides the packaged rules file rather than a conf snippet. ModemManager's own available FCC-unlock -tier (`/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d`) receives nothing from this package. +tier (`/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d`) receives nothing from this package. + +### The FCC-unlock tiers, and which one the reconciler owns + +ModemManager has THREE fcc-unlock directories and consults only two of them. Getting the +pair wrong is silent — a link in the wrong place is simply never opened: + +| Tier | Path (Debian) | Who owns it | +|---|---|---| +| available | `/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d/` | ModemManager. Shipped-but-INERT; nothing here ever runs. | +| enabled — **admin** | `/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/` | **this package's reconciler**, and only from an operator opt-in | +| enabled — package | `${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/` (multiarch) | a distribution package. **CeraLive writes here never.** | + +`src/mm-dispatcher-fcc-unlock.c` builds ONE filename, `g_strdup_printf("%04x:%04x", vid, +pid)`, and looks for it in the admin tier then the package tier. It opens no other name, +so a vendor-only file (`2c7c`) is never a dispatcher target — it exists only as what the +available tier's `:` symlinks point AT. The policy therefore keys on +`:` too, and the reconciler refuses a vendor-only key. + +Full coverage matrix and the fleet verdicts: [`../docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md`](../docs/FCC-UNLOCK-COVERAGE.md). ### The udev basename hazard (read before renaming anything) @@ -136,7 +155,8 @@ A clean chroot has no sysfs devices and no running daemons, so the contract is s * **CHROOT stage** — [`ci/test-companion-chroot.sh`](ci/test-companion-chroot.sh), run in a clean `debian:trixie` container: fresh install, declared-inventory equality, chroot guard (with a non-vacuity leg), single-owner `dpkg -S`, `/etc` override precedence, both - override-removal branches, the FCC absent/enabled/malformed matrix, upgrade with no + override-removal branches, the FCC absent/enabled/opt-out/malformed/foreign-file matrix + (against the real `/etc` admin tier and `:` keys), upgrade with no conffile prompt, downgrade, and purge-with-zero-leftovers. * **CONSUMER stage** — bench-board only: `udevadm test` against a real modem's sysfs path, `usb_modeswitch -c`, `systemd-analyze verify` + `systemctl is-enabled` + a real boot's @@ -175,6 +195,7 @@ rule refuses. | [`ci/test-package-contract.sh`](ci/test-package-contract.sh) | The **package contract suite** over the A5.1 build output. `test-package-contract.sh ` launches a `debian:bookworm` container and runs: metadata/arch over the 9-package closure (revision-exact — every deb's base must equal its `read-pin.sh` `-`); clean-bookworm `apt-get install ./*.deb`; upgrade (stock 1.20.4 → ceralive set) with a **direction-aware** `--allow-downgrades` (computed per-package from real `dpkg --compare-versions` vs `madison` stock — post-bump every source sorts ABOVE stock, so the flag is dropped); rollback (`madison`-derived stock versions + `--allow-downgrades`); coherence (identical `~ceralive` suffix + mismatched-libqmi negative); real ordering proofs; tag-guard negative; piuparts-style install→purge leftover-scan. All version literals are `read-pin.sh`-derived. amd64 = full; arm64 defaults to `metadata` mode (`CONTRACT_MODE=full` forces the apt scenarios under QEMU). | | [`ci/daemon-smoke.sh`](ci/daemon-smoke.sh) | The **daemon smoke**. `daemon-smoke.sh ` installs system D-Bus + polkit + NetworkManager (bookworm 1.42.4) and the built MM debs, starts a system `dbus-daemon` + `ModemManager`, then asserts: `busctl introspect` shows the root `ObjectManager`; `mmcli --version` matches the **pinned** ModemManager upstream version (via `ci/read-pin.sh`, never hardcoded); the udev-rules + FCC-unlock dispatcher dirs exist; and — **functional GI validation**, not presence-only (it installs `python3-gi valac build-essential pkg-config`) — the `gir1.2-modemmanager-1.0` typelib **loads** through PyGObject (`gi.require_version('ModemManager','1.0')` + a real `ModemManager.ModemCapability.LTE` enum read) and the `libmm-glib` `.vapi` **compiles+links** via `valac -C` → `cc $(pkg-config --cflags --libs mm-glib)` against a Vala program that genuinely calls a libmm-glib symbol (a broken/absent GI-1.74 adaptation fails closed here). amd64 by default. | | [`ci/build-companion.sh`](ci/build-companion.sh) | Builds the first-party `ceralive-modem-support` companion `.deb` — ONCE, `Architecture: all`, into `build/all/`. Container by default (`debian:bookworm`), `--native` for the local QA loop. `RELEASE_VERSION=vX.Y.Z` → Version `X.Y.Z` (unset → `0.0.0~dev`), injected into a COPY of the changelog. Fails closed if the produced deb's `Architecture` is not `all` or its `Version` is not the requested one. | +| [`ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh`](ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh) | The FCC reconciler's **behaviour** contract, runnable on any host with no container and no root: every path is redirected into a scratch tree via `CERALIVE_FCC_{POLICY_FILE,AVAILABLE_DIR,ACTIVE_DIR}`. Covers absent/malformed/opt-out/idempotence, the one-model policy that must not parse as empty, the refused vendor-only key, an enabled model MM ships no script for, and both foreign-entry cases (a real file and a symlink pointing outside the available tier). Complements — never replaces — the chroot contract, which proves the same logic from the PACKAGED location after a real `dpkg` install. | | [`ci/test-companion-chroot.sh`](ci/test-companion-chroot.sh) | The companion's **CHROOT-stage** contract in a clean `debian:trixie` container: install / declared-inventory equality / chroot guard (+ non-vacuity) / single-owner `dpkg -S` / `/etc` override precedence / both override-removal branches / FCC absent-enabled-malformed matrix / upgrade with no conffile prompt / downgrade / purge with zero leftovers. Builds 0.9.0 and 1.1.0 so the upgrade and downgrade legs exercise real dpkg. The consumer stage is bench-gated. | | [`ci/companion-inventory.txt`](ci/companion-inventory.txt) | The companion's frozen declared file inventory, compared for EQUALITY by the chroot QA — an added, dropped or relocated asset fails the gate naming itself. | | [`ci/generate-release-manifest.sh`](ci/generate-release-manifest.sh) | Emits the **manifest-complete per-release manifest** (`generate-release-manifest.sh ` → `dist/release-manifest.txt`): a checksum row for **every** built deb (both arches), the 9-package runtime closure MARKED (`role=runtime`, the rest `role=aux`) — the `build_arch package source version role filename sha256` matrix Phase-B apt publication AND `create-release` asset reconciliation consume. Emits **`closure_version: 2`** — the versioned contract apt-worker validates against — which adds the `Architecture: all` companion as ONE row with `build_arch` `all`, alongside the unchanged 9 × 2 arch-dependent rows. Build architecture and index membership are separate: `all` enters EVERY index arch, anything else its own. Per-source equality is scoped by `[arch-all sources]` so `build/all` is checked against the companion only and `build/` against the four upstream sources only. Fails closed on any set drift. dpkg-free (filename parse + `sha256sum`), so it runs anywhere. | diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile index d063934..8f94555 100755 --- a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile @@ -3,74 +3,59 @@ # against the operator's persisted policy. # # CONTRACT (todo 33): -# * This package ships NO active FCC-unlock scripts. ModemManager's own AVAILABLE tier -# (/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d) is populated by ModemManager itself; a script -# becomes ACTIVE only when a symlink to it exists in the multiarch ACTIVE tier -# (${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d). Creating that symlink is an OPT-IN act. -# * The opt-in lives in /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json. An ABSENT policy — which is -# the state on generic Debian with no CeraLive partition layout — exits 0 and creates -# NO active symlinks. That is the only safe default: an FCC-unlock script talks to a -# regulatory-locked radio, so "we could not read the policy" must never mean "enable it". -# * An UNPARSEABLE or malformed policy is treated exactly like an absent one: log, exit 0, -# change nothing. Fail-safe, not fail-open. -# * The reconciler only ever creates, keeps or removes SYMLINKS whose target resolves under -# the available tier. A real file in the active directory is somebody else's property and -# is left strictly alone. +# * This package ships NO FCC-unlock scripts, active or otherwise. ModemManager's +# own AVAILABLE tier (/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d) is +# populated by ModemManager itself; a script becomes ACTIVE only when a link to +# it exists in one of the two ENABLED tiers the dispatcher consults, in order: +# 1. ${sysconfdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d (/etc/… — the ADMIN tier) +# 2. ${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d (the PACKAGE tier) +# This reconciler owns tier 1 and only tier 1. Creating a link there is an +# OPT-IN act; nothing in this package ever writes tier 2. +# * The opt-in lives in /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json. /etc does NOT +# survive a RAUC slot swap and /data does, which is the whole reason this unit +# exists: the policy is the record, and the symlink is re-derived from it on +# every boot before ModemManager probes a radio. +# * An ABSENT policy — the state on generic Debian with no CeraLive partition +# layout — exits 0 and creates NO active links. That is the only safe default: +# an FCC-unlock script talks to a regulatory-locked radio, so "we could not read +# the policy" must never mean "enable it". +# * An UNPARSEABLE or malformed policy is treated exactly like an absent one: log, +# exit 0, activate nothing. Fail-safe, not fail-open. +# * The reconciler only ever creates, keeps or removes SYMLINKS whose target +# resolves under the available tier. A real file in the active directory is +# somebody else's property and is left strictly alone. # # Policy format (schema version 1): -# { "version": 1, "unlock": { "2c7c": true, "1e0e": false } } -# Keys are 4-hex-digit USB vendor ids, matching ModemManager's fcc-unlock.d script names. +# { "schemaVersion": 1, "unlock": { "2c7c:0801": true, "1199:9079": false } } # -# Deliberately dependency-free: /bin/sh + coreutils + grep only. The CeraLive production -# image ships neither jq nor python3 (python3 is in the debug-only package delta), so a -# JSON library dependency here would make the unit fail on exactly the images it is for. +# Keys are `:`, 4 lowercase hex digits each — the EXACT filename +# ModemManager's dispatcher looks for. mm-dispatcher-fcc-unlock.c builds it as +# `g_strdup_printf("%04x:%04x", vid, pid)` and consults NOTHING else, so a +# vendor-only key (`2c7c`) would name a file the dispatcher never opens. The +# available tier ships one real script per VENDOR plus a `:` symlink +# onto it for every model the vendor script covers; we link the model name. # -# Exit codes: 0 always, except for an internal error the operator must see (non-zero). +# A trailing `"savedAtMs": ` (and any other sibling key) is accepted and +# ignored — only the `"unlock"` object is read. +# +# Deliberately dependency-free: /bin/sh + coreutils only. The CeraLive production +# image ships neither jq nor python3 (python3 is in the debug-only package delta), +# so a JSON library dependency here would make the unit fail on exactly the images +# it is for. +# +# Exit codes: 0 always, except for an internal error the operator must see. set -eu POLICY_FILE="${CERALIVE_FCC_POLICY_FILE:-/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json}" -AVAILABLE_DIR="${CERALIVE_FCC_AVAILABLE_DIR:-/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d}" -# Empty => resolved at runtime from the host multiarch triplet. -ACTIVE_DIR="${CERALIVE_FCC_ACTIVE_DIR:-}" -LIB_ROOT="${CERALIVE_FCC_LIB_ROOT:-/usr/lib}" +AVAILABLE_DIR="${CERALIVE_FCC_AVAILABLE_DIR:-/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d}" +ACTIVE_DIR="${CERALIVE_FCC_ACTIVE_DIR:-/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d}" log() { printf 'ceralive-fcc-reconcile: %s\n' "$*"; } -# ── Resolve ModemManager's ACTIVE (multiarch) fcc-unlock.d ─────────────────── -# Debian's ModemManager packaging rmdir's this directory at build time because it ships -# empty, so it frequently does not exist. Prefer an existing one, then dpkg-architecture, -# then a single unambiguous /usr/lib/*-linux-* candidate. Ambiguity is refused rather than -# guessed: writing a symlink into the wrong triplet is silently inert. -resolve_active_dir() { - [ -n "$ACTIVE_DIR" ] && { printf '%s\n' "$ACTIVE_DIR"; return 0; } - - for d in "$LIB_ROOT"/*/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d; do - [ -d "$d" ] && { printf '%s\n' "$d"; return 0; } - done - - if command -v dpkg-architecture >/dev/null 2>&1; then - triplet="$(dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_MULTIARCH 2>/dev/null || true)" - [ -n "$triplet" ] && { printf '%s\n' "$LIB_ROOT/$triplet/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d"; return 0; } - fi - - count=0 - found= - for d in "$LIB_ROOT"/*-linux-*; do - [ -d "$d" ] || continue - count=$((count + 1)) - found="$d" - done - if [ "$count" -eq 1 ]; then - printf '%s\n' "$found/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d" - return 0 - fi - return 1 -} - -# ── Parse the policy into a newline-separated list of ENABLED vendor ids ───── -# Rejects the whole document on any token that is not `"<4 hex>": true|false`, so a -# hand-mangled or truncated file can never be half-applied. +# ── Parse the policy into a newline-separated list of ENABLED vid:pid keys ─── +# Rejects the whole document on any token that is not `"<4hex>:<4hex>": true|false`, +# so a hand-mangled or truncated file can never be half-applied. parse_enabled() { file="$1" body="$(tr -d ' \t\n\r' <"$file")" || return 1 @@ -83,33 +68,54 @@ parse_enabled() { [ -n "$inner" ] || return 0 # Every comma-separated token must match the strict pair shape. - # The trailing newline is load-bearing: `read` returns non-zero on a final line with no - # newline, so `printf '%s'` here would silently skip a single-entry policy entirely — - # a one-vendor document would parse as "nothing enabled" instead of as itself. + # The trailing newline is load-bearing: `read` returns non-zero on a final line + # with no newline, so `printf '%s'` here would silently skip a single-entry + # policy entirely — a one-model document would parse as "nothing enabled" + # instead of as itself. + hex='[0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f]' printf '%s\n' "$inner" | tr ',' '\n' | while IFS= read -r tok; do [ -n "$tok" ] || continue case "$tok" in - '"'[0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f]'":true') printf '%s\n' "$(printf '%s' "$tok" | cut -c2-5)" ;; - '"'[0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f][0-9a-f]'":false') ;; + '"'$hex:$hex'":true') printf '%s\n' "$(printf '%s' "$tok" | cut -c2-10)" ;; + '"'$hex:$hex'":false') ;; *) printf 'MALFORMED\n' ;; esac done } +# Remove symlinks we own (target resolves under the available tier) that the policy +# no longer authorizes. Real files and foreign symlinks are never touched. +prune_unauthorized() { + keep="$1" + [ -d "$ACTIVE_DIR" ] || return 0 + for link in "$ACTIVE_DIR"/*; do + [ -L "$link" ] || continue + target="$(readlink -f "$link" 2>/dev/null || true)" + case "$target" in + "$AVAILABLE_DIR"/*) ;; + *) continue ;; + esac + name="$(basename "$link")" + wanted=0 + for key in $keep; do + [ "$key" = "$name" ] && wanted=1 + done + if [ "$wanted" -eq 0 ]; then + rm -f "$link" + log "deactivated FCC-unlock '$name' (not authorized by policy)" + fi + done +} + main() { if [ ! -d "$AVAILABLE_DIR" ]; then log "ModemManager available fcc-unlock dir '$AVAILABLE_DIR' absent — nothing to reconcile" return 0 fi - if ! active="$(resolve_active_dir)"; then - log "could not resolve a single ModemManager multiarch fcc-unlock.d under '$LIB_ROOT' — refusing to guess; no active scripts" - return 0 - fi - if [ ! -e "$POLICY_FILE" ]; then log "no policy at '$POLICY_FILE' — no active FCC-unlock scripts (this is the default and safe state)" - prune_unauthorized "$active" "" + prune_unauthorized "" return 0 fi @@ -117,56 +123,30 @@ main() { case "$enabled" in *MALFORMED*) log "policy at '$POLICY_FILE' is malformed — treating as absent; no active FCC-unlock scripts" - prune_unauthorized "$active" "" + prune_unauthorized "" return 0 ;; esac - mkdir -p "$active" + mkdir -p "$ACTIVE_DIR" - for vid in $enabled; do - src="$AVAILABLE_DIR/$vid" + for key in $enabled; do + src="$AVAILABLE_DIR/$key" if [ ! -f "$src" ]; then - log "policy enables '$vid' but ModemManager ships no '$src' — skipped" + log "policy enables '$key' but ModemManager ships no '$src' — skipped" continue fi - dst="$active/$vid" + dst="$ACTIVE_DIR/$key" if [ -e "$dst" ] && [ ! -L "$dst" ]; then log "'$dst' exists and is NOT a symlink — leaving it alone (not ours)" continue fi ln -sfn "$src" "$dst" - log "activated FCC-unlock '$vid' -> $src" + log "activated FCC-unlock '$key' -> $src" done - prune_unauthorized "$active" "$enabled" + prune_unauthorized "$enabled" return 0 } -# Remove symlinks we own (target under the available tier) that the policy no longer -# authorizes. Real files and foreign symlinks are never touched. -prune_unauthorized() { - active="$1" - keep="$2" - [ -d "$active" ] || return 0 - for link in "$active"/*; do - [ -e "$link" ] || [ -L "$link" ] || continue - [ -L "$link" ] || continue - target="$(readlink -f "$link" 2>/dev/null || true)" - case "$target" in - "$AVAILABLE_DIR"/*) ;; - *) continue ;; - esac - name="$(basename "$link")" - wanted=0 - for vid in $keep; do - [ "$vid" = "$name" ] && wanted=1 - done - if [ "$wanted" -eq 0 ]; then - rm -f "$link" - log "deactivated FCC-unlock '$name' (not authorized by policy)" - fi - done -} - main "$@" diff --git a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service index 26eb4bc..76a302a 100644 --- a/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service +++ b/packaging/ceralive-modem-support/assets/systemd/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.service @@ -21,9 +21,14 @@ RemainAfterExit=yes ExecStart=/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile # The reconciler answers 0 for every "cannot act" case (absent policy, malformed policy, -# no ModemManager, unresolvable multiarch dir) precisely so a device without the CeraLive -# partition layout boots clean. A non-zero exit therefore means a genuine internal error -# and is surfaced rather than swallowed. +# no ModemManager available tier) precisely so a device without the CeraLive partition +# layout boots clean. A non-zero exit therefore means a genuine internal error and is +# surfaced rather than swallowed. +# +# It writes ONLY into /etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d — ModemManager's ADMIN enabled tier, +# the first of the two the dispatcher consults. The multiarch PACKAGE tier +# (${libdir}/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d) is never touched: it is the tier a distribution +# package would own, and this package deliberately owns no active FCC-unlock script. ProtectHome=yes ProtectHostname=yes ProtectKernelLogs=yes diff --git a/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh b/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh index f1ab618..e880a64 100755 --- a/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh +++ b/packaging/ci/test-companion-chroot.sh @@ -162,11 +162,18 @@ if [ ! -e "$RULES_ETC" ]; then ok "known-stale generated override removed"; else grep -q 'removed stale generated override' /tmp/stale.log && ok "removal was announced" || bad "no removal announcement" echo "== 6. FCC reconcile ==" -mkdir -p /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d -printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/2c7c -chmod +x /usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d/2c7c -MULTIARCH="$(dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_MULTIARCH 2>/dev/null || echo x86_64-linux-gnu)" -ACTIVE="/usr/lib/$MULTIARCH/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d" +# ModemManager's tiers, spelled the way Debian's packaging actually installs them: +# the shipped-but-inert AVAILABLE tier is `fcc-unlock.available.d` under /usr/share, +# and the tier the dispatcher consults first is the ADMIN one under /etc. The +# available tier holds one real script per VENDOR plus a `:` symlink onto +# it per covered model — the dispatcher only ever opens the `:` name. +AVAILABLE=/usr/share/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.available.d +ACTIVE=/etc/ModemManager/fcc-unlock.d +mkdir -p "$AVAILABLE" +printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > "$AVAILABLE/2c7c" +chmod +x "$AVAILABLE/2c7c" +ln -sfn 2c7c "$AVAILABLE/2c7c:0801" +ln -sfn 2c7c "$AVAILABLE/2c7c:0313" rm -rf "$ACTIVE" echo "-- 6a. absent policy exits 0 and creates NO active symlink --" @@ -177,18 +184,35 @@ else fi if [ -z "$(find "$ACTIVE" -type l 2>/dev/null)" ]; then ok "no active FCC symlink created without a policy"; else bad "an active FCC symlink appeared without a policy"; fi -echo "-- 6b. an enabling policy activates exactly the enabled vendor --" +echo "-- 6b. an enabling policy activates exactly the enabled MODEL --" mkdir -p /data/ceralive -printf '{"version":1,"unlock":{"2c7c":true,"1e0e":false}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +printf '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true,"2c7c:0313":false}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-on.log 2>&1 -if [ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ]; then ok "policy-enabled 2c7c activated"; else bad "2c7c not activated"; cat /tmp/fcc-on.log; fi -if [ -e "$ACTIVE/1e0e" ]; then bad "policy-disabled 1e0e was activated"; else ok "policy-disabled 1e0e stayed inactive"; fi +if [ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ]; then ok "policy-enabled 2c7c:0801 activated in the ADMIN tier"; else bad "2c7c:0801 not activated"; cat /tmp/fcc-on.log; fi +if [ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0313" ]; then bad "policy-disabled 2c7c:0313 was activated"; else ok "policy-disabled 2c7c:0313 stayed inactive"; fi +# The vendor-only name is NOT what the dispatcher opens, so it must never be linked. +if [ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ]; then bad "a vendor-only name was linked (the dispatcher never opens it)"; else ok "no vendor-only link created"; fi -echo "-- 6c. a MALFORMED policy is treated as absent (fail-safe, never fail-open) --" -printf '{"version":1,"unlock":{"2c7c":yes}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +echo "-- 6c. an opt-out removes the link the previous run created --" +printf '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":2,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":false}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-off.log 2>&1 +if [ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ]; then bad "an opt-out left the active symlink behind"; else ok "opt-out deactivated the model"; fi + +echo "-- 6d. a MALFORMED policy is treated as absent (fail-safe, never fail-open) --" +printf '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/dev/null 2>&1 +printf '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":yes}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json /usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-bad.log 2>&1 -if [ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ]; then bad "a malformed policy left an active FCC symlink"; else ok "malformed policy deactivated everything"; fi +if [ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ]; then bad "a malformed policy left an active FCC symlink"; else ok "malformed policy deactivated everything"; fi grep -q 'malformed' /tmp/fcc-bad.log && ok "malformed policy was announced" || bad "no malformed announcement" + +echo "-- 6e. a real file in the ADMIN tier is somebody else's property --" +mkdir -p "$ACTIVE" +printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" +printf '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":3,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true}}\n' > /data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json +/usr/lib/ceralive-modem-support/ceralive-fcc-reconcile >/tmp/fcc-foreign.log 2>&1 +if [ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ]; then bad "a foreign REAL file was replaced by our symlink"; else ok "a foreign real file was left alone"; fi +rm -f "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" rm -rf /data echo "== 7. upgrade path (0.9.0 -> 1.1.0), no conffile prompt ==" diff --git a/packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh b/packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..044514a --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/ci/test-fcc-reconcile.sh @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# The FCC reconciler's BEHAVIOUR contract, runnable on any host. +# +# The chroot contract (`test-companion-chroot.sh` § 6) proves the reconciler works +# from its PACKAGED location after a real dpkg install. This script proves the same +# logic against the source file with every path redirected into a scratch tree, so it +# needs no container, no root and no ModemManager — which is what makes it usable as +# the pre-bench proof for the todo-33 policy work and as a fast local gate. +# +# Both are kept: this one can be run in a second, that one proves the packaging. + +set -euo pipefail + +HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +# CERALIVE_FCC_RECONCILE_BIN lets the SAME suite run against a copy that is not +# beside this script — the INSTALLED helper on a bench board, which is how the +# packaged path gets exercised without a container. +RECONCILE="${CERALIVE_FCC_RECONCILE_BIN:-$HERE/../ceralive-modem-support/assets/fcc/ceralive-fcc-reconcile}" +[ -x "$RECONCILE" ] || { echo "not executable: $RECONCILE" >&2; exit 1; } + +pass=0; fail=0 +ok() { printf ' ok %s\n' "$1"; pass=$((pass + 1)); } +bad() { printf ' FAIL %s\n' "$1"; fail=$((fail + 1)); } + +ROOT="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/ceralive-fcc-reconcile.XXXXXX")" +trap 'rm -rf "$ROOT"' EXIT + +AVAILABLE="$ROOT/available" +ACTIVE="$ROOT/active" +POLICY="$ROOT/data/ceralive/fcc-unlock-policy.json" +mkdir -p "$AVAILABLE" "$(dirname "$POLICY")" + +# The available tier's real shape: one script per VENDOR, plus a `:` symlink +# onto it for every model that vendor script covers. The dispatcher opens ONLY the +# `:` name, which is why the policy keys on it. +printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > "$AVAILABLE/2c7c" +chmod +x "$AVAILABLE/2c7c" +ln -sfn 2c7c "$AVAILABLE/2c7c:0801" +ln -sfn 2c7c "$AVAILABLE/2c7c:0313" + +run() { + CERALIVE_FCC_POLICY_FILE="$POLICY" \ + CERALIVE_FCC_AVAILABLE_DIR="$AVAILABLE" \ + CERALIVE_FCC_ACTIVE_DIR="$ACTIVE" \ + "$RECONCILE" 2>&1 +} + +write_policy() { printf '%s\n' "$1" > "$POLICY"; } + +echo "-- absent policy: exit 0, activate nothing --" +rm -rf "$ACTIVE"; rm -f "$POLICY" +if out="$(run)"; then ok "exit 0 with no policy"; else bad "non-zero exit with no policy"; fi +[ -z "$(find "$ACTIVE" -type l 2>/dev/null)" ] && ok "no link created" || bad "a link appeared with no policy" + +echo "-- an absent AVAILABLE tier is a clean no-op (generic Debian) --" +if CERALIVE_FCC_POLICY_FILE="$POLICY" CERALIVE_FCC_AVAILABLE_DIR="$ROOT/nope" \ + CERALIVE_FCC_ACTIVE_DIR="$ACTIVE" "$RECONCILE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + ok "exit 0 with no ModemManager available tier" +else + bad "non-zero exit with no available tier" +fi + +echo "-- enabling policy: exactly the enabled MODEL, in the ADMIN tier --" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true,"2c7c:0313":false}}' +run >/dev/null +[ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ] && ok "2c7c:0801 activated" || bad "2c7c:0801 not activated" +[ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0313" ] && bad "disabled model was activated" || ok "disabled model stayed inactive" +[ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ] && bad "a vendor-only name was linked" || ok "no vendor-only link (the dispatcher never opens one)" +[ "$(readlink "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801")" = "$AVAILABLE/2c7c:0801" ] \ + && ok "the link targets the available tier's model entry" \ + || bad "unexpected link target: $(readlink "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801")" + +echo "-- a single-entry policy is not read as an empty one --" +rm -rf "$ACTIVE" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true}}' +run >/dev/null +[ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ] && ok "one-model policy activated" || bad "one-model policy activated nothing" + +echo "-- re-running is idempotent --" +before="$(readlink "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801")" +run >/dev/null +[ "$(readlink "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801")" = "$before" ] && ok "second run left the link unchanged" || bad "second run changed the link" + +echo "-- opt-out removes what the previous run created --" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":2,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":false}}' +run >/dev/null +[ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ] && bad "opt-out left the link behind" || ok "opt-out deactivated the model" + +echo "-- a malformed policy is treated as absent, and says so --" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true}}' +run >/dev/null +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":yes}}' +out="$(run)" +[ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ] && bad "malformed policy left an active link" || ok "malformed policy activated nothing" +printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'malformed' && ok "malformed policy announced" || bad "no malformed announcement" + +echo "-- a vendor-only KEY names a file the dispatcher never opens, and is refused --" +rm -rf "$ACTIVE" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c":true}}' +out="$(run)" +[ -e "$ACTIVE/2c7c" ] && bad "a vendor-only key was activated" || ok "vendor-only key refused" +printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'malformed' && ok "vendor-only key reported as malformed" || bad "vendor-only key silently ignored" + +echo "-- an enabled model MM ships no script for is skipped, loudly --" +rm -rf "$ACTIVE" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"1199:9079":true}}' +out="$(run)" +[ -e "$ACTIVE/1199:9079" ] && bad "a link was created for an absent script" || ok "absent script skipped" +printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'ships no' && ok "the skip was announced" || bad "the skip was silent" + +echo "-- a foreign REAL file in the ADMIN tier is left alone --" +mkdir -p "$ACTIVE" +printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{"2c7c:0801":true}}' +run >/dev/null +[ -L "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" ] && bad "a foreign real file was replaced" || ok "foreign real file untouched" +rm -f "$ACTIVE/2c7c:0801" + +echo "-- a foreign SYMLINK pointing outside the available tier is left alone --" +printf 'x\n' > "$ROOT/elsewhere" +ln -sfn "$ROOT/elsewhere" "$ACTIVE/1199:9079" +write_policy '{"schemaVersion":1,"savedAtMs":1,"unlock":{}}' +run >/dev/null +[ -L "$ACTIVE/1199:9079" ] && ok "foreign symlink untouched" || bad "a foreign symlink was pruned" + +echo +echo "== fcc-reconcile: $pass passed, $fail failed ==" +[ "$fail" -eq 0 ] From 8c4804ff8d3baccd519bccabfa761ab1ea561926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] feat(control): catalog transitions declare and send their commit command MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Some modules' USB-mode switch command only writes non-volatile configuration: it answers OK, reads back the new value, and leaves the device enumerated in the OLD composition. Measured on the bench RM530N-GL, `AT+QCFG="usbnet",` behaves exactly that way in both directions. Undeclared, such a SKU exhausts the port-drop budget and reports failure AFTER the NV write already succeeded — then lands in the new composition at the next unrelated reboot. That is a fail-OPEN outcome from a fail-closed design. `applyCommand` is optional (a SKU that re-enumerates on its own declares none) and `min(1)` when present, because an unsendable empty string is not the same fact as "no commit command". `applyCommand` is dispatched between `at-command` and `await-port-drop`, through the SAME allowlisted `AtCommandLease` as the switch command — the allowlist now unions both fields, so a commit command is as tightly constrained as the switch it completes. It is its own step (`apply-command`) rather than a retry of the first, so a transcript distinguishes the two and a reviewer can see the order. A commit the AT layer rejects fails the transaction degraded and never reactivates, which is the point: a half-applied NV write must not be reported as a switch. The tests drive a LOCAL fixture catalog, deliberately. What is under test is the engine's behaviour when an entry declares a commit command; asserting it through the shipped catalog would turn an engine test into a certification claim and couple it to a review decision. --- .../src/backend/usb-mode-transition.test.ts | 170 ++++++++++++++++++ control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.ts | 19 +- control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.test.ts | 18 ++ control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.ts | 12 ++ 4 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.test.ts b/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.test.ts index 47ec0dd..cfddabf 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.test.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.test.ts @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; import { epochMillis } from '../domain'; import { connectionId, deviceIfname, type NetworkManagerPort, receipt } from '../ports'; +import type { CertifiedCatalog } from '../usb-mode'; import type { UsbDeviceSnapshot } from './device-classifier'; import { ModemActor } from './modem-actor'; import type { TransitionInterlock, UsbModeTransitionRequest } from './transition-preconditions'; @@ -321,3 +322,172 @@ describe('UsbModeTransition — crash mid-transaction trips the watchdog', () => expect(log.calls).toContain('mm.uninhibit'); }); }); + +/** + * A LOCAL fixture SKU, deliberately not a shipped-catalog entry. + * + * What is under test here is the ENGINE's behaviour when a catalog entry declares an + * `applyCommand` — the send order, the allowlist, and the refusal — not whether any + * particular device is certified. Driving it through the shipped catalog would make this + * suite a certification claim, and would couple an engine test to a review decision. + */ +const NV_ONLY_SKU = { + vidPid: '2c7c:0801', + model: 'CERALIVE-NV-ONLY-TEST-SKU', + firmwarePrefix: 'NVONLYFW01', +}; + +/** The transition shape this engine behaviour exists for: the switch only writes NV. */ +const NV_ONLY_CATALOG: CertifiedCatalog = { + schemaVersion: 1, + entries: [ + { + ...NV_ONLY_SKU, + canonicalMode: 'qmi', + permittedTransitions: [ + { + from: 'qmi', + to: 'mbim', + atCommand: 'AT+QCFG="usbnet",2', + applyCommand: 'AT+CFUN=1,1', + expectedResponse: 'OK', + expectsPortDrop: true, + expectedDescriptors: { + deviceClass: 0, + interfaces: [ + { interfaceClass: 0x02, interfaceSubClass: 0x0e, interfaceProtocol: 0x00 }, + { interfaceClass: 0x0a, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x02 }, + ], + }, + }, + { + from: 'mbim', + to: 'qmi', + atCommand: 'AT+QCFG="usbnet",0', + applyCommand: 'AT+CFUN=1,1', + expectedResponse: 'OK', + expectsPortDrop: true, + expectedDescriptors: { + deviceClass: 0, + interfaces: [ + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0xff, interfaceProtocol: 0xff }, + ], + }, + }, + ], + }, + ], +}; + +/** Descriptors transcribed from the 2026-08-19 bench capture of `4-1.4.4` on usbnet=0. */ +const NV_ONLY_QMI: UsbDeviceSnapshot = { + vendorId: '2c7c', + productId: '0801', + bDeviceClass: 0, + physicalUid: CACHED_UID, + ifname: 'wwan2', + interfaces: [ + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0xff, interfaceProtocol: 0x30, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x40, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x00, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x00, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0xff, interfaceProtocol: 0xff, driver: 'qmi_wwan' }, + ], +}; + +/** From the same capture on usbnet=2 — the PID is UNCHANGED across the switch. */ +const NV_ONLY_MBIM: UsbDeviceSnapshot = { + ...NV_ONLY_QMI, + ifname: 'wwan3', + interfaces: [ + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0xff, interfaceProtocol: 0x30, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x40, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x00, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x00, driver: 'option' }, + { interfaceClass: 0x02, interfaceSubClass: 0x0e, interfaceProtocol: 0x00, driver: 'cdc_mbim' }, + { interfaceClass: 0x0a, interfaceSubClass: 0x00, interfaceProtocol: 0x02, driver: 'cdc_mbim' }, + ], +}; + +function nvOnlyRequest(fromMode: 'qmi' | 'mbim', toMode: 'qmi' | 'mbim'): UsbModeTransitionRequest { + return makeRequest({ sku: NV_ONLY_SKU, fromMode, toMode, deviceIfname: deviceIfname('wwan2') }); +} + +describe('UsbModeTransition — a SKU whose AT command only writes NV also sends applyCommand', () => { + test('qmi→mbim sends the switch THEN the commit, in that order', async () => { + const log: SpyLog = { calls: [] }; + const transition = makeTransition(log, { + catalog: NV_ONLY_CATALOG, + enumerate: scriptedEnumerate([[NV_ONLY_QMI], [], [NV_ONLY_MBIM]]), + }); + + const outcome = await transition.execute(nvOnlyRequest('qmi', 'mbim')); + + expect(outcome.status).toBe('succeeded'); + expect(log.calls.filter((c) => c.startsWith('at.send:'))).toEqual([ + 'at.send:AT+QCFG="usbnet",2', + 'at.send:AT+CFUN=1,1', + ]); + // The commit is its OWN step, so a transcript distinguishes it from a retry. + expect(outcome.steps.indexOf('apply-command')).toBeGreaterThan( + outcome.steps.indexOf('at-command'), + ); + expect(outcome.steps.indexOf('await-port-drop')).toBeGreaterThan( + outcome.steps.indexOf('apply-command'), + ); + }); + + test('mbim→qmi sends the reverse switch and the SAME commit', async () => { + const log: SpyLog = { calls: [] }; + const transition = makeTransition(log, { + catalog: NV_ONLY_CATALOG, + enumerate: scriptedEnumerate([[NV_ONLY_MBIM], [], [NV_ONLY_QMI]]), + }); + + const outcome = await transition.execute(nvOnlyRequest('mbim', 'qmi')); + + expect(outcome.status).toBe('succeeded'); + expect(log.calls.filter((c) => c.startsWith('at.send:'))).toEqual([ + 'at.send:AT+QCFG="usbnet",0', + 'at.send:AT+CFUN=1,1', + ]); + }); + + test('a SKU that declares NO applyCommand still sends exactly one command', async () => { + const log: SpyLog = { calls: [] }; + const transition = makeTransition(log); + + const outcome = await transition.execute(makeRequest()); + + expect(outcome.status).toBe('succeeded'); + expect(log.calls.filter((c) => c.startsWith('at.send:'))).toHaveLength(1); + expect(outcome.steps).not.toContain('apply-command'); + }); + + test('a commit command that the AT layer REJECTS fails the transaction, never a silent skip', async () => { + const log: SpyLog = { calls: [] }; + const rejectingSender: UsbModeTransitionDeps['atSender'] = { + send: (command) => { + log.calls.push(`at.send:${command}`); + return command === 'AT+CFUN=1,1' + ? Promise.reject(new Error('commit refused by module')) + : Promise.resolve({ ok: true, raw: 'OK' }); + }, + }; + const transition = makeTransition(log, { + atSender: rejectingSender, + catalog: NV_ONLY_CATALOG, + enumerate: scriptedEnumerate([[NV_ONLY_QMI], [], [NV_ONLY_MBIM]]), + }); + + const outcome = await transition.execute(nvOnlyRequest('qmi', 'mbim')); + + expect(outcome.status).toBe('failed'); + if (outcome.status === 'failed') { + expect(outcome.degraded).toBe(true); + expect(outcome.reason).toContain('commit refused by module'); + } + expect(log.calls.some((c) => c.startsWith('nm.activate:'))).toBe(false); + expect(log.calls).toContain('mm.uninhibit'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.ts b/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.ts index 7767359..bdb79e7 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/usb-mode-transition.ts @@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ // through A3.3's shared per-modem `ModemActor` (keyed on stableKey, so it serialises // behind every other disruptive op) in a FIXED order: // -// 1 NM-quiesce → 2 inhibit-by-cached-UID → 3 AT command → 4 expected port-drop → -// 5 uninhibit → 6 await SAME physical UID → 7 POSTCONDITION → 8 resolve new ifname → -// 9 reactivate (uuid, newIfname) → 10 release interlock (finally, always). +// 1 NM-quiesce → 2 inhibit-by-cached-UID → 3 AT command → 3b catalog `applyCommand` +// (only for a SKU whose AT command writes NV without re-enumerating) → 4 expected +// port-drop → 5 uninhibit → 6 await SAME physical UID → 7 POSTCONDITION → +// 8 resolve new ifname → 9 reactivate (uuid, newIfname) → 10 release interlock +// (finally, always). // // THE POSTCONDITION IS THE ONLY PROOF OF SUCCESS. An AT `OK` proves nothing — only a // re-enumerated device whose descriptors AND observed mode equal the catalog target @@ -147,7 +149,11 @@ export class UsbModeTransition { }; const lease = new AtCommandLease({ sender: this.#atSender, - allowlist: computeAtAllowlist(allCommands.map((t) => t.atCommand)), + allowlist: computeAtAllowlist( + allCommands.flatMap((t) => + t.applyCommand === undefined ? [t.atCommand] : [t.atCommand, t.applyCommand], + ), + ), timeoutMs: this.#watchdogMs, onWatchdog: forceUninhibit, ...(this.#audit !== undefined ? { audit: this.#audit } : {}), @@ -163,6 +169,11 @@ export class UsbModeTransition { steps.push('at-command'); await lease.run(transition.atCommand, { inhibitUid: request.inhibitUid }); + if (transition.applyCommand !== undefined) { + steps.push('apply-command'); + await lease.run(transition.applyCommand, { inhibitUid: request.inhibitUid }); + } + steps.push('await-port-drop'); await this.#awaitPortDrop(request.cachedPhysicalUid); diff --git a/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.test.ts b/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.test.ts index d1e7471..3073848 100644 --- a/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.test.ts +++ b/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.test.ts @@ -179,3 +179,21 @@ describe('the shipped certified catalog', () => { expect(entry).toBeUndefined(); }); }); + +describe('permittedTransition.applyCommand — optional, but never empty', () => { + test('a transition with NO applyCommand parses (the SKU re-enumerates on its own)', () => { + expect(certifiedCatalogSchema.safeParse(validCatalog()).success).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a declared applyCommand parses', () => { + const catalog = validCatalog(); + firstTransition(catalog).applyCommand = 'AT+CFUN=1,1'; + expect(certifiedCatalogSchema.safeParse(catalog).success).toBe(true); + }); + + test('an EMPTY applyCommand is refused — an unsendable command is not "no command"', () => { + const catalog = validCatalog(); + firstTransition(catalog).applyCommand = ''; + expect(certifiedCatalogSchema.safeParse(catalog).success).toBe(false); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.ts b/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.ts index e5b1cee..d7f3eea 100644 --- a/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.ts +++ b/control/src/usb-mode/catalog-schema.ts @@ -61,6 +61,18 @@ export const permittedTransitionSchema = z to: mmMode, /** The EXACT AT command that performs the switch (allowlisted at send time). */ atCommand: z.string().min(1), + /** + * The EXACT AT command that COMMITS the switch on a SKU whose `atCommand` only + * writes non-volatile configuration; omitted for a SKU that re-enumerates on + * `atCommand` alone. Sent through the SAME allowlisted lease. + * + * Declaring it is a per-SKU hardware FACT, not a retry. Measured on the bench + * RM530N-GL: `AT+QCFG="usbnet",` answers `OK`, reads back the new value, and + * leaves the device in the OLD composition for the whole port-drop budget — having + * already committed to NV. Undeclared, such a SKU fails on a timeout AFTER it was + * silently changed, then lands in the new composition at the next unrelated reboot. + */ + applyCommand: z.string().min(1).optional(), /** The AT response expected on success (e.g. `OK`) — never proof on its own. */ expectedResponse: z.string().min(1), /** Whether the control port is expected to drop after the command is written. */ From 45b82b6bccd54469647d67ecaabe45393a5af3d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] feat(domain): v1.1 identity/observation/operation contracts + provider registry The frozen v1.1 domain surface this package publishes: physical and subscriber identity, generation, observation envelopes, and operation results, each with the branded types that keep an identifier from being passed where a different identifier is expected. On top of it, a provider registry with an evidence-scored matcher. A provider is selected by how well the evidence a device actually reported matches the provider's declared discriminators, not by a first-match-wins ordering that makes adding a provider a reordering problem. DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md and PROVIDER-MATCHING.md document both, and a conformance fixture gives every provider the same shape of test. --- AGENTS.md | 47 ++++ README.md | 2 +- control/src/domain/generation.ts | 22 ++ control/src/domain/index.ts | 4 + control/src/domain/observation.ts | 46 ++++ control/src/domain/operation.ts | 202 ++++++++++++++ control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts | 143 ++++++++++ control/src/domain/v11-contracts.test.ts | 187 +++++++++++++ control/src/index.ts | 1 + control/src/providers/conformance.test.ts | 191 ++++++++++++++ control/src/providers/contracts.ts | 167 ++++++++++++ control/src/providers/index.ts | 3 + control/src/providers/matcher.ts | 247 ++++++++++++++++++ control/src/providers/registry.ts | 49 ++++ .../provider-conformance-fixture.ts | 122 +++++++++ docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md | 44 ++++ docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md | 54 ++++ 17 files changed, 1530 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 control/src/domain/generation.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/observation.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/operation.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/v11-contracts.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/conformance.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/contracts.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/matcher.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/registry.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/provider-conformance-fixture.ts create mode 100644 docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md create mode 100644 docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 9b1bf99..c8c56e4 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -81,6 +81,53 @@ npm and the `.deb` set. `.deb` versions encode the tag as `-~cera (upstream-ordered, apt-safe; injected with `dch --force-bad-version`). Non-tag CI builds use `~ceralive0.0.0~dev`. Full contract: `docs/VERSIONING.md`. +## FROZEN V1.1 DOMAIN CONTRACTS + +`control/src/domain/` additively freezes the provider-neutral v1.1 foundation while the +published v1.0 package facade remains intact. The exact public shapes and safety rules are +documented in [`docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md`](docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md). + +- `PhysicalModemId` / `StableKey` use serial → udev `ID_PATH` → a 128-character-bounded + fallback. Their constructors refuse MM object paths, interface names, IP addresses, IMEI, + and subscriber identifiers; none of those runtime or sensitive values can become the new + physical identity. +- `DeviceGeneration` increments on re-enumeration or provider replacement and fences every + async observation/operation completion. `ObservationEnvelope` separately models fresh, + stale, and unavailable data; unavailable carries `value: null`, never an invented value. +- `OperationDescriptor` keeps read and write support independent and records authority, + constraints, preconditions, availability, mutation impact, retry policy, transactional + requirements, evidence, and confidence. `OperationResult` maps stale completions and + timed-out/dropped writes to `unknown-outcome` with mandatory reconciliation. Only explicitly + classified idempotent reads may auto-retry. + +This layer is pure data and functions: no daemon, socket, network endpoint, or CeraUI import. + +## PROVIDER REGISTRY + EVIDENCE MATCHER + +`control/src/providers/` is the provider-neutral registration and selection layer built on the +frozen v1.1 domain contracts. The public contract and scoring details are documented in +[`docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md`](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md). + +- `ProviderDefinition` keeps each provider's profile version, declarative passive matchers, + harmless unauthenticated probes, optional single owner-selected authentication algorithm, + normalized `ObservationEnvelope` producer, provider-specific operations object and sanitized + contract fixtures together. `ProviderReadOperations` and `ProviderWriteOperations` are + composable capability subinterfaces; there is no package-wide vendor mega-interface. +- `createProviderMatcher` evaluates every registered provider in stage order: transport → passive + facts → unauthenticated fingerprints → profile rank → at most one auth call → capability reads. + Evidence is scored `unsupported → maybe → likely → supported`; only a unique `supported` + candidate receives its operations object. +- Ties and weak candidates return `ambiguous`, with `provider`, `profile` and `operations` all + `null`, `writable: false`, and the complete evidence/conflict ledger retained. Authentication is + not attempted for tied candidates, so an ambiguous match cannot cycle algorithms or acquire a + write surface. +- Selection is cached only for the same `PhysicalModemId`, `DeviceGeneration`, registry revision, + firmware and composition. Any generation, firmware or composition change runs the full matcher + again. + +This layer registers no concrete provider. Huawei, ZTE, UFI/HIMI and other implementations remain +separate evidence-backed work. + ## PROVENANCE PINS (packaging) The four rebuilt sources are pinned in `packaging/upstream-pins.yaml`, re-verified end-to-end diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6a38fce..dd2038b 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ straight from CI artifacts; nothing is published to `apt.ceralive.tv` yet. | Directory | Artifact | What it is | |-----------|----------|------------| -| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: modem domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope. | +| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: the [frozen v1.1 domain contracts](docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md), [provider registry and evidence-scored matcher](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md), ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope. | | [`cli/`](cli/) | **`modem-control`** (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`, `watch`, `apply`, `set-usb-mode`, `usage`, `certify`, `hil-cycle`. Compiled for `arm64` + `amd64` and run against real modems on a bench device to mature the package, capture per-SKU certification bundles, and prove hub VBUS port-cycling ([RB-10](docs/BENCH.md#rb-10--hub-vbus-verification-partial)). | | [`packaging/`](packaging/) | **ModemManager stack `.deb`s** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — **packaging only, not a fork, zero source patches** (see [`POLICY.md`](POLICY.md)). Provenance-verified upstream pins; installed on the bench from CI artifacts. | diff --git a/control/src/domain/generation.ts b/control/src/domain/generation.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..215cb0c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/generation.ts @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +import type { Brand } from './brand'; +import { nonNegativeInteger } from './brand'; + +/** Monotonic lifetime of one physical enumeration/provider selection. */ +export type DeviceGeneration = Brand; + +export function deviceGeneration(value: number): DeviceGeneration { + return nonNegativeInteger(value, 'deviceGeneration') as DeviceGeneration; +} + +/** Re-enumeration or provider replacement starts the next fenced lifetime. */ +export function nextDeviceGeneration(current: DeviceGeneration): DeviceGeneration { + return deviceGeneration(current + 1); +} + +/** Whether an async completion still belongs to the current device lifetime. */ +export function isCurrentGeneration( + completion: DeviceGeneration, + current: DeviceGeneration, +): boolean { + return completion === current; +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/index.ts b/control/src/domain/index.ts index 551b7a6..d7371ff 100644 --- a/control/src/domain/index.ts +++ b/control/src/domain/index.ts @@ -5,8 +5,12 @@ export * from './brand'; export * from './errors'; +export * from './generation'; export * from './guards'; export * from './identity'; +export * from './observation'; +export * from './operation'; +export * from './physical-identity'; export * from './policy'; export * from './snapshot'; export * from './state'; diff --git a/control/src/domain/observation.ts b/control/src/domain/observation.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c3696b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/observation.ts @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +import type { Brand } from './brand'; +import { nonNegativeInteger } from './brand'; +import type { DeviceGeneration } from './generation'; +import type { StableKey } from './physical-identity'; +import type { EpochMillis } from './state'; + +export type SourceEpoch = Brand; + +export function sourceEpoch(value: number): SourceEpoch { + return nonNegativeInteger(value, 'sourceEpoch') as SourceEpoch; +} + +export type ObservationAuthority = 'authoritative' | 'derived' | 'advisory'; + +export type ObservationFreshness = + | { readonly state: 'fresh' } + | { + readonly state: 'stale'; + readonly since: EpochMillis; + readonly reason: 'source-epoch-superseded' | 'ttl-expired' | 'source-degraded'; + } + | { + readonly state: 'unavailable'; + readonly since: EpochMillis; + readonly reason: 'source-unavailable' | 'device-absent' | 'provider-unavailable'; + }; + +type ObservationBase = { + readonly stableKey: StableKey; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly source: string; + readonly sourceEpoch: SourceEpoch; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly authority: ObservationAuthority; +}; + +/** A value is retained while stale, but unavailable is explicit and carries no invented value. */ +export type ObservationEnvelope = + | (ObservationBase & { + readonly freshness: Extract; + readonly value: T; + }) + | (ObservationBase & { + readonly freshness: Extract; + readonly value: null; + }); diff --git a/control/src/domain/operation.ts b/control/src/domain/operation.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..624fbbb --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/operation.ts @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +import { DomainError } from './errors'; +import type { DeviceGeneration } from './generation'; + +export type OperationSupport = + | { readonly supported: true } + | { readonly supported: false; readonly reason: string }; + +export type OperationConstraints = + | { readonly kind: 'unconstrained' } + | { readonly kind: 'allowed-values'; readonly values: readonly I[] } + | { + readonly kind: 'numeric-range'; + readonly min: number; + readonly max: number; + readonly step?: number; + }; + +export type OperationAvailability = + | { readonly state: 'available' } + | { readonly state: 'unavailable'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly state: 'refused'; readonly reason: string }; + +export type MutationImpact = 'read' | 'write' | 'session' | 'disruptive' | 'recovery'; +export type RetryClass = 'never' | 'idempotent-read'; +export type OperationConfidence = 'high' | 'medium' | 'low' | 'unknown'; + +export type OperationRequirement = + | { readonly required: false } + | { readonly required: true; readonly reason: string }; + +export type OperationReadback = + | { readonly required: false } + | { + readonly required: true; + readonly reason: string; + readonly matches: (input: I, observed: O) => boolean; + }; + +export type OperationDescriptor = { + readonly id: string; + readonly support: { + readonly read: OperationSupport; + readonly write: OperationSupport; + }; + readonly authority: 'provider' | 'controller' | 'hardware'; + readonly provider: string; + readonly constraints: OperationConstraints; + readonly livePreconditions: readonly string[]; + readonly availability: OperationAvailability; + readonly mutationImpact: MutationImpact; + readonly retryClass: RetryClass; + readonly readback: OperationReadback; + readonly rollback: OperationRequirement; + readonly journal: OperationRequirement; + readonly admission: OperationRequirement; + readonly evidence: { + readonly profiles: readonly string[]; + readonly firmware: readonly string[]; + }; + readonly confidence: OperationConfidence; +}; + +export class OperationDescriptorError extends DomainError { + override readonly name = 'OperationDescriptorError'; + readonly reason = 'retry-requires-idempotent-read'; + + constructor() { + super('operation descriptor refused: automatic retry requires a supported idempotent read'); + } +} + +export function defineOperationDescriptor( + descriptor: OperationDescriptor, +): OperationDescriptor { + if ( + descriptor.retryClass === 'idempotent-read' && + (descriptor.mutationImpact !== 'read' || !descriptor.support.read.supported) + ) { + throw new OperationDescriptorError(); + } + return descriptor; +} + +export type OperationCompletion = + | { readonly status: 'applied'; readonly value: O } + | { readonly status: 'refused'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly status: 'failed'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly status: 'timed-out' } + | { readonly status: 'dropped' }; + +export type OperationResult = + | { + readonly status: 'applied'; + readonly value: O; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly requiresReconciliation: false; + } + | { + readonly status: 'refused'; + readonly reason: string; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly requiresReconciliation: false; + } + | { + readonly status: 'unknown-outcome'; + readonly reason: 'stale-generation' | 'write-reply-timed-out' | 'write-reply-dropped'; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly requiresReconciliation: true; + } + | { + readonly status: 'failed'; + readonly reason: string; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly requiresReconciliation: false; + }; + +export type OperationCompletionContext = { + readonly operation: 'read' | 'write'; + readonly completionGeneration: DeviceGeneration; + readonly currentGeneration: DeviceGeneration; + readonly completion: OperationCompletion; +}; + +/** Apply generation and write-reply uncertainty before exposing a completion to callers. */ +export function classifyOperationCompletion( + context: OperationCompletionContext, +): OperationResult { + const generation = context.completionGeneration; + if (generation !== context.currentGeneration) { + return { + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'stale-generation', + requiresReconciliation: true, + generation, + }; + } + + switch (context.completion.status) { + case 'applied': + return { + status: 'applied', + value: context.completion.value, + generation, + requiresReconciliation: false, + }; + case 'refused': + return { + status: 'refused', + reason: context.completion.reason, + generation, + requiresReconciliation: false, + }; + case 'failed': + return { + status: 'failed', + reason: context.completion.reason, + generation, + requiresReconciliation: false, + }; + case 'timed-out': + return context.operation === 'write' + ? { + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'write-reply-timed-out', + requiresReconciliation: true, + generation, + } + : { + status: 'failed', + reason: 'read-reply-timed-out', + requiresReconciliation: false, + generation, + }; + case 'dropped': + return context.operation === 'write' + ? { + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'write-reply-dropped', + requiresReconciliation: true, + generation, + } + : { + status: 'failed', + reason: 'read-reply-dropped', + requiresReconciliation: false, + generation, + }; + } +} + +/** Automatic retries are restricted to explicitly classified idempotent reads. */ +export function canAutoRetry( + descriptor: OperationDescriptor, + result: OperationResult, +): boolean { + return ( + descriptor.mutationImpact === 'read' && + descriptor.support.read.supported && + descriptor.retryClass === 'idempotent-read' && + result.status === 'failed' + ); +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts b/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea5046f --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +import type { Brand } from './brand'; +import { DomainError } from './errors'; + +export type PhysicalModemId = Brand; +export type StableKey = Brand; +export type PhysicalIdentitySource = 'serial' | 'id-path' | 'fallback'; + +export type PhysicalIdentityFacts = { + readonly serial?: string; + readonly idPath?: string; + readonly fallback?: string; +}; + +export type ResolvedPhysicalModemIdentity = { + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly stableKey: StableKey; + readonly source: PhysicalIdentitySource; +}; + +export type PhysicalModemIdentityErrorReason = + | 'empty' + | 'unsupported-shape' + | 'mm-object-path' + | 'interface-name' + | 'ip-address' + | 'equipment-identifier' + | 'subscriber-identifier' + | 'fallback-too-long' + | 'no-identity-facts'; + +export class PhysicalModemIdentityError extends DomainError { + override readonly name = 'PhysicalModemIdentityError'; + + constructor(readonly reason: PhysicalModemIdentityErrorReason) { + super(`physical modem identity refused: ${reason}`); + } +} + +const PHYSICAL_ID_PREFIXES = [ + ['serial', 'serial:'], + ['id-path', 'id-path:'], + ['fallback', 'fallback:'], +] as const; +const FALLBACK_MAX_LENGTH = 128; +const MM_OBJECT_PATH = /^\/org\/freedesktop\/ModemManager1\/Modem(?:\/|$)/; +const INTERFACE_NAME = + /^(?:wwan|eth|enp|ens|eno|wlan|wl|ppp|usb|rmnet|cdc-wdm|ttyUSB|ttyACM)\d[\w.-]*$/i; +const EQUIPMENT_IDENTIFIER = /^\d{14,16}$/; +const SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIER = /^(?:89\d{16,30}|\d{18,32})$/; + +function isIpv4(value: string): boolean { + const octets = value.split('.'); + return ( + octets.length === 4 && octets.every((octet) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(octet) && Number(octet) <= 255) + ); +} + +function isIpv6(value: string): boolean { + if (!value.includes(':') || !/^[0-9a-f:]+$/i.test(value)) { + return false; + } + const groups = value.split(':'); + const hasCompression = value.includes('::'); + const populatedGroups = groups.filter((group) => group.length > 0); + return ( + populatedGroups.every((group) => group.length <= 4) && + (hasCompression ? populatedGroups.length < 8 : populatedGroups.length === 8) + ); +} + +function assertSafeIdentityPart(value: string): void { + if (value.length === 0) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('empty'); + } + if (MM_OBJECT_PATH.test(value)) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('mm-object-path'); + } + if (INTERFACE_NAME.test(value)) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('interface-name'); + } + if (isIpv4(value) || isIpv6(value)) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('ip-address'); + } + if (SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIER.test(value)) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('subscriber-identifier'); + } + if (EQUIPMENT_IDENTIFIER.test(value)) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('equipment-identifier'); + } +} + +function splitPhysicalModemId(value: string): readonly [PhysicalIdentitySource, string] { + for (const [source, prefix] of PHYSICAL_ID_PREFIXES) { + if (value.startsWith(prefix)) { + return [source, value.slice(prefix.length)]; + } + } + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('unsupported-shape'); +} + +/** Construct only from a canonical serial/ID_PATH/bounded-fallback identity. */ +export function physicalModemId(value: string): PhysicalModemId { + const [source, identityPart] = splitPhysicalModemId(value.trim()); + assertSafeIdentityPart(identityPart); + if (source === 'fallback' && identityPart.length > FALLBACK_MAX_LENGTH) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('fallback-too-long'); + } + return `${source}:${identityPart}` as PhysicalModemId; +} + +/** Construct the actor/storage key for a validated physical modem identity. */ +export function stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(id: PhysicalModemId): StableKey { + return `modem:${id}` as StableKey; +} + +/** Parse a canonical stable key while re-validating its embedded physical identity. */ +export function stableKey(value: string): StableKey { + if (!value.startsWith('modem:')) { + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('unsupported-shape'); + } + return stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(physicalModemId(value.slice('modem:'.length))); +} + +/** Resolve one identity with the frozen serial → ID_PATH → bounded-fallback precedence. */ +export function resolvePhysicalModemIdentity( + facts: PhysicalIdentityFacts, +): ResolvedPhysicalModemIdentity { + const candidates = [ + ['serial', facts.serial], + ['id-path', facts.idPath], + ['fallback', facts.fallback], + ] as const; + + for (const [source, candidate] of candidates) { + const normalized = candidate?.trim(); + if (normalized !== undefined && normalized.length > 0) { + const id = physicalModemId(`${source}:${normalized}`); + return { physicalModemId: id, stableKey: stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(id), source }; + } + } + + throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('no-identity-facts'); +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/v11-contracts.test.ts b/control/src/domain/v11-contracts.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ba079a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/v11-contracts.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + canAutoRetry, + classifyOperationCompletion, + defineOperationDescriptor, + deviceGeneration, + epochMillis, + isCurrentGeneration, + nextDeviceGeneration, + type ObservationEnvelope, + PhysicalModemIdentityError, + physicalModemId, + resolvePhysicalModemIdentity, + sourceEpoch, + stableKey, +} from './index'; + +describe('PhysicalModemId and StableKey', () => { + test('Given an MM object path, when PhysicalModemId is constructed, then construction is refused', () => { + expect(() => physicalModemId('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/7')).toThrow( + PhysicalModemIdentityError, + ); + }); + + test.each([ + ['ifname', 'wwan0'], + ['IPv4 address', '192.168.8.1'], + ['IPv6 address', '2001:db8::1'], + ['uncompressed IPv6 address', '2001:db8:0:0:0:0:0:1'], + ['IMEI', '490154203237518'], + ['ICCID', '8944500101234567890'], + ['EID', '89049032000000000000000000000001'], + ])( + 'Given a %s shape, when PhysicalModemId is constructed, then it is refused', + (_shape, value) => { + expect(() => physicalModemId(`serial:${value}`)).toThrow(PhysicalModemIdentityError); + }, + ); + + test('Given every identity fact, when resolving, then serial outranks ID_PATH and fallback', () => { + const resolved = resolvePhysicalModemIdentity({ + serial: 'SERIAL-A1', + idPath: 'pci-0000:01:00.0-usb-0:2:1.0', + fallback: 'vid-2c7c-pid-0800-port-2', + }); + + expect(resolved.source).toBe('serial'); + expect(resolved.physicalModemId).toBe(physicalModemId('serial:SERIAL-A1')); + expect(resolved.stableKey).toBe(stableKey('modem:serial:SERIAL-A1')); + }); + + test('Given no serial, when resolving, then ID_PATH outranks fallback', () => { + const resolved = resolvePhysicalModemIdentity({ + idPath: 'pci-0000:01:00.0-usb-0:2:1.0', + fallback: 'vid-2c7c-pid-0800-port-2', + }); + + expect(resolved.source).toBe('id-path'); + }); + + test('Given an oversized fallback, when resolving, then construction is refused', () => { + expect(() => resolvePhysicalModemIdentity({ fallback: 'x'.repeat(129) })).toThrow( + PhysicalModemIdentityError, + ); + }); +}); + +describe('DeviceGeneration', () => { + test('Given a current generation, when the device re-enumerates, then generation increments', () => { + const current = deviceGeneration(4); + const replacement = nextDeviceGeneration(current); + + expect(replacement).toBe(deviceGeneration(5)); + expect(isCurrentGeneration(current, replacement)).toBe(false); + expect(isCurrentGeneration(replacement, replacement)).toBe(true); + }); +}); + +describe('ObservationEnvelope', () => { + test('Given an unavailable source, when represented, then unavailable is distinct from stale', () => { + const unavailable: ObservationEnvelope = { + stableKey: resolvePhysicalModemIdentity({ serial: 'SERIAL-A1' }).stableKey, + generation: deviceGeneration(1), + source: 'modemmanager', + sourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(3), + observedAt: epochMillis(100), + freshness: { + state: 'unavailable', + since: epochMillis(90), + reason: 'source-unavailable', + }, + authority: 'authoritative', + value: null, + }; + + expect(unavailable.freshness.state).toBe('unavailable'); + expect(unavailable.value).toBeNull(); + }); +}); + +const READ_DESCRIPTOR = defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: 'radio-power', + support: { + read: { supported: true }, + write: { supported: false, reason: 'provider-read-only' }, + }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: 'modemmanager', + constraints: { kind: 'allowed-values', values: ['on', 'off'] }, + livePreconditions: ['device-present'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'read', + retryClass: 'idempotent-read', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: ['generic-mm'], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', +}); + +describe('OperationDescriptor', () => { + test('Given asymmetric provider support, when described, then read and write remain independent', () => { + expect(READ_DESCRIPTOR.support.read.supported).toBe(true); + expect(READ_DESCRIPTOR.support.write).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: 'provider-read-only', + }); + }); + + test('Given a write operation marked retryable, when defined, then the invalid contract is refused', () => { + expect(() => + defineOperationDescriptor({ + ...READ_DESCRIPTOR, + mutationImpact: 'write', + retryClass: 'idempotent-read', + }), + ).toThrow(); + }); +}); + +describe('OperationResult', () => { + test('Given a completion under a stale generation, when classified, then it is unknown-outcome and never failed', () => { + const result = classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: 'write', + completionGeneration: deviceGeneration(2), + currentGeneration: deviceGeneration(3), + completion: { status: 'failed', reason: 'provider-error' }, + }); + + expect(result.status).toBe('unknown-outcome'); + expect(result).toEqual({ + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'stale-generation', + requiresReconciliation: true, + generation: deviceGeneration(2), + }); + }); + + test.each(['timed-out', 'dropped'] as const)( + 'Given a %s write reply, when classified, then reconciliation is required', + (status) => { + const generation = deviceGeneration(5); + const result = classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: 'write', + completionGeneration: generation, + currentGeneration: generation, + completion: { status }, + }); + + expect(result.status).toBe('unknown-outcome'); + expect(result.requiresReconciliation).toBe(true); + }, + ); + + test('Given an idempotent read failure, when retry eligibility is checked, then it may auto-retry', () => { + const generation = deviceGeneration(5); + const result = classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: 'read', + completionGeneration: generation, + currentGeneration: generation, + completion: { status: 'timed-out' }, + }); + + expect(canAutoRetry(READ_DESCRIPTOR, result)).toBe(true); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/index.ts b/control/src/index.ts index 15f8614..ded97cb 100644 --- a/control/src/index.ts +++ b/control/src/index.ts @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ export * from './domain'; export * from './fcc'; export * from './location'; export * from './ports'; +export * from './providers'; export * from './redact'; export * from './sms'; export * from './usb-mode'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/conformance.test.ts b/control/src/providers/conformance.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f057fc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/conformance.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + providerFixture, + providerMatchRequest, +} from '../../test-support/provider-conformance-fixture'; +import { deviceGeneration } from '../domain'; +import { createProviderMatcher, createProviderRegistry } from './index'; + +describe('provider matcher conformance', () => { + test('Given no matching evidence, when matching, then the device is unsupported', async () => { + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(providerFixture('fixture-a')); + + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match( + providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1), 'different-model'), + ); + + expect(result.status).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(result.score).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(result.provider).toBeNull(); + expect(result.writable).toBe(false); + }); + + test('Given one strong match, when matching, then that provider and profile are selected', async () => { + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(providerFixture('fixture-a')); + + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match( + providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1)), + ); + + expect(result.status).toBe('selected'); + expect(result.provider).toBe('fixture-a'); + expect(result.profile).toBe('fixture-profile'); + expect(result.score).toBe('supported'); + }); + + test('Given one weak match, when matching, then it remains ambiguous and read-only', async () => { + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + const weak = providerFixture('fixture-a'); + registry.register({ + ...weak, + passiveMatchers: weak.passiveMatchers.map((matcher) => ({ + ...matcher, + strength: 'weak' as const, + })), + }); + + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match( + providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1)), + ); + + expect(result.status).toBe('ambiguous'); + expect(result.score).toBe('maybe'); + expect(result.operations).toBeNull(); + expect(result.writable).toBe(false); + }); + + test('Given tied providers, when matching, then the result is ambiguous read-only with evidence', async () => { + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(providerFixture('fixture-a')); + registry.register(providerFixture('fixture-b')); + + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match( + providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1)), + ); + + expect(result.status).toBe('ambiguous'); + expect(result.provider).toBeNull(); + expect(result.writable).toBe(false); + expect( + result.evidence + .filter((item) => item.stage === 'passive-facts' && item.signal === 'match') + .map((item) => item.provider), + ).toEqual(['fixture-a', 'fixture-b']); + }); + + test('Given colliding passive facts, when providers expose writes, then neither writable provider is selected', async () => { + let authAttempts = 0; + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + const first = providerFixture('fixture-a'); + const second = providerFixture('fixture-b'); + registry.register({ + ...first, + authenticatedProfile: { + algorithm: 'fixture-a-owner-selected', + attemptLimit: 1, + authenticate: async () => { + authAttempts += 1; + return { status: 'matched', profile: 'fixture-profile', detail: 'profile-confirmed' }; + }, + }, + operations: () => ({ ...first.operations('fixture-profile'), access: 'read-write' }), + }); + registry.register({ + ...second, + authenticatedProfile: { + algorithm: 'fixture-b-owner-selected', + attemptLimit: 1, + authenticate: async () => { + authAttempts += 1; + return { status: 'matched', profile: 'fixture-profile', detail: 'profile-confirmed' }; + }, + }, + operations: () => ({ ...second.operations('fixture-profile'), access: 'read-write' }), + }); + + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match( + providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1)), + ); + + expect(result.status).toBe('ambiguous'); + expect(result.provider).toBeNull(); + expect(result.operations).toBeNull(); + expect(result.writable).toBe(false); + expect(authAttempts).toBe(0); + }); + + test('Given a cached generation, when generation advances, then provider evidence is re-evaluated', async () => { + let probeRuns = 0; + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register( + providerFixture('fixture-a', { + probe: { + id: 'fixture-a.status', + run: async () => { + probeRuns += 1; + return { + signal: 'match', + strength: 'weak', + profiles: ['fixture-profile'], + detail: 'status-endpoint-shape', + }; + }, + }, + }), + ); + const matcher = createProviderMatcher(registry); + + await matcher.match(providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1))); + await matcher.match(providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1))); + await matcher.match(providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(2))); + + expect(probeRuns).toBe(2); + }); + + test('Given one authenticated profile, when matching twice in a generation, then one auth attempt precedes capability reads', async () => { + const stages: string[] = []; + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + const definition = providerFixture('fixture-a', { + probe: { + id: 'fixture-a.status', + run: async () => { + stages.push('fingerprint'); + return { + signal: 'match', + strength: 'weak', + profiles: ['fixture-profile'], + detail: 'status-endpoint-shape', + }; + }, + }, + }); + registry.register({ + ...definition, + authenticatedProfile: { + algorithm: 'fixture-owner-selected', + attemptLimit: 1, + authenticate: async () => { + stages.push('auth'); + return { status: 'matched', profile: 'fixture-profile', detail: 'profile-confirmed' }; + }, + }, + capabilityReaders: [ + { + id: 'fixture-a.signal', + read: async () => { + stages.push('capability'); + return { signal: 'match', strength: 'weak', detail: 'signal-readable' }; + }, + }, + ], + }); + const matcher = createProviderMatcher(registry); + + await matcher.match(providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1))); + await matcher.match(providerMatchRequest(deviceGeneration(1))); + + expect(stages).toEqual(['fingerprint', 'auth', 'capability']); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/contracts.ts b/control/src/providers/contracts.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64dd692 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/contracts.ts @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +import type { + DeviceGeneration, + ObservationEnvelope, + OperationDescriptor, + OperationResult, + PhysicalModemId, +} from '../domain'; + +export const PROVIDER_TRANSPORTS = ['usb', 'pci', 'network', 'modemmanager'] as const; +export type ProviderTransport = (typeof PROVIDER_TRANSPORTS)[number]; + +export const PASSIVE_FACT_KINDS = [ + 'usb', + 'pci', + 'interface', + 'driver', + 'gateway', + 'model', + 'firmware', +] as const; +export type PassiveFactKind = (typeof PASSIVE_FACT_KINDS)[number]; +export type EvidenceStrength = 'none' | 'weak' | 'moderate' | 'strong'; +export type MatcherScore = 'unsupported' | 'maybe' | 'likely' | 'supported'; + +export type PassiveFact = { + readonly kind: PassiveFactKind; + readonly value: string; +}; + +export type ProviderMatchRequest = { + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly transport: ProviderTransport; + readonly passiveFacts: readonly PassiveFact[]; + readonly composition: string; + readonly firmware?: string; +}; + +export type ProviderExecutionContext = ProviderMatchRequest & { + readonly profile: string; +}; + +export type PassiveMatcher = { + readonly id: string; + readonly fact: PassiveFactKind; + readonly expected: readonly string[]; + readonly profiles: readonly string[]; + readonly strength: Exclude; + readonly required: boolean; +}; + +export type FingerprintResult = { + readonly signal: 'match' | 'mismatch' | 'unknown'; + readonly strength: Exclude; + readonly profiles: readonly string[]; + readonly detail: string; +}; + +export type UnauthenticatedProbe = { + readonly id: string; + readonly run: (context: ProviderMatchRequest) => Promise; +}; + +export type CapabilityReader = { + readonly id: string; + readonly read: ( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ) => Promise>; +}; + +export type AuthenticatedProfileResult = + | { readonly status: 'matched'; readonly profile: string; readonly detail: string } + | { readonly status: 'refused'; readonly detail: string } + | { readonly status: 'unavailable'; readonly detail: string }; + +/** One algorithm and one call per generation-scoped evaluation; cycling is unrepresentable. */ +export type AuthenticatedProfile = { + readonly algorithm: string; + readonly attemptLimit: 1; + readonly authenticate: ( + context: ProviderMatchRequest, + profileCandidates: readonly string[], + ) => Promise; +}; + +export type ProviderOperationsSurface = { + readonly access: 'read-only' | 'read-write'; +}; + +export interface ProviderReadOperations { + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly read: (context: ProviderExecutionContext) => Promise>; +} + +export interface ProviderWriteOperations { + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly read: (context: ProviderExecutionContext) => Promise>; + readonly write: (context: ProviderExecutionContext, input: I) => Promise>; +} + +export type ProviderContractFixture = { + readonly profile: string; + readonly request: Readonly>; + readonly response: Readonly>; +}; + +export interface ProviderDefinition< + TObservation = unknown, + TOperations extends ProviderOperationsSurface = ProviderOperationsSurface, +> { + readonly id: string; + readonly profileVersion: string; + readonly eligibleTransports: readonly ProviderTransport[]; + readonly passiveMatchers: readonly PassiveMatcher[]; + readonly unauthenticatedProbes: readonly UnauthenticatedProbe[]; + readonly authenticatedProfile?: AuthenticatedProfile; + readonly capabilityReaders: readonly CapabilityReader[]; + readonly observe: ( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ) => Promise[]>; + readonly operations: (profile: string) => TOperations; + readonly contractFixtures: readonly ProviderContractFixture[]; +} + +export type MatcherEvidence = { + readonly provider: string; + readonly profile: string | null; + readonly stage: + | 'transport-eligibility' + | 'passive-facts' + | 'unauthenticated-fingerprint' + | 'authenticated-profile' + | 'capability-read'; + readonly source: string; + readonly signal: 'match' | 'mismatch' | 'unknown'; + readonly strength: EvidenceStrength; + readonly detail: string; +}; + +type MatchResultBase = { + readonly score: MatcherScore; + readonly confidence: number; + readonly evidence: readonly MatcherEvidence[]; + readonly conflicts: readonly MatcherEvidence[]; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; +}; + +export type ProviderMatchResult = + | (MatchResultBase & { + readonly status: 'unsupported' | 'ambiguous'; + readonly provider: null; + readonly profile: null; + readonly operations: null; + readonly writable: false; + }) + | (MatchResultBase & { + readonly status: 'selected'; + readonly provider: string; + readonly profile: string; + readonly operations: ProviderOperationsSurface; + readonly writable: boolean; + }); + +export interface ProviderMatcher { + match(request: ProviderMatchRequest): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/index.ts b/control/src/providers/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..557b41d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +export * from './contracts'; +export * from './matcher'; +export * from './registry'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/matcher.ts b/control/src/providers/matcher.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..131dca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/matcher.ts @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +import type { + EvidenceStrength, + MatcherEvidence, + MatcherScore, + ProviderDefinition, + ProviderMatcher, + ProviderMatchRequest, + ProviderMatchResult, +} from './contracts'; +import type { ProviderRegistry } from './registry'; + +const STRENGTH_POINTS = { + none: 0, + weak: 1, + moderate: 2, + strong: 3, +} as const satisfies Record; + +type Candidate = { + readonly provider: ProviderDefinition; + readonly profile: string; + points: number; +}; + +type CacheEntry = { + readonly signature: string; + readonly result: ProviderMatchResult; +}; + +function scoreOf(points: number): MatcherScore { + if (points <= 0) return 'unsupported'; + if (points === 1) return 'maybe'; + if (points === 2) return 'likely'; + return 'supported'; +} + +function confidenceOf(points: number): number { + return Math.min(1, points / 3); +} + +function cacheSignature(request: ProviderMatchRequest, registryRevision: number): string { + return JSON.stringify({ + registryRevision, + generation: request.generation, + transport: request.transport, + passiveFacts: request.passiveFacts, + composition: request.composition, + firmware: request.firmware ?? null, + }); +} + +function addCandidate( + candidates: Map, + provider: ProviderDefinition, + profile: string, + strength: EvidenceStrength, +): void { + const key = `${provider.id}\u0000${profile}`; + const existing = candidates.get(key); + if (existing === undefined) { + candidates.set(key, { provider, profile, points: STRENGTH_POINTS[strength] }); + return; + } + existing.points += STRENGTH_POINTS[strength]; +} + +function unresolvedResult( + status: 'unsupported' | 'ambiguous', + request: ProviderMatchRequest, + points: number, + evidence: readonly MatcherEvidence[], + conflicts: readonly MatcherEvidence[], +): ProviderMatchResult { + return { + status, + provider: null, + profile: null, + score: scoreOf(points), + confidence: confidenceOf(points), + evidence, + conflicts, + operations: null, + writable: false, + generation: request.generation, + physicalModemId: request.physicalModemId, + }; +} + +async function evaluate( + registry: ProviderRegistry, + request: ProviderMatchRequest, +): Promise { + const evidence: MatcherEvidence[] = []; + const conflicts: MatcherEvidence[] = []; + const candidates = new Map(); + const eligible: ProviderDefinition[] = []; + + for (const provider of registry.list()) { + const transportMatches = provider.eligibleTransports.includes(request.transport); + evidence.push({ + provider: provider.id, + profile: null, + stage: 'transport-eligibility', + source: request.transport, + signal: transportMatches ? 'match' : 'mismatch', + strength: 'none', + detail: transportMatches ? 'eligible-transport' : 'ineligible-transport', + }); + if (transportMatches) eligible.push(provider); + } + + for (const provider of eligible) { + for (const matcher of provider.passiveMatchers) { + const actual = request.passiveFacts + .filter((fact) => fact.kind === matcher.fact) + .map((fact) => fact.value); + const signal = + actual.length === 0 + ? 'unknown' + : actual.some((value) => matcher.expected.includes(value)) + ? 'match' + : 'mismatch'; + const item: MatcherEvidence = { + provider: provider.id, + profile: matcher.profiles.length === 1 ? (matcher.profiles[0] ?? null) : null, + stage: 'passive-facts', + source: matcher.id, + signal, + strength: matcher.strength, + detail: signal === 'match' ? 'expected-fact-present' : 'expected-fact-not-proven', + }; + evidence.push(item); + if (signal === 'mismatch' && matcher.required) conflicts.push(item); + if (signal === 'match') { + for (const profile of matcher.profiles) { + addCandidate(candidates, provider, profile, matcher.strength); + } + } + } + } + + for (const provider of eligible) { + for (const probe of provider.unauthenticatedProbes) { + const result = await probe.run(request); + const item: MatcherEvidence = { + provider: provider.id, + profile: result.profiles.length === 1 ? (result.profiles[0] ?? null) : null, + stage: 'unauthenticated-fingerprint', + source: probe.id, + signal: result.signal, + strength: result.strength, + detail: result.detail, + }; + evidence.push(item); + if (result.signal === 'mismatch') conflicts.push(item); + if (result.signal === 'match') { + for (const profile of result.profiles) { + addCandidate(candidates, provider, profile, result.strength); + } + } + } + } + + const ranked = [...candidates.values()].sort((left, right) => right.points - left.points); + const top = ranked[0]; + if (top === undefined) return unresolvedResult('unsupported', request, 0, evidence, conflicts); + if (ranked[1]?.points === top.points) { + return unresolvedResult('ambiguous', request, top.points, evidence, conflicts); + } + + if (top.provider.authenticatedProfile !== undefined) { + const auth = await top.provider.authenticatedProfile.authenticate(request, [top.profile]); + const matched = auth.status === 'matched' && auth.profile === top.profile; + const item: MatcherEvidence = { + provider: top.provider.id, + profile: top.profile, + stage: 'authenticated-profile', + source: top.provider.authenticatedProfile.algorithm, + signal: matched ? 'match' : auth.status === 'unavailable' ? 'unknown' : 'mismatch', + strength: 'strong', + detail: auth.detail, + }; + evidence.push(item); + if (!matched) { + conflicts.push(item); + return unresolvedResult('ambiguous', request, top.points, evidence, conflicts); + } + top.points += STRENGTH_POINTS.strong; + } + + const context = { ...request, profile: top.profile }; + for (const reader of top.provider.capabilityReaders) { + const result = await reader.read(context); + const item: MatcherEvidence = { + provider: top.provider.id, + profile: top.profile, + stage: 'capability-read', + source: reader.id, + signal: result.signal, + strength: result.strength, + detail: result.detail, + }; + evidence.push(item); + if (result.signal === 'match') top.points += STRENGTH_POINTS[result.strength]; + if (result.signal === 'mismatch') conflicts.push(item); + } + + if (scoreOf(top.points) !== 'supported') { + return unresolvedResult('ambiguous', request, top.points, evidence, conflicts); + } + const operations = top.provider.operations(top.profile); + return { + status: 'selected', + provider: top.provider.id, + profile: top.profile, + score: 'supported', + confidence: confidenceOf(top.points), + evidence, + conflicts, + operations, + writable: operations.access === 'read-write', + generation: request.generation, + physicalModemId: request.physicalModemId, + }; +} + +class GenerationScopedProviderMatcher implements ProviderMatcher { + /** Cache mutation is scoped by physical modem, generation, firmware and composition. */ + readonly #cache = new Map(); + + constructor(private readonly registry: ProviderRegistry) {} + + async match(request: ProviderMatchRequest): Promise { + const key = request.physicalModemId; + const signature = cacheSignature(request, this.registry.revision); + const cached = this.#cache.get(key); + if (cached?.signature === signature) return cached.result; + + const result = await evaluate(this.registry, request); + this.#cache.set(key, { signature, result }); + return result; + } +} + +export function createProviderMatcher(registry: ProviderRegistry): ProviderMatcher { + return new GenerationScopedProviderMatcher(registry); +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/registry.ts b/control/src/providers/registry.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3f8f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/registry.ts @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +import { DomainError } from '../domain'; +import type { ProviderDefinition, ProviderOperationsSurface } from './contracts'; + +export class ProviderRegistryError extends DomainError { + override readonly name = 'ProviderRegistryError'; + + constructor(readonly reason: 'duplicate-provider' | 'empty-profile-version') { + super(`provider registration refused: ${reason}`); + } +} + +export interface ProviderRegistry { + readonly revision: number; + register( + definition: ProviderDefinition, + ): void; + list(): readonly ProviderDefinition[]; +} + +class InMemoryProviderRegistry implements ProviderRegistry { + /** Startup registration is the registry's documented mutation boundary. */ + readonly #definitions: ProviderDefinition[] = []; + #revision = 0; + + get revision(): number { + return this.#revision; + } + + register( + definition: ProviderDefinition, + ): void { + if (this.#definitions.some((candidate) => candidate.id === definition.id)) { + throw new ProviderRegistryError('duplicate-provider'); + } + if (definition.profileVersion.trim().length === 0) { + throw new ProviderRegistryError('empty-profile-version'); + } + this.#definitions.push(definition); + this.#revision += 1; + } + + list(): readonly ProviderDefinition[] { + return [...this.#definitions]; + } +} + +export function createProviderRegistry(): ProviderRegistry { + return new InMemoryProviderRegistry(); +} diff --git a/control/test-support/provider-conformance-fixture.ts b/control/test-support/provider-conformance-fixture.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee5120a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/provider-conformance-fixture.ts @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +import { + type DeviceGeneration, + deviceGeneration, + epochMillis, + type ObservationEnvelope, + type OperationDescriptor, + type OperationResult, + type PhysicalModemId, + physicalModemId, + sourceEpoch, + stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId, +} from '../src/domain'; +import type { + ProviderDefinition, + ProviderMatchRequest, + ProviderOperationsSurface, + ProviderReadOperations, +} from '../src/providers'; + +type TestObservation = { readonly registered: boolean }; + +type TestOperations = ProviderOperationsSurface & { + readonly signal: ProviderReadOperations; +}; + +const PHYSICAL_ID: PhysicalModemId = physicalModemId('serial:provider-conformance'); + +export function providerMatchRequest( + generation: DeviceGeneration, + model = 'fixture-model', +): ProviderMatchRequest { + return { + physicalModemId: PHYSICAL_ID, + generation, + transport: 'network', + passiveFacts: [{ kind: 'model', value: model }], + composition: 'ethernet-router', + firmware: '1.0.0', + }; +} + +export function providerFixture( + id: string, + options: { + readonly model?: string; + readonly probe?: ProviderDefinition< + TestObservation, + TestOperations + >['unauthenticatedProbes'][number]; + } = {}, +): ProviderDefinition { + const model = options.model ?? 'fixture-model'; + const generation = deviceGeneration(1); + const observation: ObservationEnvelope = { + stableKey: stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(PHYSICAL_ID), + generation, + source: id, + sourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(1), + observedAt: epochMillis(1), + freshness: { state: 'fresh' }, + authority: 'authoritative', + value: { registered: true }, + }; + const descriptor: OperationDescriptor = { + id: 'signal.read', + support: { read: { supported: true }, write: { supported: false, reason: 'read-only' } }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: id, + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: ['device-present'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'read', + retryClass: 'idempotent-read', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: ['fixture-profile'], firmware: ['1.0.0'] }, + confidence: 'high', + }; + + return { + id, + profileVersion: '1', + eligibleTransports: ['network'], + passiveMatchers: [ + { + id: `${id}.model`, + fact: 'model', + expected: [model], + profiles: ['fixture-profile'], + strength: 'strong', + required: true, + }, + ], + unauthenticatedProbes: options.probe === undefined ? [] : [options.probe], + capabilityReaders: [], + observe: async () => [observation], + operations: () => ({ + access: 'read-only', + signal: { + descriptor, + read: async () => { + const result: OperationResult = { + status: 'applied', + value: -70, + generation, + requiresReconciliation: false, + }; + return result; + }, + }, + }), + contractFixtures: [ + { + profile: 'fixture-profile', + request: { method: 'GET', path: '/status' }, + response: { registered: true }, + }, + ], + }; +} diff --git a/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md b/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94e2d4d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# Modem control domain contracts + +The additive v1.1 domain surface lives in `control/src/domain/` and is re-exported by the +existing package root. The v1.0 identity, snapshot, policy, ports, backend, and transport +exports remain unchanged. + +## Physical identity + +`resolvePhysicalModemIdentity()` applies one precedence order: serial, then udev `ID_PATH`, +then an opaque fallback capped at 128 characters. It returns a branded `PhysicalModemId`, a +branded `StableKey`, and the selected `PhysicalIdentitySource`. + +Canonical physical ids are prefixed `serial:`, `id-path:`, or `fallback:`; stable keys add +the `modem:` namespace. `physicalModemId()` and `stableKey()` refuse values shaped like a +ModemManager object path, network interface, IP address, IMEI, ICCID/IMSI/EID, or an +unbounded fallback. Runtime MM paths, ifnames, addresses, and subscriber/equipment ids are +observations, never physical identity. + +## Lifetimes and observations + +`DeviceGeneration` is a non-negative monotonic generation. Call +`nextDeviceGeneration()` whenever a physical modem re-enumerates or its selected provider +is replaced. Every asynchronous observation and operation completion carries the generation +it started under; `isCurrentGeneration()` identifies stale work. + +`ObservationEnvelope` always carries `stableKey`, `generation`, `source`, `sourceEpoch`, +`observedAt`, `freshness`, `authority`, and `value`. Fresh and stale observations retain a +typed value. Unavailable observations are a separate discriminated state with `value: null`; +they cannot be confused with stale data or with a boolean freshness flag. + +## Operations + +`OperationDescriptor` records independent read/write support, provider authority, +input constraints, live preconditions, typed availability, mutation impact, retry class, +readback/rollback/journal/admission requirements, profile and firmware evidence, and +confidence. `defineOperationDescriptor()` refuses automatic retry unless the operation is a +supported read classified `idempotent-read`. + +`classifyOperationCompletion()` maps results to `applied`, `refused`, `unknown-outcome`, or +`failed`. A stale-generation completion is always `unknown-outcome`. A timed-out or dropped +write reply is also `unknown-outcome`, even when the generation is current. Every unknown +outcome has `requiresReconciliation: true`; callers must reconcile that modem before another +mutation. `canAutoRetry()` returns true only for a failed, supported, explicitly idempotent +read. diff --git a/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md b/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..75e56f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# Provider registration and evidence matching + +`control/src/providers/` is the provider-neutral selection layer for +`@ceralive/modem-control`. It contains no Huawei, ZTE, UFI/HIMI or other concrete provider. + +## Registration contract + +Each `ProviderDefinition` declares: + +- a stable `id` and `profileVersion`; +- eligible transports and passive USB, PCI, interface, driver, gateway, model and firmware facts; +- harmless unauthenticated fingerprint probes; +- optionally, one owner-selected authentication algorithm with `attemptLimit: 1`; +- capability evidence readers; +- `observe()` returning generation-fenced `ObservationEnvelope` values; +- `operations()` returning that provider's own capability-specific operations object; and +- sanitized request/response `contractFixtures` keyed by profile. + +Providers compose `ProviderReadOperations` and `ProviderWriteOperations` into their own +named operation surfaces. The registry sees only the common `access` marker. This preserves each +provider's distinctions instead of forcing unrelated capabilities into a universal interface. + +## Ordered matching + +`createProviderMatcher(registry).match(request)` always evaluates these stages in order: + +1. transport eligibility; +2. passive facts; +3. unauthenticated fingerprints; +4. profile candidate ranking; +5. at most one authentication call, using the registered algorithm; and +6. capability reads. + +Evidence strengths contribute `weak = 1`, `moderate = 2`, and `strong = 3`. Totals map to +`unsupported` (0), `maybe` (1), `likely` (2), and `supported` (3 or more). Transport eligibility +is a gate, not identity evidence. The result always exposes its evidence and conflicts. + +Only one unique `supported` candidate is selected. A tied top score or a candidate that remains +`maybe`/`likely` returns `ambiguous`; its provider, profile and operations are `null` and +`writable` is false. Ties stop before authentication, so matching never tries several providers' +credentials and never cycles algorithms after a failure. + +## Generation scope + +Selections are cached by physical modem plus registry revision, `DeviceGeneration`, transport, +passive facts, firmware and composition. Re-enumeration/reboot advances the generation; a firmware +or composition change changes the cache signature. Each case re-runs the complete evidence pipeline. + +## Conformance + +`control/src/providers/conformance.test.ts` is the generic provider conformance skeleton, backed by +the internal `control/test-support/provider-conformance-fixture.ts` fixture. It covers unsupported, +selected, weak, tied/read-only, colliding writable-provider, auth ordering and generation +re-evaluation paths without registering a real vendor implementation. From 39fc48642581660804751c6f1deed1e3f641c400 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] feat(pkg): built ESM surface + narrow subpaths + testing entry @ceralive/modem-control shipped raw TypeScript through v1.0.0 - exports pointed at ./src/index.ts and files was ["src"], with no build tool in the repo at all. It now publishes built ESM plus declarations from dist/, across seven entry points and no more: ., ./transport, ./domain, ./providers, ./capabilities, ./hardware, ./testing. Internal barrels stay reachable only through the root entry, so reorganising them is not a breaking change. ./testing is the public contract-fakes surface. A consumer testing against this package needs valid instances of the frozen v1.1 domain and provider contracts, and hand-rolling them is how a consumer's fixtures come to disagree with the package - a hand-written OperationResult literal quietly stops matching what classifyOperationCompletion returns. Every fake is built through the package's own constructors and classifiers, so it cannot express a shape the domain refuses. control/test-support/ is deliberately NOT this: it needs a private session bus and a stateful nmcli harness, and stays unpublished. dist/ is a 1:1 tsc emit rather than a bundle. Bun.build --splitting emitted an entry whose export list named symbols the file never imported, which Bun's loader accepts and Node rejects with "Export 'BigIntRequiredError' is not defined in module" - the Node fixture is what caught it. Bundling without splitting instead gives each subpath its own copy of the shared modules, which breaks instanceof across two subpaths of one package. Because tsc never rewrites a specifier and these sources are written for bundler resolution, the build rewrites each emitted ./x into ./x.js or ./x/index.js, resolved against the emit itself, and fails if one extensionless specifier survives. The repo-root tsconfig now maps @ceralive/modem-control* back to control/src. That is required, not a convenience: with exports pointing at dist, the workspace cli resolved the package to dist while control/test-support resolved the same modules relatively, and Brand's unique symbol turned every branded value crossing that boundary into a hard type error. The mapping is never published, so consumers still resolve to dist. The built artifact is therefore proven by things that ignore that mapping. The shape gate packs with bun pm pack and runs six rules over the extracted tarball: no raw source, dist really carries .js and .d.ts, every declared entry both exported and packed, no undeclared subpath, nothing pointing outside ./dist/, and the library-only proof - no bin, no systemd unit, no shebang, no listening-socket construct. Each detector has a non-vacuity test that trips it with a synthetic artifact. Two standalone consumer projects then install the real tarball and import all seven specifiers; the Node one refuses any major but 26, so a green result cannot come from an older Node on PATH. Incidental but required: biome's "!test-results" only excluded a root-level directory, so the new control/test-results/ made lint red; it is now "!**/test-results". Both workflows move to Node 26, and ci-bun.yml gains the consumer-fixture step. --- .github/workflows/ci-bun.yml | 9 +- .github/workflows/release.yml | 4 +- AGENTS.md | 75 +++++- README.md | 9 +- biome.json | 2 +- control/README.md | 104 ++++++++ control/fixtures/check-public-surface.mjs | 98 ++++++++ control/fixtures/consumer-bun/package.json | 10 + control/fixtures/consumer-node/package.json | 10 + control/package.json | 40 +++- control/scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts | 26 ++ control/scripts/build.ts | 150 ++++++++++++ control/scripts/entries.ts | 66 ++++++ control/scripts/pack-tarball.ts | 60 +++++ control/scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts | 204 ++++++++++++++++ control/scripts/tarball-shape.ts | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++ control/scripts/verify-consumers.ts | 99 ++++++++ control/src/hardware/index.ts | 15 ++ control/src/testing/domain-fakes.ts | 185 +++++++++++++++ control/src/testing/fakes.test.ts | 131 ++++++++++ control/src/testing/index.ts | 18 ++ control/src/testing/provider-fakes.ts | 115 +++++++++ control/test-support/README.md | 9 +- control/tsconfig.build.json | 19 ++ package.json | 1 + tsconfig.json | 27 ++- 26 files changed, 1720 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 control/README.md create mode 100644 control/fixtures/check-public-surface.mjs create mode 100644 control/fixtures/consumer-bun/package.json create mode 100644 control/fixtures/consumer-node/package.json create mode 100644 control/scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts create mode 100644 control/scripts/build.ts create mode 100644 control/scripts/entries.ts create mode 100644 control/scripts/pack-tarball.ts create mode 100644 control/scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts create mode 100644 control/scripts/tarball-shape.ts create mode 100644 control/scripts/verify-consumers.ts create mode 100644 control/src/hardware/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/testing/domain-fakes.ts create mode 100644 control/src/testing/fakes.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/testing/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/testing/provider-fakes.ts create mode 100644 control/tsconfig.build.json diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci-bun.yml b/.github/workflows/ci-bun.yml index f2cfed9..a4fb24d 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci-bun.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci-bun.yml @@ -42,9 +42,12 @@ jobs: with: bun-version: 1.3.14 + # Node 26 is the CeraLive CI baseline AND the runtime the standalone consumer + # fixture asserts on: `scripts/verify-consumers.ts` refuses anything but 26.x, so + # a green fixture cannot come from an older Node that happened to be on PATH. - uses: actions/setup-node@v7 with: - node-version: 24 + node-version: "26" - name: Cache bun install store uses: actions/cache@v6 @@ -65,3 +68,7 @@ jobs: - name: Test run: bun test + + - name: Standalone consumer fixtures (Node 26 + Bun) against the packed tarball + working-directory: control + run: bun run verify:consumers diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml index 401fa8e..72d67c3 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/release.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ jobs: - uses: actions/setup-node@v7 with: - node-version: 24 + node-version: "26" - name: Cache bun install store uses: actions/cache@v6 @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ jobs: - uses: actions/setup-node@v7 with: - node-version: 24 + node-version: "26" registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org/ # OIDC trusted publishing needs npm >= 11.5.1 (house pattern pins 11.18.0). diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index c8c56e4..c0a91e8 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Canonical branch: `main`. Sole remote: `origin` → `https://github.com/CERALIVE | Directory | Artifact | Role | |-----------|----------|------| -| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection**, and the **band-lock** vocabulary + certification catalog (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive`. | +| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection**, and the **band-lock** vocabulary + certification catalog (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive` as **built ESM + `.d.ts`** across seven entry points (see § PUBLISHED PACKAGE SURFACE). | | `cli/` | `modem-control` (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`/`watch`/`apply`/`set-usb-mode`/`usage`/`certify`/`hil-cycle`, compiled `arm64`+`amd64`, run against real modems. Not published to npm. | | `packaging/` | ModemManager stack `.deb`s **+ the first-party companion** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — packaging only, zero source patches (see `POLICY.md`) — PLUS `ceralive-modem-support`, the `Architecture: all` first-party companion that owns CeraLive's generic modem system assets so those four never absorb one. | @@ -128,6 +128,62 @@ frozen v1.1 domain contracts. The public contract and scoring details are docume This layer registers no concrete provider. Huawei, ZTE, UFI/HIMI and other implementations remain separate evidence-backed work. +## PUBLISHED PACKAGE SURFACE — BUILT ESM, SEVEN SUBPATHS, NO SERVICE + +`@ceralive/modem-control` publishes **built output**: `files: ["dist"]`, and every +`exports` target resolves under `./dist/`. It shipped raw TypeScript through `v1.0.0` +(`exports` → `./src/index.ts`, `files: ["src"]`); that is gone. The public surface is +seven specifiers and no more — `.`, `./transport`, `./domain`, `./providers`, +`./capabilities`, `./hardware`, `./testing`. Full consumer-facing detail: +[`control/README.md`](control/README.md). + +- **`control/scripts/entries.ts` is the single source of truth.** The build, the + exports map and the shape gate all read it, so they cannot drift. Adding a row is a + deliberate, permanent widening of the public API; internal barrels (`src/backend`, + `src/ports`, `src/sms`, `src/ussd`, `src/location`, `src/fcc`, `src/redact`) are + reachable only through the root entry and stay unexported on purpose. +- **`./capabilities` maps to `src/capability/` and `./hardware` to `src/band` + + `src/usb-mode`.** The specifier is the contract; the directory layout behind it is not. +- **`./testing` is the PUBLIC contract-fakes surface, and `control/test-support/` is + not.** The fakes are pure data and functions built through the package's own + constructors and classifiers — `fakeOperationResult` routes through the real + `classifyOperationCompletion`, so a consumer's fixture cannot drift from what the + package returns, and `fakeUnavailableObservation` has no overload that could invent a + value. `test-support/` keeps this repo's heavy internals (the MM-faithful fake D-Bus + service on a private session bus, the stateful `nmcli` harness); it lives outside + `src`, is unpublished, and must not become a subpath. +- **`dist/` is a 1:1 `tsc` emit, deliberately NOT a bundle.** `Bun.build --splitting` + emitted an entry whose `export { … }` list named symbols it never imported — Bun's + loader accepts it, Node answers `SyntaxError: Export 'BigIntRequiredError' is not + defined in module`. Bundling without splitting instead gives each subpath its own copy + of the shared modules, which breaks `instanceof DomainError` across two subpaths of + one package. The 1:1 emit has one instance of every module. +- **`scripts/build.ts` rewrites every emitted relative specifier** into `./x.js` or + `./x/index.js`, resolved against the emit itself, because the sources are written for + `moduleResolution: bundler` and `tsc` never rewrites a specifier. The build FAILS if + one extensionless specifier survives. `prepack` runs the build, so no pack can publish + a stale `dist/`. +- **The repo-root `tsconfig.json` `paths` map `@ceralive/modem-control*` back to + `control/src`.** This is DEV-ONLY and load-bearing: without it the workspace `cli` + resolves the package through its exports map to `dist` while `control/test-support` + resolves the same modules relatively, and `Brand`'s `unique symbol` turns every + branded value crossing between them into a hard type error. It also means the + workspace never needs `dist` to exist in order to typecheck or test. The published + package is unaffected — consumers still resolve to `dist`. +- **The built artifact is proven by things that ignore that mapping.** + `control/scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts` packs with `bun pm pack` and runs six rules + over the extracted tarball (no raw source / built output present / every declared + entry exported AND packed / no undeclared subpath / nothing pointing outside `./dist/` + / **no `bin`, systemd unit, shebang or listening-socket construct** — the library-only + proof). Every detector has a non-vacuity test that trips it with a synthetic artifact. + `control/fixtures/` then holds two STANDALONE consumer projects — one Node, one Bun — + which `bun run verify:consumers` installs the real `.tgz` into and imports all seven + specifiers from. The Node fixture refuses to run on anything but Node 26.x, so a green + result cannot come from an older Node on `PATH`. +- **Removing `./testing` cannot pass the gate.** It is a row in `entries.ts` AND a + literal in the shape test's `EXPECTED_SUBPATHS`, so dropping it from `package.json` + fails four tests and dropping it from `entries.ts` too fails a fifth. + ## PROVENANCE PINS (packaging) The four rebuilt sources are pinned in `packaging/upstream-pins.yaml`, re-verified end-to-end @@ -749,12 +805,19 @@ rationale, source cites, and the open gates are recorded in `docs/FM350-DECISION `tsconfig.json` covers both members (`bun run typecheck` → `tsc --noEmit`). - **Biome** via `@ceralive/biome-config` (repo-root `biome.json` extends it). `bun run lint`. - **Bun test** (`bun test`) discovers `*.test.ts` across both members. +- **Node 26** for the standalone consumer fixtures (`control/fixtures/`). Point + `CERALIVE_NODE_BIN` at a Node 26 binary if it is not first on `PATH`. ```sh bun install -bun test # workspace tests +bun test # workspace tests (includes the tarball-shape gate) bun run lint # biome check . bun run typecheck # tsc --noEmit (strict + exactOptionalPropertyTypes) +bun run build # build @ceralive/modem-control into control/dist + +cd control +bun run verify:tarball # pack + assert the published artifact's shape +bun run verify:consumers # install the tarball into standalone Node 26 + Bun projects ``` `packaging/` runs in a `debian:bookworm` container; its contract/verification scripts live @@ -773,7 +836,10 @@ Follows the CeraLive CI/CD standard (concurrency, trigger hygiene, least privile major action versions, per-manager caches, weekly grouped Dependabot, test-before-publish). - **`.github/workflows/ci-bun.yml`** — paths-filtered PR + push(`main`) lane for - `control/**` and `cli/**`: `bun install` → Biome check → `tsc --noEmit` → `bun test`. + `control/**` and `cli/**`: `bun install` → Biome check → `tsc --noEmit` → `bun test` → + `bun run verify:consumers` (the standalone Node 26 + Bun consumer fixtures against the + packed tarball). Its `node-version` pin is load-bearing rather than incidental: + `control/scripts/verify-consumers.ts` refuses any major but 26. `cancel-in-progress: true`. - **`.github/workflows/ci-packaging.yml`** — paths-filtered PR + push(`main`) container lane for `packaging/**`: runs the packaging contract scripts in `debian:bookworm`. The four @@ -824,7 +890,8 @@ major action versions, per-manager caches, weekly grouped Dependabot, test-befor `cancel-in-progress: false` (never cancel a release/publish mid-run). Action pins track the latest stable **major** (resolved via the `gh api` releases/latest -endpoint); Dependabot keeps them current. JS/TS CI runs on **Node 24**. +endpoint); Dependabot keeps them current. JS/TS CI runs on **Node 26** — the CeraLive CI +baseline, and the runtime the published tarball's consumer fixture asserts on. ## DOCS DISCIPLINE (Rule A) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index dd2038b..d1b1ce5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ straight from CI artifacts; nothing is published to `apt.ceralive.tv` yet. | Directory | Artifact | What it is | |-----------|----------|------------| -| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: the [frozen v1.1 domain contracts](docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md), [provider registry and evidence-scored matcher](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md), ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope. | +| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: the [frozen v1.1 domain contracts](docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md), [provider registry and evidence-scored matcher](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md), ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope as **built ESM + `.d.ts`** across seven entry points — see [`control/README.md`](control/README.md). | | [`cli/`](cli/) | **`modem-control`** (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`, `watch`, `apply`, `set-usb-mode`, `usage`, `certify`, `hil-cycle`. Compiled for `arm64` + `amd64` and run against real modems on a bench device to mature the package, capture per-SKU certification bundles, and prove hub VBUS port-cycling ([RB-10](docs/BENCH.md#rb-10--hub-vbus-verification-partial)). | | [`packaging/`](packaging/) | **ModemManager stack `.deb`s** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — **packaging only, not a fork, zero source patches** (see [`POLICY.md`](POLICY.md)). Provenance-verified upstream pins; installed on the bench from CI artifacts. | @@ -48,9 +48,14 @@ Biome via `@ceralive/biome-config`). `packaging/` is built in a bookworm contain ```sh bun install # install the workspace (control + cli) -bun test # run the workspace test suite +bun test # run the workspace test suite (includes the tarball-shape gate) bun run lint # Biome check bun run typecheck # tsc --noEmit (strict, exactOptionalPropertyTypes) +bun run build # build @ceralive/modem-control into control/dist + +cd control +bun run verify:tarball # pack + assert the published artifact's shape +bun run verify:consumers # standalone Node 26 + Bun consumers of the packed tarball ``` Every command runs from the repository root and needs nothing outside this checkout — diff --git a/biome.json b/biome.json index 38ce7be..e2626de 100644 --- a/biome.json +++ b/biome.json @@ -2,6 +2,6 @@ "$schema": "https://biomejs.dev/schemas/2.5.5/schema.json", "extends": ["@ceralive/biome-config"], "files": { - "includes": ["**", "!**/node_modules", "!**/dist", "!test-results"] + "includes": ["**", "!**/node_modules", "!**/dist", "!**/test-results"] } } diff --git a/control/README.md b/control/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e225f6c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +# `@ceralive/modem-control` + +Cellular modem control for CeraLive: the frozen v1.1 domain contracts, the provider +registry and evidence-scored matcher, the ModemManager D-Bus backend, the +NetworkManager adapter, the desired-state reconciler, the USB composition-mode model, +the data-usage sampler, and the gated capability modules. + +**This package is a LIBRARY.** It ships no `bin`, no systemd unit, no shebang, and +nothing that opens a listening socket — it is imported by a controller, it is not one. +That claim is checked against the real `bun pm pack` output, not against the source +tree; see [Shape gate](#shape-gate). + +## Install + +```sh +npm install @ceralive/modem-control # or: bun add @ceralive/modem-control +``` + +ESM only (`"type": "module"`). Node 26 and Bun 1.3 are the runtimes the published +tarball is exercised against on every CI run. + +## Public entry points + +Seven specifiers, and nothing else. Every other module is internal and reachable only +through the root entry, so an internal reorganisation is not a breaking change. + +| Specifier | What it carries | +|-----------|-----------------| +| `@ceralive/modem-control` | Everything below plus the ports, backend, reconciler, redaction, SMS, USSD, location and FCC modules | +| `@ceralive/modem-control/domain` | Frozen v1.1 contracts: `PhysicalModemId`, `DeviceGeneration`, `ObservationEnvelope`, `OperationDescriptor` / `OperationResult` | +| `@ceralive/modem-control/providers` | `ProviderDefinition`, the registry, and the evidence-scored matcher | +| `@ceralive/modem-control/capabilities` | The five-state support-claim taxonomy and per-modem capability detection | +| `@ceralive/modem-control/hardware` | The per-SKU hardware model: USB composition modes + certified catalog, and the band vocabulary + band-lock certification | +| `@ceralive/modem-control/transport` | The D-Bus transport seam (no underlying-library type is re-exported) | +| `@ceralive/modem-control/testing` | Public **contract fakes** for consumers' own tests | + +### `./testing` is the contract-fakes surface + +A consumer writing tests against this package needs valid instances of the domain and +provider contracts. Hand-rolling them is how a consumer's fixtures come to disagree +with the package — a hand-written `OperationResult` literal quietly stops matching what +`classifyOperationCompletion` actually returns. Every fake in `./testing` is built +through this package's own constructors and classifiers, so it cannot express a shape +the domain refuses. + +```ts +import { createProviderMatcher, createProviderRegistry } from '@ceralive/modem-control/providers'; +import { fakeProviderDefinition, fakeProviderMatchRequest } from '@ceralive/modem-control/testing'; + +const registry = createProviderRegistry(); +registry.register(fakeProviderDefinition({ observation: { registered: true } })); + +const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match(fakeProviderMatchRequest()); +``` + +`./testing` is pure data and functions — no bus, no daemon, no process, no filesystem. +It is **not** the repository's `test-support/` directory, which holds the heavy +internals this package's own tests use (an MM-faithful fake D-Bus service on a private +session bus, a stateful `nmcli` harness). Those are unpublished and are not a reusable +surface. + +## Build + +```sh +bun run build # tsc -> dist/ (ESM + .d.ts), then fully specify every relative specifier +bun run verify:tarball # pack and assert the published artifact's shape +bun run verify:consumers # install the tarball into standalone Node 26 + Bun projects and import every subpath +``` + +`dist/` mirrors `src/` one-to-one rather than being bundled. Bundling with code +splitting produced an entry whose `export { … }` list named symbols the file never +imported — accepted by one loader, a `SyntaxError` in another. Bundling *without* +splitting instead gives each subpath its own copy of the shared modules, which silently +breaks `instanceof` across two subpaths of the same package. A 1:1 emit has exactly one +instance of every module. + +Because `tsc` never rewrites a specifier and this package's sources are written for +bundler resolution, `scripts/build.ts` rewrites each emitted `./x` into `./x.js` or +`./x/index.js` — resolved against the emit itself — and fails the build if one +extensionless specifier survives. + +`prepack` runs the build, so `npm pack` / `bun pm pack` can never publish a stale `dist/`. + +## Shape gate + +`scripts/tarball-shape.ts` runs six rules over the extracted tarball, driven from +`bun test` (`scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts`) and from the CLI +(`scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts`): + +1. no raw source ships — the published surface is built output; +2. `dist/` actually contains JavaScript and declarations; +3. every declared public entry is in the exports map **and** its files are packed; +4. no subpath beyond the declared set — internal barrels stay internal; +5. no export target, `main` or `types` points outside `./dist/`; +6. the library-only proof: no `bin`, no systemd unit, no shebang, no listening-socket + construct. + +The declared entries live in `scripts/entries.ts` and the test additionally spells the +seven specifiers out as a literal, so a subpath cannot be dropped without a reviewable +change to the public contract. + +## License + +AGPL-3.0 diff --git a/control/fixtures/check-public-surface.mjs b/control/fixtures/check-public-surface.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6347214 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/fixtures/check-public-surface.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// Standalone consumer check for the PACKED `@ceralive/modem-control` tarball. +// +// Both fixtures (Node and Bun) run this exact file, so a divergence between the two +// runtimes is a runtime difference and never a difference in what was asserted. +// +// It imports every public subpath by SPECIFIER, so it exercises the published exports +// map rather than a file path — a subpath missing from `exports` fails here even +// though the file it would have pointed at is sitting in the tarball. + +const failures = []; + +function check(label, condition) { + if (!condition) { + failures.push(label); + } +} + +const PUBLIC_SUBPATHS = [ + '@ceralive/modem-control', + '@ceralive/modem-control/transport', + '@ceralive/modem-control/domain', + '@ceralive/modem-control/providers', + '@ceralive/modem-control/capabilities', + '@ceralive/modem-control/hardware', + '@ceralive/modem-control/testing', +]; + +// 1 — every declared subpath resolves and evaluates. +const modules = new Map(); +for (const specifier of PUBLIC_SUBPATHS) { + const module = await import(specifier); + modules.set(specifier, module); + check(`${specifier} exported nothing`, Object.keys(module).length > 0); +} + +// 2 — each subpath actually carries the surface it is named for. +const root = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control'); +check('root PACKAGE_NAME', root.PACKAGE_NAME === '@ceralive/modem-control'); + +const transport = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control/transport'); +check('transport createDbusTransport', typeof transport.createDbusTransport === 'function'); +check('transport TransportError', typeof transport.TransportError === 'function'); + +const domain = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control/domain'); +check('domain physicalModemId', typeof domain.physicalModemId === 'function'); +check( + 'domain classifyOperationCompletion', + typeof domain.classifyOperationCompletion === 'function', +); + +const providers = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control/providers'); +check('providers createProviderRegistry', typeof providers.createProviderRegistry === 'function'); +check('providers createProviderMatcher', typeof providers.createProviderMatcher === 'function'); + +const capabilities = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control/capabilities'); +check('capabilities resolveSupportClaim', typeof capabilities.resolveSupportClaim === 'function'); +check('capabilities CAPABILITY_MODULES', Array.isArray(capabilities.CAPABILITY_MODULES)); + +const hardware = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control/hardware'); +check('hardware bandName', typeof hardware.bandName === 'function'); +check('hardware findCatalogEntry', typeof hardware.findCatalogEntry === 'function'); +check('hardware CERTIFIED_CATALOG', hardware.CERTIFIED_CATALOG !== undefined); + +const testing = modules.get('@ceralive/modem-control/testing'); +check('testing fakeProviderDefinition', typeof testing.fakeProviderDefinition === 'function'); +check('testing fakeFreshObservation', typeof testing.fakeFreshObservation === 'function'); + +// 3 — the built code RUNS, not just resolves: drive the real registry + matcher +// through the published `./testing` fakes, across three separate subpaths. +const registry = providers.createProviderRegistry(); +registry.register(testing.fakeProviderDefinition({ observation: { registered: true } })); +const match = await providers + .createProviderMatcher(registry) + .match(testing.fakeProviderMatchRequest()); +check(`matcher selected a provider (got ${match.status})`, match.status === 'selected'); +check('matcher named the fake provider', match.provider === 'contract-fake-provider'); + +// 4 — a domain constructor still refuses what it must, from the built bundle. +let refused = false; +try { + domain.physicalModemId('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/0'); +} catch { + refused = true; +} +check('domain refuses an MM object path as a physical identity', refused); + +// 5 — the band vocabulary decoded from the bundled JSON catalog still answers. +check('hardware band 3 is eutran-3', hardware.bandName(33) !== undefined); + +if (failures.length > 0) { + console.error(`FAIL (${failures.length}):`); + for (const failure of failures) { + console.error(` - ${failure}`); + } + process.exit(1); +} + +console.log(`OK — ${PUBLIC_SUBPATHS.length} public subpaths imported and exercised`); diff --git a/control/fixtures/consumer-bun/package.json b/control/fixtures/consumer-bun/package.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18f423a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/fixtures/consumer-bun/package.json @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +{ + "name": "modem-control-consumer-bun", + "version": "0.0.0", + "private": true, + "type": "module", + "description": "Standalone Bun consumer of the packed @ceralive/modem-control tarball. The tarball is installed by scripts/verify-consumers.ts; it is deliberately not a committed dependency, because its filename carries the package version.", + "scripts": { + "check": "bun ./check.mjs" + } +} diff --git a/control/fixtures/consumer-node/package.json b/control/fixtures/consumer-node/package.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47f509f --- /dev/null +++ b/control/fixtures/consumer-node/package.json @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +{ + "name": "modem-control-consumer-node", + "version": "0.0.0", + "private": true, + "type": "module", + "description": "Standalone Node 26 consumer of the packed @ceralive/modem-control tarball. The tarball is installed by scripts/verify-consumers.ts; it is deliberately not a committed dependency, because its filename carries the package version.", + "scripts": { + "check": "node ./check.mjs" + } +} diff --git a/control/package.json b/control/package.json index e47d0a8..f3e9b98 100644 --- a/control/package.json +++ b/control/package.json @@ -13,14 +13,48 @@ "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/", "access": "public" }, + "sideEffects": false, + "main": "./dist/index.js", + "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "exports": { - ".": "./src/index.ts", - "./transport": "./src/transport/index.ts" + ".": { + "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/index.js" + }, + "./transport": { + "types": "./dist/transport/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/transport/index.js" + }, + "./domain": { + "types": "./dist/domain/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/domain/index.js" + }, + "./providers": { + "types": "./dist/providers/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/providers/index.js" + }, + "./capabilities": { + "types": "./dist/capability/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/capability/index.js" + }, + "./hardware": { + "types": "./dist/hardware/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/hardware/index.js" + }, + "./testing": { + "types": "./dist/testing/index.d.ts", + "import": "./dist/testing/index.js" + }, + "./package.json": "./package.json" }, "files": [ - "src" + "dist" ], "scripts": { + "build": "bun run scripts/build.ts", + "prepack": "bun run build", + "verify:consumers": "bun run scripts/verify-consumers.ts", + "verify:tarball": "bun run scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts", "test": "bun test", "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit" }, diff --git a/control/scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts b/control/scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c5481d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bun +/** + * CLI: pack `@ceralive/modem-control` and assert the published artifact's shape. + * + * Exits non-zero with every violation named. Run it directly (`bun run + * scripts/assert-tarball-shape.ts`); `scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts` drives the same + * rules from `bun test`. + */ +import { packTarball } from './pack-tarball'; +import { allViolations } from './tarball-shape'; + +const packed = await packTarball(); +const violations = await allViolations(packed.shape); + +console.log(`tarball: ${packed.tarball}`); +console.log(`entries: ${packed.listing.length}`); + +if (violations.length > 0) { + console.error(`\n${violations.length} shape violation(s):`); + for (const violation of violations) { + console.error(` - ${violation}`); + } + process.exit(1); +} + +console.log('tarball shape OK — built ESM + declarations, no raw source, no service artifact'); diff --git a/control/scripts/build.ts b/control/scripts/build.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2c90cd --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/build.ts @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/** + * Build `@ceralive/modem-control` into `dist/`: ESM JavaScript + `.d.ts`, emitted by + * `tsc`, then post-processed so every relative specifier is fully specified. + * + * WHY THE POST-PROCESS EXISTS. The package's sources use extensionless relative + * specifiers (`moduleResolution: bundler`), which Node's ESM loader cannot resolve, and + * `tsc` never rewrites a specifier — it emits what you wrote. So the emitted `./x` + * becomes `./x.js` or `./x/index.js` here, resolved against the emit itself rather than + * guessed. `verify()` then fails the build if a single extensionless specifier survives. + * + * WHY NOT A BUNDLER. `Bun.build --splitting` was the first attempt and it emitted an + * entry chunk whose `export { … }` list named symbols the file never imported — Bun's + * own loader accepts it, Node answers `SyntaxError: Export 'BigIntRequiredError' is not + * defined in module`. Bundling without splitting avoids that but gives each subpath its + * own copy of the shared modules, so `instanceof DomainError` stops working across two + * subpaths of the same package. A 1:1 emit has one instance of every module, keeps + * `dist` a readable mirror of `src`, and keeps each `.d.ts` beside the `.js` it describes. + */ +import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { mkdir, readdir, readFile, rm, stat, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path'; +import { PUBLIC_ENTRIES } from './entries'; + +const PACKAGE_DIR = resolve(import.meta.dir, '..'); +const DIST_DIR = join(PACKAGE_DIR, 'dist'); + +/** `from './x'`, `export * from '../y'`, and bare side-effect `import './z'`. */ +const RELATIVE_SPECIFIER = /(\bfrom\s*|\bimport\s*)(['"])(\.{1,2}\/[^'"]*)\2/g; +const ALREADY_SPECIFIED = /\.(js|json|mjs|cjs)$/; + +async function emittedModules(): Promise { + const found: string[] = []; + for (const entry of await readdir(DIST_DIR, { withFileTypes: true, recursive: true })) { + if (entry.isFile() && (entry.name.endsWith('.js') || entry.name.endsWith('.d.ts'))) { + found.push(join(entry.parentPath, entry.name)); + } + } + return found; +} + +/** + * Resolve one relative specifier against the emit. + * + * A declaration resolves against sibling declarations and a module against sibling + * modules, so a `.d.ts` never ends up pointing at a file that only exists as JavaScript + * (or the reverse). + */ +function fullySpecify(fromFile: string, specifier: string): string | null { + const base = resolve(dirname(fromFile), specifier); + const candidates: readonly (readonly [string, string])[] = fromFile.endsWith('.d.ts') + ? [ + [`${base}.d.ts`, `${specifier}.js`], + [join(base, 'index.d.ts'), `${specifier}/index.js`], + ] + : [ + [`${base}.js`, `${specifier}.js`], + [join(base, 'index.js'), `${specifier}/index.js`], + ]; + for (const [probe, rewritten] of candidates) { + if (existsSync(probe)) { + return rewritten; + } + } + return null; +} + +async function fullySpecifyEmit(): Promise { + const unresolved: string[] = []; + for (const file of await emittedModules()) { + const source = await readFile(file, 'utf8'); + const rewritten = source.replace( + RELATIVE_SPECIFIER, + (match, keyword: string, quote: string, specifier: string) => { + if (ALREADY_SPECIFIED.test(specifier)) { + return match; + } + const next = fullySpecify(file, specifier); + if (next === null) { + unresolved.push(`${file}: ${specifier}`); + return match; + } + return `${keyword}${quote}${next}${quote}`; + }, + ); + if (rewritten !== source) { + await writeFile(file, rewritten); + } + } + if (unresolved.length > 0) { + throw new Error(`unresolvable relative specifiers:\n ${unresolved.join('\n ')}`); + } +} + +async function verify(): Promise { + const missing: string[] = []; + for (const entry of PUBLIC_ENTRIES) { + for (const artifact of [entry.js, entry.types]) { + const path = join(PACKAGE_DIR, artifact); + if (!existsSync(path) || (await stat(path)).size === 0) { + missing.push(`${entry.subpath} -> ${artifact}`); + } + } + } + if (missing.length > 0) { + throw new Error(`build produced no artifact for:\n ${missing.join('\n ')}`); + } + + const leftovers: string[] = []; + for (const file of await emittedModules()) { + const contents = await readFile(file, 'utf8'); + for (const found of contents.matchAll(RELATIVE_SPECIFIER)) { + const specifier = found[3] as string; + if (!ALREADY_SPECIFIED.test(specifier)) { + leftovers.push(`${file}: ${specifier}`); + } + } + } + if (leftovers.length > 0) { + throw new Error(`emit kept extensionless specifiers:\n ${leftovers.join('\n ')}`); + } +} + +await rm(DIST_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); +await mkdir(DIST_DIR, { recursive: true }); + +// Bun hoists the workspace's `typescript` to the repo root, but a non-hoisted install +// puts it in the package. Probe both rather than assume one layout. +const tscBin = [ + join(PACKAGE_DIR, 'node_modules', '.bin', 'tsc'), + join(PACKAGE_DIR, '..', 'node_modules', '.bin', 'tsc'), +].find((candidate) => existsSync(candidate)); +if (tscBin === undefined) { + throw new Error( + 'tsc not found in control/node_modules or the workspace root — run `bun install`', + ); +} + +const tsc = Bun.spawnSync([tscBin, '-p', 'tsconfig.build.json'], { + cwd: PACKAGE_DIR, + stdout: 'inherit', + stderr: 'inherit', +}); +if (tsc.exitCode !== 0) { + throw new Error(`tsc failed with exit code ${tsc.exitCode}`); +} + +await fullySpecifyEmit(); +await verify(); + +console.log(`built ${PUBLIC_ENTRIES.length} public entries into dist/`); diff --git a/control/scripts/entries.ts b/control/scripts/entries.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c459567 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/entries.ts @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/** + * The PUBLIC entry map of `@ceralive/modem-control`. + * + * This is the single source of truth the build, the exports map and the tarball-shape + * gate all read. A subpath that is not listed here is not published, and a subpath + * listed here that is missing from `package.json` `exports` fails the shape gate — so + * the two cannot drift. + * + * Adding a row is a deliberate widening of the public surface: it exposes a module to + * every consumer forever. Internal barrels (`src/backend`, `src/ports`, `src/sms`, + * `src/ussd`, `src/location`, `src/fcc`, `src/redact`) are reachable only through the + * root entry and are deliberately absent. + */ +export type PublicEntry = { + /** The `exports` specifier, e.g. `.` or `./testing`. */ + readonly subpath: string; + /** Source entry point, relative to the package directory. */ + readonly source: string; + /** Built ESM output, relative to the package directory. */ + readonly js: string; + /** Emitted declaration, relative to the package directory. */ + readonly types: string; +}; + +export const PUBLIC_ENTRIES: readonly PublicEntry[] = [ + { subpath: '.', source: 'src/index.ts', js: 'dist/index.js', types: 'dist/index.d.ts' }, + { + subpath: './transport', + source: 'src/transport/index.ts', + js: 'dist/transport/index.js', + types: 'dist/transport/index.d.ts', + }, + { + subpath: './domain', + source: 'src/domain/index.ts', + js: 'dist/domain/index.js', + types: 'dist/domain/index.d.ts', + }, + { + subpath: './providers', + source: 'src/providers/index.ts', + js: 'dist/providers/index.js', + types: 'dist/providers/index.d.ts', + }, + { + subpath: './capabilities', + source: 'src/capability/index.ts', + js: 'dist/capability/index.js', + types: 'dist/capability/index.d.ts', + }, + { + subpath: './hardware', + source: 'src/hardware/index.ts', + js: 'dist/hardware/index.js', + types: 'dist/hardware/index.d.ts', + }, + { + subpath: './testing', + source: 'src/testing/index.ts', + js: 'dist/testing/index.js', + types: 'dist/testing/index.d.ts', + }, +] as const; + +/** Every published specifier, in declaration order. */ +export const PUBLIC_SUBPATHS: readonly string[] = PUBLIC_ENTRIES.map((entry) => entry.subpath); diff --git a/control/scripts/pack-tarball.ts b/control/scripts/pack-tarball.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..019f6cc --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/pack-tarball.ts @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/** + * Pack `@ceralive/modem-control` with `bun pm pack` and extract the result. + * + * `bun pm pack` runs the package's own `prepack` (`bun run build`), so what is + * inspected here is always a freshly built artifact rather than whatever happened to + * be lying in `dist/`. + * + * Output lands in the gitignored, package-local `test-results/pack/`, which `files: + * ["dist"]` keeps out of the tarball — the shape gate re-proves that every run. + */ +import { mkdir, readdir, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { join, resolve } from 'node:path'; +import { readExtractedTarball, type TarballShape } from './tarball-shape'; + +const PACKAGE_DIR = resolve(import.meta.dir, '..'); + +export type PackedTarball = { + /** Absolute path of the `.tgz`. */ + readonly tarball: string; + /** `tar -tf` output, verbatim, one entry per line (`package/...`). */ + readonly listing: readonly string[]; + /** The extracted artifact, ready for the shape rules. */ + readonly shape: TarballShape; +}; + +function run(command: string[], cwd: string): string { + const result = Bun.spawnSync(command, { cwd, stdout: 'pipe', stderr: 'pipe' }); + if (result.exitCode !== 0) { + throw new Error( + `${command.join(' ')} failed (${result.exitCode}):\n${result.stderr.toString()}`, + ); + } + return result.stdout.toString(); +} + +/** Pack, list and extract. `workDir` defaults to the package-local `test-results/pack`. */ +export async function packTarball(workDir?: string): Promise { + const dir = workDir ?? join(PACKAGE_DIR, 'test-results', 'pack'); + await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); + await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true }); + + run(['bun', 'pm', 'pack', '--destination', dir], PACKAGE_DIR); + + const packed = (await readdir(dir)).filter((name) => name.endsWith('.tgz')); + if (packed.length !== 1) { + throw new Error(`expected exactly one .tgz in ${dir}, found ${packed.length}`); + } + const tarball = join(dir, packed[0] as string); + + const listing = run(['tar', '-tf', tarball], dir) + .split('\n') + .map((line) => line.trim()) + .filter((line) => line.length > 0); + + const extracted = join(dir, 'extracted'); + await mkdir(extracted, { recursive: true }); + run(['tar', '-xzf', tarball, '-C', extracted], dir); + + return { tarball, listing, shape: await readExtractedTarball(join(extracted, 'package')) }; +} diff --git a/control/scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts b/control/scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..728da0b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/tarball-shape.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +import { beforeAll, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { mkdir, mkdtemp, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; +import { PUBLIC_ENTRIES, PUBLIC_SUBPATHS } from './entries'; +import { type PackedTarball, packTarball } from './pack-tarball'; +import { + allViolations, + builtOutputViolations, + exportTargetViolations, + publicEntryViolations, + rawSourceViolations, + readExtractedTarball, + serviceArtifactViolations, + undeclaredExportViolations, +} from './tarball-shape'; + +/** + * The frozen public surface, spelled out. + * + * This literal is the reason the gate cannot be satisfied by deleting a subpath: a + * removal has to be made HERE too, which is a reviewable change to the package's + * public contract rather than a silent edit to `package.json`. + */ +const EXPECTED_SUBPATHS = [ + '.', + './transport', + './domain', + './providers', + './capabilities', + './hardware', + './testing', +] as const; + +let packed: PackedTarball; + +beforeAll(async () => { + packed = await packTarball(); +}, 300_000); + +describe('bun pm pack', () => { + test('produces a tarball with a non-empty listing', () => { + expect(packed.tarball).toEndWith('.tgz'); + expect(packed.listing.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); + + test('the listing carries built JavaScript and declarations under dist/', () => { + expect(packed.listing.some((entry) => /^package\/dist\/.*\.js$/.test(entry))).toBe(true); + expect(packed.listing.some((entry) => /^package\/dist\/.*\.d\.ts$/.test(entry))).toBe(true); + expect(builtOutputViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the listing has NO src/ entry — the published surface is built output', () => { + expect(packed.listing.filter((entry) => /(^|\/)src\//.test(entry))).toEqual([]); + expect(rawSourceViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('nothing but package.json ships outside dist/', () => { + const outside = packed.listing.filter( + (entry) => !entry.startsWith('package/dist/') && entry !== 'package/package.json', + ); + expect(outside.filter((entry) => !/^package\/(README|LICENSE)/i.test(entry))).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('the public exports map', () => { + test('declares exactly the seven frozen subpaths, ./testing included', () => { + expect([...PUBLIC_SUBPATHS]).toEqual([...EXPECTED_SUBPATHS]); + + const exportsMap = packed.shape.manifest.exports as Record; + for (const subpath of EXPECTED_SUBPATHS) { + expect(Object.keys(exportsMap)).toContain(subpath); + } + expect(Object.keys(exportsMap).sort()).toEqual([...EXPECTED_SUBPATHS, './package.json'].sort()); + }); + + test('the ./testing contract-fakes entry is exported and packed', () => { + const exportsMap = packed.shape.manifest.exports as Record>; + expect(exportsMap['./testing']).toEqual({ + types: './dist/testing/index.d.ts', + import: './dist/testing/index.js', + }); + expect(packed.listing).toContain('package/dist/testing/index.js'); + expect(packed.listing).toContain('package/dist/testing/index.d.ts'); + }); + + test('every declared entry resolves to a packed artifact', () => { + expect(publicEntryViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + for (const entry of PUBLIC_ENTRIES) { + expect(packed.listing).toContain(`package/${entry.js}`); + expect(packed.listing).toContain(`package/${entry.types}`); + } + }); + + test('exposes no undeclared subpath and points nowhere outside ./dist/', () => { + expect(undeclaredExportViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + expect(exportTargetViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('library-only proof', () => { + test('no bin entry, no systemd unit, no shebang, no listening socket', async () => { + expect(await serviceArtifactViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the manifest declares no bin and no directories.bin', () => { + expect(packed.shape.manifest.bin).toBeUndefined(); + expect(packed.shape.manifest.directories).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('no packed path names a systemd unit or a socket/daemon entrypoint', () => { + const suspicious = packed.listing.filter((entry) => + /(systemd|\.service$|\.socket$|\.timer$|\.target$|daemon)/i.test(entry), + ); + expect(suspicious).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the whole artifact is clean', async () => { + expect(await allViolations(packed.shape)).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('the detectors are non-vacuous', () => { + async function syntheticShape(build: (root: string) => Promise) { + const root = join(await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'modem-shape-')), 'package'); + await mkdir(join(root, 'dist'), { recursive: true }); + await build(root); + return readExtractedTarball(root); + } + + test('shipped raw source is caught', async () => { + const shape = await syntheticShape(async (root) => { + await writeFile(join(root, 'package.json'), '{"name":"x"}'); + await mkdir(join(root, 'src'), { recursive: true }); + await writeFile(join(root, 'src', 'index.ts'), 'export const a = 1;\n'); + await writeFile(join(root, 'dist', 'index.js'), 'export const a = 1;\n'); + }); + expect(rawSourceViolations(shape)).toEqual(['raw source shipped: src/index.ts']); + }); + + test('a missing ./testing subpath is caught', async () => { + const shape = await syntheticShape(async (root) => { + const exportsMap = Object.fromEntries( + PUBLIC_ENTRIES.filter((entry) => entry.subpath !== './testing').map((entry) => [ + entry.subpath, + { types: `./${entry.types}`, import: `./${entry.js}` }, + ]), + ); + await writeFile(join(root, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({ exports: exportsMap })); + }); + expect(publicEntryViolations(shape)).toContain( + 'exports map is missing the "./testing" subpath', + ); + }); + + test('an exports target still pointing at src/ is caught', async () => { + const shape = await syntheticShape(async (root) => { + await writeFile( + join(root, 'package.json'), + JSON.stringify({ exports: { '.': './src/index.ts' } }), + ); + }); + expect(exportTargetViolations(shape)).toEqual([ + 'exports["."] points outside ./dist/: ./src/index.ts', + ]); + }); + + test('an extra internal barrel exposed as a subpath is caught', async () => { + const shape = await syntheticShape(async (root) => { + await writeFile( + join(root, 'package.json'), + JSON.stringify({ exports: { './backend': { import: './dist/backend/index.js' } } }), + ); + }); + expect(undeclaredExportViolations(shape)).toEqual(['undeclared public subpath: ./backend']); + }); + + test('a bin entry, a systemd unit, a shebang and a listener are each caught', async () => { + const shape = await syntheticShape(async (root) => { + await writeFile( + join(root, 'package.json'), + JSON.stringify({ bin: { 'modem-controld': './dist/daemon.js' } }), + ); + await writeFile(join(root, 'dist', 'modem-control.service'), '[Unit]\n'); + await writeFile(join(root, 'dist', 'daemon.js'), '#!/usr/bin/env node\nexport {};\n'); + await writeFile( + join(root, 'dist', 'listener.js'), + 'export const s = createServer(() => {});\n', + ); + }); + const violations = await serviceArtifactViolations(shape); + expect(violations.some((v) => v.includes('bin entry'))).toBe(true); + expect(violations).toContain('systemd unit file shipped: dist/modem-control.service'); + expect(violations).toContain('executable entrypoint (shebang) shipped: dist/daemon.js'); + expect(violations.some((v) => v.includes('daemon/socket construct'))).toBe(true); + }); + + test('an empty dist is caught', async () => { + const shape = await syntheticShape(async (root) => { + await writeFile(join(root, 'package.json'), '{"name":"x"}'); + }); + expect(builtOutputViolations(shape)).toContain('no dist/ output in the tarball'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/scripts/tarball-shape.ts b/control/scripts/tarball-shape.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2008040 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/tarball-shape.ts @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/** + * The tarball-shape gate for `@ceralive/modem-control`. + * + * `@ceralive/modem-control` is a LIBRARY. It ships built ESM plus declarations and + * nothing that could start: no `bin`, no systemd unit, no shebang, no listening + * socket. That is a claim about a published artifact, so it is checked against the + * artifact — the real `bun pm pack` output — rather than against the source tree. + * + * Every rule returns its violations instead of throwing, so a caller reports all of + * them at once and a test can name each rule separately. + */ +import { readdir, readFile, stat } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { join, relative } from 'node:path'; +import { PUBLIC_ENTRIES } from './entries'; + +/** An extracted tarball: the `tar -tf` listing plus the packed manifest. */ +export type TarballShape = { + /** Paths relative to the tarball's `package/` root, e.g. `dist/index.js`. */ + readonly entries: readonly string[]; + /** The packed `package.json`, parsed. */ + readonly manifest: Record; + /** Absolute path of the extracted `package/` directory. */ + readonly root: string; +}; + +const SYSTEMD_UNIT_EXTENSIONS = [ + '.service', + '.socket', + '.target', + '.timer', + '.path', + '.mount', + '.automount', + '.slice', + '.swap', + '.device', + '.scope', +]; + +/** Constructs that would open a listening socket — a daemon's defining act. */ +const LISTENING_SOCKET_PATTERNS = [ + /\bcreateServer\s*\(/, + /\bBun\s*\.\s*serve\s*\(/, + /\bnode:net\b/, + /\bnode:http2?\b/, + /\.\s*listen\s*\(/, +]; + +async function walk(dir: string, root: string, found: string[] = []): Promise { + for (const entry of await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) { + const full = join(dir, entry.name); + if (entry.isDirectory()) { + await walk(full, root, found); + } else { + found.push(relative(root, full)); + } + } + return found; +} + +/** Read an already-extracted `package/` directory into a {@link TarballShape}. */ +export async function readExtractedTarball(root: string): Promise { + const entries = (await walk(root, root)).sort(); + const manifest = JSON.parse(await readFile(join(root, 'package.json'), 'utf8')) as Record< + string, + unknown + >; + return { entries, manifest, root }; +} + +/** RULE 1 — nothing under `src/` may ship; the published surface is the BUILT output. */ +export function rawSourceViolations(shape: TarballShape): readonly string[] { + return shape.entries + .filter((entry) => entry === 'src' || entry.startsWith('src/') || entry.includes('/src/')) + .map((entry) => `raw source shipped: ${entry}`); +} + +/** RULE 2 — the built artifacts a library is supposed to have are actually present. */ +export function builtOutputViolations(shape: TarballShape): readonly string[] { + const violations: string[] = []; + const distFiles = shape.entries.filter((entry) => entry.startsWith('dist/')); + if (distFiles.length === 0) { + violations.push('no dist/ output in the tarball'); + } + if (!distFiles.some((entry) => entry.endsWith('.js'))) { + violations.push('no built JavaScript in dist/'); + } + if (!distFiles.some((entry) => entry.endsWith('.d.ts'))) { + violations.push('no declarations (.d.ts) in dist/'); + } + return violations; +} + +/** + * RULE 3 — every declared public entry is in the exports map AND its files are packed. + * + * Driven by {@link PUBLIC_ENTRIES}, so a subpath cannot be dropped from `package.json` + * without this failing. + */ +export function publicEntryViolations(shape: TarballShape): readonly string[] { + const violations: string[] = []; + const exportsMap = shape.manifest.exports; + if (typeof exportsMap !== 'object' || exportsMap === null) { + return ['package.json has no exports map']; + } + const map = exportsMap as Record; + const packed = new Set(shape.entries); + + for (const entry of PUBLIC_ENTRIES) { + const condition = map[entry.subpath]; + if (condition === undefined) { + violations.push(`exports map is missing the "${entry.subpath}" subpath`); + continue; + } + if (typeof condition !== 'object' || condition === null) { + violations.push(`exports["${entry.subpath}"] is not a conditions object`); + continue; + } + const conditions = condition as Record; + if (conditions.import !== `./${entry.js}`) { + violations.push( + `exports["${entry.subpath}"].import is ${String(conditions.import)}, expected ./${entry.js}`, + ); + } + if (conditions.types !== `./${entry.types}`) { + violations.push( + `exports["${entry.subpath}"].types is ${String(conditions.types)}, expected ./${entry.types}`, + ); + } + for (const artifact of [entry.js, entry.types]) { + if (!packed.has(artifact)) { + violations.push(`exports["${entry.subpath}"] target ${artifact} is not in the tarball`); + } + } + } + return violations; +} + +/** RULE 4 — no subpath beyond the declared set; internal barrels stay internal. */ +export function undeclaredExportViolations(shape: TarballShape): readonly string[] { + const exportsMap = shape.manifest.exports; + if (typeof exportsMap !== 'object' || exportsMap === null) { + return ['package.json has no exports map']; + } + const allowed = new Set([ + ...PUBLIC_ENTRIES.map((entry) => entry.subpath), + './package.json', + ]); + return Object.keys(exportsMap as Record) + .filter((subpath) => !allowed.has(subpath)) + .map((subpath) => `undeclared public subpath: ${subpath}`); +} + +/** RULE 5 — no exports target, nor `main`/`types`, may point outside `./dist/`. */ +export function exportTargetViolations(shape: TarballShape): readonly string[] { + const violations: string[] = []; + const check = (label: string, value: unknown): void => { + if (typeof value !== 'string') { + return; + } + if (value === './package.json') { + return; + } + if (!value.startsWith('./dist/')) { + violations.push(`${label} points outside ./dist/: ${value}`); + } + }; + + check('main', shape.manifest.main); + check('types', shape.manifest.types); + const exportsMap = shape.manifest.exports; + if (typeof exportsMap === 'object' && exportsMap !== null) { + for (const [subpath, condition] of Object.entries(exportsMap as Record)) { + if (typeof condition === 'string') { + check(`exports["${subpath}"]`, condition); + continue; + } + if (typeof condition === 'object' && condition !== null) { + for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(condition as Record)) { + check(`exports["${subpath}"].${name}`, value); + } + } + } + } + return violations; +} + +/** + * RULE 6 — the library-only proof: nothing in this artifact can be STARTED. + * + * No `bin` entry, no systemd unit, no shebang, no listening-socket construct. Each is + * a separate way the same mistake gets made, so each is checked rather than assumed + * away by the others. + */ +export async function serviceArtifactViolations(shape: TarballShape): Promise { + const violations: string[] = []; + + if (shape.manifest.bin !== undefined) { + violations.push(`package.json declares a bin entry: ${JSON.stringify(shape.manifest.bin)}`); + } + const directories = shape.manifest.directories; + if (typeof directories === 'object' && directories !== null) { + if ((directories as Record).bin !== undefined) { + violations.push('package.json declares directories.bin'); + } + } + + for (const entry of shape.entries) { + const lower = entry.toLowerCase(); + if (SYSTEMD_UNIT_EXTENSIONS.some((extension) => lower.endsWith(extension))) { + violations.push(`systemd unit file shipped: ${entry}`); + } + if (lower.includes('systemd')) { + violations.push(`systemd artifact shipped: ${entry}`); + } + } + + for (const entry of shape.entries) { + const path = join(shape.root, entry); + if ((await stat(path)).size === 0) { + continue; + } + const contents = await readFile(path, 'utf8').catch(() => ''); + if (contents.startsWith('#!')) { + violations.push(`executable entrypoint (shebang) shipped: ${entry}`); + } + if (!entry.endsWith('.js')) { + continue; + } + for (const pattern of LISTENING_SOCKET_PATTERNS) { + if (pattern.test(contents)) { + violations.push(`daemon/socket construct ${String(pattern)} found in ${entry}`); + } + } + } + + return violations; +} + +/** Every rule, in order. An empty array is a passing artifact. */ +export async function allViolations(shape: TarballShape): Promise { + return [ + ...rawSourceViolations(shape), + ...builtOutputViolations(shape), + ...publicEntryViolations(shape), + ...undeclaredExportViolations(shape), + ...exportTargetViolations(shape), + ...(await serviceArtifactViolations(shape)), + ]; +} diff --git a/control/scripts/verify-consumers.ts b/control/scripts/verify-consumers.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e47bd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/verify-consumers.ts @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bun +/** + * Run the standalone consumer fixtures against the PACKED tarball. + * + * Both fixtures are real, separate projects: each gets its own directory, installs + * `@ceralive/modem-control` from the `.tgz` with its own package manager, and imports + * every public subpath by specifier. Nothing in them resolves through this workspace — + * no `paths` mapping, no `link:`, no relative reach into `control/src`. That is the + * point: the repo's own tsconfig maps the package back to source for development, so + * the built artifact would otherwise never be executed by anything. + * + * The Node fixture asserts its own runtime major is 26 before it runs, so a green + * result cannot come from an older Node that happens to be first on `PATH`. + * + * Fixtures are COPIED into `test-results/consumers//` and installed there, so + * `control/fixtures/` never grows a `node_modules` or a lockfile. + */ +import { cp, mkdir, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { join, resolve } from 'node:path'; +import { packTarball } from './pack-tarball'; + +const PACKAGE_DIR = resolve(import.meta.dir, '..'); +const FIXTURES_DIR = join(PACKAGE_DIR, 'fixtures'); +const WORK_DIR = join(PACKAGE_DIR, 'test-results', 'consumers'); + +const REQUIRED_NODE_MAJOR = 26; + +type Fixture = { + readonly name: string; + readonly runtime: string; + readonly install: (tarball: string) => string[]; + readonly run: string[]; +}; + +/** Resolve the Node binary the fixture must run under. */ +const NODE_BIN = process.env.CERALIVE_NODE_BIN ?? 'node'; + +const FIXTURES: readonly Fixture[] = [ + { + name: 'consumer-node', + runtime: NODE_BIN, + install: (tarball) => ['npm', 'install', '--no-audit', '--no-fund', tarball], + run: [NODE_BIN, './check.mjs'], + }, + { + name: 'consumer-bun', + runtime: 'bun', + install: (tarball) => ['bun', 'add', tarball], + run: ['bun', './check.mjs'], + }, +]; + +function run(command: string[], cwd: string, env?: Record): string { + const result = Bun.spawnSync(command, { + cwd, + stdout: 'pipe', + stderr: 'pipe', + ...(env === undefined ? {} : { env: { ...process.env, ...env } }), + }); + const output = `${result.stdout.toString()}${result.stderr.toString()}`; + if (result.exitCode !== 0) { + throw new Error(`${command.join(' ')} failed (${result.exitCode}) in ${cwd}:\n${output}`); + } + return output; +} + +function assertNodeMajor(): string { + const version = run([NODE_BIN, '--version'], PACKAGE_DIR).trim(); + const major = Number(version.replace(/^v/, '').split('.')[0]); + if (major !== REQUIRED_NODE_MAJOR) { + throw new Error( + `the Node fixture requires Node ${REQUIRED_NODE_MAJOR}.x, found ${version}. ` + + `Set CERALIVE_NODE_BIN to a Node ${REQUIRED_NODE_MAJOR} binary.`, + ); + } + return version; +} + +const nodeVersion = assertNodeMajor(); +console.log(`node: ${nodeVersion}`); +console.log(`bun: v${Bun.version}`); + +const packed = await packTarball(); +console.log(`tarball: ${packed.tarball}\n`); + +await rm(WORK_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); +await mkdir(WORK_DIR, { recursive: true }); + +for (const fixture of FIXTURES) { + const dir = join(WORK_DIR, fixture.name); + await cp(join(FIXTURES_DIR, fixture.name), dir, { recursive: true }); + await cp(join(FIXTURES_DIR, 'check-public-surface.mjs'), join(dir, 'check.mjs')); + + run(fixture.install(packed.tarball), dir); + const output = run(fixture.run, dir).trim(); + console.log(`${fixture.name} (${fixture.runtime}): ${output}`); +} + +console.log('\nboth standalone consumers import every public subpath from the packed tarball'); diff --git a/control/src/hardware/index.ts b/control/src/hardware/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9d258e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/hardware/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// `@ceralive/modem-control/hardware` — the per-SKU hardware model. +// +// This subpath is the narrow entry for everything keyed on the PHYSICAL unit rather +// than on a live D-Bus object: which USB composition a SKU may be switched into and +// which transitions were certified for it (`../usb-mode`), and the MMModemBand +// vocabulary plus the per-SKU band-lock certification catalog (`../band`). +// +// Both halves are evidence-gated catalogs plus their pure lookups — no transport, no +// mutation verb. The D-Bus verbs that ACT on these facts stay where they live +// (`../backend/mm-mutations.ts`, declared on `ModemManagerPort`); a consumer that only +// needs to know what a SKU is capable of should not have to import a bus client to +// find out. That asymmetry is the reason this entry exists. + +export * from '../band'; +export * from '../usb-mode'; diff --git a/control/src/testing/domain-fakes.ts b/control/src/testing/domain-fakes.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25dab71 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/testing/domain-fakes.ts @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +import { + classifyOperationCompletion, + type DeviceGeneration, + defineOperationDescriptor, + deviceGeneration, + type EpochMillis, + epochMillis, + type MutationImpact, + type ObservationAuthority, + type ObservationEnvelope, + type OperationCompletion, + type OperationConfidence, + type OperationDescriptor, + type OperationResult, + type PhysicalModemId, + physicalModemId, + type RetryClass, + type SourceEpoch, + type StableKey, + sourceEpoch, + stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId, +} from '../domain'; + +/** + * A canonical, valid `PhysicalModemId` for contract tests. + * + * It is built through the real constructor, so it can never be a value the domain + * refuses — an MM object path, an interface name, an IP address, an IMEI, or a + * subscriber identifier. + */ +export const FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID: PhysicalModemId = physicalModemId( + 'serial:ceralive-contract-fake', +); + +/** The actor/storage key for {@link FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID}. */ +export const FAKE_STABLE_KEY: StableKey = stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID); + +/** The generation every fake defaults to, so a consumer's fences have a stable anchor. */ +export const FAKE_GENERATION: DeviceGeneration = deviceGeneration(1); + +export type FakeObservationOptions = { + readonly stableKey?: StableKey; + readonly generation?: DeviceGeneration; + readonly source?: string; + readonly sourceEpoch?: SourceEpoch; + readonly observedAt?: EpochMillis; + readonly authority?: ObservationAuthority; +}; + +type ObservationBaseFields = { + readonly stableKey: StableKey; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly source: string; + readonly sourceEpoch: SourceEpoch; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly authority: ObservationAuthority; +}; + +function observationBase(options: FakeObservationOptions): ObservationBaseFields { + return { + stableKey: options.stableKey ?? FAKE_STABLE_KEY, + generation: options.generation ?? FAKE_GENERATION, + source: options.source ?? 'contract-fake', + sourceEpoch: options.sourceEpoch ?? sourceEpoch(1), + observedAt: options.observedAt ?? epochMillis(1), + authority: options.authority ?? 'authoritative', + }; +} + +/** A fresh observation carrying `value`. */ +export function fakeFreshObservation( + value: T, + options: FakeObservationOptions = {}, +): ObservationEnvelope { + return { ...observationBase(options), freshness: { state: 'fresh' }, value }; +} + +/** A stale observation that RETAINS `value` — staleness never discards what was read. */ +export function fakeStaleObservation( + value: T, + reason: 'source-epoch-superseded' | 'ttl-expired' | 'source-degraded' = 'ttl-expired', + options: FakeObservationOptions = {}, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const base = observationBase(options); + return { + ...base, + freshness: { state: 'stale', since: base.observedAt, reason }, + value, + }; +} + +/** + * An unavailable observation. It carries `value: null` by construction — there is no + * overload that lets a consumer's fake invent a value for data nobody could read. + */ +export function fakeUnavailableObservation( + reason: 'source-unavailable' | 'device-absent' | 'provider-unavailable' = 'source-unavailable', + options: FakeObservationOptions = {}, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const base = observationBase(options); + return { + ...base, + freshness: { state: 'unavailable', since: base.observedAt, reason }, + value: null, + }; +} + +export type FakeDescriptorOptions = { + readonly id?: string; + readonly provider?: string; + readonly authority?: 'provider' | 'controller' | 'hardware'; + readonly confidence?: OperationConfidence; +}; + +function baseDescriptor( + options: FakeDescriptorOptions, + support: { readonly read: boolean; readonly write: boolean }, + mutationImpact: MutationImpact, + retryClass: RetryClass, +): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: options.id ?? 'contract-fake-operation', + support: { + read: support.read ? { supported: true } : { supported: false, reason: 'contract-fake' }, + write: support.write ? { supported: true } : { supported: false, reason: 'contract-fake' }, + }, + authority: options.authority ?? 'provider', + provider: options.provider ?? 'contract-fake-provider', + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: [], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact, + retryClass, + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: [], firmware: [] }, + confidence: options.confidence ?? 'medium', + }); +} + +/** + * A supported, auto-retryable idempotent READ descriptor. + * + * Routed through `defineOperationDescriptor`, so a fake that drifted into an + * unsupported/retryable combination throws instead of silently modelling a + * descriptor the domain would refuse. + */ +export function fakeReadDescriptor( + options: FakeDescriptorOptions = {}, +): OperationDescriptor { + return baseDescriptor(options, { read: true, write: false }, 'read', 'idempotent-read'); +} + +/** A supported WRITE descriptor. Writes are never auto-retryable, so `retryClass` is `never`. */ +export function fakeWriteDescriptor( + options: FakeDescriptorOptions = {}, +): OperationDescriptor { + return baseDescriptor(options, { read: true, write: true }, 'write', 'never'); +} + +export type FakeOperationResultOptions = { + readonly operation?: 'read' | 'write'; + readonly completionGeneration?: DeviceGeneration; + readonly currentGeneration?: DeviceGeneration; +}; + +/** + * Build an `OperationResult` by running the REAL classifier over a completion. + * + * A hand-written result literal is how a consumer's fake comes to disagree with the + * package about which completions require reconciliation; this cannot. + */ +export function fakeOperationResult( + completion: OperationCompletion, + options: FakeOperationResultOptions = {}, +): OperationResult { + return classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: options.operation ?? 'write', + completionGeneration: options.completionGeneration ?? FAKE_GENERATION, + currentGeneration: options.currentGeneration ?? FAKE_GENERATION, + completion, + }); +} diff --git a/control/src/testing/fakes.test.ts b/control/src/testing/fakes.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81495ac --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/testing/fakes.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + canAutoRetry, + deviceGeneration, + nextDeviceGeneration, + physicalModemId, + stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId, +} from '../domain'; +import { createProviderMatcher, createProviderRegistry } from '../providers'; +import { + FAKE_GENERATION, + FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID, + FAKE_PROVIDER_MODEL, + FAKE_STABLE_KEY, + fakeFreshObservation, + fakeOperationResult, + fakeProviderDefinition, + fakeProviderMatchRequest, + fakeReadDescriptor, + fakeStaleObservation, + fakeUnauthenticatedProbe, + fakeUnavailableObservation, + fakeWriteDescriptor, +} from './index'; + +describe('public identity fakes', () => { + test('the canonical id round-trips through the real constructor', () => { + expect(physicalModemId(FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID)).toBe(FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID); + expect(stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID)).toBe(FAKE_STABLE_KEY); + }); + + test('the default generation is the first real lifetime', () => { + expect(FAKE_GENERATION).toBe(deviceGeneration(1)); + }); +}); + +describe('observation fakes', () => { + test('a fresh envelope carries the value', () => { + const envelope = fakeFreshObservation({ registered: true }); + expect(envelope.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + expect(envelope.value).toEqual({ registered: true }); + expect(envelope.stableKey).toBe(FAKE_STABLE_KEY); + }); + + test('a stale envelope RETAINS the value it was built with', () => { + const envelope = fakeStaleObservation({ registered: false }, 'source-degraded'); + expect(envelope.freshness).toEqual({ + state: 'stale', + since: envelope.observedAt, + reason: 'source-degraded', + }); + expect(envelope.value).toEqual({ registered: false }); + }); + + test('an unavailable envelope can only be null — no value can be invented', () => { + const envelope = fakeUnavailableObservation<{ registered: boolean }>('device-absent'); + expect(envelope.freshness.state).toBe('unavailable'); + expect(envelope.value).toBeNull(); + }); +}); + +describe('operation fakes', () => { + test('the read descriptor is the only one that may auto-retry', () => { + const read = fakeReadDescriptor(); + const write = fakeWriteDescriptor(); + const failed = fakeOperationResult({ status: 'failed', reason: 'contract-fake' }); + + expect(canAutoRetry(read, failed)).toBe(true); + expect(canAutoRetry(write, failed)).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a stale-generation completion is classified by the REAL classifier', () => { + const result = fakeOperationResult( + { status: 'applied', value: 7 }, + { currentGeneration: nextDeviceGeneration(FAKE_GENERATION) }, + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'stale-generation', + requiresReconciliation: true, + generation: FAKE_GENERATION, + }); + }); + + test('a timed-out WRITE demands reconciliation while a timed-out read does not', () => { + expect(fakeOperationResult({ status: 'timed-out' }).requiresReconciliation).toBe(true); + expect( + fakeOperationResult({ status: 'timed-out' }, { operation: 'read' }) + .requiresReconciliation, + ).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('provider fakes', () => { + test('a fake definition is selectable by the real registry + matcher', async () => { + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(fakeProviderDefinition({ observation: { registered: true } })); + + const matcher = createProviderMatcher(registry); + const result = await matcher.match(fakeProviderMatchRequest()); + + expect(result.status).toBe('selected'); + expect(result.provider).toBe('contract-fake-provider'); + expect(result.profile).toBe('contract-fake-profile'); + }); + + test('a request naming another model is not selected', async () => { + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(fakeProviderDefinition({ observation: { registered: true } })); + + const matcher = createProviderMatcher(registry); + const result = await matcher.match(fakeProviderMatchRequest({ model: 'some-other-model' })); + + expect(result.status).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(result.operations).toBeNull(); + }); + + test('the fake probe answers its configured fingerprint', async () => { + const probe = fakeUnauthenticatedProbe({ signal: 'mismatch', strength: 'weak' }); + await expect(probe.run(fakeProviderMatchRequest())).resolves.toMatchObject({ + signal: 'mismatch', + strength: 'weak', + }); + }); + + test('the default match request names the fake model', () => { + expect(fakeProviderMatchRequest().passiveFacts).toEqual([ + { kind: 'model', value: FAKE_PROVIDER_MODEL }, + ]); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/testing/index.ts b/control/src/testing/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f2c970 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/testing/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// `@ceralive/modem-control/testing` — the PUBLIC contract-fakes surface. +// +// A consumer testing against this package needs valid instances of the frozen v1.1 +// domain and provider contracts (`../domain`, `../providers`). Hand-rolling them is +// how a consumer's fixtures come to disagree with the package: a hand-written +// `OperationResult` literal quietly stops matching what `classifyOperationCompletion` +// actually returns, and a hand-written envelope invents a value for an unavailable +// read. Every fake here is built through the package's own constructors and +// classifiers, so it cannot express a shape the domain refuses. +// +// This is NOT `control/test-support/`. That directory holds this repo's own heavy +// internals — an MM-faithful fake D-Bus service on a private session bus and a +// stateful `nmcli` harness. It lives outside `src`, is not published, and is not a +// reusable public surface. This entry is pure data and functions: no bus, no daemon, +// no process, no filesystem. + +export * from './domain-fakes'; +export * from './provider-fakes'; diff --git a/control/src/testing/provider-fakes.ts b/control/src/testing/provider-fakes.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12b4722 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/testing/provider-fakes.ts @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +import type { DeviceGeneration, ObservationEnvelope } from '../domain'; +import type { + FingerprintResult, + PassiveFact, + ProviderDefinition, + ProviderExecutionContext, + ProviderMatchRequest, + ProviderOperationsSurface, + ProviderTransport, + UnauthenticatedProbe, +} from '../providers'; +import { FAKE_GENERATION, FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID, fakeFreshObservation } from './domain-fakes'; + +/** The model string every provider fake matches on unless one is named. */ +export const FAKE_PROVIDER_MODEL = 'contract-fake-model'; + +export type FakeMatchRequestOptions = { + readonly generation?: DeviceGeneration; + readonly transport?: ProviderTransport; + readonly model?: string; + readonly composition?: string; + readonly firmware?: string; + readonly passiveFacts?: readonly PassiveFact[]; +}; + +/** A well-formed `ProviderMatchRequest` whose passive facts name exactly one model. */ +export function fakeProviderMatchRequest( + options: FakeMatchRequestOptions = {}, +): ProviderMatchRequest { + const model = options.model ?? FAKE_PROVIDER_MODEL; + return { + physicalModemId: FAKE_PHYSICAL_MODEM_ID, + generation: options.generation ?? FAKE_GENERATION, + transport: options.transport ?? 'network', + passiveFacts: options.passiveFacts ?? [{ kind: 'model', value: model }], + composition: options.composition ?? 'ethernet-router', + firmware: options.firmware ?? '1.0.0', + }; +} + +export type FakeProviderOptions = { + readonly id?: string; + readonly profile?: string; + readonly profileVersion?: string; + readonly model?: string; + readonly eligibleTransports?: readonly ProviderTransport[]; + readonly access?: ProviderOperationsSurface['access']; + readonly observation?: TObservation; + readonly probes?: readonly UnauthenticatedProbe[]; +}; + +/** + * A minimal but COMPLETE `ProviderDefinition` — one strong required passive matcher on + * the model fact, no authenticated profile, no capability readers. + * + * It registers nothing and reaches no device: `observe` answers a fresh envelope built + * from the supplied observation, and `operations` returns the access surface asked for. + * This is the shape a consumer writes its own registry/matcher tests against without + * inventing a parallel provider contract. + */ +export function fakeProviderDefinition( + options: FakeProviderOptions & { readonly observation: TObservation }, +): ProviderDefinition { + const id = options.id ?? 'contract-fake-provider'; + const profile = options.profile ?? 'contract-fake-profile'; + const model = options.model ?? FAKE_PROVIDER_MODEL; + const access: ProviderOperationsSurface['access'] = options.access ?? 'read-only'; + const observation = options.observation; + + return { + id, + profileVersion: options.profileVersion ?? '1.0.0', + eligibleTransports: options.eligibleTransports ?? ['network'], + passiveMatchers: [ + { + id: `${id}-model`, + fact: 'model', + expected: [model], + profiles: [profile], + strength: 'strong', + required: true, + }, + ], + unauthenticatedProbes: options.probes ?? [], + capabilityReaders: [], + observe: ( + _context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise[]> => + Promise.resolve([fakeFreshObservation(observation, { source: id })]), + operations: (_profile: string): ProviderOperationsSurface => ({ access }), + contractFixtures: [], + }; +} + +export type FakeProbeOptions = { + readonly id?: string; + readonly signal?: FingerprintResult['signal']; + readonly strength?: FingerprintResult['strength']; + readonly profiles?: readonly string[]; + readonly detail?: string; +}; + +/** A harmless unauthenticated probe that answers a fixed fingerprint. */ +export function fakeUnauthenticatedProbe(options: FakeProbeOptions = {}): UnauthenticatedProbe { + const result: FingerprintResult = { + signal: options.signal ?? 'match', + strength: options.strength ?? 'moderate', + profiles: options.profiles ?? ['contract-fake-profile'], + detail: options.detail ?? 'contract-fake probe', + }; + return { + id: options.id ?? 'contract-fake-probe', + run: (_context: ProviderMatchRequest): Promise => Promise.resolve(result), + }; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/README.md b/control/test-support/README.md index 59294e9..3f522c2 100644 --- a/control/test-support/README.md +++ b/control/test-support/README.md @@ -2,7 +2,14 @@ The doubles the A3.x ModemManager D-Bus backend and A4.1 NetworkManager adapter are tested against. This lives outside `control/src`, so it is **not** published in the -`@ceralive/modem-control` npm package (`files: ["src"]`) — it is test-only. +`@ceralive/modem-control` npm package (`files: ["dist"]`, and the build only emits from +`src`) — it is test-only. + +**This is not the package's contract-fakes surface.** What a CONSUMER should reuse is +the published `@ceralive/modem-control/testing` entry (`control/src/testing/`): pure +data and functions, no bus, no process. Everything here needs a private session bus or +a stateful `nmcli` state machine and is deliberately unpublished — do not promote it to +a public subpath, and do not have a consumer reach into it by path. ## `fake-mm/` — a scriptable, MM-faithful `org.freedesktop.ModemManager1` diff --git a/control/tsconfig.build.json b/control/tsconfig.build.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e39cbb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/tsconfig.build.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "extends": "../tsconfig.json", + "compilerOptions": { + "noEmit": false, + "declaration": true, + "declarationMap": false, + "sourceMap": false, + "rootDir": "src", + "outDir": "dist" + }, + "include": ["src"], + "exclude": [ + "src/**/*.test.ts", + "src/**/*.type-test.ts", + "src/transport/test-support", + "dist", + "fixtures" + ] +} diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index af461a4..0ada8ae 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ "cli" ], "scripts": { + "build": "bun run --filter '@ceralive/modem-control' build", "lint": "biome check .", "format": "biome format --write .", "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit", diff --git a/tsconfig.json b/tsconfig.json index f42f431..d9568e9 100644 --- a/tsconfig.json +++ b/tsconfig.json @@ -14,7 +14,30 @@ "noFallthroughCasesInSwitch": true, "verbatimModuleSyntax": true, "skipLibCheck": true, - "resolveJsonModule": true + "resolveJsonModule": true, + + // The workspace develops against `control/src`, never against `control/dist`. + // + // `@ceralive/modem-control` publishes BUILT output, so its exports map points at + // `dist`. Left alone, the workspace `cli` would resolve the package through that + // map while `control/test-support` resolves the same modules relatively — two + // type identities for one module, which `Brand`'s `unique symbol` turns into hard + // errors the moment a branded value crosses between them. It would also mean the + // whole workspace could not typecheck or test until `dist` existed. + // + // These mappings are DEV-ONLY: they live in the repo's tsconfig, never in the + // published package, whose exports map still resolves to `dist` for consumers. + // The built artifact is proven separately by the standalone consumer fixtures in + // `control/fixtures/`, which install the real tarball and know nothing of this file. + "paths": { + "@ceralive/modem-control": ["./control/src/index.ts"], + "@ceralive/modem-control/transport": ["./control/src/transport/index.ts"], + "@ceralive/modem-control/domain": ["./control/src/domain/index.ts"], + "@ceralive/modem-control/providers": ["./control/src/providers/index.ts"], + "@ceralive/modem-control/capabilities": ["./control/src/capability/index.ts"], + "@ceralive/modem-control/hardware": ["./control/src/hardware/index.ts"], + "@ceralive/modem-control/testing": ["./control/src/testing/index.ts"] + } }, - "include": ["control/src", "control/test-support", "cli/src", "cli/smoke"] + "include": ["control/src", "control/scripts", "control/test-support", "cli/src", "cli/smoke"] } From 657a7467e8c16c3bf31bba8493065631c433c2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] ci: Node 26 baseline + workflow canon Pins node-version to "26" across the workflows and brings them onto the shared CI canon: concurrency blocks with the correct cancel-in-progress polarity, push triggers constrained by branches so a PR-branch push does not duplicate the PR run, top-level least-privilege permissions with per-job escalation, major-pinned actions, and dependency caching. --- biome.json | 2 +- bun.lock | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- package.json | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/biome.json b/biome.json index e2626de..bb887b2 100644 --- a/biome.json +++ b/biome.json @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ { - "$schema": "https://biomejs.dev/schemas/2.5.5/schema.json", + "$schema": "https://biomejs.dev/schemas/2.5.8/schema.json", "extends": ["@ceralive/biome-config"], "files": { "includes": ["**", "!**/node_modules", "!**/dist", "!**/test-results"] diff --git a/bun.lock b/bun.lock index e33006d..3ee63de 100644 --- a/bun.lock +++ b/bun.lock @@ -5,15 +5,15 @@ "": { "name": "modem-stack", "devDependencies": { - "@biomejs/biome": "2.5.5", - "@ceralive/biome-config": "2026.6.2", + "@biomejs/biome": "2.5.8", + "@ceralive/biome-config": "2026.8.0", "@types/bun": "1.3.14", "typescript": "^5", }, }, "cli": { "name": "modem-control-cli", - "version": "0.2.0", + "version": "1.0.0", "bin": { "modem-control": "./src/index.ts", }, @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ }, "control": { "name": "@ceralive/modem-control", - "version": "0.2.0", + "version": "1.0.0", "dependencies": { "@httptoolkit/dbus-native": "0.1.5", "zod": "4.4.3", @@ -32,25 +32,25 @@ }, }, "packages": { - "@biomejs/biome": ["@biomejs/biome@2.5.5", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@biomejs/cli-darwin-arm64": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-darwin-x64": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-linux-arm64": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-linux-arm64-musl": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-linux-x64": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-linux-x64-musl": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-win32-arm64": "2.5.5", "@biomejs/cli-win32-x64": "2.5.5" }, "bin": { "biome": "bin/biome" } }, "sha512-r1S8nFsAG1MY+vJFZALzIvwXAJv6ejDQ0mxP21Tgr9YK3ZFtjrvbBwDdNhx1rUqvccEIeNg20cYCNzl6Cr69pQ=="], + "@biomejs/biome": ["@biomejs/biome@2.5.8", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@biomejs/cli-darwin-arm64": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-darwin-x64": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-linux-arm64": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-linux-arm64-musl": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-linux-x64": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-linux-x64-musl": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-win32-arm64": "2.5.8", "@biomejs/cli-win32-x64": "2.5.8" }, "bin": { "biome": "bin/biome" } }, "sha512-aeAeeJB9fSDc7Gq+2GqpQxA0qBj6gj1k2R6L1cYqGePKP/baIq1WX8y6B+D+nRsO5ViQL22K/8IwbqERW0q1nw=="], - 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"@biomejs/biome": "2.5.5", - "@ceralive/biome-config": "2026.6.2", + "@biomejs/biome": "2.5.8", + "@ceralive/biome-config": "2026.8.0", "@types/bun": "1.3.14", "typescript": "^5" } From b650b72571adbfa26722bb9776a9496633917c7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] feat(migration): pure identity/classifier/capability/parser layer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The layer CeraUI migrates onto: portable physical identity, normalized ModemManager enums, presentation helpers, shadow-divergence folding, USB network-device classification, surfaceable-module selection, and the router telemetry parsers. Every function here is pure. It takes evidence and returns a verdict, with no D-Bus handle, no process spawn, and no clock — which is what makes it testable without hardware and what lets CeraUI become a thin consumer instead of carrying a second copy of the same rules. docs/ records the boundary so a later change does not quietly reintroduce I/O into it. --- AGENTS.md | 19 ++ README.md | 8 + control/README.md | 13 + control/src/backend/device-classifier.test.ts | 45 ++- control/src/backend/device-classifier.ts | 105 +++++++ control/src/backend/index.ts | 10 + control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts | 14 + control/src/capability/support-claim.ts | 8 + control/src/domain/index.ts | 3 + control/src/domain/mm-enums.test.ts | 29 ++ control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts | 114 ++++++++ control/src/domain/modem-presentation.test.ts | 26 ++ control/src/domain/modem-presentation.ts | 50 ++++ control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts | 33 +++ .../domain/portable-physical-identity.test.ts | 30 ++ control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.test.ts | 36 +++ control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.ts | 93 ++++++ control/src/hardware/index.ts | 1 + control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts | 86 ++++++ control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts | 264 ++++++++++++++++++ control/src/index.ts | 1 + 21 files changed, 987 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 control/src/domain/mm-enums.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/modem-presentation.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/modem-presentation.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/portable-physical-identity.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.ts create mode 100644 control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index c0a91e8..fe82a29 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -429,6 +429,25 @@ coverage exist at the bench (`docs/BENCH.md` per-SKU blockers; the CeraLive-side record is todo 2's BLOCKER B3), so the readback/registration/data/fallback drill on the RM530N-GL has not run. Every claim above is fixture-proven only. +## PURE ROUTER RESPONSE PARSERS — TRANSPORT STAYS OUT + +`control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts` owns the pure CeraUI migration seam for +SIM-presence evidence and Huawei HiLink, ZTE goform, and Qualcomm UFI/HIMI response +normalization. It is exported through the existing root and `./hardware` entry points; +no new package subpath exists. Empty/refused/malformed readings remain explicit unknown +states, vendor placeholders are omitted, and HiLink capability refusal preserves the +device code. The module accepts response bodies only: HTTP, authentication, interface +binding, retries, caching, and every write remain outside it. CeraUI keeps its adapters +until the explicit cutover todo; this migration creates no sibling path dependency. + +The same transport-free migration seam also owns the remaining pure CeraUI compatibility +rules: portable USB physical identity/link-id derivation, modem display-name sanitation, +ModemManager enum normalization, USB-network classification and labels, capability-module +selection, and shadow-backend divergence folding. These helpers accept snapshots, primitive +values, or already-normalized records and return deterministic values only. They do not read +udev, invoke ModemManager, persist state, or alter CeraUI; CeraUI keeps its local adapters and +copies until the explicit consumer cutover. + ## SMS — LIST / READ AND OBSERVATION, PERMANENTLY `control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` are the read-only SMS surface: diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index d1b1ce5..a141291 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ straight from CI artifacts; nothing is published to `apt.ceralive.tv` yet. | [`cli/`](cli/) | **`modem-control`** (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`, `watch`, `apply`, `set-usb-mode`, `usage`, `certify`, `hil-cycle`. Compiled for `arm64` + `amd64` and run against real modems on a bench device to mature the package, capture per-SKU certification bundles, and prove hub VBUS port-cycling ([RB-10](docs/BENCH.md#rb-10--hub-vbus-verification-partial)). | | [`packaging/`](packaging/) | **ModemManager stack `.deb`s** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — **packaging only, not a fork, zero source patches** (see [`POLICY.md`](POLICY.md)). Provenance-verified upstream pins; installed on the bench from CI artifacts. | +The control package's existing `./hardware` entry point also exposes transport-free +SIM-presence and Huawei/ZTE/UFI response normalization. Device I/O, sessions, retries, +interface binding, caches, and writes remain outside those pure parsers. Its existing +root, `./domain`, and `./capabilities` surfaces also expose deterministic compatibility +helpers for portable modem identity, display naming, ModemManager enums, USB-network +classification, capability selection, and shadow-result comparison; these helpers perform +no discovery or transport and leave CeraUI integration to a separate cutover. + ## Versioning at a glance ONE unified **SemVer** tag `vX.Y.Z` releases **both** artifacts together: `v0.2.0` publishes diff --git a/control/README.md b/control/README.md index e225f6c..db3d816 100644 --- a/control/README.md +++ b/control/README.md @@ -34,6 +34,19 @@ through the root entry, so an internal reorganisation is not a breaking change. | `@ceralive/modem-control/transport` | The D-Bus transport seam (no underlying-library type is re-exported) | | `@ceralive/modem-control/testing` | Public **contract fakes** for consumers' own tests | +The `./hardware` surface also owns the transport-free response parsers migrated +from CeraUI: SIM-presence evidence plus normalized Huawei HiLink, ZTE goform, +and Qualcomm UFI/HIMI signal, detail, and capability reads. They accept response +bodies only; HTTP sessions, interface binding, retries, caches, and writes remain +consumer-owned. + +The migration surface is broader than response parsing but remains pure: the root and +existing `./domain`, `./capabilities`, and `./hardware` entries expose portable physical +identity/link-id derivation, modem presentation rules, ModemManager enum decoding, +USB-network classification and labels, capability-module selection, and shadow-backend +divergence folding. Every helper consumes caller-supplied values or snapshots; none discovers +devices, opens a transport, persists state, or performs a modem write. + ### `./testing` is the contract-fakes surface A consumer writing tests against this package needs valid instances of the domain and diff --git a/control/src/backend/device-classifier.test.ts b/control/src/backend/device-classifier.test.ts index 377d039..00cfdea 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/device-classifier.test.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/device-classifier.test.ts @@ -3,7 +3,15 @@ // confident guess, and mass storage without a modeswitch trigger is NOT a modem. import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; -import { classifyDevice, detectUsbMode, type UsbDeviceSnapshot } from './device-classifier'; +import { + classifyDevice, + classifyUsbNetDevice, + detectUsbMode, + modelLabel, + type UsbDeviceSnapshot, + unitDiscriminator, + vendorLabel, +} from './device-classifier'; /** A Quectel-style QMI composition: a `qmi_wwan` control port (+ AT serials). */ const QMI: UsbDeviceSnapshot = { @@ -166,3 +174,38 @@ describe('classifyDevice — honesty guards', () => { expect(classifyDevice(bareVendor).deviceClass).toBe('unmanaged'); }); }); + +describe('CeraUI USB-net classification parity', () => { + test('requires positive cellular evidence before naming a tether cellular', () => { + const plainNic: UsbDeviceSnapshot = { + vendorId: '0b95', + productId: '772b', + bDeviceClass: 0, + interfaces: [ + { + interfaceClass: 0x02, + interfaceSubClass: 0x06, + interfaceProtocol: 0, + driver: 'cdc_ether', + }, + ], + }; + expect(classifyUsbNetDevice(plainNic).deviceClass).toBe('wired-ethernet'); + expect(classifyUsbNetDevice(HILINK_ECM).deviceClass).toBe('router-cellular'); + expect(classifyUsbNetDevice(QMI).deviceClass).toBe('mm-managed'); + }); + + test('replaces duplicated class strings with database identity', () => { + const hilink: UsbDeviceSnapshot = { + ...HILINK_ECM, + manufacturer: 'HUAWEI_MOBILE', + product: 'HUAWEI_MOBILE', + databaseVendor: 'Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.', + databaseModel: 'E3372 LTE/UMTS/GSM HiLink Modem/Networkcard', + serialNumber: 'Y4QDU17621000872', + }; + expect(vendorLabel(hilink)).toBe('Huawei'); + expect(modelLabel(hilink)).toBe('E3372 LTE/UMTS/GSM HiLink Modem/Networkcard'); + expect(unitDiscriminator(hilink)).toBe('Y4QDU17621000872'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/backend/device-classifier.ts b/control/src/backend/device-classifier.ts index f5d13b9..1332bef 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/device-classifier.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/device-classifier.ts @@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ export interface UsbDeviceSnapshot { readonly productId: string; readonly model?: string; readonly firmwareRevision?: string; + readonly manufacturer?: string; + readonly product?: string; + readonly databaseVendor?: string; + readonly databaseModel?: string; + readonly serialNumber?: string; /** The device-descriptor `bDeviceClass` byte (0 ⇒ class is per-interface). */ readonly bDeviceClass: number; readonly interfaces: readonly UsbInterface[]; @@ -48,6 +53,7 @@ export interface UsbDeviceSnapshot { /** The four device classes. `pending-modeswitch` is distinct from `unmanaged`. */ export type DeviceClass = 'mm-managed' | 'router-mode' | 'unmanaged' | 'pending-modeswitch'; +export type UsbNetClass = 'mm-managed' | 'router-cellular' | 'wired-ethernet' | 'unknown'; /** A classification plus a human-readable reason (always populated). */ export interface DeviceClassification { @@ -55,8 +61,14 @@ export interface DeviceClassification { readonly reason: string; } +export interface UsbNetClassification { + readonly deviceClass: UsbNetClass; + readonly reason: string; +} + // USB-IF class / subclass / protocol codes used below. const CLASS_COMM = 0x02; // CDC communications (control interface) +const CLASS_CDC_DATA = 0x0a; const CLASS_MASS_STORAGE = 0x08; const CLASS_WIRELESS = 0xe0; // wireless controller (RNDIS lives here) const CLASS_VENDOR = 0xff; @@ -74,6 +86,21 @@ const ECM_NCM_DRIVERS: ReadonlySet = new Set(['cdc_ether', 'cdc_ncm']); const RNDIS_DRIVERS: ReadonlySet = new Set(['rndis_host']); const STORAGE_DRIVERS: ReadonlySet = new Set(['usb-storage', 'uas']); +export const CELLULAR_USB_VENDOR_IDS: ReadonlyMap = new Map([ + ['05c6', 'Qualcomm'], + ['0af0', 'Option'], + ['1199', 'Sierra Wireless'], + ['12d1', 'Huawei'], + ['1546', 'u-blox'], + ['19d2', 'ZTE'], + ['1bbb', 'TCL/Alcatel'], + ['1c9e', 'Longcheer'], + ['1e0e', 'SIMCom'], + ['2c7c', 'Quectel'], + ['2cb7', 'Fibocom'], + ['413c', 'Dell'], +]); + function isMbimControl(i: UsbInterface): boolean { return i.interfaceClass === CLASS_COMM && i.interfaceSubClass === SUB_MBIM; } @@ -199,6 +226,84 @@ export function classifyDevice(snapshot: UsbDeviceSnapshot): DeviceClassificatio return { deviceClass: 'unmanaged', reason: unmanagedReason(snapshot, hasStorage) }; } +export function cellularVendorName(vendorId: string): string | undefined { + return CELLULAR_USB_VENDOR_IDS.get(vendorId.toLowerCase()); +} + +export function cellularEvidence(device: UsbDeviceSnapshot): string | undefined { + const vendor = cellularVendorName(device.vendorId); + if (vendor !== undefined) + return `USB vendor ${device.vendorId} is ${vendor}, a cellular-module vendor`; + const modeswitch = device.udevProperties?.ID_USB_MODESWITCH; + if (modeswitch !== undefined && modeswitch !== '' && modeswitch !== '0') + return 'device carries a usb_modeswitch trigger — a mode-switching dongle'; + return device.interfaces.some(isMassStorage) + ? 'device also presents a mass-storage installer interface — the ZeroCD personality of a router-mode dongle' + : undefined; +} + +export function classifyUsbNetDevice(device: UsbDeviceSnapshot): UsbNetClassification { + const control = device.interfaces.find( + (i) => isMbimControl(i) || isQmiControl(i) || isAtControl(i), + ); + if (control !== undefined) + return { + deviceClass: 'mm-managed', + reason: `recognized ${controlKind(control)} control interface — ModemManager-manageable`, + }; + const tether = device.interfaces.find( + (i) => isRndis(i) || isEcmNcmData(i) || i.interfaceClass === CLASS_CDC_DATA, + ); + if (tether !== undefined) { + const kind = isRndis(tether) ? 'RNDIS' : 'ECM/NCM'; + const evidence = cellularEvidence(device); + return evidence === undefined + ? { + deviceClass: 'wired-ethernet', + reason: `${kind} Ethernet tether with no modem control port and no cellular evidence — a USB network adapter`, + } + : { + deviceClass: 'router-cellular', + reason: `${kind} Ethernet tether with no modem control port; ${evidence}`, + }; + } + return { + deviceClass: 'unknown', + reason: unmanagedReason( + device, + device.interfaces.some(isMassStorage) || device.bDeviceClass === CLASS_MASS_STORAGE, + ), + }; +} + +export function publishesGenericIdentity(device: UsbDeviceSnapshot): boolean { + const manufacturer = device.manufacturer?.trim(); + const product = device.product?.trim(); + return Boolean(manufacturer && product && manufacturer.toLowerCase() === product.toLowerCase()); +} + +export function vendorLabel(device: UsbDeviceSnapshot): string { + const published = device.manufacturer?.trim(); + if (published && !publishesGenericIdentity(device)) return published; + return cellularVendorName(device.vendorId) ?? device.databaseVendor?.trim() ?? device.vendorId; +} + +export function modelLabel(device: UsbDeviceSnapshot): string { + const published = device.product?.trim(); + if (published && !publishesGenericIdentity(device)) return published; + return device.databaseModel?.trim() ?? device.productId; +} + +export function unitDiscriminator(device: UsbDeviceSnapshot): string | undefined { + const serial = device.serialNumber?.trim(); + if (!serial) return undefined; + const folded = serial.toLowerCase(); + return folded === device.manufacturer?.trim().toLowerCase() || + folded === device.product?.trim().toLowerCase() + ? undefined + : serial; +} + /** * Derive the USB composition MODE a device is currently in (for a transition's * postcondition). Distinct from `classifyDevice`: this reads the data-plane diff --git a/control/src/backend/index.ts b/control/src/backend/index.ts index ff257f4..dfc5ee1 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/index.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/index.ts @@ -35,13 +35,23 @@ export { SIM_IFACE, } from './constants'; export { + CELLULAR_USB_VENDOR_IDS, + cellularEvidence, + cellularVendorName, classifyDevice, + classifyUsbNetDevice, type DeviceClass, type DeviceClassification, descriptorsMatch, detectUsbMode, + modelLabel, + publishesGenericIdentity, type UsbDeviceSnapshot, type UsbInterface, + type UsbNetClass, + type UsbNetClassification, + unitDiscriminator, + vendorLabel, } from './device-classifier'; export { buildEnrichment, diff --git a/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts b/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts index 0e5ddcc..d3394c5 100644 --- a/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts +++ b/control/src/capability/support-claim.test.ts @@ -3,11 +3,13 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; import { CAPABILITY_MODULES, type CapabilityModule, + claimableModules, mayClaimSupport, mayRenderModule, resolveCapabilityMatrix, resolveSupportClaim, SUPPORT_CLAIM_STATES, + surfaceableModules, } from './support-claim'; const ALL: readonly CapabilityModule[] = CAPABILITY_MODULES; @@ -88,4 +90,16 @@ describe('the seven-module matrix', () => { expect(claims[module]).toBe('unavailable'); } }); + + test('derives surfaceable and claimable modules in canonical module order', () => { + const claims = resolveCapabilityMatrix({ + implemented: ALL, + gates: { 'band-lock': true, sms: true, gps: true }, + capability: { 'band-lock': 'present', sms: 'present', gps: 'absent' }, + certified: { sms: true }, + }); + + expect(surfaceableModules(claims)).toEqual(['band-lock', 'sms']); + expect(claimableModules(claims)).toEqual(['sms']); + }); }); diff --git a/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts b/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts index d414300..88edde1 100644 --- a/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts +++ b/control/src/capability/support-claim.ts @@ -104,3 +104,11 @@ export function resolveCapabilityMatrix(input: CapabilityMatrixInput): Capabilit } return claims; } + +export function surfaceableModules(claims: CapabilityModuleClaims): CapabilityModule[] { + return CAPABILITY_MODULES.filter((module) => mayRenderModule(claims[module])); +} + +export function claimableModules(claims: CapabilityModuleClaims): CapabilityModule[] { + return CAPABILITY_MODULES.filter((module) => mayClaimSupport(claims[module])); +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/index.ts b/control/src/domain/index.ts index d7371ff..470f537 100644 --- a/control/src/domain/index.ts +++ b/control/src/domain/index.ts @@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ export * from './errors'; export * from './generation'; export * from './guards'; export * from './identity'; +export * from './mm-enums'; +export * from './modem-presentation'; export * from './observation'; export * from './operation'; export * from './physical-identity'; export * from './policy'; +export * from './shadow-divergence'; export * from './snapshot'; export * from './state'; diff --git a/control/src/domain/mm-enums.test.ts b/control/src/domain/mm-enums.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2be92b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/mm-enums.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + decodeMmAccessTechnologies, + decodeMmState, + decodeNetworkRejectionError, + decodeRegistrationState, + decodeUnlockRequired, + modeMaskToLabel, + runtimeIdFromPath, +} from './mm-enums'; + +describe('ModemManager enum normalization', () => { + test('folds access and mode masks into shared wire vocabulary', () => { + expect([...decodeMmAccessTechnologies((1 << 14) | (1 << 15))]).toEqual(['lte', '5gnr']); + expect(modeMaskToLabel((1 << 2) | (1 << 3) | (1 << 4))).toBe('5g4g3g'); + }); + + test('decodes states, locks, and reject causes', () => { + expect(decodeMmState(11)).toBe('connected'); + expect(decodeRegistrationState(9)).toBe('roaming'); + expect(decodeUnlockRequired(3)).toBe('sim-pin2'); + expect(decodeNetworkRejectionError(8)).toBe('gprs-and-non-gprs-not-allowed'); + }); + + test('extracts only a trailing numeric runtime id', () => { + expect(runtimeIdFromPath('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/7')).toBe(7); + expect(runtimeIdFromPath('/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/Modem/x')).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts b/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc83a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +import type { RadioAccessTechnology } from './state'; + +const ACCESS_TECH_BITS: ReadonlyArray = [ + [1 << 1, 'gsm'], + [1 << 2, 'gsm'], + [1 << 3, 'gsm'], + [1 << 4, 'gsm'], + [1 << 5, 'umts'], + [1 << 6, 'umts'], + [1 << 7, 'umts'], + [1 << 8, 'umts'], + [1 << 9, 'umts'], + [1 << 14, 'lte'], + [1 << 15, '5gnr'], + [1 << 16, 'lte'], + [1 << 17, 'lte'], +]; + +export function decodeMmAccessTechnologies(mask: number | undefined): Set { + const result = new Set(); + if (mask === undefined || mask <= 0) return result; + for (const [bit, rat] of ACCESS_TECH_BITS) if ((mask & bit) !== 0) result.add(rat); + return result; +} + +export function modeMaskToLabel(mask: number | undefined): string | undefined { + if (mask === undefined || mask <= 0) return undefined; + const tokens = [ + [1 << 1, '2g'], + [1 << 2, '3g'], + [1 << 3, '4g'], + [1 << 4, '5g'], + ] as const; + const named = tokens.filter(([bit]) => (mask & bit) !== 0).map(([, token]) => token); + return named.length === 0 ? undefined : named.reverse().join(''); +} + +const MM_STATES = new Map([ + [-1, 'failed'], + [1, 'initializing'], + [2, 'locked'], + [3, 'disabled'], + [4, 'disabling'], + [5, 'enabling'], + [6, 'enabled'], + [7, 'searching'], + [8, 'registered'], + [9, 'disconnecting'], + [10, 'connecting'], + [11, 'connected'], +]); +export function decodeMmState(state: number | undefined): string { + return state === undefined ? 'unknown' : (MM_STATES.get(state) ?? 'unknown'); +} + +export function decodeRegistrationState(state: number | undefined): string { + if (state === 0) return 'idle'; + if (state === 1 || state === 6 || state === 7) return 'home'; + if (state === 2) return 'searching'; + if (state === 3) return 'denied'; + if (state === 5 || state === 8 || state === 9) return 'roaming'; + return state === 11 ? 'emergency-only' : 'unknown'; +} + +export function decodeUnlockRequired(lock: number | undefined): string | undefined { + return lock === 1 + ? 'none' + : lock === 2 + ? 'sim-pin' + : lock === 3 + ? 'sim-pin2' + : lock === 4 + ? 'sim-puk' + : lock === 5 + ? 'sim-puk2' + : undefined; +} +export function decodeSimType(value: number | undefined): 'physical' | 'esim' | undefined { + return value === 1 ? 'physical' : value === 2 ? 'esim' : undefined; +} +export function decodeEsimStatus( + value: number | undefined, +): 'no-profiles' | 'with-profiles' | undefined { + return value === 1 ? 'no-profiles' : value === 2 ? 'with-profiles' : undefined; +} +export function decodePacketServiceState( + value: number | undefined, +): 'detached' | 'attached' | undefined { + return value === 1 ? 'detached' : value === 2 ? 'attached' : undefined; +} + +const NETWORK_REJECTIONS = new Map([ + [2, 'imsi-unknown-in-hlr'], + [3, 'illegal-ms'], + [4, 'imsi-unknown-in-vlr'], + [5, 'imei-not-accepted'], + [6, 'illegal-me'], + [7, 'gprs-not-allowed'], + [8, 'gprs-and-non-gprs-not-allowed'], + [11, 'plmn-not-allowed'], + [12, 'location-area-not-allowed'], + [13, 'roaming-not-allowed-in-location-area'], + [14, 'gprs-not-allowed-in-plmn'], + [15, 'no-cells-in-location-area'], + [17, 'network-failure'], + [22, 'congestion'], +]); +export function decodeNetworkRejectionError(value: number | undefined): string | undefined { + return value === undefined ? undefined : NETWORK_REJECTIONS.get(value); +} +export function runtimeIdFromPath(path: string): number | undefined { + const value = /\/(\d+)$/.exec(path)?.[1]; + return value === undefined ? undefined : Number.parseInt(value, 10); +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/modem-presentation.test.ts b/control/src/domain/modem-presentation.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74f287b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/modem-presentation.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { firmwareIdentityLabel, modemHardwareLabel, modemHardwareName } from './modem-presentation'; + +describe('modem hardware presentation', () => { + test('keeps an informative model and adds the IMEI tail', () => { + expect(modemHardwareName({ model: 'RM530N-GL', equipmentId: '868837088254863' })).toBe( + 'RM530N-GL - 54863', + ); + }); + + test('replaces a numeric model with the firmware family', () => { + const identity = { + model: '0', + manufacturer: '1', + firmwareRevision: 'HIMI_U01_MODEM_V1.0 1 [Sep 09 2015 10:00:00]', + }; + expect(firmwareIdentityLabel(identity.firmwareRevision)).toBe('HIMI_U01_MODEM_V1.0'); + expect(modemHardwareLabel(identity)).toBe('HIMI_U01_MODEM_V1.0'); + }); + + test('uses the unnamed floor when every reported field is uninformative', () => { + expect( + modemHardwareName({ model: '--', manufacturer: '1', firmwareRevision: '81600.0000.00' }), + ).toBe('Cellular modem'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/domain/modem-presentation.ts b/control/src/domain/modem-presentation.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a8268c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/modem-presentation.ts @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +const BARE_NUMERAL_RE = /^\d{1,4}$/; +const MMCLI_EMPTY = '--'; + +export interface ModemHardwareIdentity { + readonly model?: string; + readonly manufacturer?: string; + readonly firmwareRevision?: string; + readonly equipmentId?: string; +} + +export function isUninformativeIdentity(value: string | undefined): boolean { + const trimmed = value?.trim(); + return ( + trimmed === undefined || + trimmed === '' || + trimmed === MMCLI_EMPTY || + BARE_NUMERAL_RE.test(trimmed) + ); +} + +export function firmwareIdentityLabel(revision: string | undefined): string | undefined { + const trimmed = revision?.trim(); + if (!trimmed || trimmed === MMCLI_EMPTY) return undefined; + const head = + trimmed + .replace(/\s*\[[^\]]*]\s*$/, '') + .trim() + .split(/\s{2,}/)[0] + ?.trim() ?? ''; + return head.length >= 3 && /[A-Za-z]/.test(head) ? head : undefined; +} + +export function modemHardwareLabel(identity: ModemHardwareIdentity): string { + const model = identity.model?.trim(); + if (model !== undefined && !isUninformativeIdentity(model)) return model; + const firmware = firmwareIdentityLabel(identity.firmwareRevision); + if (firmware !== undefined) return firmware; + const manufacturer = identity.manufacturer?.trim(); + return manufacturer !== undefined && !isUninformativeIdentity(manufacturer) + ? manufacturer + : 'Cellular modem'; +} + +export function modemHardwareName(identity: ModemHardwareIdentity): string { + const label = modemHardwareLabel(identity); + const equipmentId = identity.equipmentId?.trim(); + return !equipmentId || equipmentId === MMCLI_EMPTY + ? label + : `${label} - ${equipmentId.slice(-5)}`; +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts b/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts index ea5046f..2621442 100644 --- a/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts +++ b/control/src/domain/physical-identity.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import type { Brand } from './brand'; import { DomainError } from './errors'; @@ -141,3 +142,35 @@ export function resolvePhysicalModemIdentity( throw new PhysicalModemIdentityError('no-identity-facts'); } + +export type PortableIdentityAnchor = 'usb-serial' | 'id-path' | 'ifname'; +export interface PortablePhysicalObservation { + readonly ifname: string; + readonly idPath?: string; + readonly vendorId?: string; + readonly serial?: string; +} +export interface PortablePhysicalDeviceIdentity { + readonly identityKey: string; + readonly anchor: PortableIdentityAnchor; + readonly linkId: string; +} + +export function mintLinkId(identityKey: string): string { + return `lnk_${createHash('sha256').update(identityKey).digest('hex').slice(0, 16)}`; +} + +export function resolvePortablePhysicalIdentity( + observation: PortablePhysicalObservation, +): PortablePhysicalDeviceIdentity { + const serial = observation.serial?.trim(); + const idPath = observation.idPath?.trim(); + const vendor = observation.vendorId?.trim().toLowerCase(); + const identityKey = serial + ? `usb-serial:${vendor ? `${vendor}:` : ''}${serial}` + : idPath + ? `id-path:${idPath}` + : `ifname:${observation.ifname}`; + const anchor: PortableIdentityAnchor = serial ? 'usb-serial' : idPath ? 'id-path' : 'ifname'; + return { identityKey, anchor, linkId: mintLinkId(identityKey) }; +} diff --git a/control/src/domain/portable-physical-identity.test.ts b/control/src/domain/portable-physical-identity.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c521b17 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/portable-physical-identity.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { resolvePortablePhysicalIdentity } from './physical-identity'; + +describe('portable physical identity', () => { + test('keeps one identity across a dual-mode VID:PID change', () => { + const router = resolvePortablePhysicalIdentity({ + ifname: 'enx0', + vendorId: '05c6', + serial: '2b16081', + idPath: 'usb-0:1.4.1', + }); + const qmi = resolvePortablePhysicalIdentity({ + ifname: 'wwan0', + vendorId: '05C6', + serial: '2b16081', + idPath: 'usb-0:1.4.1', + }); + expect(qmi).toEqual(router); + expect(router.anchor).toBe('usb-serial'); + expect(router.linkId).toMatch(/^lnk_[0-9a-f]{16}$/); + expect(router.linkId).not.toContain('2b16081'); + }); + + test('uses same-port identity when no serial exists', () => { + expect(resolvePortablePhysicalIdentity({ ifname: 'eth1', idPath: 'usb-0:1.4.2' }).anchor).toBe( + 'id-path', + ); + expect(resolvePortablePhysicalIdentity({ ifname: 'eth1' }).anchor).toBe('ifname'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.test.ts b/control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f3bd9d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { classifyShadowDivergences, foldGenerations, foldSignalBucket } from './shadow-divergence'; + +describe('shadow divergence', () => { + test('compares only mutually reported fields', () => { + expect( + classifyShadowDivergences( + [{ deviceKey: 'd-a', present: true, operatorName: 'Carrier' }], + [{ deviceKey: 'd-a', present: true }], + ), + ).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('reports roster and field mismatches', () => { + const result = classifyShadowDivergences( + [ + { deviceKey: 'd-a', present: true, networkType: '5G' }, + { deviceKey: 'd-b', present: true }, + ], + [ + { deviceKey: 'd-a', present: true, networkType: '4G' }, + { deviceKey: 'd-c', present: true }, + ], + ); + expect(result.map((entry) => entry.kind)).toEqual([ + 'field-mismatch', + 'only-in-mmcli', + 'only-in-dbus', + ]); + }); + + test('folds generation and signal vocabularies', () => { + expect(foldGenerations(['lte', '5gnr'])).toBe('5G'); + expect(foldSignalBucket(74)).toBe('good'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.ts b/control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..350d1f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/domain/shadow-divergence.ts @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +export type ShadowGeneration = '2G' | '3G' | '4G' | '5G'; +export type ShadowSignalBucket = 'none' | 'poor' | 'fair' | 'good' | 'excellent'; +export interface ShadowModemState { + readonly deviceKey: string; + readonly present: boolean; + readonly registration?: string; + readonly signalBucket?: ShadowSignalBucket; + readonly operatorName?: string; + readonly simPresent?: boolean; + readonly networkType?: ShadowGeneration; +} +export const SHADOW_COMPARABLE_FIELDS = [ + 'present', + 'registration', + 'signalBucket', + 'operatorName', + 'simPresent', + 'networkType', +] as const; +export type ShadowComparableField = (typeof SHADOW_COMPARABLE_FIELDS)[number]; +export interface ShadowFieldDivergence { + readonly field: ShadowComparableField; + readonly mmcli: unknown; + readonly dbus: unknown; +} +export interface ShadowModemDivergence { + readonly deviceKey: string; + readonly kind: 'only-in-mmcli' | 'only-in-dbus' | 'field-mismatch'; + readonly fields?: readonly ShadowFieldDivergence[]; +} + +export function classifyShadowDivergences( + mmcli: readonly ShadowModemState[], + dbus: readonly ShadowModemState[], +): ShadowModemDivergence[] { + const left = new Map(mmcli.map((state) => [state.deviceKey, state])); + const right = new Map(dbus.map((state) => [state.deviceKey, state])); + const result: ShadowModemDivergence[] = []; + for (const [deviceKey, mmcliState] of left) { + const dbusState = right.get(deviceKey); + if (dbusState === undefined) { + result.push({ deviceKey, kind: 'only-in-mmcli' }); + continue; + } + const fields: ShadowFieldDivergence[] = []; + for (const field of SHADOW_COMPARABLE_FIELDS) { + const a = mmcliState[field]; + const b = dbusState[field]; + if (a !== undefined && b !== undefined && a !== b) fields.push({ field, mmcli: a, dbus: b }); + } + if (fields.length > 0) result.push({ deviceKey, kind: 'field-mismatch', fields }); + } + for (const deviceKey of right.keys()) + if (!left.has(deviceKey)) result.push({ deviceKey, kind: 'only-in-dbus' }); + return result; +} + +const GENERATIONS: Readonly> = { + '2g': '2G', + gsm: '2G', + '3g': '3G', + '3g+': '3G', + umts: '3G', + '4g': '4G', + lte: '4G', + '5g': '5G', + '5gnr': '5G', +}; +const ORDER: readonly ShadowGeneration[] = ['2G', '3G', '4G', '5G']; +export function foldGeneration(token: string): ShadowGeneration | undefined { + return GENERATIONS[token.trim().toLowerCase()]; +} +export function foldGenerations(tokens: Iterable): ShadowGeneration | undefined { + let best: ShadowGeneration | undefined; + for (const token of tokens) { + const value = foldGeneration(token); + if (value !== undefined && (best === undefined || ORDER.indexOf(value) > ORDER.indexOf(best))) + best = value; + } + return best; +} +export function foldSignalBucket(quality: number | undefined): ShadowSignalBucket | undefined { + if (quality === undefined || !Number.isFinite(quality)) return undefined; + return quality <= 0 + ? 'none' + : quality < 25 + ? 'poor' + : quality < 50 + ? 'fair' + : quality < 75 + ? 'good' + : 'excellent'; +} diff --git a/control/src/hardware/index.ts b/control/src/hardware/index.ts index a9d258e..67f6efa 100644 --- a/control/src/hardware/index.ts +++ b/control/src/hardware/index.ts @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ export * from '../band'; export * from '../usb-mode'; +export * from './router-parsers'; diff --git a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e46fb7e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + deriveSimPresence, + parseHilinkCapabilities, + parseHilinkSignal, + parseUfiDetails, + parseUfiSignal, + parseZteDetails, + parseZteSignal, +} from './router-parsers'; + +describe('migrated modem facts', () => { + test('derives SIM presence from ModemManager slot facts', () => { + expect(deriveSimPresence({ sim: '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SIM/0' })).toBe('present'); + expect(deriveSimPresence({ sim: '', simSlots: ['/', '/'], failedReason: 'sim-missing' })).toBe( + 'absent', + ); + expect(deriveSimPresence({ sim: '' })).toBe('unknown'); + }); +}); + +describe('transport-free router response parsers', () => { + test('normalizes Huawei signal values without fabricating empty metrics', () => { + const signal = parseHilinkSignal({ + status: '45', + signal: + '-71dBm-93dBm12dB', + }); + expect(signal.bars).toEqual({ state: 'known', value: 4 }); + expect(signal.rsrp).toEqual({ state: 'known', value: -93 }); + expect(signal.rsrq).toEqual({ state: 'unknown', reason: 'not-reported' }); + }); + + test('normalizes ZTE and UFI signal dialects', () => { + expect(parseZteSignal('{"signalbar":"4","rssi":"-67","lte_snr":"8"}')).toMatchObject({ + bars: { state: 'known', value: 4 }, + dbm: { state: 'known', value: -67 }, + snr: { state: 'known', value: 8 }, + }); + expect( + parseUfiSignal({ + sysinfo: '{"reply":"ok","params":{"SIGNAL":-96}}', + overview: '', + status: '', + }).dbm, + ).toEqual({ state: 'known', value: -96 }); + }); + + test('extracts ZTE and UFI details while dropping vendor placeholders', () => { + expect( + parseZteDetails( + '{"network_type":"LTE","network_provider":"732103","network_provider_fullname":"Movistar","cell_id":"2c20f34"}', + ), + ).toEqual({ network_type: 'LTE', provider: 'Movistar', cell_id: '2c20f34' }); + expect( + parseUfiDetails({ + overview: + '{"reply":"ok","params":{"SSID":"4G-UFI","WANIP":"-","IMSI":"732123","ICCID":"8957","WEBVER":"WEB1.1"}}', + sysinfo: '{"reply":"ok","params":{"cellid":"42","bsid":"25002"}}', + }), + ).toEqual({ + ssid: '4G-UFI', + imsi: '732123', + iccid: '8957', + web_version: 'WEB1.1', + cell_id: '42', + station_id: '25002', + }); + }); + + test('reports Huawei network-mode capability and refusal distinctly', () => { + expect( + parseHilinkCapabilities({ + netModeList: + '00AUTO', + netMode: '00', + }), + ).toEqual({ + net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes: [{ id: '00', name: 'AUTO' }], current: '00' }, + }); + expect(parseHilinkCapabilities({ netModeList: '112008' })).toEqual({ + net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'refused', code: '112008' }, + }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ebba47 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +import { z } from 'zod'; + +export type SimPresence = 'present' | 'absent' | 'unknown'; +export type SimPresenceFacts = { + readonly sim?: string; + readonly simSlots?: readonly string[]; + readonly failedReason?: string; +}; + +const SIM_OBJECT_PATH = /^\/org\/freedesktop\/ModemManager1\/SIM\/\d+$/; + +export function deriveSimPresence(facts: SimPresenceFacts): SimPresence { + if (SIM_OBJECT_PATH.test(facts.sim?.trim() ?? '')) return 'present'; + if (facts.simSlots?.some((slot) => SIM_OBJECT_PATH.test(slot.trim()))) return 'present'; + return facts.failedReason === 'sim-missing' ? 'absent' : 'unknown'; +} + +export type RouterSignalUnknownReason = + | 'unsupported' + | 'not-reported' + | 'malformed' + | 'auth-expired' + | 'unreachable'; +export type RouterSignalMetric = + | { readonly state: 'known'; readonly value: number } + | { readonly state: 'unknown'; readonly reason: RouterSignalUnknownReason }; +export type RouterSignalModel = { + readonly provenance: 'hilink-admin-api' | 'zte-goform' | 'ufi-himiapi'; + readonly freshness: 'live' | 'unknown'; + readonly bars: RouterSignalMetric; + readonly max_bars: RouterSignalMetric; + readonly dbm: RouterSignalMetric; + readonly rsrp: RouterSignalMetric; + readonly rsrq: RouterSignalMetric; + readonly snr: RouterSignalMetric; + readonly sinr: RouterSignalMetric; +}; + +const unknown = (reason: RouterSignalUnknownReason): RouterSignalMetric => ({ + state: 'unknown', + reason, +}); +const known = (value: number): RouterSignalMetric => ({ state: 'known', value }); + +function numericMetric(value: string | number | undefined): RouterSignalMetric { + if (value === undefined || String(value).trim() === '') return unknown('not-reported'); + const parsed = Number.parseFloat(String(value)); + return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? known(parsed) : unknown('malformed'); +} + +function xmlValue(body: string, tag: string): string | undefined { + const match = body.match(new RegExp(`<${tag}>([^<]*)`, 'i')); + return match?.[1]?.trim(); +} + +const flatRecordSchema = z.record(z.string(), z.union([z.string(), z.number()])); +const ufiBodySchema = z.object({ + reply: z.string(), + params: flatRecordSchema.optional(), +}); + +function parseFlatRecord(body: string): Readonly> | undefined { + const parsed = z + .string() + .transform((value, context) => { + try { + return JSON.parse(value); + } catch (error) { + if (!(error instanceof SyntaxError)) throw error; + context.addIssue({ code: 'custom', message: 'invalid JSON' }); + return z.NEVER; + } + }) + .pipe(flatRecordSchema) + .safeParse(body); + return parsed.success ? parsed.data : undefined; +} + +function parseUfiBody(body: string): z.infer | undefined { + const parsed = z + .string() + .transform((value, context) => { + try { + return JSON.parse(value); + } catch (error) { + if (!(error instanceof SyntaxError)) throw error; + context.addIssue({ code: 'custom', message: 'invalid JSON' }); + return z.NEVER; + } + }) + .pipe(ufiBodySchema) + .safeParse(body); + return parsed.success ? parsed.data : undefined; +} + +export function parseHilinkSignal(input: { + readonly status: string; + readonly signal: string; +}): RouterSignalModel { + const authStatus = xmlValue(input.status, 'code') === '125002'; + const authSignal = xmlValue(input.signal, 'code') === '125002'; + const statusReason = authStatus ? 'auth-expired' : 'not-reported'; + const signalReason = authSignal ? 'auth-expired' : 'not-reported'; + const metric = (tag: string): RouterSignalMetric => + authSignal ? unknown(signalReason) : numericMetric(xmlValue(input.signal, tag)); + return { + provenance: 'hilink-admin-api', + freshness: authStatus && authSignal ? 'unknown' : 'live', + bars: authStatus ? unknown(statusReason) : numericMetric(xmlValue(input.status, 'SignalIcon')), + max_bars: authStatus + ? unknown(statusReason) + : numericMetric(xmlValue(input.status, 'maxsignal')), + dbm: metric('rssi'), + rsrp: metric('rsrp'), + rsrq: metric('rsrq'), + snr: unknown('unsupported'), + sinr: metric('sinr'), + }; +} + +export function parseZteSignal(body: string): RouterSignalModel { + const record = parseFlatRecord(body); + const malformed = record === undefined; + const metric = (key: string): RouterSignalMetric => + malformed ? unknown('malformed') : numericMetric(record[key]); + const bars = metric('signalbar'); + return { + provenance: 'zte-goform', + freshness: malformed ? 'unknown' : 'live', + bars, + max_bars: bars.state === 'known' ? known(5) : unknown('not-reported'), + dbm: metric('rssi'), + rsrp: metric('lte_rsrp'), + rsrq: metric('lte_rsrq'), + snr: metric('lte_snr'), + sinr: unknown('unsupported'), + }; +} + +export function parseUfiSignal(input: { + readonly sysinfo: string; + readonly overview: string; + readonly status: string; +}): RouterSignalModel { + const bodies = [input.sysinfo, input.overview, input.status].map(parseUfiBody); + const authExpired = bodies.every((body) => body?.reply === 'SessionOut'); + const answered = bodies.some((body) => body?.reply === 'ok'); + const value = + bodies[0]?.params?.SIGNAL ?? bodies[1]?.params?.SIGNAL ?? bodies[2]?.params?.signalStrength; + const dbm = authExpired + ? unknown('auth-expired') + : answered + ? numericMetric(value) + : unknown('malformed'); + return { + provenance: 'ufi-himiapi', + freshness: answered ? 'live' : 'unknown', + bars: unknown('unsupported'), + max_bars: unknown('unsupported'), + dbm, + rsrp: unknown('unsupported'), + rsrq: unknown('unsupported'), + snr: unknown('unsupported'), + sinr: unknown('unsupported'), + }; +} + +export type RouterDetails = Readonly>; + +function stated(value: string | number | undefined): string | undefined { + if (value === undefined) return undefined; + const normalized = String(value).trim(); + return normalized === '' || normalized === '-' ? undefined : normalized; +} + +function compact( + entries: readonly (readonly [string, string | undefined])[], +): RouterDetails | undefined { + const result: Record = {}; + for (const [key, value] of entries) if (value !== undefined) result[key] = value; + return Object.keys(result).length === 0 ? undefined : result; +} + +export function parseZteDetails(body: string): RouterDetails | undefined { + const value = parseFlatRecord(body); + if (value === undefined) return undefined; + return compact([ + ['network_type', stated(value.network_type)], + [ + 'provider', + stated(value.network_provider_fullname) ?? + stated(value.network_provider) ?? + stated(value.provider), + ], + ['cell_id', stated(value.cell_id)], + ['roaming', stated(value.simcard_roam)], + ['mcc', stated(value.rmcc)], + ['mnc', stated(value.rmnc)], + ['pci', stated(value.lte_pci)], + ['network_band', stated(value.wan_active_band) ?? stated(value.lte_band) ?? stated(value.band)], + ['carrier_aggregation', stated(value.wan_lte_ca)], + ]); +} + +export function parseUfiDetails(input: { + readonly overview?: string; + readonly sysinfo?: string; + readonly produceInfo?: string; +}): RouterDetails | undefined { + const overview = parseUfiBody(input.overview ?? '')?.params; + const sysinfo = parseUfiBody(input.sysinfo ?? '')?.params; + const product = parseUfiBody(input.produceInfo ?? '')?.params; + return compact([ + ['product', stated(product?.productname) ?? stated(product?.ProductName)], + ['ssid', stated(overview?.SSID)], + ['wan_ip', stated(overview?.WANIP)], + ['imsi', stated(overview?.IMSI)], + ['iccid', stated(overview?.ICCID)], + ['web_version', stated(overview?.WEBVER)], + ['cell_id', stated(sysinfo?.cellid)], + ['station_id', stated(sysinfo?.bsid)], + ['cpu_temp', stated(sysinfo?.cputemp)], + ['wifi_clients', stated(sysinfo?.wifinum)], + ['eth_clients', stated(sysinfo?.ethnum)], + ]); +} + +export type HilinkNetModeCapability = + | { + readonly state: 'reported'; + readonly modes: readonly { readonly id: string; readonly name?: string }[]; + readonly current?: string; + } + | { + readonly state: 'unavailable'; + readonly reason: RouterSignalUnknownReason | 'refused'; + readonly code?: string; + }; + +export function parseHilinkCapabilities(input: { + readonly netModeList: string; + readonly netMode?: string; +}): { readonly net_mode: HilinkNetModeCapability } { + const code = xmlValue(input.netModeList, 'code'); + if (code === '125002') return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'auth-expired' } }; + if (code !== undefined) return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'refused', code } }; + if (input.netModeList === '') + return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'unreachable' } }; + if (!//i.test(input.netModeList)) + return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'malformed' } }; + const modes = [...input.netModeList.matchAll(/([\s\S]*?)<\/NetworkMode>/gi)].flatMap( + (match) => { + const id = xmlValue(match[1] ?? '', 'Index'); + if (id === undefined || id === '') return []; + const name = xmlValue(match[1] ?? '', 'Name'); + return name === undefined || name === '' ? [{ id }] : [{ id, name }]; + }, + ); + if (modes.length === 0) return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'not-reported' } }; + const current = xmlValue(input.netMode ?? '', 'NetworkMode'); + return current === undefined || current === '' + ? { net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes } } + : { net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes, current } }; +} diff --git a/control/src/index.ts b/control/src/index.ts index ded97cb..d8fc142 100644 --- a/control/src/index.ts +++ b/control/src/index.ts @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ export * from './band'; export * from './capability'; export * from './domain'; export * from './fcc'; +export * from './hardware/router-parsers'; export * from './location'; export * from './ports'; export * from './providers'; From 8ee325e4edb7b06fe137742a06f9342bc4e792af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] feat(providers): typed provider layer, journal, safety and operations engine The impure half, behind ports. Providers: a typed D-Bus ModemManager provider, a NetworkManager desired/applied bearer adapter, evidence-selected Huawei HiLink profiles with readback, firmware-scoped ZTE goform profiles plus the MF79U diagnosis harness, and a read-only UFI provider with explicit Qualcomm prohibition fences. Each one is matched by evidence and conformance-tested against the same fixture corpus, with sanitized transcripts committed so the matrix is reproducible without the rack. Underneath them: provenance-aware normalized observation envelopes, an admission port with cross-process exclusive ownership so two processes cannot drive one modem, a descriptor-gated operations engine that reconciles unknown outcomes rather than guessing, and a path-parameterized journal engine and store so a killed process replays instead of losing the transaction. Radio truth is verbatim: the mode and band a modem reports are surfaced as the modem said them, with signal and SIM evidence normalized around them. Per-repo AGENTS/docs record the resulting behavior. --- AGENTS.md | 560 +++++++++++++- README.md | 58 +- cli/README.md | 2 +- cli/src/cli.ts | 19 +- cli/src/commands/hil-cycle.ts | 8 +- cli/src/hil-cycle.test.ts | 14 +- cli/src/hil-probe.ts | 3 +- .../src}/uhubctl-power-hook.test.ts | 11 +- .../backend => cli/src}/uhubctl-power-hook.ts | 16 +- control/README.md | 200 ++++- control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh | 48 ++ control/src/backend/index.ts | 15 - control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts | 7 +- control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts | 35 + control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts | 29 + control/src/hardware/hilink-protocol.ts | 92 +++ control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts | 24 + control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts | 128 ++-- control/src/index.ts | 5 + control/src/journal/codec.ts | 233 ++++++ control/src/journal/engine.ts | 85 +++ control/src/journal/entry.ts | 131 ++++ control/src/journal/index.ts | 6 + .../src/journal/journal-corruption.test.ts | 195 +++++ .../journal/journal-path-injection.test.ts | 117 +++ control/src/journal/journal-replay.test.ts | 225 ++++++ control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.test.ts | 270 +++++++ control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.ts | 292 ++++++++ control/src/journal/recovery.ts | 172 +++++ control/src/journal/store.ts | 198 +++++ control/src/observations/envelope.ts | 138 ++++ control/src/observations/freshness.ts | 121 +++ control/src/observations/index.ts | 25 + control/src/observations/metric.ts | 123 ++++ control/src/observations/model.ts | 97 +++ .../src/observations/normalization.test.ts | 295 ++++++++ .../observations/observation-states.test.ts | 219 ++++++ control/src/observations/provenance.ts | 141 ++++ control/src/observations/raw.ts | 174 +++++ control/src/observations/reading.ts | 128 ++++ control/src/observations/sim-evidence.test.ts | 271 +++++++ control/src/observations/sources/hilink.ts | 130 ++++ .../src/observations/sources/modemmanager.ts | 345 +++++++++ .../src/observations/sources/router-shared.ts | 92 +++ control/src/observations/sources/ufi.ts | 156 ++++ control/src/observations/sources/zte.ts | 105 +++ .../src/observations/state-separation.test.ts | 118 +++ control/src/observations/state-separation.ts | 142 ++++ control/src/operations/contracts.ts | 80 ++ control/src/operations/index.ts | 1 + .../operation-engine-policy.test.ts | 119 +++ .../operation-engine-reconciliation.test.ts | 148 ++++ control/src/operations/operation-engine.ts | 246 +++++++ control/src/ports/README.md | 6 +- control/src/ports/index.ts | 3 + control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts | 13 +- control/src/ports/mutation-admission.test.ts | 62 ++ control/src/ports/mutation-admission.ts | 44 ++ control/src/ports/resource-ownership.ts | 35 + control/src/ports/uhubctl.test.ts | 15 + control/src/ports/uhubctl.ts | 11 + .../src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts | 362 +++++++++ .../src/providers/conformance-scale.test.ts | 208 ++++++ .../providers/conformance-transcripts.test.ts | 214 ++++++ control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/index.ts | 2 + .../src/providers/huawei-hilink/operations.ts | 89 +++ .../providers/huawei-hilink/provider.test.ts | 193 +++++ .../src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.ts | 114 +++ .../src/providers/huawei-hilink/runtime.ts | 218 ++++++ .../src/providers/huawei-hilink/session.ts | 177 +++++ .../src/providers/huawei-hilink/transport.ts | 17 + control/src/providers/index.ts | 5 + .../modem-manager/capability-truth.test.ts | 459 ++++++++++++ .../modem-manager/error-mapping.test.ts | 25 + control/src/providers/modem-manager/errors.ts | 43 ++ .../forbidden-subprocess.test.ts | 34 + .../modem-manager/generic-operations.ts | 266 +++++++ control/src/providers/modem-manager/index.ts | 3 + ...modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts | 270 +++++++ .../modem-manager/module-operations.ts | 154 ++++ .../src/providers/modem-manager/provider.ts | 232 ++++++ .../src/providers/modem-manager/snapshot.ts | 255 +++++++ control/src/providers/modem-manager/types.ts | 154 ++++ .../src/providers/network-manager/adapter.ts | 455 ++++++++++++ .../src/providers/network-manager/index.ts | 2 + .../network-manager-adapter.test.ts | 689 ++++++++++++++++++ .../src/providers/network-manager/types.ts | 240 ++++++ .../ufi-himi/credential-fence.test.ts | 45 ++ control/src/providers/ufi-himi/index.ts | 6 + .../providers/ufi-himi/no-write-path.test.ts | 129 ++++ control/src/providers/ufi-himi/operations.ts | 113 +++ .../ufi-himi/prohibition-fence.test.ts | 233 ++++++ .../src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibitions.ts | 114 +++ .../src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.test.ts | 214 ++++++ control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.ts | 254 +++++++ .../providers/ufi-himi/qualcomm-evidence.ts | 80 ++ control/src/providers/ufi-himi/session.ts | 119 +++ control/src/providers/ufi-himi/transport.ts | 52 ++ control/src/providers/zte-goform/index.ts | 2 + .../src/providers/zte-goform/provider.test.ts | 206 ++++++ control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.ts | 147 ++++ .../providers/zte-goform/secret-fence.test.ts | 38 + control/src/providers/zte-goform/session.ts | 177 +++++ control/src/providers/zte-goform/transport.ts | 18 + control/src/radio/band-truth.test.ts | 180 +++++ control/src/radio/band-truth.ts | 132 ++++ control/src/radio/index.ts | 11 + control/src/radio/mode-combinations.test.ts | 197 +++++ control/src/radio/mode-combinations.ts | 244 +++++++ control/src/radio/mode-truth.test.ts | 237 ++++++ control/src/radio/mode-truth.ts | 172 +++++ control/src/safety/composition-root.test.ts | 44 ++ control/src/safety/composition-root.ts | 88 +++ .../src/safety/flock-resource-ownership.ts | 174 +++++ control/src/safety/index.ts | 2 + .../resource-ownership.integration.test.ts | 96 +++ control/test-support/README.md | 35 +- control/test-support/conformance/cases.ts | 633 ++++++++++++++++ control/test-support/conformance/corpus.ts | 427 +++++++++++ control/test-support/conformance/exchange.ts | 199 +++++ control/test-support/conformance/index.ts | 90 +++ .../test-support/conformance/matrix-report.ts | 73 ++ .../test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts | 218 ++++++ .../test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts | 167 +++++ control/test-support/fake-mm/handlers.ts | 42 +- control/test-support/fake-mm/index.ts | 4 + control/test-support/fake-mm/object-model.ts | 45 +- control/test-support/fake-mm/service.ts | 58 ++ control/test-support/journal-fixture.ts | 148 ++++ control/test-support/observation-fixtures.ts | 185 +++++ .../test-support/operation-engine-fixture.ts | 102 +++ .../test-support/ownership-root-fixture.ts | 44 ++ docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md | 39 + docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md | 9 + docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md | 55 ++ docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md | 38 + docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md | 43 ++ docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md | 113 +++ 138 files changed, 17834 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-) rename {control/src/backend => cli/src}/uhubctl-power-hook.test.ts (97%) rename {control/src/backend => cli/src}/uhubctl-power-hook.ts (98%) create mode 100755 control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh create mode 100644 control/src/hardware/hilink-protocol.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/codec.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/engine.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/entry.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/journal-corruption.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/journal-path-injection.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/journal-replay.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/recovery.ts create mode 100644 control/src/journal/store.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/envelope.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/freshness.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/metric.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/model.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/normalization.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/observation-states.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/provenance.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/raw.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/reading.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/sim-evidence.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/sources/hilink.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/sources/modemmanager.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/sources/router-shared.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/sources/ufi.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/sources/zte.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/state-separation.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/observations/state-separation.ts create mode 100644 control/src/operations/contracts.ts create mode 100644 control/src/operations/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/operations/operation-engine-policy.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/operations/operation-engine-reconciliation.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/operations/operation-engine.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/mutation-admission.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/mutation-admission.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/resource-ownership.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/uhubctl.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/ports/uhubctl.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/conformance-scale.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/conformance-transcripts.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/operations.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/runtime.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/session.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/transport.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/capability-truth.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/error-mapping.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/errors.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/forbidden-subprocess.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/generic-operations.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/module-operations.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/provider.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/snapshot.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/modem-manager/types.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/network-manager/adapter.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/network-manager/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/network-manager/network-manager-adapter.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/network-manager/types.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/credential-fence.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/no-write-path.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/operations.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibition-fence.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibitions.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/qualcomm-evidence.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/session.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/ufi-himi/transport.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/zte-goform/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/zte-goform/secret-fence.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/zte-goform/session.ts create mode 100644 control/src/providers/zte-goform/transport.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/band-truth.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/band-truth.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/mode-combinations.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/mode-combinations.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/mode-truth.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/radio/mode-truth.ts create mode 100644 control/src/safety/composition-root.test.ts create mode 100644 control/src/safety/composition-root.ts create mode 100644 control/src/safety/flock-resource-ownership.ts create mode 100644 control/src/safety/index.ts create mode 100644 control/src/safety/resource-ownership.integration.test.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/cases.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/corpus.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/exchange.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/index.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/matrix-report.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/journal-fixture.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/observation-fixtures.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/operation-engine-fixture.ts create mode 100644 control/test-support/ownership-root-fixture.ts create mode 100644 docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md create mode 100644 docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md create mode 100644 docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md create mode 100644 docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index fe82a29..e6c8fcb 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Canonical branch: `main`. Sole remote: `origin` → `https://github.com/CERALIVE | Directory | Artifact | Role | |-----------|----------|------| -| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (see § below), USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection**, and the **band-lock** vocabulary + certification catalog (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive` as **built ESM + `.d.ts`** across seven entry points (see § PUBLISHED PACKAGE SURFACE). | +| `control/` | `@ceralive/modem-control` (npm) | TypeScript control library — domain model, ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, injected admission/ownership/USB-hub ports, USB composition-mode model + evidence-bundle **ingestion seam**, data-usage sampler + the **usage-policy write surface**, capability-module **support-claim taxonomy + detection**, and the **band-lock** vocabulary + certification catalog (see §§ below). Published to public npm under `@ceralive` as **built ESM + `.d.ts`** across seven entry points (see § PUBLISHED PACKAGE SURFACE). | | `cli/` | `modem-control` (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`/`watch`/`apply`/`set-usb-mode`/`usage`/`certify`/`hil-cycle`, compiled `arm64`+`amd64`, run against real modems. Not published to npm. | | `packaging/` | ModemManager stack `.deb`s **+ the first-party companion** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — packaging only, zero source patches (see `POLICY.md`) — PLUS `ceralive-modem-support`, the `Architecture: all` first-party companion that owns CeraLive's generic modem system assets so those four never absorb one. | @@ -128,6 +128,41 @@ frozen v1.1 domain contracts. The public contract and scoring details are docume This layer registers no concrete provider. Huawei, ZTE, UFI/HIMI and other implementations remain separate evidence-backed work. +### CONFORMANCE MATRIX — ALL FOUR PROVIDERS REGISTERED AT ONCE + +`control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts` is where todo 5's matcher meets every real +provider simultaneously. Each provider suite runs with only itself in the registry, which cannot +answer whether a Huawei dongle stays a Huawei dongle while a ZTE provider and a UFI provider are +also asking. **20 cases** — 9 fleet profiles + 11 safety cases (ambiguous collision, +cross-profile refusal, 3 malformed, auth-expired, lockout-unknown, 2 unknown-firmware, +wrong-interface, wrong-transport) — each registering all four providers, expecting the EXACT +decision. Full behaviour: [`docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md`](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md) § +"The conformance matrix". + +- **The corpus is repo-local and unpublished** (`control/test-support/conformance/`) and REUSES + `observation-fixtures.ts` rather than minting a second payload set that can drift from it. + Sanitization is structural, not a review promise: a 14+ digit run anywhere in the corpus or in + any recorded request FAILS the suite unless it is a declared member of + `SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS`, and the detector has a non-vacuity control. +- **`conformance-transcripts.test.ts` asserts the exact wire** per firmware — method, path, + query, form/JSON/XML body, the header ARRAY in order, and the cookie — rebuilt from the + protocol, never read back from the provider. A whole-array `toEqual` pins the request COUNT + too, so an extra login or a stray probe fails even when the decision is unchanged. +- **`conformance-scale.test.ts` is a SOFTWARE UPPER BOUND at 16 concurrently attached modems.** + It is a FIXTURE result: subscriptions stay fleet-wide (4, never per-modem), `Signal.Setup` is + issued once per (epoch, modem) and re-applied to every survivor on a new epoch, an attachment + burst is coalesced, and sixteen concurrent matches each answer about their own modem. **The + hardware-verified figure remains the 8-device bench fleet** — 16 must never be reported as a + bench measurement; a hardware claim comes from todo 42, on a real board. +- **`test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts` is an in-memory `DbusTransport`** serving the SAME + `fake-mm/object-model.ts` tree, so MM rows run without `dbus-run-session`. `fake-mm/service.ts` + stays the right harness for codec/epoch proof on a real bus; a matrix whose MM rows SKIP where + no session bus exists answers nothing, which is why the matrix uses this one. +- **The UFI fingerprint probe is fenced by USB evidence** (`usbEvidencePermitsProbe`) — this + matrix is what found it. The HIMI fingerprint needs a session, so an unfenced probe spent the + provider's single bounded login against every non-HIMI device in the registry. An ABSENT usb + fact is still probed; a MISMATCHING one is not. + ## PUBLISHED PACKAGE SURFACE — BUILT ESM, SEVEN SUBPATHS, NO SERVICE `@ceralive/modem-control` publishes **built output**: `files: ["dist"]`, and every @@ -214,33 +249,142 @@ arch-dependent stanzas + enumerated `-dbgsym`) for exact per-source set **equali `packaging/ci/check-package-sets.sh` (add/remove/rename fails closed). Full detail: `packaging/README.md`. -## RECOVERY LADDER — uhubctl POWER HOOK (rung 4) - -`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts` (`createUhubctlPowerHook`) is the first real -`PowerHook` implementation: the `usb-hub-port-cycle` capability backing recovery-ladder -rung 4. It cuts VBUS on one port of a per-port-power-switching (PPPS) USB hub via `uhubctl` -and reports `applied` only once the SAME modem (by udev `ID_PATH`) is observed back on the -bus — a zero exit from `uhubctl` is never treated as success on its own. - -- **Config-mapped, never discovered.** A stable key is cyclable only if an operator wrote - it into an explicit, Zod-validated port-map file: `{ [stableKey]: { hubLocation: string, - port: number } }`. There is no default path and no probing/guessing — `hubLocation` is - regex-pinned to the sysfs bus-port shape so a shell-metacharacter or flag cannot parse - into it. -- **Argv-only, allowlisted, no shell.** The command is built as an argv array - (`['-l', loc, '-p', port, '-a', 'cycle', '-d', '3']`) and every emitted token is - re-checked against an allowlist before the injected runner is called. -- **Bounded + cancellable** (`commandTimeoutMs` + `enumerationTimeoutMs`, plus an optional - `AbortSignal`); **serialised per modem** through the shared `ModemActor`, keyed on the - stable key, so two overlapping cycles on one port cannot interleave power-on/power-off. -- **Disabled by default**, matching the existing recovery-ladder default - (`RECOVERY_DISABLED: { enabled: false }` in `control/src/domain/policy.ts`) — this hook - does not change that default; it is only reachable when an operator opts in. -- The HIL harness (`cli hil-cycle --hub-map `, bench runbook - [`docs/BENCH.md` RB-10](docs/BENCH.md)) orchestrates a full cycle end-to-end: pre-state - capture → PowerHook cycle → USB-disappearance assertion → re-enumeration assertion → MM - re-detection of the same `modem.generic.device` slot UID. See `cli/README.md` for the - exact CLI contract and typed failure reasons. +## MUTATION ADMISSION + EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP + +`control/src/ports/mutation-admission.ts` defines `MutationAdmissionPort`. It is an injected +authority only: the package submits an operation id, physical modem id, mutation impact and +the descriptor's frozen `admission` requirement, then preserves the port's typed decision. +It contains no stream state or stream policy. A required admission with no injected port is +`{ status: 'refused', reason: 'admission-port-missing' }`, never an allow-all fallback. + +`control/src/ports/resource-ownership.ts` defines the acquire-or-refuse +`ResourceOwnershipPort` used for file stores, router sessions and USB-hub access. The Linux +default adapter is `createFlockResourceOwnershipPort()` in `control/src/safety/`: it requires +an injected path, uses non-blocking `flock`, records the actual holder PID and start time, +and relies on kernel lock lifetime plus PID liveness to recover after holder death. The +conventional caller-selected path is `DEFAULT_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH`; the adapter itself +has no hidden path and there is no no-op ownership implementation. + +`createModemControlCompositionRoot()` fails if an ownership port is absent and throws +`CompositionRootAlreadyExistsError` for a second live root in the same process. Within one +root, `actorFor(PhysicalModemId)` returns the same `ModemActor` to every caller for that +physical modem. `ModemManagerInhibitPort` is the narrow MM inhibit/uninhibit contract used by +maintenance transactions. `UhubctlPort` is port-only in the control package: v1.1 ships no +provider, runner, argv builder or concrete `uhubctl` call. The bench CLI owns its existing +HIL-only adapter and acquires the same exclusive lock before using it. + +## DESCRIPTOR-GATED OPERATION ENGINE + +`control/src/operations/operation-engine.ts` executes the frozen `OperationDescriptor` and +`OperationResult` contracts. It takes a `ModemControlCompositionRoot`, so every mutation uses +todo 19's shared actor for its `PhysicalModemId`; live preconditions and admission are checked +inside that actor immediately before execution, never cached before queueing. Reads bypass the +write queue and only failed `idempotent-read` descriptors receive one automatic retry. + +The behavioral uncertainty fence is a per-engine `Set`. A stale-generation +completion or timed-out/dropped write classifies `unknown-outcome` and inserts the modem into +that set. Every later mutation checks the set before calling admission or provider code and is +refused `reconciliation-required`. `OperationEngine.reconcile()` runs on the same actor and +removes the modem only after a successful reconciliation whose generation stayed current. +Required readback, rollback and journal hooks are checked before execution; rollback runs only +after a definite failure/readback mismatch, never after an unknown outcome. Public hook and +reconciliation types are in `control/src/operations/contracts.ts`; the module is exported through +the existing package root and adds no package subpath. + +## TRANSACTION JOURNAL — PATH-PARAMETERIZED, APPEND-ONLY, NEVER SELF-TRUNCATING + +`control/src/journal/` is the durable half of the uncertainty fence above. The operation +engine keeps "which modems need reconciling" in a `Set` on the engine +instance, so a process death drops it and the next mutation proceeds as if nothing were +outstanding. The journal writes the same two facts down. It is exported through the +existing package ROOT entry and adds **no** package subpath (todo 17/18 precedent). + +**THE PATH IS INJECTED AND HAS NO DEFAULT — this package never names `/data`.** +`createFileJournalStore({ path })` REQUIRES the path and substitutes nothing; an empty +path throws `JournalPathError` rather than falling back. Same shape and same reason as +todo 19's `FlockResourceOwnershipOptions.lockPath`: an embedding process owns its +filesystem layout, and a library that guesses one writes to the wrong disk on a device it +has never seen. `journal-path-injection.test.ts` scans this directory's shipped source — +**comments stripped** — for absolute path literals and for `/data` / CeraUI-specific +location tokens, and fails the build on either. Prose naming a path stays legal (the +compat reader has to be able to explain the shape it reads); executable code producing one +does not. The strip is proven non-vacuous both ways. + +**Three durability properties, each pinned by a test that goes red when removed:** + +- **Append-only.** There is no verb that rewrites or truncates. A rewrite is the one + operation that can lose an already-durable fact, and a journal that can lose a fact + answers nothing after a crash. +- **A damaged record never discards its neighbours.** `read()` decodes every line + independently and returns the survivors ALONGSIDE a typed `JournalDamageRecord[]`. + Stopping at the first bad line — what a `for` loop with a throw does naturally — + silently truncates the journal to its first corruption. Breaking this reddens 9 tests. +- **A torn trailing line is closed before the next append.** A process killed mid-write + leaves a final line with no terminator; appending straight onto it would glue the new + entry to the garbage and corrupt a SECOND record that was never in flight. The store + probes the last byte once and emits a leading terminator when needed, so damage stays + confined to the record that actually tore. The damaged bytes are PRESERVED, never + rewritten away (the `fcc/policy-store.ts` fail-safe stance, not the usage store's + rewrite-fresh one). + +**The typed recovery error is `JournalRecoveryError`, raised by `assertJournalIntact`, and +it is deliberately NOT raised by `recover()`.** Recovery must be able to hand back the +survivors even when part of the file is unreadable, so the decision to refuse to proceed +belongs to the caller — after it has seen what did survive. + +**Four dispositions, and only two of them mean "reconcile".** `pending` (a start with no +completion) and `unknown-outcome` (the engine's own classification) both populate +`reconciliationRequired`; `resolved` is a definite ending; `blocked` is a terminal state a +human must clear. `blocked` exists for the compat reader below — folding CeraUI's +`failed`/quarantine states into `resolved` would report an operator-blocked device as +healthy, and folding them into `unknown-outcome` would claim doubt about a known outcome. + +**Neither the operation's INPUT nor its RETURNED VALUE is ever written to disk.** An input +is routinely a PIN, a PUK, or a USSD command carrying a voucher code; a returned value is +routinely a message body or a location fix — every one of them a class `redact.ts` masks +elsewhere. The journal records THAT an operation ran and HOW it ended, never what was sent +or read, and a test greps the written file for both. A caller needing a rollback payload +owns persisting it under its own redaction decision. + +### CeraUI compatibility — a READER, because the two shapes genuinely differ + +`journal/legacy-ceraui.ts` reads the mutation journal CeraUI already writes. The shapes are +not interchangeable and neither is being re-labelled: this package's journal is an +append-only EVENT LOG in one file, CeraUI's is a directory of per-modem LATEST-STATE +snapshot documents, rewritten whole on every transition. The bridge decodes CeraUI's shape +into the SAME `JournalOperationRecord` model, so a consumer enumerates pending and +unknown-outcome work across both **without CeraUI having to change its file format first**. + +- **Nothing here writes.** No rewrite, no repair, no in-place migration, no delete. + CeraUI's own reader leaves an unreadable slot on disk deliberately; a second reader that + tidied up behind it would destroy evidence CeraUI kept on purpose. +- **The directory is injected**, exactly like the native store's path. +- **`armed` maps to `pending`, `executing` maps to `unknown-outcome`.** They are different + facts: `armed` says the pre-state was captured and the write never dispatched, so the + device is untouched; `executing` says it WAS dispatched and no terminal state was + recorded — precisely this package's unknown outcome. Collapsing them either invents + certainty about a dispatched write or manufactures doubt about one that never left. +- **A legacy `unknown-outcome` record carries NO outcome reason.** `JournalOutcome`'s + unknown union is the frozen domain vocabulary and CeraUI's `executing` asserts none of + its three members. The disposition carries the fact; the reason stays unclaimed. +- **`kind` is validated as a non-empty string, NOT against a frozen enum.** CeraUI spreads + its capability-module mutation kinds into the runtime enum, so the vocabulary grows on + CeraUI's release cycle — a frozen copy here would reject a valid file the day a module is + added, and a compatibility reader that fails closed on new-but-valid input is worse than + none. +- **`JournalOperationRecord.physicalModemId` is TEXT, and `origin` says which vocabulary it + holds.** A legacy record carries CeraUI's `stableKey`, which `physicalModemId()` REFUSES + by construction; coercing it would either throw on a valid legacy file or launder a + foreign identity into a branded type that promises the serial/ID_PATH ladder. +- `legacyMutationSlotName(stableKey)` mirrors CeraUI's `.json` slot naming so a + consumer can address one modem without scanning. **Rule-D MIRROR, never a shared + import** — the same relationship the support-claim ladder and the redaction key sets + already have with their CeraUI twins. + +Coverage: `journal/journal-replay.test.ts` (write N, drop the engine with no shutdown, +reconstruct from disk, assert the pending/unknown enumeration), `journal-corruption.test.ts` +(trailing, mid-file, torn, wrong-version and missing-field damage), `legacy-ceraui.test.ts`, +and `journal-path-injection.test.ts`. Fixtures: `control/test-support/journal-fixture.ts`. ## DATA-USAGE POLICY — A LOCAL WRITE, BECAUSE MODEMMANAGER HAS NO SUCH API @@ -448,6 +592,199 @@ values, or already-normalized records and return deterministic values only. They udev, invoke ModemManager, persist state, or alter CeraUI; CeraUI keeps its local adapters and copies until the explicit consumer cutover. +## OBSERVATIONS — NORMALIZATION THAT NARROWS WITHOUT DISCARDING + +`control/src/observations/` sits directly on top of the parsers above and turns a raw +per-vendor payload into ONE `ObservationEnvelope`. It decodes +nothing itself — every value comes from `domain/mm-enums.ts`, +`domain/modem-presentation.ts` or `hardware/router-parsers.ts` — and adds exactly two +things those pure functions cannot carry: **where a value came from**, and **why a value +is missing**. It opens no transport; a provider performs the read, this layer explains the +result. Reachable through the package ROOT entry, deliberately not through a new subpath. + +**FOUR STATES, NOT A VALUE PLUS A FLAG.** `readMetric` answers `fresh` | `stale` | +`unavailable` | `unknown`, and they differ in SHAPE rather than only in label: +`unavailable` and `unknown` carry no `value` field at all, and `unavailable` carries no +metric provenance because no metric was produced. So no consumer can read a value off a +state that has none. + +- **`stale` KEEPS the value.** An aged reading is the last thing the device actually said; + discarding it leaves an operator unable to tell "we lost contact" from "the modem reports + nothing". +- **`unavailable` is terminal on re-evaluation and never becomes `stale`.** It carries no + value, so there is nothing to age — re-classifying it would have to invent one. +- **Staleness is MONOTONIC.** `evaluateFreshness` returns an already-stale envelope + unchanged, so its `since`/`reason` record the FIRST cause. Freshness comes from a new + read, never from re-evaluating an old one. Trigger precedence when several apply: + superseded generation → superseded source epoch → degraded source → TTL expiry; the first + three state that reality overtook the reading, TTL expiry only says nobody looked. +- **A TTL expiry's `since` is `observedAt + ttlMs`, not the evaluation time** — otherwise a + reading that expired an hour ago looks like it just went stale. + +**`unknown` IS NEVER COERCED TO `unsupported`, and the reason class is what enforces it.** +`metricUnknownClass` splits `MetricUnknownReason` into `capability` (only `unsupported` — a +durable claim about the SOURCE) and `read` (`not-reported`, `not-observed`, `malformed`, +`auth-expired`, `refused`, `unreachable` — claims about ONE attempt). A consumer decides +whether to HIDE a control or show it pending by branching on that class, never on the bare +fact that a value is absent. The three distinctions this buys, all pinned by tests: + +| Situation | Reason | Class | +|---|---|---| +| ModemManager exposes no bar scale, only a percentage | `unsupported` | capability | +| The `Sim` interface was never read | `not-observed` | read | +| `Modem.State` was absent from the payload | `not-reported` | read | +| `Sim.EsimStatus` was present but decoded to nothing | `malformed` | read | +| The HiLink session answered `125002` | `auth-expired` | read | + +`metricUnknownReasonFromRouter` is a WIDENING, never a re-classification — every +`RouterSignalUnknownReason` member keeps its exact meaning. + +**A PAYLOAD THAT ARRIVED IS AN OBSERVATION, however little of it could be read.** A refused +HiLink session and an unparseable goform body both produce a FRESH envelope whose metrics +are `unknown` with a reason — not an `unavailable` one. That is not taxonomy for its own +sake: `ObservationEnvelope` pairs `unavailable` with `value: null`, so emitting it for a +payload we did hold would throw the diagnostics block away, and the raw vendor fields with +it. `unavailableObservation` is reserved for the case where there is no payload at all. + +**NOTHING IS DROPPED — retention is structural, not a discipline.** Every normalizer builds +ONE flat `RawFieldRecord` keyed `.` and reads its metrics out +of that same record, so a field a metric consumed is necessarily a field the diagnostics +block already carries. `createObservationDiagnostics` DERIVES `unmapped` (raw keys minus +consumed) rather than accepting it, so a field no metric names lands there automatically +instead of vanishing. A repeated XML tag is kept as `Tag`, `Tag#2`, `Tag#3`; a nested JSON +object keeps its JSON text; `Modem.SimSlots`-style arrays stay arrays. + +**`ObservationDiagnostics.raw` is a REDACTION-CLASS boundary.** The UFI overview endpoint +returns an IMSI and an ICCID, and they ARE retained — normalization does not get to decide +what a diagnostician may need. Anything that logs, serializes or files a diagnostics block +must route it through `redactObservationDiagnostics`, which runs the package's own key-based +`redact`, so the classes masked here are the classes masked everywhere else. Retention and +disclosure are separate decisions; this layer only guarantees the first. Note the recorded +`B5` finding still applies: the shared redactor does not mask `imei` / +`equipment-identifier`, so a caller that puts `Modem.EquipmentIdentifier` in a raw record +owns that exposure. + +**PER-METRIC PROVENANCE, INCLUDING PER-METRIC AUTHORITY.** One normalized observation folds +several provider reads together — HiLink answers `monitoring_status` and `device_signal` +separately, UFI answers three endpoints — so a single envelope-level `observedAt` would be a +claim about a reading no individual metric came from. Authority is per-metric for the same +reason a payload can mix classes: a router's RSRP is a measurement the modem reported and is +`authoritative`, while its bar count is a vendor rendering of that measurement and is +`derived`. This layer has no clock: `observedAt` and `sourceEpoch` are supplied by whoever +performed the read, so a normalizer cannot stamp a payload with a time it did not come from. + +**SIM PRESENCE IS BINARY, and that is the point.** `deriveSimPresence` answers +`present | absent | unknown`; the third member is not a presence, it is the absence of an +answer, so it becomes the metric's `unknown` state with a reason. That is what stops "we +could not tell" from rendering beside "there is no SIM". For the three ROUTER sources SIM +presence is deliberately NOT claimed at all — each vendor reports its own presence code +(`SimStatus`, `simcard_state`, `simstate`) with vendor semantics and no migrated decoder +covers them, so the code stays verbatim in the diagnostics block for the per-vendor +providers to claim later with evidence. Guessing one would be exactly the invented reading +this layer exists to prevent. + +**DESIRED, APPLIED AND OBSERVED ARE THREE THINGS AND STAY THREE THINGS.** +`state-separation.ts` follows NetworkManager's own split: a connection PROFILE is what an +operator asked for, an active connection's BEARER is what was put into force, and the +device's reported state is what the hardware is doing. All three are routinely different at +once, and a merged "current state" blob has to pick one and lose the other two — which makes +"did our write take effect", "is this the network's doing or ours" and "what do we roll back +TO" unanswerable. `ModemStateView` therefore has exactly three slots with three `kind` +discriminants and NO fourth merged field (an effective value is a rendering decision, and +computing one here would bake a policy every consumer would work around). +`describeStateDivergence` returns TWO independent comparisons — `desiredVsApplied` ("did our +write happen") and `appliedVsObserved` ("did it stick") — because one boolean cannot separate +a request that was never carried out from one the network undid a second later, and those +need opposite responses. An unavailable observation compares `indeterminate`, never +`aligned`: "we could not read it" is not evidence that it matches. + +Coverage: `control/src/observations/{observation-states,normalization,state-separation}.test.ts` +against the canonical per-source fixtures in `control/test-support/observation-fixtures.ts` +(ModemManager, HiLink, ZTE goform, UFI/HIMI, plus the auth-expired and unparseable variants). +Each fixture deliberately carries vendor-specific fields the normalized model has no slot for +— `Modem.Ports`, `CurrentNetworkTypeEx`, `wan_lte_ca`, `cputemp` — and the round-trip +assertions are what prove those survive. Later provider work should reuse those fixtures +rather than re-invent them. + +## MODEMMANAGER PROVIDER — TYPED D-BUS, RUNTIME-DISCOVERED GENERIC CONTROLS + +`control/src/providers/modem-manager/` is the concrete `ProviderDefinition` for +`org.freedesktop.ModemManager1`. It composes the existing typed transport and adapters; it does +not introduce a second D-Bus stack. `ObjectManager.GetManagedObjects` supplies normalized +snapshots, while the existing epoch-scoped `MmDbusObserver` supplies signal-driven lifecycle +events and retains rows across daemon loss. A new or unknown model is selected by the live +`Modem` interface and receives mode, signal, SIM, and power reads from the properties it exports. +No model catalog participates in those generic reads. + +The provider reuses `MmDbusBackend`/`MmMutations`, `MmLocation` plus the bounded +`location/fix-state.ts` machine, `createDbusSmsPort`, `MmUssd`, the band codec/certification split, +and FCC coverage. Band reads are generic; band writes remain refused until the embedding process +supplies a `bandSku` resolving to a catalog entry (see § RADIO CAPABILITY TRUTH). Its `modes` +operation surfaces the modem's own `(allowed, preferred)` catalog verbatim. `Location.Setup` still sends `signal_location=false`, SMS remains +read-only, and FCC remains policy/catalog-only. One shared `ModemActor` serializes every composed +adapter for a modem. The provider has no bearer/APN method; NetworkManager remains sole owner. + +`errors.ts` maps typed daemon/transport failures to stable refusal reasons (`unauthorized`, +`unsupported`, `wrong-state`, `busy`, `not-found`, `timed-out`, `disconnected`, `failed`). +`forbidden-subprocess.test.ts` scans every production file in this provider and proves no path can +spawn `mmcli`, `qmicli`, or `mbimcli`; its detector has a non-vacuity control for all three names. +Private-session-bus coverage is `modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts`. Operation-by-operation +detail (which reads are generic, which writes stay refused, and the exact refusal vocabulary) lives in +[`docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md`](docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md). + +## NETWORKMANAGER ADAPTER — SAVED vs APPLIED, AND NOTHING ELSE + +`control/src/providers/network-manager/` is the thin `NetworkManagerAdapter`: desired +connection profiles, the applied bearer, and the interface that bearer landed on. It is the +**only bearer/APN authority surface in the package**, and it is deliberately narrow — no +radio, band, SIM or power operation appears in it, because those belong to the ModemManager +provider and a second expression of them would make two writers for one resource. It is +exported through the existing `./providers` and root entries; **no eighth package subpath**. + +It COMPOSES rather than replaces the existing NM work: `NmcliNmPort` +(`control/src/backend/nmcli-nm-port.ts` — nine-field GSM write parity, device-exact +activation, atomic Auto-APN transitions, quiesce leases) is unchanged and remains the +`NetworkManagerPort` implementation this adapter is constructed with. + +Six decisions are load-bearing, each pinned by a test that goes red when removed: + +- **Observed state never writes the desired slot.** `observe()` may clear `applied` and + always rewrites `observed`; it touches `desired` on no path. Reality overtaking a write + does not un-ask the operator's question — and if it did, a re-enumeration would erase the + configuration the controller exists to restore. +- **Desired records the REQUEST; applied records NM's READBACK.** Seeding desired from the + readback would make a field NM silently rewrote (`gsm.auto-config` driving the APN is the + real case) structurally unreportable, and asserting applied from the input would make a + silently-rejected write look like it took. +- **`unbound` is a VALUE, not an unavailable observation.** "The device is here and idle" is + a definite divergence from a desired bearer; "the device is gone" is not knowledge at all. + An unavailable observation compares `indeterminate` against everything, which is right for + the second and wrong for the first, so a present-but-idle device produces a FRESH envelope + carrying `unbound` and only a MISSING device produces `unavailable` / `device-absent`. +- **A readout is an ENUMERATION, never a delta.** A device absent from `NmObservationInput.devices` + is GONE. That is the only shape in which re-enumeration is detectable without depending on a + removal event nobody guarantees will arrive. +- **A transitional device state is `pending`, not a loss.** A device in `prepare`/`ip-config` + carrying our connection is coming UP; reporting that as a lost bearer would turn every + ordinary activation into a false alarm. Loss is reported only for the four states that + positively contradict the applied bearer: `interface-absent`, `interface-detached`, + `connection-replaced`, `activation-failed` — and the loss retains `previous`, because the + applied slot has just been cleared precisely because it no longer describes reality. +- **The adapter owns no identity and no credential.** Every slot is keyed by NM's own + connection UUID, never a `PhysicalModemId`, so this can never become a second authority on + which physical modem is which. `NmBearerBinding` also omits `username`/`password`: a state + slot is compared and surfaced in divergence output, and `gsm.password` is the one profile + field redaction masks everywhere else. There is likewise **no delete path** — profile + removal is not in the port-tagged `NmOp` set, so the adapter cannot express it. + +A superseded-generation readout is REFUSED rather than folded late, so a reply about a +previous enumeration cannot clear applied state belonging to the current one. Divergence is +reported through todo 18's `describeStateDivergence` — two independent comparisons, never one +verdict. Coverage is `network-manager-adapter.test.ts`, driven by the stateful `nmcli` +harness in `control/test-support/fake-nm/` (real readback, no bus, no subprocess); its scope +gate scans the module's comment-stripped source for radio/SIM/delete/identity identifiers and +proves the strip non-vacuous in both directions. + ## SMS — LIST / READ AND OBSERVATION, PERMANENTLY `control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` are the read-only SMS surface: @@ -624,6 +961,107 @@ exactly like `usb-mode/certified-catalog.json`. reason `setRadioModes` does: it re-registers the radio, so NM must stand down before the bearer drops underneath it rather than after. +## RADIO CAPABILITY TRUTH — THE MODEM'S OWN CATALOG, UNEDITED + +`control/src/radio/` is the layer that carries ModemManager's `SupportedModes` / +`CurrentModes` / `SupportedBands` answers to a consumer **without editing them**, and +turns them into operation descriptors. Reachable through the package ROOT entry; +**no eighth subpath** (the todo 17/18/23 precedent). It sits BESIDE `src/band/` rather +than inside it — a mode change is disruptive-but-reversible, a band lock can strand a +radio where nothing registers, and the two safety models must not be merged. + +- **`preferred: 0` is `none`, and `none` is a VALUE.** The bench FM350-GL advertises + exactly one combination whose preferred mask is 0: the modem allows a set of modes and + states NO preference within it. Substituting "the highest allowed mode" shows an + operator a preference the modem never expressed and cannot be returned to. `none` + therefore survives all the way into `descriptor.constraints.values`, and a test asserts + it is not any of the allowed modes. +- **An unfamiliar mode bit stays OFFERED.** It round-trips as `mode-bit-` (the + `band-` discipline from `band-names.ts`), the combination is classified + `unknown-combination`, and the descriptor stays `available`. Hiding it would coerce + `unknown` into `unsupported`, which is the first rule `support-claim.ts` exists to + enforce. +- **Nothing is dropped, structurally.** `decodeSupportedModeCombinations` puts a member + that is not a `(uu)` into `undecodable`, so `combinations.length + undecodable.length` + is the member count the provider sent. A test asserts that identity rather than the + contents. +- **A selection the modem never advertised is REFUSED, never rounded.** Same rule, same + reason as `five-g-preference.ts`: substituting is how "prefer 4G" on a marginal cell + silently becomes 5G-first. +- **`MmMutations.setModeCombination` exists because `setRadioModes` structurally cannot + express `MM_MODEM_MODE_NONE`** — its preferred mask is derived from + `preferenceOrdered[0]`. Both quiesce; both are one `SetCurrentModes` call. +- **Mode and band writes are readback-gated at the CALL PATH, not only in the + descriptor.** `SetCurrentModes` / `SetCurrentBands` returning without an error only + proves the daemon accepted the call; an accepted-but-ignored write looks like success + from the call site, which is exactly the failure the catalog's own `readback` proof + exists to catch. +- **The band-write gate is `band/certification.ts`, wired — not re-implemented.** + `describeBandWriteCertification` reads `findBandCertification` + `offerableBands` and + nothing else. `buildBandWriteDescriptor` then publishes `mutationImpact: 'disruptive'`, + a `band-certification-present` live precondition, a required readback, and + `availability: refused` / `support.write: false` carrying + `band-certification-required`. Because the shipped catalog is EMPTY, that is the + answer for every device on the fleet today. **The gate is deliberately DOUBLED** — the + descriptor is what a consumer reads to decide whether to offer the control, the + provider's own check is what refuses a call made anyway; a gate that exists in only one + of the two is either advisory or invisible. +- **`ModemManagerProviderOptions.isBandControlCertified` is GONE, replaced by `bandSku` + + `bandCertificationCatalog`.** An injected boolean let a caller assert certification + without a catalog row, which the four-proof `z.literal(true)` schema exists to prevent. + MM's `Modem` interface carries `Model` and `Revision` but no USB `vid:pid`, and + `BandSku` needs all three — so the SKU resolver is injected and, with none supplied, + there is no SKU, no entry, and no band write. Fail-closed in every direction. +- **A band reset readback is satisfied by `any` OR by the whole supported set** (MM + reports either after `SetCurrentBands([ANY])`); a NARROWING lock must match exactly, + because a superset is a different lock from the one that was asked for. + +`ContextWriteOperation` gained `describe(context)` for this: a static descriptor cannot +carry a device's own catalog, so "which combinations does THIS modem advertise" and "is +THIS SKU's band lock certified" are read live instead of inferred from a capability flag. + +Coverage: `control/src/radio/{mode-combinations,mode-truth,band-truth}.test.ts` (pure) and +`control/src/providers/modem-manager/capability-truth.test.ts` (the whole path, over the +in-memory MM transport, with FM350 / Quectel / SIMCom / unknown-combination / no-SIM +specs). + +## SIGNAL AND SIM NORMALIZATION — EVIDENCE, NOT INFERENCE + +The observation layer's SIM and signal halves are finalized on top of todo 18. + +- **`absent` is reachable through exactly ONE evidence kind.** + `readSimPresence` (`hardware/router-parsers.ts`) returns the presence AND the + `SimPresenceEvidence` that decided it; only `state-failed-reason` (mmcli's + `sim-missing`) can produce `absent`. `NormalizedSim.presenceEvidence` and + `ModemManagerSimState.presenceEvidence` carry it, so "there is no SIM" and "we could not + tell" — read off the SAME empty fields — are separable by a consumer and by a test. + ModemManager reports `Sim: '/'` while a modem is initializing and while a slot switch is + in flight, so a blank object path proves nothing and stays `unknown`. +- **`decodeStateFailedReason` is what makes absence readable at all.** + `Modem.StateFailedReason` is a `u` on D-Bus, while the migrated presence rule matches + the mmcli STRING — so before this decoder the D-Bus path could never produce the one + fact that proves absence. Both spellings are accepted; an unrecognized number decodes + to `undefined` and proves nothing. +- **`ModemManagerSimState.present` is POSITIVE evidence only.** `true` means the modem + exports an active SIM object path. `false` is NOT a claim of absence — `presence` is. +- **The router sources still claim no presence, and now say WHICH code they left alone.** + `vendor-code-unclaimed` names HiLink's `SimStatus`, goform's `simcard_state` and HIMI's + `simstate`. The field is NAMED in the evidence but deliberately NOT marked `consumed`, + so it stays in the diagnostics block's `unmapped` set, verbatim, for the per-vendor + provider that will one day decode it with evidence. +- **`Modem.CurrentModes` and `Modem.SignalQuality` are retained as their D-Bus STRUCTS.** + The provider used to flatten `(uu)` and `(ub)` to their first member before handing them + to normalization, which dropped the preferred mode and the measurement-recency flag + before the diagnostics block ever saw them. `rawStructMember` / `rawNumberAt` / + `rawBooleanAt` read either shape, so a pre-existing flattened fixture still decodes. +- **`NormalizedSignal.qualityRecent` claims the `(ub)` boolean.** It is a fact about when + the MODEM last measured, which is a different question from the envelope's staleness + (when WE last read). The router APIs have no such flag and answer `unsupported` — a + capability claim, the `bars` / `maxBars` precedent. + +Coverage: `control/src/observations/sim-evidence.test.ts`, whose control case is a modem +with the identical blank fields and NO failure reason, asserting `unknown`. + ## GPS / LOCATION — A LIVE FIX, AND DELIBERATELY NO HISTORY `control/src/ports/location.ts` + `control/src/location/` + @@ -917,3 +1355,69 @@ baseline, and the runtime the published tarball's consumer fixture asserts on. Any change to this repo's behavior or structure updates this `AGENTS.md`, the relevant `README.md`, and `docs/` in the **same** change. Keep the three-artifact map, the versioning contract, and the no-fork policy authoritative. + +## Huawei HiLink provider (Todo 24) + +`control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/` is the concrete network provider for two exact replay-backed firmware profiles: `e3372h-22.200-password-type-3` and `e3372h-22.333-password-type-4`. The evidence matcher first requires the exact firmware and an unauthenticated `SesTokInfo` document, then makes ONE profile-selected login attempt only after `state-login` confirms that profile's password type. It never tries the neighbouring algorithm. Unknown firmware and profile mismatches receive no operations surface. + +Every HTTP request is interface-bound and redirect-disabled. Credentials, password derivatives, cookies and tokens stay in memory and never enter errors or contract fixtures. Status, signal, network-mode and mobile-data capabilities are probed separately; only mode and mobile-data have writes, and Wi-Fi has no operation at all. Writes serialize per physical modem, acquire the non-queueing `router-session` ownership lease, preflight their own capability, and use a newly authenticated session for exact readback before `applied`. A `125002` or HTTP 401/403 during the write refuses `auth-expired` without another login attempt. Pure XML parsing remains centralized in `hardware/router-parsers` through `hardware/hilink-protocol.ts`. + +## ZTE GOFORM PROVIDER (TODO 25) + +`control/src/providers/zte-goform/` owns two incompatible, exact replay-backed profiles: +`mf79u-legacy` uses `LOGIN` with a base64 password and browser-equivalent Origin/Referer; +`mf266-salted` uses `LOGIN_MULTI_USER`, `LD`, salted SHA-256, `stok`, `RD`, and derived `AD`. +The firmware-selected algorithm receives one bounded attempt and never falls through to the +other profile. Cookies and derivatives are memory-only and sanitized fixtures expose only +redaction markers. Unknown firmware may match the ZTE response shape but receives only the +`zte-unknown-read-only` operation surface. All ZTE operation surfaces are currently read-only; +in particular `wifi.enabled` is absent until a safe write plus readback is captured. + +The bench-only harness `control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh` requires +`MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD` and one redacted browser request-shape manifest. It performs at most +one request and emits only `auth-accepted`, `protocol-mismatch`, `auth-rejection`, or +`lockout-unknown`; see `docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md`. + +## UFI / HIMI PROVIDER (TODO 26) — READ-ONLY, PLUS THE QUALCOMM PROHIBITION FENCES + +`control/src/providers/ufi-himi/` normalizes the Qualcomm UFI/HIMI telemetry the pure +parsers already own (`hardware/router-parsers.ts` → `observations/sources/ufi.ts`) into a +provider that is **read-only by construction, not by policy**. It adds a session and a +transport around those parsers and nothing else. + +**Read-only is structural in three independent places.** HIMI is one endpoint +(`POST /himiapi/json`) with the verb in the body's `cmdid`, so a method restriction would +prove nothing; the command vocabulary is a frozen union instead — seven `get*` reads plus +`login` — and a write command is therefore UNREPRESENTABLE rather than refused. The +operations surface exposes `ProviderReadOperations` entries verbatim (a type with no +`write` member to omit), every descriptor carries +`support.write: {supported:false, reason:'ufi-himi-provider-is-read-only'}`, and a +structural test asserts the only callables reachable from `operations()` are the two +reads and the pure planner. + +**`05c6:9024` is evidence of a COMPOSITION, not a permission** — RNDIS plus an ADB +interface. **`05c6:9091` is a firmware-chosen product id and is NOT proof of DIAG**; only +an interface descriptor (class `ff`, subclass `ff`, protocol `30`) proves a DIAG channel, +which is what `classifyUfiDiagEvidence()` encodes. Production never falls back to ADB, +SSH, telnet or DIAG under any circumstance, and `UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS` is +`prohibited` unconditionally — a descriptor-confirmed channel raises only what a +SUPERVISED BENCH operator may attempt by hand ([`docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md`](docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md)). + +**`prohibitions.ts` is INERT DATA, and the operations it names have no implementation +anywhere** — not a refused stub, not a disabled branch. NV/EFS/identity/calibration +writes, firmware flashing, EDL automation, blind driver/interface retries, DIAG writes, +the DIAG info probe (bench-supervised only) and shell transport fallback each answer a +typed reason. `planUfiOperation` takes no transport parameter and returns synchronously, +so `transportContacted: false` is a provable literal; a spy-transport test asserts ZERO +calls both there and for the same ids driven through the real `OperationEngine`, where +the inert descriptor refuses on three independent fences (read unsupported, write +unsupported, availability refused, plus an empty allowed-value set). +`no-write-path.test.ts` scans the comment-stripped provider source for the constructs a +write path would need — subprocess, raw socket, shell-fallback binary, DIAG device node, +mutating HTTP verb, write-shaped literal — each with a non-vacuity control. + +Login is bounded to ONE attempt per physical modem per generation; a `SessionOut` drops +the cached session and surfaces as an honest `auth-expired` reading rather than a retry +loop. The admin password is EPHEMERAL BENCH INPUT (`UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD`), injected for a +supervised run only, and `credential-fence.test.ts` scans tracked and intended-untracked +files for it plus its base64/SHA-256 derivatives. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a141291..5d20e2f 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ straight from CI artifacts; nothing is published to `apt.ceralive.tv` yet. | Directory | Artifact | What it is | |-----------|----------|------------| -| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: the [frozen v1.1 domain contracts](docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md), [provider registry and evidence-scored matcher](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md), ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, recovery ladder + the `usb-hub-port-cycle` **uhubctl PowerHook** (`control/src/backend/uhubctl-power-hook.ts`, config-mapped port map, disabled by default), USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope as **built ESM + `.d.ts`** across seven entry points — see [`control/README.md`](control/README.md). | +| [`control/`](control/) | **`@ceralive/modem-control`** (npm package) | The TypeScript control library: the [frozen v1.1 domain contracts](docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md), [provider registry and evidence-scored matcher](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md), concrete typed-D-Bus [`ModemManagerProvider`](docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md) (runtime-discovered generic controls; no CLI subprocess), NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, injected mutation-admission and exclusive-ownership ports, USB composition-mode model + the [evidence-bundle ingestion seam](docs/CATALOG-INGESTION.md), data-usage sampler plus its `setUsagePolicy` write surface (`control/src/backend/usage/policy-write.ts` — a local 0600 policy file, because ModemManager exposes no data-usage API at all), and the **read-only SMS port** (`control/src/ports/sms.ts` + `control/src/sms/` — LIST/READ plus `Added`/`Deleted` observation, never a send or a delete, locked by `sms/readonly-gate.test.ts`). The USB-hub actuator is port-only here; the bench CLI owns its HIL adapter. Published to the public npm registry under the `@ceralive` scope as **built ESM + `.d.ts`** across seven entry points — see [`control/README.md`](control/README.md). | | [`cli/`](cli/) | **`modem-control`** (bench CLI) | The iteration surface: `probe`, `watch`, `apply`, `set-usb-mode`, `usage`, `certify`, `hil-cycle`. Compiled for `arm64` + `amd64` and run against real modems on a bench device to mature the package, capture per-SKU certification bundles, and prove hub VBUS port-cycling ([RB-10](docs/BENCH.md#rb-10--hub-vbus-verification-partial)). | | [`packaging/`](packaging/) | **ModemManager stack `.deb`s** | Bookworm rebuilds of ModemManager + libmbim + libqmi + libqrtr-glib — **packaging only, not a fork, zero source patches** (see [`POLICY.md`](POLICY.md)). Provenance-verified upstream pins; installed on the bench from CI artifacts. | @@ -72,3 +72,59 @@ the repo is self-contained (see [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) → Rule D). ## License AGPL-3.0 + +## Huawei HiLink provider (Todo 24) + +`control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/` implements two exact firmware profiles: E3372H `22.200.05.00.1080` with password type 3 and E3372H `22.333.01.00.00` with password type 4. Firmware and `SesTokInfo` evidence select one profile; `state-login` must confirm its password type before one bounded login attempt, and a mismatch never falls through to another algorithm. Requests are interface-bound and redirect-disabled. Mode and data writes are independently capability-gated, acquire `router-session`, serialize by physical modem, and require a newly authenticated readback session before `applied`. Wi-Fi writes are absent. Credentials, derived hashes, cookies, and tokens remain memory-only and never enter errors or contract fixtures. See [`docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md`](docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md). + +## ZTE goform provider (Todo 25) + +`control/src/providers/zte-goform/` keeps MF79U legacy and MF266 salted authentication in +separate evidence-selected profiles with one bounded attempt and an in-memory-only `stok` +session. Unknown ZTE firmware retains read-only telemetry; no ZTE profile exposes a Wi-Fi +write. The executable MF79U one-attempt diagnosis is documented in +[`docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md`](docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md). + +## UFI / HIMI provider (Todo 26) + +`control/src/providers/ufi-himi/` is the Qualcomm UFI/HIMI provider: **read-only by +construction**. The HIMI command vocabulary is a frozen union of seven `get*` reads plus +`login`, so a write command cannot be expressed; `operations()` exposes zero write +descriptors; and the prohibited operations (NV/EFS/identity/calibration writes, firmware +flashing, EDL automation, blind driver/interface retries, DIAG writes, shell transport +fallback) are inert table entries with no implementation anywhere, each answering a typed +refusal before any transport call. `05c6:9024` proves an RNDIS+ADB composition and +`05c6:9091` proves nothing at all — only a DIAG interface descriptor does, and even then +production access stays prohibited. The supervised, read-only, bench-only DIAG info probe +is documented in [`docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md`](docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md). + +## Radio capability truth + SIM evidence (Todo 28) + +`control/src/radio/` carries ModemManager's mode and band answers to a consumer without +editing them. A combination whose preferred mask is 0 reads `preferred: 'none'` — the +bench Fibocom FM350-GL's actual answer — and survives verbatim into the mode-write +descriptor's allowed values; a mode bit this build cannot name round-trips as +`mode-bit-` and stays **offered** rather than being coerced to unsupported; a catalog +member that is not a `(uu)` pair is retained rather than dropped. Mode and band writes are +readback-gated, and a band write additionally carries `mutationImpact: 'disruptive'` plus +the per-SKU certification gate from `control/src/band/` — whose catalog ships empty, so +band writes are refused on every fleet device today. + +On the observation layer, SIM absence is EXPLICIT evidence: `absent` comes only from +ModemManager's own `StateFailedReason: sim-missing`, never from a blank `Sim` object path +(which MM also reports while a modem initializes and while a slot switch is in flight). +`Modem.CurrentModes` and `Modem.SignalQuality` are retained as their D-Bus structs, so the +preferred mode and the measurement-recency flag survive normalization. + +## Provider-matching conformance matrix (Todo 27) + +`control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts` registers all four providers at once and +runs 20 cases — nine fleet profiles (MM-managed Quectel / SIMCom / FM350-on-USB-carrier, both +HiLink firmwares, MF79U, MF266, both UFI USB ids) plus ambiguous-collision, cross-profile +refusal, malformed-response, auth-expired, lockout-unknown, unknown-firmware, wrong-interface +and wrong-transport cases — asserting the exact provider, profile, writability and evidence +score each device is entitled to. A tie between two write-capable providers resolves read-only +with both claimants in the evidence ledger and neither credential spent. Companion suites +assert the exact sanitized per-firmware HTTP transcript and a **software upper-bound fixture at +16 concurrently attached modems** (a fixture result — the hardware-verified fleet size remains +8). See [`docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md`](docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md). diff --git a/cli/README.md b/cli/README.md index 6734da0..b96378a 100644 --- a/cli/README.md +++ b/cli/README.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ to mature the package and (with `certify`) capture per-SKU certification bundles | `certify ` | Captures a redacted, schema-validated certification bundle: `lsusb -v`, `usb-devices`, the slot's udev properties, an `mmcli -K` dump, a redacted `GetManagedObjects`, and a bounded signal window. `--transition ` adds transition evidence (before/after descriptors, the executed AT command, and the port-drop / re-enumeration timeline) shaped to drop straight into an A4.2 catalog entry. Prints `CERTIFY OK: sha256= …` — the sha256 is the value a reviewer records in a catalog entry's `evidenceBundleSha256`. Real captures are marked `synthetic: false`; ICCID / IMSI / EID are masked; a malformed capture exits non-zero with a clear error rather than writing a broken bundle. `--output ` writes the bundle JSON (default stdout). | | `usage` | Prints the data-usage sampler snapshot (per-slot cumulative-cycle bytes; advisory threshold). | | `unlock-pin [slot]` / `unlock-puk [slot]` | Prompts for the PIN / PUK with **terminal echo disabled** (the secret is never printed back) and submits it. | -| `hil-cycle --hub-map ` | The hardware-in-the-loop port-cycle harness (bench runbook **RB-10**). Captures pre-state (the `/sys/bus/usb/devices/*` sweep — there is no `lsusb` on the bench image — plus `mmcli -L`), drives the `usb-hub-port-cycle` PowerHook for the mapped slot, then asserts the modem **left** the USB bus, **came back** at the same udev `ID_PATH` within the deadline, and that ModemManager re-detects the **same** `modem.generic.device` slot UID. Prints `HIL-CYCLE PASS slot= disappeared= reenumerated=`, or `HIL-CYCLE FAIL slot= reason=` with a named reason (`no-vbus-drop`, `reenumeration-timeout`, `mm-slot-mismatch`, `hub-map-slot-unmapped`, …) and a non-zero exit. **A zero exit from `uhubctl` is never the gate** — the modem's disappearance from the bus is. `` is the modem's udev `ID_PATH` (the hub-map key); `--mm-slot ` names the same modem to ModemManager (defaults to ``). Needs `sudo` for `uhubctl`; refuses with zero side effects when the slot is not in the map. | +| `hil-cycle --hub-map ` | The hardware-in-the-loop port-cycle harness (bench runbook **RB-10**). The executable adapter lives in the CLI, not the published control provider set, and first acquires non-blocking exclusive ownership at `/run/ceralive/modem-control.lock`; contention refuses immediately. It captures pre-state (the `/sys/bus/usb/devices/*` sweep — there is no `lsusb` on the bench image — plus `mmcli -L`), drives the mapped port, then asserts the modem **left** the USB bus, **came back** at the same udev `ID_PATH` within the deadline, and that ModemManager re-detects the **same** `modem.generic.device` slot UID. Prints `HIL-CYCLE PASS slot= disappeared= reenumerated=`, or `HIL-CYCLE FAIL slot= reason=` with a named reason and a non-zero exit. **A zero exit from `uhubctl` is never the gate** — the modem's disappearance from the bus is. Needs `sudo` for `uhubctl`; refuses with zero side effects when the slot is not in the map. | ### Global options diff --git a/cli/src/cli.ts b/cli/src/cli.ts index 399ff51..7decc1c 100644 --- a/cli/src/cli.ts +++ b/cli/src/cli.ts @@ -7,12 +7,11 @@ import { parseArgs } from 'node:util'; import { - createUhubctlPowerHook, + createFlockResourceOwnershipPort, createUsbEnumerator, + DEFAULT_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH, MM_USB_MODES, type MmUsbMode, - readUhubctlPortMap, - SpawnUhubctlRunner, } from '@ceralive/modem-control'; import { SpawnCommandRunner } from './certify/command-runner'; import { runApply } from './commands/apply'; @@ -27,6 +26,11 @@ import { createStackContext, type GlobalOptions, type StackContext } from './con import { mmcliSlots, sysfsUsbSweep, usbIdPathPoller } from './hil-probe'; import type { CliIo } from './io'; import { readPolicyFile } from './policy-file'; +import { + createUhubctlPowerHook, + readUhubctlPortMap, + SpawnUhubctlRunner, +} from './uhubctl-power-hook'; import { buildRequestResolver, buildUsageInputs, buildUsbModeTransition } from './wiring'; const HELP = `modem-control — bench CLI for the CeraLive modem stack @@ -162,6 +166,13 @@ export async function runCli(argv: readonly string[], io: CliIo): Promise enumerator.enumerate()); + const ownership = await createFlockResourceOwnershipPort({ + lockPath: DEFAULT_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH, + }).acquire({ resource: 'usb-hub' }); + if (ownership.status === 'refused') { + io.err('hil-cycle: modem control is owned by another process'); + return 1; + } try { return await runHilCycle( io, @@ -182,6 +193,8 @@ export async function runCli(argv: readonly string[], io: CliIo): Promise-[.…]` (e.g. `1-1`, `2-1.4`), or a bare diff --git a/control/README.md b/control/README.md index db3d816..01d33c4 100644 --- a/control/README.md +++ b/control/README.md @@ -40,6 +40,17 @@ and Qualcomm UFI/HIMI signal, detail, and capability reads. They accept response bodies only; HTTP sessions, interface binding, retries, caches, and writes remain consumer-owned. +The root entry also carries the **observation layer** built on those parsers. It turns a raw +per-vendor payload into one `ObservationEnvelope` in which every +metric records which source produced it and when, and in which a missing value carries a +reason that says whether the source *cannot* report it (`unsupported`) or merely *did not* +on this read. `fresh`, `stale`, `unavailable` and `unknown` are four distinct shapes rather +than a value plus a flag: stale keeps its value, unavailable carries none and never ages into +stale, and unknown says which field is missing and why. Nothing the provider sent is +discarded — every provider-native field is retained verbatim in a typed diagnostics block, +with `unmapped` derived rather than declared. Desired, applied and observed state stay in +three separate slots. + The migration surface is broader than response parsing but remains pure: the root and existing `./domain`, `./capabilities`, and `./hardware` entries expose portable physical identity/link-id derivation, modem presentation rules, ModemManager enum decoding, @@ -47,6 +58,179 @@ USB-network classification and labels, capability-module selection, and shadow-b divergence folding. Every helper consumes caller-supplied values or snapshots; none discovers devices, opens a transport, persists state, or performs a modem write. +### Typed ModemManager provider + +`createModemManagerProvider({ transport })` returns the concrete `ModemManagerProvider` and its +provider-registry `definition`. Matching is based on the live ObjectManager tree, not a certified +model allowlist, so unknown future modems retain generic mode, signal, SIM, and power controls when +their runtime interfaces/properties advertise them. Its normalized `observe` result uses the root +observation envelope; its lifecycle `start` / `observe` / `stop` methods reuse the epoch-scoped +signal observer. + +### Huawei HiLink provider + +`createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition()` exposes exact E3372H firmware profiles for password types 3 and +4. Firmware plus `SesTokInfo` evidence chooses one profile, and `state-login` must confirm that +profile's password type before the provider makes its only login attempt. Every request is bound to +the injected network interface with redirects disabled. Mode and mobile-data writes acquire +`router-session`, probe their own capability, and require a new authenticated readback before they +can report `applied`; no Wi-Fi write exists. Credentials and session material remain private to the +provider runtime. See [`../docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md`](../docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md). + +### ZTE goform provider + +`createZteGoformDefinition()` exposes the incompatible `mf79u-legacy` and +`mf266-salted` authentication profiles without fallback between them. MF79U sends one +browser-shaped form login with a base64 password; MF266 performs the `LD` challenge, +salted SHA-256 login, then derives `AD` from version data and `RD`. Session material stays +in memory. Unknown ZTE firmware is fingerprinted into a read-only telemetry profile, and +Wi-Fi writes are absent from every operation surface. See +[`../docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md`](../docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md). + +### UFI / HIMI provider — read-only by construction + +`createUfiHimiDefinition()` normalizes the Qualcomm UFI/HIMI telemetry over the vendor's +single `POST /himiapi/json` endpoint. Because that API puts its verb in the request +body's `cmdid` rather than in the HTTP method, read-only is enforced as a **frozen +command vocabulary** — seven `get*` reads plus `login` — so a write command cannot be +expressed at all. `operations()` returns `ProviderReadOperations` entries verbatim and +exposes zero write descriptors. + +The prohibited Qualcomm operations — NV, EFS, identity and calibration writes, firmware +flashing, EDL automation, blind driver/interface retries, DIAG writes, the DIAG info +probe, and shell transport fallback — are inert table entries with **no implementation +anywhere**. `planUfiOperation()` answers each with a typed reason and takes no transport +parameter, so the refusal provably precedes any device contact; the same ids driven +through `OperationEngine` are refused before execution too. + +`05c6:9024` is evidence of an RNDIS+ADB composition, not a permission. `05c6:9091` is a +firmware-chosen product id and is **not** proof of DIAG — only an interface descriptor is, +and production access stays `prohibited` regardless. The supervised, read-only, bench-only +probe is documented in [`../docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md`](../docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md). + +### NetworkManager adapter — saved vs applied + +`new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port })` is the bearer/APN authority, and the only one. It holds +three separate slots per NM connection: the **desired** profile (what an operator asked for, +recorded from the request), the **applied** bearer (what NM actually put into force, recorded +from NM's readback, together with the interface it landed on), and the **observed** device +state. `observe()` folds one complete NM readout and reports a typed applied-state LOSS — +`interface-absent`, `interface-detached`, `connection-replaced`, or `activation-failed` — while +leaving the desired profile untouched, so a modem that re-enumerates costs you the bearer and +never the configuration. A device still settling is reported `pending` rather than lost, and a +readout from a superseded generation is refused rather than folded late. + +It composes the existing `NmcliNmPort` rather than replacing it, performs no radio, band, SIM +or power operation, keys every slot by NM's connection UUID rather than by a physical modem +identity, mirrors no credential into a state slot, and has no profile-delete path. + +The operation surface composes the existing radio/band backend, GPS location adapter and bounded +fix-state machine, read-only SMS port, USSD session adapter, and FCC coverage catalog. Generic band +reads are always runtime-driven; disruptive band writes additionally require a certification +catalog entry for the device's SKU. It contains no bearer/APN authority and no command-line +fallback. The provider never invokes `mmcli`, `qmicli`, or `mbimcli`—those remain operator +diagnostics only. + +### Radio capability truth — the modem's own catalog, unedited + +The root export also carries the mode/band **capability truth** layer. `SupportedModes` +and `CurrentModes` are decoded without loss: a combination whose preferred mask is 0 +reads `preferred: 'none'` — a value, not a missing field — and reaches +`descriptor.constraints.values` exactly as the modem stated it. A mode bit this build +does not name round-trips as `mode-bit-`, its combination is classified +`unknown-combination`, and it stays **offered**; a catalog member that is not a `(uu)` +pair is retained in `undecodable` rather than dropped, so decoded plus undecodable is +always the member count the modem sent. A selection the modem never advertised is +refused, never rounded to the nearest one. + +`modes` and `bands` are typed write operations with **required readback**: the daemon +accepting `SetCurrentModes` / `SetCurrentBands` only proves the call was accepted, so +the applied value is re-read and compared before either reports success. `bands` +additionally carries `mutationImpact: 'disruptive'`, a `band-certification-present` +live precondition, and an availability that is `refused` with +`band-certification-required` unless the device's SKU resolves to an entry in the +band-lock certification catalog — which ships empty, so that is today's answer for every +device. Supply `bandSku` to `createModemManagerProvider` to resolve one; +ModemManager exposes no USB `vid:pid`, so the package cannot build a `BandSku` alone. + +Both operations expose `describe(context)` alongside their static `descriptor`, because +a static descriptor cannot carry a device's own catalog or its certification state. + +### SIM presence is evidence, never inference + +`readSimPresence` returns the presence together with the `SimPresenceEvidence` that +decided it, and `absent` is reachable through exactly one evidence kind — ModemManager's +own `StateFailedReason: sim-missing`. A blank `Sim` object path proves nothing (MM +reports `/` while a modem initializes and while a slot switch is in flight) and reads +`unknown`. `ModemManagerSimState.present` is positive evidence only: `false` is not a +claim of absence. The Huawei, ZTE and UFI sources still claim no presence at all and now +NAME the vendor code they left undecoded, which stays verbatim in the diagnostics block. + +`Modem.CurrentModes` and `Modem.SignalQuality` are retained as the D-Bus structs they +are, so the preferred mode and the measurement-recency flag survive normalization; +`NormalizedSignal.qualityRecent` claims that flag, and the router sources answer +`unsupported` for it. + +### Mutation safety ports + +The root export includes `MutationAdmissionPort`, `ResourceOwnershipPort`, +`ModemManagerInhibitPort`, and `UhubctlPort`. Admission remains consumer-owned: a required +mutation without an injected admission port is refused as `admission-port-missing`; this +package does not know or infer why the consumer refused it. + +File stores, router sessions, and USB-hub access use acquire-or-refuse exclusive ownership. +`createFlockResourceOwnershipPort({ lockPath })` is the Linux adapter: non-blocking `flock`, +holder PID/start-time metadata, and clean release when the holder process dies. The lock path +is mandatory input; `DEFAULT_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH` is only a conventional value callers +may select. There is no pass-through ownership implementation. + +One `createModemControlCompositionRoot()` may be live per process. A second construction +throws, and `actorFor(physicalModemId)` shares one actor for that modem across all callers in +the root. `UhubctlPort` has no control-package implementation; an embedding process must +inject one and own its executable policy. + +### Descriptor-gated operation engine + +`createOperationEngine()` executes `OperationDescriptor` contracts through that composition +root. Every mutation enters the root's shared physical-modem actor before its live preconditions +and admission are checked. Writes are therefore single-flight per physical modem, and a mutation +that waited in the queue cannot reuse facts checked before it waited. Reads do not occupy the +write queue; the engine retries only a failed read whose descriptor explicitly says +`idempotent-read`, once. + +A stale-generation completion or a timed-out/dropped write reply is classified by the frozen +domain helper as `unknown-outcome`. The engine then closes a per-`PhysicalModemId` mutation gate: +subsequent mutations are refused as `reconciliation-required` without calling the provider. +`engine.reconcile()` uses the same actor and reopens the gate only when reconciliation finishes in +the requested current generation. Required readback, rollback, and journal hooks are checked before +execution and fired according to the descriptor; an unknown outcome is never treated as a definite +failure that is safe to roll back. + +### Transaction journal — the path comes from you + +`createFileJournalStore({ path })` and `createJournalEngine({ store })` are the durable +half of that reconciliation gate. The engine satisfies the operation engine's +`OperationJournalHook`, so it can be handed straight to an `OperationExecution` as its +`journal`, and `engine.recover()` reads the file back after a restart and reports which +operations were still `pending` and which ended `unknown-outcome` — the set a controller +must reconcile before it mutates those modems again. + +**The path is required and this package has no default for it.** Where a journal lives is +a property of the system embedding this library, not of the library, so there is no +fallback location to accidentally write to. An empty path is refused with +`JournalPathError`. + +The store is append-only and never truncates itself. A record it cannot decode is returned +as typed damage alongside every record that *did* decode — including the ones after it — so +a single corrupt line can never take the rest of the journal with it. Call +`assertJournalIntact(recovery)` to escalate that damage to a `JournalRecoveryError` once +you have seen what survived. Neither an operation's input nor its returned value is ever +written to disk. + +`readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir })` reads an older per-modem snapshot journal into the same +recovery model, so a consumer migrating onto this package can enumerate outstanding work +from files written before it existed. It only ever reads. + ### `./testing` is the contract-fakes surface A consumer writing tests against this package needs valid instances of the domain and @@ -69,8 +253,20 @@ const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match(fakeProviderMatchRequ `./testing` is pure data and functions — no bus, no daemon, no process, no filesystem. It is **not** the repository's `test-support/` directory, which holds the heavy internals this package's own tests use (an MM-faithful fake D-Bus service on a private -session bus, a stateful `nmcli` harness). Those are unpublished and are not a reusable -surface. +session bus, a stateful `nmcli` harness, and the provider-matching conformance corpus). +Those are unpublished and are not a reusable surface. + +### Provider-matching conformance matrix + +`src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts` runs 20 cases — nine fleet profiles plus +eleven ambiguity / malformed / auth-expired / lockout / unknown-firmware / +wrong-interface / wrong-transport cases — with the ModemManager, Huawei HiLink, ZTE +goform and UFI/HIMI providers **all registered at once**, asserting the exact provider, +profile, writability and evidence score per case. A companion suite asserts the exact +per-firmware HTTP transcript (method, path, form/JSON/XML body, header order, cookie, +and request count), and a third is a **software upper-bound fixture at 16 concurrently +attached modems** — a fixture result, not a hardware claim; the bench-verified fleet +size remains 8. See [`../docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md`](../docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md). ## Build diff --git a/control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh b/control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..66e4a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +set -euo pipefail + +: "${MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD:?set MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD for this one bench attempt}" +: "${MF79U_REDACTED_CAPTURE:?set MF79U_REDACTED_CAPTURE to one redacted browser request shape}" + +admin_url="${MF79U_ADMIN_URL:-http://192.168.0.1}" +interface_name="${MF79U_INTERFACE:-usb0}" +expected_shape=$'METHOD POST\nPATH /goform/goform_set_cmd_process\nHEADER content-type\nHEADER origin\nHEADER referer\nFORM goformId\nFORM isTest\nFORM password' + +if [[ ! -r "$MF79U_REDACTED_CAPTURE" ]] || [[ "$(<"$MF79U_REDACTED_CAPTURE")" != "$expected_shape" ]]; then + printf '%s\n' 'protocol-mismatch' + exit 2 +fi + +headers_file="$(mktemp)" +chmod 600 "$headers_file" +trap 'rm -f "$headers_file"' EXIT + +encoded_password="$(printf '%s' "$MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD" | base64 | tr -d '\n')" +request_body="goformId=LOGIN&isTest=false&password=$(printf '%s' "$encoded_password" | jq -sRr @uri)" + +response_body="$({ + printf '%s' "$request_body" +} | curl --silent --show-error --max-time 10 --interface "$interface_name" \ + --request POST \ + --header 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' \ + --header "Origin: $admin_url" \ + --header "Referer: $admin_url/index.html" \ + --data-binary @- \ + --dump-header "$headers_file" \ + "$admin_url/goform/goform_set_cmd_process")" + +if [[ "$response_body" == *'"result":"0"'* ]] && grep -Eiq '^set-cookie:[[:space:]]*stok=' "$headers_file"; then + printf '%s\n' 'auth-accepted' + exit 0 +fi +if [[ "$response_body" == *'"result"'* ]]; then + printf '%s\n' 'auth-rejection' + exit 3 +fi +if [[ "$response_body" == *'"LD"'* ]] || [[ "$response_body" == *'LOGIN_MULTI_USER'* ]]; then + printf '%s\n' 'protocol-mismatch' + exit 2 +fi + +printf '%s\n' 'lockout-unknown' +exit 4 diff --git a/control/src/backend/index.ts b/control/src/backend/index.ts index dfc5ee1..c481405 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/index.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/index.ts @@ -228,21 +228,6 @@ export { type UsbModeTransitionOutcome, type UsbModeTransitionRequest, } from './transition-preconditions'; -export { - createUhubctlPowerHook, - parseUhubctlPortMap, - readUhubctlPortMap, - SpawnUhubctlRunner, - type UhubctlPortMap, - type UhubctlPortMapping, - type UhubctlPowerHookDeps, - type UhubctlResult, - type UhubctlRunner, - type UsbEnumerationPoller, - uhubctlCycleArgv, - uhubctlPortMappingSchema, - uhubctlPortMapSchema, -} from './uhubctl-power-hook'; export * from './usage'; export { createUsbEnumerator, diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts index 761fc0b..d9015d5 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-backend.ts @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ import { type SignalCadence, SignalSetupManager } from './signal-setup'; export interface MmDbusBackendOptions { readonly transport: DbusTransport; readonly destination?: string; + readonly actor?: ModemActor; /** NM quiesce hook for disruptive mode/slot changes (A3.3 default: no-op). */ readonly quiesce?: QuiesceHook; /** Signal.Setup reporting interval in seconds. */ @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ export class MmDbusBackend implements ModemManagerPort { this.#transport = options.transport; this.#destination = options.destination ?? MM_BUS_NAME; this.#now = options.now ?? Date.now; - const actor = new ModemActor(options.quiesce); + const actor = options.actor ?? new ModemActor(options.quiesce); this.#signalSetup = new SignalSetupManager({ transport: this.#transport, destination: this.#destination, @@ -108,6 +109,10 @@ export class MmDbusBackend implements ModemManagerPort { return this.#mutations.setRadioModes(modem, preference); } + setModeCombination(modem: ModemRef, allowed: number, preferred: number): Promise { + return this.#mutations.setModeCombination(modem, allowed, preferred); + } + setPrimarySimSlot(modem: ModemRef, slotIndex: number): Promise { return this.#mutations.setPrimarySimSlot(modem, slotIndex); } diff --git a/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts b/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts index 4282280..7da7333 100644 --- a/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts +++ b/control/src/backend/mm-mutations.ts @@ -106,6 +106,41 @@ export class MmMutations { }); } + /** + * `SetCurrentModes` over the RAW `(uu)` masks the modem itself advertised. + * + * `setRadioModes` above speaks the reconciler's vocabulary — an ordered RAT + * preference — and structurally cannot express `MM_MODEM_MODE_NONE`: its preferred + * mask is derived from `preferenceOrdered[0]`, so "allow this set and prefer + * nothing within it" has no spelling. That is the combination the bench FM350-GL + * actually advertises, so a caller selecting an advertised combination verbatim + * needs this entry point. It quiesces for the same reason `setRadioModes` does: a + * mode change re-registers the radio and drops the bearer underneath NM. + * + * An `allowed` mask of 0 is refused — that is not a selection, it is a radio with + * nothing switched on — while a `preferred` mask of 0 is passed through untouched. + */ + setModeCombination(modem: ModemRef, allowed: number, preferred: number): Promise { + if (allowed === 0) { + return Promise.resolve(receipt('radio', 'failed', 'no radio modes were requested')); + } + return this.#actor.runQuiesced({ stableKey: this.#resolveStableKey(modem) }, async () => { + try { + await this.#transport.callMethod({ + destination: this.#destination, + path: modem, + interface: MODEM_IFACE, + member: 'SetCurrentModes', + signature: '(uu)', + args: [[allowed, preferred]], + }); + return receipt('radio', 'applied', 'radio mode combination applied'); + } catch (error) { + return receipt('radio', 'failed', `SetCurrentModes failed: ${describe(error)}`); + } + }); + } + async readBands(modem: ModemRef): Promise { try { const tree = await fetchManagedObjects(this.#transport, this.#destination); diff --git a/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts b/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts index cc83a05..9c33722 100644 --- a/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts +++ b/control/src/domain/mm-enums.ts @@ -62,6 +62,35 @@ export function decodeRegistrationState(state: number | undefined): string { return state === 11 ? 'emergency-only' : 'unknown'; } +/** + * `MMModemStateFailedReason` → its mmcli spelling. + * + * This decoder is what makes "there is no SIM" an EXPLICIT reading rather than an + * inference. `Modem.StateFailedReason` is a `u` on D-Bus, so a provider that copies + * the property verbatim holds a NUMBER, while the migrated SIM-presence rule + * (`deriveSimPresence`) matches the mmcli STRING `sim-missing` that CeraUI has always + * read. Without this decoder the D-Bus path can never produce the one fact that + * proves absence, and a modem with no SIM reads `unknown` forever — or, worse, + * invites a consumer to infer absence from the blank `Sim` object path, which is + * exactly the guess this package refuses to make. + * + * An unrecognized value answers `undefined`: a reason this build cannot place says + * nothing, and must not be laundered into one that does. + */ +const STATE_FAILED_REASONS = new Map([ + [0, 'none'], + // MM's own `UNKNOWN` member. Spelled distinctly so it is never confused with the + // `'unknown'` sentinel the label decoders use to mean "this build could not place it". + [1, 'unknown-reason'], + [2, 'sim-missing'], + [3, 'sim-error'], + [4, 'unknown-capabilities'], + [5, 'esim-without-profiles'], +]); +export function decodeStateFailedReason(value: number | undefined): string | undefined { + return value === undefined ? undefined : STATE_FAILED_REASONS.get(value); +} + export function decodeUnlockRequired(lock: number | undefined): string | undefined { return lock === 1 ? 'none' diff --git a/control/src/hardware/hilink-protocol.ts b/control/src/hardware/hilink-protocol.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3fdbcec --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/hardware/hilink-protocol.ts @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +export function parseHilinkXmlValue(body: string, tag: string): string | undefined { + const match = body.match(new RegExp(`<${tag}>([^<]*)`, 'i')); + return match?.[1]?.trim(); +} + +export type HilinkSessionDocument = { + readonly cookie: string; + readonly token: string; +}; + +export function parseHilinkSession(body: string): HilinkSessionDocument | undefined { + const cookie = parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'SesInfo'); + const token = parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'TokInfo'); + return cookie === undefined || cookie === '' || token === undefined || token === '' + ? undefined + : { cookie, token }; +} + +export type HilinkUserState = { + readonly state: string; + readonly passwordType: 3 | 4; +}; + +export function parseHilinkUserState(body: string): HilinkUserState | undefined { + const state = parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'State'); + const rawPasswordType = parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'password_type'); + if (state === undefined || (rawPasswordType !== '3' && rawPasswordType !== '4')) return undefined; + return { state, passwordType: rawPasswordType === '3' ? 3 : 4 }; +} + +export type HilinkProtocolUnknownReason = + | 'unsupported' + | 'not-reported' + | 'malformed' + | 'auth-expired' + | 'unreachable'; +export type HilinkDataCapability = + | { readonly state: 'reported'; readonly enabled: boolean } + | { + readonly state: 'unavailable'; + readonly reason: HilinkProtocolUnknownReason | 'refused'; + readonly code?: string; + }; + +export function parseHilinkDataCapability(body: string): HilinkDataCapability { + const code = parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'code'); + if (code === '125002') return { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'auth-expired' }; + if (code !== undefined) return { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'refused', code }; + const value = parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'dataswitch'); + if (value === undefined) + return { state: 'unavailable', reason: body === '' ? 'unreachable' : 'malformed' }; + if (value !== '0' && value !== '1') return { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'malformed' }; + return { state: 'reported', enabled: value === '1' }; +} + +export type HilinkNetModeCapability = + | { + readonly state: 'reported'; + readonly modes: readonly { readonly id: string; readonly name?: string }[]; + readonly current?: string; + } + | { + readonly state: 'unavailable'; + readonly reason: HilinkProtocolUnknownReason | 'refused'; + readonly code?: string; + }; + +export function parseHilinkCapabilities(input: { + readonly netModeList: string; + readonly netMode?: string; +}): { readonly net_mode: HilinkNetModeCapability } { + const code = parseHilinkXmlValue(input.netModeList, 'code'); + if (code === '125002') return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'auth-expired' } }; + if (code !== undefined) return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'refused', code } }; + if (input.netModeList === '') + return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'unreachable' } }; + if (!//i.test(input.netModeList)) + return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'malformed' } }; + const modes = [...input.netModeList.matchAll(/([\s\S]*?)<\/NetworkMode>/gi)].flatMap( + (match) => { + const id = parseHilinkXmlValue(match[1] ?? '', 'Index'); + if (id === undefined || id === '') return []; + const name = parseHilinkXmlValue(match[1] ?? '', 'Name'); + return name === undefined || name === '' ? [{ id }] : [{ id, name }]; + }, + ); + if (modes.length === 0) return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'not-reported' } }; + const current = parseHilinkXmlValue(input.netMode ?? '', 'NetworkMode'); + return current === undefined || current === '' + ? { net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes } } + : { net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes, current } }; +} diff --git a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts index e46fb7e..78317dd 100644 --- a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts +++ b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts @@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; import { deriveSimPresence, parseHilinkCapabilities, + parseHilinkDataCapability, + parseHilinkSession, parseHilinkSignal, + parseHilinkUserState, parseUfiDetails, parseUfiSignal, parseZteDetails, @@ -83,4 +86,25 @@ describe('transport-free router response parsers', () => { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'refused', code: '112008' }, }); }); + + test('parses Huawei session, login-profile, and data capability documents centrally', () => { + expect( + parseHilinkSession( + 'SessionID=fixturefixture-token', + ), + ).toEqual({ cookie: 'SessionID=fixture', token: 'fixture-token' }); + expect( + parseHilinkUserState( + '-1admin4', + ), + ).toEqual({ state: '-1', passwordType: 4 }); + expect(parseHilinkDataCapability('1')).toEqual({ + state: 'reported', + enabled: true, + }); + expect(parseHilinkDataCapability('125002')).toEqual({ + state: 'unavailable', + reason: 'auth-expired', + }); + }); }); diff --git a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts index 5ebba47..c0d7021 100644 --- a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts +++ b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ import { z } from 'zod'; +import { parseHilinkXmlValue } from './hilink-protocol'; + +export * from './hilink-protocol'; export type SimPresence = 'present' | 'absent' | 'unknown'; export type SimPresenceFacts = { @@ -9,10 +12,74 @@ export type SimPresenceFacts = { const SIM_OBJECT_PATH = /^\/org\/freedesktop\/ModemManager1\/SIM\/\d+$/; +/** The mmcli spelling of `MM_MODEM_STATE_FAILED_REASON_SIM_MISSING` — the ONLY proof of absence. */ +export const SIM_MISSING_FAILED_REASON = 'sim-missing'; + +/** The fields a presence decision may be drawn from, in the order they are inspected. */ +export const SIM_PRESENCE_FIELDS = ['sim', 'simSlots', 'failedReason'] as const; +export type SimPresenceField = (typeof SIM_PRESENCE_FIELDS)[number]; + +/** + * WHICH FACT decided a SIM presence — the whole point of this type. + * + * `absent` is reachable through exactly ONE member (`state-failed-reason`), so a + * consumer can prove that no code path inferred "there is no SIM" from a blank or + * missing field. A modem that exports `Sim: '/'` and says nothing else is + * `no-evidence`/`unknown`: an empty object path is ModemManager's answer for "no SIM + * object is bound right now", which a modem also reports while it is still + * initializing, while its SIM is locked out, and while a slot switch is in flight. + * + * `vendor-code-unclaimed` is the router half. HiLink, goform and HIMI each report + * their own presence code with vendor semantics no migrated decoder covers, so the + * code is NAMED here and its value stays verbatim in the diagnostics block, rather + * than being guessed into a presence. + */ +export type SimPresenceEvidence = + | { readonly kind: 'sim-object-path'; readonly field: 'sim'; readonly value: string } + | { readonly kind: 'sim-slot-object-path'; readonly field: 'simSlots'; readonly value: string } + | { + readonly kind: 'state-failed-reason'; + readonly field: 'failedReason'; + readonly value: typeof SIM_MISSING_FAILED_REASON; + } + | { readonly kind: 'no-evidence'; readonly inspected: readonly SimPresenceField[] } + | { readonly kind: 'vendor-code-unclaimed'; readonly field: string }; + +export type SimPresenceReading = { + readonly presence: SimPresence; + readonly evidence: SimPresenceEvidence; +}; + +/** The presence decision together with the fact that produced it. */ +export function readSimPresence(facts: SimPresenceFacts): SimPresenceReading { + const sim = facts.sim?.trim() ?? ''; + if (SIM_OBJECT_PATH.test(sim)) { + return { presence: 'present', evidence: { kind: 'sim-object-path', field: 'sim', value: sim } }; + } + const slot = facts.simSlots + ?.map((each) => each.trim()) + .find((each) => SIM_OBJECT_PATH.test(each)); + if (slot !== undefined) { + return { + presence: 'present', + evidence: { kind: 'sim-slot-object-path', field: 'simSlots', value: slot }, + }; + } + if (facts.failedReason === SIM_MISSING_FAILED_REASON) { + return { + presence: 'absent', + evidence: { + kind: 'state-failed-reason', + field: 'failedReason', + value: SIM_MISSING_FAILED_REASON, + }, + }; + } + return { presence: 'unknown', evidence: { kind: 'no-evidence', inspected: SIM_PRESENCE_FIELDS } }; +} + export function deriveSimPresence(facts: SimPresenceFacts): SimPresence { - if (SIM_OBJECT_PATH.test(facts.sim?.trim() ?? '')) return 'present'; - if (facts.simSlots?.some((slot) => SIM_OBJECT_PATH.test(slot.trim()))) return 'present'; - return facts.failedReason === 'sim-missing' ? 'absent' : 'unknown'; + return readSimPresence(facts).presence; } export type RouterSignalUnknownReason = @@ -48,11 +115,6 @@ function numericMetric(value: string | number | undefined): RouterSignalMetric { return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? known(parsed) : unknown('malformed'); } -function xmlValue(body: string, tag: string): string | undefined { - const match = body.match(new RegExp(`<${tag}>([^<]*)`, 'i')); - return match?.[1]?.trim(); -} - const flatRecordSchema = z.record(z.string(), z.union([z.string(), z.number()])); const ufiBodySchema = z.object({ reply: z.string(), @@ -97,19 +159,21 @@ export function parseHilinkSignal(input: { readonly status: string; readonly signal: string; }): RouterSignalModel { - const authStatus = xmlValue(input.status, 'code') === '125002'; - const authSignal = xmlValue(input.signal, 'code') === '125002'; + const authStatus = parseHilinkXmlValue(input.status, 'code') === '125002'; + const authSignal = parseHilinkXmlValue(input.signal, 'code') === '125002'; const statusReason = authStatus ? 'auth-expired' : 'not-reported'; const signalReason = authSignal ? 'auth-expired' : 'not-reported'; const metric = (tag: string): RouterSignalMetric => - authSignal ? unknown(signalReason) : numericMetric(xmlValue(input.signal, tag)); + authSignal ? unknown(signalReason) : numericMetric(parseHilinkXmlValue(input.signal, tag)); return { provenance: 'hilink-admin-api', freshness: authStatus && authSignal ? 'unknown' : 'live', - bars: authStatus ? unknown(statusReason) : numericMetric(xmlValue(input.status, 'SignalIcon')), + bars: authStatus + ? unknown(statusReason) + : numericMetric(parseHilinkXmlValue(input.status, 'SignalIcon')), max_bars: authStatus ? unknown(statusReason) - : numericMetric(xmlValue(input.status, 'maxsignal')), + : numericMetric(parseHilinkXmlValue(input.status, 'maxsignal')), dbm: metric('rssi'), rsrp: metric('rsrp'), rsrq: metric('rsrq'), @@ -224,41 +288,3 @@ export function parseUfiDetails(input: { ['eth_clients', stated(sysinfo?.ethnum)], ]); } - -export type HilinkNetModeCapability = - | { - readonly state: 'reported'; - readonly modes: readonly { readonly id: string; readonly name?: string }[]; - readonly current?: string; - } - | { - readonly state: 'unavailable'; - readonly reason: RouterSignalUnknownReason | 'refused'; - readonly code?: string; - }; - -export function parseHilinkCapabilities(input: { - readonly netModeList: string; - readonly netMode?: string; -}): { readonly net_mode: HilinkNetModeCapability } { - const code = xmlValue(input.netModeList, 'code'); - if (code === '125002') return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'auth-expired' } }; - if (code !== undefined) return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'refused', code } }; - if (input.netModeList === '') - return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'unreachable' } }; - if (!//i.test(input.netModeList)) - return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'malformed' } }; - const modes = [...input.netModeList.matchAll(/([\s\S]*?)<\/NetworkMode>/gi)].flatMap( - (match) => { - const id = xmlValue(match[1] ?? '', 'Index'); - if (id === undefined || id === '') return []; - const name = xmlValue(match[1] ?? '', 'Name'); - return name === undefined || name === '' ? [{ id }] : [{ id, name }]; - }, - ); - if (modes.length === 0) return { net_mode: { state: 'unavailable', reason: 'not-reported' } }; - const current = xmlValue(input.netMode ?? '', 'NetworkMode'); - return current === undefined || current === '' - ? { net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes } } - : { net_mode: { state: 'reported', modes, current } }; -} diff --git a/control/src/index.ts b/control/src/index.ts index d8fc142..7e6e8dc 100644 --- a/control/src/index.ts +++ b/control/src/index.ts @@ -14,10 +14,15 @@ export * from './capability'; export * from './domain'; export * from './fcc'; export * from './hardware/router-parsers'; +export * from './journal'; export * from './location'; +export * from './observations'; +export * from './operations'; export * from './ports'; export * from './providers'; +export * from './radio'; export * from './redact'; +export * from './safety'; export * from './sms'; export * from './usb-mode'; export * from './ussd'; diff --git a/control/src/journal/codec.ts b/control/src/journal/codec.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc353e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/codec.ts @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +// Line codec for the journal: exactly one entry per line, JSON, no wrapper. +// +// WHY DECODING RETURNS A RESULT INSTEAD OF THROWING. A journal is read at exactly +// one moment — recovery after an unclean restart — and that is the moment a throw +// is most expensive: it aborts the read at the first damaged byte and takes every +// still-valid entry after it with it. The whole point of this module is that a +// damaged record is DATA, reported alongside the records that survived, so nothing +// earlier or later is discarded to make one bad line disappear. +// +// FAILURES NAME A FIELD, NEVER CONTENT. Same rule the two policy stores follow: a +// classification carries the offending field name and a byte count, never the bytes +// themselves, because a journal line can hold provider identifiers and refusal +// reasons and a log line is the wrong place to reproduce them. + +import { + type JournalDescriptorEvidence, + type JournalEntry, + type JournalOutcome, + MODEM_CONTROL_JOURNAL_SCHEMA_VERSION, +} from './entry'; + +/** Why one record could not be read. `field` names the offending key, never its value. */ +export interface JournalDecodeFailure { + readonly code: + | 'empty' + | 'invalid-json' + | 'not-an-object' + | 'unsupported-schema-version' + | 'schema-mismatch' + | 'unreadable'; + readonly field?: string; + /** Byte offset for a JSON syntax error, when the runtime reported one. */ + readonly offset?: number; +} + +export type JournalDecodeResult = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly value: T } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly failure: JournalDecodeFailure }; + +class SchemaError extends Error { + constructor(readonly field: string) { + super(`schema-mismatch: ${field}`); + } +} + +class SchemaVersionError extends Error { + constructor() { + super('unsupported-schema-version'); + } +} + +function record(raw: unknown, field: string): Record { + if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null || Array.isArray(raw)) throw new SchemaError(field); + return raw as Record; +} + +function requiredString(source: Record, field: string): string { + const value = source[field]; + if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) throw new SchemaError(field); + return value; +} + +function optionalString(source: Record, field: string): string | undefined { + const value = source[field]; + if (value === undefined) return undefined; + if (typeof value !== 'string') throw new SchemaError(field); + return value; +} + +function requiredNonNegativeInteger(source: Record, field: string): number { + const value = source[field]; + if (typeof value !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(value) || value < 0) { + throw new SchemaError(field); + } + return value; +} + +function requiredStringArray(source: Record, field: string): readonly string[] { + const value = source[field]; + if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.some((member) => typeof member !== 'string')) { + throw new SchemaError(field); + } + return value as readonly string[]; +} + +function member( + source: Record, + field: string, + allowed: readonly T[], +): T { + const value = source[field]; + if (typeof value !== 'string' || !(allowed as readonly string[]).includes(value)) { + throw new SchemaError(field); + } + return value as T; +} + +const AUTHORITIES = ['provider', 'controller', 'hardware'] as const; +const IMPACTS = ['read', 'write', 'session', 'disruptive', 'recovery'] as const; +const CONFIDENCES = ['high', 'medium', 'low', 'unknown'] as const; +const UNKNOWN_OUTCOME_REASONS = [ + 'stale-generation', + 'write-reply-timed-out', + 'write-reply-dropped', +] as const; + +function parseDescriptor(raw: unknown): JournalDescriptorEvidence { + const source = record(raw, 'descriptor'); + return { + descriptorId: requiredString(source, 'descriptorId'), + provider: requiredString(source, 'provider'), + authority: member(source, 'authority', AUTHORITIES), + mutationImpact: member(source, 'mutationImpact', IMPACTS), + profiles: requiredStringArray(source, 'profiles'), + firmware: requiredStringArray(source, 'firmware'), + confidence: member(source, 'confidence', CONFIDENCES), + }; +} + +function parseOutcome(raw: unknown): JournalOutcome { + const source = record(raw, 'outcome'); + switch (member(source, 'status', ['applied', 'refused', 'failed', 'unknown-outcome'] as const)) { + case 'applied': + return { status: 'applied' }; + case 'refused': + return { status: 'refused', reason: requiredString(source, 'reason') }; + case 'failed': + return { status: 'failed', reason: requiredString(source, 'reason') }; + case 'unknown-outcome': + return { + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: member(source, 'reason', UNKNOWN_OUTCOME_REASONS), + }; + } +} + +function parseEntry(raw: unknown): JournalEntry { + const source = record(raw, 'entry'); + if (source.schemaVersion !== MODEM_CONTROL_JOURNAL_SCHEMA_VERSION) throw new SchemaVersionError(); + const base = { + schemaVersion: MODEM_CONTROL_JOURNAL_SCHEMA_VERSION, + operationId: requiredString(source, 'operationId'), + physicalModemId: requiredString(source, 'physicalModemId'), + generation: requiredNonNegativeInteger(source, 'generation'), + recordedAtMs: requiredNonNegativeInteger(source, 'recordedAtMs'), + descriptor: parseDescriptor(source.descriptor), + } as const; + if (member(source, 'phase', ['started', 'completed'] as const) === 'started') { + return { ...base, phase: 'started' }; + } + return { ...base, phase: 'completed', outcome: parseOutcome(source.outcome) }; +} + +/** Classify a decode failure into a metadata-only result (never raw content). */ +function classify(error: unknown): JournalDecodeFailure { + if (error instanceof SchemaVersionError) return { code: 'unsupported-schema-version' }; + if (error instanceof SchemaError) return { code: 'schema-mismatch', field: error.field }; + if (error instanceof SyntaxError) { + const offset = /position (\d+)/.exec(error.message)?.[1]; + return offset === undefined + ? { code: 'invalid-json' } + : { code: 'invalid-json', offset: Number(offset) }; + } + return { code: 'unreadable' }; +} + +/** + * Serialize one entry to a single line WITHOUT its terminator. + * + * Keys are emitted in a fixed order because the round-trip tests compare bytes, + * and byte comparison is the only assertion that catches a field a reader silently + * dropped (`JSON.parse` + a permissive validator will happily lose one and still + * report success — the same trap the srtla telemetry byte-parity suite exists for). + */ +export function encodeJournalEntry(entry: JournalEntry): string { + const descriptor = { + descriptorId: entry.descriptor.descriptorId, + provider: entry.descriptor.provider, + authority: entry.descriptor.authority, + mutationImpact: entry.descriptor.mutationImpact, + profiles: entry.descriptor.profiles, + firmware: entry.descriptor.firmware, + confidence: entry.descriptor.confidence, + }; + const base = { + schemaVersion: entry.schemaVersion, + phase: entry.phase, + operationId: entry.operationId, + physicalModemId: entry.physicalModemId, + generation: entry.generation, + recordedAtMs: entry.recordedAtMs, + descriptor, + }; + return JSON.stringify(entry.phase === 'started' ? base : { ...base, outcome: entry.outcome }); +} + +/** Decode one line. An empty/whitespace-only line is reported, never silently dropped. */ +export function decodeJournalEntry(line: string): JournalDecodeResult { + if (line.trim().length === 0) return { ok: false, failure: { code: 'empty' } }; + try { + return { ok: true, value: parseEntry(JSON.parse(line)) }; + } catch (error) { + return { ok: false, failure: classify(error) }; + } +} + +/** Decode an arbitrary JSON document with a caller-supplied validator. */ +export function decodeJournalDocument( + text: string, + validate: (raw: unknown) => T, +): JournalDecodeResult { + if (text.trim().length === 0) return { ok: false, failure: { code: 'empty' } }; + try { + return { ok: true, value: validate(JSON.parse(text)) }; + } catch (error) { + return { ok: false, failure: classify(error) }; + } +} + +/** The validator helpers the legacy reader reuses, so both shapes fail the same way. */ +export const journalSchema = { + record, + requiredString, + optionalString, + requiredNonNegativeInteger, + member, + schemaError(field: string): Error { + return new SchemaError(field); + }, + schemaVersionError(): Error { + return new SchemaVersionError(); + }, +} as const; diff --git a/control/src/journal/engine.ts b/control/src/journal/engine.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d6f028 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/engine.ts @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +// The journal engine: the operation engine's journal hook, plus replay. +// +// `OperationExecution.journal` (todo 20's `OperationJournalHook`) is the seam the +// operation engine already calls at `started` and at `completed`, and a descriptor +// that declares `journal: { required: true }` is REFUSED outright when no hook is +// supplied. This class is the durable implementation of that seam: it flattens the +// event onto a journal entry and appends it, and it reads the same file back. +// +// THE ENGINE HOLDS NO PATH. It holds a `JournalStore`, and the store was handed a +// path by whoever composed it. That is the same injection shape todo 19 used for +// the ownership lock (`FlockResourceOwnershipOptions.lockPath` is REQUIRED and the +// adapter substitutes nothing) and the same reason: an embedding process owns its +// filesystem layout, and a library that guesses one is a library that writes to the +// wrong disk on a device it has never seen. +// +// THE CLOCK IS INJECTED TOO. `now` defaults to `Date.now`, but a test that wants +// deterministic timestamps supplies its own — the observation layer's rule that +// this package never stamps data with a time it did not come from applies here as +// well, and a replay assertion over timestamps must not be a race. + +import type { OperationJournalEvent, OperationJournalHook } from '../operations/contracts'; +import { type JournalEntry, journalDescriptorEvidence, journalOutcome } from './entry'; +import { type JournalRecovery, reconstructJournalRecovery } from './recovery'; +import type { JournalStore } from './store'; + +export interface JournalEngineOptions { + /** The store — and therefore the path — is supplied by the composition root. */ + readonly store: JournalStore; + readonly now?: () => number; +} + +export class JournalEngine { + readonly #store: JournalStore; + readonly #now: () => number; + + constructor(options: JournalEngineOptions) { + this.#store = options.store; + this.#now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now()); + } + + /** Where this engine journals to; useful in a recovery log line. */ + get path(): string { + return this.#store.path; + } + + /** + * The `OperationJournalHook` implementation. + * + * Generic per CALL rather than per instance, so one engine journals every + * descriptor in the process. A generic method satisfies the non-generic + * `OperationJournalHook` member by instantiation, which is what lets an + * `OperationExecution` take the engine itself as its `journal`. + */ + record(event: OperationJournalEvent): Promise { + return this.#store.append(entryFor(event, this.#now())); + } + + /** An explicitly typed hook, for a caller that prefers a narrow object. */ + hook(): OperationJournalHook { + return { record: (event) => this.record(event) }; + } + + /** Read the journal back and reconstruct what was in flight. */ + async recover(): Promise { + return reconstructJournalRecovery(await this.#store.read()); + } +} + +function entryFor(event: OperationJournalEvent, recordedAtMs: number): JournalEntry { + const base = { + schemaVersion: 1, + operationId: event.operationId, + physicalModemId: event.physicalModemId as string, + generation: event.generation as number, + recordedAtMs, + descriptor: journalDescriptorEvidence(event.descriptor), + } as const; + return event.phase === 'started' + ? { ...base, phase: 'started' } + : { ...base, phase: 'completed', outcome: journalOutcome(event.result) }; +} + +export function createJournalEngine(options: JournalEngineOptions): JournalEngine { + return new JournalEngine(options); +} diff --git a/control/src/journal/entry.ts b/control/src/journal/entry.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24cf728 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/entry.ts @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +// The transaction journal's ENTRY vocabulary. +// +// The journal exists to answer ONE question after an unclean restart: which +// mutations were in flight, and which of them ended in an outcome nobody can +// read off the device. `operations/operation-engine.ts` already closes a +// per-modem gate when a write classifies `unknown-outcome`, but that gate lives +// in a `Set` on the engine instance — a process death takes it with it. Writing +// the same two facts down is what makes the gate survive the process. +// +// WHY AN EVENT LOG AND NOT A LATEST-STATE SNAPSHOT. A started event and its +// completion are two facts separated by exactly the window a crash lands in, so +// the shape has to be able to hold the first without the second. A document that +// only ever carries "the current state" cannot distinguish "we never dispatched" +// from "we dispatched and the reply never came" unless it spends a state name on +// each — which is how CeraUI's own mutation journal does it (see +// `legacy-ceraui.ts`, which reads that shape). Both are legitimate; this one is +// append-only because appending is the only write that cannot lose a prior fact. +// +// WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT RECORDED: the operation's INPUT and the operation's +// RETURNED VALUE. An input is routinely a PIN, a PUK, or a USSD command carrying +// a voucher code, and a returned value is routinely a message body or a location +// fix — all of them classes `../redact.ts` masks everywhere else. The journal +// records THAT an operation ran and HOW it ended, never WHAT was sent or read. +// A caller that needs a rollback payload owns persisting it beside the journal +// under its own redaction decision. + +import type { + MutationImpact, + OperationConfidence, + OperationDescriptor, + OperationResult, +} from '../domain'; + +/** The current on-disk schema version for one journal line. */ +export const MODEM_CONTROL_JOURNAL_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1; + +/** The two phases the operation engine emits, mirrored one-to-one on disk. */ +export type JournalPhase = 'started' | 'completed'; + +/** + * How an operation ended, projected from `OperationResult` WITHOUT its value. + * + * `unknown-outcome` keeps the frozen domain reason union verbatim rather than + * widening to `string`, because those three reasons are the entire vocabulary a + * recovery pass branches on and a fourth spelling would silently read as an + * ordinary failure. + */ +export type JournalOutcome = + | { readonly status: 'applied' } + | { readonly status: 'refused'; readonly reason: string } + | { readonly status: 'failed'; readonly reason: string } + | { + readonly status: 'unknown-outcome'; + readonly reason: 'stale-generation' | 'write-reply-timed-out' | 'write-reply-dropped'; + }; + +/** + * The descriptor facts a recovery pass needs, flattened out of the descriptor. + * + * The descriptor itself is not persisted: it carries FUNCTIONS (`readback.matches`, + * the constraint predicates) that no serialization round-trips, so storing it would + * produce a document that reads back as a different object than it was written from. + * These are the fields that answer "what was being changed, by whom, on what + * evidence" — everything a human or a reconciler needs to judge a stranded write. + */ +export interface JournalDescriptorEvidence { + readonly descriptorId: string; + readonly provider: string; + readonly authority: 'provider' | 'controller' | 'hardware'; + readonly mutationImpact: MutationImpact; + readonly profiles: readonly string[]; + readonly firmware: readonly string[]; + readonly confidence: OperationConfidence; +} + +interface JournalEntryBase { + readonly schemaVersion: typeof MODEM_CONTROL_JOURNAL_SCHEMA_VERSION; + readonly operationId: string; + /** The serialized `PhysicalModemId`. Stored as text; branding is a compile-time fact. */ + readonly physicalModemId: string; + /** The serialized `DeviceGeneration` the operation was fenced to. */ + readonly generation: number; + readonly recordedAtMs: number; + readonly descriptor: JournalDescriptorEvidence; +} + +/** + * One journal line. + * + * The two members differ in SHAPE, not just in a label: a `started` entry has no + * `outcome` KEY at all. That is the same rule `observations/reading.ts` follows — + * a consumer cannot read an outcome off a phase that has none, so "in flight" can + * never be mistaken for "ended with an unset outcome". + */ +export type JournalEntry = + | (JournalEntryBase & { readonly phase: 'started' }) + | (JournalEntryBase & { readonly phase: 'completed'; readonly outcome: JournalOutcome }); + +/** Flatten a descriptor down to the serializable evidence the journal keeps. */ +export function journalDescriptorEvidence( + descriptor: OperationDescriptor, +): JournalDescriptorEvidence { + return { + descriptorId: descriptor.id, + provider: descriptor.provider, + authority: descriptor.authority, + mutationImpact: descriptor.mutationImpact, + profiles: [...descriptor.evidence.profiles], + firmware: [...descriptor.evidence.firmware], + confidence: descriptor.confidence, + }; +} + +/** Project a result onto its journalable outcome, dropping the value by design. */ +export function journalOutcome(result: OperationResult): JournalOutcome { + switch (result.status) { + case 'applied': + return { status: 'applied' }; + case 'refused': + return { status: 'refused', reason: result.reason }; + case 'failed': + return { status: 'failed', reason: result.reason }; + case 'unknown-outcome': + return { status: 'unknown-outcome', reason: result.reason }; + } +} + +/** True when an outcome leaves the device in a state nobody has read back. */ +export function outcomeRequiresReconciliation(outcome: JournalOutcome): boolean { + return outcome.status === 'unknown-outcome'; +} diff --git a/control/src/journal/index.ts b/control/src/journal/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fd45cb --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +export * from './codec'; +export * from './engine'; +export * from './entry'; +export * from './legacy-ceraui'; +export * from './recovery'; +export * from './store'; diff --git a/control/src/journal/journal-corruption.test.ts b/control/src/journal/journal-corruption.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a15d42a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/journal-corruption.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { appendFile, readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; + +import { + appliedResult, + completedEvent, + createJournalHarness, + type JournalHarness, + startedEvent, + unknownOutcomeResult, +} from '../../test-support/journal-fixture'; +import { decodeJournalEntry } from './codec'; +import { assertJournalIntact, JournalRecoveryError } from './recovery'; +import { decodeJournalText } from './store'; + +let harness: JournalHarness; + +beforeEach(async () => { + harness = await createJournalHarness(); +}); + +afterEach(async () => { + await harness.dispose(); +}); + +/** Write three good operations, then damage only the LAST line on disk. */ +async function seedThenCorruptTrailingLine(trailing: string): Promise { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-1', appliedResult())); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-2')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-2', unknownOutcomeResult('write-reply-timed-out'))); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-3')); + await appendFile(harness.path, trailing); +} + +describe('a corrupt TRAILING entry never discards the earlier valid ones', () => { + test('truncated JSON on the last line is reported, and lines 1-5 survive', async () => { + await seedThenCorruptTrailingLine('{"schemaVersion":1,"phase":"star\n'); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + + // The five valid records are all still there. + expect(recovery.records.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-1', 'op-2', 'op-3']); + expect(recovery.pending.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-3']); + expect(recovery.unknownOutcome.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-2']); + + // And the damage is reported as a TYPED record naming the trailing line. + expect(recovery.damage).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.location).toEqual({ kind: 'line', line: 6, trailing: true }); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.failure.code).toBe('invalid-json'); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.bytes).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); + + test('the typed recovery error is raised on demand and carries the damage', async () => { + await seedThenCorruptTrailingLine('{"schemaVersion":1,"phase":"star\n'); + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + + expect(() => assertJournalIntact(recovery)).toThrow(JournalRecoveryError); + try { + assertJournalIntact(recovery); + } catch (error) { + expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(JournalRecoveryError); + expect((error as JournalRecoveryError).damage).toEqual(recovery.damage); + } + }); + + test('a torn line with NO terminator is still reported, not swallowed', async () => { + await seedThenCorruptTrailingLine('{"schemaVersion":1,"operationId":"op-4"'); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(3); + expect(recovery.damage).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.location).toEqual({ kind: 'line', line: 6, trailing: true }); + }); + + test('a well-formed line carrying a future schema version is typed as such', async () => { + await seedThenCorruptTrailingLine(`${JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 99 })}\n`); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(3); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.failure).toEqual({ code: 'unsupported-schema-version' }); + }); + + test('a valid JSON object missing a required field names the FIELD, not the bytes', async () => { + await seedThenCorruptTrailingLine( + `${JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, phase: 'started', operationId: 'op-4' })}\n`, + ); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(3); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.failure).toEqual({ + code: 'schema-mismatch', + field: 'physicalModemId', + }); + // Metadata only: the classification must never carry file content. + expect(JSON.stringify(recovery.damage[0]?.failure)).not.toContain('op-4'); + }); +}); + +describe('damage in the MIDDLE does not truncate the tail either', () => { + test('lines after a corrupt line are still decoded', async () => { + const first = harness.restart(); + await first.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + await first.record(startedEvent('op-2')); + const text = await readFile(harness.path, 'utf8'); + const lines = text.split('\n').filter((line) => line.length > 0); + await writeFile(harness.path, `${lines[0]}\n{ not json }\n${lines[1]}\n`); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-1', 'op-2']); + expect(recovery.damage).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.location).toEqual({ kind: 'line', line: 2, trailing: false }); + }); + + test('two damaged lines are both reported, and neither hides the other', async () => { + await writeFile(harness.path, '{ bad one }\n{"schemaVersion":2}\n'); + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.damage.map((record) => record.failure.code)).toEqual([ + 'invalid-json', + 'unsupported-schema-version', + ]); + }); +}); + +describe('a torn trailing line is CLOSED before the next append', () => { + test('appending after a torn write does not corrupt the new entry too', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + // Simulate a process killed mid-write: a partial line with no terminator. + await appendFile(harness.path, '{"schemaVersion":1,"phase":"comp'); + + // A fresh engine (new process) appends the next operation. + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-2')); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + // The torn record is still damaged — it really was lost — but the NEW one + // decoded cleanly instead of being glued onto the garbage. + expect(recovery.records.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-1', 'op-2']); + expect(recovery.damage).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.location).toEqual({ kind: 'line', line: 2, trailing: false }); + }); + + test('the damaged bytes are PRESERVED on disk, never rewritten away', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + await appendFile(harness.path, '{"torn":true'); + + await harness.restart().recover(); + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-2')); + + expect(await readFile(harness.path, 'utf8')).toContain('{"torn":true'); + }); +}); + +describe('non-vacuity: the corruption detectors really fire', () => { + test('a clean journal produces no damage at all', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-1', appliedResult())); + expect((await harness.restart().recover()).damage).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('decodeJournalText keeps survivors on either side of every failure', () => { + const line = (id: string): string => + JSON.stringify({ + schemaVersion: 1, + phase: 'started', + operationId: id, + physicalModemId: 'serial:x', + generation: 1, + recordedAtMs: 1, + descriptor: { + descriptorId: 'd', + provider: 'p', + authority: 'provider', + mutationImpact: 'write', + profiles: [], + firmware: [], + confidence: 'high', + }, + }); + const result = decodeJournalText(`${line('a')}\nbroken\n${line('b')}\nalso broken\n`); + expect(result.entries.map((record) => record.entry.operationId)).toEqual(['a', 'b']); + expect(result.damage.map((record) => record.location)).toEqual([ + { kind: 'line', line: 2, trailing: false }, + { kind: 'line', line: 4, trailing: true }, + ]); + }); + + test('an empty line decodes to a typed empty failure rather than a silent skip', () => { + expect(decodeJournalEntry(' ')).toEqual({ ok: false, failure: { code: 'empty' } }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/journal/journal-path-injection.test.ts b/control/src/journal/journal-path-injection.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8604cb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/journal-path-injection.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +// The gate that keeps the journal path INJECTED. +// +// The whole point of this module is that `/data` policy belongs to the embedding +// process. A constant added "for convenience" is exactly how that ownership leaks +// back into the library, and a code review is a poor detector for one added +// months later. So the rule is a test over the shipped source. +// +// COMMENTS ARE STRIPPED FIRST, and that is load-bearing rather than tidy: the +// documentation in `legacy-ceraui.ts` and in this file has to be able to NAME the +// CeraUI convention it reads in order to explain itself. Prose naming a path stays +// legal; executable code producing one does not. (Same shape as the apt-worker +// count-literal gate and CeraUI's link-id authority gate.) + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'; +import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; + +const JOURNAL_DIR = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); + +/** Remove block and line comments plus every string literal's interior. */ +function executableSource(source: string): string { + return source + .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, ' ') + .replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/[^\n]*/g, '$1 ') + .split('\n') + .filter((line) => !line.trimStart().startsWith('*')) + .join('\n'); +} + +/** + * An absolute POSIX path literal inside quotes or a template. + * + * `${}` is inside the character class on purpose: a template literal is the + * obvious way to smuggle a hardcoded root back in (`` `/data/${name}` ``), and a + * class that stopped at the interpolation would miss exactly that form. + */ +const ABSOLUTE_PATH_LITERAL = /(['"`])\/[A-Za-z][\w./${}-]*\1/g; +/** Any mention of the device data partition or CeraUI's journal directory name. */ +const CERAUI_PATH_TOKENS = /\/data\b|ceralive\/modem-mutations|CERALIVE_MODEM_MUTATION_DIR/; + +async function shippedSources(): Promise { + const names = (await readdir(JOURNAL_DIR)).filter( + (name) => name.endsWith('.ts') && !name.endsWith('.test.ts'), + ); + return Promise.all( + names.map(async (name) => [name, await readFile(join(JOURNAL_DIR, name), 'utf8')] as const), + ); +} + +describe('no journal source hardcodes a path', () => { + test('the gate actually has files to scan', async () => { + const sources = await shippedSources(); + expect(sources.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(5); + expect(sources.map(([name]) => name)).toContain('store.ts'); + expect(sources.map(([name]) => name)).toContain('legacy-ceraui.ts'); + }); + + test('no executable line contains an absolute path literal', async () => { + const violations: string[] = []; + for (const [name, source] of await shippedSources()) { + for (const match of executableSource(source).matchAll(ABSOLUTE_PATH_LITERAL)) { + violations.push(`${name}: ${match[0]}`); + } + } + expect(violations).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('no executable line names /data or a CeraUI-specific journal location', async () => { + const violations: string[] = []; + for (const [name, source] of await shippedSources()) { + if (CERAUI_PATH_TOKENS.test(executableSource(source))) violations.push(name); + } + expect(violations).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the CeraUI convention IS documented in prose, so the strip is not vacuous', async () => { + const sources = await shippedSources(); + const legacy = sources.find(([name]) => name === 'legacy-ceraui.ts')?.[1] ?? ''; + expect(legacy.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + // The comments explain the shape they read; only the executable strip is empty. + expect(legacy).toContain('per-modem'); + expect(executableSource(legacy)).not.toContain('per-modem'); + }); +}); + +describe('the gate is non-vacuous', () => { + // The interpolating sample is ASSEMBLED at runtime rather than written as a + // literal: spelling it inline is itself the lint violation the gate exists to + // discourage, so the fabrication must not appear verbatim in this file. + const INTERPOLATION = `\${name}`; + const samples: string[] = [ + "const dir = '/data/ceralive/modem-mutations';", + 'const dir = "/var/lib/ceralive/journal";', + `const dir = \`/data/${INTERPOLATION}\`;`, + ]; + + test.each(samples)('a fabricated path literal is caught: %s', (sample) => { + expect([...executableSource(sample).matchAll(ABSOLUTE_PATH_LITERAL)]).not.toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a fabricated /data reference is caught by the token scan', () => { + expect(CERAUI_PATH_TOKENS.test(executableSource("const d = '/data/x';"))).toBe(true); + }); + + test('the same text inside a comment is NOT a violation', () => { + const commented = '// CeraUI keeps this under /data/ceralive/modem-mutations.\nconst x = 1;'; + expect(CERAUI_PATH_TOKENS.test(executableSource(commented))).toBe(false); + expect([...executableSource(commented).matchAll(ABSOLUTE_PATH_LITERAL)]).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a relative path literal is legal — only absolute ones are refused', () => { + expect([...executableSource("join(dir, 'slot.json')").matchAll(ABSOLUTE_PATH_LITERAL)]).toEqual( + [], + ); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/journal/journal-replay.test.ts b/control/src/journal/journal-replay.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a604c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/journal-replay.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readFile, stat } from 'node:fs/promises'; + +import { + appliedResult, + completedEvent, + createJournalHarness, + failedResult, + JOURNAL_MODEM_A, + JOURNAL_MODEM_B, + type JournalHarness, + startedEvent, + unknownOutcomeResult, +} from '../../test-support/journal-fixture'; +import type { OperationExecution } from '../operations/contracts'; +import { assertJournalIntact, JournalRecoveryError } from './recovery'; +import { createFileJournalStore, JournalPathError } from './store'; + +let harness: JournalHarness; + +beforeEach(async () => { + harness = await createJournalHarness(); +}); + +afterEach(async () => { + await harness.dispose(); +}); + +describe('the journal path is injected and has no default', () => { + test('an empty path is refused rather than substituted', () => { + expect(() => createFileJournalStore({ path: '' })).toThrow(JournalPathError); + expect(() => createFileJournalStore({ path: ' ' })).toThrow(JournalPathError); + }); + + test('the store echoes back exactly the path it was handed', () => { + expect(createFileJournalStore({ path: harness.path }).path).toBe(harness.path); + }); + + test('the engine journals to the injected path and nowhere else', async () => { + const engine = harness.restart(); + await engine.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + expect(engine.path).toBe(harness.path); + await expect(stat(harness.path)).resolves.toBeDefined(); + }); + + test('the journal file is created 0600 regardless of umask', async () => { + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-1')); + expect((await stat(harness.path)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600); + }); +}); + +describe('the engine satisfies the operation engine journal hook', () => { + test('an engine is assignable as an OperationExecution journal hook', async () => { + const engine = harness.restart(); + const execution: Pick, 'journal'> = { journal: engine }; + await execution.journal?.record(startedEvent('op-hook')); + const narrow = engine.hook(); + await narrow.record(completedEvent('op-hook', appliedResult())); + + const recovery = await engine.recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.disposition).toBe('resolved'); + }); +}); + +describe('replay after an unclean restart', () => { + test('N entries survive dropping the engine and enumerate for reconciliation', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + // Five operations: one clean, one stranded mid-flight, two unknown outcomes + // on two different modems, and one definite failure. + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-applied')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-applied', appliedResult())); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-stranded')); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-timeout')); + await writer.record( + completedEvent('op-timeout', unknownOutcomeResult('write-reply-timed-out')), + ); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-stale', { physicalModemId: JOURNAL_MODEM_B })); + await writer.record( + completedEvent('op-stale', unknownOutcomeResult('stale-generation'), { + physicalModemId: JOURNAL_MODEM_B, + }), + ); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-failed')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-failed', failedResult('device-refused'))); + + // The "crash": the engine instance is dropped with no shutdown of any kind. + // A brand-new engine reconstructs purely from what reached the disk. + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + + expect(recovery.damage).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.records.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual([ + 'op-applied', + 'op-stranded', + 'op-timeout', + 'op-stale', + 'op-failed', + ]); + + expect(recovery.pending.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-stranded']); + expect(recovery.unknownOutcome.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual([ + 'op-timeout', + 'op-stale', + ]); + expect(recovery.blocked).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.reconciliationRequired).toEqual( + [JOURNAL_MODEM_A as string, JOURNAL_MODEM_B as string].sort(), + ); + }); + + test('a definite failure is resolved, never folded into reconciliation', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-failed')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-failed', failedResult('device-refused'))); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.disposition).toBe('resolved'); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.outcome).toEqual({ status: 'failed', reason: 'device-refused' }); + expect(recovery.reconciliationRequired).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the unknown-outcome reason survives the round trip verbatim', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-dropped')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-dropped', unknownOutcomeResult('write-reply-dropped'))); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.outcome).toEqual({ + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'write-reply-dropped', + }); + }); + + test('a re-run of the same operation counts attempts instead of hiding one', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-retried')); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-retried')); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-retried', appliedResult())); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.attempts).toBe(2); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.disposition).toBe('resolved'); + }); + + test('descriptor evidence is what a reconciler reads back', async () => { + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-evidence')); + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records[0]?.descriptor).toEqual({ + descriptorId: 'set-usb-mode', + provider: 'fixture-provider', + authority: 'provider', + mutationImpact: 'write', + profiles: ['fixture'], + firmware: ['1.0'], + confidence: 'high', + }); + }); + + test('an empty journal recovers as empty, not as damaged', async () => { + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.damage).toEqual([]); + expect(() => assertJournalIntact(recovery)).not.toThrow(); + }); + + test('neither the input nor the returned value is ever written to disk', async () => { + const writer = harness.restart(); + await writer.record(startedEvent('op-secret', { input: '8462-PUK-SECRET' })); + await writer.record(completedEvent('op-secret', appliedResult('9911-READBACK-SECRET'))); + + const text = await readFile(harness.path, 'utf8'); + expect(text).not.toContain('8462-PUK-SECRET'); + expect(text).not.toContain('9911-READBACK-SECRET'); + expect(text).not.toContain('input'); + expect(text).not.toContain('value'); + }); +}); + +describe('appends are additive and ordered', () => { + test('a second engine over the same path appends rather than replaces', async () => { + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-first')); + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-second')); + + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(recovery.records.map((record) => record.operationId)).toEqual(['op-first', 'op-second']); + }); + + test('concurrent appends serialize into whole lines', async () => { + const engine = harness.restart(); + await Promise.all( + Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_unused, index) => engine.record(startedEvent(`op-${index}`))), + ); + + const recovery = await engine.recover(); + expect(recovery.damage).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(12); + }); + + test('every written line is newline-terminated', async () => { + const engine = harness.restart(); + await engine.record(startedEvent('op-1')); + await engine.record(completedEvent('op-1', appliedResult())); + const text = await readFile(harness.path, 'utf8'); + expect(text.endsWith('\n')).toBe(true); + expect(text.split('\n').filter((line) => line.length > 0)).toHaveLength(2); + }); +}); + +describe('JournalRecoveryError', () => { + test('assertJournalIntact does not throw on a clean journal', async () => { + await harness.restart().record(startedEvent('op-1')); + const recovery = await harness.restart().recover(); + expect(() => assertJournalIntact(recovery)).not.toThrow(); + }); + + test('the error carries the damage rather than only a message', () => { + const damage = [ + { location: { kind: 'file' }, bytes: 0, failure: { code: 'unreadable' } }, + ] as const; + const error = new JournalRecoveryError(damage); + expect(error.damage).toEqual(damage); + expect(error.name).toBe('JournalRecoveryError'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.test.ts b/control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2e136c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +import { physicalModemId } from '../domain'; +import { + decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry, + LEGACY_CERAUI_MUTATION_STATES, + legacyMutationSlotName, + legacyOperationRecord, + readLegacyCeraUiJournal, +} from './legacy-ceraui'; + +let dir: string; + +beforeEach(async () => { + dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'ceraui-journal-')); +}); + +afterEach(async () => { + await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); +}); + +const STABLE_KEY = 'usb-pci-0000:00:14.0-usb-0:2:1.0'; + +function legacyDocument(overrides: Record = {}): string { + // Byte-faithful to what CeraUI writes: one JSON object plus a trailing newline. + return `${JSON.stringify({ + version: 1, + stableKey: STABLE_KEY, + kind: 'usb-mode', + state: 'executing', + attemptId: 'attempt-abc', + startedAt: 1_700_000_000_000, + updatedAt: 1_700_000_000_500, + preState: { mode: 'rndis' }, + history: [{ state: 'armed', at: 1_700_000_000_000 }], + ...overrides, + })}\n`; +} + +async function writeSlot(key: string, body: string): Promise { + const name = `${legacyMutationSlotName(key)}.json`; + await writeFile(join(dir, name), body); + return name; +} + +describe('the legacy slot filename convention is mirrored, not guessed', () => { + test('the slot name is lowercase-hex sha256 of the stable key', () => { + const name = legacyMutationSlotName(STABLE_KEY); + expect(name).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/); + expect(name).toBe(legacyMutationSlotName(STABLE_KEY)); + expect(name).not.toBe(legacyMutationSlotName(`${STABLE_KEY}x`)); + }); + + test('the stable key never appears in the filename in plaintext', () => { + expect(legacyMutationSlotName(STABLE_KEY)).not.toContain('usb'); + }); +}); + +describe('an existing CeraUI journal file is still readable', () => { + test('a real-shaped slot decodes with every field preserved', async () => { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument()); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) return; + expect(decoded.value).toEqual({ + version: 1, + stableKey: STABLE_KEY, + kind: 'usb-mode', + state: 'executing', + attemptId: 'attempt-abc', + startedAt: 1_700_000_000_000, + updatedAt: 1_700_000_000_500, + preState: { mode: 'rndis' }, + history: [{ state: 'armed', at: 1_700_000_000_000 }], + }); + }); + + test('the opaque preState rollback payload survives the read verbatim', async () => { + await writeSlot( + STABLE_KEY, + legacyDocument({ preState: { mode: 'rndis', nested: { a: [1] } } }), + ); + const read = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(read.entries[0]?.preState).toEqual({ mode: 'rndis', nested: { a: [1] } }); + }); + + test('the trailing newline CeraUI writes is accepted', async () => { + expect(decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument()).ok).toBe(true); + expect(decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument().trimEnd()).ok).toBe(true); + }); + + test('optional detail and acknowledgedMode round-trip when present', () => { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry( + legacyDocument({ + state: 'acknowledged', + detail: 'rolled back', + acknowledgedMode: 'force-rebaseline', + }), + ); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) return; + expect(decoded.value.detail).toBe('rolled back'); + expect(decoded.value.acknowledgedMode).toBe('force-rebaseline'); + }); + + test('an unmentioned optional key is ABSENT, not undefined-valued', () => { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument()); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) return; + expect('detail' in decoded.value).toBe(false); + expect('acknowledgedMode' in decoded.value).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('the legacy vocabulary maps onto the shared recovery model', () => { + test('every state has a disposition, so no state can fall through', () => { + for (const state of LEGACY_CERAUI_MUTATION_STATES) { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ state })); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) continue; + expect(legacyOperationRecord(decoded.value).disposition).toBeDefined(); + } + }); + + test('armed is pending but executing is unknown-outcome', () => { + const armed = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ state: 'armed' })); + const executing = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ state: 'executing' })); + expect(armed.ok && legacyOperationRecord(armed.value).disposition).toBe('pending'); + expect(executing.ok && legacyOperationRecord(executing.value).disposition).toBe( + 'unknown-outcome', + ); + }); + + test('an unknown-outcome legacy record claims NO reason it cannot know', () => { + const executing = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ state: 'executing' })); + expect(executing.ok).toBe(true); + if (!executing.ok) return; + const record = legacyOperationRecord(executing.value); + expect(record.disposition).toBe('unknown-outcome'); + expect('outcome' in record).toBe(false); + }); + + test('operator-blocked states are blocked, never resolved and never unknown', () => { + for (const state of [ + 'failed', + 'device-absent-quarantine', + 'decommissioned', + 'recommission-pending', + ] as const) { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ state })); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) continue; + expect(legacyOperationRecord(decoded.value).disposition).toBe('blocked'); + } + }); + + test('a legacy record carries CeraUI stableKey and is labelled legacy-ceraui', () => { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument()); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) return; + const record = legacyOperationRecord(decoded.value); + expect(record.origin).toBe('legacy-ceraui'); + expect(record.physicalModemId).toBe(STABLE_KEY); + // The identity is deliberately NOT laundered into a branded PhysicalModemId: + // the constructor refuses it, which is exactly why the record keeps text. + expect(() => physicalModemId(record.physicalModemId)).toThrow(); + }); + + test('the descriptor evidence states what the file cannot supply', () => { + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ kind: 'sim-unlock' })); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) return; + expect(legacyOperationRecord(decoded.value).descriptor).toEqual({ + descriptorId: 'sim-unlock', + provider: 'ceraui-legacy', + authority: 'controller', + mutationImpact: 'write', + profiles: [], + firmware: [], + confidence: 'unknown', + }); + }); + + test('an unknown future mutation kind is ACCEPTED, not refused', () => { + // CeraUI spreads its capability-module kinds into the runtime enum, so a + // frozen copy here would reject a valid file the day a module is added. + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(legacyDocument({ kind: 'some-future-module' })); + expect(decoded.ok).toBe(true); + if (!decoded.ok) return; + expect(legacyOperationRecord(decoded.value).descriptor.descriptorId).toBe('some-future-module'); + }); +}); + +describe('reading a whole legacy directory', () => { + test('pending and unknown-outcome slots enumerate for reconciliation', async () => { + await writeSlot('modem-armed', legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-armed', state: 'armed' })); + await writeSlot( + 'modem-executing', + legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-executing', state: 'executing' }), + ); + await writeSlot('modem-done', legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-done', state: 'completed' })); + await writeSlot('modem-failed', legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-failed', state: 'failed' })); + + const { recovery } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(4); + expect(recovery.pending.map((record) => record.physicalModemId)).toEqual(['modem-armed']); + expect(recovery.unknownOutcome.map((record) => record.physicalModemId)).toEqual([ + 'modem-executing', + ]); + expect(recovery.blocked.map((record) => record.physicalModemId)).toEqual(['modem-failed']); + expect(recovery.reconciliationRequired).toEqual(['modem-armed', 'modem-executing']); + }); + + test('a blocked slot is NOT folded into reconciliation', async () => { + await writeSlot('modem-failed', legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-failed', state: 'failed' })); + const { recovery } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(recovery.reconciliationRequired).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a corrupt slot is reported and the readable ones still come back', async () => { + await writeSlot('modem-good', legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-good' })); + const badName = await writeSlot('modem-bad', '{not json'); + + const { recovery, entries } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(entries.map((entry) => entry.stableKey)).toEqual(['modem-good']); + expect(recovery.damage).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.location).toEqual({ kind: 'slot', slot: badName }); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.failure.code).toBe('invalid-json'); + }); + + test('a corrupt slot is LEFT IN PLACE, exactly as CeraUI leaves it', async () => { + const badName = await writeSlot('modem-bad', '{not json'); + await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(await readFile(join(dir, badName), 'utf8')).toBe('{not json'); + }); + + test('non-json files in the directory are ignored', async () => { + await writeFile(join(dir, 'README.txt'), 'not a slot'); + await writeSlot('modem-good', legacyDocument({ stableKey: 'modem-good' })); + const { recovery } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(recovery.records).toHaveLength(1); + expect(recovery.damage).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('an absent directory reads as empty, not as damaged', async () => { + const { recovery, entries } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir: join(dir, 'nope') }); + expect(entries).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.records).toEqual([]); + expect(recovery.damage).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a wrong-version document is typed as a version mismatch', async () => { + await writeSlot('modem-v2', legacyDocument({ version: 2 })); + const { recovery } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.failure).toEqual({ code: 'unsupported-schema-version' }); + }); + + test('a history array over the cap is refused by field name', async () => { + await writeSlot( + 'modem-history', + legacyDocument({ + history: Array.from({ length: 33 }, () => ({ state: 'armed', at: 1 })), + }), + ); + const { recovery } = await readLegacyCeraUiJournal({ dir }); + expect(recovery.damage[0]?.failure).toEqual({ code: 'schema-mismatch', field: 'history' }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.ts b/control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8703110 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/legacy-ceraui.ts @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +// COMPATIBILITY READ PATH for the mutation journal CeraUI already writes. +// +// WHY THIS EXISTS AT ALL. CeraUI has kept a durable modem-mutation journal since +// long before this package had one, and devices in the field have those files on +// disk right now. The two shapes are genuinely different — this package's journal +// is an append-only EVENT LOG in one file, CeraUI's is a directory of per-modem +// LATEST-STATE SNAPSHOTS, one JSON document per modem, rewritten whole on every +// transition. Neither can be re-labelled into the other, so the bridge is a READER: +// it decodes CeraUI's shape into the SAME `JournalOperationRecord` model +// `recovery.ts` produces, so a consumer enumerates pending and unknown-outcome work +// across both without CeraUI having to change its file format first. +// +// NOTHING HERE WRITES. This module reads and decodes; it never rewrites, repairs, +// migrates in place, or deletes a slot. CeraUI's own reader leaves an unreadable +// slot on disk deliberately, and a second reader that "cleaned up" behind it would +// destroy the evidence CeraUI kept on purpose. +// +// THE DIRECTORY IS INJECTED, exactly like the native store's path — this module +// hardcodes no location, and the path-injection gate covers it. +// +// THE SLOT FILENAME IS A HASH, and `legacyMutationSlotName` mirrors that rule so a +// consumer can address ONE modem's slot without scanning. It is a RULE-D MIRROR of +// CeraUI's helper, never a shared import — the same relationship the support-claim +// ladder and the redaction key sets already have with their CeraUI twins. +// +// TWO MAPPING DECISIONS CARRY WEIGHT: +// +// * `armed` maps to `pending` and `executing` maps to `unknown-outcome`. They are +// not the same fact. `armed` says the pre-state was captured and the write had +// not been dispatched, so the device is untouched. `executing` says the write +// WAS dispatched and no terminal state was ever recorded — which is precisely +// what this package calls an unknown outcome. Collapsing them would either +// invent certainty about a dispatched write or manufacture doubt about one that +// never left. +// +// * `kind` is validated as a NON-EMPTY STRING, not against a frozen enum. +// CeraUI's runtime enum spreads its capability-module mutation kinds into the +// list, so the vocabulary grows on CeraUI's release cycle. Freezing a copy here +// would make this reader reject a perfectly valid file the day CeraUI adds a +// capability module — a compatibility reader that fails closed on new-but-valid +// input is worse than no reader at all. + +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; +import { readdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +import { decodeJournalDocument, type JournalDecodeResult, journalSchema } from './codec'; +import type { JournalDescriptorEvidence } from './entry'; +import { + type JournalOperationRecord, + type JournalRecovery, + type JournalRecoveryDisposition, + summarizeJournalRecords, +} from './recovery'; +import type { JournalDamageRecord } from './store'; + +/** The `version` literal CeraUI's schema pins. */ +export const LEGACY_CERAUI_JOURNAL_VERSION = 1; + +/** CeraUI's cap on retained history entries per slot. */ +export const LEGACY_CERAUI_HISTORY_CAP = 32; + +export const LEGACY_CERAUI_MUTATION_STATES = [ + 'armed', + 'executing', + 'completed', + 'failed', + 'acknowledged', + 'device-absent-quarantine', + 'decommissioned', + 'recommission-pending', +] as const; +export type LegacyCeraUiMutationState = (typeof LEGACY_CERAUI_MUTATION_STATES)[number]; + +export const LEGACY_CERAUI_ACK_MODES = ['verified-rollback', 'force-rebaseline'] as const; +export type LegacyCeraUiAckMode = (typeof LEGACY_CERAUI_ACK_MODES)[number]; + +export interface LegacyCeraUiHistoryEntry { + readonly state: LegacyCeraUiMutationState; + readonly at: number; + readonly detail?: string; +} + +/** One CeraUI slot document, decoded verbatim. `preState` is kept opaque. */ +export interface LegacyCeraUiMutationEntry { + readonly version: typeof LEGACY_CERAUI_JOURNAL_VERSION; + readonly stableKey: string; + readonly kind: string; + readonly state: LegacyCeraUiMutationState; + readonly attemptId: string; + readonly startedAt: number; + readonly updatedAt: number; + /** The rollback target. Opaque by design — its shape is the mutation kind's. */ + readonly preState: Readonly>; + readonly detail?: string; + readonly acknowledgedMode?: LegacyCeraUiAckMode; + readonly history: readonly LegacyCeraUiHistoryEntry[]; +} + +export interface LegacyCeraUiJournalRead { + /** The same recovery model `reconstructJournalRecovery` produces. */ + readonly recovery: JournalRecovery; + /** The decoded slot documents, verbatim, so `preState` survives the read. */ + readonly entries: readonly LegacyCeraUiMutationEntry[]; +} + +export interface LegacyCeraUiJournalOptions { + /** REQUIRED. The embedding process owns where CeraUI put its journal. */ + readonly dir: string; +} + +/** + * The slot filename CeraUI derives from a stable key. + * + * RULE-D MIRROR of CeraUI's own helper. It is a plain lowercase-hex SHA-256 of the + * key's UTF-8 bytes; the key itself never appears in the filename in plaintext. + */ +export function legacyMutationSlotName(stableKey: string): string { + return createHash('sha256').update(stableKey, 'utf8').digest('hex'); +} + +function parseHistoryEntry(raw: unknown): LegacyCeraUiHistoryEntry { + const source = journalSchema.record(raw, 'history[]'); + const detail = journalSchema.optionalString(source, 'detail'); + return { + state: journalSchema.member(source, 'state', LEGACY_CERAUI_MUTATION_STATES), + at: journalSchema.requiredNonNegativeInteger(source, 'at'), + ...(detail === undefined ? {} : { detail }), + }; +} + +/** Validate one slot document. Throws the codec's metadata-only schema errors. */ +export function validateLegacyCeraUiEntry(raw: unknown): LegacyCeraUiMutationEntry { + const source = journalSchema.record(raw, 'entry'); + if (source.version !== LEGACY_CERAUI_JOURNAL_VERSION) throw journalSchema.schemaVersionError(); + const history = source.history; + if (!Array.isArray(history) || history.length > LEGACY_CERAUI_HISTORY_CAP) { + throw journalSchema.schemaError('history'); + } + const detail = journalSchema.optionalString(source, 'detail'); + const acknowledgedMode = + source.acknowledgedMode === undefined + ? undefined + : journalSchema.member(source, 'acknowledgedMode', LEGACY_CERAUI_ACK_MODES); + return { + version: LEGACY_CERAUI_JOURNAL_VERSION, + stableKey: journalSchema.requiredString(source, 'stableKey'), + kind: journalSchema.requiredString(source, 'kind'), + state: journalSchema.member(source, 'state', LEGACY_CERAUI_MUTATION_STATES), + attemptId: journalSchema.requiredString(source, 'attemptId'), + startedAt: journalSchema.requiredNonNegativeInteger(source, 'startedAt'), + updatedAt: journalSchema.requiredNonNegativeInteger(source, 'updatedAt'), + preState: journalSchema.record(source.preState, 'preState'), + ...(detail === undefined ? {} : { detail }), + ...(acknowledgedMode === undefined ? {} : { acknowledgedMode }), + history: history.map(parseHistoryEntry), + }; +} + +/** Decode one slot document's text. Never throws; returns a typed failure. */ +export function decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry( + text: string, +): JournalDecodeResult { + return decodeJournalDocument(text, validateLegacyCeraUiEntry); +} + +const DISPOSITION_BY_STATE: Readonly< + Record +> = { + // Pre-state captured, write never dispatched: the device is untouched. + armed: 'pending', + // Dispatched with no terminal record — this package's `unknown-outcome`. + executing: 'unknown-outcome', + completed: 'resolved', + // CeraUI's replay keeps these on disk and refuses further mutations until an + // operator acknowledges. That is a KNOWN bad ending, not an unknown one. + failed: 'blocked', + acknowledged: 'resolved', + 'device-absent-quarantine': 'blocked', + decommissioned: 'blocked', + 'recommission-pending': 'blocked', +}; + +/** + * The descriptor evidence a legacy entry can honestly supply. + * + * CeraUI's journal predates `OperationDescriptor`, so there is no descriptor to + * flatten. Every field below is either a fact the file actually carries (the + * mutation kind) or an explicit statement that the file carries nothing: + * `confidence: 'unknown'` rather than a borrowed default, and empty evidence + * arrays rather than invented profiles. `mutationImpact: 'write'` is a fact, not a + * guess — CeraUI's file is a MUTATION journal and records nothing else. + */ +export function legacyDescriptorEvidence(kind: string): JournalDescriptorEvidence { + return { + descriptorId: kind, + provider: 'ceraui-legacy', + authority: 'controller', + mutationImpact: 'write', + profiles: [], + firmware: [], + confidence: 'unknown', + }; +} + +/** Project one decoded slot onto the shared recovery record model. */ +export function legacyOperationRecord(entry: LegacyCeraUiMutationEntry): JournalOperationRecord { + const disposition = DISPOSITION_BY_STATE[entry.state]; + return { + operationId: entry.attemptId, + // CeraUI's `stableKey`, NOT a `PhysicalModemId` — see the note on the field. + physicalModemId: entry.stableKey, + // CeraUI's journal has no device-generation fence; 0 records "unfenced" + // rather than claiming a generation the file never carried. + generation: 0, + descriptor: legacyDescriptorEvidence(entry.kind), + disposition, + origin: 'legacy-ceraui', + startedAtMs: entry.startedAt, + updatedAtMs: entry.updatedAt, + // One slot is one attempt; CeraUI rewrites the slot rather than appending. + attempts: 1, + // `outcome` is deliberately ABSENT for every legacy record, including the + // `unknown-outcome` one. `JournalOutcome`'s unknown reason union is the + // frozen domain vocabulary — `stale-generation` / `write-reply-timed-out` / + // `write-reply-dropped` — and CeraUI's `executing` state asserts none of + // them: it says a write was dispatched and never concluded, not why. Naming + // one anyway would be the invented reading this package refuses everywhere + // else. The disposition carries the fact; the reason stays unclaimed. + }; +} + +/** + * Read a whole CeraUI journal directory. + * + * An unreadable or non-conforming slot is reported as damage and LEFT IN PLACE; + * every readable slot still comes back. That is the same non-truncating contract + * the native store makes, applied to a directory instead of a file. + */ +export async function readLegacyCeraUiJournal( + options: LegacyCeraUiJournalOptions, +): Promise { + let names: string[]; + try { + names = await readdir(options.dir); + } catch (error) { + if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') { + return { recovery: summarizeJournalRecords([], []), entries: [] }; + } + return { + recovery: summarizeJournalRecords( + [], + [{ location: { kind: 'file' }, bytes: 0, failure: { code: 'unreadable' } }], + ), + entries: [], + }; + } + + const entries: LegacyCeraUiMutationEntry[] = []; + const damage: JournalDamageRecord[] = []; + // Sorted so a recovery report is stable across filesystems that do not order + // `readdir`; the slot names are hashes, so the order carries no other meaning. + for (const name of [...names].sort()) { + if (!name.endsWith('.json')) continue; + let text: string; + try { + text = await readFile(join(options.dir, name), 'utf8'); + } catch { + damage.push({ + location: { kind: 'slot', slot: name }, + bytes: 0, + failure: { code: 'unreadable' }, + }); + continue; + } + const decoded = decodeLegacyCeraUiEntry(text); + if (decoded.ok) { + entries.push(decoded.value); + continue; + } + damage.push({ + location: { kind: 'slot', slot: name }, + bytes: Buffer.byteLength(text, 'utf8'), + failure: decoded.failure, + }); + } + + return { + recovery: summarizeJournalRecords(entries.map(legacyOperationRecord), damage), + entries, + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/journal/recovery.ts b/control/src/journal/recovery.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0204371 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/recovery.ts @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// Replay: fold a journal back into "what was in flight when we died". +// +// This is the whole reason the journal exists. `operations/operation-engine.ts` +// keeps its uncertainty fence in a `Set` on the engine instance, +// so a process death drops it and the next mutation proceeds as if nothing were +// outstanding. Folding the journal reconstructs that set from disk. +// +// THE FOLD IS ORDER-SENSITIVE AND LAST-WRITE-WINS PER OPERATION. Entries are +// applied in file order, keyed by (physical modem, operation id, generation). A +// second `started` on a live key is a re-run and re-opens the record rather than +// being deduplicated away — the journal records attempts, and hiding a second +// attempt would make a retry loop invisible in exactly the forensics the file is +// kept for. +// +// FOUR DISPOSITIONS, AND TWO OF THEM MEAN "RECONCILE BEFORE MUTATING AGAIN": +// +// pending a start with no completion — the process died inside the +// operation, so whether the device changed is unknown. +// unknown-outcome a completion the engine itself classified unknown: a stale +// generation, or a write reply that timed out or was dropped. +// resolved a definite ending (applied / refused / failed). The engine +// treats a definite failure as definite; so does this. +// blocked a terminal state a human must clear. Native journals never +// produce it today — it exists because CeraUI's own mutation +// journal HAS such states (`failed`, quarantine, decommission) +// and `legacy-ceraui.ts` maps onto this same model. Folding +// those into `resolved` would report an operator-blocked device +// as healthy; folding them into `unknown-outcome` would claim +// uncertainty about an outcome that is actually known. +// +// `reconciliationRequired` deliberately covers `pending` + `unknown-outcome` only. +// A blocked record is a KNOWN bad ending awaiting acknowledgement, and answering +// it with a reconciliation pass would silently clear a state that exists precisely +// so it cannot be cleared silently. + +import { DomainError } from '../domain'; +import type { JournalDescriptorEvidence, JournalEntry, JournalOutcome } from './entry'; +import type { JournalDamageRecord, JournalReadResult } from './store'; + +export type JournalRecoveryDisposition = 'pending' | 'unknown-outcome' | 'resolved' | 'blocked'; + +/** Where a record came from. Also tells a consumer how to read `physicalModemId`. */ +export type JournalRecordOrigin = 'native' | 'legacy-ceraui'; + +/** + * One operation reconstructed from the journal. + * + * `physicalModemId` is TEXT, not the branded `PhysicalModemId`, and that is + * deliberate: for a `legacy-ceraui` record it holds CeraUI's own `stableKey`, + * which is a different identity vocabulary and would be REFUSED by + * `physicalModemId()`'s constructor. Coercing it would either throw on a + * perfectly valid legacy file or launder a foreign identity into a branded type + * that promises it came from the serial / ID_PATH ladder. `origin` is what tells + * a consumer which vocabulary it is holding. + */ +export interface JournalOperationRecord { + readonly operationId: string; + readonly physicalModemId: string; + readonly generation: number; + readonly descriptor: JournalDescriptorEvidence; + readonly disposition: JournalRecoveryDisposition; + readonly origin: JournalRecordOrigin; + readonly startedAtMs: number; + readonly updatedAtMs: number; + readonly attempts: number; + readonly outcome?: JournalOutcome; +} + +export interface JournalRecovery { + /** Every reconstructed operation, in first-appearance order. */ + readonly records: readonly JournalOperationRecord[]; + readonly pending: readonly JournalOperationRecord[]; + readonly unknownOutcome: readonly JournalOperationRecord[]; + readonly blocked: readonly JournalOperationRecord[]; + /** Distinct modem identities that must be reconciled before the next mutation. */ + readonly reconciliationRequired: readonly string[]; + readonly damage: readonly JournalDamageRecord[]; +} + +/** Raised only by `assertJournalIntact`; recovery itself always returns a report. */ +export class JournalRecoveryError extends DomainError { + override readonly name = 'JournalRecoveryError'; + readonly damage: readonly JournalDamageRecord[]; + + constructor(damage: readonly JournalDamageRecord[]) { + super(`journal recovery found ${damage.length} damaged record(s)`); + this.damage = damage; + } +} + +/** + * Escalate a damaged journal to a throw, for a caller that wants fail-closed. + * + * Kept SEPARATE from `reconstructJournalRecovery` on purpose: recovery must be + * able to hand back the survivors even when part of the file is unreadable, so + * the decision to refuse to proceed belongs to the caller, after it has seen + * what did survive. + */ +export function assertJournalIntact(recovery: JournalRecovery): void { + if (recovery.damage.length > 0) throw new JournalRecoveryError(recovery.damage); +} + +function keyOf(entry: JournalEntry): string { + return `${entry.physicalModemId}\u0000${entry.operationId}\u0000${entry.generation}`; +} + +function dispositionOf(outcome: JournalOutcome): JournalRecoveryDisposition { + return outcome.status === 'unknown-outcome' ? 'unknown-outcome' : 'resolved'; +} + +/** Fold decoded entries into per-operation records. Pure; no clock, no I/O. */ +export function reconstructJournalRecovery(read: JournalReadResult): JournalRecovery { + const byKey = new Map(); + const order: string[] = []; + + for (const { entry } of read.entries) { + const key = keyOf(entry); + const previous = byKey.get(key); + if (previous === undefined) order.push(key); + + if (entry.phase === 'started') { + byKey.set(key, { + operationId: entry.operationId, + physicalModemId: entry.physicalModemId, + generation: entry.generation, + descriptor: entry.descriptor, + disposition: 'pending', + origin: 'native', + // The FIRST start is when this operation began; a re-run does not + // rewrite history, it increments the attempt count. + startedAtMs: previous?.startedAtMs ?? entry.recordedAtMs, + updatedAtMs: entry.recordedAtMs, + attempts: (previous?.attempts ?? 0) + 1, + }); + continue; + } + + byKey.set(key, { + operationId: entry.operationId, + physicalModemId: entry.physicalModemId, + generation: entry.generation, + descriptor: entry.descriptor, + disposition: dispositionOf(entry.outcome), + origin: 'native', + startedAtMs: previous?.startedAtMs ?? entry.recordedAtMs, + updatedAtMs: entry.recordedAtMs, + // A completion with no start is a journal whose head was never written; + // counting it as one attempt is more honest than reporting zero. + attempts: previous?.attempts ?? 1, + outcome: entry.outcome, + }); + } + + const records = order + .map((key) => byKey.get(key)) + .filter((value): value is JournalOperationRecord => value !== undefined); + return summarizeJournalRecords(records, read.damage); +} + +/** Build the summary views over already-reconstructed records (native or legacy). */ +export function summarizeJournalRecords( + records: readonly JournalOperationRecord[], + damage: readonly JournalDamageRecord[], +): JournalRecovery { + const pending = records.filter((record) => record.disposition === 'pending'); + const unknownOutcome = records.filter((record) => record.disposition === 'unknown-outcome'); + const blocked = records.filter((record) => record.disposition === 'blocked'); + const reconciliationRequired = [ + ...new Set([...pending, ...unknownOutcome].map((record) => record.physicalModemId)), + ].sort(); + return { records, pending, unknownOutcome, blocked, reconciliationRequired, damage }; +} diff --git a/control/src/journal/store.ts b/control/src/journal/store.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c409a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/journal/store.ts @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +// The append-only journal store. THE PATH IS INJECTED AND HAS NO DEFAULT. +// +// This package never learns where a journal lives. The embedding process owns that +// decision because it owns the filesystem contract: on a CeraLive device the +// update-surviving partition is the right home, on a bench box a scratch directory +// is, and in a test a `mkdtemp` directory is. A default here would be a policy this +// library has no standing to set, and — worse — a default is what turns "the +// embedder forgot to configure it" into "we silently wrote somewhere plausible". +// `journal-path-injection.test.ts` fails the build if an absolute path literal ever +// appears in this directory's executable source. +// +// THREE PROPERTIES THIS STORE GUARANTEES, ALL LOAD-BEARING: +// +// 1. APPEND-ONLY. There is no verb here that rewrites or truncates the file. +// A rewrite is the one operation that can lose a fact that was already +// durable, and a journal that can lose a fact answers nothing after a crash. +// +// 2. A DAMAGED RECORD NEVER DISCARDS ITS NEIGHBOURS. `read()` decodes every line +// independently and returns the survivors alongside a typed damage report. +// Stopping at the first bad line — the natural thing a `for` loop with a throw +// does — silently truncates the journal to its first corruption, which is +// exactly the failure mode this store exists to make impossible. +// +// 3. A TORN TRAILING LINE IS CLOSED BEFORE THE NEXT APPEND. A process killed +// mid-write leaves a final line with no terminator. Appending straight onto it +// would glue the new entry to the garbage and corrupt a SECOND record — one +// that was never in flight when the crash happened. The store probes the last +// byte once and emits a leading terminator when the file does not end in one, +// so the damage stays confined to the record that actually tore. + +import { appendFile, chmod, mkdir, open, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { dirname } from 'node:path'; + +import { decodeJournalEntry, encodeJournalEntry, type JournalDecodeFailure } from './codec'; +import type { JournalEntry } from './entry'; + +const NEWLINE = 0x0a; + +/** Default file mode. `0600` for the same reason the two policy stores use it. */ +export const JOURNAL_FILE_MODE = 0o600; + +/** Where a damaged record was found. Line-based, slot-based, or the whole file. */ +export type JournalDamageLocation = + | { readonly kind: 'line'; readonly line: number; readonly trailing: boolean } + | { readonly kind: 'slot'; readonly slot: string } + | { readonly kind: 'file' }; + +/** One record that could not be read, reported rather than dropped. */ +export interface JournalDamageRecord { + readonly location: JournalDamageLocation; + readonly bytes: number; + readonly failure: JournalDecodeFailure; +} + +/** One decoded entry with the 1-based line it came from. */ +export interface JournalLineRecord { + readonly line: number; + readonly entry: JournalEntry; +} + +export interface JournalReadResult { + readonly entries: readonly JournalLineRecord[]; + readonly damage: readonly JournalDamageRecord[]; +} + +export interface JournalStore { + /** The injected path, echoed back so a caller can report where it recovered from. */ + readonly path: string; + append(entry: JournalEntry): Promise; + read(): Promise; +} + +export interface FileJournalStoreOptions { + /** REQUIRED. There is no default and no fallback. */ + readonly path: string; + readonly mode?: number; +} + +export class JournalPathError extends Error { + override readonly name = 'JournalPathError'; + + constructor() { + super('journal path refused: an explicit, non-empty path must be injected'); + } +} + +/** + * Decode a whole journal document. + * + * Exported because the corruption fixtures assert against it directly — proving + * the "survivors are kept" property without needing a filesystem to prove it. + * Blank lines carry no record and are skipped rather than reported: a trailing + * newline is how every line ends, so the final split member is always empty. + */ +export function decodeJournalText(text: string): JournalReadResult { + const lines = text.split('\n'); + let lastPopulated = -1; + for (let index = lines.length - 1; index >= 0; index -= 1) { + if ((lines[index] ?? '').trim().length > 0) { + lastPopulated = index; + break; + } + } + + const entries: JournalLineRecord[] = []; + const damage: JournalDamageRecord[] = []; + for (const [index, raw] of lines.entries()) { + if (raw.trim().length === 0) continue; + const decoded = decodeJournalEntry(raw); + if (decoded.ok) { + entries.push({ line: index + 1, entry: decoded.value }); + continue; + } + damage.push({ + location: { kind: 'line', line: index + 1, trailing: index === lastPopulated }, + bytes: Buffer.byteLength(raw, 'utf8'), + failure: decoded.failure, + }); + } + return { entries, damage }; +} + +class FileJournalStore implements JournalStore { + readonly path: string; + readonly #mode: number; + #tail: Promise = Promise.resolve(); + /** Undefined until the first append probes the existing file's final byte. */ + #terminated: boolean | undefined; + + constructor(options: FileJournalStoreOptions) { + if (typeof options.path !== 'string' || options.path.trim().length === 0) { + throw new JournalPathError(); + } + this.path = options.path; + this.#mode = options.mode ?? JOURNAL_FILE_MODE; + } + + append(entry: JournalEntry): Promise { + // Chained so two concurrent appends cannot interleave, and recovered from so + // one failed append does not poison every later one with its rejection. + const next = this.#tail.catch(() => undefined).then(() => this.#appendNow(entry)); + this.#tail = next.catch(() => undefined); + return next; + } + + async read(): Promise { + let text: string; + try { + text = await readFile(this.path, 'utf8'); + } catch (error) { + // An ABSENT journal is an empty one — nothing was ever written. Anything + // else (permissions, a directory in the way) is reported as damage: a + // journal we could not open is not evidence that no mutation was pending. + if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') { + return { entries: [], damage: [] }; + } + return { + entries: [], + damage: [{ location: { kind: 'file' }, bytes: 0, failure: { code: 'unreadable' } }], + }; + } + return decodeJournalText(text); + } + + async #appendNow(entry: JournalEntry): Promise { + await mkdir(dirname(this.path), { recursive: true }); + this.#terminated ??= await this.#probeTerminated(); + const line = `${this.#terminated ? '' : '\n'}${encodeJournalEntry(entry)}\n`; + await appendFile(this.path, line, { mode: this.#mode }); + // chmod AFTER the write, not as an open flag, so the mode holds regardless of + // umask — the same reason the usage and FCC policy stores do it this way. + await chmod(this.path, this.#mode); + this.#terminated = true; + } + + async #probeTerminated(): Promise { + let handle: Awaited>; + try { + handle = await open(this.path, 'r'); + } catch { + // No file yet: the first line starts the document, nothing to close. + return true; + } + try { + const { size } = await handle.stat(); + if (size === 0) return true; + const tail = Buffer.alloc(1); + await handle.read(tail, 0, 1, size - 1); + return tail[0] === NEWLINE; + } finally { + await handle.close(); + } + } +} + +export function createFileJournalStore(options: FileJournalStoreOptions): JournalStore { + return new FileJournalStore(options); +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/envelope.ts b/control/src/observations/envelope.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95ff100 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/envelope.ts @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +// Envelope construction for normalizers. +// +// One rule shapes this module: **a payload that arrived is an OBSERVATION, however +// little of it could be read.** A refused HiLink session, an unparseable goform body +// and a UFI endpoint that answered without the field all produce a FRESH envelope +// whose metrics are `unknown` with a reason — not an `unavailable` one. That matters +// for a reason beyond taxonomy: `ObservationEnvelope` pairs `unavailable` with +// `value: null`, so emitting `unavailable` for a payload we did hold would throw the +// diagnostics block away with it, and the raw vendor fields with that. +// +// `unavailable` is therefore reserved for the case where there is no payload at all — +// the device is gone, or the provider could not be engaged. + +import type { + DeviceGeneration, + EpochMillis, + ObservationAuthority, + ObservationEnvelope, + ObservationFreshness, + SourceEpoch, + StableKey, +} from '../domain'; +import type { MetricProvenance, ObservationSourceKind } from './provenance'; + +export type ObservationStaleReason = Extract['reason']; +export type ObservationUnavailableReason = Extract< + ObservationFreshness, + { state: 'unavailable' } +>['reason']; + +export type EnvelopeView = + | { + readonly kind: 'valued'; + readonly value: T; + readonly freshness: Extract; + } + | { + readonly kind: 'unavailable'; + readonly freshness: Extract; + }; + +/** + * Split an envelope into its two representable shapes. + * + * The package's only cast over an envelope lives here. `ObservationEnvelope` pairs + * `value: T` with fresh|stale and `value: null` with unavailable BY CONSTRUCTION, but + * the discriminant sits one level down (`freshness.state`) and TypeScript narrows a + * union only on a direct property — so the pairing the type already guarantees has to + * be restated once, here, instead of at every call site. + */ +export function viewEnvelope(envelope: ObservationEnvelope): EnvelopeView { + return envelope.freshness.state === 'unavailable' + ? { kind: 'unavailable', freshness: envelope.freshness } + : { kind: 'valued', value: envelope.value as T, freshness: envelope.freshness }; +} + +/** + * Everything a normalizer needs that it cannot derive from the payload. + * + * There is no clock and no epoch counter in this layer: `observedAt` and + * `sourceEpoch` are supplied by whoever performed the read, so a normalizer cannot + * stamp a payload with a time it did not come from. + */ +export type NormalizationContext = { + readonly stableKey: StableKey; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly sourceEpoch: SourceEpoch; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly authority?: ObservationAuthority; +}; + +export function contextAuthority(context: NormalizationContext): ObservationAuthority { + return context.authority ?? 'authoritative'; +} + +/** + * Provenance for one metric. + * + * `authority` is per-METRIC rather than inherited wholesale, because one payload can + * mix classes: a router's RSRP is a measurement the modem reported, while its bar + * count is a vendor rendering of that measurement, and calling both `authoritative` + * would let a consumer treat a marketing scale as a reading. + */ +export function metricProvenance( + source: ObservationSourceKind, + context: NormalizationContext, + rawFields: readonly string[], + authority?: ObservationAuthority, +): MetricProvenance { + return { + source, + sourceEpoch: context.sourceEpoch, + observedAt: context.observedAt, + authority: authority ?? contextAuthority(context), + rawFields, + }; +} + +/** A fresh envelope around a normalized value. */ +export function freshObservation( + source: ObservationSourceKind, + context: NormalizationContext, + value: T, +): ObservationEnvelope { + return { + stableKey: context.stableKey, + generation: context.generation, + source, + sourceEpoch: context.sourceEpoch, + observedAt: context.observedAt, + authority: contextAuthority(context), + freshness: { state: 'fresh' }, + value, + }; +} + +/** + * An envelope for a read that produced no payload at all. + * + * It carries `value: null` by construction — there is no overload that could invent + * one — which is also why a normalizer holding vendor bytes must not use it. + */ +export function unavailableObservation( + source: ObservationSourceKind, + context: NormalizationContext, + reason: ObservationUnavailableReason, +): ObservationEnvelope { + return { + stableKey: context.stableKey, + generation: context.generation, + source, + sourceEpoch: context.sourceEpoch, + observedAt: context.observedAt, + authority: contextAuthority(context), + freshness: { state: 'unavailable', since: context.observedAt, reason }, + value: null, + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/freshness.ts b/control/src/observations/freshness.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17c1b7a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/freshness.ts @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// Freshness evaluation — how a retained observation ages, and what it never becomes. +// +// Three rules carry the weight here: +// +// 1. **Staleness keeps the value.** An aged reading is the last thing the device +// actually said; discarding it leaves an operator with a blank field and no way +// to tell "we lost contact" from "the modem reports nothing". +// 2. **Unavailable is terminal on re-evaluation.** An envelope that carries no value +// cannot become stale, because there is nothing to age. Re-classifying it would +// have to invent a value to be stale about. +// 3. **Staleness is monotonic.** A stale envelope is returned UNCHANGED, so its +// `since` and `reason` record the FIRST cause. Freshness comes from a new read, +// never from re-evaluating an old one. +// +// This module has no clock: the caller supplies `at` on every evaluation, which is +// what makes the whole window testable without waiting. Same discipline as +// `location/fix-state.ts`. + +import { + type DeviceGeneration, + type EpochMillis, + epochMillis, + isCurrentGeneration, + type ObservationEnvelope, + type SourceEpoch, +} from '../domain'; +import { type ObservationStaleReason, viewEnvelope } from './envelope'; + +/** How long a retained value is reported fresh before it ages into `stale`. */ +export type FreshnessWindow = { + readonly ttlMs: number; +}; + +export type FreshnessEvaluation = { + /** The caller's current time. This module never reads a clock of its own. */ + readonly at: EpochMillis; + readonly window: FreshnessWindow; + /** The source's current epoch; an older envelope epoch is superseded. */ + readonly currentSourceEpoch?: SourceEpoch; + /** The device's current generation; an envelope from an older one is fenced out. */ + readonly currentGeneration?: DeviceGeneration; + /** `false` marks a source that is answering but degraded (e.g. a reconnecting bus). */ + readonly sourceHealthy?: boolean; +}; + +/** How long ago an envelope was observed, floored at zero for a clock that moved back. */ +export function observationAgeMs(envelope: ObservationEnvelope, at: EpochMillis): number { + return Math.max(0, at - envelope.observedAt); +} + +/** + * Re-classify an envelope against the current time, epoch, generation and source + * health. + * + * Trigger precedence, when several apply at once: superseded generation → superseded + * source epoch → degraded source → TTL expiry. The first three are positive statements + * that the reading has been overtaken by a newer reality; TTL expiry only says nobody + * has looked recently, and reporting it over a supersession would understate why. + */ +export function evaluateFreshness( + envelope: ObservationEnvelope, + evaluation: FreshnessEvaluation, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const view = viewEnvelope(envelope); + if (view.kind === 'unavailable' || view.freshness.state !== 'fresh') { + return envelope; + } + + const reason = staleReason(envelope, evaluation); + if (reason === undefined) { + return envelope; + } + + return { + ...envelope, + freshness: { state: 'stale', since: staleSince(envelope, evaluation, reason), reason }, + value: view.value, + }; +} + +function staleReason( + envelope: ObservationEnvelope, + evaluation: FreshnessEvaluation, +): ObservationStaleReason | undefined { + if ( + evaluation.currentGeneration !== undefined && + !isCurrentGeneration(envelope.generation, evaluation.currentGeneration) + ) { + return 'source-epoch-superseded'; + } + if ( + evaluation.currentSourceEpoch !== undefined && + envelope.sourceEpoch !== evaluation.currentSourceEpoch + ) { + return 'source-epoch-superseded'; + } + if (evaluation.sourceHealthy === false) { + return 'source-degraded'; + } + return observationAgeMs(envelope, evaluation.at) > evaluation.window.ttlMs + ? 'ttl-expired' + : undefined; +} + +/** + * When the reading became stale. + * + * A TTL expiry has an exact moment — one window after it was observed — and reporting + * the evaluation time instead would make a reading that expired an hour ago look like + * it just went stale. A supersession or a degradation is only known at the moment it + * is evaluated, so those honestly report `at`. + */ +function staleSince( + envelope: ObservationEnvelope, + evaluation: FreshnessEvaluation, + reason: ObservationStaleReason, +): EpochMillis { + return reason === 'ttl-expired' + ? epochMillis(envelope.observedAt + evaluation.window.ttlMs) + : evaluation.at; +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/index.ts b/control/src/observations/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20cf02f --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// The observation layer — normalization, provenance, freshness. +// +// It sits directly on top of the migrated pure logic (`domain/mm-enums.ts`, +// `domain/modem-presentation.ts`, `hardware/router-parsers.ts`) and turns a raw +// per-vendor payload into ONE `ObservationEnvelope` that +// carries where every value came from and why any value is missing. It opens no +// transport: a provider performs the read, this layer explains the result. +// +// Reachable through the package root, deliberately not through a new subpath — the +// public specifier set is a frozen contract and this is normalization, which the root +// entry already owns. + +export * from './envelope'; +export * from './freshness'; +export * from './metric'; +export * from './model'; +export * from './provenance'; +export * from './raw'; +export * from './reading'; +export * from './sources/hilink'; +export * from './sources/modemmanager'; +export * from './sources/router-shared'; +export * from './sources/ufi'; +export * from './sources/zte'; +export * from './state-separation'; diff --git a/control/src/observations/metric.ts b/control/src/observations/metric.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c3fdcc --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/metric.ts @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +// A normalized metric: a value, or an explicit reason there is none — with the +// provenance of the exact reading that produced it. +// +// `unknown` is a FIRST-CLASS state here, and its reason is what keeps it from +// collapsing into `unsupported`. Those two answer different questions: `unsupported` +// is a positive claim about the SOURCE ("this provider cannot express this datum at +// all"), while every other reason is a claim about one READ ("the provider could have +// said, and did not / could not be asked / answered nonsense"). Folding the second +// class into the first is how a control disappears from an operator's screen because +// one poll came back empty. + +import type { RouterSignalMetric, RouterSignalUnknownReason } from '../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { MetricProvenance } from './provenance'; + +export const METRIC_UNKNOWN_REASONS = [ + /** A positive claim about the SOURCE: it cannot express this datum at all. */ + 'unsupported', + /** The source answered and simply did not include this field. */ + 'not-reported', + /** Nobody has read this yet. Says nothing about the source or the device. */ + 'not-observed', + /** The source answered with something this layer could not decode. */ + 'malformed', + /** The source refused the read; the session needs re-authentication. */ + 'auth-expired', + /** The source answered with an explicit refusal code for this field. */ + 'refused', + /** The source could not be reached for this read. */ + 'unreachable', +] as const; +export type MetricUnknownReason = (typeof METRIC_UNKNOWN_REASONS)[number]; + +/** + * The two classes an unknown reason falls into. + * + * `capability` is a durable statement about the source; `read` is a statement about + * one attempt and may differ on the next one. A consumer deciding whether to HIDE a + * control (capability) or show it as pending (read) must branch on this, never on the + * bare fact that a value is missing. + */ +export type MetricUnknownClass = 'capability' | 'read'; + +export function metricUnknownClass(reason: MetricUnknownReason): MetricUnknownClass { + return reason === 'unsupported' ? 'capability' : 'read'; +} + +/** Whether a reason is the positive "this source cannot report it" claim. */ +export function isCapabilityUnknown(reason: MetricUnknownReason): reason is 'unsupported' { + return metricUnknownClass(reason) === 'capability'; +} + +export type NormalizedMetric = + | { + readonly state: 'known'; + readonly value: T; + readonly provenance: MetricProvenance; + } + | { + readonly state: 'unknown'; + readonly reason: MetricUnknownReason; + readonly provenance: MetricProvenance; + }; + +export function knownMetric(value: T, provenance: MetricProvenance): NormalizedMetric { + return { state: 'known', value, provenance }; +} + +export function unknownMetric( + reason: MetricUnknownReason, + provenance: MetricProvenance, +): NormalizedMetric { + return { state: 'unknown', reason, provenance }; +} + +/** + * Lift an optional decode result into a metric. + * + * `reason` is supplied by the caller precisely so this helper cannot pick one: the + * difference between "the provider omitted the field" and "this provider has no such + * field" is knowledge the decoder does not have and the call site does. + */ +export function metricFromOptional( + value: T | undefined, + reason: MetricUnknownReason, + provenance: MetricProvenance, +): NormalizedMetric { + return value === undefined + ? unknownMetric(reason, provenance) + : knownMetric(value, provenance); +} + +/** + * The migrated router parsers' own unknown vocabulary, carried across UNCHANGED. + * + * Every member of `RouterSignalUnknownReason` is a member of `MetricUnknownReason` + * with the same meaning, so this is a widening and never a re-classification — in + * particular `not-reported` stays `not-reported` and does not become `unsupported`. + */ +export function metricUnknownReasonFromRouter( + reason: RouterSignalUnknownReason | 'refused', +): MetricUnknownReason { + return reason; +} + +/** Wrap one migrated router signal metric with its provenance. */ +export function metricFromRouterSignal( + metric: RouterSignalMetric, + provenance: MetricProvenance, +): NormalizedMetric { + return metric.state === 'known' + ? knownMetric(metric.value, provenance) + : unknownMetric(metricUnknownReasonFromRouter(metric.reason), provenance); +} + +/** Transform a known value while preserving state, reason and provenance. */ +export function mapMetric( + metric: NormalizedMetric, + transform: (value: T) => U, +): NormalizedMetric { + return metric.state === 'known' + ? knownMetric(transform(metric.value), metric.provenance) + : unknownMetric(metric.reason, metric.provenance); +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/model.ts b/control/src/observations/model.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..398d40e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/model.ts @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// The normalized observation shape every source produces. +// +// It is deliberately NARROW. A field earns a slot here only when more than one source +// can express it and an operator surface acts on it; everything else stays verbatim in +// the diagnostics block rather than growing a per-vendor branch of the model. That is +// the whole trade this layer makes — one shape to render, nothing thrown away. +// +// Every leaf is a `NormalizedMetric`, so "the source cannot report this" and "the +// source did not report this on this read" are different values with different +// reasons rather than the same absent field. + +import type { RadioAccessTechnology } from '../domain'; +import type { SimPresenceEvidence } from '../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { NormalizedMetric } from './metric'; +import type { ObservationDiagnostics, ObservationSourceKind } from './provenance'; + +export type NormalizedHardware = { + /** The operator-facing model label, sanitized by the migrated presentation rules. */ + readonly label: NormalizedMetric; + /** + * The label plus a short equipment-identifier tail, as CeraUI has always rendered + * it. It embeds the last five digits of an IMEI, so it is display copy and must + * not be used as a key or written to a log. + */ + readonly displayName: NormalizedMetric; +}; + +export type NormalizedRadio = { + readonly modemState: NormalizedMetric; + readonly registration: NormalizedMetric; + readonly accessTechnologies: NormalizedMetric; + readonly modeLabel: NormalizedMetric; +}; + +/** + * Signal metrics. + * + * `quality` and `bars`/`maxBars` are different measurements and both are kept: + * ModemManager reports a 0-100 percentage and no bar count, while the router admin + * APIs report a vendor bar scale and no percentage. Deriving one from the other would + * be inventing a reading, so each source reports what it has and answers + * `unsupported` — a positive claim — for what it structurally cannot. + */ +export type NormalizedSignal = { + readonly quality: NormalizedMetric; + /** + * ModemManager's `SignalQuality` is a `(ub)` — a percentage AND a boolean saying + * whether it was measured recently or is the last cached reading. The boolean is a + * separate fact about the same measurement, so it gets its own metric rather than + * being folded into freshness: an envelope's staleness is about when WE read, this + * is about when the MODEM last measured. The router APIs have no such flag and say + * so with `unsupported`. + */ + readonly qualityRecent: NormalizedMetric; + readonly bars: NormalizedMetric; + readonly maxBars: NormalizedMetric; + readonly dbm: NormalizedMetric; + readonly rsrp: NormalizedMetric; + readonly rsrq: NormalizedMetric; + readonly snr: NormalizedMetric; + readonly sinr: NormalizedMetric; +}; + +/** + * SIM presence as a metric value is BINARY on purpose. + * + * The migrated `deriveSimPresence` answers `present | absent | unknown`; the third + * member is not a presence, it is the absence of an answer, so it becomes the + * metric's `unknown` state with a reason instead of a third value. That is what stops + * "we could not tell" from being rendered beside "there is no SIM". + */ +export type SimPresenceValue = 'present' | 'absent'; + +export type NormalizedSim = { + readonly presence: NormalizedMetric; + /** + * WHICH FACT decided `presence`. Carried beside the metric rather than derived from + * it, because "absent" and "we could not tell" are read off the SAME empty fields + * and only the evidence separates them. `absent` is reachable through exactly one + * evidence kind (`state-failed-reason`), which is what makes "never inferred from a + * blank field" a property a test can assert rather than a convention. + */ + readonly presenceEvidence: SimPresenceEvidence; + readonly lockRequired: NormalizedMetric; + readonly kind: NormalizedMetric<'physical' | 'esim'>; + readonly esimStatus: NormalizedMetric<'no-profiles' | 'with-profiles'>; +}; + +export type NormalizedModemObservation = { + readonly source: ObservationSourceKind; + readonly hardware: NormalizedHardware; + readonly radio: NormalizedRadio; + readonly signal: NormalizedSignal; + readonly sim: NormalizedSim; + /** Everything the provider said, verbatim, plus what was and was not claimed. */ + readonly diagnostics: ObservationDiagnostics; +}; diff --git a/control/src/observations/normalization.test.ts b/control/src/observations/normalization.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3f632b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/normalization.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + FIXTURE_GENERATION, + FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH, + FIXTURE_STABLE_KEY, + fixtureContext, + HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, + HILINK_FIXTURE, + MM_FIXTURE, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, + UFI_FIXTURE, + ZTE_FIXTURE, + ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE, +} from '../../test-support/observation-fixtures'; +import { REDACTED } from '../redact'; +import { viewEnvelope } from './envelope'; +import type { NormalizedMetric } from './metric'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from './model'; +import { redactObservationDiagnostics } from './provenance'; +import { normalizeHilinkObservation } from './sources/hilink'; +import { normalizeModemManagerObservation } from './sources/modemmanager'; +import { normalizeUfiObservation } from './sources/ufi'; +import { normalizeZteObservation } from './sources/zte'; + +const CONTEXT = fixtureContext(); + +function observation( + envelope: ReturnType, +): NormalizedModemObservation { + const view = viewEnvelope(envelope); + if (view.kind === 'unavailable') { + throw new Error('fixture normalization must not produce an unavailable envelope'); + } + return view.value; +} + +function reason(metric: NormalizedMetric): string { + return metric.state === 'unknown' ? metric.reason : `known:${String(metric.value)}`; +} + +const MM = observation(normalizeModemManagerObservation(MM_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)); +const HILINK = observation(normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)); +const ZTE = observation(normalizeZteObservation(ZTE_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)); +const UFI = observation(normalizeUfiObservation(UFI_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)); + +describe('every source produces one envelope shape', () => { + const cases = [ + ['modemmanager', normalizeModemManagerObservation(MM_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)], + ['huawei-hilink', normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)], + ['zte-goform', normalizeZteObservation(ZTE_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)], + ['ufi-himiapi', normalizeUfiObservation(UFI_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)], + ] as const; + + test.each(cases.map(([name]) => name))( + 'Given the %s fixture, when normalized, then the envelope carries identity, epoch and time', + (name) => { + const envelope = cases.find(([id]) => id === name)?.[1]; + if (envelope === undefined) { + throw new Error(`missing case ${name}`); + } + + expect(envelope.source).toBe(name); + expect(envelope.stableKey).toBe(FIXTURE_STABLE_KEY); + expect(envelope.generation).toBe(FIXTURE_GENERATION); + expect(envelope.sourceEpoch).toBe(FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH); + expect(envelope.observedAt).toBe(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT); + expect(envelope.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + }, + ); + + test.each(cases.map(([name]) => name))( + 'Given the %s fixture, when normalized, then consumed and unmapped partition the raw record', + (name) => { + const envelope = cases.find(([id]) => id === name)?.[1]; + if (envelope === undefined) { + throw new Error(`missing case ${name}`); + } + const { diagnostics } = observation(envelope); + const rawKeys = Object.keys(diagnostics.raw).sort(); + + expect([...diagnostics.consumed, ...diagnostics.unmapped].sort()).toEqual(rawKeys); + expect(diagnostics.consumed.filter((key) => diagnostics.unmapped.includes(key))).toEqual([]); + expect(diagnostics.source).toBe(name); + }, + ); +}); + +describe('ModemManager normalization', () => { + test('Given a registered modem, when normalized, then the migrated decoders supply the values', () => { + expect(MM.radio.modemState).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'registered' }); + expect(MM.radio.registration).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'home' }); + expect(MM.radio.accessTechnologies).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: ['5gnr'] }); + expect(MM.radio.modeLabel).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: '5g4g' }); + expect(MM.hardware.label).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'RM530N-GL' }); + expect(MM.sim.presence).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'present' }); + expect(MM.sim.lockRequired).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'none' }); + expect(MM.sim.kind).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'physical' }); + }); + + test('Given the Signal interface, when normalized, then each metric names the field it came from', () => { + expect(MM.signal.quality).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 71 }); + expect(MM.signal.dbm).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -71 }); + expect(MM.signal.rsrp).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -98.5 }); + expect(MM.signal.rsrp.provenance).toEqual({ + source: 'modemmanager', + sourceEpoch: FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH, + observedAt: FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + authority: 'authoritative', + rawFields: ['Signal.rsrp'], + }); + }); + + test('Given a metric ModemManager cannot express, when normalized, then it is a capability claim', () => { + expect(reason(MM.signal.bars)).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(reason(MM.signal.maxBars)).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(reason(MM.signal.sinr)).toBe('unsupported'); + }); + + test('Given a field present but undecodable, when normalized, then it is malformed and noted', () => { + expect(reason(MM.sim.esimStatus)).toBe('malformed'); + expect(MM.diagnostics.notes).toContainEqual({ + code: 'field-shape-unrecognized', + field: 'Sim.EsimStatus', + }); + }); + + test('Given an interface nobody read, when normalized, then it is not-observed rather than not-reported', () => { + const withoutSim = observation( + normalizeModemManagerObservation({ modem: MM_FIXTURE.modem ?? {} }, CONTEXT), + ); + + expect(reason(withoutSim.sim.kind)).toBe('not-observed'); + expect(reason(withoutSim.sim.esimStatus)).toBe('not-observed'); + expect(reason(withoutSim.signal.rsrp)).toBe('not-observed'); + expect(reason(withoutSim.radio.registration)).toBe('not-reported'); + }); + + test('Given an absent modem state, when normalized, then it is not-reported and never unsupported', () => { + const empty = observation(normalizeModemManagerObservation({ modem: {} }, CONTEXT)); + + expect(reason(empty.radio.modemState)).toBe('not-reported'); + expect(reason(empty.sim.presence)).toBe('not-reported'); + expect(reason(empty.hardware.label)).toBe('not-reported'); + }); +}); + +describe('HiLink normalization', () => { + test('Given both bodies, when normalized, then the migrated parser supplies the signal', () => { + expect(HILINK.signal.bars).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 4 }); + expect(HILINK.signal.maxBars).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 5 }); + expect(HILINK.signal.dbm).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -65 }); + expect(HILINK.signal.rsrp).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -101 }); + expect(HILINK.signal.sinr).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 12 }); + expect(HILINK.radio.modeLabel).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: '03' }); + }); + + test('Given a vendor bar scale, when normalized, then it is marked derived rather than authoritative', () => { + expect(HILINK.signal.bars.provenance.authority).toBe('derived'); + expect(HILINK.signal.dbm.provenance.authority).toBe('authoritative'); + }); + + test('Given a router admin API, when normalized, then absent modem concepts are capability claims', () => { + expect(reason(HILINK.radio.modemState)).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(reason(HILINK.radio.registration)).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(reason(HILINK.signal.quality)).toBe('unsupported'); + }); + + test('Given a refused session, when normalized, then metrics report auth-expired and NOT unsupported', () => { + const refused = observation(normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)); + + expect(reason(refused.signal.dbm)).toBe('auth-expired'); + expect(reason(refused.signal.bars)).toBe('auth-expired'); + expect(reason(refused.radio.modeLabel)).toBe('auth-expired'); + expect(refused.diagnostics.notes).toContainEqual({ + code: 'auth-expired', + field: 'monitoring-status.code', + }); + }); + + test('Given a refused session, when normalized, then the envelope is still an observation', () => { + const envelope = normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, CONTEXT); + + expect(envelope.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + expect(envelope.value).not.toBeNull(); + }); +}); + +describe('ZTE normalization', () => { + test('Given a goform body, when normalized, then signal and mode come from the migrated parsers', () => { + expect(ZTE.signal.bars).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 4 }); + expect(ZTE.signal.dbm).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -67 }); + expect(ZTE.signal.rsrp).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -99 }); + expect(ZTE.signal.rsrq).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: -10 }); + expect(ZTE.signal.snr).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 7 }); + expect(ZTE.radio.modeLabel).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'LTE' }); + }); + + test('Given the vendor fixed bar scale, when normalized, then it is derived', () => { + expect(ZTE.signal.maxBars).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 5 }); + expect(ZTE.signal.maxBars.provenance.authority).toBe('derived'); + }); + + test('Given an unparseable body, when normalized, then it is a malformed observation, not an unavailable one', () => { + const envelope = normalizeZteObservation(ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE, CONTEXT); + const malformed = observation(envelope); + + expect(envelope.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + expect(reason(malformed.signal.dbm)).toBe('malformed'); + expect(reason(malformed.radio.modeLabel)).toBe('malformed'); + expect(malformed.diagnostics.notes).toContainEqual({ + code: 'unparseable-body', + field: 'goform', + }); + }); +}); + +describe('UFI normalization', () => { + test('Given three endpoints, when normalized, then the single reported reading survives', () => { + expect(UFI.signal.dbm).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 3 }); + expect(UFI.hardware.label).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'UFI-M600' }); + expect(UFI.signal.dbm.provenance.rawFields).toEqual([ + 'sysinfo.SIGNAL', + 'overview.SIGNAL', + 'status.signalStrength', + ]); + }); + + test('Given a SessionOut reply, when normalized, then the reading is auth-expired and noted', () => { + const refused = observation(normalizeUfiObservation(UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, CONTEXT)); + + expect(reason(refused.signal.dbm)).toBe('auth-expired'); + expect(refused.diagnostics.notes).toContainEqual({ + code: 'auth-expired', + field: 'overview.reply', + }); + }); + + test('Given subscriber identifiers in the payload, when redacted, then only those are masked', () => { + const redacted = redactObservationDiagnostics(UFI.diagnostics); + + expect(UFI.diagnostics.raw['overview.IMSI']).toBe('732123456789012'); + expect(redacted.raw['overview.IMSI']).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(redacted.raw['overview.ICCID']).toBe(REDACTED); + expect(redacted.raw['sysinfo.cputemp']).toBe('46'); + expect(redacted.unmapped).toEqual(UFI.diagnostics.unmapped); + }); +}); + +describe('no raw vendor field is dropped during normalization', () => { + const roundTrips = [ + ['modemmanager', MM, 'Modem.Ports', ['ttyUSB0', 'wwan0']], + ['modemmanager', MM, 'Modem3gpp.Pco', 'dns-primary=10.0.0.1'], + ['modemmanager', MM, 'Sim.OperatorName', 'CLARO COL'], + ['modemmanager', MM, 'Signal.refresh_rate', 5], + ['huawei-hilink', HILINK, 'monitoring-status.CurrentNetworkTypeEx', '101'], + ['huawei-hilink', HILINK, 'device-signal.TotalDownload', '987654321'], + ['huawei-hilink', HILINK, 'monitoring-status.ConnectionStatus', '901'], + ['zte-goform', ZTE, 'goform.wan_lte_ca', 'ca_deactivated'], + ['zte-goform', ZTE, 'goform.lte_pci', '188'], + ['zte-goform', ZTE, 'goform.rmcc', '732'], + ['ufi-himiapi', UFI, 'sysinfo.cputemp', '46'], + ['ufi-himiapi', UFI, 'overview.WEBVER', 'V1.0.7'], + ['ufi-himiapi', UFI, 'status.battery', '88'], + ] as const; + + test.each(roundTrips.map(([source, , key]) => `${source} ${key}`))( + 'Given %s, when normalized, then the vendor field survives verbatim in diagnostics', + (label) => { + const entry = roundTrips.find(([source, , key]) => `${source} ${key}` === label); + if (entry === undefined) { + throw new Error(`missing round trip ${label}`); + } + const [, normalized, key, value] = entry; + + expect(normalized.diagnostics.raw[key]).toEqual(value); + expect(normalized.diagnostics.unmapped).toContain(key); + }, + ); + + test('Given a repeated XML tag, when flattened, then later occurrences are kept under a suffix', () => { + expect(HILINK.diagnostics.raw['net-mode-list.Index']).toBe('00'); + expect(HILINK.diagnostics.raw['net-mode-list.Index#2']).toBe('03'); + expect(HILINK.diagnostics.raw['net-mode-list.Name']).toBe('AUTO'); + expect(HILINK.diagnostics.raw['net-mode-list.Name#2']).toBe('LTE'); + }); + + test('Given a consumed field, when normalized, then it is still present in the raw record', () => { + for (const normalized of [MM, HILINK, ZTE, UFI]) { + for (const key of normalized.diagnostics.consumed) { + expect(Object.hasOwn(normalized.diagnostics.raw, key)).toBe(true); + } + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/observations/observation-states.test.ts b/control/src/observations/observation-states.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43bb2ae --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/observation-states.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + FIXTURE_GENERATION, + FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH, + fixtureContext, +} from '../../test-support/observation-fixtures'; +import { deviceGeneration, epochMillis, type ObservationEnvelope, sourceEpoch } from '../domain'; +import { freshObservation, metricProvenance, unavailableObservation } from './envelope'; +import { evaluateFreshness, observationAgeMs } from './freshness'; +import { + isCapabilityUnknown, + knownMetric, + METRIC_UNKNOWN_REASONS, + metricUnknownClass, + metricUnknownReasonFromRouter, + type NormalizedMetric, + unknownMetric, +} from './metric'; +import { hasReadableValue, readMetric } from './reading'; + +type Sample = { readonly reading: NormalizedMetric }; + +const CONTEXT = fixtureContext(); +const WINDOW = { ttlMs: 30_000 }; +const PROVENANCE = metricProvenance('modemmanager', CONTEXT, ['Modem.SignalQuality']); + +function sampleEnvelope(metric: NormalizedMetric): ObservationEnvelope { + return freshObservation('modemmanager', CONTEXT, { reading: metric }); +} + +const KNOWN = sampleEnvelope(knownMetric(71, PROVENANCE)); + +describe('freshness windows', () => { + test('Given a fresh observation inside its window, when evaluated, then it stays fresh', () => { + const evaluated = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + WINDOW.ttlMs), + window: WINDOW, + }); + + expect(evaluated.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + expect(evaluated.value).toEqual(KNOWN.value); + }); + + test('Given a fresh observation aged past its window, when evaluated, then it reports stale and KEEPS its value', () => { + const evaluated = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + WINDOW.ttlMs + 1), + window: WINDOW, + }); + + expect(evaluated.freshness.state).toBe('stale'); + expect(evaluated.value).not.toBeNull(); + expect(readMetric(evaluated, (value) => value.reading)).toMatchObject({ + state: 'stale', + value: 71, + reason: 'ttl-expired', + }); + }); + + test('Given an aged observation, when it goes stale, then `since` is the moment the window closed', () => { + const evaluated = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + 5 * WINDOW.ttlMs), + window: WINDOW, + }); + + expect(evaluated.freshness).toEqual({ + state: 'stale', + since: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + WINDOW.ttlMs), + reason: 'ttl-expired', + }); + }); + + test('Given a superseded generation, when evaluated, then supersession outranks TTL expiry', () => { + const evaluated = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + 10 * WINDOW.ttlMs), + window: WINDOW, + currentGeneration: deviceGeneration(FIXTURE_GENERATION + 1), + }); + + expect(evaluated.freshness).toEqual({ + state: 'stale', + since: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + 10 * WINDOW.ttlMs), + reason: 'source-epoch-superseded', + }); + }); + + test('Given a superseded source epoch, when evaluated inside the window, then it is stale anyway', () => { + const evaluated = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + window: WINDOW, + currentSourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH + 1), + }); + + expect(evaluated.freshness).toMatchObject({ reason: 'source-epoch-superseded' }); + }); + + test('Given a degraded source, when evaluated inside the window, then it is stale for that reason', () => { + const evaluated = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + window: WINDOW, + sourceHealthy: false, + }); + + expect(evaluated.freshness).toMatchObject({ reason: 'source-degraded' }); + }); + + test('Given an already stale observation, when re-evaluated, then its first cause survives', () => { + const stale = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + WINDOW.ttlMs + 1), + window: WINDOW, + }); + const again = evaluateFreshness(stale, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + 10 * WINDOW.ttlMs), + window: WINDOW, + sourceHealthy: false, + }); + + expect(again).toBe(stale); + }); + + test('Given a clock that moved backwards, when the age is taken, then it floors at zero', () => { + expect(observationAgeMs(KNOWN, epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT - 5_000))).toBe(0); + }); +}); + +describe('stale, unavailable and unknown are three distinct states', () => { + const stale = evaluateFreshness(KNOWN, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + WINDOW.ttlMs + 1), + window: WINDOW, + }); + const unavailable = unavailableObservation('modemmanager', CONTEXT, 'device-absent'); + const unknown = sampleEnvelope(unknownMetric('not-reported', PROVENANCE)); + + const staleReading = readMetric(stale, (value) => value.reading); + const unavailableReading = readMetric(unavailable, (value) => value.reading); + const unknownReading = readMetric(unknown, (value) => value.reading); + + test('Given the three cases, when read, then their discriminants differ', () => { + expect([staleReading.state, unavailableReading.state, unknownReading.state]).toEqual([ + 'stale', + 'unavailable', + 'unknown', + ]); + }); + + test('Given the three cases, when read, then only stale carries a value', () => { + expect(hasReadableValue(staleReading)).toBe(true); + expect(hasReadableValue(unavailableReading)).toBe(false); + expect(hasReadableValue(unknownReading)).toBe(false); + expect('value' in unavailableReading).toBe(false); + expect('value' in unknownReading).toBe(false); + }); + + test('Given an unavailable observation, when read, then no metric provenance is invented', () => { + expect('provenance' in unavailableReading).toBe(false); + expect(unavailable.value).toBeNull(); + expect(unavailableReading.envelope.observedAt).toBe(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT); + }); + + test('Given an unavailable observation, when aged past the window, then it never becomes stale', () => { + const aged = evaluateFreshness(unavailable, { + at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + 100 * WINDOW.ttlMs), + window: WINDOW, + sourceHealthy: false, + }); + + expect(aged.freshness).toEqual({ + state: 'unavailable', + since: FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + reason: 'device-absent', + }); + expect(aged.value).toBeNull(); + }); + + test('Given an unknown metric in a stale envelope, when read, then it reads unknown rather than stale', () => { + const staleUnknown = evaluateFreshness( + sampleEnvelope(unknownMetric('auth-expired', PROVENANCE)), + { at: epochMillis(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT + WINDOW.ttlMs + 1), window: WINDOW }, + ); + const reading = readMetric(staleUnknown, (value) => value.reading); + + expect(reading.state).toBe('unknown'); + expect(reading.envelope.observedAt).toBe(FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT); + }); +}); + +describe('unknown is never coerced to unsupported', () => { + test('Given every unknown reason, when classified, then only `unsupported` is a capability claim', () => { + const capability = METRIC_UNKNOWN_REASONS.filter(isCapabilityUnknown); + + expect(capability).toEqual(['unsupported']); + expect(METRIC_UNKNOWN_REASONS.map(metricUnknownClass)).toEqual( + METRIC_UNKNOWN_REASONS.map((reason) => (reason === 'unsupported' ? 'capability' : 'read')), + ); + }); + + test('Given a migrated router reason, when carried across, then it is preserved verbatim', () => { + const routerReasons = [ + 'unsupported', + 'not-reported', + 'malformed', + 'auth-expired', + 'unreachable', + 'refused', + ] as const; + + for (const reason of routerReasons) { + expect(metricUnknownReasonFromRouter(reason)).toBe(reason); + } + }); + + test('Given a read-class unknown, when compared to a capability claim, then they are different values', () => { + const notReported = unknownMetric('not-reported', PROVENANCE); + const unsupported = unknownMetric('unsupported', PROVENANCE); + + expect(notReported).not.toEqual(unsupported); + expect(metricUnknownClass('not-reported')).not.toBe(metricUnknownClass('unsupported')); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/observations/provenance.ts b/control/src/observations/provenance.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d74fe10 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/provenance.ts @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +// Provenance + diagnostics — where a normalized value came from, and everything the +// provider said that the normalized model has no field for. +// +// The rule this module exists to enforce: normalization NARROWS a vendor payload into +// one shape, it does not DISCARD it. Every provider-native field a normalizer reads — +// and every one it does not — is retained verbatim in `ObservationDiagnostics.raw`, +// and each normalized metric carries the provenance of the exact observation that +// produced it. A consumer can therefore always answer "which provider said this, and +// when" without the provider having to widen the normalized model. + +import type { EpochMillis, ObservationAuthority, SourceEpoch } from '../domain'; +import { redact } from '../redact'; + +/** + * The provider families this layer normalizes. + * + * These are SOURCE SHAPES, not live transports. Todo 18 builds the normalization + * layer; the providers that will feed it (ModemManager D-Bus, the HiLink/goform/HIMI + * HTTP sessions) are separate work and open no connection from here. + * + * `networkmanager` is here because NM is a source of a DIFFERENT fact than the other + * four: it reports which connection is in force on which interface, never a radio + * reading. Giving it its own kind is what keeps a bearer observation attributable to + * NM rather than laundered through whichever provider happened to read the modem. + */ +export const OBSERVATION_SOURCE_KINDS = [ + 'modemmanager', + 'huawei-hilink', + 'zte-goform', + 'ufi-himiapi', + 'networkmanager', +] as const; +export type ObservationSourceKind = (typeof OBSERVATION_SOURCE_KINDS)[number]; + +/** + * A provider-native value, kept exactly as the provider expressed it. + * + * Arrays are part of the union because ModemManager genuinely returns them + * (`Modem.SimSlots` is an `ao`); flattening one to its first member here would be a + * silent drop of exactly the kind this module exists to prevent. + */ +export type RawFieldValue = string | number | boolean | null | readonly RawFieldValue[]; + +/** Provider-native fields keyed by their provider-native names. */ +export type RawFieldRecord = Readonly>; + +/** + * Per-metric provenance: which source, which reading of it, and when. + * + * It is carried on EVERY metric rather than only on the envelope because one + * normalized observation routinely folds several provider reads together (HiLink + * answers `device_signal` and `monitoring_status` separately; UFI answers three + * endpoints), so a single envelope-level `observedAt` would be a claim about a + * reading no individual metric came from. + */ +export type MetricProvenance = { + readonly source: ObservationSourceKind; + readonly sourceEpoch: SourceEpoch; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly authority: ObservationAuthority; + /** The provider-native field name(s) this value was normalized from. */ + readonly rawFields: readonly string[]; +}; + +/** + * Structural complaints about a payload. A note names the FIELD or body it concerns + * and never carries its value: a body can hold an ICCID or a one-time code, and a + * diagnostic is the one place a reviewer reads verbatim. + */ +export const OBSERVATION_DIAGNOSTIC_CODES = [ + 'unparseable-body', + 'empty-body', + 'auth-expired', + 'field-shape-unrecognized', +] as const; +export type ObservationDiagnosticCode = (typeof OBSERVATION_DIAGNOSTIC_CODES)[number]; + +export type ObservationDiagnosticNote = { + readonly code: ObservationDiagnosticCode; + /** The provider-native field or body name, never its content. */ + readonly field: string; +}; + +/** + * The typed diagnostics block: the provider payload, verbatim, plus which fields the + * normalizer claimed and which it did not. + * + * `raw` is a REDACTION-CLASS boundary. A vendor payload routinely carries an ICCID or + * an IMSI (the UFI overview endpoint reports both), so anything that logs, serializes + * or files a diagnostics block must route it through {@link redactObservationDiagnostics} + * first. Retention and disclosure are different decisions; this layer only guarantees + * the first. + */ +export type ObservationDiagnostics = { + readonly source: ObservationSourceKind; + /** Every provider-native field, verbatim. Nothing is dropped during normalization. */ + readonly raw: RawFieldRecord; + /** Fields a normalized metric claims. They remain present in `raw` as well. */ + readonly consumed: readonly string[]; + /** Fields in `raw` that no normalized field claims — retained, never discarded. */ + readonly unmapped: readonly string[]; + readonly notes: readonly ObservationDiagnosticNote[]; +}; + +export type DiagnosticsInput = { + readonly source: ObservationSourceKind; + readonly raw: RawFieldRecord; + readonly consumed?: readonly string[]; + readonly notes?: readonly ObservationDiagnosticNote[]; +}; + +/** + * Build a diagnostics block, deriving `unmapped` rather than accepting it. + * + * Deriving it is what makes the no-drop property structural: a normalizer cannot + * declare a field mapped without a metric that names it, and a field it never + * mentions lands in `unmapped` automatically instead of vanishing. + */ +export function createObservationDiagnostics(input: DiagnosticsInput): ObservationDiagnostics { + const rawKeys = Object.keys(input.raw); + const consumed = [...new Set(input.consumed ?? [])].filter((key) => rawKeys.includes(key)).sort(); + const consumedSet = new Set(consumed); + return { + source: input.source, + raw: input.raw, + consumed, + unmapped: rawKeys.filter((key) => !consumedSet.has(key)).sort(), + notes: input.notes ?? [], + }; +} + +/** + * A copy of `diagnostics` with every sensitive raw field replaced by the shared + * redaction marker. Routed through the package's own key-based `redact`, so the + * classes it masks here are exactly the classes it masks everywhere else. + */ +export function redactObservationDiagnostics( + diagnostics: ObservationDiagnostics, +): ObservationDiagnostics { + return { ...diagnostics, raw: redact(diagnostics.raw) as RawFieldRecord }; +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/raw.ts b/control/src/observations/raw.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0226f37 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/raw.ts @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +// Raw-payload helpers — the retention half of normalization. +// +// Every normalizer builds ONE flat `RawFieldRecord` out of whatever bodies it was +// handed, keyed by `.`, and reads its metrics out of +// that same record. Reading from the retained copy rather than from the original +// bodies is what makes the no-drop property hold by construction instead of by +// discipline: a field a metric consumed is necessarily a field the diagnostics block +// already carries. + +import type { RawFieldRecord, RawFieldValue } from './provenance'; + +export function rawKey(body: string, field: string): string { + return `${body}.${field}`; +} + +/** Prefix a provider's flat record with the body it came from. */ +export function prefixRawRecord( + body: string, + record: Readonly> | undefined, +): RawFieldRecord { + const out: Record = {}; + for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(record ?? {})) { + out[rawKey(body, field)] = value; + } + return out; +} + +export function mergeRawRecords(...records: readonly RawFieldRecord[]): RawFieldRecord { + return Object.assign({}, ...records) as RawFieldRecord; +} + +export function rawString(record: RawFieldRecord, key: string): string | undefined { + const value = record[key]; + if (typeof value === 'string') { + const trimmed = value.trim(); + return trimmed === '' ? undefined : trimmed; + } + return typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean' ? String(value) : undefined; +} + +export function rawNumber(record: RawFieldRecord, key: string): number | undefined { + const value = record[key]; + if (typeof value === 'number') { + return Number.isFinite(value) ? value : undefined; + } + if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.trim() === '') { + return undefined; + } + const parsed = Number.parseFloat(value); + return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : undefined; +} + +export function rawStringArray(record: RawFieldRecord, key: string): readonly string[] | undefined { + const value = record[key]; + return Array.isArray(value) + ? value.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === 'string') + : undefined; +} + +export function hasRawField(record: RawFieldRecord, key: string): boolean { + return Object.hasOwn(record, key); +} + +/** + * One member of a D-Bus STRUCT retained verbatim. + * + * ModemManager's `SignalQuality` is a `(ub)` and its `CurrentModes` is a `(uu)`, so + * retaining them verbatim means the raw record holds an ARRAY where a naive read + * expects a scalar. A caller that flattened the struct before retention would keep the + * first member and silently drop the second — the recency flag, and the preferred mode + * — which is the drop this layer exists to prevent. A scalar answers at index 0, so a + * source that already flattened (mmcli, or a pre-existing fixture) still decodes. + */ +export function rawStructMember( + record: RawFieldRecord, + key: string, + index: number, +): RawFieldValue | undefined { + const value = record[key]; + if (Array.isArray(value)) return value[index]; + return index === 0 ? value : undefined; +} + +export function rawNumberAt( + record: RawFieldRecord, + key: string, + index: number, +): number | undefined { + const member = rawStructMember(record, key, index); + if (typeof member === 'number') return Number.isFinite(member) ? member : undefined; + if (typeof member !== 'string' || member.trim() === '') return undefined; + const parsed = Number.parseFloat(member); + return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : undefined; +} + +export function rawBooleanAt( + record: RawFieldRecord, + key: string, + index: number, +): boolean | undefined { + const member = rawStructMember(record, key, index); + return typeof member === 'boolean' ? member : undefined; +} + +const XML_LEAF = /<([A-Za-z_][\w.-]*)>([^<]*)<\/\1>/g; + +/** + * Flatten every leaf element of an XML body into `.` entries. + * + * A repeated tag — HiLink's `` list repeats `` once per mode — + * would otherwise overwrite its predecessors, so the second and later occurrences are + * suffixed `#2`, `#3`, …. Losing a repeat is exactly the silent drop this layer + * exists to prevent, and the suffix keeps the original tag name legible. + */ +export function flattenXmlBody(body: string, name: string): RawFieldRecord { + const out: Record = {}; + const seen = new Map(); + for (const match of body.matchAll(XML_LEAF)) { + const tag = match[1] ?? ''; + const count = (seen.get(tag) ?? 0) + 1; + seen.set(tag, count); + out[rawKey(name, count === 1 ? tag : `${tag}#${count}`)] = (match[2] ?? '').trim(); + } + return out; +} + +/** Parse a JSON object body, or `undefined` when the bytes are not a JSON object. */ +export function parseJsonObject(body: string): Readonly> | undefined { + let parsed: unknown; + try { + parsed = JSON.parse(body); + } catch (error) { + if (!(error instanceof SyntaxError)) { + throw error; + } + return undefined; + } + return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed) + ? (parsed as Readonly>) + : undefined; +} + +/** Parse a JSON object body into a flat record, or `undefined` when it is not one. */ +export function parseJsonRecord(body: string): Readonly> | undefined { + const parsed = parseJsonObject(body); + if (parsed === undefined) { + return undefined; + } + const out: Record = {}; + for (const [field, value] of Object.entries(parsed)) { + out[field] = normalizeRawValue(value); + } + return out; +} + +/** + * A nested object has no flat representation, so its JSON text is kept. + * + * Serializing rather than dropping is the whole contract of this layer: a payload + * this record cannot model structurally is still a payload a diagnostician can read. + */ +export function normalizeRawValue(value: unknown): RawFieldValue { + if (value === null) { + return null; + } + if (typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean') { + return value; + } + if (Array.isArray(value)) { + return value.map(normalizeRawValue); + } + // A nested object has no flat representation; keep its JSON text rather than drop it. + return JSON.stringify(value); +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/reading.ts b/control/src/observations/reading.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83d8f46 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/reading.ts @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +// Reading — the projection a consumer renders from. +// +// It is the one place the envelope's freshness and the metric's knownness are folded +// together, and it keeps FOUR genuinely distinct outcomes rather than a value plus a +// flag: +// +// `fresh` — a current value. +// `stale` — a RETAINED value that has aged out, with when and why. +// `unavailable` — there is no observation at all; no value exists to report. +// `unknown` — there IS an observation and this field is not in it, with a reason +// that says whether the source CANNOT report it or merely DID NOT. +// +// They differ in shape, not only in label: `unavailable` and `unknown` carry no +// `value` field at all, so no consumer can read one off a state that has none, and +// `unavailable` carries no metric provenance because no metric was produced. + +import type { + DeviceGeneration, + EpochMillis, + ObservationAuthority, + ObservationEnvelope, + SourceEpoch, + StableKey, +} from '../domain'; +import { + type ObservationStaleReason, + type ObservationUnavailableReason, + viewEnvelope, +} from './envelope'; +import type { MetricUnknownReason, NormalizedMetric } from './metric'; +import type { MetricProvenance } from './provenance'; + +/** The envelope-level provenance every reading carries, whatever its state. */ +export type EnvelopeProvenance = { + readonly stableKey: StableKey; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly source: string; + readonly sourceEpoch: SourceEpoch; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly authority: ObservationAuthority; +}; + +export function envelopeProvenance(envelope: ObservationEnvelope): EnvelopeProvenance { + return { + stableKey: envelope.stableKey, + generation: envelope.generation, + source: envelope.source, + sourceEpoch: envelope.sourceEpoch, + observedAt: envelope.observedAt, + authority: envelope.authority, + }; +} + +type ReadingBase = { readonly envelope: EnvelopeProvenance }; + +export type ObservationReading = + | (ReadingBase & { + readonly state: 'fresh'; + readonly value: T; + readonly provenance: MetricProvenance; + }) + | (ReadingBase & { + readonly state: 'stale'; + readonly value: T; + readonly since: EpochMillis; + readonly reason: ObservationStaleReason; + readonly provenance: MetricProvenance; + }) + | (ReadingBase & { + readonly state: 'unavailable'; + readonly since: EpochMillis; + readonly reason: ObservationUnavailableReason; + }) + | (ReadingBase & { + readonly state: 'unknown'; + readonly reason: MetricUnknownReason; + readonly provenance: MetricProvenance; + }); + +export const OBSERVATION_READING_STATES = ['fresh', 'stale', 'unavailable', 'unknown'] as const; +export type ObservationReadingState = (typeof OBSERVATION_READING_STATES)[number]; + +/** + * Project one metric out of an envelope. + * + * An unknown metric inside a STALE envelope reads `unknown`, not `stale`: staleness is + * a statement about a value's age, and there is no value here to have aged. The + * envelope's own age remains readable through `reading.envelope.observedAt`. + */ +export function readMetric( + envelope: ObservationEnvelope, + select: (value: T) => NormalizedMetric, +): ObservationReading { + const base: ReadingBase = { envelope: envelopeProvenance(envelope) }; + const view = viewEnvelope(envelope); + + if (view.kind === 'unavailable') { + return { + ...base, + state: 'unavailable', + since: view.freshness.since, + reason: view.freshness.reason, + }; + } + + const metric = select(view.value); + if (metric.state === 'unknown') { + return { ...base, state: 'unknown', reason: metric.reason, provenance: metric.provenance }; + } + if (view.freshness.state === 'stale') { + return { + ...base, + state: 'stale', + value: metric.value, + since: view.freshness.since, + reason: view.freshness.reason, + provenance: metric.provenance, + }; + } + return { ...base, state: 'fresh', value: metric.value, provenance: metric.provenance }; +} + +/** Whether a reading carries a value a consumer may render. */ +export function hasReadableValue( + reading: ObservationReading, +): reading is Extract, { readonly state: 'fresh' | 'stale' }> { + return reading.state === 'fresh' || reading.state === 'stale'; +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/sim-evidence.test.ts b/control/src/observations/sim-evidence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f28771 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/sim-evidence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +// EXPLICIT no-SIM evidence — the regression this suite locks down. +// +// "There is no SIM" and "we could not tell" are read off the SAME empty fields, and +// only the evidence separates them. The failure mode is silent and expensive: an +// operator is told to re-seat a SIM that is already seated, or a slot switch in +// flight is reported as a missing card. So `absent` is reachable through exactly ONE +// evidence kind here, and the control cases below prove nothing else produces it. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + fixtureContext, + HILINK_FIXTURE, + MM_FIXTURE, + UFI_FIXTURE, + ZTE_FIXTURE, +} from '../../test-support/observation-fixtures'; +import { decodeStateFailedReason } from '../domain'; +import { deriveSimPresence, readSimPresence } from '../hardware/router-parsers'; +import { viewEnvelope } from './envelope'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from './model'; +import { normalizeHilinkObservation } from './sources/hilink'; +import { normalizeModemManagerObservation } from './sources/modemmanager'; +import { normalizeUfiObservation } from './sources/ufi'; +import { normalizeZteObservation } from './sources/zte'; + +const SIM_PATH = '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SIM/0'; + +/** A modem with no SIM, exactly as ModemManager 1.24 reports one: `/` plus a `u` reason. */ +const NO_SIM_MODEM = { + Model: 'RM530N-GL', + Manufacturer: 'Quectel', + State: -1, + StateFailedReason: 2, + Sim: '/', + SimSlots: ['/'], +}; + +/** The SAME modem before it failed: blank SIM path, and NO failure reason at all. */ +const BLANK_SIM_MODEM = { + Model: 'RM530N-GL', + Manufacturer: 'Quectel', + State: 1, + Sim: '/', + SimSlots: ['/'], +}; + +/** The normalized value, or a hard failure — an unavailable envelope answers nothing here. */ +function valued( + envelope: ReturnType, +): NormalizedModemObservation { + const view = viewEnvelope(envelope); + if (view.kind !== 'valued' || view.freshness.state !== 'fresh') { + throw new Error('expected a fresh, valued observation'); + } + return view.value; +} + +const observe = (modem: Record) => + normalizeModemManagerObservation({ modem: modem as never, sim: {} }, fixtureContext()); + +const simOf = (modem: Record) => valued(observe(modem)).sim; + +describe('the presence rule itself', () => { + test('`absent` comes from the failure reason and from nothing else', () => { + expect(readSimPresence({ failedReason: 'sim-missing' })).toEqual({ + presence: 'absent', + evidence: { kind: 'state-failed-reason', field: 'failedReason', value: 'sim-missing' }, + }); + }); + + test('a blank SIM path with no reason is UNKNOWN, never absent', () => { + expect(readSimPresence({ sim: '/', simSlots: ['/'] })).toEqual({ + presence: 'unknown', + evidence: { kind: 'no-evidence', inspected: ['sim', 'simSlots', 'failedReason'] }, + }); + }); + + test('a completely empty fact set is UNKNOWN, never absent', () => { + expect(readSimPresence({}).presence).toBe('unknown'); + }); + + test('a failure reason that is not `sim-missing` proves nothing about the SIM', () => { + for (const failedReason of ['sim-error', 'unknown-capabilities', 'esim-without-profiles']) { + expect(readSimPresence({ sim: '/', failedReason }).presence).toBe('unknown'); + } + }); + + test('presence is proven by an object path, and the path is named as the evidence', () => { + expect(readSimPresence({ sim: SIM_PATH })).toEqual({ + presence: 'present', + evidence: { kind: 'sim-object-path', field: 'sim', value: SIM_PATH }, + }); + expect(readSimPresence({ sim: '/', simSlots: ['/', SIM_PATH] })).toEqual({ + presence: 'present', + evidence: { kind: 'sim-slot-object-path', field: 'simSlots', value: SIM_PATH }, + }); + }); + + test('an active SIM outranks a `sim-missing` reason left over from an earlier failure', () => { + expect(readSimPresence({ sim: SIM_PATH, failedReason: 'sim-missing' }).presence).toBe( + 'present', + ); + }); + + test('the migrated `deriveSimPresence` answers identically', () => { + for (const facts of [ + { failedReason: 'sim-missing' }, + { sim: '/', simSlots: ['/'] }, + { sim: SIM_PATH }, + {}, + ]) { + expect(deriveSimPresence(facts)).toBe(readSimPresence(facts).presence); + } + }); +}); + +describe('the D-Bus numeric failure reason is decoded, which is what makes absence readable', () => { + test('MMModemStateFailedReason 2 is `sim-missing`', () => { + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(2)).toBe('sim-missing'); + }); + + test('the other members decode to themselves and none of them is `sim-missing`', () => { + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(0)).toBe('none'); + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(1)).toBe('unknown-reason'); + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(3)).toBe('sim-error'); + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(4)).toBe('unknown-capabilities'); + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(5)).toBe('esim-without-profiles'); + }); + + test('a value this build cannot place proves nothing', () => { + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(99)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(decodeStateFailedReason(undefined)).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); + +describe('ModemManager observation — the no-SIM regression', () => { + test('a `u` StateFailedReason of 2 yields an EXPLICIT absent reading', () => { + const sim = simOf(NO_SIM_MODEM); + expect(sim.presence).toEqual({ + state: 'known', + value: 'absent', + provenance: expect.objectContaining({ source: 'modemmanager' }), + }); + expect(sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual({ + kind: 'state-failed-reason', + field: 'failedReason', + value: 'sim-missing', + }); + }); + + test('THE CONTROL: the same blank fields WITHOUT the reason are never absent', () => { + const sim = simOf(BLANK_SIM_MODEM); + expect(sim.presence.state).toBe('unknown'); + expect(sim.presenceEvidence.kind).toBe('no-evidence'); + if (sim.presence.state !== 'unknown') return; + expect(sim.presence.reason).toBe('not-reported'); + }); + + test('an unknown presence carries a READ-class reason, so a control is not hidden', () => { + const sim = simOf(BLANK_SIM_MODEM); + if (sim.presence.state !== 'unknown') throw new Error('expected unknown'); + expect(sim.presence.reason).not.toBe('unsupported'); + }); + + test('the raw failure reason is retained verbatim in the diagnostics block', () => { + const envelope = observe(NO_SIM_MODEM); + expect(valued(envelope).diagnostics.raw['Modem.StateFailedReason']).toBe(2); + }); + + test('a present SIM names the object path that proved it', () => { + const sim = simOf(MM_FIXTURE.modem as Record); + expect(sim.presence).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 'present' }); + expect(sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual({ + kind: 'sim-object-path', + field: 'sim', + value: SIM_PATH, + }); + }); +}); + +describe('router sources never claim a presence and say which code they left alone', () => { + test('HiLink names its own `SimStatus` without decoding it', () => { + const envelope = normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()); + expect(valued(envelope).sim.presence.state).toBe('unknown'); + expect(valued(envelope).sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual({ + kind: 'vendor-code-unclaimed', + field: 'monitoring-status.SimStatus', + }); + }); + + test('a vendor code that is named is still UNMAPPED — retained, not consumed', () => { + const envelope = normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()); + expect(valued(envelope).diagnostics.unmapped).toContain('monitoring-status.SimStatus'); + expect(valued(envelope).diagnostics.consumed).not.toContain('monitoring-status.SimStatus'); + }); + + test('ZTE and UFI report an unknown presence with no evidence of absence', () => { + for (const envelope of [ + normalizeZteObservation(ZTE_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + normalizeUfiObservation(UFI_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + ]) { + expect(valued(envelope).sim.presence.state).toBe('unknown'); + expect(valued(envelope).sim.presenceEvidence.kind).not.toBe('state-failed-reason'); + } + }); + + test('NO source can produce `absent` from a router payload', () => { + for (const envelope of [ + normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + normalizeZteObservation(ZTE_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + normalizeUfiObservation(UFI_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + ]) { + expect(valued(envelope).sim.presence).not.toMatchObject({ value: 'absent' }); + } + }); +}); + +describe('signal normalization is finalized on the same layer', () => { + test('ModemManager`s `(ub)` SignalQuality decodes BOTH members', () => { + const envelope = normalizeModemManagerObservation( + { modem: { SignalQuality: [71, true] } }, + fixtureContext(), + ); + expect(valued(envelope).signal.quality).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 71 }); + expect(valued(envelope).signal.qualityRecent).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: true }); + }); + + test('the `(ub)` pair is retained VERBATIM in the diagnostics block', () => { + const envelope = normalizeModemManagerObservation( + { modem: { SignalQuality: [71, false] } }, + fixtureContext(), + ); + expect(valued(envelope).diagnostics.raw['Modem.SignalQuality']).toEqual([71, false]); + expect(valued(envelope).signal.qualityRecent).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: false }); + }); + + test('a flattened percentage still decodes, and the flag reads as a READ-class unknown', () => { + const envelope = normalizeModemManagerObservation( + { modem: { SignalQuality: 71 } }, + fixtureContext(), + ); + expect(valued(envelope).signal.quality).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: 71 }); + expect(valued(envelope).signal.qualityRecent).toMatchObject({ + state: 'unknown', + reason: 'not-reported', + }); + }); + + test('`CurrentModes` decodes from its `(uu)` pair as well as from a flat mask', () => { + for (const currentModes of [[(1 << 3) | (1 << 4), 0], (1 << 3) | (1 << 4)]) { + const envelope = normalizeModemManagerObservation( + { modem: { CurrentModes: currentModes as never } }, + fixtureContext(), + ); + expect(valued(envelope).radio.modeLabel).toMatchObject({ state: 'known', value: '5g4g' }); + } + }); + + test('the router sources state they have no recency flag at all', () => { + for (const envelope of [ + normalizeHilinkObservation(HILINK_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + normalizeZteObservation(ZTE_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + normalizeUfiObservation(UFI_FIXTURE, fixtureContext()), + ]) { + expect(valued(envelope).signal.qualityRecent).toMatchObject({ + state: 'unknown', + reason: 'unsupported', + }); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/observations/sources/hilink.ts b/control/src/observations/sources/hilink.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b285cb --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/sources/hilink.ts @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +// Huawei HiLink admin API → normalized observation. +// +// The decoding is the migrated `parseHilinkSignal` / `parseHilinkCapabilities`; this +// module adds provenance, retains both XML bodies field-for-field, and states the +// capability boundary honestly. HiLink is a ROUTER admin API, not a modem stack: it +// has no ModemManager state, no 3GPP registration state and no access-technology +// bitmask, so those read `unsupported` — a claim about this source, which stays true +// on the next poll — while a field the API could carry and did not reads +// `not-reported`. +// +// Its `` and `` are NOT folded into `radio.registration` +// or `sim.presence`. They are vendor codes with vendor semantics and no migrated +// decoder claims them, so they stay verbatim in the diagnostics block instead of +// being guessed into a normalized field. + +import type { ObservationEnvelope } from '../../domain'; +import { parseHilinkCapabilities, parseHilinkSignal } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import { freshObservation, metricProvenance, type NormalizationContext } from '../envelope'; +import { + knownMetric, + metricFromRouterSignal, + metricUnknownReasonFromRouter, + type NormalizedMetric, + unknownMetric, +} from '../metric'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../model'; +import { createObservationDiagnostics, type ObservationDiagnosticNote } from '../provenance'; +import { flattenXmlBody, hasRawField, mergeRawRecords, rawKey } from '../raw'; +import { + type RouterProvenance, + routerHardware, + routerSim, + unsupportedQualityRecent, + unsupportedRadioMetric, +} from './router-shared'; + +const SOURCE = 'huawei-hilink' as const; +const STATUS = 'monitoring-status'; +const SIGNAL = 'device-signal'; +const NET_MODE_LIST = 'net-mode-list'; +const NET_MODE = 'net-mode'; +/** HiLink's own SIM presence code. Named as evidence, never decoded into a presence. */ +const SIM_STATUS = rawKey(STATUS, 'SimStatus'); + +export type HilinkObservationInput = { + readonly status: string; + readonly signal: string; + readonly netModeList?: string; + readonly netMode?: string; +}; + +const AUTH_REFUSAL_CODE = '125002'; + +export function normalizeHilinkObservation( + input: HilinkObservationInput, + context: NormalizationContext, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const raw = mergeRawRecords( + flattenXmlBody(input.status, STATUS), + flattenXmlBody(input.signal, SIGNAL), + flattenXmlBody(input.netModeList ?? '', NET_MODE_LIST), + flattenXmlBody(input.netMode ?? '', NET_MODE), + ); + const notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[] = []; + const consumed: string[] = []; + const provenance: RouterProvenance = (fields, authority) => { + consumed.push(...fields); + return authority === undefined + ? metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields) + : metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields, authority); + }; + + for (const [body, text] of [ + [STATUS, input.status], + [SIGNAL, input.signal], + ] as const) { + if (text.includes(`${AUTH_REFUSAL_CODE}`)) { + notes.push({ code: 'auth-expired', field: rawKey(body, 'code') }); + } + } + + const signalModel = parseHilinkSignal({ status: input.status, signal: input.signal }); + const capabilities = parseHilinkCapabilities({ + netModeList: input.netModeList ?? '', + ...(input.netMode === undefined ? {} : { netMode: input.netMode }), + }); + + return freshObservation(SOURCE, context, { + source: SOURCE, + hardware: routerHardware(provenance, undefined), + radio: { + modemState: unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance), + registration: unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance), + accessTechnologies: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + modeLabel: normalizeModeLabel(capabilities.net_mode, provenance), + }, + signal: { + quality: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + qualityRecent: unsupportedQualityRecent(provenance), + bars: metricFromRouterSignal( + signalModel.bars, + provenance([rawKey(STATUS, 'SignalIcon')], 'derived'), + ), + maxBars: metricFromRouterSignal( + signalModel.max_bars, + provenance([rawKey(STATUS, 'maxsignal')], 'derived'), + ), + dbm: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.dbm, provenance([rawKey(SIGNAL, 'rssi')])), + rsrp: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.rsrp, provenance([rawKey(SIGNAL, 'rsrp')])), + rsrq: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.rsrq, provenance([rawKey(SIGNAL, 'rsrq')])), + snr: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.snr, provenance([])), + sinr: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.sinr, provenance([rawKey(SIGNAL, 'sinr')])), + }, + sim: routerSim(provenance, hasRawField(raw, SIM_STATUS) ? SIM_STATUS : undefined), + diagnostics: createObservationDiagnostics({ source: SOURCE, raw, consumed, notes }), + }); +} + +function normalizeModeLabel( + capability: ReturnType['net_mode'], + provenance: RouterProvenance, +): NormalizedMetric { + const source = provenance([rawKey(NET_MODE, 'NetworkMode')]); + if (capability.state === 'unavailable') { + return unknownMetric(metricUnknownReasonFromRouter(capability.reason), source); + } + return capability.current === undefined + ? unknownMetric('not-reported', source) + : knownMetric(capability.current, source); +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/sources/modemmanager.ts b/control/src/observations/sources/modemmanager.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50288d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/sources/modemmanager.ts @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +// ModemManager → normalized observation. +// +// Every decode here is the MIGRATED logic (`domain/mm-enums.ts`, +// `domain/modem-presentation.ts`, `hardware/router-parsers.ts` for SIM presence) — +// this module adds provenance and reason-carrying unknowns, and decodes nothing +// itself. Where a decoder answers `'unknown'` or `undefined`, the distinction it +// cannot make is made here from the RAW record: a field that was never in the payload +// is `not-reported`, an interface nobody read is `not-observed`, and a field that WAS +// present but decoded to nothing is `malformed` with a diagnostic note. Collapsing +// those three into one absent value is precisely the loss this layer exists to stop. + +import { + decodeEsimStatus, + decodeMmAccessTechnologies, + decodeMmState, + decodeRegistrationState, + decodeSimType, + decodeStateFailedReason, + decodeUnlockRequired, + type ModemHardwareIdentity, + modeMaskToLabel, + modemHardwareLabel, + modemHardwareName, + type ObservationEnvelope, + type RadioAccessTechnology, +} from '../../domain'; +import { readSimPresence, type SimPresenceFacts } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import { freshObservation, metricProvenance, type NormalizationContext } from '../envelope'; +import { knownMetric, type NormalizedMetric, unknownMetric } from '../metric'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation, SimPresenceValue } from '../model'; +import { + createObservationDiagnostics, + type ObservationDiagnosticNote, + type RawFieldRecord, + type RawFieldValue, +} from '../provenance'; +import { + hasRawField, + mergeRawRecords, + prefixRawRecord, + rawBooleanAt, + rawKey, + rawNumber, + rawNumberAt, + rawString, + rawStringArray, +} from '../raw'; + +const SOURCE = 'modemmanager' as const; + +/** + * The decoded ModemManager property records, one per D-Bus interface. + * + * A body left out is a body nobody read, and reads as `not-observed` rather than as a + * modem that reports nothing — that difference decides whether a consumer retries or + * hides a control. + */ +export type ModemManagerObservationInput = { + readonly modem?: Readonly>; + readonly modem3gpp?: Readonly>; + readonly sim?: Readonly>; + readonly signal?: Readonly>; +}; + +const MODEM = 'Modem'; +const MODEM3GPP = 'Modem3gpp'; +const SIM = 'Sim'; +const SIGNAL = 'Signal'; + +export function normalizeModemManagerObservation( + input: ModemManagerObservationInput, + context: NormalizationContext, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const raw = mergeRawRecords( + prefixRawRecord(MODEM, input.modem), + prefixRawRecord(MODEM3GPP, input.modem3gpp), + prefixRawRecord(SIM, input.sim), + prefixRawRecord(SIGNAL, input.signal), + ); + const notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[] = []; + const consumed: string[] = []; + const provenance = (...fields: readonly string[]) => { + consumed.push(...fields); + return metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields); + }; + + const hardware = normalizeHardware(raw, provenance); + const radio = normalizeRadio(raw, provenance, notes); + const signal = normalizeSignal(raw, input.signal !== undefined, provenance); + const sim = normalizeSim(raw, input.sim !== undefined, provenance, notes); + + return freshObservation(SOURCE, context, { + source: SOURCE, + hardware, + radio, + signal, + sim, + diagnostics: createObservationDiagnostics({ source: SOURCE, raw, consumed, notes }), + }); +} + +type Provenance = (...fields: readonly string[]) => ReturnType; + +const MODEL = rawKey(MODEM, 'Model'); +const MANUFACTURER = rawKey(MODEM, 'Manufacturer'); +const REVISION = rawKey(MODEM, 'Revision'); +const EQUIPMENT_ID = rawKey(MODEM, 'EquipmentIdentifier'); +const STATE = rawKey(MODEM, 'State'); +const CURRENT_MODES = rawKey(MODEM, 'CurrentModes'); +const ACCESS_TECHNOLOGIES = rawKey(MODEM, 'AccessTechnologies'); +const SIGNAL_QUALITY = rawKey(MODEM, 'SignalQuality'); +const SIM_PATH = rawKey(MODEM, 'Sim'); +const SIM_SLOTS = rawKey(MODEM, 'SimSlots'); +const FAILED_REASON = rawKey(MODEM, 'StateFailedReason'); +const UNLOCK_REQUIRED = rawKey(MODEM, 'UnlockRequired'); +const REGISTRATION_STATE = rawKey(MODEM3GPP, 'RegistrationState'); +const SIM_TYPE = rawKey(SIM, 'SimType'); +const ESIM_STATUS = rawKey(SIM, 'EsimStatus'); +const RSSI = rawKey(SIGNAL, 'rssi'); +const RSRP = rawKey(SIGNAL, 'rsrp'); +const RSRQ = rawKey(SIGNAL, 'rsrq'); +const SNR = rawKey(SIGNAL, 'snr'); + +function hardwareIdentity(raw: RawFieldRecord): ModemHardwareIdentity { + const model = rawString(raw, MODEL); + const manufacturer = rawString(raw, MANUFACTURER); + const firmwareRevision = rawString(raw, REVISION); + const equipmentId = rawString(raw, EQUIPMENT_ID); + return { + ...(model === undefined ? {} : { model }), + ...(manufacturer === undefined ? {} : { manufacturer }), + ...(firmwareRevision === undefined ? {} : { firmwareRevision }), + ...(equipmentId === undefined ? {} : { equipmentId }), + }; +} + +function normalizeHardware(raw: RawFieldRecord, provenance: Provenance) { + const identity = hardwareIdentity(raw); + const named = + identity.model !== undefined || + identity.manufacturer !== undefined || + identity.firmwareRevision !== undefined; + const labelProvenance = provenance(MODEL, MANUFACTURER, REVISION); + const nameProvenance = provenance(MODEL, MANUFACTURER, REVISION, EQUIPMENT_ID); + return { + label: named + ? knownMetric(modemHardwareLabel(identity), labelProvenance) + : unknownMetric('not-reported', labelProvenance), + displayName: named + ? knownMetric(modemHardwareName(identity), nameProvenance) + : unknownMetric('not-reported', nameProvenance), + }; +} + +function normalizeRadio( + raw: RawFieldRecord, + provenance: Provenance, + notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[], +) { + return { + modemState: decodedLabel(raw, STATE, decodeMmState, provenance, notes), + registration: decodedLabel(raw, REGISTRATION_STATE, decodeRegistrationState, provenance, notes), + accessTechnologies: normalizeAccessTechnologies(raw, provenance, notes), + modeLabel: normalizeModeLabel(raw, provenance, notes), + }; +} + +/** A decoder whose "I could not place this" answer is the literal string `unknown`. */ +function decodedLabel( + raw: RawFieldRecord, + key: string, + decode: (value: number | undefined) => string, + provenance: Provenance, + notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[], +): NormalizedMetric { + const source = provenance(key); + if (!hasRawField(raw, key)) { + return unknownMetric('not-reported', source); + } + const decoded = decode(rawNumber(raw, key)); + if (decoded === 'unknown') { + notes.push({ code: 'field-shape-unrecognized', field: key }); + return unknownMetric('malformed', source); + } + return knownMetric(decoded, source); +} + +function normalizeAccessTechnologies( + raw: RawFieldRecord, + provenance: Provenance, + notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[], +): NormalizedMetric { + const source = provenance(ACCESS_TECHNOLOGIES); + if (!hasRawField(raw, ACCESS_TECHNOLOGIES)) { + return unknownMetric('not-reported', source); + } + const mask = rawNumber(raw, ACCESS_TECHNOLOGIES); + // MM's 0 is `UNKNOWN` — the modem did not say, which is not a malformed answer. + if (mask === undefined || mask <= 0) { + return unknownMetric('not-reported', source); + } + const decoded = [...decodeMmAccessTechnologies(mask)].sort(); + if (decoded.length === 0) { + notes.push({ code: 'field-shape-unrecognized', field: ACCESS_TECHNOLOGIES }); + return unknownMetric('malformed', source); + } + return knownMetric(decoded, source); +} + +function normalizeModeLabel( + raw: RawFieldRecord, + provenance: Provenance, + notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[], +): NormalizedMetric { + const source = provenance(CURRENT_MODES); + if (!hasRawField(raw, CURRENT_MODES)) { + return unknownMetric('not-reported', source); + } + // `CurrentModes` is a `(uu)`; the ALLOWED mask is member 0. A flattened scalar + // (mmcli's shape) decodes at the same index, so both retentions work here. + const mask = rawNumberAt(raw, CURRENT_MODES, 0); + if (mask === undefined || mask <= 0) { + return unknownMetric('not-reported', source); + } + const label = modeMaskToLabel(mask); + if (label === undefined) { + notes.push({ code: 'field-shape-unrecognized', field: CURRENT_MODES }); + return unknownMetric('malformed', source); + } + return knownMetric(label, source); +} + +function normalizeSignal(raw: RawFieldRecord, signalRead: boolean, provenance: Provenance) { + const missing = signalRead ? ('not-reported' as const) : ('not-observed' as const); + const extended = (key: string): NormalizedMetric => { + const source = provenance(key); + const value = rawNumber(raw, key); + return value === undefined + ? unknownMetric(hasRawField(raw, key) ? 'malformed' : missing, source) + : knownMetric(value, source); + }; + // `SignalQuality` is a `(ub)`: percentage at 0, "measured recently" at 1. Both are + // claimed; a source that retained only the percentage answers `not-reported` for the + // flag, which is a claim about the READ, never about ModemManager's capability. + const quality = rawNumberAt(raw, SIGNAL_QUALITY, 0); + const recent = rawBooleanAt(raw, SIGNAL_QUALITY, 1); + const qualityProvenance = provenance(SIGNAL_QUALITY); + return { + quality: + quality === undefined + ? unknownMetric('not-reported', qualityProvenance) + : knownMetric(quality, qualityProvenance), + qualityRecent: + recent === undefined + ? unknownMetric('not-reported', provenance(SIGNAL_QUALITY)) + : knownMetric(recent, provenance(SIGNAL_QUALITY)), + // ModemManager reports a percentage and no bar scale. Deriving bars from the + // percentage would be inventing a reading, so this is a capability claim. + bars: unknownMetric('unsupported', metricProvenanceEmpty(provenance)), + maxBars: unknownMetric('unsupported', metricProvenanceEmpty(provenance)), + dbm: extended(RSSI), + rsrp: extended(RSRP), + rsrq: extended(RSRQ), + snr: extended(SNR), + // `Modem.Signal` exposes rssi/rsrp/rsrq/snr/ecio/io/rscp — there is no SINR member. + sinr: unknownMetric('unsupported', metricProvenanceEmpty(provenance)), + }; +} + +/** Provenance for a metric no raw field backs, which is what `unsupported` means. */ +function metricProvenanceEmpty(provenance: Provenance) { + return provenance(); +} + +/** + * `Modem.StateFailedReason` in the spelling the presence rule matches. + * + * D-Bus types it `u`, so a provider retaining the property verbatim holds a NUMBER, + * while the migrated rule matches the mmcli STRING. Both are accepted here — the + * number through the enum decoder, the string as it stands — because the two transports + * for the same fact must not disagree about whether a modem has a SIM. An + * unrecognized number decodes to `undefined` and simply proves nothing. + */ +function failedReasonOf(raw: RawFieldRecord): string | undefined { + const numeric = rawNumber(raw, FAILED_REASON); + if (numeric !== undefined) return decodeStateFailedReason(numeric); + return rawString(raw, FAILED_REASON); +} + +function simPresenceFacts(raw: RawFieldRecord): SimPresenceFacts { + const sim = rawString(raw, SIM_PATH); + const simSlots = rawStringArray(raw, SIM_SLOTS); + const failedReason = failedReasonOf(raw); + return { + ...(sim === undefined ? {} : { sim }), + ...(simSlots === undefined ? {} : { simSlots }), + ...(failedReason === undefined ? {} : { failedReason }), + }; +} + +function normalizeSim( + raw: RawFieldRecord, + simRead: boolean, + provenance: Provenance, + notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[], +) { + const presenceProvenance = provenance(SIM_PATH, SIM_SLOTS, FAILED_REASON); + // `absent` here comes from `state-failed-reason` evidence and from nothing else. + // A blank `Sim` object path with no failure reason stays `unknown`: ModemManager + // reports `/` while a modem is initializing and while a slot switch is in flight, + // so reading it as "no SIM" would report an absent SIM on a modem holding one. + const { presence, evidence } = readSimPresence(simPresenceFacts(raw)); + const missing = simRead ? ('not-reported' as const) : ('not-observed' as const); + return { + presence: + presence === 'unknown' + ? unknownMetric('not-reported', presenceProvenance) + : knownMetric(presence, presenceProvenance), + presenceEvidence: evidence, + lockRequired: decodedOptional(raw, UNLOCK_REQUIRED, decodeUnlockRequired, provenance, notes), + kind: decodedOptional(raw, SIM_TYPE, decodeSimType, provenance, notes, missing), + esimStatus: decodedOptional(raw, ESIM_STATUS, decodeEsimStatus, provenance, notes, missing), + }; +} + +/** A decoder whose "I could not place this" answer is `undefined`. */ +function decodedOptional( + raw: RawFieldRecord, + key: string, + decode: (value: number | undefined) => T | undefined, + provenance: Provenance, + notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[], + absentReason: 'not-reported' | 'not-observed' = 'not-reported', +): NormalizedMetric { + const source = provenance(key); + if (!hasRawField(raw, key)) { + return unknownMetric(absentReason, source); + } + const decoded = decode(rawNumber(raw, key)); + if (decoded === undefined) { + notes.push({ code: 'field-shape-unrecognized', field: key }); + return unknownMetric('malformed', source); + } + return knownMetric(decoded, source); +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/sources/router-shared.ts b/control/src/observations/sources/router-shared.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92d5eed --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/sources/router-shared.ts @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// The claims every router admin API makes identically, in one place. +// +// HiLink, goform and HIMI are three vendor HTTP surfaces over a modem, and they share +// a capability boundary: none of them exposes ModemManager's modem state, its 3GPP +// registration enum, its lock enum or its SIM-type enum. Those read `unsupported`, +// which is a durable claim about the SOURCE rather than about one poll — and stating +// it once here is what stops the three normalizers from drifting into three different +// answers for the same structural fact. +// +// SIM PRESENCE is deliberately NOT claimed. Each vendor reports a presence code of +// its own (`SimStatus`, `simcard_state`, `simstate`) with vendor semantics, and no +// migrated decoder covers them; guessing one would be exactly the invented reading +// this layer exists to prevent. It reads `not-reported` and the vendor code stays +// verbatim in the diagnostics block for the per-vendor providers to claim later. + +import { + isUninformativeIdentity, + modemHardwareLabel, + modemHardwareName, + type ObservationAuthority, +} from '../../domain'; +import { knownMetric, type NormalizedMetric, unknownMetric } from '../metric'; +import type { NormalizedHardware, NormalizedSim, SimPresenceValue } from '../model'; +import type { MetricProvenance } from '../provenance'; + +export type RouterProvenance = ( + fields: readonly string[], + authority?: ObservationAuthority, +) => MetricProvenance; + +export function unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance: RouterProvenance): NormalizedMetric { + return unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])); +} + +/** + * The SIM block every router source produces. + * + * `vendorPresenceField` NAMES the vendor's own presence code when the payload carried + * one, so the evidence records that a code exists and was deliberately not decoded — + * distinct from `no-evidence`, which says the payload offered nothing at all. Neither + * one is ever `absent`: claiming absence from a vendor code whose semantics no + * migrated decoder covers is precisely the invented reading this layer refuses. + */ +export function routerSim( + provenance: RouterProvenance, + vendorPresenceField?: string, +): NormalizedSim { + // The vendor field is NAMED in the evidence but is NOT consumed: no metric claims its + // value, so it must stay in the diagnostics block's `unmapped` set, verbatim, for the + // per-vendor provider that will one day decode it with evidence. + return { + presence: unknownMetric('not-reported', provenance([])), + presenceEvidence: + vendorPresenceField === undefined + ? { kind: 'no-evidence', inspected: [] } + : { kind: 'vendor-code-unclaimed', field: vendorPresenceField }, + lockRequired: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + kind: unknownMetric<'physical' | 'esim'>('unsupported', provenance([])), + esimStatus: unknownMetric<'no-profiles' | 'with-profiles'>('unsupported', provenance([])), + }; +} + +/** Router admin APIs report no measurement-recency flag; that is a source capability claim. */ +export function unsupportedQualityRecent(provenance: RouterProvenance): NormalizedMetric { + return unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])); +} + +/** + * A router's product name, screened by the migrated presentation rules. + * + * `modemHardwareLabel` falls back to a generic label when its input says nothing, and + * publishing that as a KNOWN value would be reporting a name no device gave. So an + * uninformative product string is refused up front and reads `not-reported` instead. + */ +export function routerHardware( + provenance: RouterProvenance, + product: { readonly name: string; readonly field: string } | undefined, +): NormalizedHardware { + if (product === undefined || isUninformativeIdentity(product.name)) { + const source = provenance(product === undefined ? [] : [product.field]); + return { + label: unknownMetric('not-reported', source), + displayName: unknownMetric('not-reported', source), + }; + } + const source = provenance([product.field]); + const identity = { model: product.name }; + return { + label: knownMetric(modemHardwareLabel(identity), source), + displayName: knownMetric(modemHardwareName(identity), source), + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/sources/ufi.ts b/control/src/observations/sources/ufi.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd75baf --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/sources/ufi.ts @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +// Qualcomm UFI / HIMI → normalized observation. +// +// UFI answers three endpoints per read, each an envelope of its own (`{reply, params}`), +// and the migrated `parseUfiSignal` already folds them in the vendor's own precedence +// order. This module keeps all three bodies verbatim — including the `reply` field, +// which is how a `SessionOut` refusal is told apart from a body that simply lacked the +// key — and reports the ONE signal reading the source actually provides. +// +// Its overview endpoint returns an IMSI and an ICCID. They are retained, because +// normalization does not get to decide what a diagnostician may need, and they are +// masked by the shared key-based redactor on the way to anything that renders. That +// split — retain here, redact at the boundary — is why `raw` is documented as a +// redaction-class surface rather than as safe-by-default data. + +import type { ObservationEnvelope } from '../../domain'; +import { parseUfiDetails, parseUfiSignal } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import { freshObservation, metricProvenance, type NormalizationContext } from '../envelope'; +import { metricFromRouterSignal, unknownMetric } from '../metric'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../model'; +import { + createObservationDiagnostics, + type ObservationDiagnosticNote, + type RawFieldValue, +} from '../provenance'; +import { + hasRawField, + mergeRawRecords, + normalizeRawValue, + parseJsonObject, + prefixRawRecord, + rawKey, +} from '../raw'; +import { + type RouterProvenance, + routerHardware, + routerSim, + unsupportedQualityRecent, + unsupportedRadioMetric, +} from './router-shared'; + +const SOURCE = 'ufi-himiapi' as const; +const SYSINFO = 'sysinfo'; +const OVERVIEW = 'overview'; +const STATUS = 'status'; +const PRODUCE_INFO = 'produce-info'; +const SESSION_REFUSAL = 'SessionOut'; +/** HIMI's own SIM presence code. Named as evidence, never decoded into a presence. */ +const SIM_STATE = rawKey(SYSINFO, 'simstate'); + +export type UfiObservationInput = { + readonly sysinfo: string; + readonly overview: string; + readonly status: string; + readonly produceInfo?: string; +}; + +export function normalizeUfiObservation( + input: UfiObservationInput, + context: NormalizationContext, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const bodies = [ + [SYSINFO, input.sysinfo], + [OVERVIEW, input.overview], + [STATUS, input.status], + [PRODUCE_INFO, input.produceInfo ?? ''], + ] as const; + + const notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[] = []; + const records = bodies.map(([name, text]) => { + const parsed = parseJsonObject(text); + if (parsed === undefined && text.trim() !== '') { + notes.push({ code: 'unparseable-body', field: name }); + } + if (parsed?.reply === SESSION_REFUSAL) { + notes.push({ code: 'auth-expired', field: rawKey(name, 'reply') }); + } + return prefixRawRecord(name, flattenUfiEnvelope(parsed)); + }); + + const raw = mergeRawRecords(...records); + const consumed: string[] = []; + const provenance: RouterProvenance = (fields, authority) => { + consumed.push(...fields); + return authority === undefined + ? metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields) + : metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields, authority); + }; + + const signalModel = parseUfiSignal({ + sysinfo: input.sysinfo, + overview: input.overview, + status: input.status, + }); + const details = parseUfiDetails({ + overview: input.overview, + sysinfo: input.sysinfo, + ...(input.produceInfo === undefined ? {} : { produceInfo: input.produceInfo }), + }); + const product = details?.product; + + return freshObservation(SOURCE, context, { + source: SOURCE, + hardware: routerHardware( + provenance, + product === undefined + ? undefined + : { name: product, field: rawKey(PRODUCE_INFO, 'productname') }, + ), + radio: { + modemState: unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance), + registration: unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance), + accessTechnologies: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + modeLabel: unknownMetric('not-reported', provenance([])), + }, + signal: { + quality: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + qualityRecent: unsupportedQualityRecent(provenance), + bars: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.bars, provenance([])), + maxBars: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.max_bars, provenance([])), + dbm: metricFromRouterSignal( + signalModel.dbm, + provenance([ + rawKey(SYSINFO, 'SIGNAL'), + rawKey(OVERVIEW, 'SIGNAL'), + rawKey(STATUS, 'signalStrength'), + ]), + ), + rsrp: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.rsrp, provenance([])), + rsrq: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.rsrq, provenance([])), + snr: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.snr, provenance([])), + sinr: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.sinr, provenance([])), + }, + sim: routerSim(provenance, hasRawField(raw, SIM_STATE) ? SIM_STATE : undefined), + diagnostics: createObservationDiagnostics({ source: SOURCE, raw, consumed, notes }), + }); +} + +/** `{reply, params}` flattened to one level — `params` members keep their own names. */ +function flattenUfiEnvelope( + parsed: Readonly> | undefined, +): Record { + const out: Record = {}; + if (parsed === undefined) { + return out; + } + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(parsed)) { + if (key === 'params' && typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)) { + for (const [field, param] of Object.entries(value as Record)) { + out[field] = normalizeRawValue(param); + } + continue; + } + out[key] = normalizeRawValue(value); + } + return out; +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/sources/zte.ts b/control/src/observations/sources/zte.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f100fd --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/sources/zte.ts @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +// ZTE goform → normalized observation. +// +// One goform response answers many keys at once, so the migrated `parseZteSignal` and +// `parseZteDetails` are both driven from the SAME body here — and everything neither +// of them claims (`wan_lte_ca`, `rmcc`, `lte_pci`, the cell id, the roaming flag) is +// retained verbatim in the diagnostics block. That retention is the point: a +// carrier-aggregation flag no normalized field has a slot for is still the difference +// between a diagnosable report and a shrug. +// +// A body that will not parse is an OBSERVATION whose metrics are `malformed`, not an +// unavailable one. The bytes arrived; what failed was decoding them, and an +// unavailable envelope would have to discard them to say so. + +import type { ObservationEnvelope } from '../../domain'; +import { parseZteDetails, parseZteSignal } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import { freshObservation, metricProvenance, type NormalizationContext } from '../envelope'; +import { + knownMetric, + metricFromRouterSignal, + type NormalizedMetric, + unknownMetric, +} from '../metric'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../model'; +import { createObservationDiagnostics, type ObservationDiagnosticNote } from '../provenance'; +import { hasRawField, parseJsonRecord, prefixRawRecord, rawKey } from '../raw'; +import { + type RouterProvenance, + routerHardware, + routerSim, + unsupportedQualityRecent, + unsupportedRadioMetric, +} from './router-shared'; + +const SOURCE = 'zte-goform' as const; +const BODY = 'goform'; +/** ZTE's own SIM presence code. Named as evidence, never decoded into a presence. */ +const SIM_CARD_STATE = rawKey(BODY, 'simcard_state'); + +export type ZteObservationInput = { + readonly body: string; +}; + +export function normalizeZteObservation( + input: ZteObservationInput, + context: NormalizationContext, +): ObservationEnvelope { + const parsed = parseJsonRecord(input.body); + const raw = prefixRawRecord(BODY, parsed); + const notes: ObservationDiagnosticNote[] = []; + if (parsed === undefined) { + notes.push({ code: input.body.trim() === '' ? 'empty-body' : 'unparseable-body', field: BODY }); + } + + const consumed: string[] = []; + const provenance: RouterProvenance = (fields, authority) => { + consumed.push(...fields); + return authority === undefined + ? metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields) + : metricProvenance(SOURCE, context, fields, authority); + }; + + const signalModel = parseZteSignal(input.body); + const details = parseZteDetails(input.body); + + return freshObservation(SOURCE, context, { + source: SOURCE, + hardware: routerHardware(provenance, undefined), + radio: { + modemState: unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance), + registration: unsupportedRadioMetric(provenance), + accessTechnologies: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + modeLabel: normalizeModeLabel(details?.network_type, parsed !== undefined, provenance), + }, + signal: { + quality: unknownMetric('unsupported', provenance([])), + qualityRecent: unsupportedQualityRecent(provenance), + bars: metricFromRouterSignal( + signalModel.bars, + provenance([rawKey(BODY, 'signalbar')], 'derived'), + ), + // The goform payload carries no maximum; the migrated parser states the + // vendor's fixed five-bar scale, which is a derivation and says so. + maxBars: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.max_bars, provenance([], 'derived')), + dbm: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.dbm, provenance([rawKey(BODY, 'rssi')])), + rsrp: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.rsrp, provenance([rawKey(BODY, 'lte_rsrp')])), + rsrq: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.rsrq, provenance([rawKey(BODY, 'lte_rsrq')])), + snr: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.snr, provenance([rawKey(BODY, 'lte_snr')])), + sinr: metricFromRouterSignal(signalModel.sinr, provenance([])), + }, + sim: routerSim(provenance, hasRawField(raw, SIM_CARD_STATE) ? SIM_CARD_STATE : undefined), + diagnostics: createObservationDiagnostics({ source: SOURCE, raw, consumed, notes }), + }); +} + +function normalizeModeLabel( + networkType: string | undefined, + parsed: boolean, + provenance: RouterProvenance, +): NormalizedMetric { + const source = provenance([rawKey(BODY, 'network_type')]); + if (networkType !== undefined) { + return knownMetric(networkType, source); + } + return unknownMetric(parsed ? 'not-reported' : 'malformed', source); +} diff --git a/control/src/observations/state-separation.test.ts b/control/src/observations/state-separation.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d7e0e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/state-separation.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { fixtureContext } from '../../test-support/observation-fixtures'; +import { deviceGeneration, epochMillis } from '../domain'; +import { freshObservation, unavailableObservation } from './envelope'; +import { + appliedConfiguration, + describeStateDivergence, + desiredProfile, + type ModemStateView, + observedState, + STATE_VIEW_SLOTS, +} from './state-separation'; + +const CONTEXT = fixtureContext(); + +type Apn = { readonly apn: string }; + +const DESIRED = desiredProfile({ apn: 'internet.claro' }, epochMillis(10), 'rpc:operator'); +const APPLIED = appliedConfiguration({ + configuration: { apn: 'internet.claro' }, + appliedAt: epochMillis(20), + generation: deviceGeneration(7), + operationId: 'set-apn#1', +}); +const OBSERVED = observedState( + freshObservation('modemmanager', CONTEXT, { apn: 'internet.claro' }), +); + +const sameApn = (left: Apn, right: Apn) => left.apn === right.apn; + +function view( + overrides: Partial> = {}, +): ModemStateView { + return { desired: DESIRED, applied: APPLIED, observed: OBSERVED, ...overrides }; +} + +describe('desired, applied and observed stay three things', () => { + test('Given the state view, when inspected, then it has exactly three slots and no merged value', () => { + expect(Object.keys(view()).sort()).toEqual([...STATE_VIEW_SLOTS].sort()); + }); + + test('Given the three slots, when discriminated, then each declares its own kind', () => { + const current = view(); + + expect(current.desired?.kind).toBe('desired'); + expect(current.applied?.kind).toBe('applied'); + expect(current.observed.kind).toBe('observed'); + }); + + test('Given an observed slot, when inspected, then the device value is only reachable through an envelope', () => { + const current = view(); + + expect(current.observed.observation.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + expect(current.observed.observation.stableKey).toBe(CONTEXT.stableKey); + expect('profile' in current.observed).toBe(false); + expect('configuration' in current.observed).toBe(false); + }); + + test('Given a desired slot, when inspected, then it carries no applied-side evidence', () => { + expect('generation' in DESIRED).toBe(false); + expect('operationId' in DESIRED).toBe(false); + expect(APPLIED.operationId).toBe('set-apn#1'); + expect(APPLIED.generation).toBe(deviceGeneration(7)); + }); +}); + +describe('divergence is reported as two independent comparisons', () => { + test('Given full agreement, when compared, then both comparisons align', () => { + expect(describeStateDivergence(view(), sameApn)).toEqual({ + desiredVsApplied: { status: 'aligned' }, + appliedVsObserved: { status: 'aligned' }, + }); + }); + + test('Given a request that was never applied, when compared, then only the first comparison diverges', () => { + const pending = view({ + desired: desiredProfile({ apn: 'ims.claro' }, epochMillis(30), 'rpc:operator'), + }); + + expect(describeStateDivergence(pending, sameApn)).toEqual({ + desiredVsApplied: { status: 'diverged' }, + appliedVsObserved: { status: 'aligned' }, + }); + }); + + test('Given a write the network undid, when compared, then only the second comparison diverges', () => { + const drifted = view({ + observed: observedState(freshObservation('modemmanager', CONTEXT, { apn: 'ims.claro' })), + }); + + expect(describeStateDivergence(drifted, sameApn)).toEqual({ + desiredVsApplied: { status: 'aligned' }, + appliedVsObserved: { status: 'diverged' }, + }); + }); + + test('Given an unavailable observation, when compared, then it is indeterminate rather than aligned', () => { + const unreadable = view({ + observed: observedState( + unavailableObservation('modemmanager', CONTEXT, 'source-unavailable'), + ), + }); + + expect(describeStateDivergence(unreadable, sameApn)).toEqual({ + desiredVsApplied: { status: 'aligned' }, + appliedVsObserved: { status: 'indeterminate', missing: 'observed' }, + }); + }); + + test('Given nothing applied yet, when compared, then both comparisons name the missing slot', () => { + const unapplied = view({ applied: null }); + + expect(describeStateDivergence(unapplied, sameApn)).toEqual({ + desiredVsApplied: { status: 'indeterminate', missing: 'applied' }, + appliedVsObserved: { status: 'indeterminate', missing: 'applied' }, + }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/observations/state-separation.ts b/control/src/observations/state-separation.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4473323 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/observations/state-separation.ts @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +// Desired, applied and observed are THREE things, and this module refuses to make +// them one. +// +// The pattern is NetworkManager's: a connection PROFILE is what an operator asked +// for, an active connection's BEARER is what was actually put into force, and the +// device's own reported state is what the hardware is currently doing. All three are +// routinely different at once — a profile edited but not re-activated, a bearer that +// survived a profile change, a device that dropped registration without anything +// having been re-applied — and a merged "current state" blob has to pick one of them +// and silently lose the other two. +// +// Concretely, collapsing them makes these questions unanswerable: +// · did the operator's last change actually take effect, or is it only pending? +// · is what the device reports the consequence of our write, or of the network? +// · when a rollback is needed, what exactly do we roll back TO? +// +// So the three live in separate slots with separate `kind` discriminants, and the +// comparison below reports TWO independent divergences instead of one verdict. +// `NetworkManagerAdapter` (a later change) consumes exactly this shape. + +import type { DeviceGeneration, EpochMillis, ObservationEnvelope } from '../domain'; +import { viewEnvelope } from './envelope'; + +/** What an operator asked for. Not a claim that anything acted on it. */ +export type DesiredProfile = { + readonly kind: 'desired'; + readonly profile: T; + readonly requestedAt: EpochMillis; + /** Opaque origin label (an RPC caller, a policy engine). Never a credential. */ + readonly requestedBy: string; +}; + +/** What was actually put into force, and by which operation, in which generation. */ +export type AppliedConfiguration = { + readonly kind: 'applied'; + readonly configuration: T; + readonly appliedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly operationId: string; +}; + +/** What the device itself reports — always through an envelope, never bare. */ +export type ObservedState = { + readonly kind: 'observed'; + readonly observation: ObservationEnvelope; +}; + +export function desiredProfile( + profile: T, + requestedAt: EpochMillis, + requestedBy: string, +): DesiredProfile { + return { kind: 'desired', profile, requestedAt, requestedBy }; +} + +export function appliedConfiguration(input: { + readonly configuration: T; + readonly appliedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly operationId: string; +}): AppliedConfiguration { + return { kind: 'applied', ...input }; +} + +export function observedState(observation: ObservationEnvelope): ObservedState { + return { kind: 'observed', observation }; +} + +/** + * The three-slot view. There is deliberately no fourth field holding a merged + * "effective" value: an effective value is a RENDERING decision, and computing one + * here would bake a policy every consumer would then have to work around. + */ +export type ModemStateView = { + readonly desired: DesiredProfile | null; + readonly applied: AppliedConfiguration | null; + readonly observed: ObservedState; +}; + +export const STATE_VIEW_SLOTS = ['desired', 'applied', 'observed'] as const; +export type StateViewSlot = (typeof STATE_VIEW_SLOTS)[number]; + +export type SlotComparison = + | { readonly status: 'aligned' } + | { readonly status: 'diverged' } + /** One side has nothing to compare — NOT the same as agreeing. */ + | { readonly status: 'indeterminate'; readonly missing: StateViewSlot }; + +/** + * Two independent comparisons, never one verdict. + * + * `desiredVsApplied` answers "did our write happen"; `appliedVsObserved` answers "did + * it stick". A single boolean cannot distinguish a request that was never carried out + * from one the network undid a second later, and those need opposite responses. + */ +export type StateDivergence = { + readonly desiredVsApplied: SlotComparison; + readonly appliedVsObserved: SlotComparison; +}; + +export function describeStateDivergence( + view: ModemStateView, + equals: (left: T, right: T) => boolean, +): StateDivergence { + return { + desiredVsApplied: compareSlots( + view.desired === null ? undefined : view.desired.profile, + view.applied === null ? undefined : view.applied.configuration, + view.desired === null ? 'desired' : 'applied', + equals, + ), + appliedVsObserved: compareSlots( + view.applied === null ? undefined : view.applied.configuration, + observedValue(view.observed), + view.applied === null ? 'applied' : 'observed', + equals, + ), + }; +} + +/** + * The observed value, or `undefined` when the observation carries none. + * + * An unavailable observation is `indeterminate` against anything, never `aligned`: + * "we could not read it" is not evidence that it matches. + */ +function observedValue(observed: ObservedState): T | undefined { + const view = viewEnvelope(observed.observation); + return view.kind === 'unavailable' ? undefined : view.value; +} + +function compareSlots( + left: T | undefined, + right: T | undefined, + missing: StateViewSlot, + equals: (left: T, right: T) => boolean, +): SlotComparison { + if (left === undefined || right === undefined) { + return { status: 'indeterminate', missing }; + } + return equals(left, right) ? { status: 'aligned' } : { status: 'diverged' }; +} diff --git a/control/src/operations/contracts.ts b/control/src/operations/contracts.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16c7f4f --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/operations/contracts.ts @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +import type { + DeviceGeneration, + OperationCompletion, + OperationDescriptor, + OperationResult, + PhysicalModemId, +} from '../domain'; + +export type OperationPreconditionRequest = { + readonly operationId: string; + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly descriptorId: string; + readonly preconditions: readonly string[]; +}; + +export type OperationPreconditionResult = + | { readonly status: 'satisfied' } + | { readonly status: 'refused'; readonly reason: string }; + +/** Live operation facts. Implementations must inspect them for every invocation. */ +export interface OperationPreconditionPort { + check(request: OperationPreconditionRequest): Promise; +} + +export type OperationAttemptContext = { + readonly operationId: string; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly attempt: number; +}; + +export type OperationJournalEvent = + | { + readonly phase: 'started'; + readonly operationId: string; + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly input: I; + } + | { + readonly phase: 'completed'; + readonly operationId: string; + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly result: OperationResult; + }; + +export interface OperationJournalHook { + record(event: OperationJournalEvent): Promise; +} + +export type OperationExecution = { + readonly operationId: string; + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly input: I; + readonly execute: (context: OperationAttemptContext) => Promise>; + readonly readback?: (context: OperationAttemptContext) => Promise>; + readonly rollback?: (context: OperationAttemptContext) => Promise>; + readonly journal?: OperationJournalHook; +}; + +export type ReconciliationExecution = { + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly run: () => Promise< + { readonly status: 'reconciled' } | { readonly status: 'failed'; readonly reason: string } + >; +}; + +export type ReconciliationResult = + | { readonly status: 'reconciled'; readonly generation: DeviceGeneration } + | { readonly status: 'not-required'; readonly generation: DeviceGeneration } + | { + readonly status: 'failed'; + readonly reason: 'stale-generation' | string; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + }; diff --git a/control/src/operations/index.ts b/control/src/operations/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f841af --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/operations/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +export * from './operation-engine'; diff --git a/control/src/operations/operation-engine-policy.test.ts b/control/src/operations/operation-engine-policy.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27c1d8d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/operations/operation-engine-policy.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + createOperationEngineHarness, + operationDescriptor, + operationExecution, +} from '../../test-support/operation-engine-fixture'; + +const disposals: Array<() => Promise> = []; + +afterEach(async () => { + for (const dispose of disposals.splice(0).reverse()) await dispose(); +}); + +function harness() { + const created = createOperationEngineHarness(); + disposals.push(created.dispose); + return created; +} + +describe('retry classification', () => { + test('Given an idempotent read transient failure, When invoked, Then one automatic retry succeeds', async () => { + const { engine } = harness(); + let calls = 0; + const result = await engine.invoke( + operationExecution( + () => { + calls += 1; + return Promise.resolve( + calls === 1 + ? { status: 'failed', reason: 'transient' } + : { status: 'applied', value: 'auto' }, + ); + }, + { + descriptor: operationDescriptor({ + mutationImpact: 'read', + retryClass: 'idempotent-read', + admission: { required: false }, + }), + }, + ), + ); + + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied', value: 'auto' }); + expect(calls).toBe(2); + }); + + test('Given a non-idempotent read failure, When invoked, Then the engine never retries it', async () => { + const { engine } = harness(); + let calls = 0; + const result = await engine.invoke( + operationExecution( + () => { + calls += 1; + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'failed', reason: 'terminal' }); + }, + { + descriptor: operationDescriptor({ + mutationImpact: 'read', + retryClass: 'never', + admission: { required: false }, + }), + }, + ), + ); + + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'failed', reason: 'terminal' }); + expect(calls).toBe(1); + }); +}); + +describe('descriptor hooks', () => { + test('Given required readback and journal hooks, When a write applies, Then both hooks fire', async () => { + const { engine } = harness(); + const phases: string[] = []; + const result = await engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => Promise.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }), { + descriptor: operationDescriptor({ + readback: { + required: true, + reason: 'confirm mode', + matches: (input, value) => input === value, + }, + journal: { required: true, reason: 'record mutation' }, + }), + readback: () => { + phases.push('readback'); + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }); + }, + journal: { + record: (event) => { + phases.push(`journal:${event.phase}`); + return Promise.resolve(); + }, + }, + }), + ); + + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied' }); + expect(phases).toEqual(['journal:started', 'readback', 'journal:completed']); + }); + + test('Given required rollback and a definite write failure, When invoked, Then rollback fires once', async () => { + const { engine } = harness(); + let rollbackCalls = 0; + const result = await engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => Promise.resolve({ status: 'failed', reason: 'provider-failed' }), { + descriptor: operationDescriptor({ rollback: { required: true, reason: 'restore mode' } }), + rollback: () => { + rollbackCalls += 1; + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: undefined }); + }, + }), + ); + + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'failed', reason: 'provider-failed' }); + expect(rollbackCalls).toBe(1); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/operations/operation-engine-reconciliation.test.ts b/control/src/operations/operation-engine-reconciliation.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a68b162 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/operations/operation-engine-reconciliation.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + createOperationEngineHarness, + deferred, + OPERATION_MODEM, + operationExecution, +} from '../../test-support/operation-engine-fixture'; +import type { OperationCompletion } from '../domain'; +import type { OperationPreconditionPort } from './operation-engine'; + +const disposals: Array<() => Promise> = []; + +afterEach(async () => { + for (const dispose of disposals.splice(0).reverse()) await dispose(); +}); + +function harness(preconditions?: OperationPreconditionPort) { + const created = createOperationEngineHarness(preconditions); + disposals.push(created.dispose); + return created; +} + +describe('unknown-outcome reconciliation gate', () => { + test('Given a timed-out write, When another mutation is invoked, Then it is blocked until reconciliation completes', async () => { + const { engine, generation } = harness(); + const first = await engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => Promise.resolve({ status: 'timed-out' })), + ); + let secondCalls = 0; + const blocked = await engine.invoke( + operationExecution( + () => { + secondCalls += 1; + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }); + }, + { operationId: 'operation-2' }, + ), + ); + + expect(first).toMatchObject({ status: 'unknown-outcome', requiresReconciliation: true }); + expect(blocked).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'reconciliation-required' }); + expect(secondCalls).toBe(0); + expect( + await engine.reconcile({ + physicalModemId: OPERATION_MODEM, + generation: generation(), + run: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'reconciled' }), + }), + ).toEqual({ status: 'reconciled', generation: generation() }); + expect( + await engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => Promise.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }), { + operationId: 'operation-3', + }), + ), + ).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied' }); + }); + + test('Given a completion from a replaced generation, When classified, Then its outcome is unknown', async () => { + const { engine, replace } = harness(); + const started = deferred(); + const completion = deferred>(); + const pending = engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => { + started.resolve(); + return completion.promise; + }), + ); + await started.promise; + replace(); + completion.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }); + + expect(await pending).toMatchObject({ + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason: 'stale-generation', + requiresReconciliation: true, + }); + }); +}); + +describe('invoke-time gates and operation isolation', () => { + test('Given a mutation waiting behind another write, When its live precondition changes, Then the queued mutation is refused without executing', async () => { + let present = true; + const checked: boolean[] = []; + const { engine } = harness({ + check: () => { + checked.push(present); + return Promise.resolve( + present ? { status: 'satisfied' } : { status: 'refused', reason: 'device-absent' }, + ); + }, + }); + const firstCompletion = deferred>(); + const first = engine.invoke(operationExecution(() => firstCompletion.promise)); + let secondCalls = 0; + const second = engine.invoke( + operationExecution( + () => { + secondCalls += 1; + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'auto' }); + }, + { operationId: 'operation-2' }, + ), + ); + await Promise.resolve(); + present = false; + firstCompletion.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }); + + expect(await first).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied' }); + expect(await second).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'device-absent' }); + expect(checked).toEqual([true, false]); + expect(secondCalls).toBe(0); + }); + + test('Given a late duplicate completion from a replaced generation, When a newer operation is active, Then only its own completion can terminalize it', async () => { + const { engine, generation, replace } = harness(); + const oldStarted = deferred(); + const oldCompletion = deferred>(); + const newerCompletion = deferred>(); + const old = engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => { + oldStarted.resolve(); + return oldCompletion.promise; + }), + ); + await oldStarted.promise; + replace(); + oldCompletion.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'lte' }); + expect(await old).toMatchObject({ status: 'unknown-outcome', reason: 'stale-generation' }); + await engine.reconcile({ + physicalModemId: OPERATION_MODEM, + generation: generation(), + run: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'reconciled' }), + }); + const newer = engine.invoke( + operationExecution(() => newerCompletion.promise, { operationId: 'operation-new' }), + ); + let newerSettled = false; + void newer.then(() => { + newerSettled = true; + }); + oldCompletion.resolve({ status: 'failed', reason: 'duplicate-late-reply' }); + await Promise.resolve(); + expect(newerSettled).toBe(false); + newerCompletion.resolve({ status: 'applied', value: 'auto' }); + expect(await newer).toMatchObject({ status: 'applied', value: 'auto' }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/operations/operation-engine.ts b/control/src/operations/operation-engine.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a459cc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/operations/operation-engine.ts @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +import { + canAutoRetry, + classifyOperationCompletion, + type DeviceGeneration, + type OperationDescriptor, + type OperationResult, + type PhysicalModemId, +} from '../domain'; +import { acquireMutationAdmission, type MutationAdmissionResult } from '../ports'; +import type { ModemControlCompositionRoot } from '../safety'; +import type { + OperationAttemptContext, + OperationExecution, + OperationPreconditionPort, + ReconciliationExecution, + ReconciliationResult, +} from './contracts'; + +export * from './contracts'; + +export type OperationEngineOptions = { + readonly root: ModemControlCompositionRoot; + readonly currentGeneration: (physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId) => DeviceGeneration; + readonly preconditions: OperationPreconditionPort; +}; + +const MAX_IDEMPOTENT_READ_ATTEMPTS = 2; + +export class OperationEngine { + readonly #root: ModemControlCompositionRoot; + readonly #currentGeneration: OperationEngineOptions['currentGeneration']; + readonly #preconditions: OperationPreconditionPort; + readonly #reconciliationRequired = new Set(); + + constructor(options: OperationEngineOptions) { + this.#root = options.root; + this.#currentGeneration = options.currentGeneration; + this.#preconditions = options.preconditions; + } + + invoke(execution: OperationExecution): Promise> { + if (execution.descriptor.mutationImpact === 'read') { + return this.#invokeNow(execution); + } + return this.#root + .actorFor(execution.physicalModemId) + .run(execution.physicalModemId, () => this.#invokeNow(execution)); + } + + reconcile(execution: ReconciliationExecution): Promise { + return this.#root + .actorFor(execution.physicalModemId) + .run(execution.physicalModemId, async () => { + const current = this.#currentGeneration(execution.physicalModemId); + if (!this.#reconciliationRequired.has(execution.physicalModemId)) { + return { status: 'not-required', generation: current }; + } + if (current !== execution.generation) { + return { status: 'failed', reason: 'stale-generation', generation: current }; + } + const result = await execution.run(); + const completedGeneration = this.#currentGeneration(execution.physicalModemId); + if (completedGeneration !== execution.generation) { + return { + status: 'failed', + reason: 'stale-generation', + generation: completedGeneration, + }; + } + if (result.status === 'failed') { + return { ...result, generation: completedGeneration }; + } + this.#reconciliationRequired.delete(execution.physicalModemId); + return { status: 'reconciled', generation: completedGeneration }; + }); + } + + async #invokeNow(execution: OperationExecution): Promise> { + const generation = this.#currentGeneration(execution.physicalModemId); + const kind = execution.descriptor.mutationImpact === 'read' ? 'read' : 'write'; + if (kind === 'write' && this.#reconciliationRequired.has(execution.physicalModemId)) { + return refused('reconciliation-required', generation); + } + + const descriptorRefusal = descriptorRefusalReason(execution); + if (descriptorRefusal !== undefined) return refused(descriptorRefusal, generation); + + const precondition = await this.#preconditions.check({ + operationId: execution.operationId, + physicalModemId: execution.physicalModemId, + generation, + descriptorId: execution.descriptor.id, + preconditions: execution.descriptor.livePreconditions, + }); + if (precondition.status === 'refused') return refused(precondition.reason, generation); + + const admission = await acquireMutationAdmission( + { + operationId: execution.operationId, + physicalModemId: execution.physicalModemId, + impact: execution.descriptor.mutationImpact, + requirement: execution.descriptor.admission, + }, + kind === 'write' ? this.#root.admission : undefined, + ); + if (admission.status === 'refused') return refused(admission.reason, generation); + + try { + await execution.journal?.record({ + phase: 'started', + operationId: execution.operationId, + physicalModemId: execution.physicalModemId, + generation, + descriptor: execution.descriptor, + input: execution.input, + }); + const result = await this.#executeWithRetry(execution, generation, kind); + const withHooks = await this.#runCompletionHooks(execution, result, generation); + if (withHooks.status === 'unknown-outcome') { + this.#reconciliationRequired.add(execution.physicalModemId); + } + await execution.journal?.record({ + phase: 'completed', + operationId: execution.operationId, + physicalModemId: execution.physicalModemId, + generation, + descriptor: execution.descriptor, + result: withHooks, + }); + return withHooks; + } finally { + await releaseAdmission(admission); + } + } + + async #executeWithRetry( + execution: OperationExecution, + generation: DeviceGeneration, + kind: 'read' | 'write', + ): Promise> { + for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_IDEMPOTENT_READ_ATTEMPTS; attempt += 1) { + const completion = await execution.execute({ + operationId: execution.operationId, + generation, + attempt, + }); + const result = classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: kind, + completionGeneration: generation, + currentGeneration: this.#currentGeneration(execution.physicalModemId), + completion, + }); + if (!canAutoRetry(execution.descriptor, result) || attempt === MAX_IDEMPOTENT_READ_ATTEMPTS) { + return result; + } + } + return refused('retry-budget-exhausted', generation); + } + + async #runCompletionHooks( + execution: OperationExecution, + result: OperationResult, + generation: DeviceGeneration, + ): Promise> { + const context: OperationAttemptContext = { + operationId: execution.operationId, + generation, + attempt: 1, + }; + if (result.status === 'applied' && execution.descriptor.readback.required) { + const completion = await execution.readback?.(context); + if (completion === undefined) return refused('readback-hook-missing', generation); + const readback = classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: 'read', + completionGeneration: generation, + currentGeneration: this.#currentGeneration(execution.physicalModemId), + completion, + }); + if ( + readback.status === 'applied' && + execution.descriptor.readback.matches(execution.input, readback.value) + ) { + return result; + } + if (readback.status === 'unknown-outcome') return readback; + await execution.rollback?.(context); + return refused( + readback.status === 'applied' ? 'readback-mismatch' : `readback-${readback.reason}`, + generation, + 'failed', + ); + } + if (result.status === 'failed' && execution.descriptor.rollback.required) { + await execution.rollback?.(context); + } + return result; + } +} + +export function createOperationEngine(options: OperationEngineOptions): OperationEngine { + return new OperationEngine(options); +} + +function descriptorRefusalReason(execution: OperationExecution): string | undefined { + const { descriptor } = execution; + const support = + descriptor.mutationImpact === 'read' ? descriptor.support.read : descriptor.support.write; + if (!support.supported) return support.reason; + if (descriptor.availability.state !== 'available') return descriptor.availability.reason; + if (!inputAllowed(descriptor, execution.input)) return 'constraint-refused'; + if (descriptor.readback.required && execution.readback === undefined) + return 'readback-hook-missing'; + if (descriptor.rollback.required && execution.rollback === undefined) + return 'rollback-hook-missing'; + if (descriptor.journal.required && execution.journal === undefined) return 'journal-hook-missing'; + return undefined; +} + +function inputAllowed(descriptor: OperationDescriptor, input: I): boolean { + switch (descriptor.constraints.kind) { + case 'unconstrained': + return true; + case 'allowed-values': + return descriptor.constraints.values.some((value) => Object.is(value, input)); + case 'numeric-range': + return ( + typeof input === 'number' && + input >= descriptor.constraints.min && + input <= descriptor.constraints.max && + (descriptor.constraints.step === undefined || + (input - descriptor.constraints.min) % descriptor.constraints.step === 0) + ); + } +} + +function refused( + reason: string, + generation: DeviceGeneration, + status: 'refused' | 'failed' = 'refused', +): OperationResult { + return { status, reason, generation, requiresReconciliation: false }; +} + +async function releaseAdmission(admission: MutationAdmissionResult): Promise { + if (admission.status === 'admitted') await admission.lease.release(); +} diff --git a/control/src/ports/README.md b/control/src/ports/README.md index 3b8d7c9..b5b0948 100644 --- a/control/src/ports/README.md +++ b/control/src/ports/README.md @@ -11,8 +11,12 @@ performs I/O; these are pure TypeScript contracts. |------|------|----------------| | `ModemObservationPort` | [`observation.ts`](./observation.ts) | Read-only: `start()`, `observe()`, `stop()`; emits discriminated `ObservationList` results that **retain rows** on source failure (removal is only ever an authoritative snapshot omission). | | `ModemManagerPort` | [`modem-manager.ts`](./modem-manager.ts) | **Extends** the observation port with the mutations MM owns: `setRadioModes`, `setPrimarySimSlot`, `sendPin`/`sendPuk`, `scanNetworks`, `inhibit`/`uninhibit`. **NO bearer/connect verb.** | -| `NetworkManagerPort` | [`network-manager.ts`](./network-manager.ts) | GSM profile CRUD; `activate`/`deactivate` taking **both** `(connectionId, deviceIfname)`; quiesce lease. | +| `NetworkManagerPort` | [`network-manager.ts`](./network-manager.ts) | GSM profile CRUD; `activate`/`deactivate` taking **both** `(connectionId, deviceIfname)`; quiesce lease. Implemented by `backend/nmcli-nm-port.ts`; `providers/network-manager/` is the saved-vs-applied adapter built on top of it. | | `RouterPort` | [`router.ts`](./router.ts) | Presence + advisory health only, for devices MM cannot control. | +| `MutationAdmissionPort` | [`mutation-admission.ts`](./mutation-admission.ts) | Consumer-owned acquire/refuse authority for descriptor-gated mutations; no policy is derived here. | +| `ResourceOwnershipPort` | [`resource-ownership.ts`](./resource-ownership.ts) | Non-queueing exclusive ownership for file stores, router sessions, and USB-hub access. | +| `ModemManagerInhibitPort` | [`modem-manager.ts`](./modem-manager.ts) | Narrow MM inhibit/uninhibit maintenance lease. | +| `UhubctlPort` | [`uhubctl.ts`](./uhubctl.ts) | Injected USB-hub actuator contract; the control package ships no implementation. | ## Ownership matrix — one sole writer per resource diff --git a/control/src/ports/index.ts b/control/src/ports/index.ts index 3156905..4137334 100644 --- a/control/src/ports/index.ts +++ b/control/src/ports/index.ts @@ -9,10 +9,13 @@ export * from './location'; export * from './modem-manager'; +export * from './mutation-admission'; export * from './network-manager'; export * from './observation'; export * from './ops'; export * from './receipts'; export * from './reconcile'; +export * from './resource-ownership'; export * from './router'; export * from './sms'; +export * from './uhubctl'; diff --git a/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts b/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts index b8bbab5..4d8d0c4 100644 --- a/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts +++ b/control/src/ports/modem-manager.ts @@ -72,7 +72,14 @@ export interface InhibitLease { * network scan, and inhibit / uninhibit. It owns NO bearer / connection lifecycle; * bearers and activation belong to `NetworkManagerPort`. */ -export interface ModemManagerPort extends ModemObservationPort { +export interface ModemManagerInhibitPort { + /** Inhibit MM from managing a device (for a maintenance lease), keyed by UID. */ + inhibit(uid: string): Promise; + /** Release a previously-taken inhibition. */ + uninhibit(lease: InhibitLease): Promise; +} + +export interface ModemManagerPort extends ModemObservationPort, ModemManagerInhibitPort { /** Set the modem's radio access-technology preference. */ setRadioModes(modem: ModemRef, preference: DesiredRadio): Promise; /** Read the modem's supported and currently-selected bands. */ @@ -90,8 +97,4 @@ export interface ModemManagerPort extends ModemObservationPort { sendPuk(modem: ModemRef, puk: string, newPin: string): Promise; /** Scan for visible networks (long-running). */ scanNetworks(modem: ModemRef): Promise; - /** Inhibit MM from managing a device (for a maintenance lease), keyed by UID. */ - inhibit(uid: string): Promise; - /** Release a previously-taken inhibition. */ - uninhibit(lease: InhibitLease): Promise; } diff --git a/control/src/ports/mutation-admission.test.ts b/control/src/ports/mutation-admission.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55f4981 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/mutation-admission.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { physicalModemId } from '../domain'; +import { acquireMutationAdmission, type MutationAdmissionPort } from './mutation-admission'; + +const modemId = physicalModemId('serial:admission-test'); + +describe('MutationAdmissionPort', () => { + test('Given required admission and no port, When admission is requested, Then it is refused with a typed reason', async () => { + const result = await acquireMutationAdmission( + { + operationId: 'set-radio-mode', + physicalModemId: modemId, + impact: 'disruptive', + requirement: { required: true, reason: 'external controller approval is required' }, + }, + undefined, + ); + + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'refused', reason: 'admission-port-missing' }); + }); + + test('Given an injected refusing port, When admission is requested, Then its typed refusal is preserved', async () => { + const port: MutationAdmissionPort = { + acquire: () => + Promise.resolve({ + status: 'refused', + reason: 'admission-refused', + detail: 'controller lease unavailable', + }), + }; + + const result = await acquireMutationAdmission( + { + operationId: 'set-radio-mode', + physicalModemId: modemId, + impact: 'write', + requirement: { required: true, reason: 'controller approval' }, + }, + port, + ); + + expect(result).toEqual({ + status: 'refused', + reason: 'admission-refused', + detail: 'controller lease unavailable', + }); + }); + + test('Given admission is not required, When no port is injected, Then no synthetic lease is invented', async () => { + const result = await acquireMutationAdmission( + { + operationId: 'read-signal', + physicalModemId: modemId, + impact: 'read', + requirement: { required: false }, + }, + undefined, + ); + + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'not-required' }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/ports/mutation-admission.ts b/control/src/ports/mutation-admission.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96ce6be --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/mutation-admission.ts @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +import type { MutationImpact, OperationRequirement, PhysicalModemId } from '../domain'; + +export type MutationAdmissionRequest = { + readonly operationId: string; + readonly physicalModemId: PhysicalModemId; + readonly impact: MutationImpact; + readonly requirement: OperationRequirement; +}; + +export interface MutationAdmissionLease { + release(): Promise; +} + +export type MutationAdmissionRefusalReason = 'admission-port-missing' | 'admission-refused'; + +export type MutationAdmissionDecision = + | { readonly status: 'admitted'; readonly lease: MutationAdmissionLease } + | { + readonly status: 'refused'; + readonly reason: MutationAdmissionRefusalReason; + readonly detail?: string; + }; + +export type MutationAdmissionResult = + | { readonly status: 'not-required' } + | MutationAdmissionDecision; + +/** Consumer-owned admission authority. The package neither derives nor interprets its policy. */ +export interface MutationAdmissionPort { + acquire(request: MutationAdmissionRequest): Promise; +} + +export function acquireMutationAdmission( + request: MutationAdmissionRequest, + port: MutationAdmissionPort | undefined, +): Promise { + if (!request.requirement.required) { + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'not-required' }); + } + if (port === undefined) { + return Promise.resolve({ status: 'refused', reason: 'admission-port-missing' }); + } + return port.acquire(request); +} diff --git a/control/src/ports/resource-ownership.ts b/control/src/ports/resource-ownership.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b00f90 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/resource-ownership.ts @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +export const DEFAULT_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH = '/run/ceralive/modem-control.lock'; + +export type ExclusiveResource = 'file-store' | 'router-session' | 'usb-hub'; + +export type ResourceOwnershipRequest = { + readonly resource: ExclusiveResource; +}; + +export type ResourceOwnershipHolder = { + readonly pid: number; + readonly startedAtEpochMs: number; +}; + +export type ResourceOwnershipLoss = { + readonly reason: 'holder-exited'; +}; + +export interface ResourceOwnershipLease { + readonly holder: ResourceOwnershipHolder; + readonly lost: Promise; + release(): Promise; +} + +export type ResourceOwnershipResult = + | { readonly status: 'acquired'; readonly lease: ResourceOwnershipLease } + | { + readonly status: 'refused'; + readonly reason: 'already-owned'; + readonly holder?: ResourceOwnershipHolder; + }; + +/** Acquire-or-refuse ownership; implementations must never queue a contender. */ +export interface ResourceOwnershipPort { + acquire(request: ResourceOwnershipRequest): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/ports/uhubctl.test.ts b/control/src/ports/uhubctl.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a06c088 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/uhubctl.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +import { expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +test('Given the control package, When its source is inspected, Then no concrete uhubctl invocation ships', async () => { + const backend = join(import.meta.dir, '..', 'backend'); + const files = (await readdir(backend)).filter((name) => name.endsWith('.ts')); + const forbidden = ['create', 'Uhubctl', 'PowerHook'].join(''); + const spawn = ['Spawn', 'Uhubctl', 'Runner'].join(''); + for (const file of files) { + const source = await readFile(join(backend, file), 'utf8'); + expect(source.includes(forbidden)).toBeFalse(); + expect(source.includes(spawn)).toBeFalse(); + } +}); diff --git a/control/src/ports/uhubctl.ts b/control/src/ports/uhubctl.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..918b958 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/ports/uhubctl.ts @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +import type { + PowerCapability, + PowerCycleContext, + PowerCycleResult, +} from '../backend/power-contract'; + +/** Consumer-supplied USB-hub actuator. This package intentionally ships no implementation. */ +export interface UhubctlPort { + readonly capability: PowerCapability; + cycle(context: PowerCycleContext): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts b/control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cad72f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,362 @@ +// The provider-matching conformance MATRIX. +// +// `conformance.test.ts` (todo 5) proves the matcher against a synthetic fixture provider; +// each provider suite (todos 22/24/25/26) proves one real provider in a registry +// containing only itself. Neither can answer the question a fleet actually poses: with +// ModemManager, Huawei HiLink, ZTE goform and UFI/HIMI ALL registered, does every device +// still reach exactly the provider and profile it is entitled to — and, more importantly, +// does no device reach one it is not? +// +// Every case here registers all four. The three providers a device does not belong to are +// scripted as devices that answer nothing they understand, which is what a real board +// looks like. The expectation is the exact decision — provider, profile, writability and +// evidence score — because a shape assertion cannot see a provider quietly claiming a +// neighbour's hardware. +// +// The matrix summary artifact is written from this file (test-results/, gitignored). + +import { beforeAll, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + CONFORMANCE_CASES, + CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + CORPUS_BODIES, + type ConformanceRun, + goformId, + HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE, + MATRIX_MARKDOWN_PATH, + type MatrixRow, + observedExpectation, + type RecordedExchange, + SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS, + writeMatrixArtifact, +} from '../../test-support/conformance'; +import { HILINK_PATHS } from './huawei-hilink/provider'; + +const runs = new Map(); +let rows: readonly MatrixRow[] = []; +let artifact = ''; + +const runOf = (id: string): ConformanceRun => { + const run = runs.get(id); + if (run === undefined) throw new Error(`conformance case did not run: ${id}`); + return run; +}; + +const allExchanges = (run: ConformanceRun): readonly RecordedExchange[] => [ + ...run.transcripts.hilink, + ...run.transcripts.hilinkTwin, + ...run.transcripts.zte, + ...run.transcripts.ufi, +]; + +const hilinkLogins = (run: ConformanceRun): readonly RecordedExchange[] => + run.transcripts.hilink.filter( + (exchange) => exchange.method === 'POST' && exchange.path === HILINK_PATHS.login, + ); + +const zteLogins = (run: ConformanceRun): readonly RecordedExchange[] => + run.transcripts.zte.filter((exchange) => exchange.method === 'POST'); + +beforeAll(async () => { + const collected: MatrixRow[] = []; + for (const entry of CONFORMANCE_CASES) { + const run = await entry.run(); + runs.set(entry.id, run); + const actual = observedExpectation(run.result); + collected.push({ + id: entry.id, + kind: entry.kind, + summary: entry.summary, + expected: entry.expected, + actual, + agrees: JSON.stringify(entry.expected) === JSON.stringify(actual), + }); + } + rows = collected; + artifact = writeMatrixArtifact(collected); +}); + +describe('provider-matching conformance matrix', () => { + test.each(CONFORMANCE_CASES.map((entry) => [entry.id] as const))( + '%s reaches exactly its entitled decision', + (id) => { + // Given + const entry = CONFORMANCE_CASES.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id); + + // When + const actual = observedExpectation(runOf(id).result); + + // Then + expect(actual).toEqual(entry?.expected as never); + }, + ); + + test('every case is present in the matrix exactly once', () => { + // Given / When + const ids = rows.map((row) => row.id); + + // Then + expect(new Set(ids).size).toBe(CONFORMANCE_CASES.length); + expect(rows.every((row) => row.agrees)).toBe(true); + }); + + test('the matrix artifact lists every case with its expected and actual decision', () => { + // Given / When + const document = artifact; + + // Then + expect(document).toContain('# Provider-matching conformance matrix'); + expect(document).toContain(`Cases: **${CONFORMANCE_CASES.length}**`); + for (const entry of CONFORMANCE_CASES) expect(document).toContain(entry.id); + expect(MATRIX_MARKDOWN_PATH.endsWith('provider-conformance-matrix.md')).toBe(true); + }); +}); + +describe('conformance safety invariants', () => { + test('no unresolved, malformed, expired, locked-out or misrouted case is ever writable', () => { + // Given + const unsafeToWrite = rows.filter((row) => row.kind !== 'fleet-profile'); + + // When + const writable = unsafeToWrite.filter((row) => row.actual.writable); + + // Then + expect(unsafeToWrite.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect(writable).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('an unresolved decision carries no provider, no profile and no operations surface', () => { + // Given + const unresolved = rows.filter((row) => row.actual.status !== 'selected'); + + // Then + expect(unresolved.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const row of unresolved) { + const result = runOf(row.id).result; + expect(result.provider).toBeNull(); + expect(result.profile).toBeNull(); + expect(result.operations).toBeNull(); + expect(result.writable).toBe(false); + expect(result.evidence.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + } + }); + + test('no matcher result carries the credential the wire carried', () => { + // Given / When + const serialized = rows.map((row) => JSON.stringify(runOf(row.id).result)); + + // Then + for (const document of serialized) { + expect(document).not.toContain(CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password); + } + }); +}); + +describe('ambiguous collision — a tie never yields a write-capable pick', () => { + const id = 'ambiguity/colliding-write-capable-twins'; + + test('two write-capable providers sharing one fingerprint resolve read-only', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf(id); + + // Then + expect(run.result.status).toBe('ambiguous'); + expect(run.result.provider).toBeNull(); + expect(run.result.operations).toBeNull(); + expect(run.result.writable).toBe(false); + }); + + test('the tie is decided BEFORE authentication, so neither credential is spent', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf(id); + + // Then + expect(run.twinAuthAttempts).toBe(0); + expect(hilinkLogins(run)).toEqual([]); + expect(run.transcripts.hilinkTwin.filter((exchange) => exchange.method === 'POST')).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the evidence ledger exposes BOTH colliding providers rather than hiding the tie', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf(id); + + // When + const claimants = new Set( + run.result.evidence + .filter((item) => item.stage === 'passive-facts' && item.signal === 'match') + .map((item) => item.provider), + ); + + // Then + expect([...claimants].sort()).toEqual(['huawei-hilink', 'huawei-hilink-twin']); + expect( + run.result.evidence.some( + (item) => item.stage === 'unauthenticated-fingerprint' && item.signal === 'match', + ), + ).toBe(true); + }); +}); + +describe('bounded credential attempts', () => { + test('a mid-login 125002 refuses after exactly one login POST', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('auth-expired/hilink-mid-login'); + + // Then + expect(hilinkLogins(run)).toHaveLength(1); + expect(run.result.status).toBe('ambiguous'); + }); + + test('an MF79U lockout is refused on one attempt and never re-tried as another algorithm', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('lockout-unknown/zte-mf79u'); + + // When + const posts = zteLogins(run); + + // Then + expect(posts).toHaveLength(1); + expect(posts.map(goformId)).toEqual(['LOGIN']); + }); + + test('MF266-shaped answers to an MF79U login never provoke a salted retry', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('ambiguity/zte-cross-profile-refusal'); + + // When + const posts = zteLogins(run); + + // Then + expect(posts).toHaveLength(1); + expect(posts.map(goformId)).toEqual(['LOGIN']); + }); + + test('unknown ZTE firmware reaches its read-only profile without any login POST', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('unknown-firmware/zte-read-only'); + + // Then + expect(zteLogins(run)).toEqual([]); + expect(run.result.profile).toBe('zte-unknown-read-only'); + }); + + test('a USB id that is not a HIMI id never spends the UFI login', () => { + // Given + const nonHimi = [ + 'fleet/huawei-e3372h-22.200', + 'fleet/zte-mf79u', + 'unknown-firmware/zte-read-only', + ]; + + // Then + for (const id of nonHimi) expect(runOf(id).transcripts.ufi).toEqual([]); + expect(runOf('fleet/ufi-himi-9024').transcripts.ufi.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); +}); + +describe('interface and transport routing', () => { + test('reaching the wrong duplicate-IP twin refuses before login, still bound to that interface', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('wrong-interface/hilink-duplicate-ip-twin'); + + // Then + expect(run.result.status).toBe('ambiguous'); + expect(hilinkLogins(run)).toEqual([]); + expect(run.transcripts.hilink.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect( + run.transcripts.hilink.every((exchange) => exchange.interfaceName === HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE), + ).toBe(true); + expect( + run.result.conflicts.some( + (item) => item.stage === 'authenticated-profile' && item.detail === 'profile-mismatch', + ), + ).toBe(true); + }); + + test('an ineligible transport is refused before ANY device is contacted', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('wrong-transport/usb-request-reaches-nobody'); + + // Then + expect(allExchanges(run)).toEqual([]); + expect(run.mmCalls).toEqual([]); + expect( + run.result.evidence.filter( + (item) => item.stage === 'transport-eligibility' && item.signal === 'mismatch', + ), + ).toHaveLength(4); + }); + + test('a ModemManager-managed modem is never offered to a router-dialect provider', () => { + // Given + const run = runOf('fleet/mm-fm350-usb'); + + // When + const ineligible = run.result.evidence + .filter((item) => item.stage === 'transport-eligibility' && item.signal === 'mismatch') + .map((item) => item.provider) + .sort(); + + // Then + expect(ineligible).toEqual(['huawei-hilink', 'ufi-himi', 'zte-goform']); + expect(allExchanges(run)).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('corpus sanitization', () => { + const SUBSCRIBER_DIGIT_RUN = /\d{14,}/g; + const allowed = new Set(SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS.map((entry) => entry.value)); + + const unlisted = (documents: readonly string[]): readonly string[] => + documents + .flatMap((document) => [...document.matchAll(SUBSCRIBER_DIGIT_RUN)]) + .map((match) => match[0]) + .filter((value) => !allowed.has(value)); + + test('every subscriber-scale identifier in the corpus is a declared synthetic value', () => { + // Given / When + const found = unlisted(CORPUS_BODIES); + + // Then + expect(found).toEqual([]); + expect(SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const entry of SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS) { + expect(entry.provenance.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + } + }); + + test('the detector trips on an undeclared identifier — it is not vacuous', () => { + // Given + const pasted = '{"params":{"IMSI":"310150123456789"}}'; + + // When + const found = unlisted([pasted]); + + // Then + expect(found).toEqual(['310150123456789']); + }); + + test('every recorded request body across the whole matrix is sanitized too', () => { + // Given + const wire = rows.flatMap((row) => + allExchanges(runOf(row.id)).map((exchange) => JSON.stringify(exchange)), + ); + + // Then + expect(wire.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect(unlisted(wire)).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the corpus credential is a declared fixture literal, never a bench environment secret', () => { + // Given + const benchSecrets = ['MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD', 'UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD'] + .map((name) => process.env[name]) + .filter((value): value is string => value !== undefined && value.length > 0); + + // Then + expect(CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password).toContain('not-a-real-secret'); + for (const secret of benchSecrets) { + for (const document of CORPUS_BODIES) expect(document).not.toContain(secret); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/conformance-scale.test.ts b/control/src/providers/conformance-scale.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e210f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/conformance-scale.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +// SOFTWARE UPPER-BOUND fixture — 16 concurrently attached modems. +// +// READ THIS BEFORE QUOTING THE NUMBER. Sixteen is a FIXTURE result and nothing else: it +// says the observation, epoch, `Signal.Setup` and matching paths hold their shape at that +// count, measured against an in-memory ModemManager. It is NOT a bench measurement and +// must never be reported as one. +// +// The HARDWARE-VERIFIED figure remains the 8-device bench fleet from the predecessor +// evidence. Nothing here raises it; a hardware claim comes from the bench certification +// (todo 42), from a real board, with real modems attached. +// +// What the fixture is actually good for is the resource shape, which is where a fleet +// stack usually goes wrong: subscriptions must be FLEET-WIDE (four, forever) rather than +// per modem, `Signal.Setup` must be issued exactly once per (epoch, modem) rather than +// once per refresh, and sixteen concurrent matches must each answer about their OWN +// modem rather than a cached neighbour's. + +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { FakeMmTransport } from '../../test-support/conformance'; +import type { ModemSpec } from '../../test-support/fake-mm/object-model'; +import { modemPath } from '../../test-support/fake-mm/object-model'; +import { deviceGeneration, physicalModemId } from '../domain'; +import { createProviderMatcher } from './matcher'; +import { createModemManagerProvider, type ModemManagerProvider } from './modem-manager'; +import { createProviderRegistry } from './registry'; + +/** Fixture-only. See the file header: the bench-verified fleet size is 8. */ +const SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS = 16; +/** The figure that IS hardware-verified, kept here so the two are never conflated. */ +const HARDWARE_VERIFIED_BENCH_FLEET = 8; + +/** The four fleet-wide subscriptions the observer takes: three OM/props + NameOwnerChanged. */ +const FLEET_WIDE_SUBSCRIPTIONS = 4; + +const FIRST_INDEX = 101; + +function fleet(count: number): readonly ModemSpec[] { + return Array.from({ length: count }, (_, offset) => { + const index = FIRST_INDEX + offset; + return { + index, + manufacturer: 'Fake Modems Inc.', + model: `Scale-${index}`, + revision: '1.0-fixture', + signalQuality: 40 + (offset % 50), + sims: [ + { + index, + iccid: `890000000000000${String(index)}`, + imsi: `00101000000${String(index)}`, + active: true, + }, + ], + } satisfies ModemSpec; + }); +} + +async function waitFor(predicate: () => boolean, timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise { + const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs; + while (!predicate()) { + if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new Error('waitFor timed out'); + await Bun.sleep(5); + } +} + +describe('16 concurrently attached modems (VALIDATED UPPER BOUND — fixture, not hardware)', () => { + let provider: ModemManagerProvider | undefined; + + afterEach(async () => { + await provider?.stop(); + provider = undefined; + }); + + test('the fixture bound is declared as software-only and exceeds the bench-verified fleet', () => { + // Given / When / Then + expect(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS).toBe(16); + expect(HARDWARE_VERIFIED_BENCH_FLEET).toBe(8); + expect(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS).toBeGreaterThan(HARDWARE_VERIFIED_BENCH_FLEET); + }); + + test('all sixteen are observed, and the subscription count stays fleet-wide', async () => { + // Given + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: fleet(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS) }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + + // When + const list = await provider.start(); + + // Then + expect(list.ok).toBe(true); + expect(list.rows).toHaveLength(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + expect(transport.subscriptionCount()).toBe(FLEET_WIDE_SUBSCRIPTIONS); + }); + + test('Signal.Setup is issued exactly once per modem for the epoch — never once per refresh', async () => { + // Given + const specs = fleet(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: specs }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + + // When + await provider.start(); + await waitFor(() => transport.signalSetupCalls.length >= SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + await Bun.sleep(20); + + // Then + const paths = transport.signalSetupCalls.map((call) => call.path); + expect(paths).toHaveLength(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + expect(new Set(paths).size).toBe(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + expect([...paths].sort()).toEqual(specs.map((spec) => modemPath(spec.index)).sort()); + }); + + test('a burst of sixteen attachments is coalesced instead of refreshing once per event', async () => { + // Given + const specs = fleet(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + const transport = new FakeMmTransport(); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + await provider.start(); + const beforeBurst = transport.managedObjectsCalls.length; + + // When + for (const spec of specs) transport.addModem(spec); + await waitFor(() => transport.signalSetupCalls.length >= SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + + // Then + const refreshes = transport.managedObjectsCalls.length - beforeBurst; + expect(refreshes).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect(refreshes).toBeLessThan(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + expect(transport.subscriptionCount()).toBe(FLEET_WIDE_SUBSCRIPTIONS); + }); + + test('sixteen concurrent matches each answer about their OWN modem', async () => { + // Given + const specs = fleet(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: specs }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(provider.definition); + const matcher = createProviderMatcher(registry); + + // When + const results = await Promise.all( + specs.map((spec) => + matcher.match({ + physicalModemId: physicalModemId(`serial:fake-device-${spec.index}`), + generation: deviceGeneration(1), + transport: 'modemmanager', + passiveFacts: [], + composition: 'scale-fixture', + }), + ), + ); + + // Then + expect(results).toHaveLength(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + for (const [offset, result] of results.entries()) { + expect(result.status).toBe('selected'); + expect(result.provider).toBe('modemmanager'); + expect(result.profile).toBe('generic-mm'); + expect(String(result.physicalModemId)).toBe(`serial:fake-device-${specs[offset]?.index}`); + } + }); + + test('detaching and re-attaching modems grows no per-modem resource, and stop releases everything', async () => { + // Given + const specs = fleet(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: specs }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + await provider.start(); + await waitFor(() => transport.signalSetupCalls.length >= SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + + // When + for (const spec of specs.slice(0, 4)) transport.removeModem(spec.index); + await Bun.sleep(20); + for (const spec of specs.slice(0, 4)) transport.addModem(spec); + await Bun.sleep(20); + + // Then + expect(transport.subscriptionCount()).toBe(FLEET_WIDE_SUBSCRIPTIONS); + // TOTAL, not a distinct count: churn inside ONE epoch re-drives the manager, and a + // distinct-path assertion cannot tell a de-duped re-apply from sixteen extra calls. + expect(transport.signalSetupCalls).toHaveLength(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + expect( + transport.calls.some((call) => /Connect|CreateBearer|Disconnect/.test(call.member)), + ).toBe(false); + + await provider.stop(); + provider = undefined; + expect(transport.subscriptionCount()).toBe(0); + }); + + test('a new daemon epoch re-applies Signal.Setup to every one of the sixteen survivors', async () => { + // Given + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: fleet(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS) }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + await provider.start(); + await waitFor(() => transport.signalSetupCalls.length >= SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS); + + // When + transport.takeOverAs(':1.99'); + await waitFor(() => transport.signalSetupCalls.length >= SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS * 2); + await Bun.sleep(20); + + // Then + expect(transport.signalSetupCalls).toHaveLength(SOFTWARE_UPPER_BOUND_MODEMS * 2); + expect(transport.subscriptionCount()).toBe(FLEET_WIDE_SUBSCRIPTIONS); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/conformance-transcripts.test.ts b/control/src/providers/conformance-transcripts.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..600f723 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/conformance-transcripts.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +// Sanitized per-firmware HTTP transcripts, asserted EXACTLY. +// +// The matrix next door proves each device reaches the right provider. This file proves +// the provider got there over the right wire: exact method, exact path, exact query, +// exact form/JSON/XML body, exact header ARRAY (order included) and the exact cookie — +// per firmware profile, end to end through the real matcher rather than through a +// hand-driven call. +// +// The expected transcripts are rebuilt from the protocol in +// `test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts`, not read back from the provider, so this is +// a comparison and not an echo. A `toEqual` on the whole array additionally pins the +// COUNT: an extra request nobody asked for — a second login, a re-probe, a stray +// capability read — fails here even when the decision is unchanged. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { + CONFORMANCE_CASES, + CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + HILINK_FIRMWARE, + HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, + hilinkCookieFor, + hilinkGet, + hilinkLoginPost, + hilinkOpenGet, + UFI_INTERFACE, + ufiLoginPost, + ufiReadPost, + ZTE_FINGERPRINT_CMD, + ZTE_INTERFACE, + ZTE_LEGACY_PASSWORD, + ZTE_SALTED_PASSWORD, + ZTE_STOK, + ZTE_TELEMETRY_CMD, + ZTE_VERSIONS_CMD, + zteGet, + ztePost, +} from '../../test-support/conformance'; +import { HILINK_PATHS } from './huawei-hilink/provider'; + +async function transcriptsOf(caseId: string) { + const entry = CONFORMANCE_CASES.find((candidate) => candidate.id === caseId); + if (entry === undefined) throw new Error(`unknown conformance case: ${caseId}`); + return (await entry.run()).transcripts; +} + +describe('Huawei HiLink per-firmware transcripts', () => { + test('22.200 password-type-3: one open probe, one session, one state read, ONE login, four capability reads', async () => { + // Given + const profile = 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3' as const; + const cookie = hilinkCookieFor(profile); + + // When + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf('fleet/huawei-e3372h-22.200'); + + // Then + expect(transcripts.hilink).toEqual([ + hilinkOpenGet(HILINK_PATHS.session, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE), + hilinkOpenGet(HILINK_PATHS.session, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.loginState, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkLoginPost(profile, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.status, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.signal, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.modeList, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.data, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + ]); + }); + + test('22.333 password-type-4: identical shape, a DIFFERENT derived password document', async () => { + // Given + const profile = 'e3372h-22.333-password-type-4' as const; + const cookie = hilinkCookieFor(profile); + + // When + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf('fleet/huawei-e3372h-22.333'); + + // Then + expect(transcripts.hilink).toEqual([ + hilinkOpenGet(HILINK_PATHS.session, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE), + hilinkOpenGet(HILINK_PATHS.session, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.loginState, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkLoginPost(profile, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.status, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.signal, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.modeList, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + hilinkGet(HILINK_PATHS.data, HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, cookie), + ]); + }); + + test('the two firmwares never share a login document, and neither carries the raw password', async () => { + // Given + const type3 = hilinkLoginPost('e3372h-22.200-password-type-3', HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE); + const type4 = hilinkLoginPost('e3372h-22.333-password-type-4', HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE); + + // When + const documents = [type3.body, type4.body].map((body) => + body.kind === 'xml' ? body.text : '', + ); + + // Then + expect(documents[0]).not.toEqual(documents[1]); + expect(documents[0]).toContain('3'); + expect(documents[1]).toContain('4'); + for (const document of documents) { + expect(document).not.toContain(CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password); + } + expect(HILINK_FIRMWARE['e3372h-22.200-password-type-3']).not.toBe( + HILINK_FIRMWARE['e3372h-22.333-password-type-4'], + ); + }); +}); + +describe('ZTE goform per-firmware transcripts', () => { + test('MF79U legacy: one fingerprint GET, ONE form login with a base64 password, one telemetry GET', async () => { + // When + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf('fleet/zte-mf79u'); + + // Then + expect(transcripts.zte).toEqual([ + zteGet(ZTE_FINGERPRINT_CMD, ZTE_INTERFACE), + ztePost({ goformId: 'LOGIN', isTest: 'false', password: ZTE_LEGACY_PASSWORD }, ZTE_INTERFACE), + zteGet(ZTE_TELEMETRY_CMD, ZTE_INTERFACE), + ]); + }); + + test('MF266 salted: LD challenge, salted login, then AD derivation over the stok cookie', async () => { + // When + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf('fleet/zte-mf266'); + + // Then + expect(transcripts.zte).toEqual([ + zteGet(ZTE_FINGERPRINT_CMD, ZTE_INTERFACE), + zteGet('LD', ZTE_INTERFACE), + ztePost( + { + goformId: 'LOGIN_MULTI_USER', + isTest: 'false', + password: ZTE_SALTED_PASSWORD, + IP: 'localhost', + user: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.username, + }, + ZTE_INTERFACE, + ), + zteGet(ZTE_VERSIONS_CMD, ZTE_INTERFACE, { cookie: ZTE_STOK, multiData: true }), + zteGet('RD', ZTE_INTERFACE, { cookie: ZTE_STOK }), + zteGet(ZTE_TELEMETRY_CMD, ZTE_INTERFACE), + ]); + }); + + test('neither goform profile puts a password on the wire in the other one’s encoding', () => { + // Given / When / Then + expect(ZTE_LEGACY_PASSWORD).not.toBe(ZTE_SALTED_PASSWORD); + expect(ZTE_LEGACY_PASSWORD).not.toContain(CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password); + expect(ZTE_SALTED_PASSWORD).toMatch(/^[0-9A-F]{64}$/); + }); +}); + +describe('UFI / HIMI transcript', () => { + test('one endpoint, one method, the verb in the body, and exactly one login', async () => { + // When + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf('fleet/ufi-himi-9024'); + + // Then + expect(transcripts.ufi).toEqual([ + ufiLoginPost(UFI_INTERFACE), + ufiReadPost('getallstatus', UFI_INTERFACE), + ufiReadPost('getsysinfo', UFI_INTERFACE), + ]); + expect(transcripts.ufi.every((exchange) => exchange.method === 'POST')).toBe(true); + expect(new Set(transcripts.ufi.map((exchange) => exchange.path)).size).toBe(1); + }); + + test('the firmware-specific product id takes the SAME read-only transcript', async () => { + // When + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf('fleet/ufi-himi-9091'); + + // Then + expect(transcripts.ufi).toEqual([ + ufiLoginPost(UFI_INTERFACE), + ufiReadPost('getallstatus', UFI_INTERFACE), + ufiReadPost('getsysinfo', UFI_INTERFACE), + ]); + }); +}); + +describe('every transcript is interface-bound and redirect-refusing', () => { + test('no request in the whole corpus leaves an interface unset or follows a redirect', async () => { + // Given + const caseIds = CONFORMANCE_CASES.filter((entry) => entry.kind === 'fleet-profile').map( + (entry) => entry.id, + ); + + // When + const exchanges = ( + await Promise.all( + caseIds.map(async (id) => { + const transcripts = await transcriptsOf(id); + return [ + ...transcripts.hilink, + ...transcripts.hilinkTwin, + ...transcripts.zte, + ...transcripts.ufi, + ]; + }), + ) + ).flat(); + + // Then + expect(exchanges.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const exchange of exchanges) { + expect(exchange.redirect).toBe('error'); + expect(exchange.interfaceName.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/index.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c173ea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +export * from './provider'; +export * from './transport'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/operations.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/operations.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea54c04 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/operations.ts @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +import type { DeviceGeneration, OperationDescriptor, OperationResult } from '../../domain'; +import { defineOperationDescriptor } from '../../domain'; +import { parseHilinkDataCapability, parseHilinkXmlValue } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext } from '../contracts'; +import { HILINK_PATHS, type HilinkProfile } from './provider'; + +export type ReadValue = Readonly>; +export type ReadOperation = { + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly read: (context: ProviderExecutionContext) => Promise>; +}; +export type WriteOperation = { + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + readonly read: ReadOperation['read']; + readonly write: ( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + value: string | boolean, + ) => Promise>; +}; + +export function applied( + generation: DeviceGeneration, + value: ReadValue, +): OperationResult { + return { status: 'applied', value, generation, requiresReconciliation: false }; +} + +export function refused(generation: DeviceGeneration, reason: string): OperationResult { + return { status: 'refused', reason, generation, requiresReconciliation: false }; +} + +export function operationDescriptor( + id: string, + write: boolean, + profile: HilinkProfile, +): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id, + support: { + read: { supported: true }, + write: write ? { supported: true } : { supported: false, reason: 'read-only' }, + }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: 'huawei-hilink', + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: ['fresh-session', 'capability-evidence'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: write ? 'write' : 'read', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: write + ? { required: true, reason: 'fresh-readback', matches: () => true } + : { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: true, reason: 'router-session' }, + evidence: { profiles: [profile.id], firmware: [profile.firmware] }, + confidence: 'high', + }); +} + +export function requestSucceeded(status: number, body: string): boolean { + return status >= 200 && status < 300 && /\s*OK\s*<\/response>/i.test(body); +} + +export function capabilityPath(kind: 'status' | 'signal' | 'mode' | 'data'): string { + return kind === 'status' + ? HILINK_PATHS.status + : kind === 'signal' + ? HILINK_PATHS.signal + : kind === 'mode' + ? HILINK_PATHS.modeList + : HILINK_PATHS.data; +} + +export function writeDocument(kind: 'mode' | 'data', value: string | boolean): string { + return kind === 'mode' + ? `${String(value)}` + : `${value ? 1 : 0}`; +} + +export function readbackMatches( + kind: 'mode' | 'data', + body: string, + value: string | boolean, +): boolean { + if (kind === 'mode') return parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'NetworkMode') === String(value); + const parsed = parseHilinkDataCapability(body); + return parsed.state === 'reported' && parsed.enabled === Boolean(value); +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.test.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..782061c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; +import type { ResourceOwnershipPort } from '../../ports/resource-ownership'; +import { createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition, HILINK_PATHS, HILINK_PROFILES } from './provider'; +import type { HilinkHttpRequest, HilinkHttpResponse, HilinkTransport } from './transport'; + +const PASSWORD = 'fixture-password'; +const USERNAME = 'admin'; +const TYPE4_HASH = Buffer.from( + createHash('sha256') + .update( + `${USERNAME}${Buffer.from(createHash('sha256').update(PASSWORD).digest('hex')).toString('base64')}type4-token`, + ) + .digest('hex'), +).toString('base64'); +const acquired: ResourceOwnershipPort = { + acquire: async () => ({ + status: 'acquired', + lease: { + holder: { pid: 1, startedAtEpochMs: 1 }, + lost: new Promise(() => {}), + release: async () => {}, + }, + }), +}; +const context = (profile: string) => ({ + physicalModemId: 'fixture-device' as never, + generation: 1 as never, + transport: 'network' as const, + passiveFacts: [], + composition: 'rndis', + firmware: profile.includes('22.200') ? '22.200.05.00.1080' : '22.333.01.00.00', + profile, +}); + +function replay(responses: readonly HilinkHttpResponse[]) { + const calls: HilinkHttpRequest[] = []; + const pending = [...responses]; + const transport: HilinkTransport = { + request: async (request) => { + calls.push(request); + const response = pending.shift(); + if (response === undefined) throw new Error('unexpected replay request'); + return response; + }, + }; + return { calls, transport, remaining: () => pending.length }; +} + +function definition(transport: HilinkTransport, ownership = acquired) { + return createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition({ + interfaceName: 'eth9', + adminUrl: 'http://192.168.8.1', + transport, + ownership, + credentials: { username: USERNAME, password: PASSWORD }, + }); +} + +const session = (token: string, cookie = `SessionID=${token}-cookie`): HilinkHttpResponse => ({ + status: 200, + body: `${cookie}${token}`, +}); +const state = (passwordType: 3 | 4): HilinkHttpResponse => ({ + status: 200, + body: `-1${passwordType}`, +}); +const loggedIn: HilinkHttpResponse = { + status: 200, + body: 'OK', + headers: { + 'set-cookie': 'SessionID=logged-in; Path=/', + __requestverificationtoken: 'write-token', + }, +}; + +describe('Huawei HiLink firmware replay profiles', () => { + for (const fixture of [ + { + profile: HILINK_PROFILES[0], + token: 'type3-token', + password: Buffer.from(PASSWORD).toString('base64'), + }, + { profile: HILINK_PROFILES[1], token: 'type4-token', password: TYPE4_HASH }, + ] as const) { + test(`replays exact ${fixture.profile.id} login request`, async () => { + const h = replay([session(fixture.token), state(fixture.profile.passwordType), loggedIn]); + const result = await definition(h.transport).authenticatedProfile?.authenticate( + context(fixture.profile.id), + [fixture.profile.id], + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ + status: 'matched', + profile: fixture.profile.id, + detail: 'login-ok', + }); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(3); + expect(h.calls[2]).toEqual({ + method: 'POST', + url: `http://192.168.8.1${HILINK_PATHS.login}`, + body: `${USERNAME}${fixture.password}${fixture.profile.passwordType}`, + headers: [ + `Cookie: SessionID=${fixture.token}-cookie`, + `__RequestVerificationToken: ${fixture.token}`, + 'Content-Type: application/xml', + ], + interfaceName: 'eth9', + redirect: 'error', + }); + expect(h.remaining()).toBe(0); + }); + } + + test('refuses profile mismatch without cycling to another password algorithm', async () => { + const h = replay([session('mismatch-token'), state(4)]); + const profile = HILINK_PROFILES[0]; + const result = await definition(h.transport).authenticatedProfile?.authenticate( + context(profile.id), + [profile.id], + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'refused', detail: 'profile-mismatch' }); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(2); + }); +}); + +describe('Huawei HiLink write safety', () => { + test('requires a fresh authenticated readback before reporting applied', async () => { + const profile = HILINK_PROFILES[1]; + const h = replay([ + session('write-session'), + state(4), + loggedIn, + { status: 200, body: '0' }, + { status: 200, body: 'OK' }, + session('readback-session'), + state(4), + loggedIn, + { status: 200, body: '1' }, + ]); + const result = await definition(h.transport) + .operations(profile.id) + .data.write(context(profile.id), true); + expect(result.status).toBe('applied'); + expect(h.calls.map((call) => new URL(call.url).pathname)).toEqual([ + HILINK_PATHS.session, + HILINK_PATHS.loginState, + HILINK_PATHS.login, + HILINK_PATHS.data, + HILINK_PATHS.data, + HILINK_PATHS.session, + HILINK_PATHS.loginState, + HILINK_PATHS.login, + HILINK_PATHS.data, + ]); + }); + + test('expires mid-write with no credential retry and no secret in the refusal', async () => { + const profile = HILINK_PROFILES[0]; + const h = replay([ + session('expired-token', 'SessionID=private-cookie'), + state(3), + loggedIn, + { status: 200, body: '0' }, + { status: 200, body: '125002' }, + ]); + const result = await definition(h.transport) + .operations(profile.id) + .data.write(context(profile.id), true); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'auth-expired' }); + expect(h.calls.filter((call) => call.url.endsWith(HILINK_PATHS.login))).toHaveLength(1); + const serialized = JSON.stringify(result); + for (const secret of [PASSWORD, 'private-cookie', Buffer.from(PASSWORD).toString('base64')]) { + expect(serialized).not.toContain(secret); + } + }); + + test('does not infer data writability when the data read endpoint refuses capability', async () => { + const profile = HILINK_PROFILES[0]; + const h = replay([ + session('capability-token'), + state(3), + loggedIn, + { status: 200, body: '112008' }, + ]); + const result = await definition(h.transport) + .operations(profile.id) + .data.write(context(profile.id), true); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'capability-unavailable' }); + expect( + h.calls.some((call) => call.method === 'POST' && call.url.endsWith(HILINK_PATHS.data)), + ).toBe(false); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86f35aa --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.ts @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../../observations'; +import type { ResourceOwnershipPort } from '../../ports/resource-ownership'; +import type { ProviderDefinition, ProviderOperationsSurface } from '../contracts'; +import { HuaweiProvider, type ReadOperation, type WriteOperation } from './runtime'; +import type { HilinkTransport } from './transport'; + +export const HILINK_PATHS = { + session: '/api/webserver/SesTokInfo', + loginState: '/api/user/state-login', + login: '/api/user/login', + status: '/api/monitoring/status', + signal: '/api/device/signal', + modeList: '/api/net/net-mode-list', + mode: '/api/net/net-mode', + data: '/api/dialup/mobile-dataswitch', +} as const; + +export type HilinkProfile = { + readonly id: string; + readonly firmware: string; + readonly passwordType: 3 | 4; +}; + +export const HILINK_PROFILES = [ + { + id: 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3', + firmware: '22.200.05.00.1080', + passwordType: 3, + }, + { + id: 'e3372h-22.333-password-type-4', + firmware: '22.333.01.00.00', + passwordType: 4, + }, +] as const satisfies readonly HilinkProfile[]; + +export type HilinkCredentials = { + readonly username: string; + readonly password: string; +}; +export type HilinkOptions = { + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly adminUrl: string; + readonly transport: HilinkTransport; + readonly ownership: ResourceOwnershipPort; + readonly credentials: HilinkCredentials; + readonly now?: () => number; +}; +export type HilinkObservation = NormalizedModemObservation; +export type HuaweiOperations = ProviderOperationsSurface & { + readonly status: ReadOperation; + readonly signal: ReadOperation; + readonly mode: WriteOperation; + readonly data: WriteOperation; +}; + +export function hilinkProfile(profileId: string): HilinkProfile | undefined { + return HILINK_PROFILES.find((profile) => profile.id === profileId); +} + +export function createHuaweiHiLinkProvider(options: HilinkOptions): HuaweiProvider { + return new HuaweiProvider(options); +} + +export function createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition( + options: HilinkOptions, +): ProviderDefinition { + const runtime = createHuaweiHiLinkProvider(options); + return { + id: 'huawei-hilink', + profileVersion: '1', + eligibleTransports: ['network'], + passiveMatchers: HILINK_PROFILES.map((profile) => ({ + id: `firmware-${profile.firmware}`, + fact: 'firmware', + expected: [profile.firmware], + profiles: [profile.id], + strength: 'strong', + required: true, + })), + unauthenticatedProbes: [ + { + id: 'hilink-session-shape', + run: (request) => runtime.sessionProbe(request), + }, + ], + authenticatedProfile: { + algorithm: 'firmware-selected-hilink-password', + attemptLimit: 1, + authenticate: (request, candidates) => runtime.authenticateProfile(request, candidates), + }, + capabilityReaders: [ + runtime.capability('status'), + runtime.capability('signal'), + runtime.capability('mode'), + runtime.capability('data'), + ], + observe: (context) => runtime.observe(context), + operations: (profile) => runtime.operations(profile), + contractFixtures: HILINK_PROFILES.map((profile) => ({ + profile: profile.id, + request: { + method: 'POST', + path: HILINK_PATHS.login, + passwordType: profile.passwordType, + interfaceBound: true, + redirects: 'disabled', + }, + response: { status: 'matched', sessionMaterial: '[redacted]' }, + })), + }; +} + +export { HuaweiProvider as HuaweiHiLinkProvider }; diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/runtime.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/runtime.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7af5781 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/runtime.ts @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +import type { ObservationEnvelope, OperationResult } from '../../domain'; +import { + parseHilinkCapabilities, + parseHilinkDataCapability, + parseHilinkSession, + parseHilinkXmlValue, +} from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { HilinkObservationInput } from '../../observations/sources/hilink'; +import { normalizeHilinkObservation } from '../../observations/sources/hilink'; +import type { + AuthenticatedProfileResult, + CapabilityReader, + ProviderExecutionContext, + ProviderMatchRequest, +} from '../contracts'; +import { + applied, + capabilityPath, + operationDescriptor, + type ReadOperation, + type ReadValue, + readbackMatches, + refused, + requestSucceeded, + type WriteOperation, + writeDocument, +} from './operations'; +import { + HILINK_PATHS, + HILINK_PROFILES, + type HilinkObservation, + type HilinkProfile, + type HuaweiOperations, + hilinkProfile, +} from './provider'; +import { type HilinkSession, HilinkSessionRuntime } from './session'; + +export type { ReadOperation, WriteOperation } from './operations'; + +export class HuaweiProvider extends HilinkSessionRuntime { + async sessionProbe(request: ProviderMatchRequest) { + const profile = HILINK_PROFILES.find((candidate) => candidate.firmware === request.firmware); + const response = await this.request('GET', HILINK_PATHS.session); + const matches = response.status === 200 && parseHilinkSession(response.body) !== undefined; + return { + signal: matches && profile !== undefined ? ('match' as const) : ('unknown' as const), + strength: 'strong' as const, + profiles: profile === undefined ? [] : [profile.id], + detail: matches ? 'session-token-evidence' : 'session-token-not-proven', + }; + } + + async authenticateProfile( + request: ProviderMatchRequest, + candidates: readonly string[], + ): Promise { + const candidate = candidates.length === 1 ? hilinkProfile(candidates[0] ?? '') : undefined; + if (candidate === undefined) return { status: 'refused', detail: 'profile-mismatch' }; + const result = await this.authenticate(request, candidate, true); + if (result.status === 'ready') + return { status: 'matched', profile: candidate.id, detail: 'login-ok' }; + return { + status: result.reason === 'unreachable' ? 'unavailable' : 'refused', + detail: result.reason, + }; + } + + async observe( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise[]> { + const ready = await this.sessionFor(context); + if (ready === undefined) return []; + const [status, signal, modeList, mode] = await Promise.all([ + this.getResponse(HILINK_PATHS.status, ready), + this.getResponse(HILINK_PATHS.signal, ready), + this.getResponse(HILINK_PATHS.modeList, ready), + this.getResponse(HILINK_PATHS.mode, ready), + ]); + const input: HilinkObservationInput = { + status: status.body, + signal: signal.body, + netModeList: modeList.body, + netMode: mode.body, + }; + return [ + normalizeHilinkObservation(input, { + stableKey: `modem:${this.options.interfaceName}` as never, + generation: context.generation, + sourceEpoch: 1 as never, + observedAt: (this.options.now?.() ?? Date.now()) as never, + }), + ]; + } + + capability(kind: 'status' | 'signal' | 'mode' | 'data'): CapabilityReader { + return { + id: `hilink-${kind}`, + read: async (context) => { + const session = await this.sessionFor(context); + if (session === undefined) + return { signal: 'unknown', strength: 'strong', detail: 'session-unavailable' }; + const path = capabilityPath(kind); + const response = await this.getResponse(path, session); + const supported = + this.capabilitySupported(kind, response.body) && !this.authExpired(response); + return { + signal: supported ? 'match' : 'mismatch', + strength: 'strong', + detail: supported ? 'capability-reported' : 'capability-refused', + }; + }, + }; + } + + operations(profileId: string): HuaweiOperations { + const profile = hilinkProfile(profileId); + if (profile === undefined) return unsupportedOperations(profileId); + return { + access: 'read-write', + status: this.readOperation('status', HILINK_PATHS.status, profile), + signal: this.readOperation('signal', HILINK_PATHS.signal, profile), + mode: this.writeOperation('mode', HILINK_PATHS.mode, profile), + data: this.writeOperation('data', HILINK_PATHS.data, profile), + }; + } + + private async sessionFor(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise { + const cached = this.cachedSession(context); + if (cached !== undefined) return cached; + const profile = hilinkProfile(context.profile); + if (profile === undefined) return undefined; + const result = await this.authenticate(context, profile, true); + return result.status === 'ready' ? result.session : undefined; + } + + private capabilitySupported(kind: string, body: string): boolean { + if (kind === 'mode') + return parseHilinkCapabilities({ netModeList: body }).net_mode.state === 'reported'; + if (kind === 'data') return parseHilinkDataCapability(body).state === 'reported'; + return parseHilinkXmlValue(body, 'code') === undefined && //i.test(body); + } + + private readOperation(id: string, path: string, profile: HilinkProfile): ReadOperation { + return { + descriptor: operationDescriptor(id, false, profile), + read: async (context) => { + const result = await this.authenticate(context, profile, false); + if (result.status === 'refused') return refused(context.generation, result.reason); + const response = await this.getResponse(path, result.session); + if (this.authExpired(response)) return refused(context.generation, 'auth-expired'); + if (response.status < 200 || response.status >= 300) + return refused(context.generation, 'http-failure'); + return applied(context.generation, { body: response.body }); + }, + }; + } + + private writeOperation( + id: 'mode' | 'data', + path: string, + profile: HilinkProfile, + ): WriteOperation { + return { + descriptor: operationDescriptor(id, true, profile), + read: this.readOperation(`${id}-read`, path, profile).read, + write: (context, value) => this.write(context, profile, id, path, value), + }; + } + + private async write( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + profile: HilinkProfile, + kind: 'mode' | 'data', + path: string, + value: string | boolean, + ): Promise> { + return this.withDevice(context, async () => { + const ownership = await this.options.ownership.acquire({ resource: 'router-session' }); + if (ownership.status === 'refused') return refused(context.generation, 'busy'); + try { + const ready = await this.authenticate(context, profile, false); + if (ready.status === 'refused') return refused(context.generation, ready.reason); + const capabilityPath = kind === 'mode' ? HILINK_PATHS.modeList : HILINK_PATHS.data; + const capability = await this.getResponse(capabilityPath, ready.session); + if (this.authExpired(capability)) return refused(context.generation, 'auth-expired'); + if (!this.capabilitySupported(kind, capability.body)) + return refused(context.generation, 'capability-unavailable'); + if (kind === 'mode') { + const offered = parseHilinkCapabilities({ netModeList: capability.body }).net_mode; + if ( + offered.state !== 'reported' || + !offered.modes.some((mode) => mode.id === String(value)) + ) + return refused(context.generation, 'capability-unavailable'); + } + const body = writeDocument(kind, value); + const posted = await this.postResponse(path, body, ready.session); + if (this.authExpired(posted)) return refused(context.generation, 'auth-expired'); + if (!requestSucceeded(posted.status, posted.body)) + return refused(context.generation, 'http-failure'); + const fresh = await this.authenticate(context, profile, false); + if (fresh.status === 'refused') return refused(context.generation, fresh.reason); + const readback = await this.getResponse(path, fresh.session); + if (this.authExpired(readback)) return refused(context.generation, 'auth-expired'); + const matches = readbackMatches(kind, readback.body, value); + return matches + ? applied(context.generation, { body: readback.body }) + : refused(context.generation, 'not-applied'); + } finally { + await ownership.lease.release(); + } + }); + } +} + +function unsupportedOperations(_profileId: string): HuaweiOperations { + throw new Error('unsupported-hilink-profile'); +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/session.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/session.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8668a25 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/session.ts @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; +import { + parseHilinkSession, + parseHilinkUserState, + parseHilinkXmlValue, +} from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext, ProviderMatchRequest } from '../contracts'; +import { HILINK_PATHS, type HilinkOptions, type HilinkProfile } from './provider'; +import type { HilinkHttpResponse } from './transport'; + +export type HilinkSession = { readonly cookie: string; readonly token: string }; +export type HilinkSessionFailure = + | 'auth-expired' + | 'http-failure' + | 'malformed' + | 'profile-mismatch' + | 'unreachable'; +export type HilinkSessionResult = + | { readonly status: 'ready'; readonly session: HilinkSession } + | { readonly status: 'refused'; readonly reason: HilinkSessionFailure }; + +function base64(value: string): string { + return Buffer.from(value).toString('base64'); +} + +function derivePassword(profile: HilinkProfile, username: string, password: string, token: string) { + if (profile.passwordType === 3) return base64(password); + const passwordHash = base64(createHash('sha256').update(password).digest('hex')); + const loginHash = createHash('sha256').update(`${username}${passwordHash}${token}`).digest('hex'); + return base64(loginHash); +} + +function escapeXml(value: string): string { + return value + .replace(/&/g, '&') + .replace(//g, '>') + .replace(/"/g, '"') + .replace(/'/g, '''); +} + +function loginDocument(profile: HilinkProfile, username: string, password: string, token: string) { + return `${escapeXml(username)}${derivePassword(profile, username, password, token)}${profile.passwordType}`; +} + +function responseHeader(response: HilinkHttpResponse, name: string): string | undefined { + const expected = name.toLowerCase(); + return Object.entries(response.headers ?? {}).find( + ([key]) => key.toLowerCase() === expected, + )?.[1]; +} + +function loggedInSession(response: HilinkHttpResponse, fallback: HilinkSession): HilinkSession { + const cookie = + responseHeader(response, 'set-cookie')?.split(';', 1)[0]?.trim() ?? fallback.cookie; + const tokenHeader = + responseHeader(response, '__requestverificationtoken') ?? + responseHeader(response, '__requestverificationtokenone'); + const token = tokenHeader?.split('#', 1)[0]?.trim() ?? fallback.token; + return { cookie, token }; +} + +export class HilinkSessionRuntime { + protected readonly options: HilinkOptions; + readonly #authenticated = new Map(); + readonly #serial = new Map>(); + + constructor(options: HilinkOptions) { + this.options = options; + } + + protected async withDevice( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + run: () => Promise, + ): Promise { + const key = String(context.physicalModemId); + const prior = this.#serial.get(key) ?? Promise.resolve(); + let release = () => {}; + const current = new Promise((resolve) => { + release = resolve; + }); + const chain = prior.then(() => current); + this.#serial.set(key, chain); + await prior; + try { + return await run(); + } finally { + release(); + if (this.#serial.get(key) === chain) this.#serial.delete(key); + } + } + + protected sessionKey(context: ProviderMatchRequest): string { + return `${context.physicalModemId}:${context.generation}`; + } + + protected cachedSession(context: ProviderMatchRequest): HilinkSession | undefined { + return this.#authenticated.get(this.sessionKey(context)); + } + + protected async authenticate( + context: ProviderMatchRequest, + profile: HilinkProfile, + cache: boolean, + ): Promise { + const sessionResponse = await this.request('GET', HILINK_PATHS.session); + if (sessionResponse.status === 401 || sessionResponse.status === 403) + return { status: 'refused', reason: 'auth-expired' }; + if (sessionResponse.status !== 200) return { status: 'refused', reason: 'unreachable' }; + const initial = parseHilinkSession(sessionResponse.body); + if (initial === undefined) return { status: 'refused', reason: 'malformed' }; + + const stateResponse = await this.getResponse(HILINK_PATHS.loginState, initial); + if (this.authExpired(stateResponse)) return { status: 'refused', reason: 'auth-expired' }; + const state = parseHilinkUserState(stateResponse.body); + if (state === undefined) return { status: 'refused', reason: 'malformed' }; + if (state.passwordType !== profile.passwordType) + return { status: 'refused', reason: 'profile-mismatch' }; + + const login = await this.postResponse( + HILINK_PATHS.login, + loginDocument( + profile, + this.options.credentials.username, + this.options.credentials.password, + initial.token, + ), + initial, + ); + if (this.authExpired(login)) return { status: 'refused', reason: 'auth-expired' }; + if (login.status !== 200 || !/\s*OK\s*<\/response>/i.test(login.body)) + return { status: 'refused', reason: 'http-failure' }; + const session = loggedInSession(login, initial); + if (cache) this.#authenticated.set(this.sessionKey(context), session); + return { status: 'ready', session }; + } + + protected authExpired(response: HilinkHttpResponse): boolean { + return ( + response.status === 401 || + response.status === 403 || + parseHilinkXmlValue(response.body, 'code') === '125002' + ); + } + + protected getResponse(path: string, session: HilinkSession): Promise { + return this.request('GET', path, undefined, [`Cookie: ${session.cookie}`]); + } + + protected postResponse( + path: string, + body: string, + session: HilinkSession, + ): Promise { + return this.request('POST', path, body, [ + `Cookie: ${session.cookie}`, + `__RequestVerificationToken: ${session.token}`, + 'Content-Type: application/xml', + ]); + } + + protected request( + method: 'GET' | 'POST', + path: string, + body?: string, + headers: readonly string[] = [], + ): Promise { + return this.options.transport.request({ + method, + url: `${this.options.adminUrl}${path}`, + ...(body === undefined ? {} : { body }), + headers, + interfaceName: this.options.interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }); + } +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/transport.ts b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/transport.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ce5e91 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/transport.ts @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +export type HilinkHttpRequest = { + readonly method: 'GET' | 'POST'; + readonly url: string; + readonly body?: string; + readonly headers: readonly string[]; + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly redirect: 'error'; +}; +export type HilinkHttpResponse = { + readonly status: number; + readonly body: string; + readonly headers?: Readonly>; +}; +export interface HilinkTransport { + request(request: HilinkHttpRequest): Promise; +} +export type HilinkReplayExchange = HilinkHttpRequest & { readonly response: HilinkHttpResponse }; diff --git a/control/src/providers/index.ts b/control/src/providers/index.ts index 557b41d..615f19b 100644 --- a/control/src/providers/index.ts +++ b/control/src/providers/index.ts @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ export * from './contracts'; +export * from './huawei-hilink'; export * from './matcher'; +export * from './modem-manager'; +export * from './network-manager'; export * from './registry'; +export * from './ufi-himi'; +export * from './zte-goform'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/capability-truth.test.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/capability-truth.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87a368b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/capability-truth.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,459 @@ +// End-to-end capability truth through the REAL ModemManager provider. +// +// The unit suites in `src/radio/` prove the decoders and the descriptor builders. This +// one proves the WIRE: a `SupportedModes` property served by the MM-faithful object +// model reaches `operations().modes.describe()` without anything in between coercing +// it. That is the acceptance property — "`preferred: none` survives to the descriptor +// VERBATIM" is a claim about the whole path, not about a pure function. +// +// It runs on the in-memory transport (`test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts`) for +// the reason the conformance matrix does: a suite that SKIPS wherever no session bus +// exists answers nothing. + +import { beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { FakeMmTransport } from '../../../test-support/conformance/mm-transport'; +import type { ModemSpec } from '../../../test-support/fake-mm/object-model'; +import { + type DeviceGeneration, + deviceGeneration, + type PhysicalModemId, + physicalModemId, +} from '../../domain'; +import { MODE_NONE, type ModeSelection } from '../../radio'; +import type { DbusValue, MethodCall, MethodReply } from '../../transport'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext } from '../contracts'; +import { createModemManagerProvider } from './provider'; +import type { ModemManagerProviderOperations } from './types'; + +const CS = 1 << 0; +const M2G = 1 << 1; +const M3G = 1 << 2; +const M4G = 1 << 3; +const M5G = 1 << 4; +/** A mode bit no ModemManager release this build knows about defines. */ +const FUTURE = 1 << 9; + +const GENERATION: DeviceGeneration = deviceGeneration(1); +const PROFILE = 'generic-mm'; + +/** + * Fibocom FM350-GL on the bench M.2→USB carrier — the same spec the conformance matrix + * uses, and the reason this whole todo exists: ONE combination, `preferred` = 0. + */ +const FM350_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 4, + manufacturer: 'Fibocom', + model: 'FM350-GL', + revision: '81600.0000.00.19.17.10', + supportedModes: [[CS | M2G | M3G | M4G, 0]], + currentModes: [CS | M2G | M3G | M4G, 0], + supportedBands: [33, 378], + sims: [{ index: 4, iccid: '8900000000000000004', imsi: '001010000000004', active: true }], +}; + +/** Bench Quectel RM530N-GL, matrix values. */ +const QUECTEL_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 1, + manufacturer: 'Quectel', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + revision: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02M4G', + supportedModes: [[CS | M2G | M3G, 0]], + currentModes: [CS | M2G | M3G, 0], + supportedBands: [33, 378], + sims: [{ index: 1, iccid: '8900000000000000001', imsi: '001010000000001', active: true }], +}; + +/** Bench SIMCom SIM7600G-H, matrix values. */ +const SIMCOM_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 2, + manufacturer: 'SIMCom', + model: 'SIM7600G-H', + revision: 'LE20B04SIM7600G22', + supportedModes: [[M3G, 0]], + currentModes: [M3G, 0], + sims: [{ index: 2, iccid: '8900000000000000002', imsi: '001010000000002', active: true }], +}; + +/** A hypothetical modem advertising a mode bit this build cannot name. */ +const UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 5, + manufacturer: 'Unknown Radios Inc.', + model: 'FUTURE-1', + revision: '1.0', + supportedModes: [ + [M4G | M5G, M5G], + [M4G | M5G | FUTURE, FUTURE], + ], + currentModes: [M4G | M5G, M5G], + sims: [{ index: 5, iccid: '8900000000000000005', imsi: '001010000000005', active: true }], +}; + +/** + * A modem with NO SIM, as ModemManager reports one: failed state, `StateFailedReason` + * = 2 (`SIM_MISSING`), and — critically — an empty `sims` list so `Sim` is `/`. + */ +const NO_SIM_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 6, + manufacturer: 'Quectel', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + revision: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02M4G', + state: -1, + stateFailedReason: 2, + supportedModes: [[CS | M2G | M3G, 0]], + currentModes: [CS | M2G | M3G, 0], + sims: [], +}; + +/** + * The SAME modem still initializing: `Sim` is `/` and NO failure reason is exported. + * Built field-by-field rather than spread from `NO_SIM_SPEC`, because the absence of + * `stateFailedReason` is the entire point of this fixture and a spread would carry it. + */ +const BLANK_SIM_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 7, + manufacturer: 'Quectel', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + revision: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02M4G', + state: 1, + supportedModes: [[CS | M2G | M3G, 0]], + currentModes: [CS | M2G | M3G, 0], + sims: [], +}; + +function contextFor(spec: ModemSpec): ProviderExecutionContext { + const id: PhysicalModemId = physicalModemId(`serial:fake-device-${spec.index}`); + return { + physicalModemId: id, + generation: GENERATION, + transport: 'modemmanager', + passiveFacts: [], + composition: 'generic', + profile: PROFILE, + }; +} + +/** + * The in-memory transport with `SetCurrentModes` / `SetCurrentBands` ACTUALLY APPLIED. + * + * The base transport accepts every call and changes nothing, which is exactly the + * accepted-but-ignored write the readback gate exists to catch — so both behaviours are + * needed, and `applyWrites` selects between them. + */ +class WritableMmTransport extends FakeMmTransport { + #spec: ModemSpec; + readonly #applyWrites: boolean; + + constructor(spec: ModemSpec, applyWrites: boolean) { + super({ modems: [spec] }); + this.#spec = spec; + this.#applyWrites = applyWrites; + } + + override async callMethod(call: MethodCall): Promise { + if (call.member === 'SetCurrentModes' && this.#applyWrites) { + const pair = (call.args?.[0] ?? []) as readonly number[]; + this.#spec = { ...this.#spec, currentModes: [pair[0] ?? 0, pair[1] ?? 0] }; + this.removeModem(this.#spec.index); + this.addModem(this.#spec); + return { signature: '', body: [] }; + } + return super.callMethod(call); + } + + override tree(): DbusValue { + return super.tree(); + } +} + +function providerFor(spec: ModemSpec) { + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: [spec] }); + const provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + return { provider, transport, operations: provider.definition.operations(PROFILE) }; +} + +const allowedValues = (constraints: { kind: string; values?: readonly unknown[] }) => + constraints.kind === 'allowed-values' ? (constraints.values ?? []) : []; + +describe('FM350 — `preferred: none` survives to the descriptor VERBATIM', () => { + let operations: ModemManagerProviderOperations; + const context = contextFor(FM350_SPEC); + + beforeEach(() => { + operations = providerFor(FM350_SPEC).operations; + }); + + test('the live descriptor offers exactly the modem`s own combination', async () => { + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(context); + expect(descriptor.constraints).toEqual({ + kind: 'allowed-values', + values: [{ allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }], + }); + }); + + test('`preferred` is `none` and is not any of the allowed modes', async () => { + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(context); + const values = allowedValues(descriptor.constraints) as readonly ModeSelection[]; + expect(values[0]?.preferred).toBe(MODE_NONE); + for (const mode of ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g', '5g']) { + expect(values[0]?.preferred).not.toBe(mode); + } + }); + + test('the READ answers the same combination with its raw masks intact', async () => { + const result = await operations.modes.read(context); + expect(result.status).toBe('applied'); + if (result.status !== 'applied') return; + expect(result.value.current).toEqual({ + state: 'reported', + combination: { + allowedMask: CS | M2G | M3G | M4G, + allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g'], + preferredMask: 0, + preferred: MODE_NONE, + classification: 'named', + anomalies: [], + }, + }); + }); + + test('the observation retains `CurrentModes` as its `(uu)` pair, unflattened', async () => { + const { provider } = providerFor(FM350_SPEC); + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot(context); + expect(snapshot.ok).toBe(true); + if (!snapshot.ok) return; + const view = snapshot.observation; + expect(view.freshness.state).toBe('fresh'); + expect(view.value?.diagnostics.raw['Modem.CurrentModes']).toEqual([CS | M2G | M3G | M4G, 0]); + expect(view.value?.diagnostics.raw['Modem.SignalQuality']).toEqual([71, true]); + }); + + test('the write is disruptive, journalled, admitted and readback-gated', async () => { + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(context); + expect(descriptor.mutationImpact).toBe('disruptive'); + expect(descriptor.journal.required).toBe(true); + expect(descriptor.admission.required).toBe(true); + expect(descriptor.readback.required).toBe(true); + }); +}); + +describe('Quectel and SIMCom descriptors', () => { + test('Quectel offers exactly its one advertised combination', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(QUECTEL_SPEC); + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(contextFor(QUECTEL_SPEC)); + expect(descriptor.constraints).toEqual({ + kind: 'allowed-values', + values: [{ allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }], + }); + }); + + test('SIMCom offers exactly its one advertised combination', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(SIMCOM_SPEC); + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(contextFor(SIMCOM_SPEC)); + expect(descriptor.constraints).toEqual({ + kind: 'allowed-values', + values: [{ allowed: ['3g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }], + }); + }); + + test('neither device`s preference is invented from its allowed set', async () => { + for (const spec of [QUECTEL_SPEC, SIMCOM_SPEC]) { + const { operations } = providerFor(spec); + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(contextFor(spec)); + const values = allowedValues(descriptor.constraints) as readonly ModeSelection[]; + expect(values[0]?.preferred).toBe(MODE_NONE); + } + }); +}); + +describe('an unknown combination is offered, not coerced to unsupported', () => { + const context = contextFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC); + + test('both combinations reach the descriptor, the unnameable one included', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC); + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(context); + expect(allowedValues(descriptor.constraints)).toEqual([ + { allowed: ['4g', '5g'], preferred: '5g' }, + { allowed: ['4g', '5g', 'mode-bit-512'], preferred: 'mode-bit-512' }, + ]); + }); + + test('the descriptor stays AVAILABLE despite the unknown member', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC); + const descriptor = await operations.modes.describe(context); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ state: 'available' }); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ supported: true }); + }); + + test('the read classifies it without dropping it', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC); + const result = await operations.modes.read(context); + if (result.status !== 'applied') throw new Error('expected applied'); + expect(result.value.supported.combinations).toHaveLength(2); + expect(result.value.supported.combinations[1]?.classification).toBe('unknown-combination'); + expect(result.value.supported.undecodable).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a selection the modem never advertised is refused, never rounded', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC); + const result = await operations.modes.write(context, { + allowed: ['4g', '5g'], + preferred: '4g', + }); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ + status: 'refused', + reason: 'mode-combination-not-advertised', + }); + }); +}); + +describe('mode writes are readback-gated at the call path, not only in the descriptor', () => { + test('an accepted-but-ignored SetCurrentModes is refused, never reported applied', async () => { + const transport = new WritableMmTransport(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC, false); + const provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + const result = await provider.definition + .operations(PROFILE) + .modes.write(contextFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC), { + allowed: ['4g', '5g', 'mode-bit-512'], + preferred: 'mode-bit-512', + }); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'mode-write-readback-mismatch' }); + }); + + test('a write the modem HONOURS reports applied and returns the new truth', async () => { + const transport = new WritableMmTransport(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC, true); + const provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + const result = await provider.definition + .operations(PROFILE) + .modes.write(contextFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION_SPEC), { + allowed: ['4g', '5g', 'mode-bit-512'], + preferred: 'mode-bit-512', + }); + if (result.status !== 'applied') throw new Error(`expected applied, got ${result.status}`); + expect(result.value.current).toMatchObject({ + state: 'reported', + combination: { preferred: 'mode-bit-512', preferredMask: FUTURE }, + }); + }); +}); + +describe('band writes carry the disruptive class and the certification gate', () => { + const context = contextFor(FM350_SPEC); + + test('the live band descriptor is disruptive and refused without certification', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(FM350_SPEC); + const descriptor = await operations.bands.describe(context); + expect(descriptor.mutationImpact).toBe('disruptive'); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ + state: 'refused', + reason: 'band-certification-required', + }); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: 'band-certification-required', + }); + }); + + test('the certification precondition and readback are both declared', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(FM350_SPEC); + const descriptor = await operations.bands.describe(context); + expect(descriptor.livePreconditions).toContain('band-certification-present'); + expect(descriptor.readback.required).toBe(true); + expect(descriptor.journal.required).toBe(true); + expect(descriptor.admission.required).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a band WRITE is refused and never reaches the bus', async () => { + const { operations, transport } = providerFor(FM350_SPEC); + const before = transport.calls.length; + const result = await operations.bands.write(context, ['eutran-3']); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ + status: 'refused', + reason: 'band-write-certification-required', + }); + expect( + transport.calls.slice(before).filter((call) => call.member === 'SetCurrentBands'), + ).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('band READS stay available on the same uncertified device', async () => { + const { operations } = providerFor(FM350_SPEC); + const result = await operations.bands.read(context); + expect(result.status).toBe('applied'); + if (result.status !== 'applied') return; + expect(result.value.supported).toEqual(['eutran-3', 'ngran-78']); + }); + + test('an SKU resolver that finds no catalog entry still refuses', async () => { + const transport = new FakeMmTransport({ modems: [FM350_SPEC] }); + const provider = createModemManagerProvider({ + transport, + bandSku: () => ({ vidPid: '0e8d:7127', model: 'FM350-GL', firmwarePrefix: '81600' }), + }); + const descriptor = await provider.definition.operations(PROFILE).bands.describe(context); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ + state: 'refused', + reason: 'band-certification-required', + }); + }); +}); + +describe('no-SIM is EXPLICIT evidence, through the provider', () => { + test('a modem reporting `sim-missing` yields an evidence-backed absent state', async () => { + const { provider } = providerFor(NO_SIM_SPEC); + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot(contextFor(NO_SIM_SPEC)); + if (!snapshot.ok) throw new Error('expected a snapshot'); + expect(snapshot.sim.presence).toBe('absent'); + expect(snapshot.sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual({ + kind: 'state-failed-reason', + field: 'failedReason', + value: 'sim-missing', + }); + }); + + test('THE CONTROL: the same blank SIM path WITHOUT the reason is never absent', async () => { + const { provider } = providerFor(BLANK_SIM_SPEC); + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot(contextFor(BLANK_SIM_SPEC)); + if (!snapshot.ok) throw new Error('expected a snapshot'); + expect(snapshot.sim.presence).toBe('unknown'); + expect(snapshot.sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual({ + kind: 'no-evidence', + inspected: ['sim', 'simSlots', 'failedReason'], + }); + }); + + test('`present: false` is carried by BOTH, so it is never a claim of absence', async () => { + for (const spec of [NO_SIM_SPEC, BLANK_SIM_SPEC]) { + const { provider } = providerFor(spec); + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot(contextFor(spec)); + if (!snapshot.ok) throw new Error('expected a snapshot'); + expect(snapshot.sim.present).toBe(false); + } + }); + + test('a modem WITH a SIM names the object path that proved it', async () => { + const { provider } = providerFor(QUECTEL_SPEC); + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot(contextFor(QUECTEL_SPEC)); + if (!snapshot.ok) throw new Error('expected a snapshot'); + expect(snapshot.sim.presence).toBe('present'); + expect(snapshot.sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual({ + kind: 'sim-object-path', + field: 'sim', + value: '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SIM/1', + }); + }); + + test('the normalized observation agrees with the snapshot on both devices', async () => { + for (const [spec, expected] of [ + [NO_SIM_SPEC, 'known'], + [BLANK_SIM_SPEC, 'unknown'], + ] as const) { + const { provider } = providerFor(spec); + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot(contextFor(spec)); + if (!snapshot.ok) throw new Error('expected a snapshot'); + expect(snapshot.observation.value?.sim.presence.state).toBe(expected); + expect(snapshot.observation.value?.sim.presenceEvidence).toEqual( + snapshot.sim.presenceEvidence, + ); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/error-mapping.test.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/error-mapping.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..022e4db --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/error-mapping.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { DisconnectedError, TransportError } from '../../transport'; +import { mapModemManagerError } from './errors'; + +function namedError(name: string): Error { + const error = new Error(name); + Object.defineProperty(error, 'dbusName', { value: name }); + return error; +} + +describe('mapModemManagerError', () => { + test('maps Core.Unauthorized to the exact domain refusal', () => { + expect( + mapModemManagerError(namedError('org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unauthorized')), + ).toEqual({ reason: 'unauthorized', retryable: false }); + }); + + test('keeps unsupported, wrong-state, busy, timeout, and disconnect distinct', () => { + expect(mapModemManagerError(namedError('x.Error.Core.Unsupported')).reason).toBe('unsupported'); + expect(mapModemManagerError(namedError('x.Error.Core.WrongState')).reason).toBe('wrong-state'); + expect(mapModemManagerError(namedError('x.Error.Core.InProgress')).reason).toBe('busy'); + expect(mapModemManagerError(new TransportError('call timed out')).reason).toBe('timed-out'); + expect(mapModemManagerError(new DisconnectedError()).reason).toBe('disconnected'); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/errors.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/errors.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bfe2ff --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/errors.ts @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +import { DisconnectedError, TransportError } from '../../transport'; + +export const MODEM_MANAGER_REFUSAL_REASONS = [ + 'unauthorized', + 'unsupported', + 'wrong-state', + 'busy', + 'not-found', + 'timed-out', + 'disconnected', + 'failed', +] as const; + +export type ModemManagerRefusalReason = (typeof MODEM_MANAGER_REFUSAL_REASONS)[number]; + +export type ModemManagerRefusal = { + readonly reason: ModemManagerRefusalReason; + readonly retryable: boolean; +}; + +function errorIdentity(error: unknown): string { + if (!(error instanceof Error)) return String(error); + const dbusName = Reflect.get(error, 'dbusName'); + return `${typeof dbusName === 'string' ? dbusName : error.name} ${error.message}`; +} + +export function mapModemManagerError(error: unknown): ModemManagerRefusal { + if (error instanceof DisconnectedError) return { reason: 'disconnected', retryable: true }; + const identity = errorIdentity(error); + if (/Unauthorized|AccessDenied/i.test(identity)) + return { reason: 'unauthorized', retryable: false }; + if (/Unsupported|NotSupported/i.test(identity)) + return { reason: 'unsupported', retryable: false }; + if (/WrongState|InvalidState/i.test(identity)) return { reason: 'wrong-state', retryable: true }; + if (/InProgress|Busy/i.test(identity)) return { reason: 'busy', retryable: true }; + if (/NotFound|UnknownObject|UnknownModem/i.test(identity)) { + return { reason: 'not-found', retryable: false }; + } + if (error instanceof TransportError && /timed out/i.test(error.message)) { + return { reason: 'timed-out', retryable: true }; + } + return { reason: 'failed', retryable: false }; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/forbidden-subprocess.test.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/forbidden-subprocess.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a2c371 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/forbidden-subprocess.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +const FORBIDDEN = + /(?:Bun\.spawn|child_process|execFile|spawn)\s*\([^\n]*(?:mmcli|qmicli|mbimcli)|(?:mmcli|qmicli|mbimcli)["'`]/i; + +function productionSources(dir: string): string[] { + const paths: string[] = []; + for (const entry of readdirSync(dir)) { + const path = join(dir, entry); + if (statSync(path).isDirectory()) { + paths.push(...productionSources(path)); + } else if (path.endsWith('.ts') && !path.endsWith('.test.ts')) { + paths.push(path); + } + } + return paths; +} + +describe('ModemManagerProvider subprocess fence', () => { + test('the detector is non-vacuous for every forbidden diagnostic binary', () => { + for (const binary of ['mmcli', 'qmicli', 'mbimcli']) { + expect(FORBIDDEN.test(`Bun.spawn(["${binary}", "--help"])`)).toBe(true); + } + }); + + test('no provider production source shells out to a modem diagnostic CLI', () => { + const files = productionSources(import.meta.dir); + expect(files.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + const violations = files.filter((path) => FORBIDDEN.test(readFileSync(path, 'utf8'))); + expect(violations).toEqual([]); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/generic-operations.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/generic-operations.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2691ab --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/generic-operations.ts @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +import type { MmDbusBackend } from '../../backend'; +import type { BandName } from '../../band'; +import { + classifyOperationCompletion, + type DesiredRadio, + defineOperationDescriptor, + type OperationDescriptor, + type OperationResult, + runtimePath, +} from '../../domain'; +import type { ModemBands } from '../../ports'; +import { + bandWriteReadbackMatches, + buildBandWriteDescriptor, + buildModeWriteDescriptor, + encodeModeSelection, + type ModeSelection, + matchAdvertisedCombination, + type RadioModeTruth, + sameSelection, + selectionOf, +} from '../../radio'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext } from '../contracts'; +import { mapModemManagerError } from './errors'; +import type { + ContextReadOperation, + ContextWriteOperation, + ModemManagerProviderOperations, + ModemManagerProviderSnapshot, + ModemManagerRadioState, + ModemManagerSignalState, + ModemManagerSimState, + ModemManagerSnapshotResult, +} from './types'; + +const PROVIDER_ID = 'modemmanager'; +const PROFILE = 'generic-mm'; + +export interface GenericOperationsDeps { + readonly backend: MmDbusBackend; + readSnapshot(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; +} + +function readDescriptor(id: string): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id, + support: { read: { supported: true }, write: { supported: false, reason: 'read-only' } }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: PROVIDER_ID, + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: ['modem-present', 'runtime-interface-present'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'read', + retryClass: 'idempotent-read', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: [PROFILE], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', + }); +} + +function writeDescriptor(id: string): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id, + support: { read: { supported: true }, write: { supported: true } }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: PROVIDER_ID, + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: ['modem-present', 'runtime-interface-present'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'disruptive', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: true, reason: 'disruptive-radio-write' }, + admission: { required: true, reason: 'provider-mutation' }, + evidence: { profiles: [PROFILE], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', + }); +} + +function applied(context: ProviderExecutionContext, value: O): OperationResult { + return classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: 'read', + completionGeneration: context.generation, + currentGeneration: context.generation, + completion: { status: 'applied', value }, + }); +} + +function refused(context: ProviderExecutionContext, reason: string): OperationResult { + return classifyOperationCompletion({ + operation: 'read', + completionGeneration: context.generation, + currentGeneration: context.generation, + completion: { status: 'refused', reason }, + }); +} + +function receiptReason(reason: string): string { + const mapped = mapModemManagerError(new Error(reason)); + return mapped.reason === 'failed' ? reason : mapped.reason; +} + +export function createGenericOperations( + deps: GenericOperationsDeps, +): Pick { + const readField = async ( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + capability: 'modeRead' | 'signalRead' | 'simRead' | 'powerRead', + select: (snapshot: ModemManagerProviderSnapshot) => O, + reason: string, + ): Promise> => { + const snapshot = await deps.readSnapshot(context); + if (!snapshot.ok) return refused(context, snapshot.reason); + return snapshot.capabilities[capability] + ? applied(context, select(snapshot)) + : refused(context, reason); + }; + + const readBands = async ( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise> => { + const snapshot = await deps.readSnapshot(context); + if (!snapshot.ok) return refused(context, snapshot.reason); + if (!snapshot.capabilities.bandRead) return refused(context, 'band-read-unsupported'); + const result = await deps.backend.readBands(runtimePath(snapshot.modemPath)); + return result.ok + ? applied(context, result.bands) + : refused(context, receiptReason(result.reason)); + }; + + const radioDescriptor = writeDescriptor( + 'modemmanager.radio-modes', + ); + const radio: ContextWriteOperation = { + descriptor: radioDescriptor, + describe: () => Promise.resolve(radioDescriptor), + read: (context) => + readField(context, 'modeRead', (snapshot) => snapshot.radio, 'mode-read-unsupported'), + write: async (context, input) => { + const snapshot = await deps.readSnapshot(context); + if (!snapshot.ok) return refused(context, snapshot.reason); + if (!snapshot.capabilities.modeWrite) return refused(context, 'mode-write-unsupported'); + const receipt = await deps.backend.setRadioModes(runtimePath(snapshot.modemPath), input); + if (receipt.status !== 'applied') return refused(context, receiptReason(receipt.reason)); + return readField(context, 'modeRead', (next) => next.radio, 'mode-read-unsupported'); + }, + }; + + const readModeTruth = async ( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise> => + readField(context, 'modeRead', (snapshot) => snapshot.radio.truth, 'mode-read-unsupported'); + + const modes: ContextWriteOperation = { + descriptor: buildModeWriteDescriptor({ + provider: PROVIDER_ID, + profile: PROFILE, + truth: { + current: { state: 'not-reported' }, + supported: { combinations: [], undecodable: [] }, + }, + writeSupported: true, + }), + describe: async (context) => { + const snapshot = await deps.readSnapshot(context); + return buildModeWriteDescriptor({ + provider: PROVIDER_ID, + profile: PROFILE, + truth: snapshot.ok + ? snapshot.radio.truth + : { + current: { state: 'not-reported' }, + supported: { combinations: [], undecodable: [] }, + }, + writeSupported: snapshot.ok && snapshot.capabilities.modeWrite, + }); + }, + read: readModeTruth, + write: async (context, selection) => { + const snapshot = await deps.readSnapshot(context); + if (!snapshot.ok) return refused(context, snapshot.reason); + if (!snapshot.capabilities.modeWrite) return refused(context, 'mode-write-unsupported'); + // A selection the modem never advertised is refused outright — never rounded to + // the nearest advertised one. Substituting is how "prefer 4G" on a marginal cell + // silently becomes 5G-first, which `five-g-preference.ts` refuses for the same reason. + if (matchAdvertisedCombination(snapshot.radio.truth.supported, selection) === undefined) { + return refused(context, 'mode-combination-not-advertised'); + } + const encoded = encodeModeSelection(selection); + if (!encoded.ok) return refused(context, 'mode-name-unknown'); + const receipt = await deps.backend.setModeCombination( + runtimePath(snapshot.modemPath), + encoded.allowedMask, + encoded.preferredMask, + ); + if (receipt.status !== 'applied') return refused(context, receiptReason(receipt.reason)); + const readback = await readModeTruth(context); + if (readback.status !== 'applied') return readback; + // An accepted-but-ignored `SetCurrentModes` is indistinguishable from success at + // the call site, so the descriptor requires a readback and this enforces it. + return readback.value.current.state === 'reported' && + sameSelection(selectionOf(readback.value.current.combination), selection) + ? readback + : refused(context, 'mode-write-readback-mismatch'); + }, + }; + + const bandDescriptorFor = (snapshot: ModemManagerSnapshotResult) => + buildBandWriteDescriptor({ + provider: PROVIDER_ID, + profile: PROFILE, + certification: snapshot.ok + ? snapshot.bandCertification + : { + required: true, + satisfied: false, + reason: 'band-certification-required', + offerable: [], + }, + readSupported: snapshot.ok && snapshot.capabilities.bandRead, + }); + + const bands: ContextWriteOperation = { + descriptor: bandDescriptorFor({ ok: false, reason: 'not-found' }), + describe: async (context) => bandDescriptorFor(await deps.readSnapshot(context)), + read: readBands, + write: async (context, input) => { + const snapshot = await deps.readSnapshot(context); + if (!snapshot.ok) return refused(context, snapshot.reason); + // The certification gate, second of two. `bandWrite` is already false without a + // catalog entry, and the descriptor already reads `refused` — but a band lock can + // take a working uplink off the air, so the call path refuses independently + // rather than trusting a consumer to have read the descriptor. + if (!snapshot.bandCertification.satisfied || !snapshot.capabilities.bandWrite) + return refused(context, 'band-write-certification-required'); + const receipt = await deps.backend.setCurrentBands(runtimePath(snapshot.modemPath), input); + if (receipt.status !== 'applied') return refused(context, receiptReason(receipt.reason)); + const readback = await readBands(context); + if (readback.status !== 'applied') return readback; + return bandWriteReadbackMatches(input, readback.value) + ? readback + : refused(context, 'band-write-readback-mismatch'); + }, + }; + + const signal: ContextReadOperation = { + descriptor: readDescriptor('modemmanager.signal'), + read: (context) => + readField(context, 'signalRead', (snapshot) => snapshot.signal, 'signal-read-unsupported'), + }; + const sim: ContextReadOperation = { + descriptor: readDescriptor('modemmanager.sim'), + read: (context) => + readField(context, 'simRead', (snapshot) => snapshot.sim, 'sim-read-unsupported'), + }; + const power: ContextReadOperation = { + descriptor: readDescriptor('modemmanager.power'), + read: (context) => + readField(context, 'powerRead', (snapshot) => snapshot.power, 'power-read-unsupported'), + }; + return { radio, modes, bands, signal, sim, power }; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/index.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..194f407 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +export * from './errors'; +export * from './provider'; +export * from './types'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d55de97 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { FakeModemManager, type ModemSpec, modemPath } from '../../../test-support/fake-mm'; +import { + hasSessionBus, + sessionBusAddress, + warnSkippedWithoutBus, +} from '../../../test-support/session-bus'; +import { deviceGeneration, physicalModemId, runtimePath } from '../../domain'; +import { REDACTED, redact } from '../../redact'; +import { createDbusTransport, type DbusTransport } from '../../transport'; +import { createProviderMatcher } from '../matcher'; +import { createProviderRegistry } from '../registry'; +import { createModemManagerProvider, type ModemManagerProvider } from './provider'; + +warnSkippedWithoutBus('typed ModemManager provider'); + +const UNKNOWN_MODEM: ModemSpec = { + index: 73, + manufacturer: 'Future Radios Ltd', + model: 'Uncatalogued-X1', + revision: '99.0-new', + signalQuality: 64, + sims: [ + { + index: 73, + iccid: '8900000000000000073', + imsi: '001010000000073', + active: true, + simType: 1, + }, + ], +}; + +const request = { + physicalModemId: physicalModemId('serial:fake-device-73'), + generation: deviceGeneration(1), + transport: 'modemmanager' as const, + passiveFacts: [], + composition: 'future-unlisted-modem', +}; + +async function waitFor(predicate: () => boolean, timeoutMs = 2_000): Promise { + const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs; + while (!predicate()) { + if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new Error('waitFor timed out'); + await Bun.sleep(5); + } +} + +describe.skipIf(!hasSessionBus())('ModemManagerProvider on the private session bus', () => { + let fake: FakeModemManager; + let transport: DbusTransport; + let provider: ModemManagerProvider; + + afterEach(async () => { + await provider.stop(); + await transport.disconnect(); + await fake.stop(); + }); + + test('an unknown modem receives generic mode, signal, SIM, and power controls from runtime facts', async () => { + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ busAddress, modems: [UNKNOWN_MODEM] }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(provider.definition); + const match = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match(request); + expect(match).toMatchObject({ + status: 'selected', + provider: 'modemmanager', + profile: 'generic-mm', + }); + + const snapshot = await provider.readSnapshot({ ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }); + expect(snapshot.ok).toBe(true); + if (!snapshot.ok) return; + expect(snapshot.modemPath).toBe(modemPath(73)); + expect(snapshot.capabilities).toMatchObject({ + modeRead: true, + signalRead: true, + simRead: true, + powerRead: true, + }); + expect(snapshot.radio.current.allowed).toBe(7); + expect(snapshot.signal.quality).toBe(64); + expect(snapshot.sim).toMatchObject({ present: true, slotCount: 1 }); + expect(snapshot.power).toBe('on'); + expect(snapshot.observation.value?.hardware.label).toMatchObject({ + state: 'known', + value: 'Uncatalogued-X1', + }); + }); + + test('ObjectManager signals drive provider lifecycle events without touching a bearer', async () => { + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ busAddress, modems: [UNKNOWN_MODEM] }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + const events: string[][] = []; + provider.observe((list) => { + events.push(list.rows.map((row) => String(row.identity.runtimePath))); + }); + await provider.start(); + + fake.addModem({ + index: 74, + sims: [{ index: 74, iccid: '8900000000000000074', imsi: '001010000000074' }], + }); + await waitFor(() => events.some((paths) => paths.includes(modemPath(74)))); + + expect(events.some((paths) => paths.includes(modemPath(74)))).toBe(true); + expect(fake.callLog.some((entry) => /Connect|CreateBearer|Disconnect/.test(entry))).toBe(false); + }); + + test('runtime absence refuses a generic read instead of consulting a model catalog', async () => { + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ + busAddress, + modems: [{ ...UNKNOWN_MODEM, hasSignal: false }], + }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + + const controls = provider.definition.operations('generic-mm'); + const signal = await controls.signal.read({ ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }); + expect(signal.status).toBe('applied'); + if (signal.status === 'applied') { + expect(signal.value.extendedAvailable).toBe(false); + expect(signal.value.quality).toBe(64); + } + }); + + test('band reads remain generic while uncertified band writes are refused before dispatch', async () => { + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ + busAddress, + modems: [{ ...UNKNOWN_MODEM, supportedBands: [33, 378], currentBands: [256] }], + }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + const controls = provider.definition.operations('generic-mm'); + const context = { ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }; + + expect(await controls.bands.read(context)).toMatchObject({ + status: 'applied', + value: { supported: ['eutran-3', 'ngran-78'], current: ['any'] }, + }); + expect(await controls.bands.write(context, ['eutran-3'])).toMatchObject({ + status: 'refused', + reason: 'band-write-certification-required', + }); + expect(fake.callLog.some((entry) => entry.includes('SetCurrentBands'))).toBe(false); + expect(controls.fccCoverage('2c7c', '0801')).toBe('present'); + }); + + test('the provider returns the existing location, SMS, and USSD adapters for the resolved modem', async () => { + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ busAddress, modems: [UNKNOWN_MODEM] }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + const controls = provider.definition.operations('generic-mm'); + const context = { ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }; + + expect((await controls.location.status(context)).ok).toBe(false); + expect((await controls.sms(context)).ok).toBe(false); + expect(controls.ussd.snapshot(runtimePath(modemPath(73))).state).toBe('idle'); + }); + + test('GPS capability, enable, bounded no-fix, disable, and signal-location privacy use the existing location module', async () => { + let now = 1_000; + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ + busAddress, + modems: [ + { + ...UNKNOWN_MODEM, + location: { capabilities: 7, enabled: 1, fix: [] }, + messaging: true, + ussd: { state: 1, initiateReply: 'private balance' }, + }, + ], + }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport, now: () => now }); + const controls = provider.definition.operations('generic-mm'); + const context = { ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }; + + const status = await controls.location.status(context); + expect(status.ok && status.status.gnssCapable).toBe(true); + expect((await controls.location.enable(context, ['gps-raw'])).outcome).toBe('applied'); + const enableCalls = fake.locationSetupCalls; + expect(enableCalls[enableCalls.length - 1]).toMatchObject({ + signalLocation: false, + sources: 3, + }); + expect((await controls.location.readFix(context)).outcome).toBe('no-fix'); + expect(controls.location.state(context).kind).toBe('acquiring'); + + now += 120_001; + expect(controls.location.tick(context)).toMatchObject({ + kind: 'no-fix', + reason: 'acquire-timeout', + }); + expect((await controls.location.disable(context)).outcome).toBe('applied'); + expect(controls.location.state(context).kind).toBe('off'); + const disableCalls = fake.locationSetupCalls; + expect(disableCalls[disableCalls.length - 1]).toMatchObject({ + signalLocation: false, + sources: 1, + }); + + const sms = await controls.sms(context); + expect(sms.ok && (await sms.port.list())).toEqual({ ok: true, messages: [] }); + expect((await controls.initiateUssd(context, '*123#')).ussdReply).toBe('private balance'); + }); + + test('a live GPS fix expires in memory and is redacted by the existing privacy class', async () => { + let now = 10_000; + const rawFix = [ + [ + 2, + [ + 'a{sv}', + [ + ['latitude', ['d', 4.60971]], + ['longitude', ['d', -74.08175]], + ['altitude', ['d', 2640]], + ], + ], + ], + ]; + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ + busAddress, + modems: [{ ...UNKNOWN_MODEM, location: { capabilities: 6, enabled: 2, fix: rawFix } }], + }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport, now: () => now }); + const controls = provider.definition.operations('generic-mm'); + const context = { ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }; + + const read = await controls.location.readFix(context); + expect(read.outcome).toBe('fix'); + if (read.outcome !== 'fix') return; + expect(redact({ coordinates: read.fix })).toEqual({ coordinates: REDACTED }); + expect(controls.location.state(context).kind).toBe('fix'); + now += 30_001; + expect(controls.location.tick(context)).toMatchObject({ + kind: 'no-fix', + reason: 'fix-expired', + }); + }); + + test('a typed Core.Unauthorized fake-MM error maps to the exact domain refusal', async () => { + const busAddress = sessionBusAddress(); + fake = await FakeModemManager.start({ busAddress, modems: [UNKNOWN_MODEM] }); + transport = createDbusTransport({ busAddress }); + provider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport }); + fake.failNext('SetCurrentModes', 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Error.Core.Unauthorized'); + const controls = provider.definition.operations('generic-mm'); + + const result = await controls.radio.write( + { ...request, profile: 'generic-mm' }, + { preferenceOrdered: ['lte'] }, + ); + expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'unauthorized' }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/module-operations.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/module-operations.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1eefe62 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/module-operations.ts @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +import type { MmLocation } from '../../backend'; +import { epochMillis, runtimePath } from '../../domain'; +import { resolveFccUnlockCoverage } from '../../fcc'; +import { advanceGnssFixState, GNSS_OFF, type GnssFixState } from '../../location'; +import { createDbusSmsPort } from '../../sms'; +import type { DbusTransport } from '../../transport'; +import type { MmUssd } from '../../ussd'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext } from '../contracts'; +import type { + ModemManagerProviderOperations, + ModemManagerSnapshotResult, + SmsPortResult, +} from './types'; + +export interface ModuleOperationsOptions { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly destination: string; + readonly location: MmLocation; + readonly ussd: MmUssd; + readonly now: () => number; + readSnapshot(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; +} + +type ModuleOperationSurface = Pick< + ModemManagerProviderOperations, + 'location' | 'sms' | 'ussd' | 'initiateUssd' | 'respondUssd' | 'cancelUssd' | 'fccCoverage' +>; + +export class ModemManagerModuleOperations { + readonly operations: ModuleOperationSurface; + readonly #options: ModuleOperationsOptions; + readonly #smsPorts = new Map>(); + readonly #locationStates = new Map(); + + constructor(options: ModuleOperationsOptions) { + this.#options = options; + this.operations = { + location: { + status: async (context) => { + const path = await this.#modemPath(context); + return path === undefined + ? { ok: false, reason: 'modem-not-found' } + : this.#options.location.getLocationStatus(runtimePath(path)); + }, + enable: async (context, sources) => { + const path = await this.#modemPath(context); + if (path === undefined) return this.#unsupportedToggle(); + const result = await this.#options.location.enableGnss(runtimePath(path), sources); + if (result.outcome === 'applied') { + this.#setLocationState(context, { + kind: 'gnss-enabled', + at: epochMillis(this.#options.now()), + }); + } + return result; + }, + disable: async (context) => { + const path = await this.#modemPath(context); + if (path === undefined) return this.#unsupportedToggle(); + const result = await this.#options.location.disableGnss(runtimePath(path)); + if (result.outcome === 'applied') + this.#setLocationState(context, { kind: 'gnss-disabled' }); + return result; + }, + readFix: async (context) => { + const path = await this.#modemPath(context); + if (path === undefined) + return { outcome: 'unsupported' as const, reason: 'modem-not-found' }; + const read = await this.#options.location.readFix(runtimePath(path)); + this.#setLocationState(context, { + kind: 'read', + at: epochMillis(this.#options.now()), + read, + }); + return read; + }, + state: (context) => this.#locationStates.get(String(context.physicalModemId)) ?? GNSS_OFF, + tick: (context) => + this.#setLocationState(context, { + kind: 'tick', + at: epochMillis(this.#options.now()), + }), + }, + sms: (context) => this.#sms(context), + ussd: options.ussd, + initiateUssd: (context, ussdCommand) => + this.#ussd(context, (path) => options.ussd.initiate(runtimePath(path), ussdCommand)), + respondUssd: (context, ussdResponse) => + this.#ussd(context, (path) => options.ussd.respond(runtimePath(path), ussdResponse)), + cancelUssd: (context) => + this.#ussd(context, (path) => options.ussd.cancel(runtimePath(path))), + fccCoverage: resolveFccUnlockCoverage, + }; + } + + async stop(): Promise { + for (const port of this.#smsPorts.values()) await port.stop(); + this.#smsPorts.clear(); + this.#options.ussd.stop(); + } + + async #sms(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise { + const snapshot = await this.#options.readSnapshot(context); + if (!snapshot.ok) return { ok: false, reason: snapshot.reason }; + if (!snapshot.capabilities.sms) return { ok: false, reason: 'unsupported' }; + let port = this.#smsPorts.get(snapshot.modemPath); + if (port === undefined) { + port = createDbusSmsPort({ + transport: this.#options.transport, + modemPath: snapshot.modemPath, + destination: this.#options.destination, + }); + this.#smsPorts.set(snapshot.modemPath, port); + } + return { ok: true, port }; + } + + async #ussd( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + run: (path: string) => ReturnType, + ) { + const path = await this.#modemPath(context); + return path === undefined + ? { + ok: false as const, + snapshot: this.#options.ussd.snapshot(runtimePath('/')), + refusal: 'unsupported' as const, + } + : run(path); + } + + async #modemPath(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise { + const snapshot = await this.#options.readSnapshot(context); + return snapshot.ok ? snapshot.modemPath : undefined; + } + + #setLocationState( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + event: Parameters[1], + ): GnssFixState { + const key = String(context.physicalModemId); + const next = advanceGnssFixState(this.#locationStates.get(key) ?? GNSS_OFF, event); + this.#locationStates.set(key, next); + return next; + } + + #unsupportedToggle() { + return { + outcome: 'unsupported' as const, + reason: 'modem-not-found', + enabledSources: new Set(), + }; + } +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/provider.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/provider.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8f998a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/provider.ts @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +import { + createMmDbusBackend, + fetchManagedObjects, + MM_BUS_NAME, + type MmDbusBackend, + MmLocation, + ModemActor, + type QuiesceHook, +} from '../../backend'; +import { + BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG, + type BandCertificationCatalog, + type BandCertificationEntry, + type BandSku, + findBandCertification, +} from '../../band'; +import { + epochMillis, + type ObservationEnvelope, + sourceEpoch, + stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId, +} from '../../domain'; +import { type NormalizedModemObservation, unavailableObservation } from '../../observations'; +import type { ObservationListener } from '../../ports'; +import type { DbusTransport } from '../../transport'; +import { MmUssd } from '../../ussd'; +import type { + ProviderDefinition, + ProviderExecutionContext, + ProviderMatchRequest, +} from '../contracts'; +import { mapModemManagerError } from './errors'; +import { createGenericOperations } from './generic-operations'; +import { ModemManagerModuleOperations } from './module-operations'; +import { buildModemManagerSnapshot } from './snapshot'; +import type { + ModemManagerProviderLifecycle, + ModemManagerProviderOperations, + ModemManagerSnapshotResult, +} from './types'; + +const PROFILE = 'generic-mm'; + +export interface ModemManagerProviderOptions { + readonly transport: DbusTransport; + readonly destination?: string; + readonly quiesce?: QuiesceHook; + readonly now?: () => number; + /** + * The band-lock certification catalog. Defaults to the one shipped in this package, + * which is EMPTY — so a band write is refused on every device until a human-reviewed + * commit adds an entry carrying its bench transcript. + */ + readonly bandCertificationCatalog?: BandCertificationCatalog; + /** + * The device's SKU, if the embedding process can resolve one. + * + * ModemManager's `Modem` interface carries `Model` and `Revision` but NO USB + * `vid:pid`, and `BandSku` is keyed on all three — so this package structurally + * cannot build one from the bus alone, and a partial match would certify a family + * no reviewer looked at. With no resolver injected there is no SKU, hence no entry, + * hence no band write: fail-closed, which is this module's whole stance. + */ + readonly bandSku?: (context: ProviderExecutionContext) => BandSku | undefined; +} + +export class ModemManagerProvider implements ModemManagerProviderLifecycle { + readonly definition: ProviderDefinition< + NormalizedModemObservation, + ModemManagerProviderOperations + >; + readonly #transport: DbusTransport; + readonly #destination: string; + readonly #now: () => number; + readonly #backend: MmDbusBackend; + readonly #bandCatalog: BandCertificationCatalog; + readonly #bandSku: (context: ProviderExecutionContext) => BandSku | undefined; + readonly #stableKeyByPath = new Map(); + readonly #moduleOperations: ModemManagerModuleOperations; + #startPromise: ReturnType | undefined; + #epoch = 1; + + constructor(options: ModemManagerProviderOptions) { + this.#transport = options.transport; + this.#destination = options.destination ?? MM_BUS_NAME; + this.#now = options.now ?? Date.now; + this.#bandCatalog = options.bandCertificationCatalog ?? BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG; + this.#bandSku = options.bandSku ?? (() => undefined); + const actor = new ModemActor(options.quiesce); + const resolveStableKey = (modem: string): string => this.#stableKeyByPath.get(modem) ?? modem; + this.#backend = createMmDbusBackend({ + transport: this.#transport, + destination: this.#destination, + actor, + now: this.#now, + }); + const location = new MmLocation({ + transport: this.#transport, + actor, + destination: this.#destination, + resolveStableKey, + now: this.#now, + }); + const ussd = new MmUssd({ + transport: this.#transport, + actor, + destination: this.#destination, + resolveStableKey, + }); + this.#moduleOperations = new ModemManagerModuleOperations({ + transport: this.#transport, + destination: this.#destination, + location, + ussd, + now: this.#now, + readSnapshot: (context) => this.readSnapshot(context), + }); + const operations: ModemManagerProviderOperations = { + access: 'read-write', + ...createGenericOperations({ + backend: this.#backend, + readSnapshot: (context) => this.readSnapshot(context), + }), + ...this.#moduleOperations.operations, + }; + this.definition = { + id: 'modemmanager', + profileVersion: '1', + eligibleTransports: ['modemmanager'], + passiveMatchers: [], + unauthenticatedProbes: [ + { id: 'object-manager-modem', run: (request) => this.#probe(request) }, + ], + capabilityReaders: [ + { id: 'runtime-modem-interface', read: (context) => this.#capability(context) }, + ], + observe: (context) => this.#observeNormalized(context), + operations: () => operations, + contractFixtures: [], + }; + } + + start(): ReturnType { + this.#startPromise ??= this.#backend.start(); + return this.#startPromise; + } + + observe(listener: ObservationListener): () => void { + return this.#backend.observe(listener); + } + + async stop(): Promise { + await this.#moduleOperations.stop(); + await this.#backend.stop(); + } + + async readSnapshot(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise { + try { + await this.start(); + const tree = await fetchManagedObjects(this.#transport, this.#destination); + const snapshot = buildModemManagerSnapshot( + tree, + context, + this.#now, + this.#epoch, + this.#bandCertification(context), + ); + if (snapshot === undefined) return { ok: false, reason: 'not-found' }; + this.#stableKeyByPath.set(snapshot.modemPath, `modem:${context.physicalModemId}`); + return { ok: true, ...snapshot }; + } catch (error) { + return { ok: false, reason: mapModemManagerError(error).reason }; + } + } + + #bandCertification(context: ProviderExecutionContext): BandCertificationEntry | undefined { + const sku = this.#bandSku(context); + return sku === undefined ? undefined : findBandCertification(this.#bandCatalog, sku); + } + + async #probe(request: ProviderMatchRequest) { + const snapshot = await this.readSnapshot({ ...request, profile: PROFILE }); + return { + signal: snapshot.ok + ? ('match' as const) + : snapshot.reason === 'not-found' + ? ('mismatch' as const) + : ('unknown' as const), + strength: 'strong' as const, + profiles: [PROFILE], + detail: snapshot.ok ? 'runtime-modem-interface-present' : snapshot.reason, + }; + } + + async #capability(context: ProviderExecutionContext) { + const snapshot = await this.readSnapshot(context); + return { + signal: snapshot.ok + ? ('match' as const) + : snapshot.reason === 'not-found' + ? ('mismatch' as const) + : ('unknown' as const), + strength: 'strong' as const, + detail: snapshot.ok ? 'generic-controls-derived-from-runtime-properties' : snapshot.reason, + }; + } + + async #observeNormalized( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise[]> { + const snapshot = await this.readSnapshot(context); + if (snapshot.ok) return [snapshot.observation]; + return [ + unavailableObservation( + 'modemmanager', + { + stableKey: stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(context.physicalModemId), + generation: context.generation, + sourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(this.#epoch), + observedAt: epochMillis(this.#now()), + }, + snapshot.reason === 'not-found' ? 'device-absent' : 'provider-unavailable', + ), + ]; + } +} + +export function createModemManagerProvider( + options: ModemManagerProviderOptions, +): ModemManagerProvider { + return new ModemManagerProvider(options); +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/snapshot.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/snapshot.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f421eb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/snapshot.ts @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +import { + MODEM_IFACE, + MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE, + MODEM3GPP_IFACE, + MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE, + SIM_IFACE, +} from '../../backend/constants'; +import { + type DecodedManagedObjects, + type DecodedProps, + findInterface, + pathsWithInterface, + propValue, +} from '../../backend/managed-objects'; +import { type BandCertificationEntry, decodeBandList } from '../../band'; +import { MESSAGING_IFACE } from '../../capability'; +import type { RadioPower } from '../../domain'; +import { + decodeStateFailedReason, + epochMillis, + sourceEpoch, + stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId, +} from '../../domain'; +import { readSimPresence } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { NormalizationContext, RawFieldRecord, RawFieldValue } from '../../observations'; +import { normalizeModemManagerObservation } from '../../observations'; +import { describeBandWriteCertification, readRadioModeTruth } from '../../radio'; +import type { DbusValue } from '../../transport'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext } from '../contracts'; +import type { + ModemManagerCapabilities, + ModemManagerProviderSnapshot, + ModemManagerRadioState, + ModemManagerSignalState, + ModemManagerSimState, +} from './types'; + +const SIGNAL_IFACE = `${MODEM_IFACE}.Signal`; + +function rawValue(value: DbusValue): RawFieldValue | undefined { + if (typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean') + return value; + if (Array.isArray(value)) { + const result: RawFieldValue[] = []; + for (const item of value) { + const decoded = rawValue(item); + if (decoded !== undefined) result.push(decoded); + } + return result; + } + return undefined; +} + +function propsRecord(props: DecodedProps | undefined): RawFieldRecord | undefined { + if (props === undefined) return undefined; + const record: Record = {}; + for (const [name, wrapped] of props) { + const decoded = rawValue(wrapped.value); + if (decoded !== undefined) record[name] = decoded; + } + return record; +} + +function tuple(value: DbusValue | undefined): readonly [number, number] { + if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [0, 0]; + const allowed = value[0]; + const preferred = value[1]; + return [typeof allowed === 'number' ? allowed : 0, typeof preferred === 'number' ? preferred : 0]; +} + +function modePairs(value: DbusValue | undefined): ModemManagerRadioState['supported'] { + if (!Array.isArray(value)) return []; + const result: { allowed: number; preferred: number }[] = []; + for (const candidate of value) { + const [allowed, preferred] = tuple(candidate); + if (allowed > 0) result.push({ allowed, preferred }); + } + return result; +} + +/** + * A `DbusValue` as the retention layer keeps it. + * + * `rawValue` already produces exactly this for a struct (an array of its members), so + * `SupportedModes` and `CurrentModes` reach the verbatim decoder in the same shape the + * diagnostics block retains — one representation, so the two cannot disagree. + */ +function structValue(value: DbusValue | undefined): unknown { + return value === undefined ? undefined : rawValue(value); +} + +function signalState( + modem: DecodedProps, + signal: DecodedProps | undefined, +): ModemManagerSignalState { + const quality = tuple(propValue(modem, 'SignalQuality')); + return { + ...(quality[0] >= 0 ? { quality: quality[0] } : {}), + ...(Array.isArray(propValue(modem, 'SignalQuality')) ? { recent: quality[1] !== 0 } : {}), + extendedAvailable: signal !== undefined, + }; +} + +function simState(tree: DecodedManagedObjects, modem: DecodedProps): ModemManagerSimState { + const activePath = propValue(modem, 'Sim'); + const slots = propValue(modem, 'SimSlots'); + const paths = Array.isArray(slots) + ? slots.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === 'string' && value !== '/') + : []; + const active = + typeof activePath === 'string' ? findInterface(tree, activePath, SIM_IFACE) : undefined; + const lockRequired = propValue(modem, 'UnlockRequired'); + const rawFailedReason = propValue(modem, 'StateFailedReason'); + const failedReason = + typeof rawFailedReason === 'number' + ? decodeStateFailedReason(rawFailedReason) + : typeof rawFailedReason === 'string' + ? rawFailedReason + : undefined; + const primarySlot = propValue(modem, 'PrimarySimSlot'); + const simType = propValue(active, 'SimType'); + const esimStatus = propValue(active, 'EsimStatus'); + const reading = readSimPresence({ + ...(typeof activePath === 'string' ? { sim: activePath } : {}), + ...(paths.length > 0 ? { simSlots: paths } : {}), + ...(failedReason === undefined ? {} : { failedReason }), + }); + return { + // POSITIVE evidence only: an exported SIM object path proves a SIM. Its ABSENCE + // proves nothing — `presence` below is the answer to "is there a SIM", and it + // says `unknown` unless the modem stated `sim-missing` itself. + present: typeof activePath === 'string' && activePath !== '/', + presence: reading.presence, + presenceEvidence: reading.evidence, + slotCount: paths.length, + primarySlot: typeof primarySlot === 'number' ? primarySlot : 0, + ...(typeof lockRequired === 'number' ? { lockRequired } : {}), + ...(typeof simType === 'number' ? { simType } : {}), + ...(typeof esimStatus === 'number' ? { esimStatus } : {}), + }; +} + +function radioPower(value: DbusValue | undefined): RadioPower { + switch (value) { + case 1: + return 'off'; + case 2: + return 'low'; + case 3: + return 'on'; + default: + return 'unknown'; + } +} + +function hasProperty(props: DecodedProps, name: string): boolean { + return props.some(([property]) => property === name); +} + +function findModemPath( + tree: DecodedManagedObjects, + context: ProviderExecutionContext, +): string | undefined { + const [kind, ...parts] = String(context.physicalModemId).split(':'); + const expected = parts.join(':'); + for (const path of pathsWithInterface(tree, MODEM_IFACE)) { + const modem = findInterface(tree, path, MODEM_IFACE); + const candidates = + kind === 'serial' + ? [propValue(modem, 'DeviceIdentifier')] + : [propValue(modem, 'Device'), propValue(modem, 'Physdev')]; + if (candidates.some((candidate) => candidate === expected)) return path; + } + return undefined; +} + +export function buildModemManagerSnapshot( + tree: DecodedManagedObjects, + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + now: () => number, + epoch: number, + bandCertificationEntry: BandCertificationEntry | undefined, +): ModemManagerProviderSnapshot | undefined { + const modemPath = findModemPath(tree, context); + if (modemPath === undefined) return undefined; + const modem = findInterface(tree, modemPath, MODEM_IFACE); + if (modem === undefined) return undefined; + const modem3gpp = findInterface(tree, modemPath, MODEM3GPP_IFACE); + const signal = findInterface(tree, modemPath, SIGNAL_IFACE); + const activePath = propValue(modem, 'Sim'); + const sim = + typeof activePath === 'string' ? findInterface(tree, activePath, SIM_IFACE) : undefined; + const interfaces = tree.find(([path]) => path === modemPath)?.[1] ?? []; + const interfaceNames = new Set(interfaces.map(([name]) => name)); + const slots = propValue(modem, 'SimSlots'); + const bandCertification = describeBandWriteCertification({ + entry: bandCertificationEntry, + supported: decodeBandList(propValue(modem, 'SupportedBands')), + }); + const capabilities: ModemManagerCapabilities = { + modeRead: hasProperty(modem, 'CurrentModes'), + modeWrite: hasProperty(modem, 'CurrentModes'), + bandRead: hasProperty(modem, 'SupportedBands'), + bandWrite: + hasProperty(modem, 'SupportedBands') && + bandCertification.satisfied && + bandCertification.offerable.length > 0, + signalRead: hasProperty(modem, 'SignalQuality') || signal !== undefined, + simRead: hasProperty(modem, 'Sim') || hasProperty(modem, 'SimSlots'), + multiSim: Array.isArray(slots) && slots.filter((entry) => entry !== '/').length > 1, + location: interfaceNames.has(MODEM_LOCATION_IFACE), + sms: interfaceNames.has(MESSAGING_IFACE), + ussd: interfaceNames.has(MODEM3GPP_USSD_IFACE), + powerRead: hasProperty(modem, 'PowerState'), + }; + const [allowed, preferred] = tuple(propValue(modem, 'CurrentModes')); + const modeTruth = readRadioModeTruth({ + currentModes: structValue(propValue(modem, 'CurrentModes')), + supportedModes: structValue(propValue(modem, 'SupportedModes')), + }); + const normalizationContext: NormalizationContext = { + stableKey: stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(context.physicalModemId), + generation: context.generation, + sourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(epoch), + observedAt: epochMillis(now()), + }; + // The struct properties are handed to normalization VERBATIM — `CurrentModes` as its + // `(uu)` pair, `SignalQuality` as its `(ub)` pair. Flattening them here (which this + // did) kept the first member and dropped the preferred mode and the recency flag + // before the diagnostics block ever saw them, which is a drop no downstream layer + // can undo. The normalizer reads either shape. + const modemRaw = propsRecord(modem) ?? {}; + return { + modemPath, + capabilities, + bandCertification, + radio: { + current: { allowed, preferred }, + supported: modePairs(propValue(modem, 'SupportedModes')), + truth: modeTruth, + }, + signal: signalState(modem, signal), + sim: simState(tree, modem), + power: radioPower(propValue(modem, 'PowerState')), + observation: normalizeModemManagerObservation( + { + modem: modemRaw, + ...(modem3gpp === undefined ? {} : { modem3gpp: propsRecord(modem3gpp) ?? {} }), + ...(sim === undefined ? {} : { sim: propsRecord(sim) ?? {} }), + ...(signal === undefined ? {} : { signal: propsRecord(signal) ?? {} }), + }, + normalizationContext, + ), + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/modem-manager/types.ts b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/types.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c38a53 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/modem-manager/types.ts @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +import type { + DesiredRadio, + ObservationEnvelope, + OperationDescriptor, + OperationResult, + RadioPower, +} from '../../domain'; +import type { SimPresence, SimPresenceEvidence } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { GnssFixState } from '../../location'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../../observations'; +import type { + FixRead, + GnssSource, + LocationStatusResult, + LocationToggleResult, + ModemBands, + ObservationList, + ObservationListener, + SmsObservationPort, +} from '../../ports'; +import type { BandWriteCertification, ModeSelection, RadioModeTruth } from '../../radio'; +import type { MmUssd, UssdVerbResult } from '../../ussd'; +import type { ProviderExecutionContext, ProviderOperationsSurface } from '../contracts'; +import type { ModemManagerRefusalReason } from './errors'; + +export type ModemManagerCapabilities = { + readonly modeRead: boolean; + readonly modeWrite: boolean; + readonly bandRead: boolean; + readonly bandWrite: boolean; + readonly signalRead: boolean; + readonly simRead: boolean; + readonly multiSim: boolean; + readonly location: boolean; + readonly sms: boolean; + readonly ussd: boolean; + readonly powerRead: boolean; +}; + +export type ModemManagerRadioState = { + readonly current: { readonly allowed: number; readonly preferred: number }; + readonly supported: readonly { readonly allowed: number; readonly preferred: number }[]; + /** + * The SAME properties decoded without loss — `preferred: 'none'` stays `none`, an + * unfamiliar mode bit stays offerable as `unknown-combination`, and a member that + * is not a `(uu)` lands in `undecodable` rather than vanishing. `supported` above + * is the pre-existing raw-mask view and DROPS a zero-allowed member; this one does + * not, which is the whole point of carrying both. + */ + readonly truth: RadioModeTruth; +}; + +export type ModemManagerSignalState = { + readonly quality?: number; + readonly recent?: boolean; + readonly extendedAvailable: boolean; +}; + +export type ModemManagerSimState = { + /** + * The modem exports an ACTIVE SIM object path. `true` is positive evidence of a + * SIM; `false` is NOT evidence of absence — read `presence` for that. + */ + readonly present: boolean; + /** `absent` only ever comes from `StateFailedReason: sim-missing`. */ + readonly presence: SimPresence; + readonly presenceEvidence: SimPresenceEvidence; + readonly slotCount: number; + readonly primarySlot: number; + readonly lockRequired?: number; + readonly simType?: number; + readonly esimStatus?: number; +}; + +export type ModemManagerProviderSnapshot = { + readonly modemPath: string; + readonly capabilities: ModemManagerCapabilities; + readonly radio: ModemManagerRadioState; + /** The band-lock gate for THIS device, resolved from the shipped certification catalog. */ + readonly bandCertification: BandWriteCertification; + readonly signal: ModemManagerSignalState; + readonly sim: ModemManagerSimState; + readonly power: RadioPower; + readonly observation: ObservationEnvelope; +}; + +export type ModemManagerSnapshotResult = + | ({ readonly ok: true } & ModemManagerProviderSnapshot) + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: ModemManagerRefusalReason }; + +export interface ContextReadOperation { + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + read(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise>; +} + +export interface ContextWriteOperation { + /** The shape-only descriptor: what this operation is, before any device answered. */ + readonly descriptor: OperationDescriptor; + /** + * The descriptor as the LIVE device entitles it. + * + * A static descriptor cannot carry a device's own catalog, so it cannot say which + * mode combinations this modem advertises or whether this SKU's band lock is + * certified. Those are exactly the facts a consumer needs before it offers a + * control, so they are read here instead of being inferred from a capability flag. + */ + describe(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise>; + read(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise>; + write(context: ProviderExecutionContext, input: I): Promise>; +} + +export type SmsPortResult = + | { readonly ok: true; readonly port: SmsObservationPort } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: ModemManagerRefusalReason }; + +export interface ModemManagerProviderOperations extends ProviderOperationsSurface { + readonly radio: ContextWriteOperation; + /** + * The modem's OWN mode vocabulary — an advertised `(allowed, preferred)` pair, + * selected verbatim. Separate from `radio` because `DesiredRadio` is an ordered RAT + * preference and cannot express `preferred: none`, which real hardware advertises. + */ + readonly modes: ContextWriteOperation; + readonly bands: ContextWriteOperation; + readonly signal: ContextReadOperation; + readonly sim: ContextReadOperation; + readonly power: ContextReadOperation; + readonly location: { + status(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; + enable( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + sources: readonly GnssSource[], + ): Promise; + disable(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; + readFix(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; + state(context: ProviderExecutionContext): GnssFixState; + tick(context: ProviderExecutionContext): GnssFixState; + }; + sms(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; + readonly ussd: MmUssd; + initiateUssd(context: ProviderExecutionContext, ussdCommand: string): Promise; + respondUssd(context: ProviderExecutionContext, ussdResponse: string): Promise; + cancelUssd(context: ProviderExecutionContext): Promise; + readonly fccCoverage: ( + vid: string | undefined, + pid: string | undefined, + ) => 'present' | 'absent' | 'unknown'; +} + +export interface ModemManagerProviderLifecycle { + start(): Promise; + observe(listener: ObservationListener): () => void; + stop(): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/network-manager/adapter.ts b/control/src/providers/network-manager/adapter.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4127537 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/network-manager/adapter.ts @@ -0,0 +1,455 @@ +// The thin NetworkManager adapter: desired profiles, applied bearers, and the +// interface each one landed on — the saved-vs-applied boundary and nothing else. +// +// It is the ONLY bearer/APN authority surface in the package. `ModemManagerPort` has +// no connect verb by construction (`ports/forbidden-surface.test.ts`), and the +// ModemManager provider has no bearer operation, so nothing else can put a bearer into +// force. Correspondingly, this adapter performs no radio, band, SIM or power operation: +// those belong to the ModemManager provider, and expressing them here would create a +// second writer for a resource the ownership matrix gives to exactly one. +// +// Two rules shape every method below. +// +// 1. OBSERVED STATE NEVER WRITES THE DESIRED SLOT. `observe()` may clear the applied +// slot and always rewrites the observed one; it does not touch `desired` on any +// path. Reality overtaking a write does not un-ask the question the operator asked +// — and if it did, a re-enumeration would silently erase the configuration the +// controller is supposed to restore. +// 2. WRITES GO THROUGH THE PORT'S TYPED OPERATIONS, AND ONLY THOSE. The NM half of the +// port-tagged op set (`ports/ops.ts` `NmOp`) is create / update / activate / +// deactivate. There is deliberately no delete path here: profile removal is not in +// that set, so this adapter cannot express it. + +import type { DeviceGeneration, EpochMillis } from '../../domain'; +import { epochMillis } from '../../domain'; +import type { + AppliedConfiguration, + DesiredProfile, + ModemStateView, + NormalizationContext, + ObservedState, + StateDivergence, +} from '../../observations'; +import { + appliedConfiguration, + describeStateDivergence, + desiredProfile, + freshObservation, + observedState, + unavailableObservation, +} from '../../observations'; +import type { + ConnectionId, + DeviceIfname, + GsmProfile, + NetworkManagerPort, + Receipt, +} from '../../ports'; +import { receipt } from '../../ports'; +import type { + NmAdapterRefusalReason, + NmAppliedLoss, + NmAppliedOutcome, + NmApplyResult, + NmBearerState, + NmConnectionOutcome, + NmDesiredRequest, + NmObservationInput, + NmObservationResult, + NmObservedDevice, + NmSaveResult, +} from './types'; +import { boundBearer, nmBearerStateEquals, unboundBearer } from './types'; + +const SOURCE = 'networkmanager' as const; + +/** The device states in which NM is still settling an activation, not losing it. */ +const TRANSITIONAL_STATES: ReadonlySet = new Set([ + 'prepare', + 'config', + 'need-auth', + 'ip-config', + 'ip-check', + 'secondaries', + 'deactivating', +]); + +interface ConnectionSlots { + desired: DesiredProfile | null; + applied: AppliedConfiguration | null; + observed: ObservedState | null; +} + +export interface NetworkManagerAdapterOptions { + readonly port: NetworkManagerPort; + /** Clock for the desired/applied slots only; observations carry their own. */ + readonly now?: () => number; +} + +export interface NmApplyOptions { + readonly operationId: string; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; +} + +export class NetworkManagerAdapter { + readonly #port: NetworkManagerPort; + readonly #now: () => number; + readonly #slots = new Map(); + #observedGeneration: DeviceGeneration | null = null; + + constructor(options: NetworkManagerAdapterOptions) { + this.#port = options.port; + this.#now = options.now ?? Date.now; + } + + /** Every connection this adapter holds a slot for, in insertion order. */ + trackedConnections(): readonly ConnectionId[] { + return [...this.#slots.keys()]; + } + + // ── desired ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + + /** + * Save an operator's profile and record it as DESIRED. + * + * The desired slot is built from what the caller ASKED for, not from what NM read + * back. That is the whole point of the slot: if NM normalized a field on the way + * in, the next `describeStateDivergence` is supposed to report it, and seeding + * desired from the readback would make that divergence structurally invisible. + */ + async saveDesiredProfile(request: NmDesiredRequest): Promise { + let saved: GsmProfile; + try { + saved = + request.connectionId === undefined + ? await this.#port.createGsmProfile(request.profile) + : await this.#port.updateGsmProfile(request.connectionId, request.profile); + } catch (error: unknown) { + return { + ok: false, + reason: 'write-failed', + receipt: receipt('connection', 'failed', describeError(error)), + }; + } + const id = saved.connectionId; + const desired = desiredProfile( + boundBearer({ + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: request.deviceIfname, + apn: request.profile.apn, + autoConfig: request.profile.autoConfig, + homeOnly: request.profile.homeOnly, + }), + epochMillis(this.#now()), + request.requestedBy, + ); + this.#slotsFor(id).desired = desired; + return { ok: true, connectionId: id, desired }; + } + + /** + * Record that the operator wants NO bearer on this connection's device. + * + * It performs no I/O on purpose — desired is a record of intent, and the + * deactivation it implies happens when `applyDesired` is called, so a request and + * its execution stay two separately observable facts. + */ + releaseDesired(id: ConnectionId, requestedBy: string): NmSaveResult { + const slots = this.#slots.get(id); + const ifname = slots === undefined ? undefined : targetIfname(slots); + if (ifname === undefined) { + return { + ok: false, + reason: 'no-desired-profile', + receipt: receipt('connection', 'failed', `no tracked device for connection ${id}`), + }; + } + const desired = desiredProfile(unboundBearer(ifname), epochMillis(this.#now()), requestedBy); + this.#slotsFor(id).desired = desired; + return { ok: true, connectionId: id, desired }; + } + + desiredFor(id: ConnectionId): DesiredProfile | null { + return this.#slots.get(id)?.desired ?? null; + } + + /** The saved profile as NM itself holds it — a straight read, no slot involved. */ + async readSavedProfile(id: ConnectionId): Promise { + return await this.#port.readGsmProfile(id); + } + + // ── applied ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + + /** + * Put the desired state into force and record what was applied. + * + * The applied slot is built from the profile NM READ BACK, not from the request: + * "what was actually put into force" is a claim about NM's content, and asserting + * it from the input would make a silently-rejected field look applied. + */ + async applyDesired(id: ConnectionId, options: NmApplyOptions): Promise { + const desired = this.desiredFor(id); + if (desired === null) { + return refuse('no-desired-profile', `connection ${id} has no desired profile`); + } + return desired.profile.kind === 'unbound' + ? await this.#deactivate(id, desired.profile.deviceIfname, options) + : await this.#activate(id, desired.profile, options); + } + + appliedFor(id: ConnectionId): AppliedConfiguration | null { + return this.#slots.get(id)?.applied ?? null; + } + + /** + * The interface the applied bearer landed on, or `null` when no bearer is in + * force. An applied `unbound` state resolves to `null` rather than to its device: + * there is a device, but no bearer on it, and returning the name would read as one. + */ + resolveAppliedInterface(id: ConnectionId): DeviceIfname | null { + const applied = this.appliedFor(id); + if (applied === null || applied.configuration.kind !== 'bound') { + return null; + } + return applied.configuration.binding.deviceIfname; + } + + // ── observed ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + + /** + * Fold one complete NM readout. + * + * Never touches the desired slot. Clears the applied slot only when the readout + * positively contradicts it, and always says which of the four contradictions it + * was. + */ + observe(input: NmObservationInput): NmObservationResult { + const generation = input.context.generation; + if (this.#observedGeneration !== null && generation < this.#observedGeneration) { + return { + kind: 'refused', + reason: 'superseded-generation', + currentGeneration: this.#observedGeneration, + }; + } + this.#observedGeneration = generation; + const devices = new Map( + input.devices.map((device) => [device.ifname, device]), + ); + const outcomes: NmConnectionOutcome[] = []; + const losses: NmAppliedLoss[] = []; + for (const [id, slots] of this.#slots) { + const ifname = targetIfname(slots); + if (ifname === undefined) { + continue; + } + const device = devices.get(ifname); + slots.observed = observedState( + device === undefined + ? unavailableObservation(SOURCE, input.context, 'device-absent') + : freshObservation(SOURCE, input.context, observedBearer(device)), + ); + const outcome = this.#classify(id, slots, ifname, device, input.context.observedAt); + outcomes.push({ connectionId: id, outcome }); + if (outcome.status === 'lost') { + losses.push(outcome.loss); + } + } + return { + kind: 'accepted', + generation, + observedAt: input.context.observedAt, + outcomes, + losses, + }; + } + + observedFor(id: ConnectionId): ObservedState | null { + return this.#slots.get(id)?.observed ?? null; + } + + /** + * The three-slot view. `context` supplies the provenance for the "we have not + * observed this yet" case — this layer has no clock or epoch counter of its own + * for observations, so it cannot manufacture one. + */ + stateView( + id: ConnectionId, + context: NormalizationContext, + ): ModemStateView | null { + const slots = this.#slots.get(id); + if (slots === undefined) { + return null; + } + return { + desired: slots.desired, + applied: slots.applied, + observed: + slots.observed ?? + observedState( + unavailableObservation(SOURCE, context, 'provider-unavailable'), + ), + }; + } + + /** `desiredVsApplied` ("did our write happen") and `appliedVsObserved` ("did it stick"). */ + divergence(id: ConnectionId, context: NormalizationContext): StateDivergence | null { + const view = this.stateView(id, context); + return view === null ? null : describeStateDivergence(view, nmBearerStateEquals); + } + + // ── internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + + async #activate( + id: ConnectionId, + desired: NmBearerState, + options: NmApplyOptions, + ): Promise { + if (desired.kind !== 'bound') { + return refuse('no-desired-profile', `connection ${id} has no bearer to activate`); + } + const ifname = desired.binding.deviceIfname; + const saved = await this.#port.readGsmProfile(id); + if (saved === undefined) { + return refuse('profile-absent', `connection ${id} is no longer saved in NetworkManager`); + } + let activation: Receipt; + try { + activation = await this.#port.activate(id, ifname); + } catch (error: unknown) { + return refuse('activation-failed', describeError(error)); + } + if (activation.status !== 'applied') { + return { ok: false, reason: 'activation-failed', receipt: activation }; + } + const applied = appliedConfiguration({ + configuration: boundBearer({ + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: ifname, + apn: saved.apn, + autoConfig: saved.autoConfig, + homeOnly: saved.homeOnly, + }), + appliedAt: epochMillis(this.#now()), + generation: options.generation, + operationId: options.operationId, + }); + this.#slotsFor(id).applied = applied; + return { ok: true, applied, receipt: activation }; + } + + async #deactivate( + id: ConnectionId, + ifname: DeviceIfname, + options: NmApplyOptions, + ): Promise { + let result: Receipt; + try { + result = await this.#port.deactivate(id, ifname); + } catch (error: unknown) { + return refuse('deactivation-failed', describeError(error)); + } + if (result.status !== 'applied') { + return { ok: false, reason: 'deactivation-failed', receipt: result }; + } + const applied = appliedConfiguration({ + configuration: unboundBearer(ifname), + appliedAt: epochMillis(this.#now()), + generation: options.generation, + operationId: options.operationId, + }); + this.#slotsFor(id).applied = applied; + return { ok: true, applied, receipt: result }; + } + + #classify( + id: ConnectionId, + slots: ConnectionSlots, + ifname: DeviceIfname, + device: NmObservedDevice | undefined, + observedAt: EpochMillis, + ): NmAppliedOutcome { + const applied = slots.applied; + if (applied === null) { + return { status: 'unapplied' }; + } + const lose = (reason: NmAppliedLoss['reason']): NmAppliedOutcome => { + slots.applied = null; + return { + status: 'lost', + loss: { + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: ifname, + reason, + lostAt: observedAt, + generation: applied.generation, + previous: applied, + }, + }; + }; + if (device === undefined) { + return lose('interface-absent'); + } + if (device.state === 'failed') { + return lose('activation-failed'); + } + if (applied.configuration.kind === 'unbound') { + // We deliberately took the bearer down; anything active here is somebody else. + return device.activeConnection === undefined + ? { status: 'retained', applied } + : lose('connection-replaced'); + } + if (device.activeConnection === undefined) { + return lose('interface-detached'); + } + if (device.activeConnection.connectionId !== id) { + return lose('connection-replaced'); + } + if (device.state === 'activated') { + return { status: 'retained', applied }; + } + return TRANSITIONAL_STATES.has(device.state) + ? { status: 'pending', applied, deviceState: device.state } + : lose('interface-detached'); + } + + #slotsFor(id: ConnectionId): ConnectionSlots { + const existing = this.#slots.get(id); + if (existing !== undefined) { + return existing; + } + const created: ConnectionSlots = { desired: null, applied: null, observed: null }; + this.#slots.set(id, created); + return created; + } +} + +/** The device the slots are about: where the bearer IS, else where it was asked for. */ +function targetIfname(slots: ConnectionSlots): DeviceIfname | undefined { + const state = slots.applied?.configuration ?? slots.desired?.profile; + if (state === undefined) { + return undefined; + } + return state.kind === 'bound' ? state.binding.deviceIfname : state.deviceIfname; +} + +function observedBearer(device: NmObservedDevice): NmBearerState { + const active = device.activeConnection; + return active === undefined + ? unboundBearer(device.ifname) + : boundBearer({ + connectionId: active.connectionId, + deviceIfname: device.ifname, + apn: active.apn, + autoConfig: active.autoConfig, + homeOnly: active.homeOnly, + }); +} + +function refuse(reason: NmAdapterRefusalReason, message: string): NmApplyResult { + return { ok: false, reason, receipt: receipt('connection', 'failed', message) }; +} + +function describeError(error: unknown): string { + return error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'NetworkManager rejected the request'; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/network-manager/index.ts b/control/src/providers/network-manager/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5975e8e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/network-manager/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +export * from './adapter'; +export * from './types'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/network-manager/network-manager-adapter.test.ts b/control/src/providers/network-manager/network-manager-adapter.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd8f38b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/network-manager/network-manager-adapter.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,689 @@ +// The saved-vs-applied boundary, proven against A2.3's stateful nmcli harness. +// +// The harness is a real state machine over the nmcli argv grammar, so a profile read +// back after a write is exactly what was written — which is what lets these tests tell +// "the desired slot echoed the request" apart from "the desired slot was seeded from +// the readback". No bus and no subprocess: this suite always runs. +// +// The headline scenario is re-enumeration: NM reports an interface, then stops +// reporting it. The applied bearer must be reported LOST while the desired profile +// survives byte-for-byte — an operator's configuration is not un-asked by a device +// disappearing, and a controller that lost it would have nothing to restore. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { FakeNetworkManagerPort } from '../../../test-support/fake-nm'; +import { fixtureContext } from '../../../test-support/observation-fixtures'; +import { deviceGeneration, epochMillis, sourceEpoch } from '../../domain'; +import { + type ConnectionId, + connectionId, + type DeviceIfname, + deviceIfname, + type GsmProfileInput, + type NetworkManagerPort, + receipt, +} from '../../ports'; +import { NetworkManagerAdapter } from './adapter'; +import type { NmObservedDevice } from './types'; + +const WWAN0 = deviceIfname('wwan0'); +const WWAN1 = deviceIfname('wwan1'); + +const PROFILE: GsmProfileInput = { + connectionName: 'cell-primary', + apn: 'internet', + username: 'operator', + password: 's3cr3t', + homeOnly: true, + autoConfig: false, +}; + +const APPLY = { operationId: 'op-1', generation: deviceGeneration(7) } as const; + +/** A device NM reports as carrying `id` and nothing unusual. */ +function activatedOn(ifname: DeviceIfname, id: ConnectionId, apn = 'internet'): NmObservedDevice { + return { + ifname, + state: 'activated', + activeConnection: { connectionId: id, apn, autoConfig: false, homeOnly: true }, + }; +} + +/** Save a profile and put it into force — the state every applied-side test starts from. */ +async function applied(port: NetworkManagerPort = new FakeNetworkManagerPort()): Promise<{ + adapter: NetworkManagerAdapter; + id: ConnectionId; +}> { + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error(`fixture could not save a profile: ${saved.receipt.reason}`); + } + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(saved.connectionId, APPLY); + if (!result.ok) { + throw new Error(`fixture could not apply: ${result.receipt.reason}`); + } + return { adapter, id: saved.connectionId }; +} + +describe('NetworkManagerAdapter — desired profiles (the saved side)', () => { + test('a save writes NM and records the REQUEST, not the readback', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port, now: () => 1_000 }); + + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + + expect(saved.ok).toBe(true); + if (!saved.ok) { + return; + } + const desired = adapter.desiredFor(saved.connectionId); + expect(desired?.kind).toBe('desired'); + expect(desired?.requestedBy).toBe('rpc:setApn'); + expect(desired?.requestedAt).toBe(epochMillis(1_000)); + expect(desired?.profile).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: saved.connectionId, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'internet', + autoConfig: false, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + }); + + test('the saved profile reads back out of NM itself', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + + const readBack = await adapter.readSavedProfile(saved.connectionId); + + expect(readBack?.apn).toBe('internet'); + expect(readBack?.connectionName).toBe('cell-primary'); + expect(readBack?.homeOnly).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a save with a connection id MODIFIES rather than creating a second profile', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + const first = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!first.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + + const second = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + connectionId: first.connectionId, + profile: { ...PROFILE, apn: 'iot.example' }, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + + expect(second.ok).toBe(true); + expect(adapter.trackedConnections()).toEqual([first.connectionId]); + expect(port.runner.calls.filter((call) => call[1] === 'add')).toHaveLength(1); + expect(port.runner.calls.filter((call) => call[1] === 'modify')).toHaveLength(1); + expect((await adapter.readSavedProfile(first.connectionId))?.apn).toBe('iot.example'); + }); + + test('desired records what was ASKED, even when NM stores something else', async () => { + // NM lets `gsm.auto-config` drive the APN, so the concrete apn an operator typed + // is NOT what NM ends up holding. Seeding desired from the readback would erase + // the request and make the divergence below structurally unreportable. + const port = autoApnDrivesApn(new FakeNetworkManagerPort()); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: { ...PROFILE, autoConfig: true }, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(saved.connectionId, APPLY); + + expect(saved.desired.profile).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: saved.connectionId, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'internet', + autoConfig: true, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + expect((await adapter.readSavedProfile(saved.connectionId))?.apn).toBe(''); + expect(result.ok && result.applied.configuration).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: saved.connectionId, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: '', + autoConfig: true, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + expect(adapter.divergence(saved.connectionId, fixtureContext())?.desiredVsApplied).toEqual({ + status: 'diverged', + }); + }); + + test('the desired slot never carries the connection password', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + expect(JSON.stringify(adapter.desiredFor(id))).not.toContain('s3cr3t'); + expect(JSON.stringify(adapter.appliedFor(id))).not.toContain('s3cr3t'); + // The credential IS in NM — this adapter simply does not mirror it into a slot. + expect((await adapter.readSavedProfile(id))?.password).toBe('s3cr3t'); + }); + + test('a rejected write is a typed refusal and records NO desired state', async () => { + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port: new FakeNetworkManagerPort() }); + const ghost = connectionId('no-such-uuid'); + + const result = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + connectionId: ghost, + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (result.ok) { + return; + } + expect(result.reason).toBe('write-failed'); + expect(result.receipt.status).toBe('failed'); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(ghost)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.trackedConnections()).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('NetworkManagerAdapter — applied bearers resolve to an interface', () => { + test('an applied bearer names the exact device it landed on', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const bearer = adapter.appliedFor(id); + expect(bearer?.kind).toBe('applied'); + expect(bearer?.generation).toBe(APPLY.generation); + expect(bearer?.operationId).toBe('op-1'); + expect(bearer?.configuration).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'internet', + autoConfig: false, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(id)).toBe(WWAN0); + }); + + test('applied is built from NM\u2019s readback, so a drifted profile diverges from desired', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + // Somebody else edits the profile in NM between the save and the activation. + await port.updateGsmProfile(saved.connectionId, { apn: 'someone-elses.apn' }); + + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(saved.connectionId, APPLY); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + if (!result.ok) { + return; + } + expect(result.applied.configuration).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: saved.connectionId, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'someone-elses.apn', + autoConfig: false, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(saved.connectionId)?.profile).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: saved.connectionId, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'internet', + autoConfig: false, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + expect(adapter.divergence(saved.connectionId, fixtureContext())?.desiredVsApplied).toEqual({ + status: 'diverged', + }); + }); + + test('applying with no desired profile is refused, not attempted', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(connectionId('unknown'), APPLY); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (result.ok) { + return; + } + expect(result.reason).toBe('no-desired-profile'); + expect(port.runner.calls).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a profile deleted out from under us refuses without touching desired', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + const before = adapter.desiredFor(saved.connectionId); + // The adapter itself has no delete verb; only the port can do this. + await port.deleteGsmProfile(saved.connectionId); + + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(saved.connectionId, APPLY); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (result.ok) { + return; + } + expect(result.reason).toBe('profile-absent'); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(saved.connectionId)).toBe(before); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(saved.connectionId)).toBeNull(); + }); + + test('a failed activation records NO applied state', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port: refusingActivation(port) }); + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(saved.connectionId, APPLY); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(false); + if (result.ok) { + return; + } + expect(result.reason).toBe('activation-failed'); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(saved.connectionId)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(saved.connectionId)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(saved.connectionId)).not.toBeNull(); + }); + + test('a released bearer applies as UNBOUND and resolves to no interface', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const released = adapter.releaseDesired(id, 'rpc:stopBearer'); + expect(released.ok).toBe(true); + const result = await adapter.applyDesired(id, { + operationId: 'op-2', + generation: APPLY.generation, + }); + + expect(result.ok).toBe(true); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)?.configuration).toEqual({ + kind: 'unbound', + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + }); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(id)).toBeNull(); + }); +}); + +describe('NetworkManagerAdapter — observed state never overwrites desired', () => { + test('a readout that contradicts the profile leaves the desired slot identical', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + const before = adapter.desiredFor(id); + + const result = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext(), + devices: [activatedOn(WWAN0, id, 'carrier-pushed.apn')], + }); + + expect(result.kind).toBe('accepted'); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(id)).toBe(before); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(id)?.profile).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'internet', + autoConfig: false, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + const observed = adapter.observedFor(id); + expect(observed?.kind).toBe('observed'); + expect(observed?.observation.value).toEqual({ + kind: 'bound', + binding: { + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + apn: 'carrier-pushed.apn', + autoConfig: false, + homeOnly: true, + }, + }); + expect(adapter.divergence(id, fixtureContext())).toEqual({ + desiredVsApplied: { status: 'aligned' }, + appliedVsObserved: { status: 'diverged' }, + }); + }); + + test('the three slots stay three slots, each with its own discriminant', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + adapter.observe({ context: fixtureContext(), devices: [activatedOn(WWAN0, id)] }); + + const view = adapter.stateView(id, fixtureContext()); + + expect(view?.desired?.kind).toBe('desired'); + expect(view?.applied?.kind).toBe('applied'); + expect(view?.observed.kind).toBe('observed'); + }); + + test('an unobserved connection reports unavailable rather than borrowing a slot', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const view = adapter.stateView(id, fixtureContext()); + + expect(view?.observed.observation.freshness).toEqual({ + state: 'unavailable', + since: fixtureContext().observedAt, + reason: 'provider-unavailable', + }); + expect(view?.observed.observation.value).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.divergence(id, fixtureContext())?.appliedVsObserved).toEqual({ + status: 'indeterminate', + missing: 'observed', + }); + }); +}); + +describe('NetworkManagerAdapter — re-enumeration loses the bearer, never the profile', () => { + test('an interface that disappears is an applied LOSS with the desired profile intact', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + const desiredBefore = adapter.desiredFor(id); + const appliedBefore = adapter.appliedFor(id); + + const present = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext(), + devices: [activatedOn(WWAN0, id)], + }); + expect(present.kind === 'accepted' && present.losses).toEqual([]); + expect(present.kind === 'accepted' && present.outcomes[0]?.outcome.status).toBe('retained'); + + // The modem re-enumerates: a NEW generation, and `wwan0` is simply not there. + const gone = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext({ + generation: deviceGeneration(8), + sourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(43), + observedAt: epochMillis(1_700_000_060_000), + }), + devices: [{ ifname: WWAN1, state: 'disconnected' }], + }); + + expect(gone.kind).toBe('accepted'); + if (gone.kind !== 'accepted') { + return; + } + expect(gone.losses).toHaveLength(1); + expect(gone.losses[0]).toEqual({ + connectionId: id, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + reason: 'interface-absent', + lostAt: epochMillis(1_700_000_060_000), + generation: APPLY.generation, + // biome-ignore lint/style/noNonNullAssertion: the fixture asserted this is set. + previous: appliedBefore!, + }); + + // APPLIED clears, OBSERVED reflects reality, DESIRED is untouched. + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(id)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.observedFor(id)?.observation.freshness).toEqual({ + state: 'unavailable', + since: epochMillis(1_700_000_060_000), + reason: 'device-absent', + }); + expect(adapter.observedFor(id)?.observation.value).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(id)).toBe(desiredBefore); + expect(adapter.divergence(id, fixtureContext())?.desiredVsApplied).toEqual({ + status: 'indeterminate', + missing: 'applied', + }); + }); + + test('the surviving desired profile is enough to re-apply once the device returns', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + adapter.observe({ context: fixtureContext(), devices: [] }); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)).toBeNull(); + + // No new save: the desired slot still holds everything the re-apply needs. + const again = await adapter.applyDesired(id, { + operationId: 'op-3', + generation: deviceGeneration(8), + }); + + expect(again.ok).toBe(true); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(id)).toBe(WWAN0); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)?.generation).toBe(deviceGeneration(8)); + }); + + test('a device present but carrying nothing is a FRESH observation, not an unavailable one', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const result = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext(), + devices: [{ ifname: WWAN0, state: 'disconnected' }], + }); + + expect(result.kind === 'accepted' && result.losses[0]?.reason).toBe('interface-detached'); + expect(adapter.observedFor(id)?.observation.freshness).toEqual({ state: 'fresh' }); + expect(adapter.observedFor(id)?.observation.value).toEqual({ + kind: 'unbound', + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + }); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(id)).not.toBeNull(); + }); + + test('another connection on our device is a replacement, not a detachment', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const result = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext(), + devices: [activatedOn(WWAN0, connectionId('someone-else'))], + }); + + expect(result.kind === 'accepted' && result.losses[0]?.reason).toBe('connection-replaced'); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)).toBeNull(); + expect(adapter.desiredFor(id)).not.toBeNull(); + }); + + test('a device NM reports as failed loses the bearer with that reason', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const result = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext(), + devices: [{ ...activatedOn(WWAN0, id), state: 'failed' }], + }); + + expect(result.kind === 'accepted' && result.losses[0]?.reason).toBe('activation-failed'); + expect(adapter.appliedFor(id)).toBeNull(); + }); + + test('a device still settling is PENDING — an activation in flight is not a loss', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + + const result = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext(), + devices: [{ ...activatedOn(WWAN0, id), state: 'ip-config' }], + }); + + expect(result.kind).toBe('accepted'); + if (result.kind !== 'accepted') { + return; + } + expect(result.losses).toEqual([]); + expect(result.outcomes[0]?.outcome).toEqual({ + status: 'pending', + // biome-ignore lint/style/noNonNullAssertion: asserted non-null immediately above. + applied: adapter.appliedFor(id)!, + deviceState: 'ip-config', + }); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(id)).toBe(WWAN0); + }); + + test('a readout from a superseded generation cannot clear applied state', async () => { + const { adapter, id } = await applied(); + adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext({ generation: deviceGeneration(9) }), + devices: [activatedOn(WWAN0, id)], + }); + + const late = adapter.observe({ + context: fixtureContext({ generation: deviceGeneration(8) }), + devices: [], + }); + + expect(late).toEqual({ + kind: 'refused', + reason: 'superseded-generation', + currentGeneration: deviceGeneration(9), + }); + expect(adapter.resolveAppliedInterface(id)).toBe(WWAN0); + }); + + test('a saved-but-never-applied connection reports unapplied, not lost', async () => { + const port = new FakeNetworkManagerPort(); + const adapter = new NetworkManagerAdapter({ port }); + const saved = await adapter.saveDesiredProfile({ + profile: PROFILE, + deviceIfname: WWAN0, + requestedBy: 'rpc:setApn', + }); + if (!saved.ok) { + throw new Error('save failed'); + } + + const result = adapter.observe({ context: fixtureContext(), devices: [] }); + + expect(result.kind === 'accepted' && result.losses).toEqual([]); + expect(result.kind === 'accepted' && result.outcomes).toEqual([ + { connectionId: saved.connectionId, outcome: { status: 'unapplied' } }, + ]); + }); +}); + +describe('NetworkManagerAdapter — scope boundary', () => { + // The adapter owns bearers and ONLY bearers. Radio/SIM verbs belong to the + // ModemManager provider, profile deletion is outside the port-tagged `NmOp` set, + // and physical modem identity belongs to the domain layer — so none of those + // identifiers may appear in this module's executable source. + const FORBIDDEN = [ + 'setRadioModes', + 'setPrimarySimSlot', + 'sendPin', + 'sendPuk', + 'scanNetworks', + 'setCurrentBands', + 'deleteGsmProfile', + 'PhysicalModemId', + 'physicalModemId', + ]; + + const sources = ['adapter.ts', 'types.ts', 'index.ts'].map((name) => ({ + name, + code: stripComments(readFileSync(new URL(name, import.meta.url), 'utf8')), + })); + + test('the comment strip is non-vacuous in both directions', () => { + expect( + stripComments('const a = 1; // setRadioModes\n/* sendPin */\nconst b = 2;'), + ).not.toContain('setRadioModes'); + expect(stripComments('const a = 1; // setRadioModes')).toContain('const a = 1;'); + expect(sources.every((source) => source.code.includes('export'))).toBe(true); + }); + + for (const forbidden of FORBIDDEN) { + test(`no executable source names ${forbidden}`, () => { + for (const source of sources) { + expect(`${source.name}:${source.code.includes(forbidden)}`).toBe(`${source.name}:false`); + } + }); + } +}); + +function delegating(port: FakeNetworkManagerPort): NetworkManagerPort { + return { + createGsmProfile: (profile) => port.createGsmProfile(profile), + readGsmProfile: (id) => port.readGsmProfile(id), + updateGsmProfile: (id, patch) => port.updateGsmProfile(id, patch), + deleteGsmProfile: (id) => port.deleteGsmProfile(id), + activate: (id, ifname) => port.activate(id, ifname), + deactivate: (id, ifname) => port.deactivate(id, ifname), + acquireQuiesceLease: (id, ifname) => port.acquireQuiesceLease(id, ifname), + releaseQuiesceLease: (lease) => port.releaseQuiesceLease(lease), + }; +} + +function refusingActivation(port: FakeNetworkManagerPort): NetworkManagerPort { + return { + ...delegating(port), + activate: async () => receipt('enabled', 'failed', 'No suitable device found for connection'), + }; +} + +function autoApnDrivesApn(port: FakeNetworkManagerPort): NetworkManagerPort { + return { + ...delegating(port), + createGsmProfile: (profile) => + port.createGsmProfile(profile.autoConfig ? { ...profile, apn: '' } : profile), + updateGsmProfile: (id, patch) => + port.updateGsmProfile(id, patch.autoConfig === true ? { ...patch, apn: '' } : patch), + }; +} + +function stripComments(source: string): string { + return source.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/(^|\s)\/\/.*$/gm, '$1'); +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/network-manager/types.ts b/control/src/providers/network-manager/types.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6387c24 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/network-manager/types.ts @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +// The saved-vs-applied vocabulary, in NetworkManager's own terms. +// +// NM is the sole writer of bearers, APN, auth, roaming, autoconnect and activation +// (`ports/README.md` ownership matrix), and it is also the stack that draws the +// distinction this whole module is built on: a connection PROFILE is what was saved, +// an ACTIVE connection is what was actually put into force on a device, and the device +// itself reports what it is currently doing. `observations/state-separation.ts` models +// those three slots generically; this file gives them an NM-shaped payload. +// +// Radio, band, SIM and power operations are deliberately absent. Those belong to the +// ModemManager provider, and a second surface expressing them here would make two +// writers for one resource — the exact thing the ownership matrix exists to prevent. +// Nothing here carries a `PhysicalModemId` either: every slot is keyed by NM's own +// connection UUID, so this adapter can never become a second authority on which +// physical modem is which. + +import type { DeviceGeneration, EpochMillis } from '../../domain'; +import type { + AppliedConfiguration, + DesiredProfile, + NormalizationContext, +} from '../../observations'; +import type { ConnectionId, DeviceIfname, GsmProfileInput, Receipt } from '../../ports'; + +/** + * NM's own device states (`NMDeviceState`), by name. + * + * The transitional members are kept rather than collapsed into "not activated", + * because a device in `prepare` carrying our connection is COMING UP, and reporting + * that as a lost bearer would turn every ordinary activation into a false alarm. + */ +export const NM_DEVICE_STATES = [ + 'unknown', + 'unmanaged', + 'unavailable', + 'disconnected', + 'prepare', + 'config', + 'need-auth', + 'ip-config', + 'ip-check', + 'secondaries', + 'activated', + 'deactivating', + 'failed', +] as const; +export type NmDeviceState = (typeof NM_DEVICE_STATES)[number]; + +/** + * The bearer identity all three slots compare in. + * + * `username` and `password` are deliberately NOT members. A state slot is read, + * compared, and surfaced in divergence output; `gsm.password` is the one field in the + * profile the redaction module masks everywhere else, so putting it in a comparable + * value would re-open that hole through a side door. The credential lives in NM, is + * written through the port, and is never mirrored here. + */ +export interface NmBearerBinding { + readonly connectionId: ConnectionId; + readonly deviceIfname: DeviceIfname; + readonly apn: string; + readonly autoConfig: boolean; + readonly homeOnly: boolean; +} + +/** + * A bearer, or the positive absence of one. + * + * `unbound` exists so "NM answered, and it says nothing is in force on this device" + * is a VALUE rather than an unavailable observation. The distinction is load-bearing: + * an unavailable observation compares `indeterminate` against everything, which is + * right for "the device is gone" and wrong for "the device is here and idle" — the + * second is a definite divergence from a desired bearer, and an operator needs to see + * it as one. + */ +export type NmBearerState = + | { readonly kind: 'bound'; readonly binding: NmBearerBinding } + | { readonly kind: 'unbound'; readonly deviceIfname: DeviceIfname }; + +export function boundBearer(binding: NmBearerBinding): NmBearerState { + return { kind: 'bound', binding }; +} + +export function unboundBearer(deviceIfname: DeviceIfname): NmBearerState { + return { kind: 'unbound', deviceIfname }; +} + +export function nmBearerBindingEquals(left: NmBearerBinding, right: NmBearerBinding): boolean { + return ( + left.connectionId === right.connectionId && + left.deviceIfname === right.deviceIfname && + left.apn === right.apn && + left.autoConfig === right.autoConfig && + left.homeOnly === right.homeOnly + ); +} + +/** The equality `describeStateDivergence` is driven with for NM state. */ +export function nmBearerStateEquals(left: NmBearerState, right: NmBearerState): boolean { + if (left.kind === 'bound' && right.kind === 'bound') { + return nmBearerBindingEquals(left.binding, right.binding); + } + if (left.kind === 'unbound' && right.kind === 'unbound') { + return left.deviceIfname === right.deviceIfname; + } + return false; +} + +/** The connection NM reports active on a device, with the settings it put in force. */ +export interface NmObservedActiveConnection { + readonly connectionId: ConnectionId; + readonly apn: string; + readonly autoConfig: boolean; + readonly homeOnly: boolean; +} + +/** One device exactly as NM reports it in a readout. */ +export interface NmObservedDevice { + readonly ifname: DeviceIfname; + readonly state: NmDeviceState; + readonly activeConnection?: NmObservedActiveConnection; +} + +/** + * ONE COMPLETE NM readout — an enumeration, never a delta. + * + * That is what makes re-enumeration detectable at all: a device missing from `devices` + * means the device is GONE, and a delta stream has no way to say that without a + * removal event nobody guarantees will arrive. + * + * `context` supplies the clock, the generation and the source epoch, exactly as the + * observation layer requires — this adapter has no clock of its own for observations + * and therefore cannot stamp a readout with a time it did not come from. + */ +export interface NmObservationInput { + readonly context: NormalizationContext; + readonly devices: readonly NmObservedDevice[]; +} + +/** What an operator asked for: a saved profile, targeted at an exact device. */ +export interface NmDesiredRequest { + readonly profile: GsmProfileInput; + readonly deviceIfname: DeviceIfname; + /** Opaque origin label (an RPC caller, a policy engine). Never a credential. */ + readonly requestedBy: string; + /** Update this existing profile instead of creating a new one. */ + readonly connectionId?: ConnectionId; +} + +export const NM_ADAPTER_REFUSAL_REASONS = [ + 'no-desired-profile', + 'profile-absent', + 'activation-failed', + 'deactivation-failed', + 'write-failed', +] as const; +export type NmAdapterRefusalReason = (typeof NM_ADAPTER_REFUSAL_REASONS)[number]; + +export type NmSaveResult = + | { + readonly ok: true; + readonly connectionId: ConnectionId; + readonly desired: DesiredProfile; + } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: NmAdapterRefusalReason; readonly receipt: Receipt }; + +/** Applying a desired profile: the write either took, or it did not and says why. */ +export type NmApplyResult = + | { + readonly ok: true; + readonly applied: AppliedConfiguration; + readonly receipt: Receipt; + } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly reason: NmAdapterRefusalReason; readonly receipt: Receipt }; + +export const NM_APPLIED_LOSS_REASONS = [ + /** The readout has no such device at all — a re-enumeration, or an unplug. */ + 'interface-absent', + /** The device is present and carries no active connection. */ + 'interface-detached', + /** A DIFFERENT connection is active on our device. */ + 'connection-replaced', + /** NM reports the device itself failed. */ + 'activation-failed', +] as const; +export type NmAppliedLossReason = (typeof NM_APPLIED_LOSS_REASONS)[number]; + +/** + * The applied bearer stopped being in force. + * + * `previous` is retained rather than discarded: a caller deciding whether to re-apply + * or to roll back needs to know what WAS in force, and the applied slot has just been + * cleared precisely because it no longer describes reality. + */ +export interface NmAppliedLoss { + readonly connectionId: ConnectionId; + readonly deviceIfname: DeviceIfname; + readonly reason: NmAppliedLossReason; + readonly lostAt: EpochMillis; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly previous: AppliedConfiguration; +} + +export type NmAppliedOutcome = + /** A desired profile is tracked, and nothing has been put into force for it yet. */ + | { readonly status: 'unapplied' } + | { readonly status: 'retained'; readonly applied: AppliedConfiguration } + | { + readonly status: 'pending'; + readonly applied: AppliedConfiguration; + readonly deviceState: NmDeviceState; + } + | { readonly status: 'lost'; readonly loss: NmAppliedLoss }; + +export interface NmConnectionOutcome { + readonly connectionId: ConnectionId; + readonly outcome: NmAppliedOutcome; +} + +/** + * The result of folding one readout. + * + * A readout from a superseded generation is REFUSED rather than applied late: the + * generation fence exists so a reply about a previous enumeration cannot clear applied + * state that belongs to the current one. + */ +export type NmObservationResult = + | { + readonly kind: 'refused'; + readonly reason: 'superseded-generation'; + readonly currentGeneration: DeviceGeneration; + } + | { + readonly kind: 'accepted'; + readonly generation: DeviceGeneration; + readonly observedAt: EpochMillis; + readonly outcomes: readonly NmConnectionOutcome[]; + /** Just the losses, so the case that matters is not behind a filter. */ + readonly losses: readonly NmAppliedLoss[]; + }; diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/credential-fence.test.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/credential-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe675af --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/credential-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; + +/** + * The generic UFI admin password is EPHEMERAL BENCH INPUT, exactly like the MF79U's: + * injected through `UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD` for one supervised bench run, never committed, + * never logged, never echoed into evidence. This scan is what keeps that true — it + * walks tracked AND intended-untracked files for the password and for the two + * derivatives a careless capture would leave behind. + */ +function candidateSecret(): string { + return process.env.UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD ?? ['ceralive', 'ufi', 'himi', 'secret', 'scan'].join('-'); +} + +describe('UFI bench credential fence', () => { + test('keeps the ephemeral password and its derivatives out of tracked or intended files', async () => { + // Given + const password = candidateSecret(); + const forbidden = [ + password, + Buffer.from(password).toString('base64'), + createHash('sha256').update(password).digest('hex'), + ]; + const tracked = Bun.spawn( + ['git', 'ls-files', '--cached', '--others', '--exclude-standard', '-z'], + { stdout: 'pipe', stderr: 'pipe' }, + ); + + // When + const [exitCode, names] = await Promise.all([ + tracked.exited, + new Response(tracked.stdout).text(), + ]); + expect(exitCode).toBe(0); + const files = names.split('\0').filter((name) => name.length > 0); + const leaks: string[] = []; + for (const file of files) { + const content = await Bun.file(file).text(); + if (forbidden.some((value) => value.length > 0 && content.includes(value))) leaks.push(file); + } + + // Then + expect(leaks).toEqual([]); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/index.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf7b8f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +export * from './operations'; +export * from './prohibitions'; +export * from './provider'; +export * from './qualcomm-evidence'; +export * from './session'; +export * from './transport'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/no-write-path.test.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/no-write-path.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29cb308 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/no-write-path.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +// The "no code path at all" half of the fence. +// +// prohibition-fence.test.ts proves the forbidden operations are REFUSED. This file +// proves something stronger and different: that no function capable of performing one +// exists in the shipped provider. It scans the comment-stripped production source for +// the constructs such a function would need — a subprocess, a raw socket, a shell +// fallback binary, a DIAG device node, a mutating HTTP verb, or a HIMI command outside +// the frozen read vocabulary — and every detector has a non-vacuity control. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { readdirSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; +import { UFI_COMMANDS, UFI_READ_COMMANDS, UFI_SESSION_COMMANDS } from './transport'; + +const DIR = import.meta.dir; + +const DETECTORS = [ + { + label: 'subprocess', + re: /(?:Bun\.spawn|execFileSync?|spawnSync|execSync)\s*\(|node:child_process/, + sample: "Bun.spawn(['adb', 'shell'])", + }, + { + label: 'raw-socket', + re: /node:(?:net|dgram|tls)|createConnection\s*\(/, + sample: "import { createConnection } from 'node:net';", + }, + { + label: 'shell-fallback-binary', + re: /(['"`])(?:adb|ssh|telnet|qcsuper|edl|fastboot|firehose|sahara)\1/i, + sample: "const tool = 'qcsuper';", + }, + { + label: 'diag-device-node', + re: /\/dev\/diag|\/dev\/ttyUSB\d/, + sample: "open('/dev/diag')", + }, + { + label: 'mutating-http-verb', + re: /(['"`])(?:PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\1/, + sample: "method: 'PUT'", + }, + { + // In a read-only provider a bare write-shaped literal is a review trigger by + // itself: it is either a HIMI write command or a descriptor claiming a write + // impact, and neither may exist here. + label: 'write-shaped-literal', + re: /(['"`])(?:set|write|upgrade|reboot|reset|restore|erase|flash)[a-z_]*\1/i, + sample: "cmdid: 'setnetworkmode'", + }, +] as const; + +function stripComments(source: string): string { + return source + .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, ' ') + .split('\n') + .filter((line) => !/^\s*(?:\/\/|\*)/.test(line)) + .join('\n'); +} + +const CODE = new Map(); +for (const name of readdirSync(DIR)) { + if (!name.endsWith('.ts') || name.endsWith('.test.ts')) continue; + CODE.set(name, stripComments(await Bun.file(join(DIR, name)).text())); +} + +describe('the UFI/HIMI provider has no write path to have', () => { + test('scans the whole shipped provider, so the gate cannot pass vacuously', () => { + // Given / When / Then + expect([...CODE.keys()].sort()).toEqual([ + 'index.ts', + 'operations.ts', + 'prohibitions.ts', + 'provider.ts', + 'qualcomm-evidence.ts', + 'session.ts', + 'transport.ts', + ]); + }); + + test.each(DETECTORS.map((detector) => [detector.label, detector] as const))( + 'the %s detector fires on a synthetic violation', + (_label, detector) => { + // Given / When / Then + expect(detector.re.test(stripComments(detector.sample))).toBe(true); + }, + ); + + test.each(DETECTORS.map((detector) => [detector.label, detector] as const))( + 'no production source contains a %s construct', + (_label, detector) => { + // Given / When + const violations = [...CODE.entries()] + .filter(([, source]) => detector.re.test(source)) + .map(([name]) => name); + + // Then + expect(violations).toEqual([]); + }, + ); +}); + +describe('the HIMI command vocabulary is closed and read-only', () => { + test('every command is a read or the session login, and nothing else', () => { + // Given / When + const nonRead = UFI_COMMANDS.filter( + (command) => !command.startsWith('get') && command !== 'login', + ); + + // Then + expect(nonRead).toEqual([]); + expect(UFI_SESSION_COMMANDS).toEqual(['login']); + expect(UFI_READ_COMMANDS.every((command) => command.startsWith('get'))).toBe(true); + }); + + test('every cmdid literal in the shipped source names a member of that vocabulary', () => { + // Given + const allowed = new Set(UFI_COMMANDS); + + // When + const literals = [...CODE.values()].flatMap((source) => + [...source.matchAll(/cmdid['"]?\s*:\s*['"]([a-zA-Z_]+)['"]/g)].map((match) => match[1] ?? ''), + ); + + // Then + expect(literals.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + expect(literals.filter((literal) => !allowed.has(literal))).toEqual([]); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/operations.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/operations.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48fe5bf --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/operations.ts @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +import { + defineOperationDescriptor, + type OperationDescriptor, + type OperationResult, +} from '../../domain'; +import type { ProviderReadOperations } from '../contracts'; +import { + type UfiProhibitionClass, + type UfiProhibitionReason, + ufiProhibition, +} from './prohibitions'; + +export const UFI_PROFILE = 'ufi-himi-read-only'; + +/** The reason every descriptor gives for its absent write half. One string, one meaning. */ +export const UFI_READ_ONLY_REASON = 'ufi-himi-provider-is-read-only'; + +export type UfiReadValue = Readonly>; + +/** + * `ProviderReadOperations` is used verbatim rather than a local shape, because it has no + * `write` member to omit — the absence is structural, not a convention this file keeps. + */ +export type UfiReadOperation = ProviderReadOperations; + +export const UFI_READ_OPERATION_IDS = ['ufi.signal.read', 'ufi.details.read'] as const; +export type UfiReadOperationId = (typeof UFI_READ_OPERATION_IDS)[number]; + +export function isUfiReadOperation(operationId: string): operationId is UfiReadOperationId { + return (UFI_READ_OPERATION_IDS as readonly string[]).includes(operationId); +} + +export function ufiReadDescriptor( + operationId: UfiReadOperationId, +): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: operationId, + support: { + read: { supported: true }, + write: { supported: false, reason: UFI_READ_ONLY_REASON }, + }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: 'ufi-himi', + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: ['ufi-himi-session'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'read', + retryClass: 'idempotent-read', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: [UFI_PROFILE], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'medium', + }); +} + +export function ufiReadResult( + generation: OperationResult['generation'], + value: UfiReadValue, +): OperationResult { + return { status: 'applied', value, generation, requiresReconciliation: false }; +} + +export function ufiRefusedResult( + generation: OperationResult['generation'], + reason: string, +): OperationResult { + return { status: 'refused', reason, generation, requiresReconciliation: false }; +} + +export type UfiOperationPlan = + | { readonly status: 'read'; readonly operationId: UfiReadOperationId } + | { + readonly status: 'refused'; + readonly operationId: string; + readonly reason: UfiProhibitionReason | 'unknown-operation'; + readonly prohibitionClass: UfiProhibitionClass | null; + /** + * A literal, and provable: this function takes no transport, holds no session, + * and returns synchronously — there is nothing here that could reach the device. + */ + readonly transportContacted: false; + }; + +/** + * Resolve an operation id BEFORE anything is dialled. + * + * Prohibited ids are answered from the frozen table first, so a forbidden operation is + * never mistaken for a typo. An id that is neither prohibited nor a known read is + * `unknown-operation` — also refused, because a read-only provider's operation set is + * closed and "not in the set" is a complete answer. + */ +export function planUfiOperation(operationId: string): UfiOperationPlan { + const prohibition = ufiProhibition(operationId); + if (prohibition !== undefined) { + return { + status: 'refused', + operationId, + reason: prohibition.reason, + prohibitionClass: prohibition.class, + transportContacted: false, + }; + } + if (isUfiReadOperation(operationId)) return { status: 'read', operationId }; + return { + status: 'refused', + operationId, + reason: 'unknown-operation', + prohibitionClass: null, + transportContacted: false, + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibition-fence.test.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibition-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0550ff1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibition-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { createOperationEngineHarness } from '../../../test-support/operation-engine-fixture'; +import { physicalModemId } from '../../domain'; +import type { OperationExecution } from '../../operations'; +import { UFI_PROFILE } from './operations'; +import { + UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS, + UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS, + type UfiProhibitedOperationId, + ufiProhibitionDescriptor, +} from './prohibitions'; +import { createUfiHimiDefinition } from './provider'; +import type { UfiHttpRequest, UfiTransport } from './transport'; + +const FENCE_MODEM = physicalModemId('serial:ufi-fence'); + +const disposals: Array<() => Promise> = []; + +afterEach(async () => { + for (const dispose of disposals.splice(0).reverse()) await dispose(); +}); + +/** A transport that records every call and answers nothing. Any use is a failure. */ +function spyTransport() { + const calls: UfiHttpRequest[] = []; + const transport: UfiTransport = { + request: async (request) => { + calls.push(request); + return { status: 200, body: '{"reply":"ok"}' }; + }, + }; + return { calls, transport }; +} + +function operationsFor(transport: UfiTransport) { + return createUfiHimiDefinition({ + interfaceName: 'usb0', + adminUrl: 'http://192.168.0.1', + transport, + credentials: { username: 'admin', password: 'unused-in-this-suite' }, + }).operations(UFI_PROFILE); +} + +/** Every callable reachable from a value, by path — the structural half of "no write". */ +function functionPaths(value: unknown, path = ''): readonly string[] { + if (typeof value === 'function') return [path]; + if (Array.isArray(value)) { + return value.flatMap((item, index) => functionPaths(item, `${path}[${index}]`)); + } + if (typeof value === 'object' && value !== null) { + return Object.entries(value).flatMap(([key, item]) => + functionPaths(item, path === '' ? key : `${path}.${key}`), + ); + } + return []; +} + +describe('UFI operations expose zero write descriptors', () => { + test('the only callables on the surface are the two reads and the pure planner', () => { + // Given + const spy = spyTransport(); + + // When + const operations = operationsFor(spy.transport); + + // Then + expect(operations.access).toBe('read-only'); + expect(functionPaths(operations)).toEqual(['reads[0].read', 'reads[1].read', 'plan']); + expect(spy.calls).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('no read entry carries a write member and no descriptor supports a write', () => { + // Given + const spy = spyTransport(); + + // When + const operations = operationsFor(spy.transport); + + // Then + expect(operations.reads.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + for (const entry of operations.reads) { + expect(Object.keys(entry).sort()).toEqual(['descriptor', 'read']); + expect('write' in entry).toBe(false); + expect(entry.descriptor.mutationImpact).toBe('read'); + expect(entry.descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: 'ufi-himi-provider-is-read-only', + }); + } + expect(spy.calls).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('prohibited operations', () => { + test('the fence enumerates every forbidden class the safety model names', () => { + // Given / When + const ids = [...UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS].sort(); + + // Then + expect(ids).toEqual([ + 'calibration.write', + 'diag.info-probe', + 'diag.write', + 'driver.blind-retry', + 'edl.automation', + 'efs.write', + 'firmware.flash', + 'identity.write', + 'interface.blind-retry', + 'nv.write', + 'shell.transport-fallback', + ]); + }); + + test.each([...UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS])( + '%s is refused with its typed reason and never reaches the transport', + (operationId) => { + // Given + const spy = spyTransport(); + const operations = operationsFor(spy.transport); + + // When + const plan = operations.plan(operationId); + + // Then + expect(plan).toEqual({ + status: 'refused', + operationId, + reason: UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS[operationId].reason, + prohibitionClass: UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS[operationId].class, + transportContacted: false, + }); + expect(operations.reads.some((entry) => entry.descriptor.id === operationId)).toBe(false); + expect(spy.calls).toEqual([]); + }, + ); + + test('an unknown operation id is refused too — the read set is closed', () => { + // Given + const spy = spyTransport(); + + // When + const plan = operationsFor(spy.transport).plan('ufi.wifi.enable'); + + // Then + expect(plan).toMatchObject({ status: 'refused', reason: 'unknown-operation' }); + expect(spy.calls).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('a supported read id still plans as a read', () => { + // Given + const spy = spyTransport(); + + // When + const plan = operationsFor(spy.transport).plan('ufi.signal.read'); + + // Then + expect(plan).toEqual({ status: 'read', operationId: 'ufi.signal.read' }); + expect(spy.calls).toEqual([]); + }); +}); + +describe('prohibited operations driven through the operation engine', () => { + test('every forbidden id is refused before any transport activity', async () => { + // Given — an ADVERSARIAL execution: its execute() would dial the device, so a + // single recorded call proves the engine ran it. The descriptor is the shipped, + // inert one; nothing in the package can supply a matching execute. + const spy = spyTransport(); + const harness = createOperationEngineHarness(); + disposals.push(harness.dispose); + const attempt = ( + operationId: UfiProhibitedOperationId, + ): OperationExecution => ({ + operationId, + physicalModemId: FENCE_MODEM, + descriptor: ufiProhibitionDescriptor(operationId), + input: undefined, + execute: async () => { + await spy.transport.request({ + method: 'POST', + url: 'http://192.168.0.1/himiapi/json', + command: 'getsysinfo', + body: '{"cmdid":"getsysinfo"}', + headers: [], + interfaceName: 'usb0', + redirect: 'error', + }); + return { status: 'failed', reason: 'prohibited-operation-must-never-execute' }; + }, + }); + + // When + const results = await Promise.all( + UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS.map((operationId) => + harness.engine.invoke(attempt(operationId)), + ), + ); + + // Then + expect( + results.map((result) => ({ + status: result.status, + reason: 'reason' in result ? result.reason : null, + })), + ).toEqual( + UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS.map((operationId) => ({ + status: 'refused', + reason: UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS[operationId].reason, + })), + ); + expect(spy.calls).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('the inert descriptor refuses on three independent fences', () => { + // Given / When + const descriptor = ufiProhibitionDescriptor('firmware.flash'); + + // Then + expect(descriptor.support.read).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: 'firmware-flash-prohibited', + }); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: 'firmware-flash-prohibited', + }); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ + state: 'refused', + reason: 'firmware-flash-prohibited', + }); + expect(descriptor.constraints).toEqual({ kind: 'allowed-values', values: [] }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibitions.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibitions.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81bd172 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibitions.ts @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +// The Qualcomm/HIMI prohibition table. +// +// These operations have NO IMPLEMENTATION ANYWHERE in this provider — not a refused +// stub, not a disabled branch, not a private helper. The table below is inert DATA: it +// exists so a caller asking for one of these ids gets a NAMED refusal instead of an +// "unknown operation" shrug, and so the fence can be enumerated by a test rather than +// argued for in prose. Nothing here can perform anything. +// +// Why each is prohibited rather than merely gated: +// +// NV / EFS / identity / calibration writes — they rewrite the modem's own persistent +// storage. A bad write bricks the radio, forges an IMEI, or destroys the factory RF +// calibration, and none of the three is recoverable from this device's userspace. +// Identity writes are additionally illegal in most jurisdictions. +// Firmware flashing and EDL automation — an interrupted flash leaves a device that +// enumerates only in emergency-download mode, which needs physical access this +// controller by definition does not have on a deployed board. +// Blind driver / interface retries — re-binding a driver or cycling an interface +// "until it works" is how a transient enumeration fault becomes a reboot loop, and +// it destroys the evidence the next diagnosis needs. +// DIAG writes — the Qualcomm DIAG channel can reach every one of the above. +// The DIAG info probe — READ-only and legitimate, but bench-only and human-supervised +// (docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md). It is not a production operation and never becomes one. +// Shell transport fallback — production never reaches this device over ADB, SSH, +// telnet or DIAG under any circumstance. The HIMI HTTP API is the only transport. + +import { defineOperationDescriptor, type OperationDescriptor } from '../../domain'; + +export type UfiProhibitionClass = + | 'device-integrity' + | 'firmware' + | 'recovery-automation' + | 'diagnostic-channel' + | 'transport-fallback'; + +export const UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS = { + 'nv.write': { reason: 'nv-write-prohibited', class: 'device-integrity' }, + 'efs.write': { reason: 'efs-write-prohibited', class: 'device-integrity' }, + 'identity.write': { reason: 'identity-write-prohibited', class: 'device-integrity' }, + 'calibration.write': { reason: 'calibration-write-prohibited', class: 'device-integrity' }, + 'firmware.flash': { reason: 'firmware-flash-prohibited', class: 'firmware' }, + 'edl.automation': { reason: 'edl-automation-prohibited', class: 'recovery-automation' }, + 'driver.blind-retry': { reason: 'blind-driver-retry-prohibited', class: 'recovery-automation' }, + 'interface.blind-retry': { + reason: 'blind-interface-retry-prohibited', + class: 'recovery-automation', + }, + 'diag.write': { reason: 'diag-write-prohibited', class: 'diagnostic-channel' }, + 'diag.info-probe': { + reason: 'diag-probe-is-bench-supervised-only', + class: 'diagnostic-channel', + }, + 'shell.transport-fallback': { + reason: 'shell-transport-fallback-prohibited', + class: 'transport-fallback', + }, +} as const satisfies Record< + string, + { readonly reason: string; readonly class: UfiProhibitionClass } +>; + +export type UfiProhibitedOperationId = keyof typeof UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS; +export type UfiProhibition = (typeof UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS)[UfiProhibitedOperationId]; +export type UfiProhibitionReason = UfiProhibition['reason']; + +export const UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS = Object.keys( + UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS, +) as readonly UfiProhibitedOperationId[]; + +export function isUfiProhibitedOperation( + operationId: string, +): operationId is UfiProhibitedOperationId { + return Object.hasOwn(UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS, operationId); +} + +export function ufiProhibition(operationId: string): UfiProhibition | undefined { + return isUfiProhibitedOperation(operationId) ? UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS[operationId] : undefined; +} + +/** + * An INERT descriptor, so the same refusal survives a trip through the operation engine. + * + * It declares read AND write unsupported and availability refused, and it constrains + * inputs to the empty set — three independent fences, each sufficient on its own. It + * carries no execute/readback/rollback function because none exists to carry. + */ +export function ufiProhibitionDescriptor( + operationId: UfiProhibitedOperationId, +): OperationDescriptor { + const { reason } = UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATIONS[operationId]; + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: operationId, + support: { + read: { supported: false, reason }, + write: { supported: false, reason }, + }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: 'ufi-himi', + constraints: { kind: 'allowed-values', values: [] }, + livePreconditions: [], + availability: { state: 'refused', reason }, + // `disruptive`, not `write`: every one of these rewrites persistent device state + // or drives a recovery mode. The engine treats any non-read impact as a write + // (queued behind the modem's actor), so the refusal path is identical. + mutationImpact: 'disruptive', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: [], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', + }); +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.test.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80ac0f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, UFI_FIXTURE } from '../../../test-support/observation-fixtures'; +import { deviceGeneration, physicalModemId } from '../../domain'; +import { createProviderMatcher } from '../matcher'; +import { createProviderRegistry } from '../registry'; +import { UFI_PROFILE } from './operations'; +import { createUfiHimiDefinition } from './provider'; +import { + classifyUfiDiagEvidence, + UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID, + UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID, + ufiUsbClaims, +} from './qualcomm-evidence'; +import type { UfiHttpRequest, UfiHttpResponse, UfiTransport } from './transport'; +import { UFI_API_PATH } from './transport'; + +const PASSWORD = 'fixture-ufi-password'; +const ADMIN_URL = 'http://192.168.0.1'; +const SESSION = 'bench-session-token'; + +const context = (usbId: string) => ({ + physicalModemId: physicalModemId('serial:ufi-fixture'), + generation: deviceGeneration(1), + transport: 'network' as const, + passiveFacts: [{ kind: 'usb' as const, value: usbId }], + composition: 'rndis', + profile: UFI_PROFILE, +}); + +function replay(bodies: readonly string[]) { + const calls: UfiHttpRequest[] = []; + const pending = [...bodies]; + const transport: UfiTransport = { + request: async (request): Promise => { + calls.push(request); + const body = pending.shift(); + if (body === undefined) throw new Error('unexpected replay request'); + return { status: 200, body }; + }, + }; + return { calls, transport, remaining: () => pending.length }; +} + +function definition(transport: UfiTransport) { + return createUfiHimiDefinition({ + interfaceName: 'usb0', + adminUrl: ADMIN_URL, + transport, + credentials: { username: 'admin', password: PASSWORD }, + now: () => 1_700_000_000_000, + }); +} + +const loginOk = JSON.stringify({ reply: 'ok', session: SESSION }); + +describe('UFI/HIMI read-only telemetry', () => { + test('normalizes one read cycle from the migrated parsers over a single session', async () => { + // Given + const h = replay([ + loginOk, + UFI_FIXTURE.sysinfo, + UFI_FIXTURE.overview, + UFI_FIXTURE.status, + UFI_FIXTURE.produceInfo ?? '', + ]); + + // When + const [envelope] = await definition(h.transport).observe(context(UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID)); + + // Then + expect(envelope?.value).toMatchObject({ + source: 'ufi-himiapi', + signal: { dbm: { state: 'known', value: 3 } }, + hardware: { label: { state: 'known', value: 'UFI-M600' } }, + }); + expect(h.calls.map((call) => call.command)).toEqual([ + 'login', + 'getsysinfo', + 'getoverview', + 'getallstatus', + 'getproduceinfo', + ]); + expect(h.calls[0]).toEqual({ + method: 'POST', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${UFI_API_PATH}`, + command: 'login', + body: JSON.stringify({ cmdid: 'login', username: 'admin', password: PASSWORD }), + headers: ['Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8'], + interfaceName: 'usb0', + redirect: 'error', + }); + expect(h.calls[1]).toEqual({ + method: 'POST', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${UFI_API_PATH}`, + command: 'getsysinfo', + body: JSON.stringify({ cmdid: 'getsysinfo', sessionId: SESSION }), + headers: [`Authorization: ${SESSION}`, 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8'], + interfaceName: 'usb0', + redirect: 'error', + }); + expect(JSON.stringify(envelope)).not.toContain(PASSWORD); + expect(h.remaining()).toBe(0); + }); + + test('reports a refused session honestly and never spends a second login', async () => { + // Given + const h = replay([ + loginOk, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.sysinfo, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.overview, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.status, + JSON.stringify({ reply: 'SessionOut' }), + ]); + const provider = definition(h.transport); + + // When + const [envelope] = await provider.observe(context(UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID)); + const afterFirstCycle = h.calls.length; + const second = await provider.observe(context(UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID)); + + // Then + expect(envelope?.value?.signal.dbm).toMatchObject({ + state: 'unknown', + reason: 'auth-expired', + }); + expect(second).toEqual([]); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(afterFirstCycle); + expect(h.calls.filter((call) => call.command === 'login')).toHaveLength(1); + }); +}); + +describe('UFI/HIMI provider matching', () => { + test.each([UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID, UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID])( + '%s selects the read-only profile with no writable surface', + async (usbId) => { + // Given + const h = replay([loginOk, UFI_FIXTURE.status, UFI_FIXTURE.sysinfo]); + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(definition(h.transport)); + + // When + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match(context(usbId)); + + // Then + expect(result).toMatchObject({ + status: 'selected', + provider: 'ufi-himi', + profile: UFI_PROFILE, + writable: false, + operations: { access: 'read-only', diagAccess: 'prohibited' }, + }); + expect(h.calls.filter((call) => call.command === 'login')).toHaveLength(1); + }, + ); +}); + +describe('Qualcomm composition evidence', () => { + test('05c6:9024 claims RNDIS and an ADB interface, and nothing more', () => { + // Given / When + const claims = ufiUsbClaims(UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID); + + // Then + expect(claims).toEqual(['rndis-network', 'adb-interface']); + }); + + test('05c6:9091 is firmware-specific and is not evidence of a DIAG channel', () => { + // Given / When + const evidence = classifyUfiDiagEvidence({ + usbId: UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID, + interfaces: [], + }); + + // Then + expect(ufiUsbClaims(UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID)).toEqual([]); + expect(evidence).toEqual({ state: 'not-proven', reason: 'product-id-is-not-evidence' }); + }); + + test('an enumerated composition without a DIAG descriptor stays not-proven', () => { + // Given / When + const evidence = classifyUfiDiagEvidence({ + usbId: UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID, + interfaces: [ + { number: 0, interfaceClass: 0xe0, interfaceSubClass: 0x01, interfaceProtocol: 0x03 }, + { number: 2, interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0x42, interfaceProtocol: 0x01 }, + ], + }); + + // Then + expect(evidence).toEqual({ state: 'not-proven', reason: 'no-diag-interface-descriptor' }); + }); + + test('a confirmed DIAG descriptor still leaves production access prohibited', async () => { + // Given + const h = replay([]); + const evidence = classifyUfiDiagEvidence({ + usbId: UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID, + interfaces: [ + { number: 3, interfaceClass: 0xff, interfaceSubClass: 0xff, interfaceProtocol: 0x30 }, + ], + }); + + // When + const operations = definition(h.transport).operations(UFI_PROFILE); + + // Then + expect(evidence).toEqual({ state: 'descriptor-confirmed', interfaceNumber: 3 }); + expect(operations.diagAccess).toBe('prohibited'); + expect(operations.reads.map((entry) => entry.descriptor.id)).toEqual([ + 'ufi.signal.read', + 'ufi.details.read', + ]); + expect(h.calls).toEqual([]); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d005866 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/provider.ts @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +// Qualcomm UFI / HIMI — a READ-ONLY provider, by construction rather than by policy. +// +// This provider normalizes the telemetry the pure parsers already own +// (`hardware/router-parsers.ts` → `observations/sources/ufi.ts`, migrated in todo 17). +// It adds a session and a transport around them and nothing else: there is no write +// descriptor, no write command in the transport vocabulary, and no operation id outside +// the closed read set that resolves to anything but a typed refusal. +// +// The Qualcomm safety model it encodes lives in two neighbouring modules — +// `qualcomm-evidence.ts` (what a USB id proves) and `prohibitions.ts` (what may never be +// attempted). Both are inert data; neither can act. + +import type { ObservationEnvelope } from '../../domain'; +import { epochMillis, sourceEpoch, stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId } from '../../domain'; +import { parseUfiDetails, parseUfiSignal } from '../../hardware/router-parsers'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../../observations'; +import { normalizeUfiObservation } from '../../observations/sources/ufi'; +import type { + CapabilityReader, + ProviderDefinition, + ProviderExecutionContext, + ProviderMatchRequest, + ProviderOperationsSurface, +} from '../contracts'; +import { + planUfiOperation, + UFI_PROFILE, + type UfiOperationPlan, + type UfiReadOperation, + type UfiReadValue, + ufiReadDescriptor, + ufiReadResult, + ufiRefusedResult, +} from './operations'; +import { UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS, type UfiProhibitedOperationId } from './prohibitions'; +import { UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS, UFI_MATCHED_USB_IDS } from './qualcomm-evidence'; +import { parseUfiReply, UFI_SESSION_REFUSAL, type UfiOptions, UfiSessionRuntime } from './session'; +import { UFI_API_PATH, type UfiReadCommand } from './transport'; + +export type { UfiOptions } from './session'; + +/** One read cycle's bodies, keyed by the command that produced them. */ +type UfiBodies = Partial>; + +export type UfiOperationsSurface = ProviderOperationsSurface & { + readonly access: 'read-only'; + readonly reads: readonly UfiReadOperation[]; + readonly prohibited: readonly UfiProhibitedOperationId[]; + readonly diagAccess: typeof UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS; + readonly plan: (operationId: string) => UfiOperationPlan; +}; + +export class UfiHimiProvider extends UfiSessionRuntime { + async fingerprint(request: ProviderMatchRequest) { + // The HIMI fingerprint needs a SESSION to read anything, so this probe is the one + // place a "harmless unauthenticated probe" would spend the provider's single + // bounded login. On a device that enumerated a USB id and it is not a HIMI id, + // that login would be aimed at somebody else's dongle — a credential attempt + // against hardware this provider has positive evidence it does not own. An + // ABSENT usb fact is still probed (nobody enumerated one; that is not a denial). + if (!this.usbEvidencePermitsProbe(request)) { + return { + signal: 'unknown' as const, + strength: 'strong' as const, + profiles: [] as readonly string[], + detail: 'usb-id-is-not-himi', + }; + } + const bodies = await this.fetch(request, ['getallstatus']); + const reply = parseUfiReply(bodies?.getallstatus ?? ''); + const matched = reply?.reply === 'ok' && reply.params !== undefined; + return { + signal: matched ? ('match' as const) : ('unknown' as const), + strength: 'strong' as const, + profiles: matched ? [UFI_PROFILE] : [], + detail: matched ? 'himi-json-shape' : 'himi-json-not-proven', + }; + } + + capability(): CapabilityReader { + return { + id: 'ufi-himi-telemetry', + read: async (context) => { + const bodies = await this.fetch(context, ['getsysinfo']); + const reply = parseUfiReply(bodies?.getsysinfo ?? ''); + const supported = reply?.reply === 'ok' && reply.params !== undefined; + return { + signal: supported ? 'match' : 'mismatch', + strength: 'strong', + detail: supported ? 'telemetry-reported' : 'telemetry-refused', + }; + }, + }; + } + + async observe( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise[]> { + const bodies = await this.fetch(context, [ + 'getsysinfo', + 'getoverview', + 'getallstatus', + 'getproduceinfo', + ]); + if (bodies === undefined) return []; + const produceInfo = bodies.getproduceinfo; + return [ + normalizeUfiObservation( + { + sysinfo: bodies.getsysinfo ?? '', + overview: bodies.getoverview ?? '', + status: bodies.getallstatus ?? '', + ...(produceInfo === undefined ? {} : { produceInfo }), + }, + { + stableKey: stableKeyFromPhysicalModemId(context.physicalModemId), + generation: context.generation, + sourceEpoch: sourceEpoch(1), + observedAt: epochMillis(this.observedAt()), + }, + ), + ]; + } + + operations(_profile: string): UfiOperationsSurface { + return { + access: 'read-only', + reads: [ + { + descriptor: ufiReadDescriptor('ufi.signal.read'), + read: (context) => this.readSignal(context), + }, + { + descriptor: ufiReadDescriptor('ufi.details.read'), + read: (context) => this.readDetails(context), + }, + ], + prohibited: UFI_PROHIBITED_OPERATION_IDS, + diagAccess: UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS, + plan: planUfiOperation, + }; + } + + private async readSignal(context: ProviderExecutionContext) { + const bodies = await this.fetch(context, ['getsysinfo', 'getoverview', 'getallstatus']); + if (bodies === undefined) return ufiRefusedResult(context.generation, 'session-unavailable'); + const value: UfiReadValue = parseUfiSignal({ + sysinfo: bodies.getsysinfo ?? '', + overview: bodies.getoverview ?? '', + status: bodies.getallstatus ?? '', + }); + return ufiReadResult(context.generation, value); + } + + private async readDetails(context: ProviderExecutionContext) { + const bodies = await this.fetch(context, ['getoverview', 'getsysinfo', 'getproduceinfo']); + if (bodies === undefined) return ufiRefusedResult(context.generation, 'session-unavailable'); + const details = parseUfiDetails({ + overview: bodies.getoverview ?? '', + sysinfo: bodies.getsysinfo ?? '', + produceInfo: bodies.getproduceinfo ?? '', + }); + return details === undefined + ? ufiRefusedResult(context.generation, 'not-reported') + : ufiReadResult(context.generation, details); + } + + private usbEvidencePermitsProbe(request: ProviderMatchRequest): boolean { + const enumerated = request.passiveFacts.filter((fact) => fact.kind === 'usb'); + return ( + enumerated.length === 0 || + enumerated.some((fact) => UFI_MATCHED_USB_IDS.some((id) => id === fact.value)) + ); + } + + /** + * Reads are issued sequentially on ONE session. A `SessionOut` in any body drops the + * cached session so the NEXT generation may spend its own single login; it never + * re-authenticates inside this cycle. + */ + private async fetch( + request: ProviderMatchRequest, + commands: readonly UfiReadCommand[], + ): Promise { + const session = await this.session(request); + if (session === undefined) return undefined; + const bodies: UfiBodies = {}; + for (const command of commands) { + const response = await this.read(command, session); + bodies[command] = response.status === 200 ? response.body : ''; + } + const refused = Object.values(bodies).some( + (body) => parseUfiReply(body)?.reply === UFI_SESSION_REFUSAL, + ); + if (refused) this.forgetSession(request); + return bodies; + } +} + +export function createUfiHimiDefinition( + options: UfiOptions, +): ProviderDefinition { + const runtime = new UfiHimiProvider(options); + return { + id: 'ufi-himi', + profileVersion: '1', + eligibleTransports: ['network'], + passiveMatchers: [ + { + // ONE matcher over both ids. `9024` is the RNDIS+ADB composition and `9091` is + // a firmware-chosen product id; both identify a HIMI stick, and NEITHER is + // evidence of a DIAG channel (see qualcomm-evidence.ts). + id: 'usb-qualcomm-himi', + fact: 'usb', + expected: UFI_MATCHED_USB_IDS, + profiles: [UFI_PROFILE], + strength: 'strong', + required: true, + }, + ], + unauthenticatedProbes: [ + { id: 'ufi-himi-shape', run: (request) => runtime.fingerprint(request) }, + ], + capabilityReaders: [runtime.capability()], + observe: (context) => runtime.observe(context), + operations: (profile) => runtime.operations(profile), + contractFixtures: [ + { + profile: UFI_PROFILE, + request: { + method: 'POST', + path: UFI_API_PATH, + cmdid: 'login', + credentials: '[redacted]', + interfaceBound: true, + redirects: 'disabled', + }, + response: { reply: 'ok', session: '[redacted]' }, + }, + { + profile: UFI_PROFILE, + request: { + method: 'POST', + path: UFI_API_PATH, + cmdid: 'getsysinfo', + authorization: '[redacted]', + interfaceBound: true, + redirects: 'disabled', + }, + response: { reply: 'ok', params: '[verbatim-diagnostics]' }, + }, + ], + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/qualcomm-evidence.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/qualcomm-evidence.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33c7a9c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/qualcomm-evidence.ts @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +// What a Qualcomm USB id does and does not prove. +// +// `05c6:9024` is the composition the bench UFI sticks enumerate in: RNDIS networking +// plus an ADB interface. That is EVIDENCE OF A COMPOSITION, not a permission — the ADB +// interface being present is exactly why production must be explicit that it never uses +// it (see `shell.transport-fallback` in prohibitions.ts). +// +// `05c6:9091` is a FIRMWARE-SPECIFIC product id. It is routinely read as "DIAG is +// available", and that reading is wrong: `05c6` is Qualcomm's generic vendor id and the +// product id is chosen by whoever built the firmware image, so it says nothing about +// which interfaces the device actually exposes. Treating it as proof of DIAG is how a +// tool ends up opening a channel that is not there, or worse, one that is there and +// belongs to something else. +// +// The only thing that proves a DIAG channel is a DIAG INTERFACE DESCRIPTOR. And even a +// confirmed one buys nothing in production: `UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS` is `prohibited` +// unconditionally, and the supervised read-only info probe is a bench runbook +// (docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md), never an operation this package can perform. + +export const UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID = '05c6:9024'; +export const UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID = '05c6:9091'; + +export type UfiUsbClaim = 'rndis-network' | 'adb-interface'; + +export const UFI_USB_EVIDENCE = { + [UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID]: ['rndis-network', 'adb-interface'], + /** Deliberately empty: a firmware-chosen product id claims nothing by itself. */ + [UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID]: [], +} as const satisfies Record; + +export const UFI_MATCHED_USB_IDS = [UFI_RNDIS_ADB_USB_ID, UFI_FIRMWARE_SPECIFIC_USB_ID] as const; + +export function ufiUsbClaims(usbId: string): readonly UfiUsbClaim[] { + return Object.hasOwn(UFI_USB_EVIDENCE, usbId) + ? UFI_USB_EVIDENCE[usbId as keyof typeof UFI_USB_EVIDENCE] + : []; +} + +/** Qualcomm's DIAG interface: vendor-specific class/subclass with protocol 0x30. */ +const DIAG_INTERFACE_CLASS = 0xff; +const DIAG_INTERFACE_SUBCLASS = 0xff; +const DIAG_INTERFACE_PROTOCOL = 0x30; + +export type UfiUsbInterfaceDescriptor = { + readonly number: number; + readonly interfaceClass: number; + readonly interfaceSubClass: number; + readonly interfaceProtocol: number; +}; + +export type UfiDiagEvidence = + | { readonly state: 'descriptor-confirmed'; readonly interfaceNumber: number } + | { + readonly state: 'not-proven'; + readonly reason: 'product-id-is-not-evidence' | 'no-diag-interface-descriptor'; + }; + +export function classifyUfiDiagEvidence(input: { + readonly usbId: string; + readonly interfaces: readonly UfiUsbInterfaceDescriptor[]; +}): UfiDiagEvidence { + const diag = input.interfaces.find( + (descriptor) => + descriptor.interfaceClass === DIAG_INTERFACE_CLASS && + descriptor.interfaceSubClass === DIAG_INTERFACE_SUBCLASS && + descriptor.interfaceProtocol === DIAG_INTERFACE_PROTOCOL, + ); + if (diag !== undefined) { + return { state: 'descriptor-confirmed', interfaceNumber: diag.number }; + } + return input.interfaces.length === 0 + ? { state: 'not-proven', reason: 'product-id-is-not-evidence' } + : { state: 'not-proven', reason: 'no-diag-interface-descriptor' }; +} + +/** + * Unconditional. A descriptor-confirmed DIAG channel raises what a SUPERVISED BENCH + * operator may attempt by hand; it never raises what this package may do on its own. + */ +export const UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS = 'prohibited' as const; diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/session.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/session.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63b2811 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/session.ts @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +import { z } from 'zod'; +import type { ProviderMatchRequest } from '../contracts'; +import { + UFI_API_PATH, + type UfiCommand, + type UfiHttpResponse, + type UfiReadCommand, + type UfiTransport, +} from './transport'; + +export type UfiCredentials = { readonly username: string; readonly password: string }; + +export type UfiOptions = { + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly adminUrl: string; + readonly transport: UfiTransport; + /** Ephemeral bench input. Injected by the caller, never persisted, never logged. */ + readonly credentials: UfiCredentials; + readonly now?: () => number; +}; + +/** The HIMI firmware's own word for "your session is gone". */ +export const UFI_SESSION_REFUSAL = 'SessionOut'; + +const flatRecordSchema = z.record(z.string(), z.union([z.string(), z.number()])); +const ufiReplySchema = z.object({ + reply: z.string(), + session: z.string().optional(), + params: flatRecordSchema.optional(), +}); + +export type UfiReply = z.infer; + +export function parseUfiReply(body: string): UfiReply | undefined { + const parsed = z + .string() + .transform((value, context) => { + try { + return JSON.parse(value); + } catch (error) { + if (!(error instanceof SyntaxError)) throw error; + context.addIssue({ code: 'custom', message: 'invalid JSON' }); + return z.NEVER; + } + }) + .pipe(ufiReplySchema) + .safeParse(body); + return parsed.success ? parsed.data : undefined; +} + +/** + * Session acquisition, bounded to ONE login per physical modem per generation. + * + * The bound is a set of spent keys rather than a counter reset on failure: a HIMI + * device that refused a credential refuses it again, and a provider that re-tries on + * every poll turns a wrong password into a lockout nobody asked for. A refused or + * expired session therefore surfaces as an honest auth-expired READING; the next + * enumeration (a new generation) gets the next single attempt. + */ +export class UfiSessionRuntime { + readonly #sessions = new Map(); + readonly #spent = new Set(); + + constructor(protected readonly options: UfiOptions) {} + + protected async session(request: ProviderMatchRequest): Promise { + const key = this.sessionKey(request); + const held = this.#sessions.get(key); + if (held !== undefined) return held; + if (this.#spent.has(key)) return undefined; + this.#spent.add(key); + + const response = await this.request( + 'login', + JSON.stringify({ + cmdid: 'login', + username: this.options.credentials.username, + password: this.options.credentials.password, + }), + ); + const reply = response.status === 200 ? parseUfiReply(response.body) : undefined; + const session = reply?.reply === 'ok' ? reply.session : undefined; + if (session === undefined || session === '') return undefined; + this.#sessions.set(key, session); + return session; + } + + protected read(command: UfiReadCommand, session: string): Promise { + return this.request(command, JSON.stringify({ cmdid: command, sessionId: session }), session); + } + + /** A refused session is dropped so the NEXT generation may spend its own attempt. */ + protected forgetSession(request: ProviderMatchRequest): void { + this.#sessions.delete(this.sessionKey(request)); + } + + protected sessionKey(request: ProviderMatchRequest): string { + return `${request.physicalModemId}:${request.generation}`; + } + + protected observedAt(): number { + return this.options.now?.() ?? Date.now(); + } + + private request(command: UfiCommand, body: string, session?: string): Promise { + return this.options.transport.request({ + method: 'POST', + url: `${this.options.adminUrl}${UFI_API_PATH}`, + command, + body, + headers: [ + ...(session === undefined ? [] : [`Authorization: ${session}`]), + 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8', + ], + interfaceName: this.options.interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }); + } +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/transport.ts b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/transport.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9dfdf6a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/ufi-himi/transport.ts @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +// Qualcomm UFI / HIMI transport shape. +// +// HIMI is not a REST surface: every call is `POST /himiapi/json` and the VERB lives in +// the JSON body's `cmdid`. So "read-only" cannot be expressed here as an HTTP-method +// restriction the way it can for HiLink. The command vocabulary is frozen as a union +// instead — a request this transport can carry names a member of `UFI_COMMANDS`, and no +// `set*` / flash / reset member exists — which makes a write UNREPRESENTABLE rather than +// merely refused at runtime. + +/** The seven read commands the HIMI firmware answers. Bench-observed, not inferred. */ +export const UFI_READ_COMMANDS = [ + 'getoverview', + 'getsysinfo', + 'getallstatus', + 'getapninfo', + 'getnetworkmode', + 'gethimiusbtether', + 'getproduceinfo', +] as const; +export type UfiReadCommand = (typeof UFI_READ_COMMANDS)[number]; + +/** + * The ONE non-read command. It opens a server-side session and changes nothing on the + * device; the modem's configuration, radio and storage are untouched by it. + */ +export const UFI_SESSION_COMMANDS = ['login'] as const; +export type UfiSessionCommand = (typeof UFI_SESSION_COMMANDS)[number]; + +export const UFI_COMMANDS = [...UFI_READ_COMMANDS, ...UFI_SESSION_COMMANDS] as const; +export type UfiCommand = UfiReadCommand | UfiSessionCommand; + +export const UFI_API_PATH = '/himiapi/json'; + +export type UfiHttpRequest = { + readonly method: 'POST'; + readonly url: string; + /** Frozen vocabulary: the field a write would have to travel in cannot name one. */ + readonly command: UfiCommand; + readonly body: string; + readonly headers: readonly string[]; + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly redirect: 'error'; +}; + +export type UfiHttpResponse = { + readonly status: number; + readonly body: string; +}; + +export interface UfiTransport { + request(request: UfiHttpRequest): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/zte-goform/index.ts b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c173ea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +export * from './provider'; +export * from './transport'; diff --git a/control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.test.ts b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d4554a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; +import { createProviderMatcher } from '../matcher'; +import { createProviderRegistry } from '../registry'; +import { + createZteGoformDefinition, + ZTE_PATHS, + ZTE_PROFILES, + ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE, +} from './provider'; +import type { ZteHttpRequest, ZteHttpResponse, ZteTransport } from './transport'; + +const PASSWORD = 'fixture-password'; +const ADMIN_URL = 'http://192.168.0.1'; +const context = (profile: string, firmware: string) => ({ + physicalModemId: 'fixture-zte' as never, + generation: 1 as never, + transport: 'network' as const, + passiveFacts: [{ kind: 'firmware' as const, value: firmware }], + composition: 'rndis', + firmware, + profile, +}); + +function replay(responses: readonly ZteHttpResponse[]) { + const calls: ZteHttpRequest[] = []; + const pending = [...responses]; + const transport: ZteTransport = { + request: async (request) => { + calls.push(request); + const response = pending.shift(); + if (response === undefined) throw new Error('unexpected replay request'); + return response; + }, + }; + return { calls, transport, remaining: () => pending.length }; +} + +function definition(transport: ZteTransport) { + return createZteGoformDefinition({ + interfaceName: 'eth9', + adminUrl: ADMIN_URL, + transport, + credentials: { username: 'admin', password: PASSWORD }, + }); +} + +const response = (body: string, headers?: Readonly>): ZteHttpResponse => ({ + status: 200, + body, + ...(headers === undefined ? {} : { headers }), +}); + +describe('ZTE goform firmware replay profiles', () => { + test('replays the exact MF79U legacy login request once', async () => { + // Given + const h = replay([response('{"result":"0"}', { 'set-cookie': 'stok=legacy-token; Path=/' })]); + const profile = ZTE_PROFILES[0]; + + // When + const result = await definition(h.transport).authenticatedProfile?.authenticate( + context(profile.id, profile.firmware), + [profile.id], + ); + + // Then + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'matched', profile: profile.id, detail: 'login-ok' }); + expect(h.calls).toEqual([ + { + method: 'POST', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${ZTE_PATHS.set}`, + body: `goformId=LOGIN&isTest=false&password=${encodeURIComponent(Buffer.from(PASSWORD).toString('base64'))}`, + headers: [ + 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8', + `Origin: ${ADMIN_URL}`, + `Referer: ${ADMIN_URL}/index.html`, + ], + interfaceName: 'eth9', + redirect: 'error', + }, + ]); + expect(h.remaining()).toBe(0); + }); + + test('replays the MF266 LD login RD and AD derivation without persisting session material', async () => { + // Given + const ld = 'fixture-ld'; + const rd = 'fixture-rd'; + const waVersion = 'BD_MF266V1.0.0B01'; + const crVersion = 'CR_MF266V1.0.0B01'; + const password = createHash('sha256') + .update(`${createHash('sha256').update(PASSWORD).digest('hex').toUpperCase()}${ld}`) + .digest('hex') + .toUpperCase(); + const ad = createHash('sha256') + .update( + `${createHash('sha256').update(`${waVersion}${crVersion}`).digest('hex').toUpperCase()}${rd}`, + ) + .digest('hex') + .toUpperCase(); + const h = replay([ + response(`{"LD":"${ld}"}`), + response('{"result":"0"}', { 'set-cookie': 'stok=salted-token; Path=/' }), + response(`{"wa_inner_version":"${waVersion}","cr_version":"${crVersion}"}`), + response(`{"RD":"${rd}"}`), + ]); + const profile = ZTE_PROFILES[1]; + + // When + const result = await definition(h.transport).authenticatedProfile?.authenticate( + context(profile.id, profile.firmware), + [profile.id], + ); + + // Then + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'matched', profile: profile.id, detail: 'login-ok' }); + expect( + h.calls.map(({ method, url, body, headers }) => ({ method, url, body, headers })), + ).toEqual([ + { + method: 'GET', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${ZTE_PATHS.get}?isTest=false&cmd=LD`, + body: undefined, + headers: [`Origin: ${ADMIN_URL}`, `Referer: ${ADMIN_URL}/index.html`], + }, + { + method: 'POST', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${ZTE_PATHS.set}`, + body: `goformId=LOGIN_MULTI_USER&isTest=false&password=${password}&IP=localhost&user=admin`, + headers: [ + 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8', + `Origin: ${ADMIN_URL}`, + `Referer: ${ADMIN_URL}/index.html`, + ], + }, + { + method: 'GET', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${ZTE_PATHS.get}?isTest=false&cmd=wa_inner_version%2Ccr_version&multi_data=1`, + body: undefined, + headers: [ + `Cookie: stok=salted-token`, + `Origin: ${ADMIN_URL}`, + `Referer: ${ADMIN_URL}/index.html`, + ], + }, + { + method: 'GET', + url: `${ADMIN_URL}${ZTE_PATHS.get}?isTest=false&cmd=RD`, + body: undefined, + headers: [ + `Cookie: stok=salted-token`, + `Origin: ${ADMIN_URL}`, + `Referer: ${ADMIN_URL}/index.html`, + ], + }, + ]); + expect(definition(h.transport).contractFixtures[1]?.response).toEqual({ + status: 'matched', + sessionMaterial: '[redacted]', + ad: '[redacted]', + }); + expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(ad); + expect(h.remaining()).toBe(0); + }); + + test('refuses MF266 responses for MF79U without trying a second algorithm', async () => { + // Given + const h = replay([response('{"LD":"salted-shape"}')]); + const profile = ZTE_PROFILES[0]; + + // When + const result = await definition(h.transport).authenticatedProfile?.authenticate( + context(profile.id, profile.firmware), + [profile.id], + ); + + // Then + expect(result).toEqual({ status: 'refused', detail: 'protocol-mismatch' }); + expect(h.calls).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + test('selects unknown ZTE firmware as read-only without authenticating', async () => { + // Given + const h = replay([ + response('{"cr_version":"unknown-zte-build","network_type":"LTE"}'), + response('{"network_type":"LTE","signalbar":"3"}'), + ]); + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(definition(h.transport)); + + // When + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match( + context(ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE, 'unknown-zte-build'), + ); + + // Then + expect(result).toMatchObject({ + status: 'selected', + provider: 'zte-goform', + profile: ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE, + writable: false, + operations: { access: 'read-only' }, + }); + expect(h.calls.every((call) => call.method === 'GET')).toBe(true); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.ts b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef9e71a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/provider.ts @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +import type { ObservationEnvelope } from '../../domain'; +import type { NormalizedModemObservation } from '../../observations'; +import { normalizeZteObservation } from '../../observations/sources/zte'; +import type { + CapabilityReader, + ProviderDefinition, + ProviderExecutionContext, + ProviderMatchRequest, + ProviderOperationsSurface, +} from '../contracts'; +import { parseZteRecord, ZteSessionRuntime } from './session'; +import type { ZteTransport } from './transport'; + +export const ZTE_PATHS = { + get: '/goform/goform_get_cmd_process', + set: '/goform/goform_set_cmd_process', +} as const; + +export type ZteProfile = { + readonly id: 'mf79u-legacy' | 'mf266-salted'; + readonly firmware: 'MF79U' | 'MF266'; + readonly algorithm: 'legacy-base64' | 'salted-sha256'; +}; + +export const ZTE_PROFILES = [ + { id: 'mf79u-legacy', firmware: 'MF79U', algorithm: 'legacy-base64' }, + { id: 'mf266-salted', firmware: 'MF266', algorithm: 'salted-sha256' }, +] as const satisfies readonly ZteProfile[]; +export const ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE = 'zte-unknown-read-only'; + +export type ZteCredentials = { readonly username: string; readonly password: string }; +export type ZteOptions = { + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly adminUrl: string; + readonly transport: ZteTransport; + readonly credentials: ZteCredentials; + readonly now?: () => number; +}; + +type ZteOperations = ProviderOperationsSurface; + +export function zteProfileForFirmware(firmware: string | undefined): ZteProfile | undefined { + return ZTE_PROFILES.find((profile) => profile.firmware === firmware); +} + +export function zteProfileById(profileId: string): ZteProfile | undefined { + return ZTE_PROFILES.find((profile) => profile.id === profileId); +} + +export class ZteGoformProvider extends ZteSessionRuntime { + async fingerprint(request: ProviderMatchRequest) { + const response = await this.get('cr_version,network_type'); + const record = response.status === 200 ? parseZteRecord(response.body) : undefined; + const profile = zteProfileForFirmware(request.firmware); + const matches = record !== undefined; + return { + signal: matches ? ('match' as const) : ('unknown' as const), + strength: 'strong' as const, + profiles: matches ? [profile?.id ?? ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE] : [], + detail: matches ? 'zte-goform-shape' : 'zte-goform-not-proven', + }; + } + + capability(): CapabilityReader { + return { + id: 'zte-telemetry', + read: async () => { + const response = await this.get('network_type,signalbar,rssi,lte_rsrp,lte_rsrq,lte_snr'); + const supported = response.status === 200 && parseZteRecord(response.body) !== undefined; + return { + signal: supported ? 'match' : 'mismatch', + strength: 'strong', + detail: supported ? 'telemetry-reported' : 'telemetry-refused', + }; + }, + }; + } + + async observe( + context: ProviderExecutionContext, + ): Promise[]> { + const response = await this.get( + 'network_type,signalbar,rssi,lte_rsrp,lte_rsrq,lte_snr,network_provider,cell_id', + this.sessionCookie(context), + ); + if (response.status !== 200) return []; + return [ + normalizeZteObservation( + { body: response.body }, + { + stableKey: `modem:${this.options.interfaceName}` as never, + generation: context.generation, + sourceEpoch: 1 as never, + observedAt: (this.options.now?.() ?? Date.now()) as never, + }, + ), + ]; + } + + operations(_profile: string): ZteOperations { + return { access: 'read-only' }; + } +} + +export function createZteGoformDefinition( + options: ZteOptions, +): ProviderDefinition { + const runtime = new ZteGoformProvider(options); + return { + id: 'zte-goform', + profileVersion: '1', + eligibleTransports: ['network'], + passiveMatchers: ZTE_PROFILES.map((profile) => ({ + id: `firmware-${profile.firmware}`, + fact: 'firmware', + expected: [profile.firmware], + profiles: [profile.id], + strength: 'strong', + required: true, + })), + unauthenticatedProbes: [ + { id: 'zte-goform-shape', run: (request) => runtime.fingerprint(request) }, + ], + authenticatedProfile: { + algorithm: 'firmware-selected-zte-goform', + attemptLimit: 1, + authenticate: (request, candidates) => runtime.authenticateProfile(request, candidates), + }, + capabilityReaders: [runtime.capability()], + observe: (context) => runtime.observe(context), + operations: (profile) => runtime.operations(profile), + contractFixtures: ZTE_PROFILES.map((profile) => ({ + profile: profile.id, + request: { + method: 'POST', + path: ZTE_PATHS.set, + goformId: profile.algorithm === 'legacy-base64' ? 'LOGIN' : 'LOGIN_MULTI_USER', + interfaceBound: true, + redirects: 'disabled', + }, + response: + profile.algorithm === 'salted-sha256' + ? { status: 'matched', sessionMaterial: '[redacted]', ad: '[redacted]' } + : { status: 'matched', sessionMaterial: '[redacted]' }, + })), + }; +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/zte-goform/secret-fence.test.ts b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/secret-fence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3643797 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/secret-fence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; + +function candidateSecret(): string { + return process.env.MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD ?? ['ceralive', 'mf79u', 'secret', 'scan'].join('-'); +} + +describe('MF79U credential fence', () => { + test('keeps the ephemeral password and its derivatives out of tracked or intended files', async () => { + // Given + const password = candidateSecret(); + const forbidden = [ + password, + Buffer.from(password).toString('base64'), + createHash('sha256').update(password).digest('hex'), + ]; + const tracked = Bun.spawn( + ['git', 'ls-files', '--cached', '--others', '--exclude-standard', '-z'], + { stdout: 'pipe', stderr: 'pipe' }, + ); + + // When + const [exitCode, names] = await Promise.all([ + tracked.exited, + new Response(tracked.stdout).text(), + ]); + expect(exitCode).toBe(0); + const files = names.split('\0').filter((name) => name.length > 0); + const leaks: string[] = []; + for (const file of files) { + const content = await Bun.file(file).text(); + if (forbidden.some((value) => value.length > 0 && content.includes(value))) leaks.push(file); + } + + // Then + expect(leaks).toEqual([]); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/providers/zte-goform/session.ts b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/session.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54297e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/session.ts @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; +import { z } from 'zod'; +import type { AuthenticatedProfileResult, ProviderMatchRequest } from '../contracts'; +import { + ZTE_PATHS, + ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE, + type ZteOptions, + type ZteProfile, + zteProfileById, + zteProfileForFirmware, +} from './provider'; +import type { ZteHttpResponse } from './transport'; + +type ZteSession = { readonly cookie: string; readonly ad?: string }; +const flatRecordSchema = z.record(z.string(), z.union([z.string(), z.number()])); + +export function parseZteRecord( + body: string, +): Readonly> | undefined { + const result = z + .string() + .transform((value, context) => { + try { + return JSON.parse(value); + } catch (error) { + if (!(error instanceof SyntaxError)) throw error; + context.addIssue({ code: 'custom', message: 'invalid JSON' }); + return z.NEVER; + } + }) + .pipe(flatRecordSchema) + .safeParse(body); + return result.success ? result.data : undefined; +} + +function stokCookie(response: ZteHttpResponse): string | undefined { + const expected = 'set-cookie'; + const header = Object.entries(response.headers ?? {}).find( + ([key]) => key.toLowerCase() === expected, + )?.[1]; + const cookie = header?.split(';', 1)[0]?.trim(); + return cookie?.startsWith('stok=') ? cookie : undefined; +} + +function sha256(value: string): string { + return createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex').toUpperCase(); +} + +export class ZteSessionRuntime { + readonly #sessions = new Map(); + + constructor(protected readonly options: ZteOptions) {} + + async authenticateProfile( + request: ProviderMatchRequest, + candidates: readonly string[], + ): Promise { + const candidate = candidates.length === 1 ? candidates[0] : undefined; + if (candidate === ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE) { + return { status: 'matched', profile: ZTE_UNKNOWN_PROFILE, detail: 'read-only-fingerprint' }; + } + const profile = zteProfileById(candidate ?? ''); + if (profile === undefined || zteProfileForFirmware(request.firmware)?.id !== profile.id) { + return { status: 'refused', detail: 'profile-mismatch' }; + } + return profile.algorithm === 'legacy-base64' + ? this.loginLegacy(request, profile) + : this.loginSalted(request, profile); + } + + protected sessionCookie(request: ProviderMatchRequest): string | undefined { + return this.#sessions.get(this.sessionKey(request))?.cookie; + } + + protected get(cmd: string, cookie?: string, multiData = false): Promise { + const query = new URLSearchParams({ isTest: 'false', cmd }); + if (multiData) query.set('multi_data', '1'); + return this.request('GET', `${ZTE_PATHS.get}?${query.toString()}`, undefined, cookie); + } + + private async loginLegacy( + request: ProviderMatchRequest, + profile: ZteProfile, + ): Promise { + const response = await this.post( + new URLSearchParams({ + goformId: 'LOGIN', + isTest: 'false', + password: Buffer.from(this.options.credentials.password).toString('base64'), + }).toString(), + ); + const record = parseZteRecord(response.body); + const cookie = stokCookie(response); + if (response.status !== 200 || record?.result !== '0' || cookie === undefined) { + return { + status: 'refused', + detail: record?.LD === undefined ? 'auth-rejection' : 'protocol-mismatch', + }; + } + this.#sessions.set(this.sessionKey(request), { cookie }); + return { status: 'matched', profile: profile.id, detail: 'login-ok' }; + } + + private async loginSalted( + request: ProviderMatchRequest, + profile: ZteProfile, + ): Promise { + const ldResponse = await this.get('LD'); + const ld = parseZteRecord(ldResponse.body)?.LD; + if (ldResponse.status !== 200 || typeof ld !== 'string') { + return { status: 'refused', detail: 'protocol-mismatch' }; + } + const login = await this.post( + new URLSearchParams({ + goformId: 'LOGIN_MULTI_USER', + isTest: 'false', + password: sha256(`${sha256(this.options.credentials.password)}${ld}`), + IP: 'localhost', + user: this.options.credentials.username, + }).toString(), + ); + const cookie = stokCookie(login); + if ( + login.status !== 200 || + parseZteRecord(login.body)?.result !== '0' || + cookie === undefined + ) { + return { status: 'refused', detail: 'auth-rejection' }; + } + const versions = parseZteRecord( + (await this.get('wa_inner_version,cr_version', cookie, true)).body, + ); + const rd = parseZteRecord((await this.get('RD', cookie)).body)?.RD; + const waVersion = versions?.wa_inner_version; + const crVersion = versions?.cr_version; + if (typeof waVersion !== 'string' || typeof crVersion !== 'string' || typeof rd !== 'string') { + return { status: 'refused', detail: 'protocol-mismatch' }; + } + this.#sessions.set(this.sessionKey(request), { + cookie, + ad: sha256(`${sha256(`${waVersion}${crVersion}`)}${rd}`), + }); + return { status: 'matched', profile: profile.id, detail: 'login-ok' }; + } + + private sessionKey(request: ProviderMatchRequest): string { + return `${request.physicalModemId}:${request.generation}`; + } + + private post(body: string): Promise { + return this.request('POST', ZTE_PATHS.set, body); + } + + private request( + method: 'GET' | 'POST', + path: string, + body?: string, + cookie?: string, + ): Promise { + const headers = [ + ...(method === 'POST' + ? ['Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8'] + : []), + ...(cookie === undefined ? [] : [`Cookie: ${cookie}`]), + `Origin: ${this.options.adminUrl}`, + `Referer: ${this.options.adminUrl}/index.html`, + ]; + return this.options.transport.request({ + method, + url: `${this.options.adminUrl}${path}`, + ...(body === undefined ? {} : { body }), + headers, + interfaceName: this.options.interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }); + } +} diff --git a/control/src/providers/zte-goform/transport.ts b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/transport.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5928b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/providers/zte-goform/transport.ts @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +export type ZteHttpRequest = { + readonly method: 'GET' | 'POST'; + readonly url: string; + readonly body?: string; + readonly headers: readonly string[]; + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly redirect: 'error'; +}; + +export type ZteHttpResponse = { + readonly status: number; + readonly body: string; + readonly headers?: Readonly>; +}; + +export interface ZteTransport { + request(request: ZteHttpRequest): Promise; +} diff --git a/control/src/radio/band-truth.test.ts b/control/src/radio/band-truth.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41196dc --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/band-truth.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +// The band-write descriptor and its certification gate. +// +// This suite proves the WIRING, not a second gate: `band/certification.ts` already +// owns the four-proof catalog and `offerableBands`, and every decision here is read +// out of it. What is asserted is that a band write can only ever reach a consumer as +// a `disruptive`, readback-required, certification-gated operation — and that the +// shipped (empty) catalog therefore refuses every device on the fleet today. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG, + type BandCertificationEntry, + findBandCertification, +} from '../band'; +import type { ModemBands } from '../ports'; +import { + BAND_NONE_OFFERABLE_REFUSAL, + BAND_WRITE_OPERATION_ID, + BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL, + bandWriteReadbackMatches, + buildBandWriteDescriptor, + describeBandWriteCertification, +} from './band-truth'; + +/** The bench Quectel's advertised bands, as the conformance fixtures spell them. */ +const SUPPORTED = ['eutran-3', 'eutran-7', 'ngran-78']; + +const SWEPT_ENTRY: BandCertificationEntry = { + vidPid: '2c7c:0801', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + firmwarePrefix: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02', + evidence: 'docs/BENCH.md RB-11 (fixture only)', + proofs: { supportedRead: true, set: true, readback: true, reset: true }, + provenBands: [], +}; + +const NARROWED_ENTRY: BandCertificationEntry = { ...SWEPT_ENTRY, provenBands: ['eutran-3'] }; + +const descriptorFor = (entry: BandCertificationEntry | undefined, supported = SUPPORTED) => + buildBandWriteDescriptor({ + provider: 'modemmanager', + profile: 'generic-mm', + certification: describeBandWriteCertification({ entry, supported }), + readSupported: true, + }); + +describe('the shipped catalog is empty, so every device is refused today', () => { + test('no fleet SKU resolves to an entry', () => { + expect(BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG.entries).toEqual([]); + expect( + findBandCertification(BAND_CERTIFICATION_CATALOG, { + vidPid: '2c7c:0801', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + firmwarePrefix: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02M4G', + }), + ).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('an uncertified device refuses the write in support AND availability', () => { + const descriptor = descriptorFor(undefined); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ supported: false, reason: BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL }); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ state: 'refused', reason: BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL }); + }); + + test('an uncertified device offers NO bands even though the modem advertises three', () => { + const certification = describeBandWriteCertification({ + entry: undefined, + supported: SUPPORTED, + }); + expect(certification.satisfied).toBe(false); + expect(certification.offerable).toEqual([]); + }); + + test('reading bands stays available on an uncertified device', () => { + expect(descriptorFor(undefined).support.read).toEqual({ supported: true }); + }); +}); + +describe('certification is REQUIRED, structurally', () => { + test('every certification decision requires certification, certified or not', () => { + for (const entry of [undefined, SWEPT_ENTRY, NARROWED_ENTRY]) { + expect(describeBandWriteCertification({ entry, supported: SUPPORTED }).required).toBe(true); + } + }); + + test('a swept entry offers the whole advertised set', () => { + expect(describeBandWriteCertification({ entry: SWEPT_ENTRY, supported: SUPPORTED })).toEqual({ + required: true, + satisfied: true, + reason: 'band-certification-proven', + offerable: SUPPORTED, + }); + }); + + test('a narrowed entry offers only its proven bands', () => { + expect( + describeBandWriteCertification({ entry: NARROWED_ENTRY, supported: SUPPORTED }).offerable, + ).toEqual(['eutran-3']); + }); + + test('a certified band the modem no longer advertises is not offerable', () => { + const certification = describeBandWriteCertification({ + entry: NARROWED_ENTRY, + supported: ['eutran-7'], + }); + expect(certification.offerable).toEqual([]); + expect(descriptorFor(NARROWED_ENTRY, ['eutran-7']).availability).toEqual({ + state: 'refused', + reason: BAND_NONE_OFFERABLE_REFUSAL, + }); + }); +}); + +describe('the descriptor carries the disruptive class and its readback', () => { + const descriptor = descriptorFor(SWEPT_ENTRY); + + test('mutation impact is `disruptive`, never `write`', () => { + expect(descriptor.mutationImpact).toBe('disruptive'); + expect(descriptor.mutationImpact).not.toBe('write'); + expect(descriptor.id).toBe(BAND_WRITE_OPERATION_ID); + }); + + test('the write is journalled, admitted and never auto-retried', () => { + expect(descriptor.journal).toEqual({ required: true, reason: 'disruptive-radio-write' }); + expect(descriptor.admission).toEqual({ required: true, reason: 'provider-mutation' }); + expect(descriptor.retryClass).toBe('never'); + }); + + test('the certification precondition is named in `livePreconditions`', () => { + expect(descriptor.livePreconditions).toContain('band-certification-present'); + }); + + test('the offered values are exactly what the catalog proves', () => { + expect(descriptor.constraints).toEqual({ kind: 'allowed-values', values: [SUPPORTED] }); + }); + + test('readback is required and refuses a partially-applied lock', () => { + expect(descriptor.readback.required).toBe(true); + if (!descriptor.readback.required) return; + const observed: ModemBands = { supported: SUPPORTED, current: ['eutran-3'] }; + expect(descriptor.readback.matches(['eutran-3'], observed)).toBe(true); + expect(descriptor.readback.matches(['eutran-3', 'eutran-7'], observed)).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('readback semantics', () => { + test('a narrowing lock must match exactly — a superset is a different lock', () => { + expect( + bandWriteReadbackMatches(['eutran-3'], { + supported: SUPPORTED, + current: ['eutran-3', 'eutran-7'], + }), + ).toBe(false); + }); + + test('order does not matter for an exact set', () => { + expect( + bandWriteReadbackMatches(['eutran-7', 'eutran-3'], { + supported: SUPPORTED, + current: ['eutran-3', 'eutran-7'], + }), + ).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a reset is confirmed by `any` OR by the whole supported set', () => { + expect(bandWriteReadbackMatches(['any'], { supported: SUPPORTED, current: ['any'] })).toBe( + true, + ); + expect(bandWriteReadbackMatches(['any'], { supported: SUPPORTED, current: SUPPORTED })).toBe( + true, + ); + }); + + test('a reset is NOT confirmed by a modem that stayed locked to one band', () => { + expect(bandWriteReadbackMatches(['any'], { supported: SUPPORTED, current: ['eutran-3'] })).toBe( + false, + ); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/radio/band-truth.ts b/control/src/radio/band-truth.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cad4b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/band-truth.ts @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +// The band-write descriptor — the certification gate, expressed as an operation contract. +// +// It ADDS NOTHING to `band/certification.ts`. That module already owns the four-proof +// per-SKU catalog, the fail-closed lookup, and the `offerableBands` narrowing, and it +// is the only place a SKU may be declared certified. What was missing was the other +// end of the wire: a band write's OPERATION DESCRIPTOR did not say that it is +// disruptive-with-a-certification-requirement, so the gate lived only inside the +// provider's capability flag and a consumer reading the descriptor could not see it. +// +// TWO INDEPENDENT FENCES, deliberately. `availability: refused` is what a consumer +// reads to decide whether to offer the control at all; the provider's own +// `bandWrite` capability check is what refuses the call if one is made anyway. A gate +// that exists only in the descriptor is advisory, and a gate that exists only in the +// provider is invisible — a band lock can take a working uplink off the air, so it +// gets both. + +import { type BandCertificationEntry, type BandName, offerableBands } from '../band'; +import { defineOperationDescriptor, type OperationDescriptor } from '../domain'; +import type { ModemBands } from '../ports'; + +export const BAND_WRITE_OPERATION_ID = 'modemmanager.bands'; + +/** The refusal reasons a band write may carry. Certification is the first gate. */ +export const BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL = 'band-certification-required'; +export const BAND_READ_REFUSAL = 'band-read-unsupported'; +export const BAND_NONE_OFFERABLE_REFUSAL = 'no-offerable-certified-bands'; + +/** + * The band-lock certification decision for one device, as a descriptor consumer sees it. + * + * `required` is `true` unconditionally and is typed as the literal, so no code path can + * produce a band-write decision that does not require certification. This is the one + * capability module documented as STRICTER than `support-claim.ts`'s `capable` floor. + */ +export type BandWriteCertification = { + readonly required: true; + readonly satisfied: boolean; + readonly reason: 'band-certification-proven' | typeof BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL; + /** What the catalog proves is settable, intersected with what the modem advertises. */ + readonly offerable: readonly BandName[]; +}; + +export function describeBandWriteCertification(input: { + readonly entry: BandCertificationEntry | undefined; + readonly supported: readonly BandName[]; +}): BandWriteCertification { + const offerable = offerableBands(input.entry, input.supported); + return input.entry === undefined + ? { required: true, satisfied: false, reason: BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL, offerable } + : { required: true, satisfied: true, reason: 'band-certification-proven', offerable }; +} + +export type BandWriteDescriptorInput = { + readonly provider: string; + readonly profile: string; + readonly certification: BandWriteCertification; + readonly readSupported: boolean; +}; + +function sameBandSet(left: readonly BandName[], right: readonly BandName[]): boolean { + if (left.length !== right.length) return false; + const sorted = [...right].sort(); + return [...left].sort().every((band, index) => band === sorted[index]); +} + +/** + * Whether a band readback confirms the write. + * + * A NARROWING lock must match exactly — a superset is a different lock from the one + * that was asked for. The reset (`['any']`) is the exception ModemManager forces: + * releasing a lock is `SetCurrentBands([ANY])`, and a modem afterwards reports either + * `any` or its whole supported set, both of which mean "no lock is in force". + */ +export function bandWriteReadbackMatches( + requested: readonly BandName[], + observed: ModemBands, +): boolean { + if (requested.length === 1 && requested[0] === 'any') { + return ( + (observed.current.length === 1 && observed.current[0] === 'any') || + sameBandSet(observed.current, observed.supported) + ); + } + return sameBandSet(requested, observed.current); +} + +/** + * The live band-write descriptor. + * + * `mutationImpact: 'disruptive'` because `SetCurrentBands` re-registers the radio and + * drops the bearer underneath NetworkManager; `readback` is REQUIRED because an + * accepted-but-ignored band write is the failure mode the catalog's own `readback` + * proof exists to catch, and it looks like success from the call site alone. + */ +export function buildBandWriteDescriptor( + input: BandWriteDescriptorInput, +): OperationDescriptor { + const refusal = !input.certification.satisfied + ? BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL + : input.certification.offerable.length === 0 + ? BAND_NONE_OFFERABLE_REFUSAL + : undefined; + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: BAND_WRITE_OPERATION_ID, + support: { + read: input.readSupported + ? { supported: true } + : { supported: false, reason: BAND_READ_REFUSAL }, + write: input.certification.satisfied + ? { supported: true } + : { supported: false, reason: BAND_WRITE_REFUSAL }, + }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: input.provider, + constraints: { kind: 'allowed-values', values: [input.certification.offerable] }, + livePreconditions: ['modem-present', 'runtime-interface-present', 'band-certification-present'], + availability: + refusal === undefined ? { state: 'available' } : { state: 'refused', reason: refusal }, + mutationImpact: 'disruptive', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: { + required: true, + reason: 'band-write-readback', + matches: bandWriteReadbackMatches, + }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: true, reason: 'disruptive-radio-write' }, + admission: { required: true, reason: 'provider-mutation' }, + evidence: { profiles: [input.profile], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', + }); +} diff --git a/control/src/radio/index.ts b/control/src/radio/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ea13c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Radio capability TRUTH: the modem's own mode catalog and band-write gate, verbatim. +// +// It sits beside `src/band/` (the band vocabulary and per-SKU certification catalog) +// rather than inside it, because a mode combination is not a band and the two have +// different safety models — a mode change is disruptive-but-reversible, a band lock +// can strand a radio where nothing registers. Reachable through the package ROOT +// entry, deliberately NOT a new package subpath (the todo 17/18/23 precedent). + +export * from './band-truth'; +export * from './mode-combinations'; +export * from './mode-truth'; diff --git a/control/src/radio/mode-combinations.test.ts b/control/src/radio/mode-combinations.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4589da --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/mode-combinations.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +// The verbatim mode-catalog decoder. +// +// Every case here is a LOSS this decoder exists to prevent, not a shape exercise: +// the FM350's stated no-preference, a mode bit a future ModemManager adds, and a +// catalog member that is not a `(uu)` at all. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import { + decodeModeCombination, + decodeSupportedModeCombinations, + encodeModeNames, + hasUnknownCombination, + isFullyNamedMask, + isNamedMode, + MODE_ANY, + MODE_NONE, + modeCombination, + modeName, + modeNames, + modeValue, + statesNoPreference, +} from './mode-combinations'; + +const CS = 1 << 0; +const M2G = 1 << 1; +const M3G = 1 << 2; +const M4G = 1 << 3; +const M5G = 1 << 4; + +/** The bench FM350-GL's single advertised combination: allowed CS+2G+3G+4G, preferred NONE. */ +const FM350_ALLOWED = CS | M2G | M3G | M4G; + +describe('mode name vocabulary', () => { + test('the five named MM mode bits round-trip', () => { + for (const [bit, name] of [ + [CS, 'cs'], + [M2G, '2g'], + [M3G, '3g'], + [M4G, '4g'], + [M5G, '5g'], + ] as const) { + expect(modeName(bit)).toBe(name); + expect(modeValue(name)).toBe(bit); + expect(isNamedMode(name)).toBe(true); + } + }); + + test('an unnamed bit round-trips as a passthrough rather than being dropped', () => { + const future = 1 << 9; + expect(modeName(future)).toBe('mode-bit-512'); + expect(modeValue('mode-bit-512')).toBe(future); + expect(isNamedMode('mode-bit-512')).toBe(false); + }); + + test('none is 0 and any is the full mask', () => { + expect(modeValue(MODE_NONE)).toBe(0); + expect(modeValue(MODE_ANY)).toBe(0xffffffff); + expect(modeNames(0)).toEqual([]); + expect(modeNames(0xffffffff)).toEqual([MODE_ANY]); + }); + + test('a name this build cannot place is refused, never coerced to a neighbour', () => { + expect(modeValue('lte-advanced')).toBeUndefined(); + expect(encodeModeNames(['4g', 'lte-advanced'])).toEqual({ ok: false, unknown: 'lte-advanced' }); + }); + + test('encoding a set is the OR of its bits', () => { + expect(encodeModeNames(['2g', '3g', '4g'])).toEqual({ ok: true, mask: M2G | M3G | M4G }); + expect(encodeModeNames([])).toEqual({ ok: true, mask: 0 }); + }); +}); + +describe('FM350 `preferred: none` — the case this module exists for', () => { + const combination = modeCombination(FM350_ALLOWED, 0); + + test('preferred is the literal `none`, not the highest allowed mode', () => { + expect(combination.preferred).toBe(MODE_NONE); + expect(combination.preferred).not.toBe('4g'); + expect(combination.preferredMask).toBe(0); + }); + + test('a stated no-preference is NOT an anomaly and stays fully named', () => { + expect(combination.anomalies).toEqual([]); + expect(combination.classification).toBe('named'); + expect(statesNoPreference(combination)).toBe(true); + }); + + test('the allowed set is decoded in MM bit order, verbatim', () => { + expect(combination.allowed).toEqual(['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g']); + expect(combination.allowedMask).toBe(FM350_ALLOWED); + }); + + test('the raw masks survive alongside the names', () => { + expect(decodeModeCombination([FM350_ALLOWED, 0])).toEqual(combination); + }); +}); + +describe('unknown combinations are passed through TYPED, never dropped', () => { + test('an unfamiliar allowed bit keeps the combination and classifies it', () => { + const combination = modeCombination(M4G | (1 << 9), M4G); + expect(combination.allowed).toEqual(['4g', 'mode-bit-512']); + expect(combination.classification).toBe('unknown-combination'); + expect(combination.anomalies).toEqual(['unnamed-allowed-bit']); + }); + + test('a preferred mode outside its own allowed set is reported, not corrected', () => { + const combination = modeCombination(M4G, M5G); + expect(combination.preferred).toBe('5g'); + expect(combination.anomalies).toEqual(['preferred-not-in-allowed']); + expect(combination.classification).toBe('unknown-combination'); + }); + + test('a zero allowed mask is retained as an anomaly rather than filtered away', () => { + const combination = modeCombination(0, 0); + expect(combination.allowed).toEqual([]); + expect(combination.anomalies).toEqual(['empty-allowed']); + }); + + test('a multi-bit preferred mask is reported as non-singular and kept whole', () => { + const combination = modeCombination(M4G | M5G, M4G | M5G); + expect(combination.preferred).toBe('4g+5g'); + expect(combination.preferredMask).toBe(M4G | M5G); + expect(combination.anomalies).toContain('preferred-not-singular'); + }); + + test('`unknown` is never `unsupported` — the classification carries no support claim', () => { + const combination = modeCombination(M4G | (1 << 9), 0); + expect(combination.classification).toBe('unknown-combination'); + expect(combination.allowedMask).toBe(M4G | (1 << 9)); + expect(combination.allowed.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + }); +}); + +describe('decoding a whole SupportedModes catalog', () => { + test('nothing is dropped: decoded + undecodable equals what the provider sent', () => { + const members = [ + [M4G, 0], + [M4G | M5G, M5G], + 'not-a-pair', + [M4G, M5G, M2G], + [M4G], + [M2G | M3G, M3G], + ]; + const set = decodeSupportedModeCombinations(members); + expect(set.combinations.length + set.undecodable.length).toBe(members.length); + expect(set.undecodable).toEqual(['not-a-pair', [M4G, M5G, M2G], [M4G]]); + }); + + test('an undecodable member is retained EXACTLY as it arrived', () => { + const set = decodeSupportedModeCombinations([{ allowed: 8 }]); + expect(set.combinations).toEqual([]); + expect(set.undecodable).toEqual([{ allowed: 8 }]); + }); + + test('a non-array property is an empty catalog, not a throw', () => { + expect(decodeSupportedModeCombinations(undefined)).toEqual({ + combinations: [], + undecodable: [], + }); + expect(decodeSupportedModeCombinations(7)).toEqual({ combinations: [], undecodable: [] }); + }); + + test('the FM350 catalog decodes to exactly one no-preference combination', () => { + const set = decodeSupportedModeCombinations([[FM350_ALLOWED, 0]]); + expect(set.combinations).toHaveLength(1); + expect(set.combinations[0]?.preferred).toBe(MODE_NONE); + expect(hasUnknownCombination(set)).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a catalog carrying one unknown member reports so without hiding the rest', () => { + const set = decodeSupportedModeCombinations([ + [M4G, 0], + [M4G | (1 << 9), 0], + ]); + expect(set.combinations).toHaveLength(2); + expect(hasUnknownCombination(set)).toBe(true); + }); + + test('a negative or non-integer mask is not a pair', () => { + const set = decodeSupportedModeCombinations([ + [-1, 0], + [8, 1.5], + ]); + expect(set.combinations).toEqual([]); + expect(set.undecodable).toHaveLength(2); + }); +}); + +describe('mask naming', () => { + test('isFullyNamedMask accepts none, any and every named combination', () => { + expect(isFullyNamedMask(0)).toBe(true); + expect(isFullyNamedMask(0xffffffff)).toBe(true); + expect(isFullyNamedMask(FM350_ALLOWED)).toBe(true); + expect(isFullyNamedMask(M4G | (1 << 9))).toBe(false); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/radio/mode-combinations.ts b/control/src/radio/mode-combinations.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..949e70c --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/mode-combinations.ts @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +// `MMModemMode` ↔ mode NAME, and the (allowed, preferred) COMBINATION, verbatim. +// +// ModemManager advertises what a radio can do as `Modem.SupportedModes`, an `a(uu)` +// of (allowed-mask, preferred-mask) pairs, and what it is doing as `Modem.CurrentModes`, +// one `(uu)`. Everything an operator may legally ask for is in that list, and this +// module's whole job is to carry it across UNCHANGED. +// +// THREE THINGS ARE ROUTINELY LOST BY A DECODER THAT MEANS WELL, and each one is a +// documented CeraLive case rather than a hypothetical: +// +// 1. `preferred: 0` (`MM_MODEM_MODE_NONE`). The bench Fibocom FM350-GL advertises +// exactly one combination, and its preferred mask is 0 — the modem allows a set +// of modes and states NO preference within it. That is a real, legal answer, and +// it is NOT the same as "prefer the highest allowed mode". Substituting a default +// shows an operator a preference the modem never expressed and cannot be returned +// to. `preferred` is therefore the name `none`, carried through to the operation +// descriptor's own allowed-value list. +// 2. A bit this build does not name. MM's mode enum grows; a mask carrying an +// unfamiliar bit is still a combination the modem advertised and will accept. It +// round-trips as `mode-bit-` (the `band-` discipline from `band-names.ts`), +// the combination is CLASSIFIED `unknown-combination`, and it stays offerable. +// `unknown` is never coerced to `unsupported` — that is the support-claim +// taxonomy's first rule, and it applies to a mode catalog exactly as it does to a +// capability probe. +// 3. A member that is not a `(uu)` at all. Dropping it silently shortens the catalog, +// so `decodeSupportedModeCombinations` RETAINS it in a separate `undecodable` +// list. Decoded + undecodable always equals what the provider sent. +// +// This module is pure and total: no transport, no clock, no I/O. The `SetCurrentModes` +// call itself stays where every other radio mutation lives (`backend/mm-mutations.ts`). + +/** A mode as every operator-facing surface spells it. Opaque; compare by equality. */ +export type ModeName = string; + +/** + * `MM_MODEM_MODE_NONE` (0) — the modem expresses no preference within its allowed set. + * A legal, load-bearing value; never a stand-in for "not reported". + */ +export const MODE_NONE = 'none'; + +/** `MM_MODEM_MODE_ANY` (0xFFFFFFFF) — every mode the modem has. */ +export const MODE_ANY = 'any'; +const MODE_ANY_VALUE = 0xffffffff; + +/** The named `MMModemMode` bits, in MM's own bit order. */ +const NAMED_BITS: readonly (readonly [number, ModeName])[] = [ + [1 << 0, 'cs'], + [1 << 1, '2g'], + [1 << 2, '3g'], + [1 << 3, '4g'], + [1 << 4, '5g'], +]; + +const BIT_TO_NAME = new Map(NAMED_BITS); +const NAME_TO_BIT = new Map(NAMED_BITS.map(([bit, name]) => [name, bit])); + +/** The passthrough spelling for a mode bit this build does not name. */ +const PASSTHROUGH_RE = /^mode-bit-(\d+)$/; + +const NAMED_MASK = NAMED_BITS.reduce((mask, [bit]) => mask | bit, 0); + +/** Decode one `MMModemMode` bit. Total: an unnamed bit round-trips. */ +export function modeName(bit: number): ModeName { + return BIT_TO_NAME.get(bit) ?? `mode-bit-${bit}`; +} + +/** Encode one mode name. `undefined` for a name this build cannot place. */ +export function modeValue(name: ModeName): number | undefined { + if (name === MODE_NONE) return 0; + if (name === MODE_ANY) return MODE_ANY_VALUE; + const known = NAME_TO_BIT.get(name); + if (known !== undefined) return known; + const passthrough = PASSTHROUGH_RE.exec(name); + if (passthrough?.[1] === undefined) return undefined; + const parsed = Number(passthrough[1]); + return Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : undefined; +} + +/** True when this build recognises the name (a `mode-bit-` passthrough does not). */ +export function isNamedMode(name: ModeName): boolean { + return name === MODE_NONE || name === MODE_ANY || NAME_TO_BIT.has(name); +} + +/** + * Split a mask into its set bits, named where this build can and passed through where + * it cannot. A zero mask is the EMPTY set — the caller decides whether that reads as + * `none` (a preference) or as an anomaly (an allowed set nothing can be chosen from). + */ +export function modeNames(mask: number): readonly ModeName[] { + if (!Number.isSafeInteger(mask) || mask <= 0) return []; + if (mask === MODE_ANY_VALUE) return [MODE_ANY]; + const names: ModeName[] = []; + for (let bit = 1; bit <= mask && bit > 0; bit *= 2) { + if ((mask & bit) !== 0) names.push(modeName(bit)); + } + return names; +} + +/** Encode a set of mode names into one mask. Fails closed on an unplaceable name. */ +export function encodeModeNames( + names: readonly ModeName[], +): + | { readonly ok: true; readonly mask: number } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly unknown: ModeName } { + let mask = 0; + for (const name of names) { + const value = modeValue(name); + if (value === undefined) return { ok: false, unknown: name }; + mask |= value; + } + return { ok: true, mask: mask >>> 0 }; +} + +/** Why a combination could not be fully placed. Never a reason to hide it. */ +export const MODE_COMBINATION_ANOMALIES = [ + /** The allowed mask carries a bit this build does not name. */ + 'unnamed-allowed-bit', + /** The preferred mask carries a bit this build does not name. */ + 'unnamed-preferred-bit', + /** The preferred mode is not a member of the allowed set. */ + 'preferred-not-in-allowed', + /** The preferred mask names more than one mode; MM's contract is at most one. */ + 'preferred-not-singular', + /** The allowed mask is zero — nothing can be selected from this combination. */ + 'empty-allowed', +] as const; +export type ModeCombinationAnomaly = (typeof MODE_COMBINATION_ANOMALIES)[number]; + +export type ModeCombinationClassification = 'named' | 'unknown-combination'; + +/** + * One `(allowed, preferred)` pair, decoded without loss. + * + * The masks are retained ALONGSIDE the names so a consumer can always reproduce the + * exact bytes the modem reported, whatever this build managed to name. + */ +export type ModeCombination = { + readonly allowedMask: number; + readonly allowed: readonly ModeName[]; + readonly preferredMask: number; + /** `none` when the modem stated no preference — verbatim, never a substitute. */ + readonly preferred: ModeName; + readonly classification: ModeCombinationClassification; + readonly anomalies: readonly ModeCombinationAnomaly[]; +}; + +/** + * A `SupportedModes` catalog: everything decoded, plus everything that could not be. + * + * `undecodable` exists so the no-drop property is structural rather than a promise — + * `combinations.length + undecodable.length` is the member count the provider sent. + */ +export type ModeCombinationSet = { + readonly combinations: readonly ModeCombination[]; + /** Members that were not a `(uu)` pair, retained exactly as the provider sent them. */ + readonly undecodable: readonly unknown[]; +}; + +function isUnnamed(names: readonly ModeName[]): boolean { + return names.some((name) => !isNamedMode(name)); +} + +/** Build a combination from two raw masks, recording every anomaly it carries. */ +export function modeCombination(allowedMask: number, preferredMask: number): ModeCombination { + const allowed = modeNames(allowedMask); + const preferredNames = modeNames(preferredMask); + const anomalies: ModeCombinationAnomaly[] = []; + if (allowed.length === 0) anomalies.push('empty-allowed'); + if (isUnnamed(allowed)) anomalies.push('unnamed-allowed-bit'); + if (isUnnamed(preferredNames)) anomalies.push('unnamed-preferred-bit'); + if (preferredNames.length > 1) anomalies.push('preferred-not-singular'); + // A zero preferred mask is `none` and is NOT an anomaly: it is MM's own way of + // saying "no preference within the allowed set", which the FM350 actually reports. + if ( + preferredNames.length > 0 && + preferredMask !== MODE_ANY_VALUE && + (preferredMask & allowedMask) !== preferredMask + ) { + anomalies.push('preferred-not-in-allowed'); + } + return { + allowedMask, + allowed, + preferredMask, + preferred: preferredNames.length === 0 ? MODE_NONE : (preferredNames.join('+') as ModeName), + classification: anomalies.length === 0 ? 'named' : 'unknown-combination', + anomalies, + }; +} + +/** True when the modem stated no preference within this combination's allowed set. */ +export function statesNoPreference(combination: ModeCombination): boolean { + return combination.preferredMask === 0; +} + +function decodePair(value: unknown): readonly [number, number] | undefined { + if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== 2) return undefined; + const [allowed, preferred] = value; + if (typeof allowed !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(allowed) || allowed < 0) + return undefined; + if (typeof preferred !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(preferred) || preferred < 0) { + return undefined; + } + return [allowed, preferred]; +} + +/** Decode one `CurrentModes` `(uu)`. `undefined` only when the value is not a pair. */ +export function decodeModeCombination(value: unknown): ModeCombination | undefined { + const pair = decodePair(value); + return pair === undefined ? undefined : modeCombination(pair[0], pair[1]); +} + +/** + * Decode a `SupportedModes` `a(uu)`. + * + * Nothing is dropped: a member that is not a pair lands in `undecodable`, and a pair + * this build cannot fully name lands in `combinations` classified + * `unknown-combination`. A non-array value is an empty catalog, not an error — a modem + * that advertises no mode control is a real reading. + */ +export function decodeSupportedModeCombinations(value: unknown): ModeCombinationSet { + if (!Array.isArray(value)) return { combinations: [], undecodable: [] }; + const combinations: ModeCombination[] = []; + const undecodable: unknown[] = []; + for (const member of value) { + const pair = decodePair(member); + if (pair === undefined) undecodable.push(member); + else combinations.push(modeCombination(pair[0], pair[1])); + } + return { combinations, undecodable }; +} + +/** True when any advertised combination carries an anomaly this build could not place. */ +export function hasUnknownCombination(set: ModeCombinationSet): boolean { + return ( + set.undecodable.length > 0 || + set.combinations.some((each) => each.classification === 'unknown-combination') + ); +} + +/** Whether a mask names a mode this build recognises across every set bit. */ +export function isFullyNamedMask(mask: number): boolean { + return mask === MODE_ANY_VALUE || mask === 0 || (mask & ~NAMED_MASK) === 0; +} diff --git a/control/src/radio/mode-truth.test.ts b/control/src/radio/mode-truth.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d321811 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/mode-truth.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +// The mode-write DESCRIPTOR — where the modem's own catalog becomes a contract. +// +// The acceptance property this suite exists for: a combination the modem advertised +// reaches `descriptor.constraints.values` unchanged, `preferred: 'none'` included. A +// descriptor that quietly substituted a default would be indistinguishable from a +// correct one at every other layer. + +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; + +import { MODE_NONE, modeCombination } from './mode-combinations'; +import { + advertisesNoPreference, + buildModeWriteDescriptor, + encodeModeSelection, + MODE_WRITE_OPERATION_ID, + type ModeSelection, + matchAdvertisedCombination, + readRadioModeTruth, + sameSelection, + selectionOf, +} from './mode-truth'; + +const CS = 1 << 0; +const M2G = 1 << 1; +const M3G = 1 << 2; +const M4G = 1 << 3; +const M5G = 1 << 4; +const FUTURE = 1 << 9; + +const FM350_ALLOWED = CS | M2G | M3G | M4G; + +/** Fibocom FM350-GL: one combination, preferred NONE (the conformance-matrix spec's own values). */ +const FM350 = readRadioModeTruth({ + currentModes: [FM350_ALLOWED, 0], + supportedModes: [[FM350_ALLOWED, 0]], +}); + +/** Quectel RM530N-GL as the matrix fixtures spell it: allowed CS+2G+3G, preferred NONE. */ +const QUECTEL = readRadioModeTruth({ + currentModes: [CS | M2G | M3G, 0], + supportedModes: [[CS | M2G | M3G, 0]], +}); + +/** SIMCom SIM7600G-H as the matrix fixtures spell it: allowed 3G, preferred NONE. */ +const SIMCOM = readRadioModeTruth({ + currentModes: [M3G, 0], + supportedModes: [[M3G, 0]], +}); + +/** A modem advertising a real preference plus a bit this build cannot name. */ +const UNKNOWN_COMBINATION = readRadioModeTruth({ + currentModes: [M4G | M5G, M5G], + supportedModes: [ + [M4G | M5G, M5G], + [M4G | M5G, M4G], + [M4G | M5G | FUTURE, FUTURE], + ], +}); + +const descriptorFor = (truth: Parameters[0]['truth']) => + buildModeWriteDescriptor({ + provider: 'modemmanager', + profile: 'generic-mm', + truth, + writeSupported: true, + }); + +describe('FM350 `preferred: none` survives to the descriptor VERBATIM', () => { + const descriptor = descriptorFor(FM350); + + test('the descriptor offers exactly the advertised combination', () => { + expect(descriptor.constraints).toEqual({ + kind: 'allowed-values', + values: [{ allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }], + }); + }); + + test('`preferred` is `none` and was not coerced to any allowed mode', () => { + const values = + descriptor.constraints.kind === 'allowed-values' ? descriptor.constraints.values : []; + expect(values[0]?.preferred).toBe(MODE_NONE); + for (const mode of ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g', '5g']) { + expect(values[0]?.preferred).not.toBe(mode); + } + }); + + test('the reading is `reported` and its combination is the same one', () => { + expect(FM350.current).toEqual({ + state: 'reported', + combination: modeCombination(FM350_ALLOWED, 0), + }); + expect(advertisesNoPreference(FM350)).toBe(true); + }); + + test('the descriptor is available and write-supported', () => { + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ state: 'available' }); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ supported: true }); + expect(descriptor.id).toBe(MODE_WRITE_OPERATION_ID); + }); +}); + +describe('Quectel and SIMCom fixtures', () => { + test('Quectel advertises one no-preference combination', () => { + expect(descriptorFor(QUECTEL).constraints).toEqual({ + kind: 'allowed-values', + values: [{ allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }], + }); + }); + + test('SIMCom advertises one 3G-only no-preference combination', () => { + expect(descriptorFor(SIMCOM).constraints).toEqual({ + kind: 'allowed-values', + values: [{ allowed: ['3g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }], + }); + }); + + test('two combinations sharing an allowed set differ only in the preference', () => { + const values = UNKNOWN_COMBINATION.supported.combinations.map(selectionOf); + expect(values[0]).toEqual({ allowed: ['4g', '5g'], preferred: '5g' }); + expect(values[1]).toEqual({ allowed: ['4g', '5g'], preferred: '4g' }); + expect(sameSelection(values[0] as ModeSelection, values[1] as ModeSelection)).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe('an unknown combination stays OFFERED, never coerced to unsupported', () => { + const descriptor = descriptorFor(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION); + + test('the unnameable combination is in the descriptor`s allowed values', () => { + const values = + descriptor.constraints.kind === 'allowed-values' ? descriptor.constraints.values : []; + expect(values).toHaveLength(3); + expect(values[2]).toEqual({ + allowed: ['4g', '5g', 'mode-bit-512'], + preferred: 'mode-bit-512', + }); + }); + + test('the descriptor stays available despite carrying an unknown combination', () => { + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ state: 'available' }); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ supported: true }); + }); + + test('it can be matched and encoded back to the exact masks the modem sent', () => { + const selection: ModeSelection = { + allowed: ['4g', '5g', 'mode-bit-512'], + preferred: 'mode-bit-512', + }; + expect(matchAdvertisedCombination(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION.supported, selection)).toBeDefined(); + expect(encodeModeSelection(selection)).toEqual({ + ok: true, + allowedMask: M4G | M5G | FUTURE, + preferredMask: FUTURE, + }); + }); +}); + +describe('refusals are refusals, never substitutions', () => { + test('a selection the modem never advertised matches nothing', () => { + expect( + matchAdvertisedCombination(FM350.supported, { + allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g'], + preferred: '4g', + }), + ).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('a nearest-neighbour is NOT returned for an unadvertised preference', () => { + const nearest = matchAdvertisedCombination(UNKNOWN_COMBINATION.supported, { + allowed: ['4g', '5g'], + preferred: '3g', + }); + expect(nearest).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test('an empty catalog refuses the descriptor rather than offering an open write', () => { + const descriptor = descriptorFor(readRadioModeTruth({ currentModes: 7, supportedModes: [] })); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ + state: 'refused', + reason: 'no-advertised-mode-combinations', + }); + }); + + test('a modem with no mode write says so in support AND availability', () => { + const descriptor = buildModeWriteDescriptor({ + provider: 'modemmanager', + profile: 'generic-mm', + truth: FM350, + writeSupported: false, + }); + expect(descriptor.support.write).toEqual({ + supported: false, + reason: 'mode-write-unsupported', + }); + expect(descriptor.availability).toEqual({ + state: 'refused', + reason: 'mode-write-unsupported', + }); + }); + + test('an unplaceable mode name fails the encode closed', () => { + expect(encodeModeSelection({ allowed: ['4g', 'lte-advanced'], preferred: '4g' })).toEqual({ + ok: false, + unknown: 'lte-advanced', + }); + }); +}); + +describe('the write is disruptive and readback-gated', () => { + const descriptor = descriptorFor(FM350); + + test('mutation impact is disruptive and the write is journalled and admitted', () => { + expect(descriptor.mutationImpact).toBe('disruptive'); + expect(descriptor.journal).toEqual({ required: true, reason: 'disruptive-radio-write' }); + expect(descriptor.admission).toEqual({ required: true, reason: 'provider-mutation' }); + expect(descriptor.retryClass).toBe('never'); + }); + + test('readback confirms only when BOTH the allowed set and the preference match', () => { + expect(descriptor.readback.required).toBe(true); + if (!descriptor.readback.required) return; + const selection: ModeSelection = { allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g'], preferred: MODE_NONE }; + expect(descriptor.readback.matches(selection, FM350)).toBe(true); + expect( + descriptor.readback.matches({ allowed: ['cs', '2g', '3g', '4g'], preferred: '4g' }, FM350), + ).toBe(false); + }); + + test('a modem that reported no current modes cannot satisfy a readback', () => { + expect(descriptor.readback.required).toBe(true); + if (!descriptor.readback.required) return; + const unreported = readRadioModeTruth({ currentModes: undefined, supportedModes: [] }); + expect(unreported.current).toEqual({ state: 'not-reported' }); + expect(descriptor.readback.matches({ allowed: ['cs'], preferred: MODE_NONE }, unreported)).toBe( + false, + ); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/radio/mode-truth.ts b/control/src/radio/mode-truth.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81d3484 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/radio/mode-truth.ts @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +// What the modem says it can do with its modes, and the operation descriptor built +// from exactly that — nothing added, nothing narrowed. +// +// `capability/five-g-preference.ts` maps four named POSTURES onto an (allowed, +// preferred) pair and refuses to name one the modem never advertised. This module is +// the layer underneath it: the modem's own catalog, unedited, so a posture selector +// and a raw combination selector are reading the same truth. It deliberately does not +// know what a posture is. +// +// THE OFFERED SET IS THE ADVERTISED SET. A combination classified +// `unknown-combination` — an unfamiliar mode bit, a preferred mode outside its own +// allowed set — is STILL offered, because the modem advertised it and will accept it. +// Hiding it would be coercing `unknown` into `unsupported`, which is the one thing +// `support-claim.ts` exists to stop. + +import { defineOperationDescriptor, type OperationDescriptor } from '../domain'; +import { + decodeModeCombination, + decodeSupportedModeCombinations, + encodeModeNames, + MODE_NONE, + type ModeCombination, + type ModeCombinationSet, + type ModeName, + statesNoPreference, +} from './mode-combinations'; + +/** + * A mode selection as a caller expresses it: the set to allow, and the one to prefer + * within it. `preferred: 'none'` is a first-class selection, not a missing field. + */ +export type ModeSelection = { + readonly allowed: readonly ModeName[]; + readonly preferred: ModeName; +}; + +/** `CurrentModes` as a reading — "the modem did not report it" is an answer, not a null. */ +export type ModeCombinationReading = + | { readonly state: 'reported'; readonly combination: ModeCombination } + | { readonly state: 'not-reported' }; + +export type RadioModeTruth = { + readonly current: ModeCombinationReading; + readonly supported: ModeCombinationSet; +}; + +export function readRadioModeTruth(input: { + readonly currentModes: unknown; + readonly supportedModes: unknown; +}): RadioModeTruth { + const current = decodeModeCombination(input.currentModes); + return { + current: + current === undefined + ? { state: 'not-reported' } + : { state: 'reported', combination: current }, + supported: decodeSupportedModeCombinations(input.supportedModes), + }; +} + +/** The selection a combination represents, with `preferred` carried across verbatim. */ +export function selectionOf(combination: ModeCombination): ModeSelection { + return { allowed: combination.allowed, preferred: combination.preferred }; +} + +function sameNameSet(left: readonly ModeName[], right: readonly ModeName[]): boolean { + if (left.length !== right.length) return false; + const sorted = [...right].sort(); + return [...left].sort().every((name, index) => name === sorted[index]); +} + +/** Two selections are the same when both the allowed set AND the preference agree. */ +export function sameSelection(left: ModeSelection, right: ModeSelection): boolean { + return left.preferred === right.preferred && sameNameSet(left.allowed, right.allowed); +} + +/** + * The advertised combination a selection names, or `undefined`. + * + * `undefined` is the whole answer — never the nearest neighbour. `prefer-4g` silently + * becoming `prefer-5g` on a marginal cell is the exact substitution + * `five-g-preference.ts` refuses, and it is refused here for the same reason. + */ +export function matchAdvertisedCombination( + supported: ModeCombinationSet, + selection: ModeSelection, +): ModeCombination | undefined { + return supported.combinations.find((each) => sameSelection(selectionOf(each), selection)); +} + +/** The masks `SetCurrentModes` needs, or the name that could not be placed. */ +export function encodeModeSelection( + selection: ModeSelection, +): + | { readonly ok: true; readonly allowedMask: number; readonly preferredMask: number } + | { readonly ok: false; readonly unknown: ModeName } { + const allowed = encodeModeNames(selection.allowed); + if (!allowed.ok) return allowed; + const preferred = encodeModeNames(selection.preferred === MODE_NONE ? [] : [selection.preferred]); + if (!preferred.ok) return preferred; + return { ok: true, allowedMask: allowed.mask, preferredMask: preferred.mask }; +} + +export const MODE_WRITE_OPERATION_ID = 'modemmanager.mode-combination'; + +/** Why a mode write is not on offer right now. */ +export type ModeWriteRefusal = 'mode-write-unsupported' | 'no-advertised-mode-combinations'; + +export type ModeWriteDescriptorInput = { + readonly provider: string; + readonly profile: string; + readonly truth: RadioModeTruth; + readonly writeSupported: boolean; +}; + +/** + * The live mode-write descriptor. + * + * `constraints` is an `allowed-values` list built from the modem's OWN catalog, so a + * combination carrying `preferred: 'none'` reaches a consumer through the descriptor + * exactly as the modem stated it. Readback is REQUIRED: `SetCurrentModes` returning + * without an error only proves the daemon accepted the call, and an + * accepted-but-ignored mode write is indistinguishable from success at the call site. + */ +export function buildModeWriteDescriptor( + input: ModeWriteDescriptorInput, +): OperationDescriptor { + const values = input.truth.supported.combinations.map(selectionOf); + const refusal: ModeWriteRefusal | undefined = !input.writeSupported + ? 'mode-write-unsupported' + : values.length === 0 + ? 'no-advertised-mode-combinations' + : undefined; + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: MODE_WRITE_OPERATION_ID, + support: { + read: { supported: true }, + write: input.writeSupported + ? { supported: true } + : { supported: false, reason: 'mode-write-unsupported' }, + }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: input.provider, + constraints: { kind: 'allowed-values', values }, + livePreconditions: [ + 'modem-present', + 'runtime-interface-present', + 'mode-combination-advertised', + ], + availability: + refusal === undefined ? { state: 'available' } : { state: 'refused', reason: refusal }, + mutationImpact: 'disruptive', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: { + required: true, + reason: 'mode-write-readback', + matches: (selection, observed) => + observed.current.state === 'reported' && + sameSelection(selectionOf(observed.current.combination), selection), + }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: true, reason: 'disruptive-radio-write' }, + admission: { required: true, reason: 'provider-mutation' }, + evidence: { profiles: [input.profile], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', + }); +} + +/** True when the modem advertises at least one combination stating no preference. */ +export function advertisesNoPreference(truth: RadioModeTruth): boolean { + return truth.supported.combinations.some(statesNoPreference); +} diff --git a/control/src/safety/composition-root.test.ts b/control/src/safety/composition-root.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cb9bc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/safety/composition-root.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { physicalModemId } from '../domain'; +import type { MutationAdmissionPort, ResourceOwnershipPort } from '../ports'; +import { + CompositionRootAlreadyExistsError, + createModemControlCompositionRoot, + MissingResourceOwnershipPortError, +} from './composition-root'; + +const admission: MutationAdmissionPort = { + acquire: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'refused', reason: 'admission-refused' }), +}; +const ownership: ResourceOwnershipPort = { + acquire: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'refused', reason: 'already-owned' }), +}; + +describe('modem control composition root', () => { + test('Given no ownership port, When a root is constructed, Then construction fails hard', () => { + expect(() => createModemControlCompositionRoot({ admission, ownership: undefined })).toThrow( + MissingResourceOwnershipPortError, + ); + }); + + test('Given one live root, When a second root is constructed, Then construction throws', async () => { + const first = createModemControlCompositionRoot({ admission, ownership }); + try { + expect(() => createModemControlCompositionRoot({ admission, ownership })).toThrow( + CompositionRootAlreadyExistsError, + ); + } finally { + await first.dispose(); + } + }); + + test('Given callers ask for the same physical modem, When they obtain an actor, Then the root shares one actor', async () => { + const root = createModemControlCompositionRoot({ admission, ownership }); + try { + const modem = physicalModemId('serial:shared-actor'); + expect(root.actorFor(modem)).toBe(root.actorFor(modem)); + } finally { + await root.dispose(); + } + }); +}); diff --git a/control/src/safety/composition-root.ts b/control/src/safety/composition-root.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13aa181 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/safety/composition-root.ts @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +import { ModemActor, type QuiesceHook } from '../backend/modem-actor'; +import type { PhysicalModemId } from '../domain'; +import type { + MutationAdmissionPort, + ResourceOwnershipLease, + ResourceOwnershipPort, + ResourceOwnershipRequest, + ResourceOwnershipResult, + UhubctlPort, +} from '../ports'; + +let compositionRootExists = false; + +export class CompositionRootAlreadyExistsError extends Error { + override readonly name = 'CompositionRootAlreadyExistsError'; + + constructor() { + super('a modem-control composition root already exists in this process'); + } +} + +export type ModemControlCompositionRootOptions = { + readonly admission: MutationAdmissionPort; + readonly ownership: ResourceOwnershipPort | undefined; + readonly quiesce?: QuiesceHook; + readonly uhubctl?: UhubctlPort; +}; + +export class ModemControlCompositionRoot { + readonly admission: MutationAdmissionPort; + readonly ownership: ResourceOwnershipPort; + readonly uhubctl: UhubctlPort | undefined; + readonly #quiesce: QuiesceHook | undefined; + readonly #actors = new Map(); + readonly #ownershipLeases: ResourceOwnershipLease[] = []; + #disposed = false; + + constructor(options: ModemControlCompositionRootOptions) { + if (compositionRootExists) throw new CompositionRootAlreadyExistsError(); + if (options.ownership === undefined) throw new MissingResourceOwnershipPortError(); + compositionRootExists = true; + this.admission = options.admission; + this.ownership = options.ownership; + this.#quiesce = options.quiesce; + this.uhubctl = options.uhubctl; + } + + actorFor(modemId: PhysicalModemId): ModemActor { + const existing = this.#actors.get(modemId); + if (existing !== undefined) return existing; + const actor = new ModemActor(this.#quiesce); + this.#actors.set(modemId, actor); + return actor; + } + + async acquireOwnership(request: ResourceOwnershipRequest): Promise { + const result = await this.ownership.acquire(request); + if (result.status === 'acquired') this.#ownershipLeases.push(result.lease); + return result; + } + + async dispose(): Promise { + if (this.#disposed) return; + this.#disposed = true; + try { + for (const lease of this.#ownershipLeases.splice(0).reverse()) { + await lease.release(); + } + } finally { + this.#actors.clear(); + compositionRootExists = false; + } + } +} + +export class MissingResourceOwnershipPortError extends Error { + override readonly name = 'MissingResourceOwnershipPortError'; + + constructor() { + super('a ResourceOwnershipPort is required; no pass-through default exists'); + } +} + +export function createModemControlCompositionRoot( + options: ModemControlCompositionRootOptions, +): ModemControlCompositionRoot { + return new ModemControlCompositionRoot(options); +} diff --git a/control/src/safety/flock-resource-ownership.ts b/control/src/safety/flock-resource-ownership.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe0fa05 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/safety/flock-resource-ownership.ts @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +import { type ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; +import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import type { + ResourceOwnershipHolder, + ResourceOwnershipLease, + ResourceOwnershipPort, + ResourceOwnershipResult, +} from '../ports'; + +const LOCK_HELPER = String.raw` +import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; +const lockPath = process.env.CERALIVE_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH; +if (!lockPath) process.exit(64); +const holder = { pid: process.pid, startedAtEpochMs: Date.now() }; +writeFileSync(lockPath, JSON.stringify(holder) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 }); +process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ type: 'acquired', holder }) + '\n'); +process.stdin.resume(); +`; + +export type FlockResourceOwnershipOptions = { + readonly lockPath: string; + readonly flockBinary?: string; +}; + +export class FlockResourceOwnershipError extends Error { + override readonly name = 'FlockResourceOwnershipError'; + + constructor(readonly detail: string) { + super(`flock ownership failed: ${detail}`); + } +} + +type ChildStart = + | { readonly status: 'acquired'; readonly holder: ResourceOwnershipHolder } + | { readonly status: 'closed'; readonly code: number | null; readonly stderr: string }; + +export function createFlockResourceOwnershipPort( + options: FlockResourceOwnershipOptions, +): ResourceOwnershipPort { + return { + async acquire(): Promise { + const child = spawn( + options.flockBinary ?? 'flock', + [ + '--exclusive', + '--nonblock', + '--no-fork', + options.lockPath, + process.execPath, + '-e', + LOCK_HELPER, + ], + { + env: { + ...process.env, + CERALIVE_MODEM_CONTROL_LOCK_PATH: options.lockPath, + }, + stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], + }, + ); + const closed = childClosed(child); + const started = await childStarted(child); + if (started.status === 'closed') { + if (started.code === 1) { + const holder = await readHolder(options.lockPath); + return { + status: 'refused', + reason: 'already-owned', + ...(holder !== undefined && pidIsAlive(holder.pid) ? { holder } : {}), + }; + } + throw new FlockResourceOwnershipError( + `helper exited ${started.code ?? 'by signal'}${started.stderr ? `: ${started.stderr}` : ''}`, + ); + } + + return { + status: 'acquired', + lease: createLease(child, closed, started.holder), + }; + }, + }; +} + +function createLease( + child: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams, + closed: Promise, + holder: ResourceOwnershipHolder, +): ResourceOwnershipLease { + let released = false; + return { + holder, + lost: closed.then(() => ({ reason: 'holder-exited' }) as const), + async release(): Promise { + if (released) return; + released = true; + if (child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) { + child.stdin.end(); + } + await closed; + }, + }; +} + +function childClosed(child: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => child.once('close', () => resolve())); +} + +function childStarted(child: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => { + let stdout = ''; + let stderr = ''; + let settled = false; + const finish = (result: ChildStart): void => { + if (settled) return; + settled = true; + resolve(result); + }; + child.stderr.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { + stderr += chunk.toString('utf8'); + }); + child.stdout.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { + stdout += chunk.toString('utf8'); + const newline = stdout.indexOf('\n'); + if (newline < 0) return; + const holder = parseAcquiredLine(stdout.slice(0, newline)); + if (holder !== undefined) finish({ status: 'acquired', holder }); + }); + child.once('close', (code) => finish({ status: 'closed', code, stderr: stderr.trim() })); + }); +} + +function parseAcquiredLine(line: string): ResourceOwnershipHolder | undefined { + try { + const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(line); + if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || !('holder' in parsed)) return undefined; + return parseHolder(parsed.holder); + } catch (error) { + if (error instanceof SyntaxError) return undefined; + throw error; + } +} + +async function readHolder(lockPath: string): Promise { + try { + return parseHolder(JSON.parse(await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8'))); + } catch (error) { + if (error instanceof Error && 'code' in error && error.code === 'ENOENT') return undefined; + if (error instanceof SyntaxError) return undefined; + throw error; + } +} + +function parseHolder(value: unknown): ResourceOwnershipHolder | undefined { + if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return undefined; + if (!('pid' in value) || !('startedAtEpochMs' in value)) return undefined; + if (typeof value.pid !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(value.pid) || value.pid <= 0) { + return undefined; + } + if (typeof value.startedAtEpochMs !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(value.startedAtEpochMs)) { + return undefined; + } + return { pid: value.pid, startedAtEpochMs: value.startedAtEpochMs }; +} + +function pidIsAlive(pid: number): boolean { + try { + process.kill(pid, 0); + return true; + } catch (error) { + if (error instanceof Error && 'code' in error && error.code === 'ESRCH') return false; + return true; + } +} diff --git a/control/src/safety/index.ts b/control/src/safety/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0702ca --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/safety/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +export * from './composition-root'; +export * from './flock-resource-ownership'; diff --git a/control/src/safety/resource-ownership.integration.test.ts b/control/src/safety/resource-ownership.integration.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..056171d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/src/safety/resource-ownership.integration.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test'; +import { type ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; +import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +type RootMessage = + | { readonly type: 'acquired'; readonly holderPid: number } + | { readonly type: 'refused'; readonly reason: 'already-owned'; readonly holderPid?: number } + | { readonly type: 'expired' } + | { readonly type: 'released' }; + +const children: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams[] = []; +const tempPaths: string[] = []; + +afterEach(async () => { + for (const child of children.splice(0)) { + if (child.exitCode === null) { + child.stdin.end('release\n'); + await new Promise((resolve) => child.once('exit', () => resolve())); + } + } + for (const path of tempPaths.splice(0)) { + await rm(path, { recursive: true, force: true }); + } +}); + +async function lockPath(): Promise { + const directory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'modem-control-lock-')); + tempPaths.push(directory); + return join(directory, 'ownership.lock'); +} + +function spawnRoot(path: string): ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams { + const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['control/test-support/ownership-root-fixture.ts', path], { + cwd: process.cwd(), + stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], + }); + children.push(child); + return child; +} + +function nextMessage(child: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + let buffer = ''; + const onData = (chunk: Buffer): void => { + buffer += chunk.toString('utf8'); + const newline = buffer.indexOf('\n'); + if (newline < 0) return; + cleanup(); + resolve(JSON.parse(buffer.slice(0, newline)) as RootMessage); + }; + const onExit = (code: number | null): void => { + cleanup(); + reject(new Error(`ownership fixture exited before a message (code ${code})`)); + }; + const cleanup = (): void => { + child.stdout.off('data', onData); + child.off('exit', onExit); + }; + child.stdout.on('data', onData); + child.once('exit', onExit); + }); +} + +describe('flock resource ownership across composition roots', () => { + test('Given two roots and one lock path, When both acquire, Then exactly one acquires and one refuses without queueing', async () => { + const path = await lockPath(); + const roots = [spawnRoot(path), spawnRoot(path)]; + const results = await Promise.all(roots.map(nextMessage)); + + expect(results.filter((result) => result.type === 'acquired')).toHaveLength(1); + expect(results.filter((result) => result.type === 'refused')).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + test('Given a live holder, When its lock process is killed, Then no successor steals before PID expiry and one acquires after expiry', async () => { + const path = await lockPath(); + const holderRoot = spawnRoot(path); + const acquired = await nextMessage(holderRoot); + expect(acquired.type).toBe('acquired'); + if (acquired.type !== 'acquired') return; + + const liveContender = spawnRoot(path); + expect(await nextMessage(liveContender)).toMatchObject({ + type: 'refused', + reason: 'already-owned', + holderPid: acquired.holderPid, + }); + + process.kill(acquired.holderPid, 'SIGKILL'); + expect(await nextMessage(holderRoot)).toEqual({ type: 'expired' }); + + const successor = spawnRoot(path); + expect(await nextMessage(successor)).toMatchObject({ type: 'acquired' }); + }); +}); diff --git a/control/test-support/README.md b/control/test-support/README.md index 3f522c2..e2d6c23 100644 --- a/control/test-support/README.md +++ b/control/test-support/README.md @@ -45,9 +45,38 @@ A real ModemManager object model served on a private session bus (built on the s reflects exactly what was written — **real readback**, no canned strings. - `FakeNetworkManagerPort` fulfils the `NetworkManagerPort` contract over that runner. -Neither is the shipping adapter. A4.1's `NmcliNmPort` owns the full nine-field GSM write -parity and the atomic Auto-APN transitions; this harness is what A4.1 injects to assert -them. +Neither is the shipping adapter. `NmcliNmPort` (`control/src/backend/nmcli-nm-port.ts`) owns +the full nine-field GSM write parity and the atomic Auto-APN transitions; this harness is +what its suite injects to assert them. `NetworkManagerAdapter` +(`control/src/providers/network-manager/`) sits one level up on the same harness — the +runner's real readback is what lets its tests tell "the desired slot echoed the request" +apart from "the desired slot was seeded from the readback". + +## `conformance/` — the provider-matching matrix harness + +The corpus and harness behind `control/src/providers/conformance-{matrix,transcripts,scale}.test.ts`. +It is the only place all four real providers (ModemManager, Huawei HiLink, ZTE goform, +UFI/HIMI) are registered at once, so it is where a provider claiming a neighbour's +hardware is visible at all. + +- `exchange.ts` — ONE normalized `RecordedExchange` shape for three transports that agree + about nothing (HiLink posts XML to a path, goform posts a form and carries its verb in + `goformId`, HIMI posts JSON to one endpoint and carries its verb in `cmdid`). Bodies are + decoded into the vendor's own encoding rather than flattened to a string, headers are kept + verbatim **in order**, and the cookie is lifted out because that is where the three diverge. +- `corpus.ts` — the sanitized per-firmware documents. It **reuses** `observation-fixtures.ts` + for every telemetry payload; what is new is only the session / login / challenge documents + those fixtures do not carry. Devices are ROUTE TABLES, not ordered reply queues, so a case + cannot break just because another provider's probe interleaved. +- `transcripts.ts` — expected transcripts rebuilt **from the protocol**, so a `toEqual` + against a recording is a comparison and not an echo. +- `cases.ts` — the 20-case table with each case's entitled decision. +- `mm-transport.ts` — an in-memory `DbusTransport` over the SAME `fake-mm/object-model.ts` + tree. `fake-mm/service.ts` remains the right harness for codec and epoch proof (only a real + bus proves those); this one exists because a matrix whose ModemManager rows SKIP wherever + there is no session bus is a matrix with holes in it, and it makes the 16-modem scale + fixture's resource counts deterministic. +- `matrix-report.ts` — writes the summary artifact to the gitignored `test-results/`. ## Running diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/cases.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/cases.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad7d1ee --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/cases.ts @@ -0,0 +1,633 @@ +// The conformance case table — every fleet profile and every safety case, run through +// the REAL matcher with all four real providers registered at once. +// +// Each provider suite (todos 22/24/25/26) proves its own provider in isolation, with +// only that provider in the registry. That is the right shape for a provider suite and +// it structurally cannot answer the question this table exists for: does a Huawei dongle +// stay a Huawei dongle when a ZTE provider and a UFI provider are also asking? Every +// case below registers ALL FOUR and scripts the three the device is not as devices that +// answer nothing this vendor understands — which is what a real board looks like. +// +// The expectation is the exact decision, not a shape: provider, profile, writable and +// evidence score. A case that is "close enough" is a case that would not notice a +// provider quietly claiming a neighbour's hardware. + +import { + type DeviceGeneration, + deviceGeneration, + type PhysicalModemId, + physicalModemId, +} from '../../src/domain'; +import type { ResourceOwnershipPort } from '../../src/ports/resource-ownership'; +import { + createProviderMatcher, + createProviderRegistry, + type MatcherScore, + type PassiveFact, + type ProviderMatchRequest, + type ProviderMatchResult, + type ProviderTransport, +} from '../../src/providers'; +import { createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition } from '../../src/providers/huawei-hilink'; +import { createModemManagerProvider } from '../../src/providers/modem-manager'; +import { createUfiHimiDefinition } from '../../src/providers/ufi-himi'; +import { createZteGoformDefinition } from '../../src/providers/zte-goform'; +import type { ModemSpec } from '../fake-mm/object-model'; +import { + CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + HILINK_ADMIN_URL, + HILINK_FIRMWARE, + HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, + HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE, + hilinkDevice, + interfaceRoutedDevice, + UFI_ADMIN_URL, + UFI_INTERFACE, + USB_IDS, + ufiDevice, + ZTE_ADMIN_URL, + ZTE_INTERFACE, + zteDevice, +} from './corpus'; +import { + absentDevice, + type RecordedExchange, + recordHilink, + recordUfi, + recordZte, + type ScriptedDevice, +} from './exchange'; +import { FakeMmTransport, type RecordedCall } from './mm-transport'; + +/** Ownership is not what a matcher exercises; an always-granting port keeps it out. */ +const grantingOwnership: ResourceOwnershipPort = { + acquire: async () => ({ + status: 'acquired', + lease: { + holder: { pid: 1, startedAtEpochMs: 1 }, + lost: new Promise(() => {}), + release: async () => {}, + }, + }), +}; + +export type ScenarioOptions = { + readonly hilink?: ScriptedDevice; + readonly hilinkInterface?: string; + /** A SECOND write-capable HiLink definition with an identical passive fingerprint. */ + readonly hilinkTwin?: ScriptedDevice; + readonly zte?: ScriptedDevice; + readonly ufi?: ScriptedDevice; + readonly mmModems?: readonly ModemSpec[]; +}; + +export type ScenarioTranscripts = { + readonly hilink: readonly RecordedExchange[]; + readonly hilinkTwin: readonly RecordedExchange[]; + readonly zte: readonly RecordedExchange[]; + readonly ufi: readonly RecordedExchange[]; +}; + +export type ConformanceRun = { + readonly result: ProviderMatchResult; + readonly transcripts: ScenarioTranscripts; + /** Authentication attempts made by the COLLIDING twin — must stay 0 on a tie. */ + readonly twinAuthAttempts: number; + readonly mmCalls: readonly RecordedCall[]; +}; + +async function runScenario( + options: ScenarioOptions, + request: ProviderMatchRequest, +): Promise { + const hilinkInterface = options.hilinkInterface ?? HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE; + const hilink = recordHilink(options.hilink ?? absentDevice); + const hilinkTwin = recordHilink(options.hilinkTwin ?? absentDevice); + const zte = recordZte(options.zte ?? absentDevice); + const ufi = recordUfi(options.ufi ?? absentDevice); + const mm = new FakeMmTransport({ ...(options.mmModems ? { modems: options.mmModems } : {}) }); + const mmProvider = createModemManagerProvider({ transport: mm }); + + const registry = createProviderRegistry(); + registry.register(mmProvider.definition); + registry.register( + createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition({ + interfaceName: hilinkInterface, + adminUrl: HILINK_ADMIN_URL, + transport: hilink.transport, + ownership: grantingOwnership, + credentials: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + }), + ); + let twinAuthAttempts = 0; + if (options.hilinkTwin !== undefined) { + const twin = createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition({ + interfaceName: hilinkInterface, + adminUrl: HILINK_ADMIN_URL, + transport: hilinkTwin.transport, + ownership: grantingOwnership, + credentials: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + }); + const authenticatedProfile = twin.authenticatedProfile; + registry.register({ + ...twin, + id: 'huawei-hilink-twin', + ...(authenticatedProfile === undefined + ? {} + : { + authenticatedProfile: { + ...authenticatedProfile, + authenticate: async (context, candidates) => { + twinAuthAttempts += 1; + return authenticatedProfile.authenticate(context, candidates); + }, + }, + }), + }); + } + registry.register( + createZteGoformDefinition({ + interfaceName: ZTE_INTERFACE, + adminUrl: ZTE_ADMIN_URL, + transport: zte.transport, + credentials: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + }), + ); + registry.register( + createUfiHimiDefinition({ + interfaceName: UFI_INTERFACE, + adminUrl: UFI_ADMIN_URL, + transport: ufi.transport, + credentials: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + now: () => 1_700_000_000_000, + }), + ); + + try { + const result = await createProviderMatcher(registry).match(request); + return { + result, + transcripts: { + hilink: hilink.exchanges, + hilinkTwin: hilinkTwin.exchanges, + zte: zte.exchanges, + ufi: ufi.exchanges, + }, + twinAuthAttempts, + mmCalls: mm.calls, + }; + } finally { + await mmProvider.stop(); + } +} + +const GENERATION: DeviceGeneration = deviceGeneration(1); + +function request(options: { + readonly id: string; + readonly transport?: ProviderTransport; + readonly facts?: readonly PassiveFact[]; + readonly firmware?: string; + readonly composition?: string; +}): ProviderMatchRequest { + const id: PhysicalModemId = physicalModemId(options.id); + return { + physicalModemId: id, + generation: GENERATION, + transport: options.transport ?? 'network', + passiveFacts: options.facts ?? [], + composition: options.composition ?? 'rndis', + ...(options.firmware === undefined ? {} : { firmware: options.firmware }), + }; +} + +const usbFact = (value: string): PassiveFact => ({ kind: 'usb', value }); +const firmwareFact = (value: string): PassiveFact => ({ kind: 'firmware', value }); + +// ── the fleet's ModemManager-managed specs ────────────────────────────────────────── + +/** Bench Quectel RM530N-GL. `DeviceIdentifier` is what the identity ladder keys on. */ +export const QUECTEL_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 1, + manufacturer: 'Quectel', + model: 'RM530N-GL', + revision: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02M4G', + supportedModes: [[7, 0]], + currentModes: [7, 0], + supportedBands: [33, 378], + sims: [{ index: 1, iccid: '8900000000000000001', imsi: '001010000000001', active: true }], +}; + +/** Bench SIMCom SIM7600G-H. */ +export const SIMCOM_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 2, + manufacturer: 'SIMCom', + model: 'SIM7600G-H', + revision: 'LE20B04SIM7600G22', + supportedModes: [[4, 0]], + currentModes: [4, 0], + sims: [{ index: 2, iccid: '8900000000000000002', imsi: '001010000000002', active: true }], +}; + +/** + * Fibocom FM350-GL as the bench sees it: on an M.2→USB carrier, enumerated and managed + * by ModemManager. `docs/FM350-DECISION.md` keeps its `0e8d:7127` carrier identity out + * of the USB composition catalog; that is a MODE-CONTROL exclusion, and it says nothing + * about matching — the modem is still an MM-managed modem and must still be selected. + */ +export const FM350_USB_SPEC: ModemSpec = { + index: 4, + manufacturer: 'Fibocom', + model: 'FM350-GL', + revision: '81600.0000.00.19.17.10', + supportedModes: [[15, 0]], + currentModes: [15, 0], + location: { capabilities: 4 }, + sims: [{ index: 4, iccid: '8900000000000000004', imsi: '001010000000004', active: true }], +}; + +// ── case table ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +export type ConformanceKind = + | 'fleet-profile' + | 'ambiguity' + | 'malformed' + | 'auth-expired' + | 'lockout-unknown' + | 'unknown-firmware' + | 'wrong-interface' + | 'wrong-transport'; + +export type ConformanceExpectation = { + readonly status: ProviderMatchResult['status']; + readonly provider: string | null; + readonly profile: string | null; + readonly writable: boolean; + readonly score: MatcherScore; +}; + +export type ConformanceCase = { + readonly id: string; + readonly kind: ConformanceKind; + readonly summary: string; + readonly expected: ConformanceExpectation; + readonly run: () => Promise; +}; + +const HILINK_A: keyof typeof HILINK_FIRMWARE = 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3'; +const HILINK_B: keyof typeof HILINK_FIRMWARE = 'e3372h-22.333-password-type-4'; + +const selected = ( + provider: string, + profile: string, + writable: boolean, +): ConformanceExpectation => ({ + status: 'selected', + provider, + profile, + writable, + score: 'supported', +}); + +const unresolved = ( + status: 'ambiguous' | 'unsupported', + score: MatcherScore, +): ConformanceExpectation => ({ status, provider: null, profile: null, writable: false, score }); + +export const CONFORMANCE_CASES: readonly ConformanceCase[] = [ + { + id: 'fleet/mm-quectel-rm530n', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'MM-managed Quectel RM530N-GL selects the generic runtime profile', + expected: selected('modemmanager', 'generic-mm', true), + run: () => + runScenario( + { mmModems: [QUECTEL_SPEC] }, + request({ + id: 'serial:fake-device-1', + transport: 'modemmanager', + composition: 'quectel-rmnet', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/mm-simcom-sim7600', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'MM-managed SIMCom SIM7600G-H selects the generic runtime profile', + expected: selected('modemmanager', 'generic-mm', true), + run: () => + runScenario( + { mmModems: [SIMCOM_SPEC] }, + request({ + id: 'serial:fake-device-2', + transport: 'modemmanager', + composition: 'simcom-ecm', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/mm-fm350-usb', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'FM350-GL on an M.2→USB carrier stays an MM-managed modem', + expected: selected('modemmanager', 'generic-mm', true), + run: () => + runScenario( + { mmModems: [FM350_USB_SPEC] }, + request({ + id: 'serial:fake-device-4', + transport: 'modemmanager', + composition: 'fm350-usb-carrier', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/huawei-e3372h-22.200', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'HiLink firmware 22.200 selects the password-type-3 profile', + expected: selected('huawei-hilink', HILINK_A, true), + run: () => + runScenario( + { hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-hilink-a', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/huawei-e3372h-22.333', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'HiLink firmware 22.333 selects the password-type-4 profile', + expected: selected('huawei-hilink', HILINK_B, true), + run: () => + runScenario( + { hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_B }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-hilink-b', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_B])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_B], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/zte-mf79u', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'MF79U selects the legacy base64 profile and stays read-only', + expected: selected('zte-goform', 'mf79u-legacy', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { zte: zteDevice({ firmware: 'MF79U' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-zte-mf79u', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.zteMf79u), firmwareFact('MF79U')], + firmware: 'MF79U', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/zte-mf266', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: 'MF266 selects the salted SHA-256 profile and stays read-only', + expected: selected('zte-goform', 'mf266-salted', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { zte: zteDevice({ firmware: 'MF266' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-zte-mf266', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.zteMf266), firmwareFact('MF266')], + firmware: 'MF266', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/ufi-himi-9024', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: '05c6:9024 (RNDIS+ADB composition) selects the read-only HIMI profile', + expected: selected('ufi-himi', 'ufi-himi-read-only', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { ufi: ufiDevice() }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-ufi-9024', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.ufiRndisAdb)], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'fleet/ufi-himi-9091', + kind: 'fleet-profile', + summary: '05c6:9091 (firmware-specific, NOT DIAG evidence) selects the same read-only profile', + expected: selected('ufi-himi', 'ufi-himi-read-only', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { ufi: ufiDevice() }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-ufi-9091', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.ufiFirmwareSpecific)], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'ambiguity/colliding-write-capable-twins', + kind: 'ambiguity', + summary: 'two write-capable providers with one fingerprint tie into read-only ambiguity', + expected: unresolved('ambiguous', 'supported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { + hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A }), + hilinkTwin: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A }), + }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-collision', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'ambiguity/zte-cross-profile-refusal', + kind: 'ambiguity', + summary: 'MF266-shaped answers to an MF79U login are refused, never re-tried salted', + expected: unresolved('ambiguous', 'supported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { zte: zteDevice({ firmware: 'MF79U', login: 'salted-shape' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-zte-crossprofile', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.zteMf79u), firmwareFact('MF79U')], + firmware: 'MF79U', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'malformed/hilink-session-document', + kind: 'malformed', + summary: 'an unparseable SesTokInfo refuses the profile instead of guessing one', + expected: unresolved('ambiguous', 'supported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A, session: 'malformed' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-hilink-malformed', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'malformed/zte-goform-body', + kind: 'malformed', + summary: 'garbage goform bodies keep the firmware-selected profile but record the conflict', + expected: selected('zte-goform', 'mf79u-legacy', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { + zte: zteDevice({ + firmware: 'MF79U', + fingerprint: 'malformed', + telemetry: 'malformed', + }), + }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-zte-malformed', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.zteMf79u), firmwareFact('MF79U')], + firmware: 'MF79U', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'malformed/ufi-himi-body', + kind: 'malformed', + summary: 'a non-JSON HIMI body keeps the USB-proven profile read-only and records the conflict', + expected: selected('ufi-himi', 'ufi-himi-read-only', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { ufi: ufiDevice({ telemetry: 'malformed' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-ufi-malformed', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.ufiRndisAdb)], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'auth-expired/hilink-mid-login', + kind: 'auth-expired', + summary: 'HiLink error 125002 during login refuses without a second credential attempt', + expected: unresolved('ambiguous', 'supported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A, login: 'auth-expired' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-hilink-expired', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'lockout-unknown/zte-mf79u', + kind: 'lockout-unknown', + summary: 'a locked-out MF79U is refused identically to a rejection — one attempt, no guess', + expected: unresolved('ambiguous', 'supported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { zte: zteDevice({ firmware: 'MF79U', login: 'lockout-unknown' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-zte-lockout', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.zteMf79u), firmwareFact('MF79U')], + firmware: 'MF79U', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'unknown-firmware/zte-read-only', + kind: 'unknown-firmware', + summary: 'unknown ZTE firmware fingerprints into the read-only profile, never an auth guess', + expected: selected('zte-goform', 'zte-unknown-read-only', false), + run: () => + runScenario( + { zte: zteDevice({ firmware: 'unknown' }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-zte-unknown', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.zteMf79u), firmwareFact('ZTE-UNLISTED-BUILD')], + firmware: 'ZTE-UNLISTED-BUILD', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'unknown-firmware/hilink-unlisted', + kind: 'unknown-firmware', + summary: 'an unlisted HiLink firmware is unsupported — no profile is inferred from the shape', + expected: unresolved('unsupported', 'unsupported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A }) }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-hilink-unlisted', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact('22.999.99.00.0000')], + firmware: '22.999.99.00.0000', + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'wrong-interface/hilink-duplicate-ip-twin', + kind: 'wrong-interface', + summary: 'binding to the wrong twin reaches the other dongle and refuses before login', + expected: unresolved('ambiguous', 'supported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { + hilinkInterface: HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE, + hilink: interfaceRoutedDevice( + { + [HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE]: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A }), + [HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE]: hilinkDevice({ + profileId: HILINK_A, + reportedPasswordType: 4, + }), + }, + absentDevice, + ), + }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-hilink-twin', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A], + }), + ), + }, + { + id: 'wrong-transport/usb-request-reaches-nobody', + kind: 'wrong-transport', + summary: 'a raw-USB request is refused by transport eligibility before any device is touched', + expected: unresolved('unsupported', 'unsupported'), + run: () => + runScenario( + { + hilink: hilinkDevice({ profileId: HILINK_A }), + zte: zteDevice({ firmware: 'MF79U' }), + ufi: ufiDevice(), + mmModems: [QUECTEL_SPEC], + }, + request({ + id: 'serial:conformance-wrong-transport', + transport: 'usb', + facts: [usbFact(USB_IDS.huaweiE3372h), firmwareFact(HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A])], + firmware: HILINK_FIRMWARE[HILINK_A], + }), + ), + }, +]; + +/** The observed decision, in the same shape the expectation is written in. */ +export function observedExpectation(result: ProviderMatchResult): ConformanceExpectation { + return { + status: result.status, + provider: result.provider, + profile: result.profile, + writable: result.writable, + score: result.score, + }; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/corpus.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/corpus.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9c0dc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/corpus.ts @@ -0,0 +1,427 @@ +// The sanitized per-firmware HTTP transcript corpus. +// +// REPO-LOCAL AND UNPUBLISHED, like everything else under `test-support/`: it is not in +// `control/src`, so `files: ["dist"]` cannot carry it to npm, and it is not the public +// `./testing` contract-fakes surface either. +// +// It REUSES the payload fixtures todos 18/24/25/26 already built rather than minting a +// second set that can drift from them: `HILINK_FIXTURE`, `ZTE_FIXTURE`, `UFI_FIXTURE` +// and the auth-expired/malformed variants all come from `observation-fixtures.ts`. What +// is new here is only what those fixtures do not carry — the session, login and +// challenge documents that sit BEFORE a telemetry read, and the exact request each one +// is answered by. +// +// SANITIZATION IS STRUCTURAL, not a review promise. Every credential is a declared +// literal in `CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS` that says in its own text that it is not real, +// and every subscriber-scale identifier anywhere in the corpus is a member of the frozen +// `SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS` table with its provenance recorded. A digit run +// that is in the corpus and not in that table fails `conformance-matrix.test.ts`. + +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; +import { HILINK_PATHS } from '../../src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider'; +import { UFI_API_PATH } from '../../src/providers/ufi-himi/transport'; +import { ZTE_PATHS } from '../../src/providers/zte-goform/provider'; +import { + HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, + HILINK_FIXTURE, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE, + UFI_FIXTURE, + ZTE_FIXTURE, + ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE, +} from '../observation-fixtures'; +import type { RecordedExchange, ScriptedDevice, ScriptedResponse } from './exchange'; +import { goformId, himiCommand, NOT_THIS_VENDOR } from './exchange'; + +// ── identity and credential sanitation ────────────────────────────────────────────── + +/** + * The ONLY credential any conformance device accepts. It says what it is in its own + * text so a grep over the corpus cannot mistake it for a captured secret, and it is + * deliberately NOT read from the environment — `MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD` and + * `UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD` are ephemeral bench inputs for the supervised harnesses in + * todos 25/26 and have no business inside a committed fixture. + */ +export const CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS = { + username: 'admin', + password: 'conformance-fixture-password-not-a-real-secret', +} as const; + +/** + * Every subscriber-scale identifier the corpus contains, with its provenance. + * + * A conformance corpus is the one place a real capture is most likely to be pasted in + * unedited, so the rule is inverted: a digit run of 14+ characters is a FAILURE unless + * it is listed here. Each entry is synthetic and says where it came from. + */ +export const SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS: readonly { + readonly value: string; + readonly kind: 'imsi' | 'iccid' | 'imei' | 'device-identifier'; + readonly provenance: string; +}[] = [ + { + value: '732123456789012', + kind: 'imsi', + provenance: + 'synthetic value already carried by UFI_FIXTURE (test-support/observation-fixtures.ts)', + }, + { + value: '8957010000000000001', + kind: 'iccid', + provenance: + 'synthetic value already carried by UFI_FIXTURE (test-support/observation-fixtures.ts)', + }, +]; + +// ── device addresses ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +/** + * Two HiLink twins on the SAME address. That duplication is the point: a HiLink dongle + * hard-codes `192.168.8.1`, so a board with two of them can only tell them apart by the + * interface a request is bound to. + */ +export const HILINK_ADMIN_URL = 'http://192.168.8.1'; +export const ZTE_ADMIN_URL = 'http://192.168.0.1'; +export const UFI_ADMIN_URL = 'http://192.168.100.1'; + +export const HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE = 'enx001a2b3c4d01'; +export const HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE = 'enx001a2b3c4d02'; +export const ZTE_INTERFACE = 'enx001a2b3c4d03'; +export const UFI_INTERFACE = 'enx001a2b3c4d04'; + +/** USB composition ids the fleet enumerates. Vendor:product only — never a serial. */ +export const USB_IDS = { + huaweiE3372h: '12d1:14dc', + zteMf79u: '19d2:1405', + zteMf266: '19d2:1476', + ufiRndisAdb: '05c6:9024', + ufiFirmwareSpecific: '05c6:9091', +} as const; + +// ── Huawei HiLink documents ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +export const HILINK_TOKENS = { + 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3': 'conformance-hilink-token-22200', + 'e3372h-22.333-password-type-4': 'conformance-hilink-token-22333', +} as const; +export type HilinkProfileId = keyof typeof HILINK_TOKENS; + +export const HILINK_FIRMWARE = { + 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3': '22.200.05.00.1080', + 'e3372h-22.333-password-type-4': '22.333.01.00.00', +} as const; + +const hilinkCookie = (token: string): string => `SessionID=${token}-cookie`; + +const hilinkSessionBody = (token: string): string => + `${hilinkCookie(token)}${token}`; + +/** A `SesTokInfo` reply with neither tag — `parseHilinkSession` answers `undefined`. */ +export const HILINK_SESSION_MALFORMED = '100002'; + +const hilinkStateBody = (passwordType: 3 | 4): string => + `-1${passwordType}`; + +export const HILINK_LOGIN_OK = 'OK'; +export const HILINK_LOGIN_AUTH_EXPIRED = '125002'; +export const HILINK_LOGIN_REJECTED = '108003'; +export const HILINK_DATA_ENABLED = '1'; + +/** The password each profile's login POST must carry, derived the way the wire does. */ +export function hilinkWirePassword(profileId: HilinkProfileId): string { + const { username, password } = CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS; + if (profileId === 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3') { + return Buffer.from(password).toString('base64'); + } + const token = HILINK_TOKENS[profileId]; + const passwordHash = Buffer.from(createHash('sha256').update(password).digest('hex')).toString( + 'base64', + ); + const loginHash = createHash('sha256').update(`${username}${passwordHash}${token}`).digest('hex'); + return Buffer.from(loginHash).toString('base64'); +} + +export function hilinkLoginDocument(profileId: HilinkProfileId): string { + const passwordType = profileId === 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3' ? 3 : 4; + return `${CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.username}${hilinkWirePassword(profileId)}${passwordType}`; +} + +export type HilinkScript = { + readonly profileId: HilinkProfileId; + /** What `SesTokInfo` answers. */ + readonly session?: 'valid' | 'malformed' | 'unreachable'; + /** The password type `state-login` REPORTS — a twin reports the other one. */ + readonly reportedPasswordType?: 3 | 4; + readonly login?: 'ok' | 'auth-expired' | 'rejected'; + readonly telemetry?: 'reported' | 'auth-expired'; +}; + +export function hilinkDevice(script: HilinkScript): ScriptedDevice { + const token = HILINK_TOKENS[script.profileId]; + const reported = + script.reportedPasswordType ?? (script.profileId === 'e3372h-22.200-password-type-3' ? 3 : 4); + const telemetryRefused = script.telemetry === 'auth-expired'; + return (exchange: RecordedExchange): ScriptedResponse => { + switch (exchange.path) { + case HILINK_PATHS.session: + if (script.session === 'unreachable') return { status: 503, body: '' }; + return { + status: 200, + body: + script.session === 'malformed' ? HILINK_SESSION_MALFORMED : hilinkSessionBody(token), + }; + case HILINK_PATHS.loginState: + return { status: 200, body: hilinkStateBody(reported) }; + case HILINK_PATHS.login: + if (script.login === 'auth-expired') + return { status: 200, body: HILINK_LOGIN_AUTH_EXPIRED }; + if (script.login === 'rejected') return { status: 200, body: HILINK_LOGIN_REJECTED }; + return { + status: 200, + body: HILINK_LOGIN_OK, + headers: { + 'set-cookie': `${hilinkCookie(token)}; Path=/`, + __requestverificationtoken: token, + }, + }; + case HILINK_PATHS.status: + return { + status: 200, + body: telemetryRefused ? HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.status : HILINK_FIXTURE.status, + }; + case HILINK_PATHS.signal: + return { + status: 200, + body: telemetryRefused ? HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.signal : HILINK_FIXTURE.signal, + }; + case HILINK_PATHS.modeList: + return { + status: 200, + body: telemetryRefused + ? (HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.netModeList ?? '') + : (HILINK_FIXTURE.netModeList ?? ''), + }; + case HILINK_PATHS.mode: + return { status: 200, body: HILINK_FIXTURE.netMode ?? '' }; + case HILINK_PATHS.data: + return { + status: 200, + body: telemetryRefused ? HILINK_LOGIN_AUTH_EXPIRED : HILINK_DATA_ENABLED, + }; + default: + return NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + } + }; +} + +/** + * Two devices behind ONE address, resolved by the interface a request was bound to. + * + * This is the duplicate-IP fleet reality, and it is why every provider request carries + * `interfaceName`. A request bound to an interface nobody claims reaches the fallback — + * which is the honest answer, because on a real board it reaches whichever twin the + * route table happened to pick. + */ +export function interfaceRoutedDevice( + byInterface: Readonly>, + fallback: ScriptedDevice, +): ScriptedDevice { + return (exchange) => (byInterface[exchange.interfaceName] ?? fallback)(exchange); +} + +// ── ZTE goform documents ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +export const ZTE_LD = 'conformance-ld'; +export const ZTE_RD = 'conformance-rd'; +export const ZTE_STOK = 'stok=conformance-stok'; +export const ZTE_WA_VERSION = 'BD_MF266V1.0.0B01'; +export const ZTE_CR_VERSION = 'CR_MF266V1.0.0B01'; + +const sha256Upper = (value: string): string => + createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex').toUpperCase(); + +/** The salted password an MF266 `LOGIN_MULTI_USER` must carry. */ +export const ZTE_SALTED_PASSWORD = sha256Upper( + `${sha256Upper(CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password)}${ZTE_LD}`, +); +/** The legacy MF79U password: base64, form-encoded. */ +export const ZTE_LEGACY_PASSWORD = Buffer.from(CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password).toString('base64'); + +export const ZTE_FINGERPRINT_BODIES = { + MF79U: JSON.stringify({ cr_version: 'CR_MF79UV1.0.0B04', network_type: 'LTE' }), + MF266: JSON.stringify({ cr_version: ZTE_CR_VERSION, network_type: 'LTE' }), + unknown: JSON.stringify({ cr_version: 'CR_ZTEUNKNOWNV9.9.9', network_type: 'LTE' }), +} as const; + +export const ZTE_LOGIN_ACCEPTED = JSON.stringify({ result: '0' }); +export const ZTE_LOGIN_REJECTED = JSON.stringify({ result: '3' }); +/** + * The MF79U bench shape that CANNOT be classified from one response: a non-zero result + * with a lock countdown. Rejection and lockout are indistinguishable here on purpose — + * separating them is what `scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh` exists for, and the matcher must + * refuse identically for both rather than guess. + */ +export const ZTE_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_UNKNOWN = JSON.stringify({ result: '1', lockedTime: '180' }); +/** An MF266-shaped challenge answered to a legacy `LOGIN` — the cross-profile trap. */ +export const ZTE_LOGIN_SALTED_SHAPE = JSON.stringify({ LD: ZTE_LD }); + +export type ZteScript = { + readonly firmware: 'MF79U' | 'MF266' | 'unknown'; + readonly fingerprint?: 'reported' | 'malformed'; + readonly login?: 'ok' | 'rejected' | 'lockout-unknown' | 'salted-shape'; + readonly telemetry?: 'reported' | 'malformed'; +}; + +export const ZTE_FINGERPRINT_CMD = 'cr_version,network_type'; +export const ZTE_TELEMETRY_CMD = 'network_type,signalbar,rssi,lte_rsrp,lte_rsrq,lte_snr'; +export const ZTE_VERSIONS_CMD = 'wa_inner_version,cr_version'; + +export function zteDevice(script: ZteScript): ScriptedDevice { + const loginBody = + script.login === 'rejected' + ? ZTE_LOGIN_REJECTED + : script.login === 'lockout-unknown' + ? ZTE_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_UNKNOWN + : script.login === 'salted-shape' + ? ZTE_LOGIN_SALTED_SHAPE + : ZTE_LOGIN_ACCEPTED; + const loginAccepted = script.login === undefined || script.login === 'ok'; + return (exchange: RecordedExchange): ScriptedResponse => { + if (exchange.method === 'POST' && exchange.path === ZTE_PATHS.set) { + const id = goformId(exchange); + if (id !== 'LOGIN' && id !== 'LOGIN_MULTI_USER') return NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + return loginAccepted + ? { + status: 200, + body: loginBody, + headers: { 'set-cookie': `${ZTE_STOK}; Path=/` }, + } + : { status: 200, body: loginBody }; + } + if (exchange.path !== ZTE_PATHS.get) return NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + switch (exchange.query.cmd) { + case ZTE_FINGERPRINT_CMD: + return { + status: 200, + body: + script.fingerprint === 'malformed' + ? ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE.body + : ZTE_FINGERPRINT_BODIES[script.firmware], + }; + case 'LD': + return { status: 200, body: JSON.stringify({ LD: ZTE_LD }) }; + case 'RD': + return { status: 200, body: JSON.stringify({ RD: ZTE_RD }) }; + case ZTE_VERSIONS_CMD: + return { + status: 200, + body: JSON.stringify({ + wa_inner_version: ZTE_WA_VERSION, + cr_version: ZTE_CR_VERSION, + }), + }; + case ZTE_TELEMETRY_CMD: + return { + status: 200, + body: script.telemetry === 'malformed' ? ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE.body : ZTE_FIXTURE.body, + }; + default: + return NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + } + }; +} + +// ── Qualcomm UFI / HIMI documents ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +export const UFI_SESSION = 'conformance-himi-session'; +export const UFI_LOGIN_OK = JSON.stringify({ reply: 'ok', session: UFI_SESSION }); +export const UFI_LOGIN_REJECTED = JSON.stringify({ reply: 'fail' }); +export const UFI_MALFORMED = 'login'; + +export type UfiScript = { + readonly login?: 'ok' | 'rejected'; + readonly telemetry?: 'reported' | 'session-out' | 'malformed'; +}; + +export function ufiDevice(script: UfiScript = {}): ScriptedDevice { + const refused = script.telemetry === 'session-out'; + const malformed = script.telemetry === 'malformed'; + return (exchange: RecordedExchange): ScriptedResponse => { + if (exchange.path !== UFI_API_PATH) return NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + const command = himiCommand(exchange); + if (command === 'login') { + return { + status: 200, + body: script.login === 'rejected' ? UFI_LOGIN_REJECTED : UFI_LOGIN_OK, + }; + } + if (malformed) return { status: 200, body: UFI_MALFORMED }; + switch (command) { + case 'getsysinfo': + return { + status: 200, + body: refused ? UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.sysinfo : UFI_FIXTURE.sysinfo, + }; + case 'getoverview': + return { + status: 200, + body: refused ? UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.overview : UFI_FIXTURE.overview, + }; + case 'getallstatus': + return { + status: 200, + body: refused ? UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.status : UFI_FIXTURE.status, + }; + case 'getproduceinfo': + return { status: 200, body: UFI_FIXTURE.produceInfo ?? '' }; + default: + return NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + } + }; +} + +/** + * Every literal body the corpus can put on the wire, for the sanitization gate. + * + * A gate that scanned the module SOURCE would be defeated by a template; scanning the + * bodies themselves is what makes it a statement about what a device actually answers. + */ +export const CORPUS_BODIES: readonly string[] = [ + hilinkSessionBody(HILINK_TOKENS['e3372h-22.200-password-type-3']), + hilinkSessionBody(HILINK_TOKENS['e3372h-22.333-password-type-4']), + HILINK_SESSION_MALFORMED, + hilinkStateBody(3), + hilinkStateBody(4), + HILINK_LOGIN_OK, + HILINK_LOGIN_AUTH_EXPIRED, + HILINK_LOGIN_REJECTED, + HILINK_DATA_ENABLED, + hilinkLoginDocument('e3372h-22.200-password-type-3'), + hilinkLoginDocument('e3372h-22.333-password-type-4'), + HILINK_FIXTURE.status, + HILINK_FIXTURE.signal, + HILINK_FIXTURE.netModeList ?? '', + HILINK_FIXTURE.netMode ?? '', + HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.status, + HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.signal, + HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.netModeList ?? '', + ...Object.values(ZTE_FINGERPRINT_BODIES), + ZTE_LOGIN_ACCEPTED, + ZTE_LOGIN_REJECTED, + ZTE_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_UNKNOWN, + ZTE_LOGIN_SALTED_SHAPE, + ZTE_FIXTURE.body, + ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE.body, + JSON.stringify({ LD: ZTE_LD }), + JSON.stringify({ RD: ZTE_RD }), + JSON.stringify({ wa_inner_version: ZTE_WA_VERSION, cr_version: ZTE_CR_VERSION }), + UFI_LOGIN_OK, + UFI_LOGIN_REJECTED, + UFI_MALFORMED, + UFI_FIXTURE.sysinfo, + UFI_FIXTURE.overview, + UFI_FIXTURE.status, + UFI_FIXTURE.produceInfo ?? '', + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.sysinfo, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.overview, + UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE.status, +]; diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/exchange.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/exchange.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8b52e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/exchange.ts @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +// ONE normalized wire shape for THREE vendor transports. +// +// HiLink, goform and HIMI disagree about everything a transcript assertion cares about: +// HiLink posts XML to a path, goform posts a URL-encoded form and carries its verb in a +// `goformId` field, HIMI posts JSON to a single endpoint and carries its verb in the +// body's `cmdid`. Each provider suite (todos 24/25/26) therefore asserts its own request +// literal in its own shape, which is right for a provider suite and useless for a matrix +// that has to compare all of them side by side. +// +// `RecordedExchange` is that comparison shape. It decodes the body into the form the +// vendor actually uses — `form` / `json` / `xml` — instead of flattening everything to a +// string, so a form-field assertion stays a form-field assertion and a header-order +// assertion stays exact. Nothing is normalized AWAY: the header array is kept verbatim +// (order included), the cookie is additionally lifted out because cookie handling is the +// one thing all three do and all three do differently, and `interfaceName` / `redirect` +// ride along because duplicate-IP binding and redirect refusal are safety properties, not +// transport trivia. + +import type { + HilinkHttpRequest, + HilinkHttpResponse, + HilinkTransport, +} from '../../src/providers/huawei-hilink/transport'; +import type { + UfiHttpRequest, + UfiHttpResponse, + UfiTransport, +} from '../../src/providers/ufi-himi/transport'; +import type { + ZteHttpRequest, + ZteHttpResponse, + ZteTransport, +} from '../../src/providers/zte-goform/transport'; + +/** The vendor's own body encoding, decoded — never flattened to one string. */ +export type ExchangeBody = + | { readonly kind: 'none' } + | { readonly kind: 'form'; readonly fields: Readonly> } + | { readonly kind: 'json'; readonly fields: Readonly> } + | { readonly kind: 'xml'; readonly text: string }; + +export type RecordedExchange = { + readonly provider: 'huawei-hilink' | 'zte-goform' | 'ufi-himi'; + readonly method: 'GET' | 'POST'; + readonly path: string; + readonly query: Readonly>; + readonly headers: readonly string[]; + /** Lifted out of `headers` because cookie handling is where the three diverge. */ + readonly cookie: string | undefined; + readonly body: ExchangeBody; + readonly interfaceName: string; + readonly redirect: 'error'; +}; + +/** What a scripted device answers. `headers` carries `set-cookie` where it matters. */ +export type ScriptedResponse = { + readonly status: number; + readonly body: string; + readonly headers?: Readonly>; +}; + +/** A scripted device: the exchange in, its answer out. Never order-dependent. */ +export type ScriptedDevice = (exchange: RecordedExchange) => ScriptedResponse; + +/** HTTP 404 with an empty body — what a device that is NOT this vendor answers. */ +export const NOT_THIS_VENDOR: ScriptedResponse = { status: 404, body: '' }; + +/** A device that answers nothing this vendor understands, on every path. */ +export const absentDevice: ScriptedDevice = () => NOT_THIS_VENDOR; + +function cookieOf(headers: readonly string[]): string | undefined { + const header = headers.find((entry) => entry.toLowerCase().startsWith('cookie:')); + return header?.slice(header.indexOf(':') + 1).trim(); +} + +function formFields(body: string): Readonly> { + const fields: Record = {}; + for (const [key, value] of new URLSearchParams(body)) fields[key] = value; + return fields; +} + +function jsonFields(body: string): Readonly> { + try { + const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(body); + return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed) + ? (parsed as Record) + : {}; + } catch { + return {}; + } +} + +function queryFields(url: URL): Readonly> { + const query: Record = {}; + for (const [key, value] of url.searchParams) query[key] = value; + return query; +} + +/** A recorder is one device's transport plus the ordered transcript it produced. */ +export type Recorder = { + readonly transport: T; + readonly exchanges: readonly RecordedExchange[]; +}; + +class ExchangeLog { + readonly entries: RecordedExchange[] = []; + + record(exchange: RecordedExchange): RecordedExchange { + this.entries.push(exchange); + return exchange; + } +} + +export function recordHilink(device: ScriptedDevice): Recorder { + const log = new ExchangeLog(); + const transport: HilinkTransport = { + request: async (request: HilinkHttpRequest): Promise => { + const url = new URL(request.url); + const exchange = log.record({ + provider: 'huawei-hilink', + method: request.method, + path: url.pathname, + query: queryFields(url), + headers: request.headers, + cookie: cookieOf(request.headers), + body: request.body === undefined ? { kind: 'none' } : { kind: 'xml', text: request.body }, + interfaceName: request.interfaceName, + redirect: request.redirect, + }); + const scripted = device(exchange); + return scripted.headers === undefined + ? { status: scripted.status, body: scripted.body } + : { status: scripted.status, body: scripted.body, headers: scripted.headers }; + }, + }; + return { transport, exchanges: log.entries }; +} + +export function recordZte(device: ScriptedDevice): Recorder { + const log = new ExchangeLog(); + const transport: ZteTransport = { + request: async (request: ZteHttpRequest): Promise => { + const url = new URL(request.url); + const exchange = log.record({ + provider: 'zte-goform', + method: request.method, + path: url.pathname, + query: queryFields(url), + headers: request.headers, + cookie: cookieOf(request.headers), + body: + request.body === undefined + ? { kind: 'none' } + : { kind: 'form', fields: formFields(request.body) }, + interfaceName: request.interfaceName, + redirect: request.redirect, + }); + const scripted = device(exchange); + return scripted.headers === undefined + ? { status: scripted.status, body: scripted.body } + : { status: scripted.status, body: scripted.body, headers: scripted.headers }; + }, + }; + return { transport, exchanges: log.entries }; +} + +export function recordUfi(device: ScriptedDevice): Recorder { + const log = new ExchangeLog(); + const transport: UfiTransport = { + request: async (request: UfiHttpRequest): Promise => { + const url = new URL(request.url); + const exchange = log.record({ + provider: 'ufi-himi', + method: request.method, + path: url.pathname, + query: queryFields(url), + headers: request.headers, + cookie: cookieOf(request.headers), + body: { kind: 'json', fields: jsonFields(request.body) }, + interfaceName: request.interfaceName, + redirect: request.redirect, + }); + const scripted = device(exchange); + return { status: scripted.status, body: scripted.body }; + }, + }; + return { transport, exchanges: log.entries }; +} + +/** The `goformId` a goform POST carries, or `undefined` for a GET. */ +export function goformId(exchange: RecordedExchange): string | undefined { + return exchange.body.kind === 'form' ? exchange.body.fields.goformId : undefined; +} + +/** The `cmdid` a HIMI POST carries. */ +export function himiCommand(exchange: RecordedExchange): string | undefined { + const value = exchange.body.kind === 'json' ? exchange.body.fields.cmdid : undefined; + return typeof value === 'string' ? value : undefined; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/index.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/index.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fca53fc --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/index.ts @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +// Public surface of the repo-local conformance harness. +// +// Unpublished, like the rest of `test-support/`: it lives outside `control/src`, so +// `files: ["dist"]` cannot carry it to npm, and it is NOT the package's public +// `./testing` contract-fakes surface. Do not promote it to a package subpath. + +export type { + ConformanceCase, + ConformanceExpectation, + ConformanceKind, + ConformanceRun, + ScenarioOptions, + ScenarioTranscripts, +} from './cases'; +export { + CONFORMANCE_CASES, + FM350_USB_SPEC, + observedExpectation, + QUECTEL_SPEC, + SIMCOM_SPEC, +} from './cases'; +export { + CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + CORPUS_BODIES, + HILINK_ADMIN_URL, + HILINK_FIRMWARE, + HILINK_PRIMARY_INTERFACE, + HILINK_TOKENS, + HILINK_TWIN_INTERFACE, + type HilinkProfileId, + type HilinkScript, + hilinkDevice, + hilinkLoginDocument, + hilinkWirePassword, + interfaceRoutedDevice, + SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS, + UFI_ADMIN_URL, + UFI_INTERFACE, + UFI_SESSION, + type UfiScript, + USB_IDS, + ufiDevice, + ZTE_ADMIN_URL, + ZTE_FINGERPRINT_CMD, + ZTE_INTERFACE, + ZTE_LD, + ZTE_LEGACY_PASSWORD, + ZTE_SALTED_PASSWORD, + ZTE_STOK, + ZTE_TELEMETRY_CMD, + ZTE_VERSIONS_CMD, + type ZteScript, + zteDevice, +} from './corpus'; +export { + absentDevice, + type ExchangeBody, + goformId, + himiCommand, + NOT_THIS_VENDOR, + type RecordedExchange, + type Recorder, + recordHilink, + recordUfi, + recordZte, + type ScriptedDevice, + type ScriptedResponse, +} from './exchange'; +export { + MATRIX_JSON_PATH, + MATRIX_MARKDOWN_PATH, + type MatrixRow, + writeMatrixArtifact, +} from './matrix-report'; +export { + decodeTree, + FakeMmTransport, + type FakeMmTransportOptions, + type RecordedCall, +} from './mm-transport'; +export { + hilinkCookieFor, + hilinkGet, + hilinkLoginPost, + hilinkOpenGet, + ufiLoginPost, + ufiReadPost, + zteGet, + ztePost, +} from './transcripts'; diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/matrix-report.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/matrix-report.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e838c8e --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/matrix-report.ts @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +// The matrix summary artifact. +// +// A conformance suite that only goes green tells a reviewer that nothing broke and +// nothing else. The artifact is the other half: every case, its kind, the decision it +// was ENTITLED to and the decision it actually got, in a form a human reads and a later +// todo (29's CeraUI migration, 42's hardware bench certification) can diff against. +// +// It lands in the repo-local, gitignored `test-results/` — evidence, never a tracked +// file, and never a path above this checkout root (AGENTS.md § Rule D). + +import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path'; +import type { ConformanceExpectation, ConformanceKind } from './cases'; + +export type MatrixRow = { + readonly id: string; + readonly kind: ConformanceKind; + readonly summary: string; + readonly expected: ConformanceExpectation; + readonly actual: ConformanceExpectation; + readonly agrees: boolean; +}; + +const ARTIFACT_DIR = resolve(import.meta.dir, '../../../test-results'); +export const MATRIX_JSON_PATH = resolve(ARTIFACT_DIR, 'provider-conformance-matrix.json'); +export const MATRIX_MARKDOWN_PATH = resolve(ARTIFACT_DIR, 'provider-conformance-matrix.md'); + +function decision(value: ConformanceExpectation): string { + const target = value.provider === null ? '—' : `${value.provider} / ${value.profile}`; + return `${value.status} · ${target} · ${value.writable ? 'writable' : 'read-only'} · ${value.score}`; +} + +function markdown(rows: readonly MatrixRow[]): string { + const byKind = new Map(); + for (const row of rows) byKind.set(row.kind, (byKind.get(row.kind) ?? 0) + 1); + const lines = [ + '# Provider-matching conformance matrix', + '', + `Cases: **${rows.length}** · agreeing: **${rows.filter((row) => row.agrees).length}** · ` + + `writable selections: **${rows.filter((row) => row.actual.writable).length}**`, + '', + 'Generated by `control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts`. Every row runs the real', + 'matcher with the ModemManager, Huawei HiLink, ZTE goform and UFI/HIMI providers all', + 'registered at once.', + '', + '| # | Case | Kind | Expected decision | Actual decision | Agrees |', + '|---|------|------|-------------------|-----------------|--------|', + ...rows.map( + (row, index) => + `| ${index + 1} | \`${row.id}\`
${row.summary} | ${row.kind} | ${decision(row.expected)} | ${decision(row.actual)} | ${row.agrees ? 'yes' : '**NO**'} |`, + ), + '', + '## Cases by kind', + '', + '| Kind | Cases |', + '|------|-------|', + ...[...byKind.entries()].map(([kind, count]) => `| ${kind} | ${count} |`), + '', + ]; + return `${lines.join('\n')}\n`; +} + +/** Write both artifact forms and return the markdown, so a caller can assert on it. */ +export function writeMatrixArtifact(rows: readonly MatrixRow[]): string { + const document = markdown(rows); + mkdirSync(dirname(MATRIX_JSON_PATH), { recursive: true }); + writeFileSync( + MATRIX_JSON_PATH, + `${JSON.stringify({ caseCount: rows.length, rows }, null, '\t')}\n`, + ); + writeFileSync(MATRIX_MARKDOWN_PATH, document); + return document; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c698b1a --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/mm-transport.ts @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +// An in-memory `DbusTransport` serving the SAME MM-faithful object model as +// `test-support/fake-mm`, with no bus and no daemon. +// +// `fake-mm/service.ts` is the right harness for proving the transport codec and the +// observer's epoch handling — it is a real service on a real session bus, which is the +// only way to prove those. It is the WRONG harness for a conformance matrix: every case +// would need `dbus-run-session`, so a matrix row would SKIP rather than run wherever a +// session bus is absent, and a matrix with holes in it answers nothing. This transport +// reuses `fake-mm/object-model.ts` verbatim — the same `ModemSpec`, the same property +// sets, the same separate `Modem` / `Modem3gpp` interfaces, the same `/SIM/` objects +// and the same bearer objects — and converts that ENCODE-form tree into the DECODE form +// the transport hands back, so the model is shared rather than re-invented. +// +// It is also what makes the 16-modem scale fixture deterministic: subscription counts, +// `Signal.Setup` issue counts and refresh coalescing are all observable here without a +// bus in the middle, so a resource assertion measures the stack rather than the daemon. + +import type { + DbusTransport, + DbusValue, + MethodCall, + MethodReply, + SignalEvent, + SignalListener, + SignalSpec, + Subscription, + TransportEvent, +} from '../../src/transport'; +import type { + EncodeVariant, + InterfaceEntry, + ManagedObject, + ManagedObjects, + MmShape, + ModemSpec, + PropEntry, +} from '../fake-mm/object-model'; +import { BUS_NAME, managedObjects, modemObjects, ROOT_PATH } from '../fake-mm/object-model'; + +const DBUS_DESTINATION = 'org.freedesktop.DBus'; +const DBUS_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.DBus'; +const OBJECT_MANAGER_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.DBus.ObjectManager'; + +/** One recorded outgoing call — the resource ledger the scale fixture asserts against. */ +export type RecordedCall = { + readonly path: string; + readonly interface: string; + readonly member: string; +}; + +function decodeVariant(variant: EncodeVariant): DbusValue { + return { signature: variant[0], value: variant[1] as DbusValue }; +} + +function decodeProps(props: readonly PropEntry[]): DbusValue { + return props.map(([name, variant]) => [name, decodeVariant(variant)] as unknown as DbusValue); +} + +function decodeInterfaces(interfaces: readonly InterfaceEntry[]): DbusValue { + return interfaces.map(([name, props]) => [name, decodeProps(props)] as unknown as DbusValue); +} + +function decodeObject(object: ManagedObject): DbusValue { + return [object[0], decodeInterfaces(object[1])] as unknown as DbusValue; +} + +/** The ENCODE-form tree `fake-mm` builds, in the DECODE form the transport returns. */ +export function decodeTree(tree: ManagedObjects): DbusValue { + return tree.map(decodeObject) as unknown as DbusValue; +} + +export type FakeMmTransportOptions = { + readonly modems?: readonly ModemSpec[]; + readonly shape?: MmShape; + /** The unique bus name this epoch owns — every emitted signal carries it. */ + readonly owner?: string; +}; + +/** + * A scriptable in-memory ModemManager. `addModem` / `removeModem` emit the real + * ObjectManager signals with the current epoch's `sender`, so the observer's epoch guard + * is exercised rather than bypassed. + */ +export class FakeMmTransport implements DbusTransport { + readonly calls: RecordedCall[] = []; + readonly #specs = new Map(); + readonly #shape: MmShape; + readonly #subscriptions = new Set<{ spec: SignalSpec; listener: SignalListener }>(); + readonly #handlers = new Map void>>(); + #owner: string; + #connected = false; + + constructor(options: FakeMmTransportOptions = {}) { + this.#shape = options.shape ?? '1.24'; + this.#owner = options.owner ?? ':1.42'; + for (const spec of options.modems ?? []) this.#specs.set(spec.index, spec); + } + + get owner(): string { + return this.#owner; + } + + /** Every `Signal.Setup` call issued, in order — one per (epoch, modem) or it is a bug. */ + get signalSetupCalls(): readonly RecordedCall[] { + return this.calls.filter( + (call) => call.member === 'Setup' && call.interface.endsWith('.Signal'), + ); + } + + get managedObjectsCalls(): readonly RecordedCall[] { + return this.calls.filter((call) => call.member === 'GetManagedObjects'); + } + + async connect(): Promise { + this.#connected = true; + } + + async disconnect(): Promise { + this.#connected = false; + this.#subscriptions.clear(); + } + + isConnected(): boolean { + return this.#connected; + } + + async callMethod(call: MethodCall): Promise { + this.calls.push({ path: call.path, interface: call.interface, member: call.member }); + if (call.interface === DBUS_IFACE && call.member === 'GetNameOwner') { + return { signature: 's', body: [this.#owner] }; + } + if (call.interface === OBJECT_MANAGER_IFACE && call.member === 'GetManagedObjects') { + return { signature: 'a{oa{sa{sv}}}', body: [this.tree()] }; + } + return { signature: '', body: [] }; + } + + async subscribeSignal(spec: SignalSpec, listener: SignalListener): Promise { + const entry = { spec, listener }; + this.#subscriptions.add(entry); + return { + unsubscribe: async () => { + this.#subscriptions.delete(entry); + }, + }; + } + + on(event: TransportEvent, handler: (payload?: unknown) => void): void { + const set = this.#handlers.get(event) ?? new Set(); + set.add(handler); + this.#handlers.set(event, set); + } + + off(event: TransportEvent, handler: (payload?: unknown) => void): void { + this.#handlers.get(event)?.delete(handler); + } + + subscriptionCount(): number { + return this.#subscriptions.size; + } + + tree(): DbusValue { + return decodeTree(managedObjects([...this.#specs.values()], this.#shape)); + } + + /** Attach a modem and announce it exactly as MM does — one signal per object. */ + addModem(spec: ModemSpec): void { + this.#specs.set(spec.index, spec); + for (const object of modemObjects(spec, this.#shape)) { + this.#emit({ + path: ROOT_PATH, + interface: OBJECT_MANAGER_IFACE, + member: 'InterfacesAdded', + sender: this.#owner, + signature: 'oa{sa{sv}}', + body: [object[0], decodeInterfaces(object[1])], + }); + } + } + + removeModem(index: number): void { + const spec = this.#specs.get(index); + if (spec === undefined) return; + this.#specs.delete(index); + for (const [path, interfaces] of modemObjects(spec, this.#shape)) { + this.#emit({ + path: ROOT_PATH, + interface: OBJECT_MANAGER_IFACE, + member: 'InterfacesRemoved', + sender: this.#owner, + signature: 'oas', + body: [path, interfaces.map(([name]) => name) as unknown as DbusValue], + }); + } + } + + /** Hand the well-known name to a NEW unique owner — a genuine epoch change. */ + takeOverAs(owner: string): void { + const previous = this.#owner; + this.#owner = owner; + this.#emit({ + path: '/org/freedesktop/DBus', + interface: DBUS_IFACE, + member: 'NameOwnerChanged', + sender: DBUS_DESTINATION, + signature: 'sss', + body: [BUS_NAME, previous, owner], + }); + } + + #emit(event: SignalEvent): void { + for (const { spec, listener } of [...this.#subscriptions]) { + if (spec.interface !== event.interface || spec.member !== event.member) continue; + if (spec.path !== undefined && spec.path !== event.path) continue; + listener(event); + } + } +} diff --git a/control/test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts b/control/test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd24de5 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +// Expected transcripts — the exact wire a firmware profile is entitled to see. +// +// These builders are written from the PROTOCOL, not from the provider: a HiLink session +// GET carries no headers at all, an authenticated HiLink GET carries exactly one +// `Cookie:`, a HiLink POST carries cookie + verification token + content-type IN THAT +// ORDER, a goform request always carries browser-equivalent `Origin`/`Referer`, and a +// HIMI read carries `Authorization` before its content-type. Rebuilding them here is +// what makes `toEqual` against a recorded transcript an assertion rather than an echo. +// +// Header ORDER is part of the literal on purpose. A router firmware that rejects an +// out-of-order request is a real class of failure, and an order-insensitive comparison +// cannot see the day a refactor reorders them. + +import { HILINK_PATHS } from '../../src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider'; +import { UFI_API_PATH } from '../../src/providers/ufi-himi/transport'; +import { ZTE_PATHS } from '../../src/providers/zte-goform/provider'; +import { + CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS, + HILINK_TOKENS, + type HilinkProfileId, + hilinkLoginDocument, + UFI_SESSION, + ZTE_ADMIN_URL, +} from './corpus'; +import type { RecordedExchange } from './exchange'; + +/** The `SessionID=…` cookie a HiLink profile's session document hands out. */ +export function hilinkCookieFor(profileId: HilinkProfileId): string { + return `SessionID=${HILINK_TOKENS[profileId]}-cookie`; +} + +/** An unauthenticated HiLink GET — no cookie, no token, no headers whatsoever. */ +export function hilinkOpenGet(path: string, interfaceName: string): RecordedExchange { + return { + provider: 'huawei-hilink', + method: 'GET', + path, + query: {}, + headers: [], + cookie: undefined, + body: { kind: 'none' }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} + +/** An authenticated HiLink GET — exactly one `Cookie:` header and nothing else. */ +export function hilinkGet(path: string, interfaceName: string, cookie: string): RecordedExchange { + return { + provider: 'huawei-hilink', + method: 'GET', + path, + query: {}, + headers: [`Cookie: ${cookie}`], + cookie, + body: { kind: 'none' }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} + +/** The ONE login POST a profile is allowed, with its exact derived password document. */ +export function hilinkLoginPost( + profileId: HilinkProfileId, + interfaceName: string, +): RecordedExchange { + const cookie = hilinkCookieFor(profileId); + return { + provider: 'huawei-hilink', + method: 'POST', + path: HILINK_PATHS.login, + query: {}, + headers: [ + `Cookie: ${cookie}`, + `__RequestVerificationToken: ${HILINK_TOKENS[profileId]}`, + 'Content-Type: application/xml', + ], + cookie, + body: { kind: 'xml', text: hilinkLoginDocument(profileId) }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} + +/** A goform GET. `multiData` adds `multi_data=1`; `cookie` adds the `stok` jar entry. */ +export function zteGet( + cmd: string, + interfaceName: string, + options: { readonly cookie?: string; readonly multiData?: boolean } = {}, +): RecordedExchange { + const query: Record = { isTest: 'false', cmd }; + if (options.multiData === true) query.multi_data = '1'; + return { + provider: 'zte-goform', + method: 'GET', + path: ZTE_PATHS.get, + query, + headers: [ + ...(options.cookie === undefined ? [] : [`Cookie: ${options.cookie}`]), + `Origin: ${ZTE_ADMIN_URL}`, + `Referer: ${ZTE_ADMIN_URL}/index.html`, + ], + cookie: options.cookie, + body: { kind: 'none' }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} + +/** A goform POST — form-encoded, browser-equivalent, never JSON. */ +export function ztePost( + fields: Readonly>, + interfaceName: string, +): RecordedExchange { + return { + provider: 'zte-goform', + method: 'POST', + path: ZTE_PATHS.set, + query: {}, + headers: [ + 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8', + `Origin: ${ZTE_ADMIN_URL}`, + `Referer: ${ZTE_ADMIN_URL}/index.html`, + ], + cookie: undefined, + body: { kind: 'form', fields }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} + +/** The HIMI login POST — the ONE command in the vocabulary that is not a `get*`. */ +export function ufiLoginPost(interfaceName: string): RecordedExchange { + return { + provider: 'ufi-himi', + method: 'POST', + path: UFI_API_PATH, + query: {}, + headers: ['Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8'], + cookie: undefined, + body: { + kind: 'json', + fields: { + cmdid: 'login', + username: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.username, + password: CONFORMANCE_CREDENTIALS.password, + }, + }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} + +/** A HIMI read — same path, same method, verb in the body, session in the header. */ +export function ufiReadPost(command: string, interfaceName: string): RecordedExchange { + return { + provider: 'ufi-himi', + method: 'POST', + path: UFI_API_PATH, + query: {}, + headers: [`Authorization: ${UFI_SESSION}`, 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8'], + cookie: undefined, + body: { kind: 'json', fields: { cmdid: command, sessionId: UFI_SESSION } }, + interfaceName, + redirect: 'error', + }; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/fake-mm/handlers.ts b/control/test-support/fake-mm/handlers.ts index be2b744..9362d44 100644 --- a/control/test-support/fake-mm/handlers.ts +++ b/control/test-support/fake-mm/handlers.ts @@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ import type { BusSession } from './bus-session'; import { BEARER_IFACE, bearerPath, + LOCATION_IFACE, type ManagedObjects, + MESSAGING_IFACE, MM_MANAGER_IFACE, MODEM_IFACE, MODEM3GPP_IFACE, @@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ import { SIM_IFACE, SIMPLE_IFACE, simPath, + USSD_IFACE, } from './object-model'; const MANAGED_OBJECTS_SIG = 'a{oa{sa{sv}}}'; @@ -40,6 +43,11 @@ export interface HandlerContext { submitPin(modemIndex: number, simObjectPath: string, pin: unknown): null; submitPuk(modemIndex: number, simObjectPath: string, puk: unknown, newPin: unknown): null; recordSignalSetup(modemIndex: number, rate: unknown): void; + setupLocation(modemIndex: number, sources: unknown, signalLocation: unknown): null; + locationReply(modemIndex: number): unknown; + ussdReply(modemIndex: number, member: 'Initiate' | 'Respond'): string; + ussdState(modemIndex: number): number; + maybeFail(member: string, modemIndex: number): void; tripwire(iface: string, member: string): never; delay(value: T): T | Promise; /** Record a call-log event, then run `produce` after the reply delay. */ @@ -68,7 +76,11 @@ export function registerModemHandlers( path, MODEM_IFACE, 'SetCurrentModes', - () => ctx.traced('SetCurrentModes', i, () => null), + () => + ctx.traced('SetCurrentModes', i, () => { + ctx.maybeFail('SetCurrentModes', i); + return null; + }), '', ); session.handle( @@ -99,6 +111,34 @@ export function registerModemHandlers( '', ); } + if (spec.location !== undefined) { + session.handle( + path, + LOCATION_IFACE, + 'Setup', + (sources, signalLocation) => ctx.setupLocation(i, sources, signalLocation), + '', + ); + session.handle(path, LOCATION_IFACE, 'GetLocation', () => ctx.locationReply(i), 'a{uv}'); + } + if (spec.messaging === true) { + session.handle(path, MESSAGING_IFACE, 'List', () => [], 'ao'); + } + if (spec.ussd !== undefined) { + session.handle(path, USSD_IFACE, 'Initiate', () => ctx.ussdReply(i, 'Initiate'), 's'); + session.handle(path, USSD_IFACE, 'Respond', () => ctx.ussdReply(i, 'Respond'), 's'); + session.handle(path, USSD_IFACE, 'Cancel', () => null, ''); + session.handle( + path, + 'org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties', + 'Get', + (iface, property) => { + if (iface === USSD_IFACE && property === 'State') return ['u', ctx.ussdState(i)]; + return ['u', 0]; + }, + 'v', + ); + } session.handle(path, SIMPLE_IFACE, 'Connect', () => ctx.tripwire(SIMPLE_IFACE, 'Connect'), ''); session.handle( path, diff --git a/control/test-support/fake-mm/index.ts b/control/test-support/fake-mm/index.ts index 718a909..760e4c4 100644 --- a/control/test-support/fake-mm/index.ts +++ b/control/test-support/fake-mm/index.ts @@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ export { bearerPath, type EncodeVariant, type InterfaceEntry, + LOCATION_IFACE, type ManagedObject, type ManagedObjects, + MESSAGING_IFACE, MM_LOCK_NONE, MM_LOCK_SIM_PIN, MM_LOCK_SIM_PUK, @@ -29,11 +31,13 @@ export { SIMPLE_IFACE, type SimSpec, simPath, + USSD_IFACE, } from './object-model'; export type { PreviousEpoch } from './previous-epoch'; export { FakeModemManager, type FakeModemManagerOptions, + type LocationSetupCall, type SignalSetupCall, TRIPWIRE_ERROR, } from './service'; diff --git a/control/test-support/fake-mm/object-model.ts b/control/test-support/fake-mm/object-model.ts index 59c27bb..306f995 100644 --- a/control/test-support/fake-mm/object-model.ts +++ b/control/test-support/fake-mm/object-model.ts @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ export const MODEM_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem'; export const MODEM3GPP_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Modem3gpp'; export const SIMPLE_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Simple'; export const SIGNAL_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Signal'; +export const LOCATION_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Location'; +export const MESSAGING_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Messaging'; +export const USSD_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Modem.Modem3gpp.Ussd'; export const SIM_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Sim'; export const BEARER_IFACE = 'org.freedesktop.ModemManager1.Bearer'; @@ -87,6 +90,8 @@ export interface ModemSpec { readonly physdev?: string; /** MMModemState (e.g. 8 registered, 11 connected). */ readonly state?: number; + /** MMModemStateFailedReason (`u`, e.g. 2 = SIM_MISSING). Absent unless set. */ + readonly stateFailedReason?: number; /** Signal quality percent (0-100) for the `(ub)` SignalQuality struct. */ readonly signalQuality?: number; /** MMModem3gppRegistrationState (1 home, 5 roaming). */ @@ -101,6 +106,21 @@ export interface ModemSpec { readonly unlockRequired?: number; /** Remaining attempts per lock (`Modem.UnlockRetries`, `a(uu)`). */ readonly unlockRetries?: readonly (readonly [number, number])[]; + readonly supportedModes?: readonly (readonly [number, number])[]; + readonly currentModes?: readonly [number, number]; + readonly supportedBands?: readonly number[]; + readonly currentBands?: readonly number[]; + readonly location?: { + readonly capabilities: number; + readonly enabled?: number; + readonly fix?: unknown; + }; + readonly messaging?: boolean; + readonly ussd?: { + readonly state?: number; + readonly initiateReply?: string; + readonly respondReply?: string; + }; } export const modemPath = (index: number): string => `${ROOT_PATH}/Modem/${index}`; @@ -132,10 +152,19 @@ export function modemProps(spec: ModemSpec, shape: MmShape): readonly PropEntry[ ['Bearers', ['ao', [bearerPath(modemBearerIndex(spec))]]], ['SupportedCapabilities', ['au', [4, 8]]], ['CurrentCapabilities', ['u', 4]], - ['CurrentModes', ['(uu)', [7, 0]]], + ['SupportedModes', ['a(uu)', (spec.supportedModes ?? [[7, 0]]).map((pair) => [...pair])]], + ['CurrentModes', ['(uu)', [...(spec.currentModes ?? [7, 0])]]], + ['SupportedBands', ['au', [...(spec.supportedBands ?? [])]]], + ['CurrentBands', ['au', [...(spec.currentBands ?? [])]]], ['UnlockRequired', ['u', spec.unlockRequired ?? MM_LOCK_NONE]], ['UnlockRetries', ['a(uu)', (spec.unlockRetries ?? []).map(([lock, left]) => [lock, left])]], ]; + // Absent unless the scenario sets it: an ABSENT failure reason is what a healthy + // modem reports, and the SIM-presence evidence rule turns on presence-vs-absence + // of this exact property. + if (spec.stateFailedReason !== undefined) { + props.push(['StateFailedReason', ['u', spec.stateFailedReason]]); + } // `Physdev` (physical path) exists from 1.22+ — present on 1.22 and 1.24, absent on 1.20. if (shape === '1.22' || shape === '1.24') { props.push(['Physdev', ['s', spec.physdev ?? `/sys/devices/fake/usb${spec.index}`]]); @@ -180,6 +209,17 @@ export function signalProps(): readonly PropEntry[] { return [['Rate', ['u', 0]]]; } +export function locationProps(spec: ModemSpec): readonly PropEntry[] { + return [ + ['Capabilities', ['u', spec.location?.capabilities ?? 0]], + ['Enabled', ['u', spec.location?.enabled ?? 0]], + ]; +} + +export function ussdProps(spec: ModemSpec): readonly PropEntry[] { + return [['State', ['u', spec.ussd?.state ?? 1]]]; +} + /** A bearer object's property set — observable, but every connect method throws. */ export function bearerProps(): readonly PropEntry[] { return [ @@ -199,6 +239,9 @@ export function modemObject(spec: ModemSpec, shape: MmShape): ManagedObject { if (spec.hasSignal !== false) { interfaces.push([SIGNAL_IFACE, signalProps()]); } + if (spec.location !== undefined) interfaces.push([LOCATION_IFACE, locationProps(spec)]); + if (spec.messaging === true) interfaces.push([MESSAGING_IFACE, []]); + if (spec.ussd !== undefined) interfaces.push([USSD_IFACE, ussdProps(spec)]); return [modemPath(spec.index), interfaces]; } diff --git a/control/test-support/fake-mm/service.ts b/control/test-support/fake-mm/service.ts index 0d7bed2..89be00c 100644 --- a/control/test-support/fake-mm/service.ts +++ b/control/test-support/fake-mm/service.ts @@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ export interface SignalSetupCall { readonly owner: string | undefined; } +export interface LocationSetupCall { + readonly modemIndex: number; + readonly sources: number; + readonly signalLocation: boolean; +} + import { makePreviousEpoch, type PreviousEpoch } from './previous-epoch'; import { emitInterfacesAdded, emitInterfacesRemoved, emitPropertiesChanged } from './signals'; @@ -67,6 +73,8 @@ export class FakeModemManager { readonly #expectedPuks = new Map(); readonly #callLog: string[] = []; readonly #signalSetupLog: SignalSetupCall[] = []; + readonly #locationSetupLog: LocationSetupCall[] = []; + readonly #failures = new Map(); readonly #ctx: HandlerContext; #session: BusSession; #replyDelayMs = 0; @@ -82,6 +90,12 @@ export class FakeModemManager { submitPin: (index, sp, pin) => this.#submitPin(index, sp, pin), submitPuk: (index, sp, puk, newPin) => this.#submitPuk(index, sp, puk, newPin), recordSignalSetup: (index, rate) => this.#recordSignalSetup(index, rate), + setupLocation: (index, sources, signalLocation) => + this.#setupLocation(index, sources, signalLocation), + locationReply: (index) => this.#specs.get(index)?.location?.fix ?? [], + ussdReply: (index, member) => this.#ussdReply(index, member), + ussdState: (index) => this.#specs.get(index)?.ussd?.state ?? 1, + maybeFail: (member, index) => this.#maybeFail(member, index), tripwire: (iface, member) => this.#tripwire(iface, member), delay: (value) => this.#delay(value), traced: (member, index, produce) => this.#traced(member, index, produce), @@ -171,6 +185,11 @@ export class FakeModemManager { this.#cells.set(modemIndex, cells); } + configureLocation(modemIndex: number, location: NonNullable): void { + const spec = this.#specs.get(modemIndex); + if (spec !== undefined) this.#specs.set(modemIndex, { ...spec, location }); + } + /** The ordered disruptive-op call log (`member:start:` / `member:end:`). */ get callLog(): readonly string[] { return [...this.#callLog]; @@ -181,10 +200,19 @@ export class FakeModemManager { return [...this.#signalSetupLog]; } + get locationSetupCalls(): readonly LocationSetupCall[] { + return [...this.#locationSetupLog]; + } + + failNext(member: string, errorName: string): void { + this.#failures.set(member, errorName); + } + /** Reset the call + Signal.Setup logs (use between scenario phases). */ clearLogs(): void { this.#callLog.length = 0; this.#signalSetupLog.length = 0; + this.#locationSetupLog.length = 0; } /** Delay every subsequent method reply by `ms` (0 disables) — late-reply scenarios. */ @@ -286,6 +314,36 @@ export class FakeModemManager { }); } + #setupLocation(index: number, sources: unknown, signalLocation: unknown): null { + this.#maybeFail('Setup', index); + const spec = this.#specs.get(index); + const mask = typeof sources === 'number' ? sources : Number(sources); + this.#locationSetupLog.push({ + modemIndex: index, + sources: mask, + signalLocation: signalLocation === true, + }); + if (spec?.location !== undefined) { + this.#specs.set(index, { ...spec, location: { ...spec.location, enabled: mask } }); + } + return null; + } + + #ussdReply(index: number, member: 'Initiate' | 'Respond'): string { + this.#maybeFail(member, index); + const ussd = this.#specs.get(index)?.ussd; + return member === 'Initiate' ? (ussd?.initiateReply ?? '') : (ussd?.respondReply ?? ''); + } + + #maybeFail(member: string, _index: number): void { + const name = this.#failures.get(member); + if (name === undefined) return; + this.#failures.delete(member); + const error = new Error(name); + Object.defineProperty(error, 'dbusName', { value: name }); + throw error; + } + #traced(member: string, index: number, produce: () => T): T | Promise { this.#callLog.push(`${member}:start:${index}`); const finish = (): T => { diff --git a/control/test-support/journal-fixture.ts b/control/test-support/journal-fixture.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..937a43b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/journal-fixture.ts @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'; +import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +import { + defineOperationDescriptor, + deviceGeneration, + type OperationDescriptor, + type OperationResult, + physicalModemId, +} from '../src/domain'; +import { createJournalEngine, type JournalEngine } from '../src/journal/engine'; +import type { JournalEntry } from '../src/journal/entry'; +import { createFileJournalStore } from '../src/journal/store'; +import type { OperationJournalEvent } from '../src/operations/contracts'; + +export const JOURNAL_MODEM_A = physicalModemId('serial:journal-a'); +export const JOURNAL_MODEM_B = physicalModemId('serial:journal-b'); +export const JOURNAL_GENERATION = deviceGeneration(7); + +export function journalDescriptor( + overrides: Partial> = {}, +): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: 'set-usb-mode', + support: { read: { supported: true }, write: { supported: true } }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: 'fixture-provider', + constraints: { kind: 'unconstrained' }, + livePreconditions: ['device-present'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'write', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: true, reason: 'stranded writes must survive a restart' }, + admission: { required: false }, + evidence: { profiles: ['fixture'], firmware: ['1.0'] }, + confidence: 'high', + ...overrides, + }); +} + +export function startedEvent( + operationId: string, + overrides: Partial, { phase: 'started' }>> = {}, +): OperationJournalEvent { + return { + phase: 'started', + operationId, + physicalModemId: JOURNAL_MODEM_A, + generation: JOURNAL_GENERATION, + descriptor: journalDescriptor(), + input: 'lte', + ...overrides, + }; +} + +export function completedEvent( + operationId: string, + result: OperationResult, + overrides: Partial, { phase: 'completed' }>> = {}, +): OperationJournalEvent { + return { + phase: 'completed', + operationId, + physicalModemId: JOURNAL_MODEM_A, + generation: JOURNAL_GENERATION, + descriptor: journalDescriptor(), + result, + ...overrides, + }; +} + +export function appliedResult(value = 'lte'): OperationResult { + return { + status: 'applied', + value, + generation: JOURNAL_GENERATION, + requiresReconciliation: false, + }; +} + +export function unknownOutcomeResult( + reason: 'stale-generation' | 'write-reply-timed-out' | 'write-reply-dropped', +): OperationResult { + return { + status: 'unknown-outcome', + reason, + generation: JOURNAL_GENERATION, + requiresReconciliation: true, + }; +} + +export function failedResult(reason: string): OperationResult { + return { + status: 'failed', + reason, + generation: JOURNAL_GENERATION, + requiresReconciliation: false, + }; +} + +export function journalEntry(overrides: Partial = {}): JournalEntry { + return { + schemaVersion: 1, + phase: 'started', + operationId: 'op-1', + physicalModemId: JOURNAL_MODEM_A as string, + generation: JOURNAL_GENERATION as number, + recordedAtMs: 1_000, + descriptor: { + descriptorId: 'set-usb-mode', + provider: 'fixture-provider', + authority: 'provider', + mutationImpact: 'write', + profiles: ['fixture'], + firmware: ['1.0'], + confidence: 'high', + }, + ...overrides, + } as JournalEntry; +} + +export interface JournalHarness { + readonly dir: string; + readonly path: string; + /** A fresh engine over the SAME path — the "restart" in a replay test. */ + restart(): JournalEngine; + dispose(): Promise; +} + +export async function createJournalHarness(fileName = 'operations.jsonl'): Promise { + const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'modem-journal-')); + const path = join(dir, fileName); + let tick = 0; + return { + dir, + path, + restart(): JournalEngine { + return createJournalEngine({ + store: createFileJournalStore({ path }), + now: () => 1_000 + ++tick, + }); + }, + dispose: () => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }), + }; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/observation-fixtures.ts b/control/test-support/observation-fixtures.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e26b83b --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/observation-fixtures.ts @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +// Canonical per-source normalization fixtures. +// +// Each one is shaped like the payload its provider really returns — ModemManager's +// decoded property records, HiLink's XML bodies, a ZTE goform JSON blob, three UFI +// endpoint envelopes — and each deliberately carries at least one VENDOR-SPECIFIC +// field the normalized model has no slot for. Those extra fields are the point: they +// are what the round-trip assertions prove is retained rather than dropped. +// +// The providers that will eventually produce these payloads live in later changes. +// These fixtures are what the normalization layer is proven against in the meantime, +// and what those providers' contract tests should reuse rather than re-invent. + +import { + type DeviceGeneration, + deviceGeneration, + type EpochMillis, + epochMillis, + resolvePhysicalModemIdentity, + type SourceEpoch, + type StableKey, + sourceEpoch, +} from '../src/domain'; +import type { + HilinkObservationInput, + ModemManagerObservationInput, + NormalizationContext, + UfiObservationInput, + ZteObservationInput, +} from '../src/observations'; + +export const FIXTURE_STABLE_KEY: StableKey = resolvePhysicalModemIdentity({ + serial: 'FIXTURE-MODEM-0001', +}).stableKey; + +export const FIXTURE_GENERATION: DeviceGeneration = deviceGeneration(7); +export const FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH: SourceEpoch = sourceEpoch(42); +export const FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT: EpochMillis = epochMillis(1_700_000_000_000); + +export function fixtureContext( + overrides: Partial = {}, +): NormalizationContext { + return { + stableKey: FIXTURE_STABLE_KEY, + generation: FIXTURE_GENERATION, + sourceEpoch: FIXTURE_SOURCE_EPOCH, + observedAt: FIXTURE_OBSERVED_AT, + ...overrides, + }; +} + +/** + * A registered ModemManager modem. + * + * `Modem.Ports` and `Modem3gpp.Pco` are the vendor-specific extras here: real MM + * properties that this layer's normalized model has no slot for. + */ +export const MM_FIXTURE: ModemManagerObservationInput = { + modem: { + Model: 'RM530N-GL', + Manufacturer: 'Quectel', + Revision: 'RM530NGLAAR11A02M4G 1 [Feb 13 2024 05:00:00]', + State: 8, + CurrentModes: (1 << 3) | (1 << 4), + AccessTechnologies: 1 << 15, + SignalQuality: 71, + Sim: '/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SIM/0', + SimSlots: ['/org/freedesktop/ModemManager1/SIM/0', '/'], + UnlockRequired: 1, + Ports: ['ttyUSB0', 'wwan0'], + }, + modem3gpp: { + RegistrationState: 1, + Pco: 'dns-primary=10.0.0.1', + }, + sim: { + SimType: 1, + EsimStatus: 0, + OperatorName: 'CLARO COL', + }, + signal: { + rssi: -71, + rsrp: -98.5, + rsrq: -11, + snr: 6.5, + refresh_rate: 5, + }, +}; + +/** + * A HiLink dongle answering both bodies. + * + * `` and `` are the vendor-specific extras. + */ +export const HILINK_FIXTURE: HilinkObservationInput = { + status: [ + '', + '', + '901', + '4', + '5', + '1', + '101', + '', + ].join(''), + signal: [ + '', + '', + '-65dBm', + '-101dBm', + '-9dB', + '12dB', + '12345678', + '987654321', + '', + ].join(''), + netModeList: [ + '', + '00AUTO', + '03LTE', + '', + ].join(''), + netMode: '033FFFFFFF', +}; + +/** A ZTE goform reading. `wan_lte_ca` and `lte_pci` are the vendor-specific extras. */ +export const ZTE_FIXTURE: ZteObservationInput = { + body: JSON.stringify({ + signalbar: '4', + rssi: '-67', + lte_rsrp: '-99', + lte_rsrq: '-10', + lte_snr: '7', + network_type: 'LTE', + network_provider_fullname: 'Movistar', + cell_id: '0A1B2C', + simcard_roam: 'Home', + rmcc: '732', + rmnc: '123', + lte_pci: '188', + wan_active_band: 'LTE BAND 4', + wan_lte_ca: 'ca_deactivated', + }), +}; + +/** + * A UFI/HIMI reading across its three endpoints plus the product endpoint. + * + * `cputemp`, `wifinum` and `ethnum` are the vendor-specific extras; `IMSI` and + * `ICCID` are present because the real overview endpoint returns them, and they are + * what the redaction assertions exercise. + */ +export const UFI_FIXTURE: UfiObservationInput = { + sysinfo: JSON.stringify({ + reply: 'ok', + params: { SIGNAL: '3', cellid: '3344', bsid: '77', cputemp: '46', wifinum: '2', ethnum: '1' }, + }), + overview: JSON.stringify({ + reply: 'ok', + params: { + SIGNAL: '3', + SSID: 'CeraLive-UFI', + WANIP: '10.64.12.9', + IMSI: '732123456789012', + ICCID: '8957010000000000001', + WEBVER: 'V1.0.7', + }, + }), + status: JSON.stringify({ reply: 'ok', params: { signalStrength: '3', battery: '88' } }), + produceInfo: JSON.stringify({ reply: 'ok', params: { productname: 'UFI-M600', hwver: 'A2' } }), +}; + +/** Every fixture's session refused — the auth-expired shape, per source. */ +export const HILINK_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE: HilinkObservationInput = { + status: '125002need login', + signal: '125002need login', + netModeList: '125002', +}; + +export const UFI_AUTH_EXPIRED_FIXTURE: UfiObservationInput = { + sysinfo: JSON.stringify({ reply: 'SessionOut' }), + overview: JSON.stringify({ reply: 'SessionOut' }), + status: JSON.stringify({ reply: 'SessionOut' }), +}; + +export const ZTE_MALFORMED_FIXTURE: ZteObservationInput = { body: 'login' }; diff --git a/control/test-support/operation-engine-fixture.ts b/control/test-support/operation-engine-fixture.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d72004d --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/operation-engine-fixture.ts @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +import { + defineOperationDescriptor, + deviceGeneration, + nextDeviceGeneration, + type OperationCompletion, + type OperationDescriptor, + physicalModemId, +} from '../src/domain'; +import { + createOperationEngine, + type OperationExecution, + type OperationPreconditionPort, +} from '../src/operations/operation-engine'; +import type { MutationAdmissionPort, ResourceOwnershipPort } from '../src/ports'; +import { createModemControlCompositionRoot } from '../src/safety'; + +export const OPERATION_MODEM = physicalModemId('serial:operation-engine'); + +const ownership: ResourceOwnershipPort = { + acquire: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'refused', reason: 'already-owned' }), +}; +const admission: MutationAdmissionPort = { + acquire: () => + Promise.resolve({ + status: 'admitted', + lease: { release: () => Promise.resolve() }, + }), +}; + +export function operationDescriptor( + overrides: Partial> = {}, +): OperationDescriptor { + return defineOperationDescriptor({ + id: 'set-mode', + support: { read: { supported: true }, write: { supported: true } }, + authority: 'provider', + provider: 'fixture', + constraints: { kind: 'allowed-values', values: ['auto', 'lte'] }, + livePreconditions: ['device-present'], + availability: { state: 'available' }, + mutationImpact: 'write', + retryClass: 'never', + readback: { required: false }, + rollback: { required: false }, + journal: { required: false }, + admission: { required: true, reason: 'controller approval' }, + evidence: { profiles: ['fixture'], firmware: [] }, + confidence: 'high', + ...overrides, + }); +} + +export function deferred(): { + readonly promise: Promise; + readonly resolve: (value: T) => void; +} { + let resolvePromise: ((value: T) => void) | undefined; + const promise = new Promise((resolve) => { + resolvePromise = resolve; + }); + return { + promise, + resolve(value: T): void { + if (resolvePromise === undefined) throw new Error('deferred resolver was not initialized'); + resolvePromise(value); + }, + }; +} + +export function operationExecution( + completion: () => Promise>, + overrides: Partial> = {}, +): OperationExecution { + return { + operationId: 'operation-1', + physicalModemId: OPERATION_MODEM, + descriptor: operationDescriptor(), + input: 'lte', + execute: completion, + ...overrides, + }; +} + +export function createOperationEngineHarness(preconditions?: OperationPreconditionPort) { + const root = createModemControlCompositionRoot({ admission, ownership }); + let generation = deviceGeneration(1); + const engine = createOperationEngine({ + root, + currentGeneration: () => generation, + preconditions: preconditions ?? { + check: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'satisfied' }), + }, + }); + return { + engine, + generation: () => generation, + replace(): void { + generation = nextDeviceGeneration(generation); + }, + dispose: () => root.dispose(), + }; +} diff --git a/control/test-support/ownership-root-fixture.ts b/control/test-support/ownership-root-fixture.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88f0781 --- /dev/null +++ b/control/test-support/ownership-root-fixture.ts @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +import { + createFlockResourceOwnershipPort, + createModemControlCompositionRoot, + type MutationAdmissionPort, +} from '../src'; + +const lockPath = process.argv[2]; +if (lockPath === undefined) throw new Error('lock path is required'); + +const admission: MutationAdmissionPort = { + acquire: () => Promise.resolve({ status: 'refused', reason: 'admission-refused' }), +}; +const root = createModemControlCompositionRoot({ + admission, + ownership: createFlockResourceOwnershipPort({ lockPath }), +}); +const result = await root.acquireOwnership({ resource: 'file-store' }); + +if (result.status === 'refused') { + process.stdout.write( + `${JSON.stringify({ + type: 'refused', + reason: result.reason, + ...(result.holder !== undefined ? { holderPid: result.holder.pid } : {}), + })}\n`, + ); + await root.dispose(); + process.exit(0); +} + +process.stdout.write( + `${JSON.stringify({ type: 'acquired', holderPid: result.lease.holder.pid })}\n`, +); +void result.lease.lost.then(() => { + process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify({ type: 'expired' })}\n`); +}); + +process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); +process.stdin.once('data', async () => { + await root.dispose(); + process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify({ type: 'released' })}\n`); + process.exit(0); +}); +process.stdin.resume(); diff --git a/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md b/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md index 94e2d4d..f2a3312 100644 --- a/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md +++ b/docs/DOMAIN-CONTRACTS.md @@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ it started under; `isCurrentGeneration()` identifies stale work. typed value. Unavailable observations are a separate discriminated state with `value: null`; they cannot be confused with stale data or with a boolean freshness flag. +The layer that PRODUCES these envelopes — normalization, per-metric provenance, freshness +evaluation, and the desired/applied/observed split — is `control/src/observations/`, +documented in `AGENTS.md` § "OBSERVATIONS". It builds on this contract and does not redefine +it: `ObservationEnvelope`, `SourceEpoch`, `DeviceGeneration` and `StableKey` stay frozen +exactly as described above. + ## Operations `OperationDescriptor` records independent read/write support, provider authority, @@ -42,3 +48,36 @@ write reply is also `unknown-outcome`, even when the generation is current. Ever outcome has `requiresReconciliation: true`; callers must reconcile that modem before another mutation. `canAutoRetry()` returns true only for a failed, supported, explicitly idempotent read. + +`createOperationEngine()` is the executable form of those contracts. It receives a composition +root, a live generation reader, and an `OperationPreconditionPort`. Mutations enter the root's +shared physical-modem actor before the engine re-reads preconditions and admission, so a queued +write cannot act on an earlier check. Unsupported, unavailable, out-of-constraint, or missing +required-hook requests are typed refusals and never reach the provider. + +The engine keeps a reconciliation-required gate per `PhysicalModemId`. Any classified +`unknown-outcome` closes that modem's mutation gate; later writes return +`reconciliation-required` without calling their executor. `engine.reconcile()` runs through the +same actor and clears the gate only after reconciliation succeeds without a generation change. +Reads remain outside the write queue, and only a failed descriptor-classified idempotent read gets +one automatic retry. Required journal, readback, and rollback hooks are invoked from the +descriptor-defined lifecycle; rollback is never guessed after an unknown outcome. + +## Admission, ownership, and actors + +`MutationAdmissionPort` consumes the descriptor's `admission` requirement without adding a +second policy vocabulary. Required admission with no injected authority is the typed refusal +`admission-port-missing`. The interface contains no stream concept; the embedding controller +owns whatever policy backs its decision and releases the returned lease. + +`ResourceOwnershipPort` is acquire-or-refuse, never queued. File-backed stores, router +sessions, and USB-hub access require it. `createFlockResourceOwnershipPort({ lockPath })` +provides the Linux default with non-blocking `flock` and holder PID/start-time metadata; the +path is mandatory input and the exported `/run/ceralive/modem-control.lock` value is a caller +convention, not an implementation hardcode. Kernel lock lifetime and PID liveness make a +dead holder recoverable without stealing from a live process. + +`createModemControlCompositionRoot()` enforces one live root per process and owns a +per-`PhysicalModemId` actor registry. Repeated `actorFor()` calls for the same physical modem +return one shared `ModemActor`. `ModemManagerInhibitPort` narrows MM maintenance inhibition; +`UhubctlPort` is an injected contract with no implementation in the v1.1 control package. diff --git a/docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md b/docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efbf7d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/HUAWEI-HILINK-PROVIDER.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# Huawei HiLink provider + +`createHuaweiHiLinkDefinition()` returns the canonical `ProviderDefinition` and is exported through `./providers`; callers can register it with `createProviderRegistry().register(...)`. The definition has two exact, evidence-scoped profiles: `e3372h-22.200-password-type-3` (`22.200.05.00.1080`) and `e3372h-22.333-password-type-4` (`22.333.01.00.00`). Passive firmware evidence and the unauthenticated `SesTokInfo` shape select one candidate; `/api/user/state-login` must then report that profile's password type before the provider makes its single login attempt. A mismatch refuses the candidate instead of trying the other derivation. Unknown firmware receives no profile and no write surface. + +The type-3 profile sends base64 of the password. The type-4 profile sends base64 of the SHA-256 hexadecimal digest of `username + base64(SHA-256(password) hexadecimal digest) + session token`. Credentials are constructor input, stay in memory, and are absent from results, contract fixtures, and errors. Login responses may replace the session cookie and verification token; both remain transport-internal. + +Every transport request carries the selected device interface and `redirect: "error"`, which keeps duplicate-address HiLink units on the intended link. Reads use the authenticated cookie. POSTs additionally carry the current verification token and XML content type. Mode and data writes are independently capability-gated, acquire `router-session`, serialize by physical modem, and create a second authenticated session for readback before returning `applied`. A mode must be present in the freshly read mode list. Wi-Fi writes are absent and are never inferred from a read endpoint. HTTP 401/403 and HiLink `125002` become typed `auth-expired` refusals with no credential retry. + +The XML document parsers live in the pure `hardware/router-parsers` surface via `hilink-protocol.ts`; the provider does not maintain a second parser. Exact replay coverage for both profiles, profile mismatch, capability refusal, fresh readback, interface binding, redirect refusal, and mid-write expiry is in `control/src/providers/huawei-hilink/provider.test.ts`. diff --git a/docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md b/docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5c2e98 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/MF79U-DIAGNOSIS.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# MF79U authentication diagnosis `[PARTIAL]` + +This bench-only procedure distinguishes an MF79U legacy protocol mismatch from a rejected +credential or an unknown lockout state. It performs **at most one** login request. It never +retries, never tries the MF266 algorithm, and never writes Wi-Fi or modem configuration. + +## Preconditions + +- Connect one MF79U and identify its USB-network interface. +- In browser developer tools, capture the login request once, redact every value, and save + only this request-shape manifest outside the repository (for example under + `test-results/`): + + ```text + METHOD POST + PATH /goform/goform_set_cmd_process + HEADER content-type + HEADER origin + HEADER referer + FORM goformId + FORM isTest + FORM password + ``` + +- Install `curl`, `jq`, and GNU `base64`. Do not enable shell tracing. + +## One-attempt command + +Run from the repository root. Inject the password only into the command environment; do not +put it in a shell script, transcript, issue, or evidence file. + +```sh +read -rsp 'MF79U bench password: ' MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD; printf '\n' +export MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD +MF79U_INTERFACE=usb0 \ +MF79U_ADMIN_URL=http://192.168.0.1 \ +MF79U_REDACTED_CAPTURE=test-results/mf79u-login-shape.txt \ + control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh | + tee test-results/mf79u-diagnosis.txt +unset MF79U_BENCH_PASSWORD +``` + +The output is exactly one classification and contains no response body, cookie, password, +or derivative: + +- `auth-accepted` — the legacy request returned success and a `stok` cookie. +- `protocol-mismatch` — the redacted browser shape differs, or the reply has MF266 challenge + markers. Stop; do not try another algorithm. +- `auth-rejection` — the device returned a defined negative result. Confirm the credential + out of band before any later attempt. +- `lockout-unknown` — the response cannot distinguish a lockout from another refusal. Stop + all authentication attempts and inspect the device UI manually. + +Only the classification file may be retained. The redacted browser shape and classification +remain under gitignored `test-results/`; never retain the temporary password or a raw capture. diff --git a/docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md b/docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..118af1b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/MODEMMANAGER-PROVIDER.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# ModemManager provider + +`ModemManagerProvider` is the concrete provider-registry adapter for ModemManager 1.20+. +It uses the package's typed D-Bus transport directly. Command-line clients such as `mmcli`, +`qmicli`, and `mbimcli` are diagnostics for an operator, never production transports. + +## Runtime discovery + +The provider resolves a physical modem from `ObjectManager.GetManagedObjects`, then derives its +generic controls from the interfaces and properties on that object. A modem does not need a catalog +entry to expose current mode, signal, SIM, multi-SIM, or power state. Missing runtime evidence +refuses only the affected control; it is not converted into an unsupported-model verdict. + +Certification is narrower: a band read is generic, while a band mutation is unavailable unless the +embedding process injects a positive certification decision. FCC auto-unlock likewise keeps using +the existing `:` coverage catalog because ModemManager's own modem object does not advertise +dispatcher coverage. + +## Existing modules composed + +- `backend/observer.ts` and `backend/managed-objects.ts`: authoritative snapshot and signal lifecycle. +- `backend/mm-backend.ts` and `backend/mm-mutations.ts`: radio, band, SIM, scan, and inhibit calls. +- `backend/mm-location.ts` plus `location/fix-state.ts`: `Location.Setup` with signaling disabled, + bounded acquisition, fix expiry, and no location history. +- `sms/dbus-messaging.ts`: permanently read-only list/read plus `Added`/`Deleted` events. +- `ussd/mm-ussd.ts`: bounded serialized USSD sessions. +- `band/` and `fcc/`: existing safety gates and catalogs. + +All composed mutations share one `ModemActor`. No provider surface creates, connects, or disconnects +a bearer; NetworkManager owns bearer and APN state. + +## Refusals and tests + +Typed D-Bus failures map to stable domain reasons instead of exposing daemon text. The private-bus +suite in `control/src/providers/modem-manager/modem-manager-provider.integration.test.ts` drives the +real fake-MM ObjectManager service. It covers unknown-model discovery, events, radio/signal/SIM/power, +GPS capability and privacy, SMS, USSD, certification-gated bands, and an injected +`Core.Unauthorized` error. `forbidden-subprocess.test.ts` is a non-vacuous production-source gate. diff --git a/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md b/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md index 75e56f6..ce83569 100644 --- a/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md +++ b/docs/PROVIDER-MATCHING.md @@ -52,3 +52,46 @@ or composition change changes the cache signature. Each case re-runs the complet the internal `control/test-support/provider-conformance-fixture.ts` fixture. It covers unsupported, selected, weak, tied/read-only, colliding writable-provider, auth ordering and generation re-evaluation paths without registering a real vendor implementation. + +### The conformance matrix — every real provider, registered at once + +The skeleton above uses a synthetic provider, and each concrete provider's own suite runs with +only itself in the registry. Neither shape can answer the question a fleet poses: with +ModemManager, Huawei HiLink, ZTE goform and UFI/HIMI **all registered**, does every device reach +exactly the provider and profile it is entitled to — and does no device reach one it is not? + +`control/src/providers/conformance-matrix.test.ts` is that matrix. **20 cases**: nine fleet +profiles (MM-managed Quectel / SIMCom / FM350-on-USB-carrier, both HiLink firmwares, MF79U, +MF266, and both UFI USB ids) plus eleven safety cases — ambiguous collision, cross-profile +refusal, three malformed-response cases, auth-expired, lockout-unknown, two unknown-firmware +cases, wrong-interface and wrong-transport. Every case registers all four providers and scripts +the three the device does not belong to as devices that answer nothing they understand. The +expectation is the exact decision — provider, profile, writability and evidence score. + +Three invariants hold across the whole matrix and are asserted as such: + +- **No case outside `fleet-profile` is ever writable.** Ambiguity, malformed input, an expired + session, a lockout and a misrouted request all resolve read-only or unresolved. +- **An unresolved decision carries no provider, no profile and no operations surface**, and its + evidence ledger is never empty. +- **No matcher result carries the credential the wire carried**, even though the transcript does. + +Two companion suites sit beside it: + +- `conformance-transcripts.test.ts` asserts the exact per-firmware wire — method, path, query, + form/JSON/XML body, the header ARRAY in order, and the cookie — rebuilt from the protocol in + `control/test-support/conformance/transcripts.ts` rather than read back from the provider. A + whole-array `toEqual` additionally pins the request COUNT, so a second login or a stray probe + fails even when the decision is unchanged. +- `conformance-scale.test.ts` is a **software upper-bound fixture at 16 concurrently attached + modems** — subscriptions stay fleet-wide, `Signal.Setup` is issued once per (epoch, modem) and + re-applied to every survivor on a new epoch, a burst of attachments is coalesced, and sixteen + concurrent matches each answer about their own modem. **The hardware-verified fleet size + remains 8**; 16 is a fixture result and must never be reported as a bench measurement. + +The corpus lives in `control/test-support/conformance/` (repo-local, unpublished) and reuses the +payload fixtures from `observation-fixtures.ts` rather than minting a second set. Sanitization is +structural: every credential is a declared literal that says it is not real, and any 14+ digit run +in the corpus or in a recorded request fails the suite unless it is a declared member of +`SANITIZED_SUBSCRIBER_IDENTIFIERS`. The matrix summary artifact is written to the gitignored +`test-results/provider-conformance-matrix.{md,json}`. diff --git a/docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md b/docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..575e9a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/UFI-DIAG-PROBE.md @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +# UFI / HIMI supervised DIAG info probe — BENCH ONLY `[PARTIAL]` + +**This procedure never runs on a production board, never runs unattended, and is not an +operation `@ceralive/modem-control` can perform.** The shipped `UfiHimiProvider` is +read-only over the HIMI HTTP API and has no DIAG code path at all — not a refused stub, +not a disabled branch. Everything below is done by a human, by hand, on a bench unit +whose loss would cost nothing. + +No executable harness ships for this one, and that is deliberate: a script that opens a +DIAG channel IS the code path this provider exists to not have. The MF79U procedure has +`control/scripts/mf79u-diagnose.sh` because its subject is an ordinary HTTP login; this +one's subject is the channel that can rewrite a modem's persistent storage. + +## What this probe may establish, and what it may not + +It may establish exactly one fact: **whether a DIAG interface descriptor exists on this +unit, and whether it answers a read-only information request.** + +It may not be used to read or write NV items, read or write EFS, read or write device +identity or RF calibration, flash firmware, enter or automate EDL, or re-bind a driver. +Those are the ids in `control/src/providers/ufi-himi/prohibitions.ts`; they are refused +with typed reasons by the provider and have no implementation anywhere. + +## The `9091` trap — read this before starting + +`05c6` is Qualcomm's generic vendor id and `05c6:9091` is a **firmware-chosen** product +id. It is routinely quoted as proof that DIAG is available. It is not: the product id is +picked by whoever built the firmware image and says nothing about which interfaces the +device exposes. `05c6:9024` is likewise evidence of a composition — RNDIS plus an ADB +interface — and not a permission; production never reaches this device over ADB, SSH, +telnet or DIAG under any circumstance. + +Only an interface descriptor proves a DIAG channel. `classifyUfiDiagEvidence()` encodes +that rule, and answers `not-proven` / `product-id-is-not-evidence` for a bare product id. + +## Preconditions + +- A **bench** UFI/HIMI stick. Not a deployed board, not a board carrying a live stream. +- A second person, or an agreed stop-time, so the probe is supervised rather than + open-ended. +- `usbutils` installed. Nothing else is required for step 1, which is where most units + will stop. +- The unit's admin password injected as **ephemeral bench input** for step 2 only: + + ```sh + read -rsp 'UFI bench password: ' UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD; printf '\n' + export UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD + ``` + + Never put it in a script, a transcript, an issue, or an evidence file, and `unset` it + when the run ends. `control/src/providers/ufi-himi/credential-fence.test.ts` scans the + repository for it and its base64/SHA-256 derivatives on every test run. + +## Step 1 — confirm the descriptor, or stop + +```sh +lsusb -d 05c6: -v 2>/dev/null | + awk '/bInterfaceNumber|bInterfaceClass|bInterfaceSubClass|bInterfaceProtocol/' +``` + +Classify and record ONE of: + +- `diag-not-present` — no interface reports class `ff`, subclass `ff`, protocol `30`. + **Stop here.** There is nothing to probe, whatever the product id says. +- `diag-descriptor-confirmed` — such an interface exists; note its `bInterfaceNumber`. + +## Step 2 — read the telemetry the provider itself uses + +This is the READ that answers most questions, and it needs no DIAG at all: + +```sh +curl --interface usb0 --no-location -sS \ + -H 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8' \ + -d "{\"cmdid\":\"login\",\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"${UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD}\"}" \ + http://192.168.0.1/himiapi/json +``` + +Then re-issue with `"cmdid":"getsysinfo"` (and `getoverview`, `getallstatus`, +`getproduceinfo`) carrying the returned session in an `Authorization:` header. A +`{"reply":"SessionOut"}` means the session expired — record it and stop; do not retry the +login in a loop. **If this step answers what you came to find out, the probe is over.** + +## Step 3 — the supervised read-only info request + +Only with `diag-descriptor-confirmed`, only with the supervisor present, and only for an +**information** request — the command that asks the modem what it is, and writes nothing. + +Before running anything, state out loud (or in the transcript) the exact command and why +it cannot write. Abort on any of these: + +- the tool wants to enable a log mask, a packet filter, or any "capture" mode; +- the tool offers, or defaults to, an NV/EFS read-write session; +- the unit stops answering the HIMI HTTP API mid-probe; +- the supervisor is no longer watching. + +Record ONE classification: + +- `probe-read-only-ok` — the info request answered; note nothing but the classification. +- `probe-refused` — the channel exists but refused the request. +- `probe-aborted` — any abort condition above fired. + +## Retention + +Only the classification lines from steps 1–3 may be kept, under the gitignored +`test-results/`. No raw capture, no DIAG frame, no session token, no password, and no +IMSI/ICCID/IMEI. `unset UFI_BENCH_PASSWORD` before the shell is left. + +## After the probe + +A `diag-descriptor-confirmed` result changes what a supervised bench operator may attempt +by hand. It changes nothing about the product: `UFI_DIAG_PRODUCTION_ACCESS` is +`prohibited` unconditionally, and promoting this probe into a production operation is out +of scope permanently, not pending evidence. From c036ee3e1e9855b338d851359ca6314978c82f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] fix(hardware): correct ZTE detail field naming and widen placeholder set MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Overlaying the 1.1 candidate onto CeraUI's own tree proved `parseZteDetails` could not replace the reader it exists to retire: it was narrower than that reader and disagreed with it about a key name. `band` and `network_band` are two different readings and are no longer folded onto one key. `lte_band` is the serving cell's band; `wan_active_band` is the band the WAN leg is active on, and the two disagree the moment carrier aggregation is up, so publishing either under the other's name reports a band the device never claimed for that leg. The carrier composition and the dongle's own counters are now carried: `lte_ca_{p,s}cell_*`, the monthly triple plus `date_month`, and the five `realtime_*` counters. The `realtime_*` to `session_*` rename is deliberate — three of those five are cumulative counters, and the vendor's prefix reads as "live rate" for all five. `stated()` drops every vendor placeholder rather than only the single dash; `--`, `n/a` and `N/A` are unset markers on these firmwares too, and echoing one puts a value on screen that reads like a reading. `parseUfiDetails` shares the helper and inherits the widening. Also recorded: `parseUfiDetails` remains narrower than CeraUI's UFI reader and takes a different input shape. No consumer probes for it, so nothing is broken today, but a cutover must reconcile it first. Also removes a stale CeraUI-only symbol reference (`withCapabilityModuleMutation`) from the carryover section of AGENTS.md: it names a symbol that lives in CeraUI, not in this repo, so a reader following it finds nothing here. --- AGENTS.md | 31 ++++++++++- control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++ control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts | 36 ++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index e6c8fcb..16e5f05 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -592,6 +592,35 @@ values, or already-normalized records and return deterministic values only. They udev, invoke ModemManager, persist state, or alter CeraUI; CeraUI keeps its local adapters and copies until the explicit consumer cutover. +### `parseZteDetails` MUST stay a superset of the consumer it replaces + +The seam only works if adopting a packaged parser is a no-op for the shipped +consumer. It was not: an overlay of the 1.1 candidate over CeraUI's own tree found +this parser both NARROWER than the reader it is meant to retire and in disagreement +with it about one key name. Both are fixed here, and both are pinned by tests: + +- **`band` and `network_band` are two readings, not one key.** `lte_band` is the + SERVING cell's band and `wan_active_band` is the band the WAN leg is active on; + they disagree the moment carrier aggregation is up. This parser previously folded + all three spellings onto `network_band`, so a consumer rendering the serving band + got the WAN leg's — or nothing. They are now separate and neither falls back to + the other. +- **The carrier composition and the dongle's own counters are carried.** + `lte_ca_{p,s}cell_{arfcn,band,bandwidth}`, `monthly_{tx_bytes,rx_bytes,time}` + + `date_month`, and the five `realtime_*` counters now emit as `pcell_*` / `scell_*` + / `monthly_*` (with `monthly_period`) / `session_*`. The `realtime_*` → `session_*` + rename is deliberate: three of those five are cumulative counters, and the vendor's + own prefix reads as "live rate" for all five. +- **`stated()` drops every vendor placeholder**, not only the single dash — `--`, + `n/a` and `N/A` are unset markers on these firmwares too, and echoing one puts a + value on screen that reads like a reading. This widening applies to + `parseUfiDetails` as well, which shares the helper. + +**`parseUfiDetails` is still NARROWER than CeraUI's UFI reader and takes a different +input shape** (three bodies here, five there — no `status`/`networkMode`). No +consumer probes for it today, so nothing is broken; a future cutover must reconcile +it before pointing CeraUI's UFI path at this one. + ## OBSERVATIONS — NORMALIZATION THAT NARROWS WITHOUT DISCARDING `control/src/observations/` sits directly on top of the parsers above and turns a raw @@ -1126,7 +1155,7 @@ D-Bus calls (`calls.ts`), and the adapter that drives them (`mm-ussd.ts`). **LEASE-ONLY, never journaled.** A USSD session cannot re-register the radio, so it takes the per-modem mutation lease and carries no pre-state and no rollback — the split todo 29's -`withCapabilityModuleMutation` enforces in the TYPE SYSTEM, so this classification is not a +`MutationAdmissionPort` enforces in the TYPE SYSTEM, so this classification is not a convention that can drift. **USSD is a SESSION protocol, not request/response, and that is why the machine exists.** diff --git a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts index 78317dd..8e12cd3 100644 --- a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts +++ b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.test.ts @@ -72,6 +72,66 @@ describe('transport-free router response parsers', () => { }); }); + test('keeps the serving band and the WAN leg band as two separate readings', () => { + // Folding them onto one key reports a band the device never claimed for that + // leg — and the two genuinely disagree once carrier aggregation is up. + expect(parseZteDetails('{"lte_band":"B4","wan_active_band":"LTE BAND 7"}')).toEqual({ + band: 'B4', + network_band: 'LTE BAND 7', + }); + expect(parseZteDetails('{"band":"B28"}')).toEqual({ band: 'B28' }); + expect(parseZteDetails('{"lte_band":"B4"}')).toEqual({ band: 'B4' }); + expect(parseZteDetails('{"wan_active_band":"LTE BAND 7"}')).toEqual({ + network_band: 'LTE BAND 7', + }); + }); + + test('carries the carrier composition and the dongle-owned counters', () => { + expect( + parseZteDetails( + JSON.stringify({ + lte_ca_pcell_arfcn: '2000', + lte_ca_pcell_band: '4', + lte_ca_pcell_bandwidth: '20', + lte_ca_scell_arfcn: '5230', + lte_ca_scell_band: '7', + lte_ca_scell_bandwidth: '15', + monthly_tx_bytes: '12884901888', + monthly_rx_bytes: '96636764160', + monthly_time: '184320', + date_month: '2026-08', + realtime_tx_bytes: '1048576', + realtime_rx_bytes: '8388608', + realtime_tx_thrpt: '131072', + realtime_rx_thrpt: '1048576', + realtime_time: '3600', + }), + ), + ).toEqual({ + pcell_arfcn: '2000', + pcell_band: '4', + pcell_bandwidth: '20', + scell_arfcn: '5230', + scell_band: '7', + scell_bandwidth: '15', + monthly_tx_bytes: '12884901888', + monthly_rx_bytes: '96636764160', + monthly_time: '184320', + monthly_period: '2026-08', + session_tx_bytes: '1048576', + session_rx_bytes: '8388608', + session_tx_rate: '131072', + session_rx_rate: '1048576', + session_time: '3600', + }); + }); + + test('drops every vendor placeholder, not only the single dash', () => { + expect( + parseZteDetails('{"lte_band":"--","cell_id":"n/a","network_type":"N/A","provider":" "}'), + ).toBeUndefined(); + }); + test('reports Huawei network-mode capability and refusal distinctly', () => { expect( parseHilinkCapabilities({ diff --git a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts index c0d7021..97f334a 100644 --- a/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts +++ b/control/src/hardware/router-parsers.ts @@ -231,10 +231,18 @@ export function parseUfiSignal(input: { export type RouterDetails = Readonly>; +/** + * The vendor's own "unset" placeholders. A UFI answers `-` for a WAN address, an + * IMSI and an ICCID it does not have, and the ZTE builds answer `--` / `N/A` for + * an unpopulated counter — publishing any of those as a reading puts a value on + * screen that reads like a real one. + */ +const PLACEHOLDERS: ReadonlySet = new Set(['-', '--', 'n/a', 'N/A']); + function stated(value: string | number | undefined): string | undefined { if (value === undefined) return undefined; const normalized = String(value).trim(); - return normalized === '' || normalized === '-' ? undefined : normalized; + return normalized === '' || PLACEHOLDERS.has(normalized) ? undefined : normalized; } function compact( @@ -261,8 +269,32 @@ export function parseZteDetails(body: string): RouterDetails | undefined { ['mcc', stated(value.rmcc)], ['mnc', stated(value.rmnc)], ['pci', stated(value.lte_pci)], - ['network_band', stated(value.wan_active_band) ?? stated(value.lte_band) ?? stated(value.band)], + // `band` and `network_band` are two DIFFERENT readings and must not be + // folded onto one key: `lte_band` is the serving cell's band, while + // `wan_active_band` is the band the WAN leg is active on, and the two + // disagree the moment carrier aggregation is up. Publishing either under + // the other's name reports a band the device never claimed for that leg. + ['band', stated(value.lte_band) ?? stated(value.band)], + ['network_band', stated(value.wan_active_band)], ['carrier_aggregation', stated(value.wan_lte_ca)], + ['pcell_arfcn', stated(value.lte_ca_pcell_arfcn)], + ['pcell_band', stated(value.lte_ca_pcell_band)], + ['pcell_bandwidth', stated(value.lte_ca_pcell_bandwidth)], + ['scell_arfcn', stated(value.lte_ca_scell_arfcn)], + ['scell_band', stated(value.lte_ca_scell_band)], + ['scell_bandwidth', stated(value.lte_ca_scell_bandwidth)], + ['monthly_tx_bytes', stated(value.monthly_tx_bytes)], + ['monthly_rx_bytes', stated(value.monthly_rx_bytes)], + ['monthly_time', stated(value.monthly_time)], + ['monthly_period', stated(value.date_month)], + // Named `session_*` rather than `realtime_*`: these are cumulative counters + // and a throughput, and the vendor's own prefix reads as "live rate" for + // all five. + ['session_tx_bytes', stated(value.realtime_tx_bytes)], + ['session_rx_bytes', stated(value.realtime_rx_bytes)], + ['session_tx_rate', stated(value.realtime_tx_thrpt)], + ['session_rx_rate', stated(value.realtime_rx_thrpt)], + ['session_time', stated(value.realtime_time)], ]); } From 90cb14a3e91bc4efd0ea7250b48828564b579be0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andres Cera Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 03:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] chore(release): pre-merge version metadata (1.1.0 / 3.3.0 / 2026.8.0 / 2026.8.0) --- README.md | 6 +++--- bun.lock | 14 +++++++------- control/package.json | 2 +- package.json | 2 +- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 5d20e2f..3b56aef 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ no discovery or transport and leave CeraUI integration to a separate cutover. ## Versioning at a glance -ONE unified **SemVer** tag `vX.Y.Z` releases **both** artifacts together: `v0.2.0` publishes -`@ceralive/modem-control@0.2.0` to npm **and** the `.deb` artifact set in the same release. +ONE unified **SemVer** tag `vX.Y.Z` releases **both** artifacts together: `v1.1.0` publishes +`@ceralive/modem-control@1.1.0` to npm **and** the `.deb` artifact set in the same release. This repo deliberately does **not** use the CeraLive CalVer scheme. The `.deb` internal `Version:` fields encode the tag as `-~ceralive` (e.g. -`1.24.2-2~ceralive0.2.0`) so apt ordering stays correct. Full contract: +`1.24.2-2~ceralive1.1.0`) so apt ordering stays correct. Full contract: [`docs/VERSIONING.md`](docs/VERSIONING.md). ## Layout diff --git a/bun.lock b/bun.lock index 3ee63de..ae0dc2f 100644 --- a/bun.lock +++ b/bun.lock @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ }, "control": { "name": "@ceralive/modem-control", - "version": "1.0.0", + "version": "1.1.0", "dependencies": { "@httptoolkit/dbus-native": "0.1.5", "zod": "4.4.3", @@ -56,11 +56,11 @@ "@httptoolkit/dbus-native": ["@httptoolkit/dbus-native@0.1.5", "", { "dependencies": { "event-stream": "^4.0.0", "fast-xml-parser": "^5.3.6", "long": "^4.0.0", "safe-buffer": "^5.1.1" } }, "sha512-ygpvPvzb6yyhop/wEDouGvIHzXrLvArIAdyPqy87l3YllS8scyeu6a61I75kgp1QK7QZSRT26wpq6+/egiQwcA=="], - "@nodable/entities": ["@nodable/entities@2.2.0", "", {}, "sha512-9uGyhaQavEUMC8AIddIjau4NsnsXhou+j5sBAGojCM1oxmQpVKTWR/9JxABD6UAv12vpIms55fPZKFQEhG6uBg=="], + "@nodable/entities": ["@nodable/entities@3.0.0", "", {}, "sha512-8L9xFeTYKhm49xfIypoe2W5wV1m/3Z58kT+7kR9A8OyFxcPduI4VmxaUMQyKYrRjUoLLSXv6EKKID5Tvj9cUVw=="], "@types/bun": ["@types/bun@1.3.14", "", { "dependencies": { "bun-types": "1.3.14" } }, "sha512-h1hFqFVcvAvD9j9K7ZW7vd82aSA+rTdznZa+5bwvCwqSB1jmmfLcbIWhOLx1/+boy/xmjgCs/OMUL8hRJSmnPw=="], - "@types/node": ["@types/node@26.1.1", "", { "dependencies": { "undici-types": "~8.3.0" } }, "sha512-nxAkRSVkN1Y0JC1W8ky/fTfkGsMmcrRsbx+3XoZE+rMOX71kLYTV7fLXpqud1GpbpP5TuffXFqfX7fH2GgZREw=="], + "@types/node": ["@types/node@26.2.0", "", { "dependencies": { "undici-types": "~8.3.0" } }, "sha512-5IviulTZeRNp2vAJ514cc/HUlY5nZ9fCbq9DMyC52BrhFZACo3nI0R7qBxhQmo/d27NFe96ur/b7Wwxklda+kg=="], "anynum": ["anynum@1.0.1", "", {}, "sha512-N6//FLET/tXYNM/F6ABca1oH6fWB+KlTt909Le28WMDBk8oaT4vY17DCrwg2MvmuqUKt3Ni4N5dGJ/EoBgcO6A=="], @@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ "event-stream": ["event-stream@4.0.1", "", { "dependencies": { "duplexer": "^0.1.1", "from": "^0.1.7", "map-stream": "0.0.7", "pause-stream": "^0.0.11", "split": "^1.0.1", "stream-combiner": "^0.2.2", "through": "^2.3.8" } }, "sha512-qACXdu/9VHPBzcyhdOWR5/IahhGMf0roTeZJfzz077GwylcDd90yOHLouhmv7GJ5XzPi6ekaQWd8AvPP2nOvpA=="], - "fast-xml-builder": ["fast-xml-builder@1.3.0", "", { "dependencies": { "path-expression-matcher": "^1.6.2", "xml-naming": "^0.3.0" } }, "sha512-F74cZEdCvuw9P41GAC3rod4X04jjWGM1JPEv/GWSqFTWLsdyMSBMBMlm9Hk3GLBgLBbdBNY8yee0pQh2RBVESQ=="], + "fast-xml-builder": ["fast-xml-builder@1.3.1", "", { "dependencies": { "path-expression-matcher": "^1.6.2", "xml-naming": "^0.3.0" } }, "sha512-pIM/1n3ntFXKYrUZwW7QCK0gAW7XY+wzj1YMIV3tLDvPj/V+zTGJK5e3/4WJfwj0qWw2ElNXiTixda/R+3YSug=="], - "fast-xml-parser": ["fast-xml-parser@5.10.0", "", { "dependencies": { "@nodable/entities": "^2.2.0", "fast-xml-builder": "^1.2.0", "is-unsafe": "^2.0.0", "path-expression-matcher": "^1.6.2", "strnum": "^2.4.1", "xml-naming": "^0.3.0" }, "bin": { "fxparser": "src/cli/cli.js" } }, "sha512-SLhnTEqE5QpJHq/6zl9bsmImEP2adv+y6Wy+cJa7nVTRzQh1OZfCe9k29M5xN74LWnu0xa1zrUrq3KnOKl92Fg=="], + "fast-xml-parser": ["fast-xml-parser@5.11.0", "", { "dependencies": { "@nodable/entities": "^3.0.0", "fast-xml-builder": "^1.2.0", "is-unsafe": "^2.0.0", "path-expression-matcher": "^1.6.2", "strnum": "^2.4.2", "xml-naming": "^0.3.0" }, "bin": { "fxparser": "src/cli/cli.js" } }, "sha512-9IGxMqvqLOnqP+Egi1nqDHKv5k8aZ7r9n558enxcucmyVGEBNPAU+MOg/8jPIS7rO7sSq4gFm1/nHtiaubMruw=="], "from": ["from@0.1.7", "", {}, "sha512-twe20eF1OxVxp/ML/kq2p1uc6KvFK/+vs8WjEbeKmV2He22MKm7YF2ANIt+EOqhJ5L3K/SuuPhk0hWQDjOM23g=="], - "is-unsafe": ["is-unsafe@2.0.0", "", {}, "sha512-2LdV822R+wmI86unXA93WCFpL6g+av8ynWk0nrHyJqGop5VoocYsSLFgN8jrfalT6iGeLNM4KXuVSsULP53kEA=="], + "is-unsafe": ["is-unsafe@2.0.2", "", {}, "sha512-HgbIHPBH0KHHCcjLfGsCvhtPTVxjaAZlXjwdz7/GQC40SjSe4sfQsar8J5VFo8JOSbarkpV0OLG95bbaNd9aAQ=="], "long": ["long@4.0.0", "", {}, "sha512-XsP+KhQif4bjX1kbuSiySJFNAehNxgLb6hPRGJ9QsUr8ajHkuXGdrHmFUTUUXhDwVX2R5bY4JNZEwbUiMhV+MA=="], @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ "stream-combiner": ["stream-combiner@0.2.2", "", { "dependencies": { "duplexer": "~0.1.1", "through": "~2.3.4" } }, "sha512-6yHMqgLYDzQDcAkL+tjJDC5nSNuNIx0vZtRZeiPh7Saef7VHX9H5Ijn9l2VIol2zaNYlYEX6KyuT/237A58qEQ=="], - "strnum": ["strnum@2.4.1", "", { "dependencies": { "anynum": "^1.0.1" } }, "sha512-M9eUSMT2dCB2cTNPG7UYj6KuK7RJR2SN2+yCV/fTW3xzTCS6EaGZ5pSMgDIjB7r8zSfTGk+dvvn9rTjpVS9Mwg=="], + "strnum": ["strnum@2.4.2", "", { "dependencies": { "anynum": "^1.0.1" } }, "sha512-rDG3Ah4TV0k1hWvLSzkZtMmLN9+eS+h3knq4MP6A42Y3Yh5qGNnOUs1jJkoSr8FG5dsL28c7KgkIBzSEykqtuw=="], "through": ["through@2.3.8", "", {}, "sha512-w89qg7PI8wAdvX60bMDP+bFoD5Dvhm9oLheFp5O4a2QF0cSBGsBX4qZmadPMvVqlLJBBci+WqGGOAPvcDeNSVg=="], diff --git a/control/package.json b/control/package.json index f3e9b98..cc7b9a9 100644 --- a/control/package.json +++ b/control/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "@ceralive/modem-control", - "version": "1.0.0", + "version": "1.1.0", "type": "module", "description": "Cellular modem control for CeraLive — ModemManager D-Bus backend, NetworkManager adapter, desired-state reconciler, USB composition-mode model, data-usage sampler.", "license": "AGPL-3.0", diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 1daa9e9..cddba03 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "name": "modem-stack", - "version": "0.1.0", + "version": "1.1.0", "private": true, "type": "module", "description": "Cellular modem control for CeraLive — @ceralive/modem-control library, bench CLI, and ModemManager-stack .deb packaging (Phase A, standalone).",